STATEMENT OF
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE DEANELL
REECE TACHA
CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
BEFORE THE
SECOND NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE
JULY 17, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and
offer my views on the pressing need for salary improvement for the federal
judiciary. It is an honor as well as a pleasure to appear before
this knowledgeable Commission.
I want to begin by offering a brief snapshot of
the federal judiciary. Since I was appointed to the bench in 1986,
the workload for appellate judges has gone in an upward trajectory.
In 1986, there were 34,292 appellate cases filed. In 2001, 57,464
appellate cases were filed. As a result, the workload per authorized
three judge panel increased from 659 in 1986 to 1,032 in 2001. This
represents an increase of over 50 percent. The workload for district
judges has increased as well. These caseload statistics become even
more startling when one considers not just the number of cases, but their
character. Most civil cases filed in federal courts are complex and
protracted. They can drag on for years, and involve a judge in the
most complex analyses of entire industries in an effort to apply the law.
With rapid technological changes occurring in business and everyday life,
cases which require considerable scientific and technical sophistication
have become not the exception, but the rule. The very best legal
minds are necessary for their adjudication. Many cases also involve
complex questions of standing, class actions, exhaustion, statutes of limitation,
choices of remedy, and attorney’s fees. Moreover, federal judges
must meet deadlines provided for under the Speedy Trial Act, as well as
comply with a range of procedures required by the Sentencing Reform Act
in applying the Sentencing Guidelines.
In 1979, Judge Irving Kaufman, the first chair
of the Committee on the Judicial Branch, wrote:
The roll call of causes dealt with by the judiciary
sounds like a litany of the most vexing questions in current American political
history: racial discrimination and segregation, school admissions and affirmative
action, busing, free speech and political protest, internal and foreign
security, the rights of criminal defendants, church-state relations from
prayers in public schools to public funding for parochial schools, legislative
reapportionment, obscenity, the draft, abortion, the death penalty, women’s
rights, and ecology. Moreover, the complex subject matter of modern
statutes and Congress’s tendency to legislate by exhortatory generality
have propelled the courts into what may appear to be an unaccustomed regulatory
and quasi-legislative role. Both the pettiest details and the broadest
concepts of government have come within the judicial ambit. Ideally,
the modern judge should be, in the phrase describing Justice Brandeis,
a master of both microscope and telescope.
The point is simple, but important: Our system
of government requires that federal judges, because of the seriousness
of the questions presented, be highly qualified lawyers and that they operate
free from extraneous influences.
Yet, as chair of the Judicial Branch Committee,
I see letters from judges across the country stating that the discharge
of the judicial office is becoming increasingly difficult for them.
The reason: financial pressures and constant worry over them.
I am not here today to document to you the specific extent to which judges’
real disposable income has declined in the last ten years or even the last
thirty years. Justice Stephen Breyer and Administrative Office Director
Leonidas Ralph Mecham have ably prepared a thorough statistical overview.
My focus today is on the Constitution.
You have been told that a district judge
now makes 25 percent less than the real income earned by a district judge
in 1969; you have been told that, at current levels of inflation, it would
require an adjustment of $37,500 to return the district judge salary to
the 1969 level. The entire budget of the Third Branch is less than
one-half of one percent of the total federal budget. If judicial
salaries were increased by 25 percent, I believe that the Third Branch
budget would still be less than one-half of one percent of the federal
budget. I am sure that you and your staff will give the Consumer
Price Index and the Employment Cost Index, as well as statistical pay comparability
data the credence they deserve.
My concern is both more general than those
statistics and more specific. It is more general because this is
part of a problem with implications beyond next year’s level of judicial
salaries. It is more specific because there is emerging a trend whose
damage is more severe, and more immediate, than anything I have seen in
all my years on the federal bench. In his 2000 year-end report on
the federal judiciary, the Chief Justice stated that he considers the need
for increased pay to be “the most pressing issue facing the Judiciary.”
The letters from judges spell out their worries and concerns about families,
children’s education, and so many related matters. These letters
are deeply disturbing and evidence an unease rooted in compensation, but
whose implications go deeper.
Recently, an Article III judge wrote to Director
Mecham stating:
[H]ad I remained [a state] Appellate Court Judge,
I could have retired a year and one-half ago, upon reaching age 60, at
a pension only 15% less than our present federal salary with an automatic
3% increase per year. And there is no comparison in the state judiciary
to the complexity of cases in the federal system.
One former magistrate judge, John Carroll, wrote
to me about his tenure on the bench stating:
Most of us entered the judiciary in mid-life
anticipating a career in judicial service. Most of us also expected
that there would be a coherent system for raises that could serve as the
basis for some financial planning. The system we encountered was
just the opposite. There was absolutely no way of knowing from year
to year whether we would get a raise. In fact, in many years we did
not. This financial uncertainty, the inability to anticipate even
a cost of living increase, was demeaning and disruptive.
