APPENDIX E Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs At Other Generator/Storage Locations
Department of Energy
Programmatic
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
and
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management Programs
Environmental Impact Statement
Preliminary Final
Volume 1
Appendix E
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs
At Other Generator/Storage Locations
March 24, 1995
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Management
Idaho Operations Office
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
2. SNF MANAGEMENT AT ORIGINATING SITES 2-1
2.1 Overview of SNF Types, Inventories, and Generation Rates 2-1
2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage 2-2
2.1.2 Domestic Licensed Research Reactors 2-6
2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 2-15
2.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program Plans and Alternatives 2-17
2.2.1 No Action 2-17
2.2.2 Decentralization 2-20
2.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis 2-21
2.2.4 Regionalization 2-22
2.2.5 Centralization 2-22
3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS 3-1
3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage 3-1
3.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory 3-1
3.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory 3-8
3.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories 3-15
3.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East 3-23
3.2 Domestic Research Reactors 3-33
3.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology Research
Reactor 3-34
3.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor 3-37
3.2.3 University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor 3-39
3.2.4 University of Michigan Ford Nuclear Reactor 3-41
3.2.5 University of Texas TRIGA 3-43
3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 3-45
3.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project 3-46
3.3.2 Fort St. Vrain 3-52
3.3.3 B&W Lynchburg 3-58
4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 4-1
4.1 No Action 4-1
4.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage 4-1
4.1.2 Domestic Research Reactors 4-4
4.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 4-7
4.2 Decentralization 4-9
4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis 4-10
4.4 Regionalization 4-10
4.5 Centralization 4-10
5. CUMULATIVE IMPACTS 5-1
5.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors 5-1
5.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory 5-1
5.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory 5-2
5.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories 5-2
5.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East 5-2
5.2 Domestic Research Reactors 5-2
5.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology 5-2
5.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5-3
5.2.3 Conclusion 5-3
5.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 5-3
6. ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED 6-1
6.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors 6-1
6.2 Domestic Research Reactors 6-1
6.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 6-2
7. IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES 7-1
7.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors 7-1
7.2 Domestic Research Reactors 7-1
7.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel 7-2
TABLES
2.1-1 Domestic non-DOE research reactors 2-7
2.1-2 Category 1 projected SNF inventories 2-12
2.1-3 Category 2 projected SNF inventories 2-13
1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is performing a DOE-wide programmatic
evaluation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives in order to determine the
appropriate means of managing existing and projected quantities of SNF from now until the year
2035. At the same time, the DOE is performing a site-specific assessment of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in order to determine how to manage environmental restoration,
waste management, and SNF at the INEL. Sites currently involved with the management of
major fractions of DOE SNF (i.e., the Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, and INEL), alternative
sites being analyzed for management of SNF (Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site), and
sites involved with management of SNF from Naval Reactors are addressed in separate
appendixes to this volume of the environmental impact statement (EIS).
This appendix addresses other DOE sites and locations which currently generate and
manage small quantities of SNF. These facilities are presently storing and/or generating, in most
cases, relatively small quantities of SNF which the DOE has taken title to, has possession of, or
will take possession of at sometime in the future. These facilities, referred to in this document as
"originating sites," include the following:
- DOE, University, and Other Research and Test Reactors
The following DOE facilities are addressed in this appendix:
Brookhaven National Laboratories
- High Flux Beam Reactor
- Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor
Los Alamos National Laboratory
- Omega West Reactor
- Chemistry-Metallurgy Research Facility
Sandia National Laboratories
- Manzano Storage Structures
- Annular Core Research Reactor
- Sandia Pulse Reactor II and III and Critical Assembly
- Hot Cell Facility
- Special Nuclear Materials Storage Facility
Argonne National Laboratory - East
- Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell
- Chicago Pile 5
In addition, the DOE has title to SNF from university and other domestic research
reactors. These facilities are identified and data provided on both the quantity of
spent fuel in storage and estimates of the future generation rate of SNF at these
facilities. However, rather than address each of these university and other research
reactor facilities individually, representative facilities will be used when addressing
specific topics related to facilities, the SNF, or projected environmental impacts
associated with the various fuel management alternatives.
- Commercial Power Reactor Fuels
The DOE has possession of 125 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and 20 complete or
sectioned spent nuclear fuel rods from various nuclear power plants that were to be
used to support DOE-sponsored research and development programs. This SNF is
currently in storage at either the West Valley Demonstration Project in West Valley,
New York, or the B&W Lynchburg Technology Center in Campbell County, Virginia.
In addition, according to the terms of a three-party agreement between the Public
Services Company of Colorado, General Atomics, and the Atomic Energy Commission,
the DOE has a commitment to provide dry storage at the INEL for eight segments of
Fort St. Vrain spent fuel (approximately 1,920 spent fuel elements). Three segments
of this SNF have been shipped to the INEL; the other five are currently being stored
at the Fort St. Vrain site.
The DOE also has possession of other commercial SNF, including that from the
Arkansas, Calvert Cliffs, Connecticut Yankee, Consolidated Edison, Cooper, Dresden,
H. B. Robinson, Monticello, Oconee, Peach Bottom, Point Beach, Quad Cities, Saxton,
Shippingport, Surry, and Three Mile Island reactors. These represent very small
quantities of SNF and are currently stored at the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, Naval
Reactor Facility at the INEL, or the ORR. This commercial SNF is addressed in the
corresponding appendix for each of these sites and is not discussed in detail in this
appendix.
Spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors which is currently at commercial
reactor sites will fall under the purview of the DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management and is outside the scope of this EIS.
Although these facilities represent small sources of SNF, an evaluation has been conducted
in order to consider the impacts at these originating sites along with the cumulative impacts of
management of all DOE SNF.
Of the five SNF management alternatives being evaluated (Volume 1, Chapter 3), only the
two alternatives that preclude the shipment of SNF (Alternative 1 - No Action and Alternative 2
- Decentralization) have a definable impact on the sites and facilities discussed in this appendix.
Several facilities generating SNF have limited storage capacities, and/or the facility license from
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may limit the quantity of fuel permitted to be
stored onsite. Implementation of the No Action Alternative could mean that some of the
facilities with limited SNF storage capacity would have to shut down. The impact on some
facilities would be the need to construct additional onsite SNF storage capacity in order to
continue safe operation. Expansion of SNF storage capacity is only viable provided adequate
space and adequate funding are available and expansion is approved through the NRC licensing
process.
In the case of the West Valley Demonstration Project, the SNF is currently being stored in
accordance with the applicable DOE Orders. Extended storage of SNF at this site would require
construction of a concrete pad for a dry storage facility. However, the DOE has entered into an
agreement with an agency of the State of New York to remove all SNF from the West Valley
Demonstration Project. An extension to the schedule for removal of SNF has been requested by
DOE and the agreement with the state is being renegotiated.
The other alternatives, which involve the shipment of the SNF from the site at which it is
generated to one or more DOE SNF interim storage facilities, reflect the current mode of SNF
management at the generating facilities. Even though the selection of a site where SNF may be
transported and stored may be different than the current planning basis, shipment to a different
location does not impact the facility or site at which the SNF is generated.
Section 2 of this appendix presents a description of SNF management at the originating
sites, including an overview of the types and inventories for SNF in three major categories: DOE
test and experimental reactors; domestic research reactors; and nuclear power reactor spent fuel.
Section 3 presents summary descriptions of the potentially affected environments for the three
categories, and Section 4 describes the environmental consequences of SNF management
alternatives at these sites. Cumulative impacts are presented in Section 5, adverse impacts that
cannot be avoided in Section 6, and irreversible and irretrievable commitments in Section 7.
2. SNF MANAGEMENT AT ORIGINATING SITES
2.1 Overview of SNF Types, Inventories, and Generation Rates
This appendix addresses the management of SNF at originating sites, defined as DOE test
and experimental reactors, domestic research reactors, and certain nuclear power plant spent
fuels now in storage. Specific discussions of the various sites are provided in following sections.
DOE experimental reactors and small-quantity storage: These reactors and SNF
storage facilities are located on DOE-owned sites, such as Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories.
These sites host a variety of research and development or production activities, which
may include test or experimental reactors and storage of small quantities of SNF, in
different areas of the site.
- Domestic research reactors: The greatest variations in site characteristics are those
associated with research reactors. Most sites are at colleges or universities. However,
a few of them are sited at government and industrial facilities.
- Nuclear power plant spent fuel: The SNF in this category is not located at currently
operating nuclear reactor facilities. The facilities housing the subject SNF are located
at the following sites: 1) the former West Valley fuel reprocessing site, 2) the
shutdown Fort St. Vrain nuclear power plant site (currently undergoing
decommissioning), and 3) a commercial research laboratory (B&W Lynchburg
Technology Center) located on a large rural site. The DOE also has possession of
other commercial SNF, including that from the Arkansas, Calvert Cliffs, Connecticut
Yankee, Consolidated Edison, Cooper, Dresden H. B. Robinson, Monticello, Oconee,
Peach Bottom, Point Beach, Quad Cities, Saxton, Shippingport, Surry, and Three Mile
Island reactors. These represent very small quantities of SNF and are currently stored
at the Hanford Site, INE~ SRS, Naval Reactors Facility at the INEl, or the ORR.
This commercial SNF is addressed in the corresponding appendix for each of these
sites and is not discussed further in this appendix.
The SNFs addressed in this appendix are of varying sizes and design configurations. In
general, nuclear fuel consists of an assembly of structural components, such as plates or hollow
rods, containing fissionable material. The fuel may be in the form of metal or a compound (e.g.,
oxide, carbide, nitride) and may vary in the degree of enrichment of the uranium -235 isotope.
The structural materials may be aluminum, stainless steel, zirconium alloy, or other material such
as ceramics. They form a barrier isolating the fuel (and fission products) from the reactor
coolant or storage facility environment as well as providing structural support for maintaining the
geometry of the fuel. The components are arranged into a specific geometric configuration
determined by the type of reactor and desired performance. This assembly of fuel-bearing
components is referred to as a "fuel element" (also referred to in the nuclear industry as a fuel
assembly).
For each of the major facility categories, the following subsections provide details on the
quantities of SNF currently in storage and the quantities of additional SNF expected to be
produced by the end of the year 2035.
2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage
The Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia
National Laboratories use test and experimental reactors for research and for small-scale
production of medical and other specific isotopes. In addition, small quantities of SNF are
currently in storage at these sites as well as at Argonne National Laboratory - East. The amount
of SNF generated by these facilities, the amount expected to be generated through the year 2035,
and accommodations being undertaken at the present time to store the SNF located at these
facilities are discussed in the following sections.
2.1.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory.
2.1.1.2.1 High Flux Seam Reactor-By mid-1995 there are projected to be 937
High Flux Beam Reactor elements (0.
241 MmlIM) in the reactor or in onsite wet storage. A
total of 5,600 additional SNF elements (1.498 MThM) are predicted to be produced if the
reactor continues operation through the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.1.2.2 Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor-The Brookhaven Medical
Research Reactor is operating at the present time and has 36 elements (0.
0034 MTHM) in the
rcactor or in onsite wet storage. Thirty-two additional SNF elements (0.0028 MTHM) are
expected to be produced by the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory.
2.1.1.2.1 Omega West Reactor-The Omega West Reactor has been permanently
shut down.
This reactor is being decommissioned. There are no elements in the reactor, and all
of the 86 elements (0.014 MTHM) are in temporary dry storage at the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Complex (Wichmann 1 995a).
Additional reactor sites and critical facilities that are part of the los Alamos National
Laboratory are listed below. Each contains some radioactive and fissionable materials but does
not routinely produce SNF (ANS 1988):
Big Ten Critical Assembly
- Fast Burst Reactor - GODWA
- Fast Burst Reactor - SKUA
- Flattop Critical Assembly
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - COMET
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - HONEYCOMB
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - PLANET
- General Purpose Critical Assembly - VENUS
- General Purpose Critical Assembly Machine
- Solution High Energy Burst Assembly
2.1.1.3 Sandla National Laboratories. The Sandia National Laboratory reactors operate
as needed on a low duty cycle, so the fission product inventories remain low and the fuel loading
lasts for the life of the reactor, eliminating routine generation of spent fuel. Hence, except for a
few broken plates that are in storage, the SNF at Sandia National Laboratories is still in use in
the reactors (DOE 1993d).
The Sandia National Laboratories contain five SNF storage facilities: the Manzano Storage
Structures, the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility, the Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility, the
Hot Cell Facility, and the Special Nuclear Materials storage facility (DOE 1993b).
2.1.1.3.1 Manrano Storage Structures-The Manzano Storage Structures are
reinforced concrete bunkers located in the southeast portion of Kirtland Air Force Base.
Until
recently, when Sandia National Laboratories took responsibility for the site, the Manzano
facilities were operated and maintained by the Department of Defense. The Sandia National
Laboratories currently use four structures for dry storage of reactor-irradiated nuclear material
(DOE 1993b). There is a total of 0.025 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of SNF in storage
at this facility (Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.1.3.2 Annular Core Research Reactor-The Annular Core Research Reactor is
a pool-type research reactor capable of steady-state, pulse, and tailored transient operation.
The
Annular Core Research Reactor facility includes the reactor pool, one safe, and eight dry floor
storage vaults, all located in the high-bay of Building 6588. The eight storage vaults on the high-
bay floor are used to securely store irradiated experiments containing a variety of nuclear
materials, but principally U-235. Materials from only three experiments containing reactor
irradiated nuclear materials are stored at the Annular Core Research Reactor (DOE 1993b).
There are a total of 438 elements plus uranium from three experiments (for a total of
0.04MTHM) in use or storage at these facilities (Wichmann 1995a).
In addition, DOE is considering using the Annular Core Research Reactor for production of
molybdenum-99. If the molybdenum -99 production mission is assigned to the Annular Core
Research Reactor, the current reactor fuel would likely be removed and would need to be stored
at the start of, or within a few years of starting, operation (SNL 1994).
2.1.1.3.3 Sandia Pulse Reactor Hand HI, and Critical Assembly- Three reactors
are in operation at the Sandia Pulse Reactor facility: Sandia Pulse Reactor II and Sandia Pulse
Reactor III are unmoderated, fast-burst reactors capable of pulsed and steady-state operation.
The Critical Assembly is a small, water-moderated reactor used to perform measurements of key
reactor parameters to benchmark the computer calculations and thereby refine the designs for a
planned space propulsion reactor. The yard storage holes are 19 stainless-steel types located in a
corner of the Sandia Pulse Reactor compound. These tubes are surrounded by a high-density
concrete monolith. The yard holes are used to securely store irradiated experiments containing a
variety of nuclear materials, but principally U-235. All of the materials remain in their own
containers, some of which consist of double containment. At the Special Nuclear Material dry
storage facility, Sandia National Laboratories stores previously failed fuel elements from Sandia
Pulse Reactor II and elements from experiments that have been exposed to short irradiation
periods (DOE 1993b). There are a total of 43 elements (with a total of 0.37 MTHM) of SNF in
use or storage at these facilities (Wichmann 1995a).
Future plans include bringing on-line an additional pulse reactor named Sandia Pulse
Reactor IlIM. With this new reactor, a total of three pulse reactors would be located at Sandia
National Laboratories' Technical Area V.
2.1.1.3.4 Hot Cell Facilty-The Hot Cell Facility at Sandia National Laboratories is
a nonreactor nuclear facility housed in Building 6580 in Technical Area V.
Research programs
at Sandia National Laboratories--material studies, fuel studies, and safety studies.-require that
experiments containing radioactive materials be assembled and/or disassembled, samples
prepared, and microscopic and chemical analyses performed. The principal storage facility for
the Hot Cell Facility is Room 108, which is a heavily shielded room used previously as a
preparation room next to the irradiation room of the Sandia Engineering Reactor, which has
been defueled. There are a series of 13 storage holes under the Hot Cell Facility Monorail that
are available to store irradiated material coming into or out of the Hot Cell Facility. Only one of
the holes is currently in use. The other areas of the Hot Cell Facility are used for storing minor
amounts of material (DOE 1993b) There is a total of 0.009 MTHM of SNF in storage at this
facility (Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East. The Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility,
operated by the Materials Science Division, consists of a concrete-shielded, low-flow inert-
atmosphere complex that was designed for the examination of irradiated plutonium fuel
assemblies and related hardware (DOE 1993d). There are a total of four units of Experimental
Breeder Reactor fuel, one canister containing remnants of commercial SNF, and 16 SNF
elements from Oak Ridge (For a total of 0.081 MTHM) in storage (Wichmann 1995a).
The Chicago Pile 5 Building houses a heavy-water, moderated reactor whose fuel has been
removed and shipped offsite. Currently, the Chicago Pile S is in the process of being
decontaminated and decommissioned and contains only two highly enriched uranium target (i.e.,
converter) elements (DOE 1993d).
2.1.2 Domestic Licensed Research Reactors
Table 2.1-1 identifies 57 non-DOE facilities representing domestic, licensed, small
generators of SNF (NRC 1993a; ANS 1988). They include training, research, and test reactors at
universities, commercial establishments, and several government installations; all but one
(McClellan Air Force Base) have been licensed by the NRC. Although they are not DOE
Facilities, DOE has title to the SNF and has the responsibility for interim storage and ultimate
disposition.
