No. 99-898
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
DAVID W. OGDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MARK B. STERN
STEPHANIE R. MARCUS
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Sections 402 and 403 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1612 and 1613 (Supp. IV 1998), which
restrict the eligibility of aliens for federal public assistance programs,
contravene the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 99-898
CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-21a) is reported at 189
F.3d 598. The order of the district court (Pet. App. 22a-47a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on August 31, 1999. The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on November 26, 1999. This Court's
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. This case presents an equal-protection challenge to Sections 402 and
403 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA or Act), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2262-2265, 8 U.S.C.
1612, 1613 (Supp. IV 1998). The provisions at issue restrict the eligibility
of aliens for federal public assistance programs, including the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, 42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.; the food stamp program,
7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.; the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
program, 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.; and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.1
These restrictions are intended to implement Congress's "national policy
with respect to welfare and immigration," stated in the text of the
Act, especially the policy of "[s]elf-sufficiency," which has
been "a basic principle of United States immigration law since this
country's earliest immigration statutes." 8 U.S.C. 1601(1) (Supp. IV
1998). Congress further stated that
[i]t continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that-
(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to
meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the resources
of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and
(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for
immigration to the United States.
8 U.S.C. 1601(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
"Despite the principle of self-sufficiency," Congress concluded,
"aliens have been applying for and receiving public benefits from Federal,
State, and local governments at increasing rates," and "[c]urrent
eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable financial support
agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens
not burden the public benefits system." 8 U.S.C. 1601(3) and (4) (Supp.
IV 1998). Congress therefore found that there are "compelling government
interest[s]" in "enact[ing] new rules for eligibility and sponsorship
agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance
with national immigration policy," and in "remov[ing] the incentive
for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits."
8 U.S.C. 1601(5) and (6) (Supp. IV 1998).
In accordance with these policy statements, the Act restricts the eligibility
of aliens for specified federal benefit programs. Under Section 401 of the
Act, any alien who is not a "qualified alien" is generally ineligible
for "any Federal public benefit." 8 U.S.C. 1611(a) (Supp. IV 1998).2
Section 402(a) of the Act provides that a "qualified alien" is
generally ineligible for "any specified Federal program," which
term encompasses the SSI and federal food stamp programs. 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(1)
and (3) (Supp. IV 1998). Section 403(a) of the Act provides that a qualified
alien who enters the United States on or after August 22, 1996, generally
"is not eligible for any Federal means-tested public benefit for a
period of 5 years beginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United
States with a status within the meaning of the term 'qualified alien.'"
8 U.S.C. 1613(a) (Supp. IV 1998). "Federal means-tested public benefits"
include TANF and Medicaid. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,257 (1997).3
Although the Act renders many aliens ineligible for federal assistance programs,
Congress has also legislated several exceptions to that general rule. Benefits
remain available to a qualified alien "lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence" who "has worked" or "can
be credited" with "40 qualifying quarters of coverage as defined
under title II of the Social Security Act." 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(B)
and (b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). Benefits also remain available to a qualified
alien who is a veteran with an honorable discharge who fulfills the minimum
active duty-service requirements, an active-duty service member, or the
spouse or the unmarried dependent child of such a veteran or active-duty
service member. 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(C) and (b)(2)(C), 1613(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1998). Disabled and blind qualified aliens lawfully residing in the United
States on August 22, 1996, and qualified aliens lawfully residing in the
United States who were receiving SSI benefits on August 22, 1996, remain
eligible for SSI benefits. 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(E) and (F) (Supp. IV 1998).4
Congress has also enacted legislation making the following qualified aliens
eligible for food stamps, effective November 1, 1998: (1) disabled and blind
aliens lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996; (2) aliens
who, on August 22, 1996, were lawfully residing in the United States and
were at least 65 years old; and (3) children currently under 18 years old
who were lawfully residing in the United States on August 22, 1996. 8 U.S.C.
1612(a)(2)(F), (I) and (J) (Supp. IV 1998).
