It’s a pleasure to be together again with our CSI partners. Pleased to have so many Directors General of Customs Administrations with us for this CSI Confrence.

All of us at this conference are united behind a common goal—and that is to use our Customs authorities, both inbound and outbound authorities, and Customs-to-Customs cooperation in order to secure and facilitate the movement of trade.

CSI protects the trade lanes—the shipping lanes—between our seaports and our nations. It protects the primary system of global trade—containerized shipping—from being exploited and disrupted by global terrorists. Specifically, CSI is designed to:

First, evaluate for risk of terrorism all containers bound for the U.S.—before they are loaded at CSI ports.

Second, build a robust cargo security system that will withstand a terrorist incident, and that will ensure that trade continues from—and through—CSI ports even if a terrorist attack occurs.

Third, CSI protects and facilitates the movement of legitimate trade by working with host CSI teams of Customs administrations, at CSI ports, inspecting containers identified as posing a potential terrorist risk before they are loaded on board container ships.

That’s a big mandate, but today CSI is working—and it is achieving those goals—in 38 of the largest container seaports in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America.

CSI not only secures the world’s most important shipping lanes, but it protects each of our nation’s economies—and indeed, the global economy—against the threat of terrorism.

CSI helps protect our nations and our economies by deterring global terrorists from attempting to use your CSI seaports—and the cargo moving through them—to carry out terrorist attacks or transport terrorist weapons.

And the CSI partners in this room are doing just that. You are deterring terrorists.

I appreciate the great work you have done—and continue to do in ports around the world—to make CSI a success—and to secure these all-important shipping lanes.

We came together last year at the first CSI conference to share ideas on a number of important issues—namely on targeting, on how to improve the effectiveness of CSI, how to strengthen CSI operations, and make sure that all high-risk cargo containers are inspected, using the best available “NII” x-ray imagining and radiation detection equipment.

It’s good to bring you together again, and to welcome our new partners in CSI—this extremely valuable anti-terrorism initiative. We have some important work to do over the next three days. But, I think it’s appropriate for us to acknowledge how far this program has come in just three years.

Because, three years ago, the first CSI port to became operational back in September 2002. That was the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands.

Now there are 38 CSI ports!

Our goal when we began was to establish CSI at the 20 largest seaports—container ports—of the world.

That is done.

The top 20, plus 18 more of the world’s largest ports—38 in all, are participating in CSI. This year alone, 12 more seaports have joined CSI. By the end of this month, we hope to add two more, which will bring the total to 40 CSI ports.

Right now, CSI ports are screening more than 70 percent of the maritime cargo containers destined to the U.S. By next year, we expect CSI to be operational in about 50 ports—covering more than 90 percent of the cargo containers moving to the United States—through the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific corridors.

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All of us recognize that if a terrorist attack occurs in a seaport of the United States, or any other seaport, the economic impact would be potentially devastating—and the economic ripples would be felt around the world.

The fact is, all nations have a stake in protecting global trade and the global economy.

Just two days ago, we marked the anniversary of 9/11—the worst terrorist attack, in terms of loss of life, in the history of the world. 2,933 innocent people were murdered that day. The victims were citizens of 86 different countries.

That date will always be a sobering reminder that our world will never be the same.

The threat of global terrorism, regrettably, continues—and it’s very real.

And, the United States is not the only target of global terrorists. Since 9/11, they have attacked in London just two months ago…in Madrid…in Istanbul…in Bali…Morocco…Tunisia…Saudi Arabia…and Djakarta.

The target is globalization. And it is the global economy.

In fact, terrorists target the forces of globalization that lead to economic uplift, democratization, and reform.

That’s why we need initiatives like CSI.

Before 9/11, there was no program to detect, deter and prevent the concealment of terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction.

And, one of the most consequential threats to all our trading partners—and to the United States—is the potential for global terrorists to use the international maritime system to smuggle terrorist weapons—or even terrorist operatives—into a country. Or to turn a cargo container into a weapon. Think of the consequences!

Ninety-five percent of global trade moves by oceangoing vessels—and most of that is within oceangoing cargo containers. Containers stacked on top of each other many stories high.

