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REVOLUTION IN SERBIA -- (Senate - October 06, 2000)

[Page: S10050]  GPO's PDF

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   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have had many debates on the floor of the Senate, genuinely heartfelt debates about the role of the United States of America in the world and the use of American force in the world.

   We have had a split in this body between the parties, and within the parties, about whether or not it is appropriate for the United States to take a leadership role in Europe, including, on occasion, the use of force to promote our national interest and that of our allies.

   There are several political cancers that exist in various parts of the world. And the one remaining cancer on the continent of Europe--the primary one--is Slobodan Milosevic.

   I suggest that we all take a lesson from what is going on now in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--in Serbia. Many of us, Democrat and Republican, have argued--myself; Senator MCCAIN; Senator LIEBERMAN; Senator Dole, when he was here--that the United States had an obligation, in its own self-interest and in the interest of our allies, and in the interest of humanity, to intervene, to stop the genocide and the ethnic cleansing that was being perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic's vile nationalism.

   I have been arguing for some time now that, absent our involvement in that region of the world, there would be chaos in, if not the heart, then the belly of Europe, and that if we acted with dispatch--swiftly and with resolve, and a willingness not to back away--Slobodan Milosevic, as with most thugs, would be stopped and would be eliminated.

   Some have said on this floor, and some will say in the various Presidential and Senatorial and House campaigns that are going on, that we did not have an exit strategy when we committed American forces in Kosovo or American forces in Bosnia. Some will say that we have not succeeded because all is not tranquil, and if we were to withdraw American forces, things would revert to the chaos that existed before, and that this serves as proof that what we had done had not worked. The press and others declared early on in the bombing campaign in Kosovo--3 days into the 70-some day campaign--that it was a failure.

   I am told, time and again, by some of my colleagues on the floor and I have read some pundits who state that, in fact, the American people are not patient, that they want instant results.

   I say this. The end of Slobodan Milosevic is evidence of a number of things. One, our involvement was not only positive and good and successful, it was absolutely necessary. Without the leadership of the United States of America, I respectfully suggest our European allies would not have been as aggressive, they would not have been as united, and they would not have been as resolved.

   Second, I hope we take a lesson from this as well to demonstrate that the American people have a great deal more patience and wisdom than we give them credit for. I have not heard, nor have I heard anyone else tell me that, while they have been home in the last 4 years, they have been told, as they walked from the grocery store, or to the drugstore, or home, that it is urgent we withdraw American forces from the Balkans.

   Quite frankly, the opposite has occurred. The American people intuitively knew this was a place where wars have started before, this was a place where if chaos reigned it could not be contained, this was a place where a man such as Slobodan Milosevic could do nothing but ultimately harm the interest of Europe

[Page: S10051]  GPO's PDF
and the United States. They were resolved, and they are resolved, to keep American forces in that area to maintain the peace and security of the region, along with our allies.

   I might add, parenthetically, that we make up only, roughly, 7,000 of the nearly 41,000 troops that are in Kosovo, and that, in fact, we are doing the Lord's work there. It is kind of

   interesting that, in the six or seven trips I have made to the region--the last one being a trip to Kosovo--after I came back I remember having discussions here on the floor, and I would hear about how down the morale was of the American forces and how circumspect they were about whether we should be involved.

   That is not what I found, whether it was at Camp McGovern in Bosnia several years ago or at Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo last year. What I found was that these young women and men knew exactly why they were there. They knew why they were there. They did not have to be told. And they felt good about it. They knew they were doing the Lord's work. They understood. They understood there was a purpose and meaning for being there. All they had to do was ride through the streets and they understood it. It is interesting that the retention rate and reenlistment rate is higher for those who have been in Kosovo or Bosnia than for any other segment of the military.

   So I would argue that what is happening in Yugoslavia now is making a lie of some of the assertions that were taken for granted around this place by a majority of the people on the floor, as well as a majority of the press, as well as a majority of the people who are so-called pundits.

   This is the point I want to make.

   We should not now, at this moment, change policy. Slobodan Milosevic is a war criminal. We should not, as former Secretary Eagleburger--a man for whom I have great respect--said yesterday on television, accommodate his departure from Serbia by winking and nodding and essentially letting him off the hook on the War Crimes Tribunal. We should not do that.

   The newly elected President of Serbia, Vojislav Kostunica, is a lot of things that are good. But his record shows that he is also a fierce nationalist.

   We should lift sanctions, but only when Milosevic goes. But again, just a word of caution, we should not lift all sanctions until we are clear that the new leadership in Serbia, in Belgrade, will honor the Dayton accords and will not use force in Kosovo. This is no time to relent. None--none--of us should relent now.

   We have been right so far. A steady course, firm hand, U.S. power, U.S. leadership, and U.S. resolve have brought us this far. Without it, none of what has happened would be, in fact, what the history books will write about 2, 5, 10, and 20 years from now. History will record that what we did was the right thing to do from a moral standpoint, and, even more importantly, in a Machiavellian sense, right for the national interests of the United States, and essential for any prospect of long-term peace and security in Europe.

   I said a week ago that Milosevic could not be sustained, no matter what he did from this point on. The tides of history have moved. We saw it some years ago in Bulgaria. We saw it in Romania. We saw it occur again in Croatia. We saw it again in Bosnia. And we now see it in Serbia. For the first time in modern European history, there is a prospect--a serious prospect--that the Balkans will be integrated into Europe as a whole.

   I can think of no more significant foreign policy initiative that this Government has taken since the Berlin Wall came down that has been so clearly vindicated--so clearly vindicated. So now is not the time to take an easy road out. Lift sanctions partially, make it clear to the Serbian people that we love them--our fight was never with them; they are a noble people--but I think we should have a steady hand. We are prevailing. The West is prevailing. Yugoslavia, in particular--most people refer to it as Serbia--is about to come into the light of day. We must not now send the wrong signal and let people in Serbia conclude that there is not a price to pay for those who violate, in a massive way, the human rights of their fellow citizens and that we expect the new government to behave in a way consistent with international norms.

   I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.


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