Type: VVER-1000
Units: Five
Total megawatts (net): 5,700 (950 per unit)
Location: Energodar, Ukraine
Dates of initial operation:
For an overview of the principal strengths and deficiencies of Soviet-designed plants, see Soviet Nuclear Power Plant Designs.
Zaporozhye's station manager has noted that the plant's steam generators have experienced corrosion problems and may have to be replaced in units 1 and 2, and possibly in units 3, 4 and 5.
In January 1992, a fire extinguisher was accidentally activated in Unit 2; subsequent water damage led to a plant shutdown. The incident was classified as Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
In May 1993, while Unit 5 was in a maintenance and refueling outage, hydrogen leaked from a line in the turbine generator cooling system and was ignited by a welder's torch. The explosion and subsequent fire caused the death of one maintenance worker and severely burned a second. There was no damage to equipment in the turbine hall. A state investigating commission reportedly concluded that the accident was caused by a flagrant violation of safety regulations.
Also in May, Unit 2 was shut down after a group of control rods malfunctioned during planned maintenance work. A similar malfunction occurred in Unit 5 before it was shut down for planned maintenance earlier in the month.
In June 1993, a radioactive "hot spot" was discovered near Unit 1. The contamination occurred after water seeped from the reactor building. A drain valve in the reactor's primary circuit make-up system apparently failed, and water seeped from the floor of one of the rooms of the reactor building onto the roof of the adjacent motor drive building. From there, heavy rains washed it to the ground. The event was classified as Level 2 on the INES.
In January 1994, contaminated primary circuit water entered a compressed air system in Unit 4 because of a valve failure. The contamination affected one room and some piping inside an auxiliary building. The event was classified as Level 2 on the INES.
Personnel, Cash Shortages. Plant workers reportedly sent a letter to then-President Kravchuk and the Ukrainian Parliament in May 1993, saying that the entire plant might have to be shut down because of a shortage of skilled personnel. The letter asked for salary increases to bring plant workers up to the level of Russian nuclear plant personnel. According to plant manager Vladimir Bronnikov, the plant lost 427 highly qualified workers in 1993. Bronnikov also said that the plant was paid for only 40 percent of the electricity it delivered in 1993. In addition, the plant is running out of spent fuel storage capacity. Bronnikov has reportedly said that without additional storage, the plant may be forced to shut down Unit 1 in 1995, and might have to close two more units in 1996.
According to a Ukrainian news agency report in October 1994, units 2 and 3 at the Zaporozhye plant had run out of fuel and did not have the $300-500 million needed to buy more. The report added that the plant also did not have the money needed to carry out maintenance work. In November 1994, plant manager Bronnikov said that Zaporozhye would use government credit to launch its 1995 engineering plans.
Some plant employees reportedly held a rally in July 1995 to protest delays in the payment of wages. According to a Ukrainian news agency report, Zaporozhye's management told employees that the plant was owed 12 million rubles by its customers, and thus had insufficient funds to pay wages on a regular basis.
Plant Performance. Zaporozhye's performance in 1995 was poor, with a capacity factor for the year of 54 percent. In addition, the plant had more malfunctions--35--than any other Ukrainian nuclear plant. Following the unplanned shutdown of Unit 1's reactor in early December 1995, Russia disconnected its power grid from that of Ukraine. The same week, Unit 5 shut down when a steam generator feedwater regulator got stuck.
In November 1995, Goskomatom management reportedly voted to remove Vladimir Bronnikov as general manager of Zaporozhye, but there has been no confirmation of his dismissal to date.
The Ukrainian Parliament's 1990 moratorium stopped construction on a sixth unit at the site. In October 1993, the Ukrainian parliament voted to lift the moratorium on new plant construction, citing Ukraine's energy shortage as the reason. In February 1994, then-President Kravchuk issued a directive calling for the completion by 1999 of five VVER-1000s that were under construction, including Zaporozhye 6. The unit began operation in October 1995.
According to plant manager Bronnikov, some upgrades could not be incorporated in Unit 6 because of a lack of money and equipment. He also reportedly said that because the plant owed 2.5 billion rubles to Russian scientific and technical institutes, all safety upgrade programs had been halted.
WANO Exchange Visits. The World Association of Nuclear Operators has sponsored several exchange visits involving the Zaporozhye plant. The plant has hosted personnel from the following plants or organizations:
In addition, personnel from Zaporozhye have visited the following plants:
Plant Twinning. The Zaporozhye plant is twinned with France's Bugey plant, with Germany's Neckarwestheim plant and with the Catawba plant in the United States.
