No. 98-1115
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
MARICOPA-STANFIELD IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ELLEN J. DURKEE
ANDREW C. MERGEN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether petitioner irrigation districts were deprived of property without
just compensation when Congress reallocated certain water, which it had
earlier made available to the Central Arizona Project "on an interim
basis" (Pub. L. No. 98-530, § 2(k), 98 Stat. 2701), to other uses.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
No. 98-1115
MARICOPA-STANFIELD IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-21a) is reported at 158
F.3d 428. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 23a-48a) is unreported.
The order of the court of appeals granting interlocutory review (Pet. App.
22a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals initially entered its judgment on July 7, 1998. Petitioners
then filed a petition for rehearing and a suggestion of rehearing en banc.
The court of appeals withdrew its original opinion and substituted a revised
opinion on October 14, 1998. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on January 12, 1999. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. By federal law and interstate compact, the right to use water from the
Colorado River has been legally apportioned among the seven States through
which the river and its tributaries pass: Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada,
New Mexico, Arizona, and California. See generally Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963). In the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, Congress
allocated to Arizona water users 2.8 million acre-feet per year of the Colorado
River's normal annual flow of approximately 15 million acre-feet. 43 U.S.C.
617c, 617l(a); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 561, 565.
The distribution of most of that water within Arizona is governed by the
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. 1501-1556, and Arizona
law. The Basin Project Act authorized the Bureau of Reclamation, an agency
within the United States Department of the Interior, to construct a 335-mile-long
system of canals, siphons, pumping plants, and tunnels known as the Central
Arizona Project (CAP). 43 U.S.C. 1521. The Act further authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to contract for the repayment of CAP construction costs
with a single political subdivision in Arizona, 43 U.S.C. 1524, and Arizona
created the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) for that
purpose. Not all Colorado River water used in Arizona is part of the CAP
supply. When Congress authorized construction of the CAP, it required the
Secretary to respect the rights of entities with preexisting, senior entitlements
to Colorado River water within Arizona's allocation. See 43 U.S.C. 1521(b).
On December 15, 1972, the United States entered into a combined water service
and repayment contract with the CAWCD. That so-called Master Contract provides
for delivery by the United States of CAP water to various subcontractors
and obligates the CAWCD to repay $1.2 billion in costs for the construction
of the delivery facilities. Pet. App. 24a; Central Ariz. Irrigation &
Drainage Dist. v. Lujan, 764 F. Supp. 582, 584-585 (D. Ariz. 1991).1
2. The Basin Project Act authorizes the Secretary to allocate Arizona's
CAP water supply among categories of users within the State. 43 U.S.C. 1524.2
In a March 1983 decision, see 48 Fed. Reg. 12,446, the Secretary allocated
a total of 309,000 acre-feet per year to Arizona Indian Tribes, 640,000
acre-feet per year to "municipal and industrial" users, and the
remainder of the CAP water to non-Indian agricultural users. Pet. App. 3a-4a
& n.3. The Secretary determined, and petitioners do not now contest,
that, during water shortages, Indians and "municipal and industrial"
users take priority over non-Indian agricultural users. Ibid. Within the
309,000 acre-feet allocated to the Indian Tribes, the Secretary included
a specific contractual obligation to provide 58,300 acre-feet of water each
year to the Ak-Chin Tribe. Id. at 6a.
Shortly after the allocation decision, the Secretary and the CAWCD entered
into separate contractual agreements with each of the petitioners in this
case, which are Arizona irrigation districts involved in the provision of
CAP water to non-Indian agricultural concerns. Those agreements entitled
petitioners and other non-Indian agricultural users to a percentage of the
"CAP residual pool," which is the portion of CAP water not allocated
to Indian Tribes or to "municipal or industrial" users. Petitioners
agreed to reimburse the federal government for the cost of constructing
the facilities that deliver CAP water to them. Pet. App. 4a-5a.
In the Ak-Chin Settlement Act of 1984 (Ak-Chin Act), which was enacted after
the Secretary's 1983 allocation decision and after the Secretary had entered
into the contracts at issue here, Congress augmented the Ak-Chin's water
rights to a general entitlement of between 75,000 and 85,000 acre-feet of
water per year, depending on availability. See Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-530, § 2(a),(b), and (k), 98 Stat. 2698-2701 (Pet. App. 55a-57a).
