The Container Security Initiative is an initiative developed by United States Customs in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Its purpose is to protect containerized shipping from exploitation by terrorists. Containerized shipping is a critical component of global trade because most of the international trade moves or is transported in containers. CSI is designed to protect that containerized trade.

Although we are over 16 months removed from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, we must remember that the threat from international terrorism is every bit as real and immediate and dangerous as it was then, if not more so. And it is a threat that knows no boundaries - it is truly a multi-national threat.

The terrorist attacks in Bali, in Kenya, in Jordan, off the coast of Yemen, and elsewhere across the globe remind us that the terrorist threat is one we must all confront. These attacks also remind us that it is an ongoing and long-term threat we face. As you know, just a few weeks ago, British authorities discovered evidence indicating the production of ricin, a deadly toxin, in an apartment in London, occupied by terrorists. Regrettably, one of the terrorists murdered a British law enforcement officer. Other Al Qaeda-linked terrorists were arrested in Spain and Italy last week.

Terrorists will continue to search for vulnerabilities in our systems, and they will continue to try to harm us not just physically, but economically as well. In addition to the lives of innocent civilians, global trade and, indeed, the global economy are at risk.

Unfortunately, because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is vulnerable to terrorist attack. And an attack involving sea containers could wreak havoc on global trade and the global economy, and damage the economic growth of all nations.

CSI
CSI addresses this threat. Through CSI, the United States is partnering with other governments to identify and pre-screen high-risk cargo containers for terrorist weapons at the ports of departure instead of waiting to inspect them at the ports of arrival - where in this age of weapons of mass destruction, it would be too late.

CSI was proposed just one year ago, at a speech I gave at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, D.C., in January 2002. CSI has, as I explained then, four core elements:

• First, identify "high-risk" containers. These include any containers that may contain - based on intelligence and risk targeting principles - terrorist weapons, or even terrorists.
• Second, pre-screen containers before they are shipped.
• Third, use technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers, so that it can be done rapidly without materially slowing down the movement of trade.
• Fourth, use smarter, more secure containers - containers where customs officials will be able to tell if a container has been tampered with.

Under the CSI program, a small number of U.S. Customs personnel are deployed to work with our host nation counterparts to target high-risk cargo containers.

The goal of the first phase of CSI was to begin implementation of the program at as many of the top 20 container ports - in terms of volume of cargo containers shipped to United States seaports - as possible. Those ports were the logical place for us to start CSI, because they account for nearly 70%, over two-thirds, of all the containers entering the U.S.

As you can see from the check marks on this chart, nations representing 18 of those top 20 ports are participating in CSI. By any standard, this is remarkable progress in just one year!

Now that we have nearly achieved our goal for CSI's first phase by getting commitments from nearly all of the top 20 ports, we are doing what is necessary to get CSI operational in those ports as quickly as possible. And, importantly, we are starting Phase 2 of CSI: expansion of CSI beyond the top 20.

Today's announcement here in Gothenburg marks an important milestone. It marks the beginning of Phase 2 of CSI. And by that I mean the expansion of CSI to additional ports - to ports like Gothenburg that ship significant amounts of cargo to the United States, ports like Gothenburg that have the infrastructure and technology to participate in the CSI program.

Gothenburg is the first European port beyond the top twenty to be included in CSI. And I am also announcing that in Asia, we have begun Phase 2 by expanding CSI to the two major ports of Malaysia.

To be eligible for this second phase of CSI:

1. a country's customs administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, or being transshipped through a country;
2. must have or be in the process of acquiring non-intrusive inspection equipment - large x-ray-type systems - and radiation detection equipment in order to conduct security; and
3. the seaport must have -- like Gothenburg - regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States.

By making CSI more broadly available beyond so-called top 20 ports, concerns regarding possible trade distortion will be eliminated.

It is particularly appropriate that Gothenburg be the very first European expansion port for CSI, because of its importance to the Nordic region, and because of the volume of trade between and from Nordic countries and the United States, through the Port of Gothenburg.

Implementing CSI here at Gothenburg is also appropriate, because the Swedish Customs Administration is a recognized leader in developing and implementing effective, progressive risk management principles - the kind of principles that are at the heart of CSI's goals of improving security without slowing the flow of legitimate trade.

I am also impressed by the Swedish Customs Stairway Security program, a program similar to the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. It involves public-private partnerships aimed at improving security throughout the entire supply chain.

The announcement today by Mr. Pagrotsky, Sweden's Minister of Trade, of a new Centre of Excellence here in Gothenborg - one that will develop methods to further improve the efficiency and security of the supply chain - is another example of Sweden's progressive approach to the challenging security issues we are all facing.

The demonstrated commitment of Swedish Customs to improving security has helped make this port, the Port of Gothenburg, stand out as a role model and a clear example of "best practices" for other world ports.

With Gothenburg, Phase 2 of CSI is off to a strong start in Europe. And I want to tell you that U.S. Customs is prepared to move quickly with Phase 2, rapidly adding additional European ports that meet the minimum standards for CSI. For Europe, I am optimistic that CSI will be expanded to, among others, the ports of Marseilles, Gioia Tauro, Barcelona, Valencia, and other ports in the U.K. beyond Felixtowe. In fact, we can and should expand CSI to virtually all European ports that ship the cargo containers to the U.S.

Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that in our mutual mission to secure maritime commerce from the threat of terrorism, we are off to a good start. Beginning Phase 2 of CSI with the Port of Gothenburg in Europe is a significant step forward, and I am confident that this will be a model CSI port for other ports throughout Europe and elsewhere.

But we are still at the beginning of a long and challenging road. It is critical that together we maintain the sense of urgency and action that galvanized the world against terrorism after September 11th. It is critical that those of us in government continue to do everything we can to protect the global trading system, and the means of transporting that trade, from the terrorist threat. And it is critical that we all work together to improve security without stifling the ever greater and freer flow of trade between our two nations - and among the nations of the world.

To that end, I look forward to being able to expand and implement CSI at other ports of Europe, and throughout the rest of the world, in the weeks and months to come.

* Commissioner Bonner reserves the right to edit his written remarks during his oral presentation and to speak extemporaneously. Thus, his actual remarks, as given, may vary slightly from the written text.