In order to assess their SNF management capabilities, these 57 facilities have been
identified as belonging to one of three categories. These categories identify the key
characteristics of a facility relevant to the assessment of DOE-postulated SNF alternatives. The
three categories are:
Category 1 - Facilities that have limited onsite storage capacity compared to the
amount of SNF projected to be generated at their facility by the year 2035
Category 2 - Facilities that do not routinely generate additional SNF
Category 3 - Facilities that no longer possess SNF onsite.
The category for each facility is identified in Table 2.1-1.
Table 2.1-1. Domestic non-DOE research reactors.
Licensee
location Reactor type NRC Docket no. Category
Aerotest TRIGA (Indus) 50-228 2
San Ramon, CA
Arkansas Tech Univ. TRIGA 50-606 2
Russellville, AR
Armed Forces TRIGA 50-170 2
Radiobiology Research
Institute (AFRRI)
Bethesda, MD
Brigham Young Univ. L-77 50-262 3
Provo, UT
Catholic University AGN-201 50-77 3
Washington, DC
Cintichem, Inc. Pool 50-54 3
Tuxedo, NY
Cornell University TRIGA 50-157 2
Ithaca, NY
Cornell University ZPR 50-97 2
Ithaca, NY
Dow Chemical Company TRIGA 50-264 2
Midland, MI
General Atomics TRIGA Mark I 50-89 2
San Diego, CA
General Atomics TRIGA Mark F 50-163 2
San Diego, CA
General Electric Co. NTR 50-73 1
Pleasanton, CA
Georgia Institute of Research HW 50-160 2
Technology
Atlanta, GA
Idaho State University AGN-201 50-284 2
Pocatello, ID
Iowa State University MTR-10 Pool 50-116 2
Ames, IA
Kansas State University TRIGA 50-188 1
Manhattan, KS
Licensee
location Reactor type NRC Docket no. Category
McClellan Air Force Base SNRS None 2
McClellan, CA
Manhattan College Tank-ZPR 50-199 2
Riverdale, NY
Massachusetts Institute HW 50-20 1
Research of Technology
Cambridge, MA
N.S. Savannah PWR 50-238 3
Mount Pleasant, SC
NASA Plum Brook NASA Tr. Tank 50-185 3
Sandusky, OH
National Institute of Test 50-184 1
Standards and
Technology (NIST)
Gaithersburg, MD
North Carolina State U. Pulstar 50-297 2
Raleigh, NC
Ohio State University Pool 50-150 2
Columbus, OH
Oregon State University TRIGA 50-243 2
Corvallis, OR
Penn State University TRIGA 50-5 2
University Park, PA
Purdue University Lockheed 50-182 2
West Lafayette, IN
Reed College TRIGA 50-288 2
Portland, OR
Rensselaer Polytechnic Critical Assembly 50-225 2
Institute
Troy, NY
Rhode Island Atomic Pool 50-193 1
Energy Commission
Narragansett, RI
State Univ. of New York Pulstar 50-57 1
Buffalo
Buffalo, NY
Texas A&M University AGN-201 50-59 2
College Station, TX
Texas A&M University TRIGA 50-128 1
College Station, TX
U.S. Geological Survey TRIGA 50-274 1
Denver, CO
University of Arizona TRIGA 50-113 2
Tucson, AZ
University of CaliforniaTRIGA 50-224 3
at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA
University of CaliforniaTRIGA 50-326 2
at Irvine
Irvine, CA
University of CaliforniaEducator 50-142 3
at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA
University of Florida Argonaut 50-83 2
Gainesville, FL
University of Illinois LOPRA 50-356 1
Urbana, IL
University of Kansas Lockheed 50-148 3
Lawrence, KS
University of Maryland TRIGA 50-166 2
College Park, MD
University of Mass. GE Pool 50-223 2
at Lowell
Lowell, MA
University of Michigan Pool 50-2 1
Ann Arbor, MI
University of Missouri Tank 50-186 1
Columbia
Columbia, MO
University of Missouri Pool 50-123 2
Rolla
Rolla, MO
University of New AGN-201 50-252 2
Mexico
Albuquerque, NM
University of Texas TRIGA-Mark II 50-602 2
Austin, TX
University of Utah TRIGA 50-407 2
Salt Lake City, UT
University of Virginia Pool 50-62 1
Charlottesville, VA
University of WashingtonArgonaut 50-139 3
Seattle, WA
University of Wisconsin TRIGA 50-156 2
Madison, WI
Veterans Admin. Medical TRIGA 50-131 2
Center
Omaha, NE
Washington State U. TRIGA 50-27 2
Pullman, WA
Watertown Army Pool 50-47 3
Materials Research
Reactor
Watertown, MA
Westinghouse Zion W Tank 50-22 3
Training Reactor
Pittsburgh, PA
Worcester Polytechnic Pool 50-134 2
Institute
Worcester, MA
2.1.2.1 Reactors with Limited Storage Capacity. The sites in Category I have limited
storage capacity when compared to the amount of SNF that is projected to be generated by 2035.
Table 2.1-2 lists the projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 with the corresponding MTHM at
each of the Category 1 sites. Assuming continuing operation of each reactor, the projected
amount of additional SNF that would be generated through 2035 is also provided in Table 2.1-2.
To reduce the risk of theft or diversion of highly enriched uranium fuel and the
consequences to public health, safety, and the environment from such theft or diversion, the NRC
has imposed limitations on the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in domestic nonpower
reactors. Unless the NRC has determined that the nonpower reactor has a unique purpose
requiring the use of high enriched uranium fuel, each licensee will replace all highly enriched
uranium fuel in its possession with available low enriched uranium fuel acceptable to the
Commission. If federal government funding for conversion is not available, the conversion from
high enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel may be deferred on an annual basis. A
number of domestic research reactors are in the process of converting from highly enriched
uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel.
2.1.2.2 Reactors with Sufficient Storage Capacity. Licensed domestic research reactor
sites with sufficient SNF storage capacity are listed in Table 2.1-3. These Category 2 sites include
operating facilities with low fuel burnup rates, where the amount of SNF generated is not
expected to exceed the current onsite storage capacity. Some Category 2 sites are also
converting from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel but have sufficient
capacity to store this additional SNF onsite.
The projected inventory at each reactor site as of June 1, 1995 and the corresponding
MTHM are presented in Table 2.1-3. The amount of SNF that is projected to be generated
through the year 2035 is also listed in Table 2.1-3.
2.1.2.3 Reactors without SNF Onsite. The licensed domestic research reactors that are
no longer operating and have shipped all SNF offsite are identified as Category 3 in Table 2.1-1.
These sites either have been decommissioned or are in the process of decommissioning. Some of
the facilities have been decontaminated, although they may not have been completely dismantled.
Table 2.1-2. Category 1 projected SNF inventories.
Licensee Inventory Future increases
location as of June 1, 1995 through 2035
Elements MTHM Elements MTHM
Kansas State 107 0.020 140 0.027
University
Manhattan, KS
Massachusetts 66 0.021 480 0.150
Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA
National Institute 186 0.04 1,160 0.300
of Standards and
Technology
Gaithersburg, MD
Rhode Island 57 0.030 160 0.222
Atomic Energy
Commission
Narragansett, RI
State University of 25 0.493 5 0.100
New York - Buffalo
Buffalo, NY
Texas A&M (TRIGA) 186 0.030 378 0.060
College Station, TX
U.S. Geological 161 0.032 39 0.010
Survey
Denver, CO
University of 198 0.037 313 0.59
Illinois
Urbana, IL
University of 103 0.072 480 0.400
Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI
University of 82 0.055 1,040 0.700
Missouri
Columbia, MO
University of 65 0.066 60 0.210
Virginia
Charlottesville, VA
a. Source: Wichmann 1995a.
Note: Projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 is 0.896 MTHM.
Projected additional SNF generated through 2035 is 2.769 MTHM.
Table 2.1-3. Category 2 projected SNF inventories.
Licensee Inventory Future increase
location as of June 1, 1995 through 2035
Elements MTHM Elements MTHM
Aerotest 91 0.015 0 0
San Ramon, CA
Arkansas Tech. Univ. 0 0 0 0
Russellville, AR
Armed Forces Radiobiology 95 0.018 0 0
Research Institute
Bethesda, MD
Cornell University (TRIGA) 123 0.023 770 0.143
Ithaca, NY
Cornell University (ZPR) 814d 1.7d 0 0
Ithaca, NY
Dow Chemical Company 78 0.014 0 0
Midland, MI
General Atomicsc 263 0.058 20 0.016
San Diego, CA
GE Nuclear Test Reactor 8 0.008 0 0
Plesanton, CA
Georgia Institute of Technology 50 0.030 120 0.107
Atlanta, GA
Idaho State University 9d 0.011d 0 0
Pocatello, ID
Iowa State University 27 0.024 0 0
Ames, IA
McClellan Air Force Base 90 0.015 0 0
McClellan, CA
Manhattan College 17d 0.019d 0 0
Riverdale, NY
North Carolina State U. 34 0.428 25 0.315
Raleigh, NC
Ohio State University 24 0.021 0 0
Columbus, OH and
638b
Oregon State University 96 0.017 96 0.060
Corvallis, OR
Pennsylvania State Univ. 175 0.041 40 0.009
University Park, PA
Purdue University 13 0.002 13 0.063
West Lafayette, IN
Reed College 67 0.013 0 0
Portland, OR
Rensselaer Polytechnic Instituteb 597d 0.388d 0 0
Troy, NY
Licensee Inventory Future increase
location as of June 1, 1995 through 2035
Elements MTHM Elements MTHM
Texas A&M - AGN-201 9 0.011 0 0
College Station, TX
University of Arizona 97 0.081 8 0.0015
Tucson, AZ
University of California 113 0.021 0 0
Irvine
Irvine, CA
University of Florida 23 0.04 22 0.172
Gainesville, FL
University of Maryland 93 0.016 93 0.016
College Park, MD
University of Mass. Lowell 26 0.004 26 0.100
Lowell, MA
University of Missouri 56 0.269 0 0
Rolla, MO
University of New Mexico 9d 0.004d 0 0
Albuquerque, NM
University of Texas 154 0.029 0 0
Austin, TX
University of Utah 139 0.026 0 0
Salt Lake City, UT
University of Wisconsin 228 0.039 0 0
Madison, WI
Veterans Admin. Medical 56 0.001 0 0
Center
Omaha, NE
Washington State Univ. 215 0.037 112 0.051
Pullman, WA
Worcester Polytechnic 27e 0.022 0 0
Institute
Worcester, MA
a. Source: Wichmann 1995a and Wichmann 1995b.
b. Fuel pins, not reactor assemblies.
c. Reactor scheduled to shut down in 1998.
d. Contact-handled fuel/targets (i.e., with radiation levels low enough to permit handling without
shielding or remote operations), even though slightly irradiated, are not included as SNF.
Note: The projected inventory as of June 1, 1995 is expected to be 1.323 MTHM and the
approximate total for the additional SNF projected to be generated through 2035 is 1.054
MTHM. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
The SNF that originated at these sites has either been reprocessed or is stored and accounted for
at DOE storage facilities.
2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
This subsection addresses spent nuclear power plant fuel that DOE has possession of or will
take possession of sometime in the future. Currently this fuel is in storage at one of three sites:
the West Valley Demonstration Project, the Fort St. Vrain nuclear power plant site, and the
B&W Lynchburg Technology Center in Lynchburg, Virginia. In all cases, no new additional SNF
is being or will be added to existing SNF inventories.
2.1.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project. The West Valley Demonstration~ Project is
located on the site of the first U.S. commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, which was
operated by Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., until 1972 (WVNS 1994).
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., shut down the reprocessing facility in 1972 in order to
implement modifications for the purpose of increasing the facility's capacity. From 1973 to 1975
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., continued to accept a total of 750 SNF elements. However, in 1976,
it withdrew from the reprocessing business (WVNS 1994).
In 1980 Congress enacted Public Law 96-368, the West Valley Demonstration Project Act.
The act directed the DOE to develop and demonstrate the technology for solidifying high-level
waste in storage at the West Valley Demonstration Project so that this waste would be suitable
for transportation to and long-term disposal in a federal repository (wvNS 1994).
The owners of the 750 SNF elements still in storage at the West Valley facility fuel storage
pool were informed in 1981 that they would have to take back their SNF. By 1986, 625 of the
elements had been returned to their respective owners; then, however, DOE took possession of
the remaining 125 SNF elements (26.65 MTHM) under an agreement with Nuclear Fuel Services,
Inc. The DOE was to use these 125 elements to demonstrate the safe transportation and long-
term storage of SNF in a dual-purpose cask. These 125 SNF elements are included in this EIS
(Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.3.2 Fon St. Vrain. Fort St. Vrain, a 330 MWe (Megawatt electric) high-temperature
gas-cooled reactor power plant, went into operation in January 1979 and teriminated commercial
operation in August 1989. It is currently undergoing decommissioning (FSV 1990a; NRC 1991a)
Prior to August 1989 a three-party agreement was reached between the Public Services
Company of Colorado (the owner of Fort St. Vrain), General Atomics (the reactor developer),
and the DOE that called for the DOE to take possession of eight segments of approximately 240
SNF elements each of SNF from the Fort St. Vrain for dry storage at the INEL. SNF from the
Fort St. Vrain had been shipped to the INEL when a court action was initiated by the state of
Idaho to stop any additional shipment of SNF to INEL.
In an effort to facilitate the continued decommissioning of the Fort St. Vrain station, the
Public Services Company of Colorado has decided to store the Fort St. Vrain's SNF in a modular
vault dry storage system, which is a reinforced concrete and sheathed steel frame building located
on the Fort St. Vrain site immediately adjacent to but outside the fence around the Fort St.
Vrain site. The modular vault dry storage system, designed to house 1,482 high-temperature, gas-
cooled reactor SNF elements, 6 neutron source elements, and 37 keyed top reflector elements,
became operational in late 1991 (FSV 1990a). There are 1,464 elements (16 MTHM) currently
in storage in the modular vault dry storage system (Wichmann 1995a).
2.1.3.3 B&W Lynchburg. The B&W facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, is engaged in
research and development on uranium fuels and the overall fuel cycle, and in the examination
and testing of irradiated fuels (NRC 1987).
B&W Lynchburg currently has in storage at its facility 0.044 MTHM of SNF stored in 15
cannisters (Wichmann 1995a) consisting of 3 full.length fuel rods, 17 sectioned fuel rods, and a
small quantity of fuel debris from Three Mile Island 2. All of this SNF material is in the
possession of the DOE and was provided to B&W under a DOE contract for Fuel Performance
Improvements Programs. None of the activities ongoing at B&W Lynchburg could result in the
generation of additional SNF for which the DOE has responsibility, since the facility's three
reactors have been decommissioned (Wright 1993; ANS 1988).
2.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program Plans and Alternatives
The plans for management of SNF at originating sites, including generating and storage
sites, or facilities generating small annual quantities of SNF, were determined by conducting a
survey of the NRC licensees and others operating these sites. These plans, as they are projected
to be affected by the alternatives being assessed in this EIS, are presented in this section.
Availability of onsite SNF storage capacity is the primary consequence of DOE SNF
management decisions for all originating sites. Of the five DOE SNF management alternatives,
only Alternative 1 (No Action - no SNF transportation) may not have been addressed under the
NRC licensing process for an individual SNF originating site. DOE management plans for the
alternatives which involve SNF transportation- would not affect the originating sites. The.
management plans at the DOE facilities to which the SNF may be shipped are addressed in the
sections of this EIS dealing with those DOE facilities. The alternate plans with regard to
transportation are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1. Accordingly, the next few subsections
will focus primarily on the No Action Alternative and describe general information on SNF
produced at the originating sites, including non-DOE facilities storing SNF.
2.2.1 No Action
The No Action Alternative is intended to evaluate the impact of storage of SNF at the
current storage and originating sites. This means that all facilities which are generating or storing
SNF and intend to ship SNF to a DOE facility would maintain their SNF onsite. If the SNF-
originating site has adequate storage capacity, operations at the site would continue without
change of plans. If SNF storage capacity is inadequate, new plans, including expansion of storage
capacity or decreasing the rate of fuel burn-up, would have to be considered. Possible SNF
management plans are discussed more specifically in the following subsections.
Of the total of approximately 2,700 MThM of SNF estimated as the total DOE inventory
by 2035, approximately 51 MTHM of SNF is associated with the facilities addressed in this
appendix (Wichmann 1995a).
2.2.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. There is insufficient
onsite storage capacity at the High Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory to
store all of the SNF projected to be generated through the year 2035. If SNF shipments are no
made to another DOE storage facility, at the current rate of generation the remaining onsite
storage space would be depleted in January 1996. There is a plan to install a storage rack in the
existing wet storage facility that would add space for 162 elements. Even with this rack, storage
space would be depleted in 1998. If SNF could not be shipped by that time, the arrangement of
existing racks could be modified to provide additional space. There are no plans to shut down
the reactor in the near future (Carelli 1993).