Every year, more than 100 million containers crisscross the international shipping lanes. Nearly 10 million of those containers arrive at U.S. seaports with goods manufactured abroad—goods manufactured in your countries—or shipped from or through your seaports.

That means that every day, about 25,000 seagoing containers arrive—and are off loaded—at U.S. seaports.

If even a single one of those containers goes off, or explodes, the disruption to trade and to national economies of our nations could be enormous.

After 9/11, I saw the effects of increasing inspections and scrutiny at U.S. borders. We virtually shut down our ports of entry.

And, we saw what happened on the West Coast of the United States in 2002 when the ports were shut for 11 days during the longshoreman strike. Container ships piled up, retailers shelves emptied, and factories waiting for foreign parts stalled. Cost to just the U.S. economy, by one estimate, amounted to $15.6 billion—over $1 billion a day.

National security experts have pointed out the vulnerability of oceangoing cargo containers to terrorist exploitation. These warnings arise precisely because terrorist weapons can be so easily concealed inside a container. Or a container can be made into a weapon.

The reality is: any terrorist attack using a container could stop global trade in its tracks, unless we have a maritime security strategy that can target, detect, and deter such an incident.

And we do. It is CSI.

Strategy to Secure and Facilitate Trade

After 9/11, we devised and implemented a strategy to increase the security of trade against the terrorist threat, and at the same time, actually facilitate the movement of trade.

We did this through four interrelated initiatives that many of you are familiar with:

• The 24-Hour Rule,
• The National Targeting Center, housing our Automated Targeting System,
• The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and importantly, we did this through
• Container Security Initiative (CSI).

No single initiative can alone secure global trade, but these initiatives are interlocking and working together, they give us the best chance to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons from moving through the supply chain and into and through our seaports.

Here’s the way these initiatives work together:

• We obtain advance electronic information on all cargo—all 10 million of the cargo containers being shipped to the U.S.—24 hours before they are loaded at overseas seaports. This is the 24-Hour Rule.
  

• Using the Automated Targeting System, at CBP’s National Targeting Center in Virginia—which you will visit—we evaluate each and every one of these containers—100 percent—for terrorist risk before they are loaded and shipped to U.S. seaports.

  This was not done before 9/11. It wasn’t even possible before the 24-Hour Rule.

  We evaluate these containers—not only using the automated manifest information from the 24-Hour Rule—but by applying targeting rules sets based upon also strategic intelligence, and anomaly analysis.

  Using these targeting rules, we identify all high-risk containers, that is to say, those containers posing a potential terrorist risk.
  

  Perhaps a better way to look at it is, we are able to identify the large majority that are no—or low—risk. The balance—although a relatively small percentage—pose a potential risk.
  

• Then, there is the all-important work of CSI. Working with all of you—our CSI partners—through CSI, “high-risk” containers, as I have defined that term, are inspected before they are loaded on board vessels. This is an absolutely critical element of CSI, of CSI security, and ultimately, its facilitation benefits.

  None of this was done before 9/11.

  It wasn’t possible before the 24-Hour Rule, before the National Targeting Center to risk manage cargo containers for the threat of terrorism.

  As for the CSI security inspections, they are accomplished using advanced detection technology—large-scale x-ray scanning machines and radiation detectors.

  CBP has partnered with the Department of Energy on their Megaports Initiative and has deployed highly sensitive Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to some CSI ports.

  But, every “high-risk” container receives both an x-ray and radiation scan prior to being laded on a vessel.

  We don’t mean to say that there is a probability that a “high-risk” container contains a terrorist weapon only that such a container, based on multiple risk factors, poses a potential risk.

  Of course, if there is an anomaly in the x-ray image or unexplained radiation emissions—which is relatively infrequent—a physical inspection is required.

  In some CSI ports, it will be desirable to increase the number of security inspections so that the facilitation benefits of CSI can be realized.

  Once high-risk containers are inspected at CSI ports, they are not to be inspected again upon arrival at their port of destination, at the U.S. seaport, except, of course, for occasional random inspections.

  This means that the containers inspected at a CSI port, and indeed, all containers moving from a CSI port, will actually move faster and more predictably through U.S. seaports.

  Major multinational and U.S. importers will want to have their cargo shipped through CSI ports, believe me!

  This is why, when CBP asks that a high-risk container be inspected, it should be done with the CSI port. Your port will benefit because goods will not be held up when they arrive in the U.S.

