Other Resources:

Avian Flu.gov USDA Bird Flu Press Release

SEC. JOHANNS: Well, good afternoon. I'm going to be joined by some others here. And that's a good place for me to start. I'd like to begin by saying, thanks to our panel of technical experts for joining me today to talk about a topic that doesn't always get on the front page, but it's a very important topic that we continue to work on. And that's avian influenza of bird flu as it's commonly called.

It was about a year ago this month that I was joined by my colleagues at Health and Human Services and the Department of Interior to discuss our expectations, our preparedness and our plan to enhance our early warning system for the detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza. I'm pleased to report that our departments and others in the federal government continue our collaborative efforts.

In fact, we decided to bring together an interagency panel of experts today to give you an update, and then that panel is going to be happy to answer any questions that you have.

Joining us as a guest today is Dr. Rick Kearny from the Department of Interior, a representative from HHS had planned to join us today but a conflict arose. So suffice it to say that we're working with HHS as well. From the USDA we have Dr. Ron DeHaven, Dr. John Clifford, Dr. Tom Liberto from our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; Dr. Steve Kappes from Agricultural Research Service, and Dr. David Goldman from our Food Safety and Inspection Service.

We work together to monitor and to try to slow the spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 overseas, to expand prevention and protection here at home, and to make sure we continue to have a strong early warning system.

For those of you who might not be familiar with our departments' respective roles, I'll just take a moment to refresh our memories. The Department of Interior monitors wild bird populations through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Park Service. USDA also has a connection with wild birds through our Animal and Plant Inspection Service and our Agricultural Research Service.

In addition, we work on the international front to slow the spread of the virus, and here at home to protect domestic birds and commercial flocks. The Department of Health and Human Services is a part of this effort because we all recognize a link between protecting animal health and protecting human health. I'm pleased to have this opportunity to update you on our collaborative efforts relating to avian influenza, and then as I said our panel is going to be happy to answer any questions that you have.

I might mention that just a few minutes ago an important step was taken toward international collaboration, and so that's a good beginning place. Today I was joined by the director general of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to sign a framework agreement to facilitate greater collaboration between the USDA and the FAO. This framework agreement will help to address all types of animal diseases, and it will specifically assist us with our goal to slow the spread of AI overseas.

I believe this agreement will bolster the effectiveness of FAO, OIE Crisis Center in Rome. We have three USDA specialists assigned to the center, and they help to coordinate and carry out emergency response to animal diseases like high path AI.

Through this center we are working to stop the spread of this virus at its source, which is overseas. This week in Washington, USDA is hosting a workshop on preparedness for experts who are interested in being part of the international rapid deployment teams to combat high path AI.

We have 50 experts from more than 15 countries around the world, mostly from the private sector, who are interested in helping and have expertise in avian influenza epidemiology, biosecurity, surveillance and detection.

We also are working with FAO and OIE to bring interested countries together for a workshop in Rome to discuss communications and public awareness initiatives. We hope to focus a network of communications on preventing the further global spread of highly pathogenic AI.

At this workshop, we will share our plans to offer educational materials that will provide information about AI diagnostics, compensation programs, and vaccination facts.

These videos and DVD sets will be available later this year.

While we have accomplished a great deal during the past year with our international partners to help control the spread of high path H5N1, there certainly is more work to be done. We are on track to meet the goals put forth on the President's National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which includes both avian influenza and human pandemic preparedness. And I would say that preparation is both international and here at home.

Before I offer some details about our efforts here in the United States, I'd like to remind you that the United States is free of any high path AI virus at this time. Historically, we have detected and eradicated high path AI three times in this country. They were not the H5N1 strain that is causing concern around the world, but they were strains classified as being deadly to birds and easily spread between them. So we've had some practice in responding to high path AI.

I add that an outbreak among birds, wild or commercial for that matter, would not signal the start of a human pandemic. The virus would have to mutate and become easily transmitted between people before concerns would arise related to human pandemic. As I said, as of right now there are no detections of high path H5N1 in the U.S., and we're doing all we can to keep it that way.