2. Petitioners filed suit in district court, alleging that the Act's restrictions
on the eligibility of lawful permanent resident aliens for federal benefits
violate constitutional principles of equal protection. The district court
dismissed the complaints. Pet. App. 22a-47a. Following this Court's decision
in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976), the district court upheld the
restrictions on the ground that they are rationally related to legitimate
governmental interests. See Pet. App. 44a-46a.
3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-21a. Like the district court,
the court of appeals determined that the constitutionality of the challenged
restrictions should be examined under the rational-basis standard set forth
in Diaz. Id. at 8a-12a. The court rejected petitioners' reliance on Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), which held that a state statute denying
welfare benefits to a class of resident aliens should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny. The court of appeals noted that this Court in Graham "devoted
several paragraphs of its opinion to distinguishing between state authority
to make alienage-based classifications and federal authority to do so,"
Pet. App. 8a, and that Diaz also distinguished Graham "and explained
that state and federal alienage classifications must be treated differently
because of Congress' plenary authority to regulate the conditions of entry
and residence of aliens," id. at 9a. That difference in the applicable
standard of review, the court continued (id. at 10a), was not called into
question by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
which held that state and federal racial classifications are both subject
to strict scrutiny. The court observed (Pet. App. 10a) that "Adarand
itself acknowledged an exception to [the] general rule" requiring the
same level of scrutiny for state and federal classifications "for cases
in which special deference to the political branches of the federal government
is appropriate," and also that Adarand cited (see 515 U.S. at 217-218)
for that proposition Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), a case
involving federal exercise of the immigration power.
The court then upheld the challenged restrictions under the rational basis
standard. Pet. App. 13a-21a. The court observed that the Act's restrictions
on alien eligibility for federal public benefits are rationally related
to several legitimate governmental purposes: encouraging aliens to rely
on their own resources and those of their families, sponsors and private
organizations, rather than the public fisc (id. at 15a); removing a possible
incentive to immigrate in order to obtain welfare benefits (id. at 16a);
reducing the escalating cost of funding federal benefits programs (id. at
16a-17a); and encouraging noncitizens to naturalize (id. at 17a-18a).5 The
court acknowledged that the Act's restrictions might be overinclusive with
respect to some of those legitimate interests (id. at 16a, 17a-18a), but,
it emphasized, "rational basis scrutiny does not require a perfect
fit between [the] legitimate governmental purpose and the means chosen to
achieve it." Id. at 18a. The court also found no merit to petitioners'
suggestion that the Act's restrictions were motivated by animus toward noncitizens.
Id. at 18a-19a.
The court noted that the Act "contains a number of exceptions to its
general exclusion of aliens from the welfare programs," but, it continued,
those exceptions do not detract from "the rationality of the overall
statutory scheme." Pet. App. 19a. Several of the exceptions "extend
benefits to aliens who have made special contributions to this Country,"
ibid., and other exceptions "ensure benefits to individuals who have
sought refuge in this Country because of especially difficult conditions
in their own countries," id. at 20a. "No doubt," the court
remarked, "there is some question whether Congress included within
the excepted class all those who should have been included. Drawing such
lines, however, is a legislative task for Congress." Ibid.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the PRWORA's restrictions
on the eligibility of aliens for federal public benefits comport with constitutional
principles of equal protection. That decision also does not conflict with
any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals. Further review
is therefore not warranted.
1. The PRWORA's restrictions on the eligibility of certain classes of aliens
for federal assistance represent a permissible exercise of Congress's constitutional
authority over aliens. This Court has emphasized that Congress has broad
power to draw distinctions on the basis of alienage. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80, 85 (1976). "For reasons long recognized
as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political
branches of the Federal Government." Id. at 81. "Since decisions
in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since
a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing
political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a
character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than
to the Judiciary." Ibid. Thus, the Court will uphold congressional
classifications affecting aliens as long as they are not "wholly irrational."
Id. at 83.