2.2.1.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Based on current projections, the onsite storage
capacity of 11 of the 45 domestic research reactors would be exhausted before the year 2035 if
the No Action Alternative were to be implemented. All 11 of these facilities have been
identified as Category 1.
Several of the facilities in Category 1 have indicated that they would consider various
options of increasing storage capacity if the No Action Alternative were to be implemented. Five
would consider reracking, one would consider expanding dry storage within the reactor building,
three would consider expanding wet storage within the reactor building, and one would consider
adding 200 square feet (18.6 square meters) of wet storage area outside the reactor building.
Any previously planned expansion of onsite SNF storage capacity at individual odginating
facilities is addressed in site-specific NRC environmental assessments and thus is not considered
to be a consequence of the proposed actions under this ElS. The facilities that are already
planning to expand their SNF storage capacity include the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
At one of these facilities the expanded storage capacity is projected to be adequate through
the year 2005. However, without SNF transportation through the year 2035, none of the facilities
would have adequate storage capacity. One of the facilities in Category 1 has offloaded its highly
enriched uranium fuel and would consider reracking but might elect to shut down in 2001
because of a lack of wet storage capacity (Jentz 1993).
All 34 facilities identified as Category 2 have sufficient SNF storage capacity onsite to
accommodate any of the DOE SNF alternatives. Two facilities may elect to shut down before
the year 2005: one because it may not renew its license; the other because, without transferring
SNF offsite, it might not meet licensing limits on possession of uranium-235 after conversion from
highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel. One facility, which expects to convert
from highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel, might elect to shut down in the
year 2005 if no offsite transportation were available, unless it can expand its SNF wet storage
capacity. A few facilities have indicated that they will appeal the NRC-required conversion of
highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel if no oflsite transportation is allowed.
Although several Category 2 facilities can operate practically indefinitely without refueling, it is
questionable how many of them would operate as planned if there were no SNF transportation
through the year 2035. Many research reactors operate with variable core loadings, storing, and
reusing partially depleted fuel elements as well as adding new fuel to the reactor (Jentz 1993).
2.2.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The No Action Alternative
necessitating extended interim onsite storage of SNF would require a revision of the SNF
management program at the West Valley Demonstration Project. The need to revise this
program is a result of the following (DOE 1993b):
The West Valley fuel pool is almost 30 years old and does not meet current DOE
design criteria.
The pool is single-walled, unlined, and lacks the capability for leak detection, thus
presenting the potential for an undetected release to the environment.
Continued storage of fuel onsite would interfere with and for some areas prevent the
ongoing decontamination and decommissioning activities at the West Valley
Demonstration Project facility from proceeding as planned.
The management of SNF at the West Valley Demonstration Project is to continue the use
of the existing spent fuel pool with no modifications.
Loss of access to the INEL for storage of its SNF has already resulted in the construction o
new onsite SNF storage at Fort St. Vrain. However, under this alternative Public Service
Company of Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming free of radioactive materials by
1998 under this option.
Adequate storage capacity exists and the storage facilities are in adequate condition at the
B&W Lynchburg Technology Center (DOE 1993b).
2.2.2 Decentralization
Alternative 2, Decentralization, is similar to the No Action Alternative except that limited
offsite shipments are permitted as required to allow continued operation of the given facility.
Decentralization is not expected to impose additional requirements for storing SNF at the
facilities included in this appendix above those already identified under the No Action
Alternative. Planning at the sites receiving SNF shipments that would be allowed under this
alternative is addressed in Appendixes A, B, and C. Intersite transportation impacts are analyzed
in Appendix I to Volume 1.
2.2.2.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Smell Ouantity &orage. Compared to the
restrictions imposed under the No Action Alternative, Decentralization does not change the
management plans at these DOE experimental reactors and small.quantity storage facilities.
2.2.2.2 Domestic Research Reactors. The Decentralization Alternative is similar to the
No Action Alternative, except that limited offsite shipments are permitted as required to allow
continued operation of the given facility. Under this alternative, the domestic research reactors
are allowed to return to DOE any SNF in excess of their current onsite storage capacity.
Additional storage capacity would be not be required at these originating facilities. Therefore,
decentralization does not affect existing SNF management plans at university research reactors or
other facilities in the domestic research reactor group, except for possible rerouting of SNF
shipments to INEL or Savannah River Site.
2.2.2.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Decentralization Alternative is
similar to the No Action Alternative, except that limited offsite shipments are permitted as
required to allow continued operation of the given facility. The three facilities being addressed in
this subsection are only storing SNF and do not generate additional SNF. Because SNF would
not be shipped offsite, SNF remaining at the site could interfere with the planned
decontamination and decommissioning operations at West Valley Demonstration Project. Under
this option, Public Service Company of Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming free of
radioactive material by 1998.
2.2.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis
Alternative 3, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, would not be expected to change any existing SNF
management plans at the sites included in this appendix. Alternative 3 would permit the timely
shipment of SNF from the originating sites to DOE interim storage facilities at INEL or
Savannah River Site. Planning at these SNF-receiving sites is addressed in Appendixes A, B,
and C. Interstate transportation impacts are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.
2.2.3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Implementation of
this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, limited onsite
construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation containers,
suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment to a D9E
interim storage site(s) is accomplished.
2.2.3.2 Domestic Research Reactors, Alternative 3 does not affect the existing SNF
management plans at domestic research reactor facilities. Management of SNF at these reactors
would continue to follow the same plans as in the past.
2.2.3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear FueL Under Alternative 3, DOE plans to
ship the SNF currently in storage at the West Valley Demonstration Project to INEL Test Area
North for storage. Implementation of this alternative would therefore preclude the need for any
additional action at the West Valley Demonstration Project related to providing a new onsite
SNF storage facility.
If Public Service Company of Colorado shipped the remaining fuel segments, the Fort St.
Vrain Site would be free of radioactive materials by 1998.
This alternative would have no impact on the management of the SNF material in storage
at the B&W Lynchburg Technology Center.
2.2.4 Regionalization
Alternative 4, Regionalization, would not be expected to change any existing SNF
management plans at the sites included in this appendix, Alternative 4 would permit the
shipment of SNF from the originating sites to regional DOE interim storage facilities. Planning
at the SNF-recieving sites is addressed in Appendixes A, B, C, and F. Intersite transportation
impacts are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.
2.2.4.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small Quantity Storage. Implementation of
this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, limited onsite
construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation containers,
suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment to a DOE
interim storage site(s) is accomplished.
2.2.4.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Regionalization does not affect the existing SNF
management plans at domestic research reactor facilities, except for possible rerouting of SNF
shipments.
2.2.4.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Regionalization Alternative for
SNF addressed in this appendix is the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative except
that the SNF would be sent to other locations. With the exception of INEL, facilities are not
presently available for SNF storage at receiving sites considered under regionalization for SNF
from West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain. The SNF would remain in storage
at West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain until facilities are available for receipt
at the selected regional SNF management sites.
2.2.5 Centralization
Alternative 5, Centralization, would not be expected to change any existing SNF
management plans at the sites included in this appendix. Alternative 5 would permit the
shipment of SNF from the originating sites to centralized DOE interim storage facilities.
planning at the SNF-receiving sites is addressed in Appendixes A, B, C, and F. Intersite
transportation plans are analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1.
2.2.5.1 DOE Expedmental Reactors and Small Ouantity Storage. Implementation of
this alternative could require a transition period of several years. Therefore, limited onsite
construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or acquisition of SNF transportation containers,
suitable for use as temporary dry storage containers, may be necessary until shipment to a DOE
interim storage site(s) is accomplished.
2.2.5.2 Domestic Research Reactors. Centralization does not affect the existing SNF
management plans of domestic research reactor facilities except for rerouting of SNF shipments.
2.2.5.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel. The Centralization Alternative for
SNF being addressed in this appendix is described as being the same as the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis Alternative except that the SNF would be sent to other locations. With the exception of
INEL, facilities are not presently available for SNF storage at receiving sites considered under
centralization for SNF from West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain. The SNF
would remain in storage at West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain until facilities
are available for receipt of the SNF at the selected central SNF management site.
3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENTS
Descriptions of those facilities generating and/or storing small quantities of spent nuclear
fuel for which DOE has accepted responsibility are presented in this section. The following
subsections present environmental information for each of the three categories of originating
sites: DOE Test and Experimental Reactors, Domestic Research Reactors, and Nuclear Power
Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Sites.
The wide variety of facilities and installations included in this category precludes the
definition of their affected environments in a consistent and uniform manner. The information
available in existing facility documents used as the bases for this analysis varies widely with the
nature of the installation and the requirements of the overseeing or regulatory agencies.
3.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage
The DOE experimental reactors and small-quantity SNF storage facilities included in this
category are located at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Sandia National Laboratory, and Argonne National Laboratory - East. The facilities, sites, and
their environments are described in this section. Only those DOE sites at which spent nuclear
fuel is currently generated and/or stored are discussed. Information on environmental factors
that are not uniformly available in existing National Environmental Policy Act documentation for
all four sites (including aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, traffic and transportation, and
utilities and energy) is not provided in this document.
3.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory
There are two reactors at the Brookhaven National Laboratory which generate SNF
potentially affected by actions analyzed in this EIS: the 60 MW High Flux Beam Reactor and
the 5 MW Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor (ANS 1988).
3.1.1.1 High Flux Beam Reactor. The 60 MW High Flux Beam Reactor is a heavy water
moderated and cooled research reactor which replaces an earlier 40 MW reactor. The High Flux
Beam Reactor began operation in 1965. The High Flux Beam Reactor facility is composed of
five buildings located on the 5,265-acre (2,131-hectare) site of the Brookhaven National
Laboratory. The distance from the reactor to the nearest site boundary is to the south at 3700
feet (1288 meters). The spent nuclear fuel is stored in an 8-foot-wide, 43-foot-long, 20-foot-deep
canal (2.4 meters wide, 13.2 meters long, 6.1 meters deep). Within the canal, the fuel is located
in storage racks, either in a 30-cell rack or in a long-term storage rack (Carelli 1993).
3.1.1.2 Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor. The Brookhaven Medical Research
Reactor is a 5 MW heterogeneous, thermal, tank type reactor which is light water moderated and
cooled. The reactor, used for research, became fully operational in 1959. The Brookhaven
Medical Research Reactor is located in one building at the Brookhaven National Laboratory
approximately 0.25 mile (0.4 kilometer) south of the High Flux Beam Reactor site. Fuel storage
at the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor consists of a shelf, lined with boral sheets, in the
upper part of the reactor vessel above the active core region. The shelf is located under 8 feet
(2.5 meters) of water and is considered critically safe when fully loaded. Like the High Flux
Beam Reactor, there is no facility for dry storage at the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor
(Carelli 1993).
3.1.1.3 Affected Environment at Brookhaven National Laboratory.
3.1.1.3.1 Land Use-The Brookhaven National Laboratory is located approximately
60.
1 miles (97 kilometers) east of New York City on Long Island, New York. The site is located
in a primarily suburban area. Land on the 5,265-acre (2,131-hectare) site is divided between
undeveloped natural areas and the developed areas that support the laboratory's scientific
research (BNL 1992c).
Regional land use includes a variety of residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
institutional, recreational, and public uses. Although agricultural and undeveloped forest land
have been the dominant land uses in the region, development pressures for residential and
commercial land uses have increased steadily in recent years (BNL 1992c).
3.1.1.3.2 Socioeconomics-The Brookhaven National Laboratory is located in
central Suffolk County just at the fringe of developed areas, in an area of rapidly growing
population.
About 1.32 million persons reside in Suffolk County and about 410,000 persons
reside in Brookhaven Township, within which the Laboratory is situated. Between 1995 and
2040, population in Suffolk County is expected to increase 14.6 percent (DOC 1991a).
Approximately 8,000 persons reside within a half mile (0.8 kilometer) of the laboratory boundary
(BNL 1992b).
The population of Suffolk County is approximately 96 percent urban and has a substantially
higher median family income than the rest of the state (DOC 1991c). Between 1970 and 1990,
total employment in Suffolk County increased 103.8 percent (DOC 1992).
Dominant industries in the area include government, manufacturing, retail and services, with
approximately 20 percent of earnings in Suffolk County coming from government spending (DOC
1992).
The Brookhaven National Laboratory is composed of a total staff of 3449 regular employees
(BNL 1993a).
As reported in 1988, there were a total of 69 personnel working at the reactors (ANS 1988).
This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support personnel. While not
their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and some support personnel include
tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, packaging, and shipping SNF.
3.1.1.3.3 Cultural Resources-The Brookhaven National Laboratory has no
properties designated as National Historic Landmarks.
The Old Reactor Building (Building 701) and the Old Cyclotron Enclosure (Building 902)
are eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). Camp Upton
training trenches from World War I are also eligible for inclusion on the NRHP.
3.1.1.3.4 Geology-The Brookhaven National Laboratory site is in the upper part
of the Peconic River Valley, which is bordered by two lines of low hills.
These extend east and
west beyond the limits of the valley nearly the full length of Long Island and form its most
prominent topographic features (ERDA 1977).
A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.19 g at Brookhaven National
Laboratory is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2000 years
(DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic
hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities
should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site
specific procedures.
No earthquake has yet been recorded in the Brookhaven National Laboratory area with a
Modified Mercalli intensity in excess of III. Long Island lies in the Uniform Building Code Zone
2A (moderate) seismic hazard area. No active earthquake producing faults are known in the
Long Island area (ERDA 1977).
3.1.1.3.5 Air Resources-In terms of meteorology, the laboratory can be
characterized, like most Eastern Seaboard areas, as a well-ventilated site.
The prevailing ground-
level winds are from the southwest during the summer, from the northwest during the winter, and
about equally from these two directions during the spring and fall (BNL 1992b).
The mean annual temperature for the site during 1991 was 52.8yF (11.6yC), with
temperatures ranging from 21.2yF (-6yC) to 83.8yF (28.8yC). The annual precipitation during
1991 was 45.3 inches (115 centimeters), which is about 3.6 inches (9.0 centimeters) below the
40-year annual precipitation average of 48.4 inches (123 centimeters) (BNL 1992b).
The State of New York has adopted ambient air quality standards that specify maximum
permissible short- and long-term concentrations for various contaminants. These standards are
generally the same as the national standards for criteria pollutants (NYSDEC 1977). Suffolk
County, in which the site is located, is classified as being in nonattainment of the standards for
the criteria pollutant ozone. The county is in attainment of standards for carbon monoxide,
particluates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead (NYSDEC 1993).
3.1.1.3.6 Water Resources-The Brookhaven National Laboratory site lies on the
western rim of the shallow Peconic River watershed.
The marshy areas in the north and eastern
sections of the site are a portion of the Peconic River headwaters. The Peconic River both
recharges and receives water from the groundwater aquifer, depending on the hydrogeological
potential. In times of drought the river water typically recharges to groundwater, while in times
of normal to above normal precipitation, the river receives water from the aquifer (BNL 1992b).
Groundwater flow in the vicinity of Brookhaven National Laboratory is controlled by many
factors. The main groundwater divide lies 1.25 to 5 miles (2 to 8 kilometers) south of Long
Island Sound parallel to the Sound. This divide is known to shift 0.6 to 1.25 miles (1 to
2 kilometers), north to south. East of Brookhaven National Laboratory is a secondary
groundwater divide that defines the southern boundary of the area contributing groundwater to
the Peconic River. The exact location of the triple-point intersection of these two divides is not
known and may be under Brookhaven National Laboratory. South of these divides, the
groundwater moves southward to Great South Bay and to Moriches streams. In general, the
groundwater from the area between the two branches of the divide moves out eastward to the
Peconic River. North of the divide, groundwater moves northward to Long Island Sound.
Pressure of a higher water table to the west of the Brookhaven National Laboratory area
generally inhibits movement toward the west. Variability in the direction of flow in the
Brookhaven National Laboratory site is a function of the hydraulic potential and is further
complicated by the presence of clay deposits that accumulate perched water at several places
plus the pumping/recharge of groundwater that are part of Brookhaven National Laboratory daily
operations. In general, groundwater in the northeast and northwest sections of the site flows
toward the Peconic River. On the western portion of the site, groundwater flow tends to be
toward the south, while along the southern and southeastern sections of the site it tends to be
toward the south to southeast (BNL 1992b).
In all areas of the site, horizontal groundwater velocity is estimated to range from 12 to 18
inches (30 to 45 centimeters) a day. The site occupied by Brookhaven National Laboratory has
been identified by the Long Island Regional Planning Board and Suffolk County as being over a
deep recharge zone for Long Island. This implies the precipitation and surface water which
recharges within this zone has the potential to replenish the lower aquifer systems (Magothy
and/or Lloyd) which exist below the Upper Glacial Aquifer. The extent to which the Brookhaven
National laboratory site contributes to deep flow recharge is currently under evaluation.
However, it is estimated that up to two-fifths of the recharge from rainfall moves into the deeper
aquifers. These lower aquifers discharge to the Atlantic Ocean (BNL 1992b).
The three aquifers (Upper Glacial, Magothy and Lloyd) underlying the Brookhaven
National Laboratory comprise the Nassau/Suffolk Aquifer System, which has been designated as
a sole source aquifer by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. More detailed aquifer
characterization information can be found in the Brookhaven National Laboratory Site Baseline
Report (SAIC 1992).