Now we work on several fronts to protect the United States. We monitor our ports of entry for illegal poultry and poultry products. We monitor wild birds and commercial poultry. And we promote biosecurity practices on commercial poultry farms. The U.S. government's anti-smuggling efforts aim to seize birds and bird products that are smuggled into the United States to reduce the risk of introducing a foreign poultry disease here.

We work with the Department of Homeland Security, Interior, and Health and Human Services to protect against potentially contagious diseases introduced by imports, whether they would be legal imports or illegal.

Last year our smuggling interdiction team conducted 31 special operations at various ports of entry, restaurants and markets throughout the United States. One of these operations led to the seizure of 360,000 pounds of prohibited poultry products. This year we plan to double the number of operations to 70. So far, 23 operations have been conducted at various air and land and sea ports, mail facilities, markets, warehouses and restaurants to find illegal poultry products.

To raise awareness among importers and distributors, the anti-smuggling unit will launch a national public awareness campaign this year. It will focus on the threat of introducing high path H5N1 AI through smuggled poultry and the role it plays in protecting the United States from this threat.

The Biosecurity for the Birds Campaign educates backyard poultry owners and exotic bird enthusiasts about highly contagious and deadly poultry diseases such as H5N1 high path. It teaches the warning signs of disease and how to report sick or dead birds. We have a guide, a brochure, poster and DVD that have been distributed through everything from ag radio and magazines to feed sacks as well as through partnerships with FFA and 4-H.

We continue to build upon this campaign -- it's now in its fourth year -- by creating bilingual websites, brochures, and a public service announcement that will soon be distributed to media outlets promoting good biosecurity practices. These materials have been distributed to 70 countries around the world.

Wild bird surveillance is another important part of our early warning system, specifically targeting the migratory birds. Since the announcement of the wild bird plan last year, USDA and the Department of Interior, along with state and academic partners, have collected and tested more than 100,000 wild bird samples from all 50 states. The testing has focused on the four major North American flyways. All of these samples have tested negative for high path, H5N1.

Last year we announced several detections of low path H5N1 known as the North American strain, which is common to wild birds in the United States. We wanted to make sure that the public understood the difference. The two types are really very different from each other. Low path AI is as common as the human flu and sometimes it isn't even noticeable in birds. High path strains of AI, like H5N1, are easily transmitted between birds and typically fatal in birds.

Through these half dozen detections of common strains of AI, we are learning more about the less dangerous low path AI viruses. In April we will implement the 2007 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Early Detection System, which is an updated version of our Wild Bird Surveillance Plan for this year.

Once again, our state and academic partners will conduct surveillance in all four major flyways and in Hawaii and in the South Pacific. We also will use the data collected from 2006 to further focus our sampling on high risk species and geographic locations.

It is important to remind the public that a detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in wild birds does not mean our commercial poultry industry would be affected. The U.S. poultry industry is much better positioned to deal with bird flu than many of the countries currently affected by the high path H5N1 virus. There are two reasons I can make this statement. One, our industry is integrated. In many of the countries struggling with the virus, chickens are commonly raised in yards and even inside homes. In the U.S., chickens, turkeys, and eggs produced for human consumption are typically raised in very controlled environments.

Secondly, biosecurity practices have been a part of the business of raising poultry for decades. The vast majority of our commercial poultry producers raise their chickens and turkeys in covered structures with very controlled access.

Having said that, if the virus did reach a commercial poultry flock, as I said we have experience in dealing with it, even the more dangerous strains of AI.

I'm pleased to report that we have had tremendous cooperation with our poultry producers who have every incentive to protect their flocks. The United States is the world's largest producer and exporter of poultry meat and the second largest egg producer. It's a $29 billion industry, and poultry producers are as eager to protect their livelihoods as protecting their flocks.