As the court of appeals recognized (Pet. App. 9a), Diaz is of particular
relevance to this case. In Diaz, the Court rejected an equal-protection
challenge to federal legislation that required aliens to be lawfully admitted
for permanent residence and to reside in the United States for at least
five years to qualify for certain Medicare benefits. 426 U.S. at 69-70.
The Court sustained that restriction in light of Congress's broad power
to regulate in the fields of immigration and naturalization. See id. at
78-84. The Court emphasized that "Congress has no constitutional duty
to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens[.]"
Id. at 82. And the Court made clear that it is for Congress to determine
which subgroups of aliens should receive "a share in the bounty that
a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens[.]" Id.
at 80.
The Court assumed in Diaz that "the five-year line drawn by Congress
[was] longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the [Medicare]
program," and that "unnecessary hardship is incurred by persons
just short of qualifying." 426 U.S. at 83. The Court stressed, however,
that "[t]he task of classifying persons for medical benefits, like
the task of drawing lines for federal tax purposes, inevitably requires
that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment
be placed on different sides of the line," and "the differences
between the eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree rather
than differences in the character of their respective claims." Id.
at 83-84. "When this kind of policy choice must be made," the
Court stated, "we are especially reluctant to question the exercise
of congressional judgment." Id. at 84. Because neither of the requirements
imposed by Congress was "wholly irrational," id. at 83, the Court
sustained the legislation.
The court of appeals in this case therefore properly relied on Diaz when
it applied the rational-basis standard to examine petitioners' equal-protection
claim. Pet. App. 8a-12a. And, as the court properly determined (id. at 13a-18a),
the challenged provisions of the Act are consistent with equal-protection
principles, because they further several legitimate governmental interests:
encouraging aliens to rely on their own resources and those of their families,
sponsors and private organizations; reducing the costs of federal welfare
programs; providing an incentive for aliens to become citizens; and removing
a possible incentive to immigrate to the United States in order to obtain
welfare benefits. The court of appeals therefore correctly upheld the challenged
restrictions under a straightforward application of Diaz.
2. Petitioners argue, however, that Diaz does not enunciate the proper standard
for review of the challenged provisions of the Act. They maintain that the
Act's restrictions should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, as this Court
subjected a state restriction on aliens' eligibility for welfare benefits
to heightened scrutiny in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Petitioners
contend that decisions after Diaz, notably Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), require the courts to apply the same standard
of review to state and federal classifications of aliens, at least outside
the context of admission and exclusion (Pet. 10-11); that the highly deferential
standard articulated and applied in Diaz properly governs only congressional
decisions concerning the admission and exclusion of aliens (Pet. 12); and
that Diaz should be limited to its facts, as a case upholding a restriction
to ensure the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program (Pet. 13-15). Those
arguments are without merit.
a. As an initial matter, the Court in Graham clearly limited its holding
to state legislation. See 403 U.S. at 376 (holding that "a state statute
that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens" is unconstitutional);
Pet. App. 8a. Indeed, one of the rationales in Graham for invalidating the
state laws at issue was the federal government's exclusive authority over
the regulation of immigration and naturalization. 403 U.S. at 377-380. As
the Court explained, the state laws "conflict[ed] with the[] overriding
national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government."
Id. at 378. That conflict rendered the state statutes unconstitutional:
"Since such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, they are constitutionally
impermissible." Id. at 380.
Further, in Diaz, which was decided after Graham, the Court made clear that
federal legislation regulating benefits received by aliens after they have
arrived in the United States is not subject to strict scrutiny. See 426
U.S. at 81-83. In so holding, the Court expressly distinguished Graham,
explaining that the equal protection analysis in cases like Graham "involves
singificantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship
between aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal
Government." Id. at 84-85. The Court explained that, while there is
little basis for a State to distinguish between persons who are citizens
of another State from those who are citizens of another country, "a
comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally
legitimate part of its business." Id. at 85. See also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
The Court's decision in Adarand did not change the standard of review applicable
to federal legislation governing aliens. Petitioners argue that, under Adarand,
the test for determining whether a statutory classification deprives a person
of equal protection must be the same whether the classification is based
in state or federal legislation. But Adarand did not involve immigration
matters, nor did it involve classifications drawn between citizens and aliens
or among classes of aliens. Moreover, in Adarand, the Court specifically
recognized the "special deference" due to the political branches
in cases involving federal authority over immigration matters, 515 U.S.