3.1.1.3.7 Ecological Resources-Approximately 75 percent of Brookhaven National
Laboratory is primarily woodland.
Terrestrial habitats include pine plantations, moderately
mature pitch pine/oak forest, predominantly deciduous forest, early successional shrub/sapling
community, pine barrens shrub/sapling wetlands, and lawn areas (BNL 1993a).
The isolation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory site and its variety of wildlife habitats
have made it a refuge for a surprisingly diverse animal population. Thirty species of mammals
have been recorded on site or within a 10-mile (16-kilometer) radius. All of these are year-round
residents except for five summer-resident and two migrant species of bats. (BNL 1992c)
About 400 non-extinct species of birds have been recorded on all of Long Island since
records have been kept, and at least 180 of these have been recorded on site. Thirty-three
species are found throughout the year and all except six of these breed on site. Forty-nine other
species are summer residents. All except nine nest on site, four others probably do, and the rest
nest elsewhere on Long Island, most nearby (BNL 1993).
In September 1990, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service confirmed that no Federal or State
endangered species occur in the vicinity of Brookhaven National Laboratory. However, the State
endangered tiger salamander breeds in a pond in the southeast corner of the site (BNL 1992c).
3.1.1.3.8 Public Health and Safety-The calculated effective dose equivalent
associated with effluent releases from the most recent reports for a 5-year period are presented
below (BNL 1993b, 1992a, 1992b, 1990, 1989).
The annual doses for each year are only a
fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 millirem per year. The data are from all
laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
Airborne effluents
(maximum site Liquid effluents
Year boundary) (maximum individual)
1988 0.113 millirem 0.15 millirem
1989 0.120 millirem 0.96 millirem
1990 0.067 millirem 0.85 millirem
1991 0.170 millirem 0.74 millirem
1992 0.097 millirem 0.91 millirem
The collective (population) dose equivalent (total population dose) beyond the site
boundary, within a radius of 50 miles (80 kilometers), attributed to laboratory operations from
reports for a 5-year period is presented below (BNL 1993b, 1992a, 1992b, 1990, 1989). The data
are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1988 2.5 person-rem
1989 3.2 person-rem
1990 1.8 person-rem
1991 3.6 person-rem
1992 3.2 person-rem
3.1.1.3.9 Waste Management-Brookhaven National Laboratory generates low-
level, low-level mixed and hazardous wastes, in conjunction with its activities as a scientific
research center.
In 1992, the site generated approximately 508 tons (461 metric tons) of solid
waste and 19.6 cubic yards (15 cubic meters) of liquid waste (DOE 1994b).
Brookhaven National Laboratory currently stores about 110 cubic yards (84 cubic meters) of
low-level mixed waste and has no current or planned onsite treatment facilities. All waste
streams are currently shipped to Hanford. These waste streams include organic liquids, acid and
alkaline solutions, uranium hydride, cleaning/degreasing solvents, chromic acid cleaning solutions,
and lead- and mercury-contaminated equipment (DOE 1993g).
In 1989, EPA listed BNL on the National Priorities Lists and in 1992 an Interagency
Agreement was signed among DOE, EPA Region II, and the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation. Seven operable units have been identified for remedial
investigation/feasibility studies and evaluated for suitable remedial action. The operable units
consist of various groupings (generally by area) of buildings and sumps, underground pipes and
tanks, the sewage runoff and discharge areas, trichloroethylene and reactor spill areas and
groundwater. Some contamination at the site was the result of U.S. Army practices from 1917 to
1947 (DOE 1993g).
3.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory
The Omega West Reactor, operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, is a thermal,
heterogeneous, closed-tank research reactor normally functioning at a power level of 8 MW. The
Omega West Reactor was operational from 1956 until December 1992, when it was shut down.
This reactor is permanently shut down and is being decommissioned. All spent nuclear fuel,
consisting of 86 fuel elements, is in temporary storage at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Complex in Wing 9. They are being stored in old "Rover Project" casks which were once
certified for transport of spent nuclear fuel. LANL has no permit for long-term storage of spent
fuel.
3.1.2.1 Land Use. Los Alamos National Laboratory is located approximately 60 miles
(96 kilometers) north-northeast of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Los Alamos occupies an area of
about 28,000 acres (11,000 hectares) located primarily in Los Alamos County in northern New
Mexico, about 24 miles (39 kilometers) northwest of Santa Fe. The County of Los Alamos has
zoned the entire area of the lab Federal Land. Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed
nine land use classifications for its operations. There are no prime farmlands on the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, although portions are designated as a National Environmental Research
Park (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.2 Socioeconomics. The civilian labor force in the region of interest grew 144
percent, increasing from 34,467 in 1970 to 84,107 in 1990. Total employment increased from
31,155 to 79,846 between 1970 and 1990, an annual growth rate of 5 percent. The
unemployment rates for 1970 and 1990 were 9.6 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively. For the
same years, personal income increased from approximately $324.7 million to $2.3 billion (an
annual average of 10 percent), and per capita income increased from $3,396 to $15,348 (DOE
1993a).
Between 1975 and 1990, employment at Los Alamos National Laboratory increased from
5,094 to 7,622, representing 10 percent of the region of interest employment in 1990. As of
September 1992, employment at Los Alamos National Laboratory had increased to 7,450. The
prepared Fiscal Year 1994 budget projects a reduction in expenditures at the site resulting in
reduced employment (DOE 1993a).
In 1991, more than half of the Los Alamos National Laboratory workforce resided in the
unincorporated communities of Los Alamos and White Rock in Los Alamos County. Between
1970 and 1990, the population in the region of interest increased 61 percent to 151,408. During
the same period, the New Mexico population increased 49 percent. The population in the three-
county region of interest is projected to increase from an estimated 169,000 in 2000 to 191,000 by
2020, an annual rate of less than 1 percent (DOE 1993a).
Employment associated with SNF management such as routine operations of the facility
including care and periodic inventories of the SNF amounts to about 1.3 person-years per year
(Cruz 1995).
3.1.2.3 Cultural Resources. The prehistoric chronology for the Los Alamos National
Laboratory area consists of six broad time periods: Paleoindian (10,000-4000 B.C.), Archaic
(5500 B.C.-A.D. 600), Early Developmental (A.D. 600-900), Late Developmental (A.D. 900-1100)
Coalition (A.D. 1110-1325), and Classic (A.D. 1325-1600). Prehistoric site types identified in the
vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory include large multiroom pueblos, pithouse villages,
field houses, talus houses, cave kivas, shrines, towers, rockshelters, animal traps, hunting blinds,
water control features, agricultural fields and terraces, quarries, rock art, trails, campsites,
windbreaks, rock rings, and limited activity sites. Approximately 75 percent of Los Alamos
National Laboratory has been inventoried for cultural resources. Coverage for some inventories
has been less than 100 percent; however, about 60 percent of Los Alamos National Laboratory
has received 100 percent coverage. Over 975 prehistoric sites have been recorded; about 95
percent of these sites are considered eligible or potentially eligible for the National Register of
Historic Places (DOE 1993a).
Native Americans in this area include those living in the San Ildefonso, San Juan, Santa
Clara, Nambe, Tesuque, Pojoaque pueblos east of Los Alamos, and the Jemez and Cochiti
pueblos. Native American resources on Los Alamos National Laboratory may consist of
prehistoric sites with ceremonial features such as kivas, village shrines, petroglyphs, or burials; all
of these site types or features would be of concern to local groups (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.4 Geology. Los Alamos National Laboratory is located on the Pajarito Plateau.
The surface of the plateau is dissected by deep, southeast-trending canyons separated by long,
narrow mesas (DOE 1993a).
Los Alamos National Laboratory lies in the Uniform Building Code Zone 2B seismic hazard
area. The strongest earthquake in the last 100 years within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius was
estimated to have a magnitude of 5.5 to 6 and a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII. Studies
suggest that several faults have produced seismic events with a magnitude of 6.5 to 7.8 in the last
500,000 years. Los Alamos National Laboratory operates a seismic hazards program which
monitors seismicity through a seismic network and conducts studies in paleoseismology. These
studies have determined the presence of three faults in the area that are considered active as
defined by 10 CFR 100, Appendix A. These form the Pajarito fault system, which includes the
Pajarito, Water Canyon, and Guaje Mountain faults. The Guaje Mountain fault had movement
on it between 4,000 and 6,000 years ago. There is no evidence of movement along the Pajarito
fault system during historical times. The 100-year earthquake at Los Alamos is regarded as
having a magnitude of 5, with an event of magnitude 7 being the maximum reasonably
foreseeable earthquake. These values are currently used in design considerations at Los Alamos
(DOE 1993a).
Maximum horizontal ground surface accelerations ranging from 0.17 to 0.25g at Los Alamos
National Laboratory are estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2000
years (DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic
hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities
should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site
specific procedures.
Geological concerns associated with the Los Alamos National Laboratory area include
potential downslope movements in association with regional seismic activity. Although isolated
rockfalls commonly occur from the canyon rims, landslides are an unlikely hazard (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.5 Air Resources. The climate at Los Alamos National Laboratory and in the
surrounding region is characterized as a semiarid tropical and subtropical steppe. Mountain
barriers deplete a large portion of the moisture from the maritime air masses from the Pacific
Ocean, a condition that contributes to the semiaridness. The annual average temperature in the
area is 56.2oF (13.4oC); average daily temperatures range from 22.3oF (-5.4oC) in January to
92.8oF (33.8oC) in July. The average annual precipitation in the area is 8.1 inches
(20.6 centimeters). The average monthly precipitation ranges from 0.38 inch (0.97 centimeter) in
November to 1.51 inches (3.84 centimeters) in August (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.6 Water Resources. The major surface water body in the immediate vicinity of Los
Alamos National Laboratory is the Rio Grande east of the site. The primary surface water
features near Los Alamos National Laboratory are intermittent streams. Sixteen drainage areas
pass through or start in the Los Alamos National Laboratory site. Most Los Alamos National
Laboratory facilities are located well above the streambeds. Only those Technical Areas located
within canyons would be within the 500-year floodplain (DOE 1993a).
No surface water is withdrawn at Los Alamos National Laboratory for either drinking water
or facility operations. The water supply system for Los Alamos is based on a series of
groundwater supply wells and springs (DOE 1993a).
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Mortandad canyons currently receive treated industrial or sanitary
effluent. Acid-Pueblo Canyon does not receive Los Alamos National Laboratory effluents.
Surface waters in these canyons are not a source of municipal, industrial, or agricultural water
supply. Only during periods of heavy precipitation or snow melt would waters from Acid-Pueblo,
Los Alamos, or Sandia Canyons extend beyond Los Alamos National Laboratory boundaries and
reach the Rio Grande. In Mortandad Canyon, there has been no surface runoff to the
laboratory's boundary since studies were initiated in 1960 (DOE 1993a).
The main aquifer consists mainly of sediments of the Santa Fe Group. Nearly all
groundwater at Los Alamos National Laboratory is obtained from deep wells that produce water
from this aquifer. The Bandelier Tuff, a volcanic unit that lies above the Santa Fe Group,
contains fractures that yield small amounts of water to springs. A minor amount of groundwater
at Los Alamos National Laboratory is obtained from springs. The aquifers that lie beneath Los
Alamos National Laboratory are considered Class II aquifers, having current sources of drinking
water and water with other beneficial uses (DOE 1993a).
The water in the main aquifer moves slowly from the major recharge area in the west to
discharge springs in White Rock Canyon along the Rio Grande. The depth to the aquifer ranges
from about 1,200 feet (365 meters) on the west to about 600 feet (183 meters) on the east. The
total saturated thickness penetrated by production wells ranges up to at least 1,700 feet
(518 meters) (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.7 Ecological Resources. Terrestrial habitats within undeveloped areas of Los
Alamos National Laboratory support six major vegetative communities: juniper-grassland, pinyon
pine-juniper, ponderosa pine, mixed conifer, spruce-fir, and subalpine grassland. Undeveloped
areas within Los Alamos National Laboratory provide habitat for a diversity of terrestrial wildlife.
Los Alamos National Laboratory was designated a National Environmental Research Park in
1976 (DOE 1993a).
National Wetland Inventory maps indicate that wetlands within Los Alamos National
Laboratory are restricted to several canyons containing the Rio Grande or its tributaries. Most
of the wetlands shown on the National Wetland Inventory maps have been designated as
temporary or seasonal (DOE 1993a).
Aquatic habitats on Los Alamos National Laboratory are limited to the Rio Grande and
several springs and intermittent streams in the canyons. These habitats currently receive
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-permitted wastewater discharges. Fourteen
species of fish are known to inhabit the roughly 6-mile (10-kilometer) reach of the Rio Grande
between Los Alamos National Laboratory and Chochiti Lake. The springs and streams on the
site support limited, if any, aquatic life (DOE 1993a).
Seventeen federally listed or New Mexico-listed threatened, endangered, or candidate
species potentially occur in the vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Four of these
species have been observed on Los Alamos National Laboratory, including the bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus)(a federally listed endangered species that roosts along the Rio
Grande); the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus)(a federally listed endangered species that
historically nests in the northeast corner of Los Alamos National Laboratory); the northern
goshawk (Accipiter gentilis) (A Federal candidate Category 2 species that forages in the northwest
corner of Los Alamos National Laboratory); and the giant helleborine orchid (Epipactic gigantea)
(a state-listed endangered species that occurs near springs in White Rock Canyon). Five other
species occur in close proximity to Los Alamos National Laboratory and are likely to exist on the
site (DOE 1993a).
3.1.2.8 Public Health and Safety. The total maximum individual dose to a member of
the public associated with both gaseous and liquid effluents from the most recent reports for a 5-
year period is presented below (LANL 1993, 1992, 1990, 1989, 1988). The annual doses for each
year are only a fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 millirem per year. The data are
from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1987 6.1 millirem
1988 6.2 millirem
1989 3.9 millirem
1990 3.1 millirem
1991 4.4 millirem
The population collective effective dose equivalent attributable to laboratory operations to
persons living within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the laboratory for a 5-year period is presented
below (LANL 1993, 1992, 1990, 1989, 1988). The data are from all laboratory operations,
including storage of SNF.
1987 3.5 person-rem
1988 2.2 person-rem
1989 3.1 person-rem
1990 3.1 person-rem
1991 1.1 person-rem
3.1.2.9 Waste Management. Current low-level radioactive waste management activities
at Los Alamos National Laboratory may require expansion of the existing landfill at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A portion of the proposed expansion area for the existing landfill has been
contaminated by a chemical plume from the hazardous chemical disposal site, which restricts
further development. DOE is considering the expansion to ensure continued operation of
laboratory activities that generate low level radioactive waste and to provide safe isolation of the
wastes (DOE 1993a).
Waste minimization has been implemented by Los Alamos National Laboratory's
Environmental Management Division using programmatic controls such as source reduction,
inventory control, product substitution, and waste exchange programs. A Waste Minimization
and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan was completed in 1991. Major waste generating
operations have been prioritized by severity of hazard and volume in order to determine which
generating systems to address. Also, halogenated solvent substitution has been evaluated for a
number of research processes (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories
Sandia National Laboratories, headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, maintain
facilities in three locations: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Livermore, California; and Tonopah,
Nevada. The facilities discussed in this document refer only to the Albuquerque location, located
adjacent to the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico. The site is approximately 6.5 miles (10
kilometers) southeast of downtown Albuquerque. Sandia National Laboratories consist of 8,300
acres (3,360 hectares) on Kirtland Air Force Base allocated to DOE.
Sandia National Laboratories use facilities at five Technical Areas and a Test Field (DOE
1993a).
- Technical Area I--Administration, site support, technical support, component
development, research, energy programs, microelectronics, defense programs, and
exploratory systems.
- Technical Area II--Testing of explosive components.
- Technical Area III--Testing and simulation of a variety of natural and induced
environments, including two rocket sled tracks, two centrifuges, and a radiant heat
facility.
- Technical Area IV--A remote site for pulsed power sciences such as X-ray, gamma-ray,
and particle beam fusion accelerators.
- Technical Area V--A remote area for experimental and engineering reactors and
particle accelerators.
- Coyote Test Field--Land parcels scattered throughout the Coyote Test Field used for
testing.
The Sandia National Laboratories contain five SNF storage facilities: the Manzano Storage
Structures, the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility, the Sandia Pulse Reactor Facility, the
Hot Cell Facility, and the Special Nuclear Materials storage facility (DOE 1993b).
3.1.3.1 Manzano Storage Structures. The Manzano Storage Structures are reinforced
concrete bunkers located in the southeast portion of Kirtland Air Force Base. Until recently,
when the Sandia National Laboratories took responsibility for the site, the Manzano facilities
were operated and maintained by the Department of Defense. The Sandia National
Laboratories currently use four structures for dry storage of reactor irradiated nuclear material.
The two types of bunkers which Sandia National Laboratories utilize are reinforced concrete
bunkers with an earth covering, and reinforced concrete bunkers bored into the mountain. The
average storage space available is 1800 square feet (167 square meters). A ring road encircles
the mountain and provides access to all of the bunkers. The ventilation is natural air circulation
(DOE 1993b).