USDA provides incentives for reporting disease by compensating producers for destroyed birds, so I'm pleased to report that we've received tremendous cooperation in the areas of protection and in testing. This coordination is provided in part through the National Poultry Improvement Plan. It certifies flocks as free of poultry diseases including avian influenza. Last year this critical program was expanded to include commercial production poultry flocks in addition to the breeder flocks.

As a result, significantly more samples will be collected for AI testing. USDA also recently expanded this program to provide 100 percent indemnity or compensation for costs associated with eradication of low path H5 and H7, in addition to doing so for the high path strains.

Since experience has demonstrated that H5 and H7 subtypes of low path AI have the potential to mutate into high path AI, this will enhance our early warning system.

Our producers have demonstrated that they will call us at the first sign of sick birds, knowing that with the high path strain of bird flu we will pay for the birds that we destroy. So unlike what we've seen in some other countries where producers are reluctant to report the virus because of the economic loss, our producers know that their loss will be covered.

In fact, industry groups have led the charge by stepping up testing of commercial poultry flocks by working through USDA's surveillance program, known as the National Health Surveillance System. Every participating company tests each broiler flock before slaughter. This represents 98 percent of U.S. broiler production.

Monthly reports describing this surveillance data are posted on the USDA website. We've also stepped up efforts at live bird markets. USDA and our state partners provide surveillance for H5 and H7 AI in the live bird marketing system. All live bird markets and their suppliers must be registered or licensed with states, must have written biosecurity protocols in place, and must allow federal and state inspectors access to the facilities.

In 2006, more than 132,000 birds were tested as a part of this program. Currently 12 states participate in the program. This year it will expand to include additional states that have smaller live bird marketing systems.

So far you've heard about the international wild bird surveillance and domestic poultry protection and surveillance efforts. Before I turn this over to the experts and take your questions, there's one more area that I'd like to visit with you about quickly and that's research.

USDA employs some of the world's top avian influenza researchers, and their work has been invaluable to help us further understand the complexities of high path AI. The conclusions of a study on the commingling of birds in Alaska and the disease implications were recently released. The seven-year study involved USDA and the University of Alaska scientists who conducted AI virus surveillance among waterfowl and shore birds on the Eastern Shore of Alaska. That's where Asian and North American birds meet at the same summer breeding grounds.

The scientists took over 8,000 samples during this time. The results of this study suggest that the risk of the introduction of high path H5N1 AI through migratory birds in this region is relatively low. While this is good news, we must not let our guard down. We will remain vigilant in our efforts to protect the nation from high path H5N1.

Another USDA study confirmed that properly cooked poultry is safe to eat. Our scientists tested infected chicken meat and determined that properly cooked poultry is safe to eat. Our scientists tested infected chicken meat and determined that heating it to 165 degrees kills high path avian influenza, including the H5N1 strain, in a matter of seconds. This confirms that producers have the power to protect themselves, even in the event of an outbreak in birds in the U.S., by simply cooking the poultry to the proper temperature.

There is much more that we need to learn about the nature of high path H5N1 AI virus, and we're fortunate to have some of the world's best researchers at the USDA.

To better support their work in 2008, the President's budget includes an increase of $16 million to design a new consolidated poultry research facility in Athens, Georgia. This facility will be a premier center for conducting critical research on exotic and emerging avian diseases that could have devastating effects on animal and human health.

I'll briefly offer two concluding thoughts because they are important, and it's important that I repeat them.

One, a detection of H5N1 virus does not signal the start of human pandemic. This virus is not easily transmitted person to person. The vast majority of the people overseas who have become ill have had direct contact with infected birds.

Two, properly prepared poultry is safe to eat. If there's a detection of high path H5N1 in this country, it should not cause a loss of confidence in the safety of poultry. Birds that become infected quickly die, so there is little risk of an infected bird entering the food supply. But even if it did, proper cooking kills the AI virus just as it does with other viruses and bacteria.

With that, I'm going to turn the microphone over to technical experts who are with me today. They will answer your questions in a moment. First, I'd like them to offer some additional details regarding our efforts.

