The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is an influential voice in policy here—and abroad.

As Andrew mentioned, this is my last speech as Commissioner of United States Customs and Border Protection, and I can’t think of a more fitting forum to share some thoughts with you before I leave.

9/11 and the Twin Goals
This morning I want to talk to you about the strategy we put in place after 9/11 to secure and facilitate trade and travel, and about what we will need to do to further secure our nation against what is a continuing threat of terrorist attack.

Let me take you back to the beginning—to September 10th, 2001. That was the day I arrived in Washington.

Needless to say, the plans I had made for leading U.S. Customs were dramatically altered on the morning of 9/11.

I immediately realized that—as a border agency—from that day forward U.S. Customs had a national security mission—keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons from getting into our country.

That was the first of two realizations that have guided my tenure as Commissioner.

The second realization came on September 12th and 13th of 2001, when I—all of us—saw the effects of going to Level One Alert—of vastly increasing inspections and security at our borders—at our seaports, and at our land border crossings with Canada and Mexico.

At our land border crossings with Canada, wait times, which averaged 10 to 20 minutes on September 10, 2001, skyrocketed to over 10 to 12 hours by September 12th and 13th.

By Friday, September 14th, automobile plants in Michigan—unable to get just-in-time parts—were beginning to shut down production. I was on the phone continuously during this period with executives of the major automobile manufacturers—GM, Daimler-Chrysler, and Ford.

So, the second realization was: yes, we had to secure our border, but we had to find ways to do so without closing off our borders—without shutting down our economy in the process.

And since 9/11, we have worked to develop—and implement—a “smart border” strategy that accomplished both those objectives. A strategy that better secures the cross border movement of trade and people, but does so in ways that makes that movement more efficient. A strategy that accomplishes the “twin goals” of security and facilitation.

Those twin goals have been the touchstones for the strategy, and all the initiatives we have launched since 9/11.

And in the past 4 years, we have quite literally reinvented our borders, and how they operate. The private sector, too, has had to rethink—with us—how they conduct business in this age of global terrorism.

International trade and travel are no longer just about moving goods and people quickly and inexpensively. In this age of global terrorism, it is about moving goods and people efficiently, but securely.

The Threat Continues
And, the terrorist threat is still with us. It is still very real—as witnessed by the terrorist attacks last week in Jordan. And the attacks in London this past July. And in Madrid on 3/11…and in Instanbul…in Bali…Morocco...Tunisia…

Saudi Arabia…and Djakarta.

All since 9/11. All carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda-associated terrorists groups.

Al Qaeda’s brand of terrorism goes beyond anything we’ve ever seen before.

Like Communism, a threat that dominated much of the 20th Century, global terrorism is, I submit, the greatest threat of the 21st Century.

Al Qaeda’s purpose is clear. They want to revert back and create an idealized Islamic caliphate of 10 centuries ago. And, they want to achieve their goal by asymmetrical warfare, and by severely damaging the U.S. and the global economy.

And, they will go to any lengths to achieve their goals. Killing fellow Muslims. Killing Americans. Killing Brits, Spaniards, Australians, Jordanians…women, children, the elderly, any anyone who crosses their path.

Abu Musab Zarqawi, al Qaeda’s man in Iraq, is exporting his violence beyond the borders of Iraq now into neighboring countries, like Jordan.

And let us not forget that al Qaeda leaders—Bin Laden and al Zawahiri—have warned that they plan to attack the United States again, on our soil, and hit us even harder than 9/11.

Organizing Our Government to Confront a New Threat
After 9/11, one of the most important steps the U.S. government took to increase our national security and combat terrorism was to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and within it, for the first time in our nation’s history, one border agency responsible for securing, managing and controlling America’s borders, U.S. Customs and Border Protection—or CBP.

And, I am proud to have served as the first Commissioner of CBP.