  The last element of CSI is a smarter, more secure container—the “Smart Box.” CBP is continuing to evaluate and research technologies that better secure containers, and Jim Carson from CBP’s Field Operations Office will provide an overview later as part of this conference.

  Part of a more secure container, of course, is finding the right technology for a smarter, tamper-evident container, and we are working toward that. But, it must have a low false read rate to be effective.

CSI, and all of these initiatives, are designed to make our global trade lanes more secure.

Every one of these initiatives makes use of technology, advance information, and partnerships to achieve its goals.

Of course, we value information that your CSI teams share with the CBP-CSI teams, and sometimes that information allows us to reduce a container from the high-risk category and eliminate the need for a security inspection.

WCO Framework

While I won’t discuss it in great detail, I do want to mention the adoption in June by the World Customs Organization of the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.

This WCO Framework is nothing less than a global strategy that all nations can join to combat global terrorism and to protect trade and the global economy, in the process. This Framework has the potential to revolutionize the security of trade and assure the more efficient movement of global trade. So far, 79 members of the 166 members of the WCO have signed onto the Framework—and have committed to implementing the Framework.

The Framework provides for a new level of partnership and interconnectedness between Customs administrations. It transforms Custom-to-Customs relationships, and how customs authorities around the world discharge their responsibilities.

Under the Framework, Customs Administrations gain new relevance—a new 21st century role. Customs agencies will become the securers of trade as well as the facilitators of trade. Like CSI, the Framework gives Customs Authorities the opportunity to strengthen their enforcement and security responsibilities.

The Framework also holds the promise of linking its security and facilitation goals with Customs reforms in nations that join the Framework, including the use of risk management, automated targeting systems, advanced detection technology, as well as greater transparency, and integrity.

This is especially important for developing nations that join the Framework.

Adoption of the Framework means that nations—through their Customs authorities—will perform outbound anti-terrorism security inspections at a receiving Customs Administration’s request. Historically, most customs authorities have focused on inbound shipments. This revolutionary idea, of course, is drawn from the CSI concept.

This WCO Framework will build security for the movement of legitimate trade, by using risk management, automated targeting systems, screening, detection technology, and trusted partners to create the broader “security envelope” that Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has referred to, an envelope through which goods will move more rapidly, more predictably, and more efficiently than ever before.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection supports the Framework, and is committed to its implementation as quickly as possible.

The Framework presents some new concepts for Customs Authorities, except those that have implemented CSI with us. But it will, if implemented, strengthen and expand the role of Customs agencies within their respective countries.

Capacity Building is an important part of the Framework because about two thirds of the 79 members that have signed onto the Framework will need assistance in the form of training, equipment, and technology.

CBP has begun establishing the mechanisms within our agency to help with capacity building and with implementation of the Framework.

We have assigned an Attache from CBP to work full-time in the newly established Directorate for Capacity Building at the WCO Headquarters in Brussels.

At CBP Headquarters, we have established a new Framework Implementation and Capacity Building Division within our Office of International Affairs to help drive the process forward.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying: CSI is the cornerstone of a global strategy for securing and facilitating trade lanes bilaterally, between many seaports of the world and seaports of the United States.

CSI adds an important layer of protection to our day-to-day seagoing commerce, which did not exist before.

The cooperation and collaboration with all of you improves our mutual ability to detect—and deter—international terrorists, and protect our shipping lanes and our economies.

It underscores the importance of Customs agencies to play the key role in accomplishing this security objective.

In essence, CSI is like an insurance policy, insuring that should a terrorist attack occur anywhere in the world, trade will continue to move from—and between CSI ports—countries that have implemented CSI at their ports and the United States.

This is an important conference. And you are our important partners in our joint efforts to secure our nations and the global economy. The time we spend together over the next three days will be time to reaffirm our partnerships—to talk about our successes—and plan for the future.

I’m looking forward to talking with you—and working with you—as we continue building and perfecting the Container Security Initiative—the network of security between our seaports that protects our trade lanes and our economies.

* Commissioner Bonner reserves the right to edit his written remarks during his oral presentation and to speak extemporaneously. His actual remarks, as given, therefore, may vary somewhat from the written text.