We'll start with Dr. Rick Kearny from Interior. And then we'll just go immediately to Dr. DeHaven, and then Dr. Steve Kappes from our Agricultural Research Service.

DR. RICK KEARNY: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And thank you once again for the invitation to the Department of the Interior to participate in today's event. I think this epitomizes the cooperation that has emerged between the Departments of Agriculture and Interior on this important issue. And I wanted to point out that the efforts of the USDA are very highly appreciated by all within the wildlife community.

This program for wild bird surveillance in the United States has been nothing less than an overwhelming success, with a very short amount of time the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, State Wildlife Agencies and Tribal Wildlife Authorities came together to develop a program to test our wild bird populations for high path H5N1 avian influenza. And in less than 12 months of sampling, we have collected and analyzed and reported to the American people the results of more than 100,000 samples collected in the wild.

And that has been a tremendous asset, tremendous success for the American people.

To talk about surveillance in wild birds, we need to talk about the five strategies that were followed during 2006. The first of these strategies was a systematic investigation of reports of sick and dying birds.

Secondly, we took samples from live and apparently healthy wild birds.

Thirdly, we sampled birds that were taken by hunters at state wildlife migration areas, national wildlife refuges, and other locations.

Fourthly, we investigated birds that were kept in captivity and allowed to mingle with wild birds that were essentially sentinels for the presence of the virus.

And lastly, we collected samples from bird droppings and analyzed those in a laboratory setting for the presence of H5N1. And as you've mentioned, sir, in no case was any highly pathogenic H5N1 discovered.

In 2006 there were 143 reports of bird mortality and sickness across the United States and well over 1,000 samples were collected from these situations. In live birds we collected nearly 45,000 samples from across the United States on birds which are known to migrate between North America and Asia, where the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus is known to exist. -- or on species that mingle with those that do make that crossing between Asia and North America.

We sampled nearly 50,000 birds taken by hunters, both in the spring subsistence hunt performed by Native Alaskan peoples as well as the full hunting season in the remainder of the United States. We analyzed samples from nearly 500 sentinel birds as well as 50,000 fecal samples from across the country, and the results of these analyses are available on the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Early Detection System Website for all the American people, in fact people around the world, to see what it is we are doing.

As I mentioned, no high path H5N1 was discovered.

In 2007, we intend to improve upon our sampling efforts, as you mentioned. We will be revising our sampling efforts based upon the results of scientific studies recently completed, one of which you mentioned-- as well as several others the Department of Agriculture, Department of Interior and State Partners have completed.

And we will be increasing the amount of mortality investigations as compared to last year. We do know, based upon results in Europe and Asia, that the first signs of highly pathogenic H5N1 are oftentimes the observation of sick and dying wild birds. We will be looking at those more closely.

Within the Department of the Interior, we shall be expanding upon our live bird sampling activities across the United States. And thirdly, we shall be working more closely with Canada and Mexico. In fact, just last week, representatives of the Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture and the States sat down with our Canadian/Mexican counterparts in order to develop plans for coordinated sampling in 2007 and the exchange of information from those sampling efforts.

So in summary, this program for testing wild bird populations for highly pathogenic H5N1 has been an overwhelming success for the American people, and we are going to make that even better in 2007. Thank you.

DR. DEHAVEN: Rick, thank you. And we appreciate your presence here today and the ongoing cooperation with the Department of Interior and U.S. Department of Agriculture.

As Secretary Johanns has pointed out, the USDA is working very hard on a number of fronts to address the potential risks represented by highly pathogenic H5N1 virus. Our efforts domestically within the United States focus in three areas--

Exclusion, keeping the virus out of the United States; early detection, find it quickly if it's here; and then rapid response.

But we're also addressing that threat internationally working with countries throughout the world to prepare for, manage, and eradicate highly pathogenic AI outbreaks. We recognize that reducing the virus load at its source in infected poultry is perhaps the most effective way to reduce the potential for it to find its way to the United States or reduce the potential for it to mutate into that all-feared pandemic virus.