CBP’s budget for this year is $7.1 billion. And, with 42,000 employees, CBP is not only one-fourth of the employees of the Department of Homeland Security, it is the largest honest-to-goodness merger of people and functions that’s taken place in the Department of Homeland Security.

Customs and Border Protection combined the personnel of four different agencies—Customs, Immigration, Agriculture Border Inspectors, and the entire Border Patrol—into one agency with a priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.

With the creation of CBP, now one government agency clears every person, shipment, vehicle and aircraft—everyone and everything—entering the United States and we do it for all purposes—customs, immigration, agriculture protection, and importantly, anti-terrorism.

A merger of all border agencies was actually recommended by seven independent commissions, going back thirty years ago. Unfortunately, it took the terrorist attacks of 9/11—the worst terrorist attack in the history of the world—to make it happen.

The best way to prevent another attack is to prevent the terrorist operatives from getting into the U.S. in the first place. Because, I will tell you, the overwhelming number of al Qaeda are not here. They are not in the United States. They need to get their operatives into the United States, if they are going to be able to attack us in our homeland.

And the priority job of Customs and Border Protection is to prevent that from happening. No agency of our federal government has a more important mission than CBP.

And, let me tell you: CBP is one part of the Department of Homeland Security that is working!

Four hundred ninety-three (493) foreign nationals were refused entry into the U.S. this past Fiscal Year, because they presented multiple terrorist risk factors and their purpose for entering the U. S. was not credible.

U.S. Strategy for Securing Trade and Travel

Two weeks ago, I spoke about CBP’s international cargo security strategy at our Trade Symposium here in Washington. Last week, I spoke to the World Travel Congress in Montreal about CBP’s international traveler security strategy.

The principles of our strategy to secure trade and travel are the same. And, we have made great progress in better securing, and at the same time, facilitating the movement of both goods and people across our borders.

To understand our strategy—and the philosophy behind it—you need to understand how the whole—the entire security strategy—fits together—and how it is greater and stronger than the sum of its parts.

Our strategy is built on five interrelated, interlocking initiatives. Five Pillars, if you will.

The first is advance information about who and what is heading to the U.S. from abroad.

The second is automated targeting—Automated Targeting Systems that we have built at CBP’s National Targeting Center.

Third, the use of sophisticated detection technology and biometrics.

Fourth, partnering with other countries, and

Fifth, partnering with the private sector, through C-TPAT.

Pillar One: Advance Information
The first pillar is advance information.

We require advance electronic information on all cargo being shipped to the U.S. before it arrives at our ports of entry, and we also require advance information on all people before they arrive at U.S. airports from abroad.

For oceangoing cargo containers being shipped to the U.S, that means advance manifest data 24 hours before they are loaded at overseas seaports—on board vessels headed for the U.S.

That is the 24-Hour Rule. It’s been in effect since 2002.

The Trade Act rules extended the advance electronic information requirement to all modes of transportation, including truck, rail, and air.

We have also required—since November 2001—all commercial airlines to provide to CBP advance electronic information on all passengers flying into the U.S. from abroad, which is captured by CBP’s Advance Passenger Information System—APIS.

Pillar Two: National Targeting Center
The second pillar is evaluating that advance information for risk of terrorism.

After 9/11, we knew we needed to do two things that U.S. Customs had never done before:

• We needed to target cargo shipments and travelers that presented a risk for the terrorist threat, and
• We needed to target on a national, rather than a port-by-port basis.

To do this, we built the National Targeting Center (NTC), which stood up in October 2001, and using our Automated Targeting System, we built in targeting or risk assessment rules and algorithms based upon strategic intelligence about the terrorist threat.

At the NTC, CBP evaluates each and every cargo container—100 percent—for terrorist risk before they leave foreign seaports. And we evaluate every passenger flying to the U.S. from abroad shortly after wheels up at, say, Heathrow or Narita, or wherever the flight is originating.