U.S. Assistance. Working groups sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have explored a wide variety of issues at Zaporozhye, including regulatory inspection practices, fire-protection approaches and internal communications.
In 1993, Duke Engineering & Services (Europe) Inc. signed a contract with Zaporozhye to develop an independent spent fuel storage facility at the plant consisting initially of 14 dry storage casks. The company will provide design, fabrication, project management, technical support and training, licensing support, quality assurance and public outreach support for Zaporozhye. The contract provides for Zaporozhye to build additional casks as needed.
In July 1994, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency sponsored a feasibility study for the project, which also helped Duke Engineering & Services and Zaporozhye in initial planning and project development.
In July 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy agreed to provide financial support to the project through its International Nuclear Safety Program. The DOE contract provides funding for three dry storage casks, a cask transporter and miscellaneous ancillary equipment and engineering services.
Also under the DOE program, basic fire protection equipment, such as sprinkler heads, control panels, self-contained breathing apparatus, and sealants, is being supplied to Zaporozhye.
Spanish Contract. The Spanish company Tecnatom has been awarded a contract for the supply of nondestructive equipment to the Zaporozhye plant. The equipment, which includes a data acquisition system for reactor pressure vessel inspection, a mechanical and electrical system for reactor vessel closure stud inspection, an automatic pipe inspection system and a containment instrumentation system, is expected to be delivered in early 1996. Zaporozhye will reportedly pay for the equipment with money raised through barter deals involving uranium.
Croatian Contract. Croatia's Inetec has a contract, running from 1995 to 2000, to carry out eddy current testing of steam generator tubing and tube plugging, and to supply four sets of eddy current testing equipment and one set of plugging equipment.
IAEA Workshop. An IAEA team conducted a workshop at the Zaporozhye plant Oct. 30-Nov. 2, 1995. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss nuclear maintenance practices, especially preventive and predictive maintenance. An earlier mission to Zaporozhye had identified preventive maintenance as an area where significant improvements might be made, and the workshop was arranged as a follow-up. Zaporozhye made presentations on its maintenance programs, and the IAEA team made presentations on maintenance practices in Switzerland and the United States. The IAEA presentations included lessons learned in optimizing maintenance based on industry experience. Fifteen managers from Zaporozhye and six managers from Chernobyl attended the workshop.
Safety Review Mission. An International Atomic Energy Agency Safety Review Mission visited Zaporozhye in May 1994 in connection with the IAEA's program on the safety of VVER-1000s. The team identified the main engineered safety features at the plant and pointed out aspects of plant design that reflected international practice.
The team also identified design shortcomings through an examination of operational experience and a comparison with plant design in other countries. Most of the shortcomings--which included fuel assembly structural instability, higher incidence of instrumentation and control system failure, and heat exchanger fouling--were being addressed by the plant.
The team further identified areas in which management and operational safety practices could be improved. It pointed out that some elements of a safety culture were in place at the plant, but a self-critical attitude needed to be encouraged and allowed to develop.
ASSET Mission. An IAEA ASSET mission visited Zaporozhye June 13-24, 1994, to review the plant's management policy on safe operation. The team found that while the frequency of total plant events was comparable to that of other plants visited by ASSET missions, the frequency of safety significant events had increased in the last two years because of the problem of malfunctioning control rods. The team noted that the problem had been recognized and addressed by plant management.
The team reviewed 709 events that were reported between January 1990 and March 1994. Of these, the team found 275 to be safety relevant; nine were classified as Level 2, 15 were classified as Level 1 and the rest, as Level 0. The team identified eight safety problems, two of which--potential unreliability of reactivity control because of sticking control rods and unreliability of mechanical components (pumps and valves) in safety-related systems--were determined to be pending because corrective action had not been fully implemented.
The team conducted an in-depth analysis of three events, and noted that in one case its analysis confirmed the analysis done earlier by the plant. The team considered this to be a successful application of the ASSET methodology in event analysis.
Among the team's recommendations to improve the prevention of incidents were:
maintenance personnel should be trained in the processes and procedures of work on sensitive devices
operator response procedures for situations involving the failure of automatic control systems should be improved
management should consider the development of a comprehensive quality assurance program for plant modifications
the operational feedback program should be reviewed within a year for its effectiveness
internal reporting criteria should be changed so that non-safety relevant events are reported separately from safety relevant events.
Planned ASSET Mission. An ASSET peer review mission to Zaporozhye is scheduled for May 6-10, 1996. The mission will review the plant's analysis of events reflecting safety culture issues based on ASSET procedures.
December 1995