That water is to come from two sources, one within the CAP and one outside
it. See Pet. App. 5a-6a & n.7. Under subsection 2(f)(1) of the Ak-Chin
Act, the Secretary is first required to give the Ak-Chin Tribe 50,000 acre-feet
of water previously assigned to the Yuma-Mesa Division of the Gila Project,
98 Stat. 2699, which has never been part of the CAP and which has a priority
date superior to the CAP's. See Pet. App. 5a n.7. Under subsection 2(f)(2),
the Secretary must then supply the Ak-Chin Tribe with whatever portion of
its previous 58,300 acre-foot allotment of CAP water is necessary to meet
the Tribe's new total entitlement (75,000 to 85,000 acre-feet) under the
Act. 98 Stat. 2699.
The remainder of that previous 58,300 acre-foot allotment of CAP water described
in Subsection 2(f)(2) of the Ak-Chin Act-known as the "excess Ak-Chin"
water, and constituting roughly 23,000 to 33,000 acre-feet per year-is the
subject of this litigation. The Ak-Chin Act specified that "the Secretary
shall allocate on an interim basis to the [CAP] any of the water referred
to in subsection (f) which is not required for delivery to the Ak-Chin Indian
Reservation under this Act." § 2(k), 98 Stat. 2701. For eight
years, that "interim" arrangement made additional water available
to petitioners, which take water from the CAP residual pool. The arrangement
ended, however, with the enactment of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Water
Rights Settlement Act of 1992 (SCAT Act), Pub. L. No. 102-575, Tit. XXXVII,
§§ 3701-3711, 106 Stat. 4740-4752. In Section 3704(a) of the SCAT
Act, Congress provided that "[t]he Secretary shall reallocate, for
the exclusive use of the [San Carlos Apache] Tribe, all of the water referred
to in [Subsection 2(f)(2) of the Ak-Chin Act], which is not required for
delivery to the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation under the Act." 106 Stat.
4742.
Petitioners asserted a property interest in the Ak-Chin Act's "interim"
allocation of the excess Ak-Chin water to the CAP, and they claimed that
the SCAT Act had unlawfully terminated that interest without just compensation.
Although Congress did not accept that contention, it created a special jurisdictional
provision to ensure efficient disposition of the claim in federal district
court. Section 3708(f) of the SCAT Act confers jurisdiction on the district
court in Arizona (and concurrent jurisdiction on the United States Claims
Court, now the United States Court of Federal Claims) "to hear and
decide any claim brought by the Central Arizona Water Conservation District
or other contractors of CAP water," and defines "claim" to
mean "a claim that the reallocation of water to the Tribe pursuant
to section 3704(a) of this Act has unlawfully deprived the Central Arizona
Water Conservation District or other contractors of CAP water of legal rights
to such water." 106 Stat. 4749.
3. The district court granted summary judgment to petitioners on the issue
of liability. Pet. App. 23a-48a. After first affirming its jurisdiction
over the case (id. at 32a-34a), the district court held that the SCAT Act's
assignment of water to the San Carlos Apache Tribe deprived petitioners
of a constitutionally protected property interest in the excess Ak-Chin
water. The court reasoned that, under the 1983 contracts between petitioners
and the Secretary, the excess Ak-Chin water could not be used to augment
the water rights of Indians or municipal and industrial users because it
had been irrevocably committed to the CAP residual pool. Id. at 35a-47a.
The court then scheduled a hearing to discuss calculation of damages. Id.
at 48a.
4. The United States filed an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b),
and the court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1a- 21a. After rejecting a
jurisdictional challenge raised by several amici curiae (see id. at 8a-12a),
the court turned to the merits. The court observed that petitioners could
assert a compensable taking only if they could show a protected property
right to the excess Ak-Chin water. Although petitioners assert such a right,
the court explained, their claim presupposes that allocation of water to
the CAP "rather than to a specific user or user class automatically
and irrevocably would allocate that water to the non-Indian agricultural
pool." Id. at 13a. The court rejected that premise as inconsistent
both with the Ak-Chin Act itself (id. at 13a-17a) and with the government's
consistent practice of treating the excess Ak-Chin water "as remaining
in the Indian priority pool" (id. at 17a n.16) even before passage
of the SCAT Act.
The court alternatively held that, even if the Ak-Chin Act could be construed
to give petitioners individual interests in the excess Ak-Chin water, they
could not claim an "enduring property right unless that interest rose
to the level of an entitlement" that was immune from reallocation.
Pet. App. 17a-18a. Petitioners have no such entitlement here, the court
concluded, because the Ak-Chin Act itself directed the Secretary to allocate
the excess Ak-Chin water to the CAP only "on an interim basis."
Id. at 19a (quoting § 2(k), 98 Stat. 2701).
ARGUMENT
Although petitioners mistakenly contend (Pet. 14-16) that this dispute has
broad implications for water rights throughout the Southwest, the dispute
is in fact confined to the excess Ak-Chin water reallocated in the SCAT
Act, and its proper resolution is governed by several narrow provisions
specific to that water. The court of appeals' construction of those provisions
is correct, and the case warrants no further review.