The NTC is also linked to our Passenger Analysis and Cargo Analysis Units at all of our ports of entry. All passengers hit against the Terrorist Watch List, but we also identify passengers who present multiple terrorist risk factors, including, for example, travel patterns associated with terrorist travel. This was one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

And, it is important to note, that the 2nd Pillar—risk targeting for the terrorist threat—was not possible without advance electronic information—the 1st Pillar.

Pillar Three: Technology
The third pillar is detection technology, including use of biometrics.

In June 2002, although little noted, we required all high-risk containers arriving at U.S. ports of entry to be given security inspections, using NII and radiation detection devices.

We needed NII equipment to be able to do this, as well as automated risk targeting for the terrorist threat.

We literally invented the “minimum security inspection”—NII and radiation detection, and required that all “high risk” containers be given a security inspection on arrival.

Why both NII and radiation detection?

Because NII can detect a lot of things, even lead shielded materials, that may not be picked up, even by highly sensitive Radiation Portal Monitors.

Since 9/11, we have quadrupled the number of NII machines at our ports of entry, from about 45 to over 160 now. And, we have deployed over 600 highly sensitive Radiation Portal Monitors at our nation’s ports of entry—to all major land ports of entry, and to more and more of our seaports.

So, you see, before CSI at foreign ports, we instituted a container security regime at our own ports of entry. With our domestic security system in place, we could think about pushing our borders outward—to foreign ports.

For travelers, we now use biometrics—the US VISIT system—to identify whether the person presenting himself at a U.S. port of entry is, in fact, the person issued a visa. We’re also able to run that person against a database of terrorist prints and for major wants and warrants. US VISIT was rolled out to U.S. airports in January 2004, and it is fast, clean and adds to our security without adding to delay in processing of arriving passengers.

We have also vastly improved false and stolen document identification capabilities through our Document Analysis Unit, which is linked to all our ports of entry. All aliens arrested by CBP’s Border Patrol now have their prints bounced against the FBI fingerprint database. That milestone was completed last year by linking the IDENT and IAFIS systems.

Pillar Four: Partnering with other Countries

The next pillar—Pillar Four—partnering with other countries—is best exemplified by the Container Security Initiative—CSI.

Beginning in January 2002, we proposed the Container Security Initiative, where we post CBP officers at foreign seaports. And working with our host countries, we target and inspect high-risk containers before they leave foreign CSI seaports for U.S. seaports.

Our initial goal was implementing CSI at the top 20 largest foreign ports. And we have far exceeded that goal!

CSI is now operational in 41 of the largest container ports of the world—ports like Rotterdam, Hamburg, Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Next month, we will expand CSI to the 42nd port, Lisbon, Portugal.

Although we are still expanding CSI to foreign seaports, we have already built a CSI security network that can recover rapidly from a terrorist attack that uses or impacts on the global supply chain.

Under CSI, high-risk containers receive a security inspection before being loaded onto a vessel destined for the U.S. Once high-risk containers are inspected at CSI ports, they are not ordinarily inspected again upon arrival in the U.S. This means that the containers inspected at CSI ports actually move faster and more predictably through U.S. seaports.

This, again, helps us realize those twin goals: security and facilitation.

Immigration Advisory Program
For passengers, we have a program that is similar to CSI—but it is for travelers—the Immigration Advisory Program—or IAP.

Like CSI, we use our automated targeting system, Terrorist Watch List, and intelligence as to risk factors, so that we are able to identify potential terrorist threats before they board aircraft bound for the United States.

We partner with host nations and the air carriers to see that potential terrorists do not board aircraft headed to the U.S. This added layer of security provides CBP with the means and opportunity to respond to suspected overseas threats before they get onto planes and before they arrive at our door. And this eliminates the need for airlines to reroute, cancel or divert flights.

Right now, this program is operational at two overseas airports, but we expect to expand IAP to several additional countries this year.

Trusted, Vetted Traveler Programs
Part of our strategy has been to pioneer trusted traveler and trusted cargo shipment programs.