3.1.3.2 Annular Core Research Reactor. The Annular Core Research Reactor is a pool-
type research reactor capable of steady-state, pulse, and tailored transient operation. The
reactor has a large central irradiation cavity (primary experiment location) that extends through
the core, two interchangeable, fuel-ringed external cavities, an unfueled external cavity and two
neutron radiography facilities. The Annular Core Research Reactor facility includes the reactor
pool, one safe, and eight dry floor storage vaults, all located in the high-bay of Building 6588.
The Annular Core Research Reactor is used primarily for testing electronics and for reactor
safety research. The eight storage vaults on the high-bay floor are used to securely store
irradiated experiments containing a variety of nuclear materials, but principally uranium-235.
Materials from only three experiments containing reactor irradiated nuclear materials are stored
at the Annular Core Research Reactor (DOE 1993b).
3.1.3.3 Sandia Pulse Reactor II and III, and Critical Assembly. Three reactors are
operated at the Sandia Pulse Reactor facility; Sandia Pulse Reactor II and Sandia Pulse
Reactor III are unmoderated, fast-burst reactors capable of pulsed and steady-state operation.
They are designed to produce a neutron energy spectrum similar to that produced from fission.
The primary experiment location for each reactor is a central cavity that extends through the
core. The principal use of the reactors is to irradiate electronic devices requiring high neutron
fluence and/or high dose rates. The Critical Assembly is a small, water-moderated reactor used
to perform measurements of key reactor parameters to benchmark the computer calculations and
thereby refine the designs for a planned space propulsion reactor. The yard storage holes are
19 stainless-steel types located in a corner of the Sandia Pulse Reactor compound. These tubes
are surrounded by a high-density concrete monolith. The yard holes are used to securely store
irradiated experiments containing a variety of nuclear materials, but principally uranium-235. All
of the materials reside in their own containers, some of which have double containment (DOE
1993b).
3.1.3.4 Hot Cell Facility. The Hot Cell Facility at Sandia National Laboratories is a
nonreactor nuclear facility that is housed in Building 6580 in Technical Area V. The Hot Cell
Facility includes the Hot Cell, the Glove Box Laboratory, Radiochemistry Laboratory, and
support facilities in rooms 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 113A, 203, and 212A.
This facility is designed to permit safe handling and experimentation with Special Nuclear
Materials, both irradiated and unirradiated. Research programs at Sandia National Laboratories
(material studies, fuel studies, and safety studies) require that experiments containing radioactive
materials be assembled and/or disassembled, samples prepared, and microscopic and chemical
analyses performed. The principal storage facility for the Hot Cell Facility is Room 108, which is
a heavily shielded room used previously as a preparation room next to the irradiation room of
the Sandia Engineering Reactor which has been defueled. There are a series of 13 storage holes
under the Hot Cell Facility Monorail that are available to store irradiated material coming into
or out of the Hot Cell Facility. Only one of the holes is currently in use. The other areas of the
Hot Cell Facility are used for storing minor amounts of material (DOE 1993b).
3.1.3.5 Special Nuclear Material Storage Facility. At this dry storage facility, Sandia
National Laboratories stores previously failed fuel elements from Sandia Pulse Reactor II and
elements from experiments that have been exposed to short irradiation periods. The complex
also provides for a loading area, a maintenance area, and an administrative office area. The
ventilation consists of a forced air filtered system (DOE 1993b).
3.1.3.6 Affected Environment at Sandia National Laboratories.
3.1.3.6.1 Land Use-Sandia National Laboratories are located approximately
6.
5 miles (10.5 kilometers) southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico. There are no
prime farmlands on Sandia National Laboratories (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3.6.2 Socioeconomics-The civilian labor force in the region of interest grew
132 percent, increasing from 133,798 in 1970 to 310,252 in 1990.
Total employment increased
from 124,605 to 293,905 between 1970 and 1990, an annual growth rate of 4 percent. The
unemployment rates for 1970 and 1990 were 6.9 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. For the
same years, personal income increased from approximately $1.3 billion to $9.4 billion (an annual
average of 10 percent), and per capita income increased from $3,438 to $15,992 (DOE 1993a).
Between 1970 and 1990, employment levels at Sandia National Laboratories increased from
6.440 to 7,536, representing 3 percent of the region of interest employment in 1990. Changes in
mission requirements have historically led to fluctuations in employment levels over the period.
For example, employment decreased to 5,542 in 1975 and increased to 7,051 by 1985. As of
September 30, 1992, employment levels at Sandia National Laboratories had increased to 8,473.
The prepared Fiscal Year 1994 budget projects a reduction in expenditures at the site, resulting
in reduced employment. The reduction in work force associated with the budget reductions is
only estimated at this time (DOE 1993a).
Between 1970 and 1990, the population in the region of interest increased 58 percent to
589,131. During the same period, the population of New Mexico increased 49 percent. The
population in the three-county region of interest is projected to increase from an estimated
682,000 in 2000 to 771,000 by 2020, an annual rate of less than 1 percent (DOE 1993a).
As reported in 1988, there were a total of 21 personnel working at the reactors (ANS 1988).
This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support personnel. While not
their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and some support personnel include
tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, packaging, and shipping SNF.
3.1.3.6.3 Cultural Resources-The prehistoric chronology for the Sandia National
Laboratories area consists of three broad time periods: Paleoindian (10,000-5500 B.
C.), Archaic
(5500 B.C.-A.D. 1), and Anasazi (A.D. 1600). Prehistoric site types include pueblos, pithouse
villages, rockshelters, hunting blinds, agricultural terraces, quarries, lithic and ceramic scatters,
lithic scatters, and hearths. About 22 percent of Sandia National Laboratories/DOE-controlled
land has been intensively inventoried for cultural resources; another 28 percent has received less
intensive surveys. Because techniques and procedures varied greatly between projects in these
areas, most surveys are not considered adequate. All five DOE Technical Areas have been
intensively surveyed; no prehistoric sites were recorded. Sixty-four prehistoric sites have been
recorded in DOE-owned or controlled lands beyond the five Technical Areas. About 88 percent
of these sites are considered eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (DOE 1993a).
Native Americans in this area include those living on the Sandia Pueblo, north of
Albuquerque, and the Isleta Pueblo, south of Kirtland Air Force Base. Native American
resources on Sandia National Laboratories/DOE-controlled lands may consist of prehistoric sites
with ceremonial features such as kivas, village shrines, petroglyphs, or burials; all of these types
or features would be of concern to local groups (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3.6.4 Geology-Sandia National Laboratories lie on a sequence of sedimentary,
igneous, and Precambrian basement rocks.
The northern and western sections of Sandia
National Laboratories rest on Miocene to Quaternary gravels, sands, silts, and clays deposited in
the basin formed by uplift of the mountains to the east. The eastern portion of Sandia National
Laboratories is underlain primarily by Precambrian rocks (DOE 1993a).
The eastern portion of Sandia National Laboratories is cut by the Tijeras, Hubble Springs,
Sandia, and Manzano faults. Both the Tijeras and Sandia faults, which intersect on the site, are
considered capable faults (DOE 1993a).
Sandia National Laboratories lies in the Uniform Building Code 2B seismic hazard area.
The facility is situated in a region of high seismic activity but low magnitude and intensity.
Available records indicate that more than 1,100 earthquakes have occurred during the past 127
years. However, during the past century, only three have caused damage at Albuquerque.
Intensities have been as high as a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII, which can cause damage
(DOE 1993a).
Possible geological concerns include potential ground shaking and rupturing associated with
regional seismic activity and the two capable faults intersecting on the site. Statistical studies
indicate that a nondamaging earthquake (Modified Mercalli Intensity less than III) may be
expected every 2 years, with a damaging event every 100 years (DOE 1993a).
A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.28g at Sandia National Laboratory
is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2000 years (DOE 1994a).
The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons
across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities should be evaluated on
a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site specific procedures.
3.1.3.6.5 Air Resources-The climate at Sandia National Laboratories and in the
surrounding region is characteristic of a semiarid steppe.
The annual average temperature in the
area is 56.2oF (13.4oC); temperatures vary from an average daily minimum of 22.3oF (-5.4oC) in
January to an average daily maximum of 92.8oF (33.8oC) in July. The average annual
precipitation is 8.1 inches (20.6 centimeters) (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3.6.6 Water Resources-Sandia National Laboratories are located within the
Kirtland Air Force Base on the Albuquerque East Mesa.
The mesa slopes gently southwest to
the Rio Grande, the primary drainage channel for the area. The average flow of the Rio Grande
is 1,008 cubic feet (28.5 cubic meters) per second. No perennial streams flow through the Sandia
National Laboratories area. The two primary surface channels at Sandia National Laboratories
are Tijeras Arroyo and the smaller Arroyo del Coyote. The Arroyo del Coyote joins the Tijeras
Arroyo to discharge into the Rio Grande approximately 5 miles (8 kilometers) from the western
edge of Kirtland Air Force Base. Both arroyos flow intermittently during spring snow melt or
following thunderstorms. Springs in the eastern mountains provide a perennial flow in the upper
reaches of Tijeras Arroyo. Most of this flow evaporates or percolates into the soil before
reaching Kirtland Air Force Base (DOE 1993a).
High peak flows of short duration characterize floods in the area. High-intensity summer
thunderstorms produce the greatest flows, but the probability of flooding is not considered high
at Kirtland Air Force Base. The southeast corner of Technical Area IV and the east side of
Technical Area II lie within the 500-year floodplain of Tijeras Arroyo (DOE 1993a).
Sandia National Laboratories lie within the north-south trending Albuquerque basin. The
principal aquifer of the Albuquerque basin is the Valley Fill aquifer. The Valley Fill consists of
unconsolidated and semiconsolidated sands, gravels, silts, and clays that vary in thickness from a
few feet (meters) adjacent to the mountain ranges to over 21,000 feet (6,400 meters) at a point
5 miles (8 kilometers) southwest of Kirtland Air Force Base airfield. The Valley Fill aquifer is
considered a Class IIa aquifer, having a current source of drinking water and waters with other
beneficial uses. (DOE 1993a)
The regional water table is separated by a fault complex that divides the area into a deep
region on the west side of the complex and a shallower region on the east side. The depth to
groundwater ranges from 50 to 100 feet (15 to 30 meters) on the east side of the fault complex
and from 380 to 500 feet (115 to 1150 meters) on the west side. Based on available data, the
apparent direction of groundwater flow west of the fault complex is generally to the north and
northwest. The direction of groundwater flow east of the fault complex typically is west toward
the fault system (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3.6.7 Ecological Resources-Most undeveloped lands within Technical Areas I
and III of Sandia National Laboratories support grassland vegetation.
Terrestrial wildlife using
grassland habitats on Sandia National Laboratories are typical of similar habitats in central New
Mexico. The size and diversity of wildlife populations are thought to be limited by the poor
availability of water. An inventory of wildlife species on Kirtland Air Force Base (including
Sandia National Laboratories) has been recently updated (DOE 1993a).
No wetland inventories have been performed for Sandia National Laboratories, and no
National Wetland Inventory maps have been published. Several springs exist on Kirtland Air
Force base, including Sol se Mete Spring, Coyote Springs, and G Spring. These are associated
with canyons and arroyos. No springs exist in Technical Areas I through V, and none are located
within permitted land to which Sandia National Laboratories has access (DOE 1993a).
Potential aquatic habitat within Kirtland Air Force Base is limited to arroyos and canyons
and the few springs associated with them. The nearest major perennial aquatic habitat is the Rio
Grande, approximately 5 miles (8 kilometers) to the west (DOE 1993a).
No federally listed threatened or endangered species are known to occur on Sandia
National Laboratories. The peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus), a federally and state-listed
endangered species, could potentially occur in the mountainous areas of Kirtland Air Force Base
surrounding Sandia National Laboratories, but the likelihood is low because of the poor quality
habitat for this species. The grama grass cactus (Pediocactus papyracanthus), a Federal
Candidate Category 2 and state-listed endangered species, is known to occur in grasslands on
Kirtland Air Force Base similar to those occurring on Sandia National Laboratories. The spotted
bat (Euderma maculatum), also a Federal Category 2 and state-endangered species, has a low
probability of occurrence on Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories lie
within the breeding range of several Federal Candidate bird species (DOE 1993a).
3.1.3.6.8 Public Health and Safety-The annual dose to a maximally exposed
individual due to release of gaseous radionuclides from laboratory operations from reports for a
5-year period is presented below (SNL 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989).
The data are from all
laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1988 0.00034 millirem
1989 0.00088 millirem
1990 0.0020 millirem
1991 0.0014 millirem
1992 0.0034 millirem
The estimated population dose to persons living within a 50-miles (80-kilometer) radius
surrounding the laboratory due to release of gaseous radionuclides from laboratory operations
from reports for a 5-year period is presented below (SNL 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989). The
data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1988 0.039 person-rem
1989 0.097 person-rem
1990 0.82 person-rem
1991 0.052 person-rem
1992 0.020 person-rem
3.1.3.6.9 Waste Management-Low-level radioactive waste at Sandia National
Laboratories is generated in both technical and remote test areas as a result of research and
development activities.
Most of the low-level radioactive waste consists of contaminated
equipment and combustible decontamination materials and cleanup debris. All generated low-
level radioactive waste is temporarily stored at generator sites or above ground in transportation
containers at the Technical Area III disposal site. All low-level radioactive waste packages are
currently onsite pending approval of transport by commercial carriers offsite for burial (DOE
1993a).
Mixed wastes include radioactively contaminated oils and solvents and radioactively
contaminated or activated lead or other heavy metals. Other mixed wastes may be generated as
a result of weapons tests (DOE 1993a).
3.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East
The Argonne National Laboratory - East stores reactor irradiated nuclear materials in the
Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell (Building 212, Wing F), the Chicago Pile 5 Building, and analytical
laboratories within Building 205. The principal mission (past and present) of the Alpha-Gamma
Hot Cell is research on the behavior of materials, fuel, and structures used in nuclear reactors.
Chicago Pile 5 houses a shut-down, heavy-water, moderated reactor whose fuel has been
removed and shipped offsite. Currently Chicago Pile 5 is in the process of being decontaminated
and decommissioned and contains only two highly enriched uranium target (i.e., converter)
elements. Building 205 contains analytical laboratories that perform analyses on gram quantities
of SNF samples coming from the Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell (DOE 1993b).
3.1.4.1 Land Use. The laboratory and support facilities occupy about a 200-acre
(81-hectare) tract; 1,700 acres (688 hectares) within the site perimeter are devoted to forest and
landscaped areas. The Dupage County Forest Preserve District operates 2,040-acre
(826-hectare) green belt forest preserve, known as the Waterfall Glen Forest Preserve, which
surrounds the site. Much of this forest preserve was formerly Argonne National Laboratory
property but was deeded to the Forest Preserve District in 1973 for use as a public recreation
area, nature preserve, and demonstration forest. In the past few years, a number of industrial
parks have been constructed to the north and northwest of the laboratory. Also, many
commercial establishments and a large number of dwelling units have been constructed within a
few miles (kilometers) of Argonne National Laboratory. Before being occupied by Argonne
National Laboratory, most of the site was wooded and the remaining land was used for farming
(ANL-E 1993a).
3.1.4.2 Socioeconomics. Argonne National Laboratory is located within the Chicago
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, which comprises six Illinois and two Indiana counties
around the southwest corner of Lake Michigan. The population between 1970 and 1990 in the
region increased 1.2 percent from 6,491,300 to 6,568,800 people. During this time total Illinois
population increased 2.9 percent. Data sources for this information include U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Department of Energy documents (DOC 1992).
The nearby areas of Will and Cook Counties have generally developed at a considerably
lower rate than has the DuPage County area, except along the Illinois Waterway where industrial
development has taken place. Included within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius are portions of
Lake and Porter Counties in Indiana, and all of DuPage, Will, Cook, Kendall, and Kane Counties
in Illinois (DOC 1992).
Beyond the forest preserve at Argonne National Laboratory's perimeter, the population
density is low, except for a high-density residential area--over 15 units per acre (37 units per
hectare) and about 4,500 residents--beginning some 650 yards (600 meters) east of the perimeter.
DuPage County's growth rate has been the highest of any metropolitan Illinois county. In 1990,
the total number of housing units within region equaled 2,548,736. Cook County contained the
largest percentage of the region's housing units (DOC 1991b).
With its workforce of about 4,700 persons, Argonne National Laboratory is one of the three
largest employers in DuPage County. Employees commute to Argonne National Laboratory
from distances as far as 30 miles (50 kilometers); thus the payroll is spread over a wide area.
However, nearby villages, notably Lemont and Downers Grove, do house high numbers of
Argonne National Laboratory employees. About 50 percent of Argonne National Laboratory
employees reside within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of the site. The laboratory also purchases much
of its utilities, outside services, equipment, and supplies locally (DOC 1992).
Employment associated with SNF management such as routine operations of the facility
including care and periodic inventories of the SNF amounts to about 0.5 person-years per year
(Neimark 1995).
3.1.4.3 Cultural Resources. The ANL-E site has no properties designated as National
Historic Landmarks or listed on the National Register of Historic Places.