With regard to our international efforts to help slow the spread of H5N1, we've provided countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam with training and equipment, provided experts for response teams, and expanded lab capacity here and abroad to assist with diagnostic efforts.

We are pursuing our efforts through primarily international organizations, especially the Food and Agricultural Organization, or FAO, of the United Nations; as well as the World Organization for Animal Health, known as the OIE.

Last year, the FAO launched its crisis management center at its headquarters in Rome with the goal of better tracking H5N1 and that virus where it's found around the world and then coordinating global response efforts when it is found.

And then coordinating global response when it is found.

USDA has supported this effort at the Crisis Management Center by providing personnel expertise as well as financial assistance.

Many countries lack the resources and veterinary infrastructure to control the disease in poultry, so we are working closely with the OIE to send assessment teams to those affected countries, assisting them and their cooperators to better identify their needs and focus those needs with limited resources.

Together with the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, APHIS has provided workshops on AI surveillance in countries such as China, Thailand, Mexico and Russia. And not only have we provided experts, but we've also trained foreign diagnosticians so they can then return home and train other diagnosticians in their own countries.

As Secretary Johanns mentioned, next month we will be cohosting with the FAO and the OIE a meeting on communications and outreach. The idea is to deliver on a global scale a consistent message with regard to the threat and response to highly pathogenic avian influenza.

We indeed have a lot of activities ongoing within the United States to prepare for and detect quickly should we find that virus in the United States. With regard to our exclusion activities, we're working hard to keep it out of the United States through a number of efforts. We have in place stringent import restrictions on poultry and poultry products from countries known to be affected by the virus. Our Smuggling and Interdiction Trade Compliance Team is providing information to our colleagues in Customs and Border protection so they can be on the alert for poultry and poultry products that may be smuggled into the United States from affected countries. This SITC group, Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance Team, also looks for illegal poultry and poultry products that may have made its way through our ports and borders and found a way into domestic commerce.

Indeed, in last year our SITC group, working cooperatively with Customs and Border Protection, successfully seized hundreds of thousands of pounds of prohibited products through those interdiction efforts.

In terms of early detection, the key is to preventing the spread of H5N1, the highly pathogenic virus, should it occur in this country. And if it does arrive, we want to find it very quickly. The USDA and our state and industry partners have extensive surveillance in four areas-- commercial poultry, live bird markets, backyard producers and, as Rick has mentioned, migratory birds.

Commercial poultry producers survey their flocks on a daily basis looking for any clinical signs that would be consistent with highly pathogenic avian influenza. And indeed, if these producers detect any signs they report it to USDA or state authorities, who then would respond quickly and conduct investigations. Virtually all commercial broiler and turkey flocks are tested as part of this surveillance program before they go to slaughter.

In our live bird marketing system, we have been conducting surveillance since 1986, focusing those efforts primarily in the northeastern states. More recently however we have developed a federally coordinated, state-assisted program that provides surveillance for AI live bird markets in all parts of the United States.

Since 2004, we have been involved in educating backyard poultry owners and exotic bird owners about highly contagious bird diseases such as exotic Newcastle disease, as well as avian influenza. Our Biosecurity for the Birds Campaign is an outreach program that teaches owners how to protect their birds, to identify signs of diseases, and provides information on what to do if they detect that there's a problem.

Rick has given a very good, thorough understanding of our Migratory Bird Surveillance Program, recognizing that indeed the potential for these birds as a pathway for bringing the virus to the United States is recognized. And so we have extensive efforts that have been in place and will continue in terms of surveillance on that potential pathway of bringing the virus to the United States.

In terms of the rapid response if we do detect the virus in the United States, there has been a lot of effort to improve our preparation and planning in that regard. In the event that our surveillance efforts would detect the virus in the United States, we have plans in place for a swift emergency response. If highly pathogenic AI is suspected in any of those populations that I mentioned, we would conduct an on-site investigation and submit laboratory samples within a four-hour time period.