We have partnered with our neighbors in Canada and Mexico to implement trusted traveler programs, such as NEXUS.

Travelers, who want expedited treatment across our border, provide us biographical and biometric data that are run through the crime and terrorist indices of both the U.S. and Canada.

Applicants also submit to a personal interview, and if we conclude that they are no risk for terrorism or smuggling or illegal immigration, they are enrolled into the NEXUS program, and they get a proximity card, which allows them to whiz through the border entry points.

Importantly, we have expanded the NEXUS program to low risk air passengers. This is NEXUS AIR. With Canada, we piloted NEXUS AIR at Vancouver airport last year, and with Canada have agreed to expand it to all airports that fly passengers between the U.S. and Canada. That means NEXUS AIR passengers—using a biometric identifier—bypass immigration and customs.

Think of that convenience!

We also have a program for commercial trucks—FAST—Fast and Secure Trade—where importers, trucking companies, and truck drivers are vetted and pre-cleared to move through dedicated “FAST” lanes across the border.

These trusted, vetted programs are, I believe, the wave of the future. They make sense for business and for security—and “there I go again,” the twin goals.

I believe there will be a day—soon—at U.S. airports, where trusted, vetted passengers, with a biometric identifier—perhaps a fast scan of the two index fingertips—breeze through U.S. immigration and customs, that is to say, CBP, upon arrival to the U.S.

It will not only reduce the hassle factor, but CBP Officers will be able to spend more of their time with unknown passengers, and especially with those who may pose a potential threat—which is the whole point of our trusted traveler and cargo programs. Narrowing the haystack.

We already have equipment in place at JFK to start this U.S. trusted passenger program—a US PASS—and will begin it once we have final policy approval from the Department of Homeland Security to go forward.

Pillar Five: Partnering with Private Sector
And, the fifth—and very important pillar of our strategy—is partnering with the private sector. For cargo security, that’s C-TPAT—the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. Some of you here are C-TPAT partners.

We started C-TPAT in November 2001 with just 7 companies. Today, more than 10,000 companies have applied to become C-TPAT members. And more than 5,000 companies have been certified as having implemented C-TPAT security criteria.

Through C-TPAT, we have dramatically increased the security of the supply chain, from the foreign loading docks all the way to U.S. ports—in partnership with the private sector owners and operators of the supply chain.

C-TPAT is the largest and most successful government-private sector partnership to arise from 9/11.

None of these initiatives—not one of them—existed before 9/11.

All of these initiatives help to extend the zone of security beyond our actual borders—and they help us meet our “twin goals” of securing our nation, without shutting down our borders.

Completing the Vision

We have accomplished a lot in four years, but we have more to do to secure the international movement of goods and people. And, I’d like to suggest some next steps—“Bonner’s Top Ten List” of things we need to do to achieve the twin goals.

First, we need additional information that pushes back further and deeper into the supply chain, than the 24-Hour and Trade Act rules. We need about 23 data elements from 6 existing commercial documents. Things like confirmed purchase orders. We need to know where containers have been before they reach a CSI port. We need to know the identity of the foreign manufacturer, or real shipper.

We need this information in order to improve our targeting for the terrorist threat—and thereby, reduce the number of anti-terrorism security inspections needed.

This expanded advance information is what we’ve referred to as CBP’s “Advance Trade Data Initiative.”

Second, we need to implement “one window into government” for all trade data. That is a promise of ACE, and linking other government agencies with ACE through ITDS. And we must make it happen.

Third, regarding passengers en route to the U.S., we need to get the Advance Passenger Information, not at wheels up, but before the plane pushes back, before the boarding process is complete. In that way, known terrorists can be prevented from boarding aircraft. This would be a 60 minute or 30 minute rule—or something equivalent. But this simple change would better protect the airlines, their passengers, and avoid in flight diversions of flights.

Fourth, now that the World Customs Organization has adopted the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, we need to implement that Framework—broadly and expeditiously.