1. Petitioners claim a right under their 1983 contracts to a fixed share
of the extra 23,000 to 33,000 acre-feet per year of undesignated CAP water
that the Ak-Chin Act made available in 1984. That claim rests on two premises:
first, that the Ak-Chin Act irrevocably committed that water to the CAP;
and, second, that the 1983 contracts bound the Secretary to give petitioners
a fixed share of that extra water. Each of those premises is independently
essential to petitioners' claim, and each is false.
a. First, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the Ak-Chin
Act irrevocably committed the water at issue to the CAP.
By allocating 50,000 acre-feet of Yuma-Mesa water per year to the Ak-Chin
Tribe, the Ak-Chin Act had the provisional effect of increasing the amount
of undesignated CAP water by substantially decreasing the previous allocation
of CAP water to the Ak-Chin. See Pet. App. 5a-6a & n.7. As the court
of appeals determined, that Yuma-Mesa water has always been separate from
the CAP. See ibid. That factbound determination-which petitioners question
but do not directly challenge here (see Pet. 8, 21-23), and which in any
event would not warrant this Court's review-is significant for purposes
of this case. Because the Yuma-Mesa water entered the equation only after
petitioners had entered into their 1983 contracts, the SCAT Act's reallocation
of the excess Ak-Chin water to other Indian users did not make petitioners
worse off than they would have been under those contracts if Congress had
not subsequently enacted the relevant provisions of either the Ak-Chin Act
or the SCAT Act.3
In alleging a right to have all excess Ak-Chin water allocated to the CAP,
therefore, petitioners must rely on the Ak-Chin Act itself, which created
that excess water category to begin with, rather than on their contracts
with the Secretary, which preceded the Act. By its terms, however, the Ak-Chin
Act forecloses, rather than supports, petitioners' claim to an "irrevocabl[e]"
(Pet. 24) property interest in that water. Section 2(k) of the Act provides
that the extra water shall be "allocate[d] on an interim basis to the
Central Arizona Project." 98 Stat. 2701 (emphasis added). As the court
of appeals explained (Pet. App. 19a-20a), when Congress allocates water
rights on an "interim" basis, it may reallocate those rights in
later legislation without incurring a constitutional obligation to pay just
compensation. Analogously, the government may grant temporary permits to
people without thereby obligating itself to compensate them when it needs
to revoke those permits.4
Without citing relevant authority, petitioners contend that "interim"
is a term of art "[i]n the context of western water law" and that
here the term confirms only that the Ak-Chin retain senior rights to a portion
of the original CAP water that had been allocated to the Tribe before passage
of the Act. Pet. 25 n.18. That reading, however, not only defies the plain
meaning of the term "interim" (which means "not permanent"),
but also deprives it of any independent significance in the Ak-Chin Act.
Section 2(k) itself separately makes clear that the "interim"
allocation of Ak-Chin water to the CAP is appropriate only when the amount
taken "is not required for delivery to the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation"-i.e.,
only when it "exceeds the quantity necessary to meet the [Secretary's]
obligations" to the Ak-Chin. 98 Stat. 2701 (emphasis added). Under
petitioners' construction, Congress's inclusion of the term "interim"
would have added nothing to the rest of the provision. Finally, if there
were any ambiguity on the meaning of Congress's "interim" allocation,
which there is not, the Secretary's interpretation would be entitled to
substantial deference. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-845 (1984).
b. The explicitly interim character of Section 2(k) of the Ak-Chin Act is
itself a sufficient basis for rejecting petitioners' claim. Even if the
Ak-Chin Act's allocation of excess Ak-Chin water to the CAP had been permanent
and irrevocable, however, petitioners' claim would be invalid for an independent
reason as well: Neither the 1983 allocation decision nor the 1983 contracts
compelled the Secretary to allocate a fixed share of the excess Ak-Chin
water to petitioners.
Based on its reading of the record, the court of appeals correctly held
that "post-1983 allocations to the CAP do not fall to a particular
user or user class, but remain at the Secretary's discretionary disposal,
because the users' allotments were predicated on the amount of water in
the CAP in 1983." Pet. App. 16a-17a.5 That factbound determination
warrants no further review. Petitioners' contrary position is particularly
problematic here, because, as the court of appeals observed, "the Secretary
never treated [petitioners] as having automatic access to this or any other
water allocated to the 'Central Arizona Project.' Quite to the contrary,
the Secretary publicly treated the excess Ak-Chin water as remaining in
the Indian priority pool between the Ak-Chin Settlement and the SCAT Acts."