In 2002, our Agricultural Research Service within the Department of Agriculture was successful in developing a rapid diagnostic test for avian influenza that completes the testing in three hours, as compared to up to two weeks in the previous tests that we were using. This rapid test has now been distributed to our National Animal Health Laboratory Network, which is a network of 45 USDA-approved federal, state and university animal diagnostic laboratories located in 40 states.

All of these laboratories are trained to use this ARS-developed rapid test, so if the tests indicate that we have potentially a highly pathogenic AI virus, we would immediately work with the states to initiate a full-blown response to include prompt destruction of the affected flock, stopping movement in that area, conducting surveillance testing in the area, as well as conducting a comprehensive epidemiological investigation.

To expand and strengthen our highly pathogenic AI response plans, we have created, and continue to refine with our industry and state partners, our National Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan, a document that would guide our joint federal/state/industry response.

Again, as Secretary Johanns mentioned, outbreaks of poultry diseases are not new to us, and past experiences have helped us to improve our response capability. We have many partners in our high path AI preparedness response efforts, and they include stakeholders with other federal agencies, with our State Departments of Agriculture, tribal officials, industry stakeholders, and international counterparts. We will continue to work closely with all of these partners, and ensure that we have an effective and coordinated response and approach to highly pathogenic AI preparedness and response.

I'll now turn the microphone over to my colleague from Agricultural Research Service, Steve Kappes.

MR. STEVE KAPPES: Thank you, Dr. DeHaven. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It's my pleasure to talk to you a little bit about the research that we're doing with avian influenza. ARS, Agriculture Research Service, is the in-house research arm of USDA. We work very closely with our sister agency, CSREES, and they provide competitive funding for primarily universities to conduct avian influenza research.

Just to show that we have a lot of experience in this area, we've been working on avian influenza since 1969. We need to point out that the common avian influenza viruses that we see act a little differently than the viruses that are currently circulating in Asia. So we have a lot of experience on the common ones; we have less experience on the Asian form of what's circulating.

Our mission includes to support regulatory agencies. In this case it's both APHIS as we've heard from Dr. DeHaven, as well as FSIS. We have an ongoing research effort to evaluate vaccines. The avian influenza virus mutates at a very fast rate, so the vaccines that we have available to us today may only be effective for about two years. So this is a constant research effort in trying to evaluate those vaccines to see if they will continue to be effective in the new strains that are showing up.

Also, we're evaluating different vaccine platforms. We're trying to make this a more efficient process in designing the vaccines for the next strains that are coming along. So this will reduce the time it takes to do that.

Also we're working on developing mass vaccination strategies. One of them is through aerosolizing so you don't have to handle every bird when you vaccinate. It makes it much easier and cheaper to vaccinate.

ARS has also developed the rapid diagnostic test that Dr. DeHaven just talked about, and we have made some recent improvements. The first improvement was, originally we designed it so we'll only detect the North American strains of avian influenza. We have now modified those tests so it will also detect the Asian strains. And the second improvement is that we've improved it in detecting avian influenza virus particles in fecal material. Fecal material is a very good way to spread avian influenza virus, and there's some unknown inhibitors that prevent this test from working very well when the virus particles are in the feces, and we've developed a process to pull those inhibitors from the material.

We're also working on the meat and eggs that Secretary Johanns just told you about. We evaluated the survival of virus particles in meat and eggs, and as he'd indicated, the FSIS guidelines of heating poultry meat to 165 degrees Fahrenheit is very effective in inactivating the virus.

We also have work on evaluating virus particles in the environment. Secretary Johanns mentioned the Alaska study that we started in 1998, which was, once again, well advanced before this became a big issue here in the United States. The reason is, as he indicated, there's birds that go from the Asian and the North American flyways. What we've found is only low path avian influenza viruses. We've not found any high path. And all those viruses are from the North American origin; they are not of Asian origin.

One would ask, if you have ducks going back and forth, why don't you find it? Hypothesis is that the distance may be too long for a sick bird to get that far. So we don't, it's unlikely that we'll see it in Alaska.