In 1992, 26 archaeological properties had been recorded at ANL-E. One site has been
evaluated as being potentially eligible for the National Register, 19 sites are not considered
eligible, and 6 sites have not been evaluated (ANL-E 1993a).
The Illinois State Historic Preservation Agency has not evaluated the ANL-E site's potential
to contain additional unidentified archaeological or architectural resources. The potential of the
ANL-E site to contain traditional cultural resources of interest to Native American groups has
not been evaluated (ANL-E 1993a).
3.1.4.4 Geology. The topography at ANL-E is generally gently rolling; the average
elevation is 725 feet (221 meters) above sea level. Slopes of consequence are found only
adjacent to streams and near the southern edge of the site, where the fall into the Des Plaines
River Valley begins (ANL-E 1993b). The geology of the Argonne National Laboratory area
consists of about a 100-foot-thick (30-meter-thick) deposit of glacial till on top of dolomite
bedrock. The bedrock at Argonne National Laboratory is the Niagaran and Alexandrian
dolomite of Silurian age (about 400 million years old). These formations are underlain by
Maquoketa shale of Ordovician age, and older dolomites and sandstones of Ordovician and
Cambrian age. The beds are nearly horizontal (ANL-E 1993b).
The Niagaran and Alexandrian dolomite are about 200 feet (60 meters) thick in the
Argonne National Laboratory area, and are widely used in DuPage County as a source of
groundwater. The Maquoketa shale separates the upper dolomite aquifer from the underlying
sandstone and dolomite aquifers. This shale retards hydraulic connection between the upper and
lower aquifers; the lower aquifer has a much lower piezometric level and does not appear to be
affected by pumpage from the overlying Silurian bedrock (ANL-E 1993a).
A capable fault is one that has had movement at, or near, the ground surface at least once
within the past 35,000 years or recurring movement within the past 500,000 years (10 CFR 100,
Appendix A). A few minor earthquakes have occurred in northern Illinois, believed to have been
caused by isostatic adjustments of the Earth's crust in response to glacial unloading. Several
areas of seismic activity are present at moderate distances from ANL-E, including the New
Madrid Fault zone in the St. Louis area of southwestern Missouri, the Wabash Valley Fault zone
along the southern Illinois-Indiana border, and the Anna region of western Ohio. Ground
motions induced by near and distance seismic sources are expected to be minimal at the
Laboratory (ANL-E 1993a).
A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.15g at Argonne National
Laboratory - East is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once every 2000
years (DOE 1994a). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for general seismic
hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities
should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and standards and site
specific procedures.
No active volcanoes are considered to be in the ANL-E region (Keller 1979). Therefore,
the potential for damage from volcanic activity is minimal.
The major soil type present at ANL-E is Morley silt loam. This soil covers approximately
70 percent of the site. Stream valley soils, including the Askum, Peotone, and Sawmill silty clay
loams, cover approximately 15 percent of the site, urban land soils approximately 10 percent, and
other minor soils the remaining 5 percent (Mapes 1979).
3.1.4.5 Air Resources. The regional climate around Argonne National Laboratory is
characterized as being continental, with relatively cold winters and hot summers. The area is
subject to frequently changing weather as storm systems move from the Great Plains toward the
east. The weather is slightly modified by Lake Michigan, which is about 22 miles (35 kilometers)
east-northeast of the Laboratory (ANL-E 1993a).
Meteorological data presented here were compiled from the National Weather Service
Station at the O'Hare International Airport in Chicago and from the meteorological tower
operated at ANL-E. The prevailing winds for the airport are from the south and southwest with
a northeast component. The frequency of calm winds, defined as those less than 2 miles per
hour (1 meter per second), was approximately 4 percent. The 1992 average wind rose for the
ANL-E site is very similar to this pattern, with prevailing winds from the west to south, but with a
more significant northeast component. In 1992, the percentage of calm winds at ANL-E was
approximately 3 percent (ANL-E 1993a).
The amount of rainfall recorded in 1992, 31.5 inches (80.01 centimeters), was nearly
identical to the site's historical average of 31.48 inches (79.95 centimeter). The temperatures
recorded during 1992 were also similar to the site's long-term averages. The coldest months
during 1992 were January and December, with monthly averages of 27.9yF (-2.3yC) and 28.0yF
(-2.2yC), respectively. The warmest months were July and August, with monthly averages of
68.5yF (20.3yC) and 66.9yF (19.4yC), respectively (ANL-E 1993a).
The area experiences about 40 thunderstorms annually. Occasionally, these storms are
accompanied by hail, damaging winds, or tornadoes. From 1957 to 1969 there were 371
tornadoes in the state, with more than 65 percent occurring in the spring months. The
theoretical probability of a tornado strike at Argonne is 8.54 x 10-4 each year, or a recurrence
interval of 1 tornado every 1,200 years. The Argonne National Laboratory site was struck by
tornadoes in 1976 and 1978, with minor damage to power lines, roofs, and trees.
The State of Illinois has adopted ambient air quality standards that specify maximum
permissible short- and long-term concentrations of various contaminants (State of Illinois Rules
and Regulations 1992). These standards are the same as the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for criteria pollutants (NAAQS; 40 CFR 50). In addition to standards for criteria
pollutants, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency has made applicable all regulations
promulgated by the EPA relating to National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP), under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (40 USC 7412, 7601a).
The ANL-E site and the surrounding counties are classified by the EPA as severe
nonattainment areas for the criteria pollutant ozone (O3). All other surrounding counties and
areas are in attainment of the remaining National Ambient Air Quality Standards criteria
pollutants: nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sodium dioxide (SO2), lead (Pb), particulate matter less than
10 microns in diameter (PM10) and carbon monoxide (CO) (with the exception of the Lyons
Township in southeast Chicago, which is listed as a moderate nonattainment area for PM10)
(ANL-E 1993b).
3.1.4.6 Water Resources.
Surface Water - The ANL-E is in the Des Plaines River drainage basin 24 miles (39 kilometers)
west of Lake Michigan and is on the northern margin of the Des Plaines River valley. The
largest onsite stream is Sawmill Creek, which originates north of the site and enters the Des
Plaines River about 1.25 miles (2.01 kilometers) southeast from the center of the site. Two small
streams originate onsite and combine to form Freund Brook, which discharges into a Sawmill
Creek. Most of ANL-E is drained by Freund Brook. The Des Plaines River flows southwest
about 30 miles (48 kilometers) until it joins with the Kankakee River to form the Illinois River
(ANL-E 1993a). As noted in National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, December 1992 (USGS,
1992) the ANL-E region has no federally designated wild and scenic rivers.
Flow in Sawmill Creek, upstream from the ANL-E wastewater outfall, averaged 6.3 cubic
feet (0.18 cubic meters) per second in 1992. Flow in the Des Plaines River near the site is
approximately 900 feet3 (25.5 meters) per second (ANL-E, 1991). In addition, ANL-E facilities
are not in the 500-year floodplain. The floodplain areas are largely confined to areas within 200
feet (61 meters) of the surface streams (ANL-E 1993a).
The potable and site water supplies are obtained from groundwater (ANL-E 1993b). The
first downstream location where surface water is used for drinking is at Alton, on the Mississippi
River, about 370 miles (595 kilometers) from ANL-E. The first downstream location where
surface water is used for drinking is at Alton, on the Mississippi River, about 370 miles
(595 kilometers) from ANL-E (ANL-E 1993b).
The ANL-E has nine National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitted outfalls,
most of which discharge directly or indirectly to Sawmill Creek (ANL-E 1991).
In addition to this outfall monitoring, surface water bodies in the region are routinely
monitored for radioactive and nonradioactive parameters. In 1990, measurable levels of
americium-241, californium-249, californium-252, cesium-137, curium-242, curium-244, neptunium-
237, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, strontium-90, and tritium were detected in Sawmill Creek
downstream from the only small fraction of the DOE-derived concentration guides for water
(DOE Order 5400.5). Dilution in the Des Plaines River reduced the concentration of the
measured radionuclides to levels below their respective detection limits. Streams sediments in
the ANL-E region are routinely sampled for radionuclides at 3 onsite and 10 offsite locations.
These samples are not routinely analyzed for chemical constituents (ANL-E 1991).
Groundwater - The ANL-E vicinity uses two principal aquifers for its water supply. The
upper aquifer is the Niagara and Alexandria dolomite, which is about 200 feet (61 meters) thick
in the region and has a potentiometric surface between 500 and 100 feet (152 and 30 meters)
below ground (ANL-E 1993b). Water flows through this unit in a southern direction (ANL-E
1991). No aquifers in the region are considered sole source aquifers under the Safe Drinking
Water Act regulations (EPA 1994).
The ANL-E receives its potable water supply from four wells in the Niagara dolomite
aquifer. These wells are approximately 300 feet (91 meters) deep and provide hard water that
requires treatment before use (ANL-E 1993b). Treated sanitary and laboratory wastewater from
ANL-E are combined and discharged into Sawmill Creek. This effluent averaged 0.83 million
gallons (3.1 million liters) per day (ANL-E 1993a).
Groundwater is monitored for radioactive and nonradioactive parameters at 32 ANL-E
locations. Groundwater in the four onsite drinking water wells is also monitored for radioactive
and nonradioactive parameters, as required by the Safe Drinking Water Act. In 1990, all results
were less than the limits established by the Safe Drinking Water Act except for elevated levels of
total dissolved solids and turbidity. The average concentration of tritium was approximately 1
percent of the EPA Primary Drinking Water Standard of 20,000 picocuries per liter. One well
was removed from service in 1990 (ANL-E 1991).
3.1.4.7 Ecological Resources. The Argonne National Laboratory site lies within the
Prairie Peninsula Section of the Oak-Hickory Forest Region. The Prairie Peninsula is a mosaic
of oak forest, oak openings, and tall-grass prairie occurring on glaciated parts of Illinois,
northwest Indiana, southern Wisconsin, and parts of other states. Forests in the Argone National
Laboratory-East region are predominantly oak hickory. Other forested areas consist of sugar
maple, red oak, and basswood (ANL-E 1993a).
The mixture of vegetational communities (open fields, deciduous forests, pine plantations,
wetlands, and mowed rights-of-way), coupled with a large degree of protection from human
intrusion, makes the Argonne National Laboratory site an effective refuge for many species of
animals. These animals are characteristically found in open fields, forests, and forest-edge
communities in the Midwest. Also other bird species use the Argonne National Laboratory site
as a stopover during spring and fall migrations. By far, the most numerous animals on the site
are the small invertebrates (ANL-E 1993b).
The site is inhabited by fallow deer, (Dama dama), eastern cottontail rabbit, opossum,
raccoon and squirrels. Although fallow deer have several color varieties, only the white variety
occurs at Argonne. Invertebrate fauna consist primarily of dipteran larvae, crayfish, caddisfly
larvae, and midge larvae. Few fish are present due to the low summer flows and high
temperatures. Wetlands include a cattail marsh and wooded swamp habitat (ANL-E 1993b).
An opinion rendered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service indicated that the only federally
listed endangered or threatened vertebrate species likely to be present in the vicinity of the
Argonne National Laboratory site is the Indiana bat (Miotis sodalis). An unconfirmed capture of
an Indiana bat in nearby waterfall Glen Forest Preserves indicates that the bat may occur on the
ANL-E site. In addition, a September 1980 updated of the "Red Book" for the North-Central
Region lists the federally endangered bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) as wintering in nearby
Will County. Both American and Arctic subspecies of the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus
anatum and F. p. tundrius) and Kirtland's warbler (Dendroica kirtlandii) migrate through
northeastern Illinois and thus might occasionally be found on or near the Argonne National
Laboratory site. All three of these bird taxa are on the Federal endangered species list (ANL-E
1993b).
At least two plant species proposed for Federal endangered/threatened designation are
known to occur in counties near the Argonne National Laboratory site and therefore might be
present here. These are Thismia americana, found on wet prairies in Cook County; and Plantago
cordata, a plant of wet woodlands recorded in Will County (ANL-E 1993b).
3.1.4.8 Public Health and Safety. The highest annual dose received by an offsite
resident from a combination of the separate airborne and direct exposure pathways from the
most recent reports for a 5-year period is presented below (ANL-E 1993a, 1992, 1991, 1990,
1989). The annual doses are only a fraction of the DOE Public Dose Limit of 100 millirem per
year. The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1988 0.66 millirem
1989 0.49 millirem
1990 0.41 millirem
1991 0.29 millirem
1992 0.34 millirem
The total annual population dose to the entire area within a 50-mile (80-kilometer) radius
of the laboratory for a 5-year period is presented below (ANL-E 1993a, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989).
The data are from all laboratory operations, including storage of SNF.
1988 25 person-rem
1989 17 person-rem
1990 15 person-rem
1991 15 person-rem
1992 17 person-rem
3.1.4.9 Waste Management. Activities conducted at ANL-E generate a variety of
radioactive and hazardous waste streams (DOE 1994b).
The ANL-E reports 10 mixed waste streams in the inventory of operations waste. Of these,
eight are low-level mixed waste streams and two are mixed transuranic waste streams. The
ANL-E currently stores about 2.5 cubic yards (1.9 cubic meters) of mixed transuranic waste and
projects that 2.1 yards3 (1.6 meters3) of additional transuranic wastes will be generated through
the end of 1997. This waste will be processed as necessary (characterized, repackaged,
immobilized) to meet the waste acceptance criteria of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(DOE 1993e).
The ANL-E has no facilities for treating low-level mixed waste and transuranic waste.
ANL-E currently stores about 125 cubic yards (96 meters3) of low-level transuranic waste, which
includes low-level waste and transuranic waste reclassified as low-level transuranic waste.
Roughly 30 meters3 (39 cubic yards) of low-level transuranic waste are projected to be generated
through the end of 1997 (DOE 1993e).
Two major, unused facilities at ANL-E are undergoing environmental restoration. The
Laboratory expects to complete removal of the Experimental Boiling Water Reactor vessel by
the end of Fiscal Year 1995 and to complete the conversion of the CP-5 reactor building to an
interim safe storage condition during Fiscal Year 1994 (DOE 1993f).
3.2 Domestic Research Reactors
The environments of domestic research reactors that may be affected by SNF activities are
described in this section. Representative environments of sites generating and storing SNF are
described as a basis for assessing the 57 reactor sites identified in Subsection 2.1.2. This
approach was selected to permit enveloping the characteristics of the large number of sites
covered. Additionally, it is recognized that the programmatic SNF analyses in this EIS are not
intended to be site specific. Site-specific environmental information has already been presented
to the NRC and analyzed as part of the facility licensing process.
Domestic research reactors are located in a wide variety of environmental settings, ranging
from relatively densely populated urban areas to rural/semirural university campuses and
industrial parks. To provide reasonably representative descriptions of potentially affected
environments for these diverse installations, environmental information has been provided for
5 of the 11 Category 1 reactor sites. These five reactor sites encompass the diverse range of
reactor types and power level as well as diverse environmental setting.
As reported in 1988, there were a total of 268 personnel working at the 11 Category 1
reactors (ANS 1988). This number included operators, experimenting scientists, and support
personnel. While not their main occupation, part of the duties of the operators and some
support personnel include tasks associated with refueling, storing, inventorying, packaging, and
shipping SNF.
Environmental information is provided for those facilities whose ability to store SNF is
limited when compared to their fuel burnup rate. For those operating facilities possessing
adequate storage for their SNF, projected to be generated through 2035, there would be no
incremental impacts on the surrounding environment. Accordingly, no environmental analyses
have been performed and no information is provided in this section.
The environmental information for each of these reactors has been presented as part of
their license applications to the NRC and has been assessed by that agency as part of the
licensing process for each facility. The environmental impacts of expanded storage of SNF at
these facilities are expected to be minimal (although other effects on the institutions themselves
may be extensive). Information on environmental factors that are not affected by the activities of
storing SNF at these sites (including cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, ecological
resources, noise, traffic and transportation, utilities and energy, materials and waste management)
is not provided in this document.
Data on the calculated doses to the general public resulting from effluents from NRC
licensed research reactors is not available, since their license and reporting requirements were
not the same as those for DOE facilities. At the time of the reports (1987-1993), the effluent
release limits in 10 CFR 20 (specified as maximum permissible concentrations) were based on a
dose limit of 500 millirem per year to a hypothetical member of the public. The conservative
assumptions made in calculating the 10 CFR 20 concentration limits were that the person only
drank the water and breathed the air released from the licensed facility. The licensed research
reactors proved to the NRC that the dose limit of 500 millirem per year for the general public
was being met by maintaining the release concentrations at the site boundary below the
maximum permissible concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20. In reality, the actual dose
received by any member of the public was well below the prescribed limit of 500 millirem per
year because 1) no individual drinks the water discharged in the sewer systems from these
facilities, 2) no individual stands at the closest downwind location for 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year, and 3) the radioactivity concentrations at the site boundary are well below the
concentration limits.
As of 1993, licensed research reactors are required to meet the dose limits specified by the
EPA in 40 CFR 61 of 10 millirem per year to the maximum exposed individual from airborne
effluents. In addition, as of 1994, the licensed research reactors are required to comply with the
new 10 CFR 20, in which exposure to any member of the public from all pathways is limited to
100 millirem per year.
