CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner has promoted maritime security programs tirelessly since the days following 9/1l. One of them, the Container Security Initiative, or CSI—now operational at 37 ports around the world—has become the international gold standard for securing maritime cargo by scrutinizing containers at their point of departure.

Photo Credit: Gerald Nino

The port of Gothenburg, Sweden, joined the Container Security Initiative in May 2003.

Dimensions of the problem

Currently, almost 90 percent of international commerce moves by sea container, and the number of containers is on the rise. According to the World Shipping Council, more than a 100 million containers crisscross international sea lanes each year. Ocean-going cargo ships carry up to 8,000 containers at a time, each the size of a small apartment, stacked dozens of stories high.

In fiscal year 2004, almost 10 million sea containers entered the United States, nearly a million more than in FY '03, and 2 million more than entered in FY '02. The number of trade entries that CBP processed over the eight years from FY 1996 through FY 2004 increased 75 percent (16 million in FY ’96 to 28 million in FY ‘04). CBP’s automated commercial-trade calculations predict continued growth of about 7 percent a year and estimate that the number of vessel containers in circulation will increase about 14 percent a year.

This growth in maritime commerce represents economic prosperity to WCO members, but to terrorists, it may be seen as a window of opportunity: seemingly limitless numbers of places to hide weapons. Terrorists understand the cold reality that among all this traffic, it only takes one: al Qaeda could smuggle a single crude nuclear device inside any one of the almost 27,000 sea containers that arrive in the United States each day.

CSI: closing the window

In January 2002, Commissioner Bonner unveiled a maritime security program based upon the old military strategy of extending the security perimeter outward, to manage potential threats before they reach our seaports. CBP officers would go abroad to screen and target containers with their customs counterparts at ports of export, making America’s borders the last line of defense, not the first. CBP officers would conduct security screening and targeting, with host-country customs officials retaining the right and authority to examine containers targeted as high-risk.

This program was the Container Security Initiative.

CSI consists of four core elements, all of which depend upon up-to-the-minute technology:

• Computerized intelligence, manifest and other automated information is used to identify containers that pose a risk for terrorism;
• Pre-screening at the port of departure of containers that pose a risk;
• Non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology, like gamma- and X-ray machines, are used to examine containers that pose a risk, and;
• “Smart boxes,” or tamper-evident containers are used to ship cargo.

CSI was launched initially at 20 of the ports that ship the highest volume of sea containers to the United States. These 20 ports account for two-thirds of all maritime containers shipped to the U.S. By July 2005, 37 ports had become operational.

Acting as one

CSI’s effectiveness depends upon the participation of our trading partners, so from the moment of its announcement in 2002, Commissioner Bonner lobbied vigorously for their endorsement. His efforts reflected his vision for maritime cargo security: if widely implemented, CSI would mean that for the first time, nations were locking arms, acting in concert against maritime terrorism. Clearly, in the face of international terrorism, governments working together could achieve far greater security, and more effectively reduce their risks, than those that tried to do so independently.

If U.S. and host-government’s customs officials have cleared a shipment at the port of export, it will get expedited processing and release upon arriving in the United States. This gets importers’ goods to American markets more quickly and lets CBP officers spend their time on high-risk shipments that have not been prescreened.

Looking to the future

CSI is now in its expansion phase. To be an eligible CSI port, candidate nations must have in place minimum standards of infrastructure and technology, which include:

• Availability and utilization of NII and radiation-detection equipment to inspect cargo;
• Commitment to establishing an automated risk-management system that can identify potential high-risk containers, validate threat assessments and substantiate why certain containers have been selected for examination;
• Willingness and ability to share critical data, intelligence and risk-management information with CBP and, if necessary, development of an automated mechanism for these exchanges;
• Thorough assessment and addressing a port’s infrastructure vulnerabilities; and
• Maintaining employee integrity programs to identify and combat security or integrity violations (e.g., to prevent internal conspiracies).

Even with 37 ports on board, CSI is still a revolutionary method of securing international maritime cargo. CBP officers are needed on-site for training, observation, assistance—in a phrase, capacity building. But as our foreign partners adjust to CSI’s procedures, methods and goals, CBP officers will be able to manage screening and targeting activities from a centralized location in the United States.

That CSI has spread to seaports on all continents of the globe demonstrates, as does WCO’s Framework of Standards, that nations can eliminate mutual threats and solve common problems. LW