The last item is that we've been doing quite a bit of work on sequencing the DNA from the avian influenza virus. This allows us to better understand what the virus particles are capable of doing. It allows us to identify the genes that cause the disease, the severity of disease, as well as what type of species are able to be infected with it. With the common avian influenza, generally you don't see sickness in ducks. But with the Asian strain that's circulating in those countries, it causes disease in ducks. Why do those strains cause that?

So obtaining DNA sequences in a very large number of isolets of avian influenza will allow us to unlock some of that information and use it not only to control the spread of the disease but also how to treat animals once they are infected. Thank you.

SEC. JOHANNS: Well, thank you very much. It's not often that we pull people together and give them a 45-minute briefing around here. But it's important, and there was a lot of new information today that I really wanted to get out, and a lot has been done since the last time we sat down together.

So with that, what I'm going to do here is probably be the traffic cop, ask questions and what I'll try to do is get an expert to jump in here. Libby?

REPORTER: -- with the National Academy of Journal. In the past, it's been a few months but they talked about the threat from south of the United States and raised the possibility that actually it might be more likely for an infected bird to come here from the south rather than from Alaska. Could someone address that?

MR. KEARNY: I'd be happy to. I'm familiar with that paper you're referring to, and I want to point out that while there were some scientific issues as yet unresolved with that particular study, it does point out that we needed to be on guard from the movement of H5N1 into this country from all directions, not just via the Alaska connection.

The truth of the matter is, we have been vigilant, all across the United States, over the past year. While our initial efforts did focus on Alaska and the Pacific flyway as a point of most likely entry based upon the knowledge at that point in time. We did develop a system which was national in geographic scope so that throughout the spring and summer of 2006, in fact even into the current time, there's sampling going on all across the United States to guard against that potential avenue.

DR. DEHAVEN: Mr. Secretary, one more thing I might add too is that we mentioned that many of our efforts are focused internationally. And so some of our efforts are working with our counterparts in Mexico to do similar surveillance in Mexico, which not only would assist them if we find a virus but also is an early warning for us. So as Rick said, we're not only conducting surveillance throughout the United States; we are doing similar testing in Mexico and other strategically located countries.

REPORTER: How much of the smuggled poultry that you discovered came from China? How bad is the virus still circulating in China? And how soon can we expect your proposed rule on allowing in processed Chinese poultry? And does that still seem like a good idea?

SEC. JOHANNS: I'll take the last part of that, and then somebody over here will take the first part. That is processed poultry. In other words, it's cooked poultry. And so as we've indicated today, cooking that poultry to 165 degrees kills the virus and does so quickly. So it's something we look at. But again I just remind everybody that that's cooked, processed poultry. So, and actually I think, I'm trying to remember this rule -- Dr. DeHaven help me -- but is that poultry that is processed in China but from elsewhere?

DR. DEHAVEN: Two rules, Mr. Secretary. One rule that would allow poultry meat from countries that we recognize as free of avian influenza to go to China for processing and then return. Now the second rule that would consider poultry produced in China to come to the United States after it's processed and of course temperature would, the cooking process would render the virus inactive.

SEC. JOHANNS: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: Thank you. This is David Goldman from FSIS. The second rule you're referring to is still under departmental review, so we're still quite a ways off from even implementing that should it be enacted.

SEC. JOHANNS: Okay. How much virus?

DR. DEHAVEN: We have found as we mentioned, somewhere in excess of 400,000 pounds of smuggled product, prohibited poultry product, from affected countries around the world. I don't have, though, a breakout in terms of the country of origin of that product, but undoubtedly much of it has come from China. I think we tend to get the picture in many of these affected countries that a large percentage of their poultry is affected and that those products are then finding their way to the United States, when in fact the outbreaks are relatively sporadic.

Though the fact that the product may find its way to the United States from an affected country doesn't necessarily mean that the virus is present. We of course require it to be destroyed. We're increasing our vigilance. And I should also mention too that we take appropriate enforcement action against those that would be responsible for bringing those products into the United States to cut off that pathway.

SEC. JOHANNS: Yes?