The Framework was approved by the World Customs Organization this past June, and 115 of the 168 member nations of the WCO have declared their intent to implement the Framework. The WCO Framework incorporates the core security and facilitation principles—those 5 initiatives or pillars pioneered by the United States.

By internationalizing these principles, we—all of us—will ensure cargo shipments are better secured, not just to the U.S., but wherever trade moves around the world. And we ensure that this security is achieved, not by being a drag on the movement of trade, but by actually making the transnational movement of goods more efficient.

With the WCO Framework, private sector companies only need to comply with one set of security standards, and one set of data elements they must transmit.

Fifth and sixth, we need to implement a “smart box”—the use of a tamper-evident container that will make the green lane a reality.

In some sense, everything we have done since 9/11 has been moving us steadily toward the Green Lane—no inspections on arrival, except for random inspections.

FAST, for example, is very close to a Green Lane at the land border. We clear FAST trucks in 17 seconds or less! And that’s fast. But we need the equivalent of a FAST lane for oceangoing cargo, and air cargo, too.

Developing a tamper evident container with low false positive reads is still a work in progress, but I believe this step will be completed this fiscal year. It is the lynchpin and final step needed to make the Green Lane a reality.

Seventh, at our borders, we need to add infrastructure—build bridges and FAST and NEXUS lanes. Nowhere is this more important than in the Michigan-Ontario segment of our border.

Eighth, in the post 9/11 era, security of a company’s supply chain should be a required topic of discussion in corporate boardrooms. Security of supply chains is often as important to the financial survival of a company as the accuracy of a company’s financial statements.

I am not proposing Sarbanes-Oxley for supply chain security—at least, not yet—but CEO’s have a vested interest in this issue. It has to come from the top. That is why one of the best practices requirements for C-TPAT’s Tier Three, the highest level of benefits, is that supply chain security is part of the corporate governance structure, and that it is periodically reviewed for adequacy by CEOs and corporate boards.

Ninth, we must truly make the good government idea of “One Face at the Border” a reality. There should only be one agency at the borders, CBP, although CBP does and should act for all other agencies, whether that is USDA, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, the DEA, or the FDA, or any other agencies, but these agencies should not have separate personnel at the ports of entry. Let us not fragment the personnel and functions performed by the U.S. government at the borders again. Only if OMB, and the federal government, insists that the organizing principle of “One Face at the Border” be strictly adhered to will we be able to resist individual agencies wastefully staffing their own personnel at the border ports of entry.

We have done a remarkable job merging and creating one border agency for our government, and there is no need for multiple agencies to have inspectors at our ports of entry.

Lastly, we need to gain control of our borders with Mexico and Canada, between the entry points, by implementing the Secure Border Initiative that Secretary Chertoff announced recently.

President Reagan nailed it when he said two decades ago: “The simple truth is we’ve lost control of our own borders, and no nation can do that and survive.”

It’s not just adding more Border Patrol Agents, although we will need more Agents. This year, we’re adding 1,500, thanks to President Bush and the Congress.

Control of our borders will require improved and better integrated detection technology—an America’s Shield Initiative, by any name—as well as more Agents, but mark my words, we can control our borders. It can be done—and in the era of global terrorism, it is absolutely essential that we control our borders.

If we combine the Secure Border Initiative with the President’s Temporary Worker Proposal, as we should, we can be assured that we will, for the first time in decades, control our borders.

Conclusion

We can do these things! All of these things I’ve mentioned can—and should—be done.

As I leave government, I leave with a sense that I have done my duty.

As another great President, Teddy Roosevelt said: “Far and away life’s greatest prize is the chance to work hard at work worth doing.”

I know I’ve worked hard.

Being Commissioner these past four years has unquestionably involved me in work that has been worth doing!

Goodbye and God bless you all.

*Commissioner Bonner reserves the right to edit his written remarks during his oral presentation and to speak extemporaneously. His actual remarks, as given, therefore, may vary somewhat from the written text.