Id. at 17a n.16 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 4470, 4476 (1992)); see also Master
Repayment Contract, ¶ 8.7 (Appellant's E.R. 149) (addressing Secretary's
discretion to protect Indian water rights); cf. 57 Fed. Reg. at 4471 (Pet.
App. 80a) (amounts of water for non-Indian agricultural users "are
expected to decrease during the project life as the [municipal and industrial]
use increases").6
2. Petitioners contend that the decision below conflicts with United States
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), which addressed the "unmistakability"
doctrine in government contract law, and they criticize the court of appeals
for not citing Winstar in its opinion. See, e.g., Pet. 13, 28. As an initial
matter, petitioners themselves never cited Winstar either in their merits
brief in the court of appeals or in their petition for rehearing. Even if
this case could somehow be said to involve a Winstar issue, this Court does
not ordinarily grant certiorari to review questions that were neither raised
in nor addressed by the court of appeals. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1993).
In any event, no Winstar issue is properly presented here to begin with.7
Recourse to the unmistakability doctrine is of course unnecessary where,
as here, a plaintiff has no valid claim against the government under ordinary
legal principles. Here the court of appeals needed to rely only on such
ordinary principles to determine that, in allocating the excess Ak-Chin
water to the CAP "on an interim basis," the government had preserved
its authority to reallocate that water later; indeed, the court concluded,
petitioners' contrary position is "unthinkable" even on its own
terms. Pet. App. 20a. It follows a fortiori, the court added, that the United
States did not "unmistakably" render itself liable to petitioners'
"unthinkable" claim. That statement, however, related at most
to an alternative holding, see Pet. App. 18a-19a, 20a-21a, and it warrants
no further review.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ELLEN J. DURKEE
ANDREW C. MERGEN
Attorneys
APRIL 1999
1 The 1972 Master Repayment Contract was amended in 1988. All references
to the Master Repayment Contract in this brief are to the amended contract.
The provisions relevant to this case are materially the same in each contract.
2 An allocation "is an offer to contract." 45 Fed. Reg. 81,265
(1980). It does not commit the Secretary to deliver water. Water delivery
is based on a party's specific contract. Ibid.; see also Pet. App. 4a.
3 Petitioners' characterization of the Ak-Chin Act as a "compromise"
designed to resolve a dispute about the status of the Yuma-Mesa water (see
Pet. 21-25) would not help their position here even if that characterization
were accurate. As discussed in the text, any benefits petitioners could
claim to have derived from the Ak-Chin Act were explicitly "interim"
in character. "Interim" benefits are "interim" whether
or not they are part of a "compromise."
4 The combined effect of the Ak-Chin Act and the SCAT Act is essentially
the same as if Congress had simply provided in a single Act for the Ak-Chin
Tribe to assign a portion of its high-priority CAP water right directly
to the San Carlos Apache Tribe, an approach that clearly would not have
violated any rights of petitioners. The fact that Congress accomplished
that result in two Acts rather than one, and allocated excess water to the
CAP during the "interim," does not change the constitutional analysis.
5 As the court of appeals explained, petitioners are incorrect in claiming
that the Ak-Chin Act divested the Secretary of that discretion. See Pet.
App. 17a-19a. Indeed, Section 8 of the Act itself provided that "[n]othing
in this Act shall be construed to enlarge or diminish the authority of the
Secretary with regard to the Colorado River." 98 Stat. 2702; see Pet.
App. 19a n.19.
6 In ¶ 8.12 of the Master Contract, the parties agreed that the United
States would be immune from liability "for any damages * * * arising
out of or in any way connected with any suspension or reduction in the delivery
of water pursuant to this contract or with any shortage in the quantity
of water available for delivery hereunder or to any subcontractor for any
cause whatsoever." Pet. App. 95a; Appellant's E.R. 158. Petitioners
contend that the court of appeals construed that provision to "give[]
the Secretary carte blanche to relieve the government of any liability-or
any actual obligations-under its water supply contracts." Pet. 20.
That is incorrect. The court of appeals never even explicitly cited that
provision; while the court did allude to ¶ 8.12 in passing, it did
so only to support the proposition that the Ak-Chin Act did not limit Congress's
power to reallocate the water at issue. Pet. App. 20a. This case therefore
presents no issue concerning the full scope of ¶ 8.12.
7 Five Justices in Winstar disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that
the "unmistakability" doctrine was inapplicable on the facts of
that case. See 518 U.S. at 919-924 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 924-937 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Winstar therefore does not
support a claim that that doctrine is inapplicable in a particular context,
although it does of course address the extent to which that doctrine materially
affects the outcome of specific cases. See id. at 920-922 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). The governmental obligations alleged in this case have
virtually nothing in common with the obligations at issue in Winstar itself,
which involved regulation of financial institutions.