at 217-218, and acknowledged an exception to the rule requiring the same
standard of review for state and federal legislation where such special
deference is appropriate, id. at 218; see Pet. App. 10a. Nothing in Adarand
suggests that the Court was overruling its prior holding in Diaz.6
b. Nor has this Court suggested that the deferential standard applied in
Diaz to federal legislation is limited to decisions concerning the initial
admission and exclusion of aliens. To the contrary, the Court has stressed
that "[t]he National Government has broad constitutional powers in
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period
they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and
the terms and conditions of their naturalization." Graham, 403 U.S.
at 377 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). Congress's
restrictions on aliens' eligibility for federal public benefits are properly
viewed as a regulation of aliens' conduct in the United States. Congress
declared that the national policy of immigration favors self-sufficiency
on the part of aliens, which is obviously an aspect of the aliens' conduct
while in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. 1601(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The restrictions
may also be viewed as encouraging naturalization and discouraging immigration
for the purpose of obtaining public benefits, see Pet. App. 17a, both of
which are interests directly implicated in federal regulation of immigration
and naturalization.7
c. Petitioners acknowledge that, in Diaz, this Court "relied on federal
immigration powers to uphold legislation affecting no one's immigration
status," but they attempt to distinguish Diaz on the ground that it
involved a durational residence requirement for obtaining benefits under
Medicare, which is an insurance program. Pet. 8. Petitioners argue that
"[i]t is only appropriate-and actuarially sound-to require noncitizens
to reside in this country and contribute to the program for some substantial
period before they may receive the benefits of this insurance fund."
Ibid. On that basis, petitioners claim that "Diaz should not be understood
to rest on the federal immigration power, but rather on the long-settled
rule that certain benefits can be denied to noncitizens when there is a
'special public interest' that demands that such benefits not be made available
to citizens and noncitizens on an equal footing." Ibid.
Petitioners misread Diaz. The central issue in Diaz was not what type of
benefit program was at issue, but whether Congress's broad power over immigration
matters was implicated. See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81-83. Moreover, petitioners'
argument is at odds with the repeated references in Diaz to "welfare
benefits" generally, as opposed to insurance programs in particular.
See id. at 80, 81 n.20, 82, 84-85. The Court also emphasized Congress's
power to distinguish between citizens and aliens (id. at 78-81), and noted
that the deference owed to Congress's decisions on immigration matters "dictate[s]
a narrow standard of review." Id. at 82. That principle of deference
"has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government." Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-793 n.4 (1977).
3. The decision below is consistent with the only decision of another court
of appeals that has addressed the restrictions in the PRWORA on alien eligibility
for federal public assistance benefits. See Rodriguez v. United States,
169 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999).8 In Rodriguez, the court applied rational-basis
review, relying squarely on Diaz (id. at 1346-1350), and also upheld the
Act under that standard of review (id. at 1350-1352). The court also rejected
the contention that the PRWORA reflects animus toward aliens (id. at 1352-1353).
That decision is consistent with the decision of the court of appeals in
this case. Further review is therefore not warranted.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
DAVID W. OGDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MARK B. STERN
STEPHANIE R. MARCUS
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 2000
1 The Act sets forth several exceptions to that general exclusion. In particular,
it makes clear that aliens are not made ineligible for numerous programs,
such as the national school lunch program (see 42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.),
assistance under the Child Nutrition Act (see 42 U.S.C. 1771 et seq.), and
federally funded immunization programs. See 8 U.S.C. 1613(c)(2) (Supp. IV
1998). See also pp. 4-5, infra (noting programs for which some classes of
aliens remain eligible).