REPORTER: My question concerns international cooperation on reporting of genomic sequences on H5N1 strains. A year or so ago there was considerable concern in the scientific community that we were not getting cooperation in international arena on reporting on the strains. Do we have assurance now -- and that was apparently a handicap on the vaccine issue -- do we have the assurance now, particularly with the agreements made today, that we have information we need, data we need, on the strains?

DR. DEHAVEN: Thank you, Sally, for that question. There has been some concern internationally about the sharing of virus isolets from countries that are affected and do find the virus. And that goes both on the animal health side as well as primarily the human health side for just the reasons that you mentioned: one, we want to watch the virus to see if it's mutating and, if so, how. And what is the significance of that? As well as to making sure that as vaccines are being developed that they are being developed against the most current form of the virus.

HHS, Health and Human Services, has taken the lead working with the World Health Organization, to encourage countries to share those isolets so that we can do that important work. And suffice it to say, we are coordinating very closely with the WHO and our Health and Human Services colleagues in that effort because some of these isolets come from people. Some of them come from animals. So we are working through our HHS colleagues and the international organizations to encourage that kind of cooperation.

REPORTER: Just a question about the scope of the expansion of efforts that you've been talking about. You mentioned that in the commercial poultry monitoring there will be 132,000 birds tested in 2006, but there would be more markets added this year. I'm wondering, how many more markets and how many more birds?

There was also a reference to 12 states where there are operations taking place, but a few more would be added. How many more states is a "few?"

DR. DEHAVEN: 132,000 samples last year-- I don't know that we necessarily are targeting a particular number of samples. I think the more important number is, how many different markets and how many different states are coming under that program? We currently have 12. We would hope that during this year that number would increase to 29 or 30 states that we'd have cooperative agreements and that kind of surveillance ongoing.

REPORTER: On the size of the states, if they're smaller states just how much of a greater magnitude that's going to be? I'm assuming it's the 12 biggest poultry states you're doing right now?

DR. DEHAVEN: The focus has actually been in the Northeastern part of the United States where we knew we had a low path virus that was circulating. So the focus up to this point has been in the 12 northeastern states. Now we're spreading to other states that have similar, but in many cases different kinds of live bird markets. Not all of these live bird markets are the same.

So clearly, we are focusing on states where there are commercial poultry populations but not exclusively so, recognizing that live bird markets create the perfect opportunity for spreading disease. You have birds coming in from a number of sources. You have people and equipment going back from those birds back to poultry premises. So this is a key area where we're focusing our efforts.

Again, primary emphasis on poultry producing states but not exclusively so.

SEC. JOHANNS: Okay. We'll wrap up with this question here.

REPORTER: In the event that there would be a detection of the high path H5N1 virus in the United States and with a lack of a mandatory animal ID program, how confident are you that you could track the course of the outbreak?

SEC. JOHANNS: Ron, you want to take that?

DR. DEHAVEN: Certainly. A National Animal ID system will help us in any disease outbreak in terms of tracking animals. I think particularly with the poultry industry and some of the other highly integrated industries where birds typically don't move as individuals but move as large groups of animals, the companies that we work with know where birds came from, they know where they are because we're talking about large groups of birds. And we have excellent cooperation with our industry counterparts. So while a National Animal ID system could certainly assist us and there is no less emphasis in poultry production as some of the other areas, I think we have the benefit of large groups of animals moving through marketing channels as a group. And so it's not as challenging in terms of knowing where animals were and where they are now with poultry as it might be with some other species, for example beef cattle that tend to move individually as opposed to in large groups of animals.

SEC. JOHANNS: The other thing I'd mention, there's a pretty short period of time between hatch and processing, and so only so many movements are going to happen. Whereas, with cattle industry for example, those cattle are with us awhile before they are ready for processing. So you're dealing with just a much different period of time when it comes to poultry, and that makes it a little bit easier also, quite a bit easier as a matter of fact. Cattle can move around a lot in their lifetime.

Okay, thank you everybody.