3.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology Research Reactor
The National Institute of Standards and Technology research reactor, formerly known as the
National Bureau of Standards Reactor, is a highly enriched, heavy-water-cooled and moderated
vessel-type reactor. The National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor received an
Atomic Energy Commission provisional license in 1967 to operate at 10 MW. On May 16, 1984,
the NRC upgraded the National Institute of Standards and Technology research reactor license
to operate for 20 years at up to 20 MW (NRC 1983).
The spent fuel storage pool, located in the basement of the confinement building, is used to
store spent fuel under filtered, demineralized water until the fuel is shipped offsite. A spent-fuel
storage pool cooling system is installed to dissipate the decay heat from elements stored in the
pool. Storage racks are provided to store both full fuel elements and cut fuel pieces in a defined
geometry. Boral or stainless steel spacers are placed between elements as required to control
criticality. The storage rack arrangement ensures that the fuel in the pool remains subcritical
(NRC 1983).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology site is a 576-acre tract of land in upper
Montgomery County, Maryland, approximately 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) southwest of the City of
Gaithersburg, Maryland. According to the 1990 census, the population of Gaithersburg was
39,542 (Rand 1992). The general area is a combination of residential and rural. The nearest
population centers are Gaithersburg, adjacent to the site, and Rockville, 5 miles (8 kilometers)
southeast of the site. The National Institute of Standards and Technology site is located
approximately 20 miles (32 kilometers) northwest of the center of the District of Columbia. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology campus is bounded on the east by a major
interstate highway (I-270), on the north and west by Maryland Route 124, and on the southeast
by Muddy Branch Road. The area adjacent to the reactor building is occupied by a parking lot,
the reactor cooling tower, and roads. Thus, the area within a 500-foot (152-meter) radius of the
reactor building stack is not readily available for the construction of new buildings, and planning
for future development of the National Institute of Standards and Technology site does not
include any new buildings within 500 feet (152 meters) of the reactor stack. The site boundary
nearest to the National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor is approximately 0.25 mile
(0.4 kilometer) southwest of the reactor. The nearest offsite residential or commercial housing is
about 1,500 feet (457 meters) to the southeast of the reactor (NRC 1983).
During the period 1955-1967, 28 tornadoes were reported in a 2 degree latitude-longitude
square containing the site. The computed recurrence interval for a tornado at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology site is about 2000 years. Numerous tropical storms,
tornadoes and hurricanes have affected the area. In the period from 1871 to 1978, about
20 tornadoes or hurricanes have passed within 100 miles (160 kilometers) of the site (NRC 1983).
There is no known major fault in the site vicinity (Seismic Zone 1). There is no known
relationship between mapped faults and the moderate seismicity in the region. The maximum
potential earthquake for the area was estimated to result in a maximum ground acceleration of
0.07 g at the reactor site. The effects of stresses developed by 0.1 g earthquake loadings have
been evaluated, and it was demonstrated that the confinement building and reactor equipment
would remain intact and maintain their capability (NRC 1983).
A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents from the
National Institute of Standards and Technology from the most recent reports for a 5-year period
is presented below (NIST 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989).
Year Airborne effluents Liquid effluents into
sanitary sewer
Argon-41 Tritium Tritium Other beta-
gamma emitters
1988 900 Ci 393 Ci 5.1 Ci 0.0026 Ci
1989 328 Ci 461 Ci 2.9 Ci 0.0039 Ci
1990 687 Ci 309 Ci 2.2 Ci 0.0011 Ci
1991 971 Ci 251 Ci 1.8 Ci 0.0016 Ci
1992 665 Ci 351 Ci 1.5 Ci 0.0004 Ci
3.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor is a tank-type, light-water cooled and
moderated, heavy-water reflected, plate fuel, research and training reactor. The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Reactor received its 5 MW operating license June 9, 1958 and originally
was designed to have a heavy-water moderated and cooled core utilizing curved plate-type fuel
elements, highly enriched in uranium-235. The major revision of the core design occurred in
1970 (MIT 1981, 1970).
The reactor building is a steel, gas-tight, 70-foot (21.3-meter) internal diameter, 50-foot
(15.2-meter) high, domed right cylinder with 2-foot (0.6-meter) thick concrete shielding walls on
the inside. The reactor building basement contains an 8-foot (2.4-meter) diameter, 20-foot-deep
(6-meter-deep) spent fuel storage tank of demineralized water. The containment building has an
air conditioning and multiple filter ventilation system which exhausts to a 150-foot (46-meter)
stack.
Irradiated fuel elements can be stored in any of the following locations:
a) In the reactor core
b) In the cadmium-lined fuel storage ring (holds 27 SNF elements) attached to the flow
shroud, or briefly in a three-element rack in the core tank used during transfers of
spent fuel out of the core tank
c) In 22 steel-lined dry storage holes, 5 inches (13 centimeters) in diameter, on the
reactor top biological shield
d) In the spent fuel storage tank in the basement of the reactor building
e) In the fuel element transfer flask or other proper shield within the controlled area.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor is located a few blocks northwest of the
main Massachusetts Institute of Technology campus in Cambridge, Massachusetts and less than
2,000 feet (610 meters) from the Charles River, which separates Cambridge from Boston.
According to the 1990 census, Cambridge had a population of 95,802 (Rand 1992). The MIT
Reactor is located in the midst of a heavily industrialized section of Cambridge. The site
measures approximately 280 feet in length by 150 feet in width (85 meters by 46 meters). Boston
and Albany Railroad tracks, used exclusively for freight traffic, run parallel to the back of the
reactor exclusion area. Although the site boundary comes nearest to the reactor on the side
facing the railroad tracks, the closest point of normal public occupancy near the site boundary is
on the Albany Street side at approximately 120 feet (37 meters). (MIT 1970)
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Meteorology Department has stated that
conditions for the reactor site should vary only slightly from those at Logan Airport in east
Boston. The area atmospheric conditions vary from highly stable situations with light winds to
unstable periods with strong winds in excess of 47 miles (75.6 kilometers) per hour. Water
drainage from the reactor site is into the Charles River and on into Boston Harbor and
Massachusetts Bay. The drainage in this section of Cambridge is such that after a record-
breaking 20 inches (0.5 meter) of rain fell in 48 hours, the Charles River did not overflow its
banks, nor was the area inundated (MIT 1970).
The Cambridge area lies in the Boston Basin which has been relatively free of earthquakes
in the past 150 years but had several earthquakes in the preceding centuries. The region is
located in Seismic Zone 2. The most severe shock with a probable epicenter near Cambridge
occurred in 1755 with a Rossi-Forel intensity of 9 (equivalent to Modified Mercalli Intensity IX
or X). Partial or total destruction of some buildings occurred. Since 1817, no earthquake with a
Rossi-Forel intensity of more than 5 (equivalent to Modified Mercalli Intensity VI) has been
reported near Boston (MIT 1970).
A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor from the most recent reports for a 5-
year period is presented below (MIT 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988). Liquid radioactive wastes
generated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor facility are discharged
only to the sanitary sewer serving the facility. All releases were in accordance with Technical
Specifications 3.8-1 and 10 CFR 20. All activities were substantially below the limits specified in
10 CFR 20.303. Gaseous radioactivity is discharged to the atmosphere from the containment
building exhaust stack. All gaseous releases were in accordance with the Technical Specifications
and all nuclides were below the limits of 10 CFR 20. The information is reported by fiscal year,
from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the current year.
Year Airborne Liquid effluents
effluents into sanitary sewer
Argon-41 Tritium Other beta-
gamma emitters
1988 2627 Ci 0.071 Ci 0.0011 Ci
1989 1529 Ci 0.107 Ci 0.0034 Ci
1990 543 Ci 0.059 Ci 0.0220 Ci
1991 684 Ci 0.115 Ci 0.0071 Ci
1992 728 Ci 0.023 Ci 0.0137 Ci
3.2.3 University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor
The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor is a 10 MW tank in pool light water
moderated and cooled research reactor. The reactor uses plate-type fuel containing 93 percent
enriched uranium-235. The core forms an annular fuel region which is pressurized and cooled by
forced convection. The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor received its operating
license October 11, 1966 and initially operated at 5 MW. The reactor power was increased to
10 MW in 1974 (UMC 1965; NRC 1991b).
The reactor is housed in a five-level, poured-concrete, gas-tight containment building which
is in the center of the Research Reactor Facility, a one-level building of poured-concrete, block
and brick construction. The reactor vessel is located eccentrically within an open pool 10 feet
(3 meters) in diameter and 30 feet (9 meters) deep. Permanent SNF storage is provided within
the biological shield, in a pool separated from the reactor by a massive submerged concrete weir
(UMC 1965).
The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor currently has 44 fuel elements in
the core, 20 SNF elements in wet storage and none in dry storage. Without offsite shipment of
SNF, the University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor's storage capacity of 120 elements
would be filled by June 1996. Before this could occur, NRC approval would be required to raise
the reactor's uranium-235 possession limit above 165 pounds (75 kilograms). Increased SNF
storage capacity could be achieved by reracking and building a new wet-storage area within the
reactor building. However, there are no plans to expand the current SNF storage capacity
(Jentz 1993).
The University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor Facility is located within the 85-acre
(0.344-square-kilometer) Research Park about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) southwest of the main
campus of the University of Missouri, south of the main business district of the city of Columbia,
Boone County, Missouri. According to the 1990 census, the population of Columbia was 69,101
(Rand 1992). The nearest permanent residence is approximately 1,000 feet (305 meters) from
the reactor. There are a number of small industrial activities in the area, but for the county,
agriculture is the leading activity.
Wind speeds up to 50 miles (80 kilometers) per hour are not uncommon at Columbia.
Ninety-four-mile-per-hour (151-kilometer-per-hour) winds have an average recurrence interval of
100 years; winds of 105 miles (169 kilometers) per hour have an average recurrence interval of
200 years. The frequency of tornadoes is so low that it is difficult to estimate the probability of
the event. In most of the Midwest, there are an average 2.5 tornadoes per year in a
10,000 square-mile (25,900-square-kilometer) area. Surface drainage from the site moves south
to enter Hinkson Creek, which drains to Perche Creek and then to the Missouri River
(UMC 1961).
Columbia's position within the stable area of Missouri (Seismic Zone 1) and the seismic
history of the area indicate that the probability of seismic damage to the area is extremely low.
A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents from the
University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor from the most recent reports for a 5-year
period is presented below (UMC 1992, 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988). The information is reported by
fiscal year, from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the current year.
Year Airborne effluents Liquid effluents into
sanitary sewer
Argon-41 Tritium Tritium Other beta-
gamma emitters
1988 813 Ci 14.5 Ci 0.077 Ci 0.0080 Ci
1989 920 Ci 2.8 Ci 0.0352 Ci 0.0085 Ci
1990 590 Ci 2.3 Ci 0.555 Ci 0.0385 Ci
1991 520 Ci 15.0 Ci 0.1600 Ci 0.0250 Ci
1992 440 Ci 0.73 Ci 0.2094 Ci 0.0488 Ci
3.2.4 University of Michigan Ford Nuclear Reactor
The University of Michigan's Ford Nuclear Reactor is a pool-type heterogeneous
2-megawatt-thermal reactor that is light-water cooled and moderated. The Ford Nuclear Reactor
has been operated since 1957 and received a 20-year license renewal from the NRC on July 29,
1985 (NRC 1985c). Its principal function is for teaching, research, activation, and experiments
(NRC 1985d).
The reactor is located in a windowless, four-story reinforced concrete building that is
approximately a 70-foot (21.3-meter) cube. The reactor room, designed to restrict leakage, is
equipped with its own ventilation system and exhaust stack (NRC 1985d).
The Ford Nuclear Reactor site situated on the North Campus, which is about 1.75 miles
(2.8 kilometers) northeast of the old University of Michigan campus. The North Campus is a
tract of nearly 900 acres (3.64 square kilometers), approximately 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers)
northeast of the center of Ann Arbor. According to the 1990 census, the population of the city
of Ann Arbor was 109,592 (Rand 1992). The University of Michigan controls all the land within
1500 feet (457 meters) of the reactor site, with the exception of a small portion of the highway
right-of-way along Glacier Way to the southeast and the Arborcrest Cemetery, located 800 feet
(244 meters) to the east of the site. The reactor exclusion area consists of all the land 500 feet
(152 meters) to the east, 1000 feet (305 meters) to the west and north, and 1200 feet
(366 meters) to the south (NRC 1985d).
The reactor building and the contiguous Phoenix Memorial Laboratory are located near the
center of the North Campus area. The following guidelines were used by the university in
developing the North Campus area: (1) only laboratory and research buildings will be
constructed within 50 feet (15 meters) of the reactor and (2) no housing or other buildings
containing housing facilities will be erected within 1500 feet (457 meters) of the reactor.
Therefore, all buildings, except the reactor and laboratory buildings, are generally occupied
during normal school hours only. The closest permanent residences are about 1500 feet
(457 meters) from the Ford Nuclear Reactor facility (NRC 1985d).
The heaviest rainfall intensity occurs in connection with thundershower activity, and the
heaviest recorded 24-hour period of rainfall was approximately 5 inches (13 centimeters). Hourly
intensities as high as 1.2 inches (3 centimeters). occur with a frequency of once every 2 years.
Average annual snowfall is 30.2 inches (76.7 centimeters.). Annual totals have ranged from 13 to
54 inches (33 to 137 centimeters). The heaviest recorded snowfall for a single day was 6.2 inches
(15.7 centimeters). The highest wind velocity recorded in the Ann Arbor area was 60 miles per
hour (27 meters per second). Michigan lies at the northeastern edge of the nation's maximum
frequency belt for tornadoes. For the past decade, Michigan has averaged nine tornadoes per
year, 90 percent of which have been in the southern half of the lower peninsula (NRC 1985d).
The University of Michigan Ann Arbor site, within the Central Stable Region, is
characterized by a relatively low level of seismic activity (Seismic Zone 1). Recent
interpretations of geophysical investigations suggest that different areas of the Central Stable
Region exhibit different levels of seismic activity. For instance, Barstow et al. developed an
earthquake frequency map for the eastern United States that places Ann Arbor in a zone where
8-15 earthquakes per 4500 square miles (11,660 square kilometers), with Modified Mercalli
Intensities of III or greater, have occurred during the time period 1800-1977. The Anna, Ohio,
location experienced a frequency of 32-63 earthquakes per 4500 square miles (11,660 square
kilometers) with Modified Mercalli Intensity III or greater for the same time period. The
Michigan Basin area, in general, is considered to have had no more than 0-3 earthquakes per
4,500 square miles (11,660 square kilometers) of Modified Mercalli Intensity III or greater. A
seismicity map developed by the Geological Survey of the State of Michigan shows that for the
time period from 1872-1967, only 34 earthquakes were felt (reported) in the entire State of
Michigan. A U.S. Geological Survey seismicity map of the State of Michigan shows a total of
83 earthquakes in the state since 1872. The nearest of these to Ann Arbor (March 13, 1978;
Modified Mercalli Intensity IV) was about 30 miles (48 kilometers) away. Only six earthquakes
have been reported within 60 miles (96 kilometers) of Ann Arbor. The risk of damage from
earthquakes to well-designed structures is relatively low for the Ann Arbor area. In addition, the
earthquake intensity/magnitude potential is relatively low for the Michigan region, and there are
no known structures in the Ann Arbor area capable of causing earthquakes (NRC 1985d).
A summary of the radioactive material released in airborne and liquid effluents from the
Ford Nuclear Reactor from the most recent reports for a 5-year period is presented below
(UMI 1994, 1993, 1992, 1991, 1990).
Year Airborne Liquid effluents into
effluents sanitary sewer
Argon-41 Tritium Other beta-
gamma emitters
1989 31 Ci 0.051 Ci 0.18 Ci
1990 35 Ci 0.069 Ci 0.48 Ci
1991 41 Ci 0.079 Ci 0.11 Ci
1992 39 Ci No discharges
1993 39 Ci No discharges
3.2.5 University of Texas TRIGA
The University of Texas General Atomic TRIGA Mk-II Reactor replaces an earlier TRIGA
Mk-I reactor which had been in operation on the main campus in Austin, Texas since 1963. The
TRIGA Mk-II is a 1.1 MW heterogeneous, pool-type reactor incorporating solid uranium-
zirconium hydride fuel-moderator elements with an enrichment of 19.7 percent uranium-235.
The University of Texas TRIGA core is similar to most other TRIGA reactors operated
throughout the world as well as the United States. It received its NRC operating license on
January 17, 1992 (NRC 1985a, 1992).
The University of Texas TRIGA Mk-II Reactor facility is housed in the Nuclear Engineering
Teaching Laboratory on the east tract of the Balcones Research Center about 7 miles
(11.3 kilometers) north of the University of Texas main campus, in the City of Austin, Travis
County. According to the 1990 census, the City of Austin had a population of 465,622 (Rand
1992). Residential areas are located from 0.8 to 1.3 miles (1.3 to 2.1 kilometers) from the
reactor facility. Most areas adjacent to the research center are developed for mixed commercial
and industrial activities. Major activities in the area are from the University of Texas main
campus at Austin and the State of Texas government and the business district of the City of
Austin (NRC 1985a).