2 The Act defines "qualified alien" to refer principally to aliens
who are lawful permanent resident aliens, and also certain aliens who have
been granted forms of relief such as asylum, withholding of deportation,
and parole based on urgent humanitarian needs. See 8 U.S.C. 1641(b) (Supp.
IV 1998). The restrictions on the receipt of federal benefits by aliens
who are not "qualified aliens" are not at issue here. See Pet.
App. 3a n.3.
3 Apart from the five-year restriction covering qualified aliens who entered
the United States on or after August 22, 1996, the States are "authorized
to determine the eligibility" of qualified aliens "for any designated
Federal program[s]," including TANF and Medicaid. 8 U.S.C. 1612(b)(1)
and (3) (Supp. IV 1998).
4 Nonqualified aliens who were receiving SSI on August 22, 1996, also remain
eligible for SSI. 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
5 The court of appeals observed (Pet. App. 17a) that the policy of encouraging
aliens to naturalize is not expressly set forth in Congress's statement
of policies in the PRWORA, but it nonetheless accepted that policy as legitimate
and found it rationally related to the Act's restrictions on alien eligibility
for benefits.
6 Nor, contrary to the suggestion of petitioners (Pet. 11), does Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), require a different result. In Saenz, the Court
stated that "Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 507. In enacting restrictions on aliens' eligibility
for federal benefits (even those administered by the States), Congress does
not authorize the States to violate the Amendment; rather, Congress exercises
its own constitutionally assigned responsibility governing the conduct of
aliens in the United States. A deferential level of scrutiny is appropriate
to congressional classifications affecting aliens because the text and structure
of the Constitution place primary responsibility for regulating the conduct
of aliens in the United States in Congress. Petitioners point out (Pet.
11) that the Court in Graham also stated that "Congress does not have
the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause." 403 U.S. at 382. Graham did not hold, however, that Congress
would not have had the authority to enact or authorize the state welfare
restriction challenged in that case; it held, rather, that in light of what
it regarded at the time as the serious constitutional questions that would
be presented by such a holding, the Court would not construe the applicable
federal statute to authorize those restrictions. See ibid. In this case,
it is undisputed that the pertinent federal statutes do restrict the eligibility
of aliens for public assistance benefits. The Court's decision in Diaz,
which followed Graham, made clear that the standards governing judicial
scrutiny of federal legislation affecting aliens are more deferential than
those controlling judicial review of state legislation.
7 Petitioners rely (Pet. 7, 12, 15) on De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355
(1976), but that reliance is misplaced. In De Canas, the Court held that
a state law that prohibited employers from knowingly employing illegal aliens
"if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident
workers" was not prohibited state regulation of immigration, and was
not preempted by federal law. Id. at 352-365. As the Court explained, although
the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively
a federal power," that does not mean that "every state enactment
which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus
per se pre-empted by this constitutional power[.]" Id. at 354-355.
Because the challenged state law was consistent with federal immigration
law, the Court stated, "absent congressional action," it was not
"an invalid state incursion on federal power." Id. at 356. Thus,
De Canas stands only for the proposition that courts will not automatically
strike down every state statute that adversely affects some group of aliens,
if there is no conflict between the state and federal law. De Canas does
not suggest that the federal government's extensive power over aliens is
limited to the power to make decisions about who should be permitted to
immigrate.
8 Most district courts that have considered the issue have also upheld the
restrictions on alien eligibility in the Act, as petitioners acknowledge
(Pet. 16). A district court recently invalidated the Act insofar as it denies
Medicaid coverage for prenatal medical care to otherwise eligible pregnant
aliens, but it did so on the ground that the Act supposedly distinguishes
among United States citizens (the children of the pregnant aliens) based
on the alienage or citizenship status of their mothers. See Lewis v. Grinker,
No. CV-79-1740 (CPS) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2000), slip op. 71-85.