Judge Carroll did resign and became the Dean of the Cumberland
School of Law at Samford University in Birmingham, Alabama.
As Mr. Mecham’s written submission to the Commission
illustrates, Judge Carroll’s views are not unique. What underlies
these letters are feelings of betrayal and abandonment. The most
profound cause of these feelings is Presidential and congressional inaction
with respect to salaries. These letters, once more, are frank:
“[m]y compensation as a Federal Magistrate Judge has failed to keep pace
with inflation and accordingly I have lost purchasing power over the past
years on the bench.”
In 1985, former federal Judge Fred Shannon shared
the following thoughts on the problem of judicial compensation with the
Judicial Compensation Task Force of the Quadrennial Commission on Executive
, Legislative and Judicial Compensation:
We expect our judges to have superior intellectual
ability, to be learned in the law and to know and evenhandedly apply the
principles of equity. We demand that they reason carefully and fully
and articulate fluently and in writing the bases for their decisions.
We require that they be patient and courteous and accord to every lawyer
and litigant the respect and dignity to which each is entitled, and even
beyond, so that we the people respect our judiciary and trust it to dispense
true and equal justice. In order to insure that our judges remain
faithful to their impartial role, we have prevented them from supplementing
their income in any way other than by passive investment or by writing
or speaking on subjects that will promote a better understanding of the
judicial system and the legal profession. And yet, their compensation
is simply not comparable to what people of their stature and with their
responsibility would earn in the private sector. Clearly our expectations
and demands are out of balance with the remuneration we offer. Drastic
positive adjustment is necessary in order that our demands and expectations
can continue to be realized for the benefit of ourselves as a nation governed
by the rule of law.
I submit that Judge Shannon’s observations are as true today
as they were in 1985.
I believe a great debt of thanks is owed
to those men and women who now serve in the federal judiciary, for the
sacrifices they are making are wholly unselfish and benefit others to the
judges’ personal financial disadvantage. Still, it is wrong for our
nation to exact such a steep price for public service. Rather than
a reward for selflessness, we are imposing a penalty, and it is becoming
detrimental to the system.
As a result of salary neglect, judges are
leaving the bench in unprecedented numbers. Between 1958 and 1969, three
Article III judges resigned from office. In the 1970's, just as inflation
started to erode the real income of judges at an alarming rate, 22 judges
left the bench. In the 1980's, no less than 41 left the bench.
By the end of the 1990's, that number rose to 55. Eighteen more Article
III judges have resigned or retired from judicial service since 2000.
We are losing many of our most experienced jurists. They are leaving
the bench in growing numbers for the lucrative world of private dispute
resolution (where they can charge up to $7,000 a day for their services)
or are returning to private practice. I do not mean to imply that
every one of them has resigned solely because of inadequate compensation;
I do not know that. But it is in the mind of each, and I add quickly,
in the mind of every federal judge who remains. To those who argue
that the lines of applicants for vacant judgeships continue to be lengthy,
I would respond that the number of exceptional judges leaving the bench
is growing at a greater rate.
As I stated earlier, my focus as a judge
is on the Constitution. The relationship between compensation and
the independence of the judiciary is well established. The Founders
wrote the Compensation Clause in order to help ensure “complete independence
of the courts of justice.” One of the grievances against George III
listed in the Declaration of Independence was: “He has made Judges dependent
on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.” Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 79,
stated:
In the general course of human nature, a power
over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we
can never hope to see realized in practice the complete separation of the
Judicial from the Legislative power, in any system, which leaves the former
dependent of pecuniary resource on the occasional grants of the latter.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 understood that the judiciary would require persons "of the first
talents" and that to attract them the pay would have to be substantial.
In setting levels of judicial compensation,
I believe the framers intended to make judges independent of influence
but not independently wealthy. This is in the interest of the public,
not the judge. I am afraid that today’s eroding federal judicial
salary will lead, sooner or later, to less competent judges and ultimately
to inferior adjudication. The function of our courts as the guardians
of the Constitution will be undermined.
I hope my comments to the Commission have
been helpful. I come to you not as one primarily telling you to recommend
more money, but as one suggesting to you that the judges we have are worth
keeping. In closing, I hope that you will consider the following:
(1) Is the current judicial salary fair; (2) Does it aid in maintaining
judicial independence; and (3) Does the current judicial salary-fixing
process improve and not diminish the Third Branch of government?
I hope that you will agree that our nation must remain committed to recruiting
and retaining the highest quality lawyers for its judicial system.
Our nation's judiciary enjoys a proud tradition, distinguished by intellectual
ability and dedication to public service.