Destructive wind and damaging hailstorms are infrequent. On rare occasions, dissipating
tropical storms affect the city with strong winds and heavy rains. Tornado activity at the site is
roughly one event per year per 1000 square miles (2,600 square kilometers), or 4 x 10-6 per year
for an area of 333 square feet (30.8 square meters), which is roughly equal to the general site
area. Water drainage at the immediate site is primarily related to the potential but temporary
occurrence of extreme rainfall rates. Surface water runoff from the Balcones Research Center
site is drained into the Shoal Creek Watershed except for the extreme northeast region of the
site, which drains into the Walnut Creek watershed. The facility is located in the northeast site
region with drainage into the Walnut Creek watershed. It is situated at an elevation well above
the local area flood plain, and is located nearly equidistant 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometer) from the
drainage easements of both watersheds. Thus no significant general site area flooding is
anticipated (NRC 1985a).
The University of Texas TRIGA reactor site is located in a zone where no damage from
earthquakes is expected (Seismic Zone 1). This does not mean, however, that the area is
aseismic. The Austin region has experienced three (recorded) earthquakes within a 50-mile
(92.6-kilometer) radius since the late nineteenth century:
- May 1, 1873--Manor earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity III-IV
- January 5, 1887--Paige earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity V
- October 9, 1902--Creedmore earthquake with epicentral Modified Mercalli Intensity
IV-V.
Other regions in central and east Texas have experienced earthquakes of epicentral Modified
Mercalli Intensity V and possibly VI. Damage from an Modified Mercalli Intensity VI
earthquake is limited to cracked plaster and damage to chimneys. Structures of good design do
not begin to experience damage from intensities below Modified Mercalli Intensity VII.
Therefore, when state-of-the-art engineering practices for general structures of common design
are adhered to, seismic excitations from earthquakes of Modified Mercalli Intensities V or VI are
not expected to affect the integrity of the reactor (NRC 1985a).
The University of Texas TRIGA reactor recently became operational, with its first criticality
occurring in March 1992. There is no history of releases and exposures for this reactor.
3.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
In this section, the environments of three facilities housing power reactor SNF to be
managed by DOE are described. These facilities are the West Valley Demonstration Project in
New York State; the Fort St. Vrain SNF Storage Facility in Colorado; and the B&W Research
Technology Center in Virginia. General environmental concerns related to these facilities and
their operation have been addressed either during their initial licensing/permitting activities or
during a subsequent amendment process. Information on environmental factors that are not
uniformly available in existing NEPA documentation for all three sites (noise, traffic, utilities and
energy, and waste management) are not provided in this document.
3.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project
The West Valley Demonstration Project consists of numerous structures and facilities. The
Fuel Receiving & Storage facility, located adjacent to the original fuel reprocessing plant, is
where SNF management activities at the West Valley Demonstration Project are currently
performed. The Fuel Receiving & Storage facility consists of the following buildings and systems
(WVNS 1993).
- Fuel Receiving & Storage Building - This building contains the spent fuel pool, cask
unloading pool, cask decontamination area, cask and fuel handling equipment, and the
spent fuel pool water treatment system.
- The water treatment system maintains a water quality that ensures visual clarity for
underwater operations and that degradation of the SNF is minimized.
- The spent fuel pool provides shielding from irradiated fuel and ensures that stored
assemblies are maintained in a critically safe geometry. The pool is about 30 years old
and was not designed with a liner or a leak detection system, nor were the fuel racks
designed to withstand a design-basis earthquake.
- Radwaste Process Building - This building houses the equipment for the Radwaste
Treatment System, including the high integrity containers used to store spent resins
and filter media, as well as shields for those containers.
- Recirculation Ventilation Building - This building houses the ventilation equipment for
the Fuel Receiving & Storage building including fans, filters, heaters, chiller, and
controls.
The Western New York Nuclear Service Center is located in the town of Ashford,
Cattaraugus County, in rural western New York State, approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers)
south of Buffalo and 24.5 miles (40 kilometers) inland (east) of Lake Erie. The West Valley
Demonstration Project site consists of a 220-acre (88-hectare) tract which is located in the center
of the 3,345-acre (1,341-hectare) Western New York Nuclear Service Center, (WVNS 1992a).
3.3.1.1 Land Use. Regional land use is predominantly agricultural, with some scattered
residential areas. The communities of West Valley, Riceville, Ashford, Hollow, and the village of
Springville are located within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the West Valley Demonstration Project.
The proximity of the city of Buffalo, Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario influence land use patterns in
the region (WVNS 1992a).
3.3.1.2 Socioeconomics. The West Valley Demonstration Project comprises Cattaraugus
and Erie Counties in the State of New York. These counties collectively account for 96 percent
of the site's employee residential distribution. Most West Valley Demonstration Project
employees live in Erie County. Total employment in the region increased 14.4 percent between
1970 and 1990. During the same period, total population in the region decreased 12.2 percent.
Personal income in 1990 for Cattaraugus and Erie County residents was $13,698 and $18,305,
respectively (DOC 1992). The total number of housing units within the region is 438,970.
The number of regular employees working at West Valley Demonstration Project is 1050
personnel. Employment associated with SNF management at West Valley amounts to 9 person-
years per year (Connors 1995).
3.3.1.3 Cultural Resources. The cultural resources of 360 acres (145 hectares) that may
be affected by future West Valley Demonstration Project Plans and/or West Valley
Demonstration Project completion and Western New York Nuclear Service Center closure have
been investigated. No recorded extant historic structures are located within or adjacent to the
study area, but seven recorded prehistoric sites are within a 1.5-mile (2.4-kilometer) radius of the
study area described below. There are no structures or prehistoric sites within the study area nor
within the town of Ashford that are listed on the New York State Register of Historic Places or
the National Register of Historic Places (WVNS 1994).
3.3.1.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The natural landscape in the area consists of
rolling wooded hillsides, a mix of actively used agricultural fields, inactive farm fields reverting to
brush, and rural homesites. Large portions of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center
are relatively undisturbed and consist of a mixture of abandoned agricultural areas in various
stages of ecological succession, forested tracts, and wetlands joined by transitional ecotones. The
terrain in the area of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center is not unique in terms of
landforms, vegetation, expanses of water, or land use (WVNS 1993).
3.3.1.5 Geology. The West Valley Demonstration Project is located within the
Cattaraugus highlands, which is a transitional zone between the Appalachian Plateau Province
and the Great Lakes Plain (WVNS 1993).
No fold or fault of any consequence is recognized within the site. The Clarendon-Linden
Structure is the closest active "capable" earthquake (fault)-producing feature known to exist in
the region. It is approximately 23 miles (37 kilometers) from the site (WVNS 1993). The site
has experienced a moderate amount of relatively minor seismic activity. During historical times,
ground motion at the site probably has not exceeded a Modified Mercalli Intensity of IV or a
horizontal acceleration of 0.05g. It is estimated that the maximum earthquake on the Claredon-
Linden Structure would produce an earthquake of Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI to VII and a
maximum horizontal acceleration of approximately 0.12g at the site. The Claredon-Linden Fault
Zone is located approximately 18 miles (29 kilometers) east of the West Valley Demonstration
Project (WVNS 1993).
The West Valley Demonstration Project region has no active volcanoes (Keller 1979). The
major soil types at the West Valley Demonstration Project include the well-drained Chenango
gravelly loam, the poorly drained Erie silt loam, and the poorly drained Mahoning silt loam.
3.3.1.6 Air Resources. A 200 feet (60-meter) onsite meteorological tower is operated by
DOE at the West Valley Demonstration Project. A review of the West Valley Demonstration
Project tower's 1992 data indicates that the prevailing wind was from the south-southeast with a
mean wind speed of 5.4 miles per hour (2.4 meters per second). The precipitation for 1992 was
7.1 inches (18 centimeters) above the annual average of 40.9 inches (104 centimeters). The
onsite 1992 wind data and National Weather Service wind data collected at Buffalo airport did
not compare well, thereby indicating that Buffalo airport is not representative for predicting
conditions at the West Valley Demonstration Project.
The state of New York has adopted national ambient air quality standards. The West
Valley Demonstration Project is in a Class II Prevention of Significant Deterioration area. The
nearest Class I Prevention of Significant Deterioration area is the Edwin B. Forsyth National
Wildlife Refuge, approximately 300 miles (483 kilometers) southeast of the site.
3.3.1.7 Water Resources. The West Valley Demonstration Project is located in the
Cattaraugus Creek drainage basin, which is part of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence watershed.
All surface drainage from the West Valley Demonstration Project is to Buttermilk Creek, which
flows into Cattaraugus Creek and ultimately into Lake Erie (WVNS 1992a). Cattaraugus Creek
is used for swimming, canoeing, and fishing. Although limited irrigation water for nearby golf
course greens and tree farms is taken from Cattaraugus Creek, no public water supply is drawn
from the creek downstream of the site. The West Valley Demonstration Project has three
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitted outfalls that discharge to Erdman
Brook (WVNS 1992a).
The West Valley Demonstration Project site has two aquifers, but neither is considered
highly permeable. The Cattaraugus Creek Basin aquifer system is a sole source aquifer under
Safe Drinking Water Act regulations (EPA 1994). Groundwater beneath the West Valley
Demonstration Project is not used for process or drinking water. The site receives all of its water
supply from surface water. Offsite water supplies north of the site and south of Cattaraugus
Creek derive mainly from springs and shallow dug wells (WVNS 1992a).
More detailed aquifer characterization information can be found in the West Valley
Demonstration Project Safety Analysis Report for Project Overview and General Information,
WVNS-SAR-001 (WVNS 1993).
3.3.1.8 Ecological Resources. The West Valley Demonstration Project lies within the
Humid Temperature Domain, Warm Continental Division (Bailey 1994). The West Valley
Demonstration Project is in a transitional zone between the Appalachian Plateau to the south
and east and the Great Lakes Plain to the north and west (WVNS 1992b). The West Valley
Demonstration Project is equally divided between forest land and abandoned farm fields (WVNS
1993).
Native vegetation, removed by previous agricultural activity, is becoming reestablished and,
if left undisturbed, will slowly revert by successional stages to a climax hardwood community
(WVNS 1992b).
Terrestrial wildlife is abundant within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center and
surrounding areas because of the mixture of open areas and forested lands as well as the
Center's protected nature (WVNS 1992b). Fifty-four species of mammals potentially occur on
the site (22 have been recorded onsite). The most common mammal is the white-tailed deer
(Odocoileus virginianus), which is also the most abundant game species in the region. However,
hunting is prohibited. Other common game and furbearer species include raccoon (Procyon
lotor), muskrat (Ondatra zibethica), red fox (Vulpes fulva), gray fox (Urocyon cinereoargenteus),
woodchuck (Marmota monax), mink (Mustela vison), beaver (Castor canadensis), eastern
cottontail (Sylvilagus floridanus), red squirrel (Tamiasciurus hudsonicus), and gray squirrel (Sciurus
carolinensis) WVNS 1992b).
The various old-field, deciduous, and coniferous woodlands, marshes, reservoirs, and streams
within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center provide a diversity of habitats used by a
wide variety of birds. Bird species at the West Valley Demonstration Project include permanent
and summer residents, migrants, and visitants. The abundance of upland meadow ecosystem
within the Western New York Nuclear Services Center provides a unique habitat for several New
York protected birds (WVNS 1992b).
Aquatic communities at the Western New York Nuclear Services Center include common
shiners, eastern blacknose dace, common white sucker, and bluegill sunfish (WVNS 1992b).
Total wetland area is approximately 35 acres (14 hectares). The general types of wetlands
on the West Valley Demonstration Project can be described as palustrine, emergent, shrub/scrub,
and forested (WVNS 1993a).
A riparian area on Cattaraugus Creek is recognized by New York State as Habitat
Significant for Wildlife (WVNS 1992b; WVNS 1993). Canada geese and other waterfowl have
been observed periodically using the onsite reservoirs during migration (WVNS 1992b).
3.3.1.9 Transportation. Transportation in the Western New York Nuclear Service
Center vicinity is primarily by highway system. Roads in Cattaraugus County are considered rural
roads, except for those in Olean and Salamanca, located 38 miles (61 kilometers) and 26 miles
(42 kilometers), respectively, south of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. New York
State classifies rural roads as interstate, principal arterial, minor arterial, major collector, minor
collector, and local. Rock Springs Road, next to the Western New York Nuclear Service Center
on the west, is a local road that services as the site-access road and connects with U.S. Route 219
about 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) west of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center. Route
219 connects with Interstate 90 (the New York State Thruway) approximately 25 miles
(40 kilometers) north and with Interstate 17 (the Southern Tier Expressway) approximately
29 miles (46 kilometers) south of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WVNS 1993a).
Rail service to the Western New York Nuclear Service Center is provided by the Buffalo &
Pittsburgh Division of the CSX Railroad, located 0.6 mile (1 kilometer) east of the Western New
York Nuclear Service Center. A rail spur connects the West Valley Demonstration Project to
the CSX (WVNS 1993a).
The Buffalo International Airport is located approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers) north.
A general aviation airport, Olean Municipal Airport, is approximately 20 miles (32 kilometers)
southeast of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WVNS 1993a).
3.3.1.10 Public Health and Safety. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. developed an
environmental surveillance program in March 1963 before beginning fuel reprocessing. The
program was intended to establish onsite background levels of gross radiological activity in
surface water and air. The West Valley Demonstration Project began groundwater monitoring in
1982 (WVNS 1994).
Fallout data show the environmental levels of deposition at West Valley to have been within
the nationwide normal range of the Radiation Alert Network measurements. Gross beta
measurements in air taken at West Valley also were within the normal range of such readings
taken throughout the United States. Levels of airborne particulates and deposition beyond the
Western New York Nuclear Service Center perimeter have consistently been indistinguishable
from the natural background.
The calculated total dose associated with airborne and liquid effluents released from West
Valley Demonstration Project for a 6-year period are presented below (WVNS, 1994). The
annual doses for each year are only a fraction of the DOE public dose limit of 100 millirem per
year.
Maximum Individual Collective Dose
Year at Site Boundary EDE Within 50-Miles (80-km)
1988 0.11 millirem 0.031 person-rem
1989 0.08 millirem 0.065 person-rem
1990 0.25 millirem 0.058 person-rem
1991 0.06 millirem 0.015 person-rem
1992 0.05 millirem 0.011 person-rem
1993 0.03 millirem 0.072 person-rem
3.3.2 Fort St. Vrain
Between 1979 and 1989 a high temperature gas-cooled reactor was in operation at the Fort
St. Vrain site. In 1989, the Fort St. Vrain reactor was permanently shut down. At that time the
Public Services Company of Colorado, the owner of Fort St. Vrain, proceeded with plans to
decommission the Fort St. Vrain powerplant. To facilitate the decommissioning, the SNF had to
be removed from the reactor. However, implementation of an agreement between the DOE and
the Public Services Company of Colorado which would have provided for the storage of Fort St.
Vrain SNF at the INEL was blocked, requiring the Public Services Company of Colorado to
provide storage for the SNF from the Fort St. Vrain reactor. The SNF from the Fort St. Vrain is
being stored in an independent spent fuel storage installation located on the Fort St. Vrain site
(FSV 1990b).
The Fort St. Vrain site is located in Weld County in northeastern Colorado, approximately
3.5 miles (5.6 kilometers) northwest of the town of Platteville, 0.5 mile (0.8 kilometer) west of the
South Platte River, and 35 miles (56 kilometers) north of Denver. The Fort St. Vrain site
consists of 2,798 acres (1,132 hectares). About 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) north of the northern
portion of the site is the confluence of the South Platte River and St. Vrain Creek. St. Vrain
Creek flows in a northerly direction and passes within approximately 0.75 mile (1.2 kilometers)
west of the site at its nearest approach (NRC 1991c; PSC 1994).
3.3.2.1 Land Use. Most of the land in the immediate area of the Fort St. Vrain site is
disturbed, agricultural land. Its agricultural value is enhanced by a number of irrigation ditches
fed by surface water diversions from the South Platte River and St. Vrain Creek. The
predominant use of the land, surface water, and groundwater is agricultural (NRC 1991c).
3.3.2.2 Socioeconomics. The immediate area surrounding the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station site is rural, with many communities within commuting distance. The nearest
community is Platteville. Larger cities in the vicinity include Boulder, Denver, Estes Park, Fort
Collins, Greeley, Longmont, Loveland, and Lyons (NRC 1991a).
The population density in the vicinity of the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station is
low. The nearest residence is more than 2,600 feet (0.8 kilometer) north-northwest of the site.
The number of residents living within 1 mile (1.6 kilometer) of the Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation site (based on projections from 1980 census data) is 39; the projected figure
for the year 2012 is 40. However, 1990 figures indicate populations are changing at a similarly
low rate, less than 1 percent per year, and consequently the projections will not change
significantly (NRC 1991a).
Based on the 1980 census, the population within a 5-mile (8-kilometer) radius of the site at
that time was 3,148, with 1,662 residing in the town of Platteville. The projected population for
the year 2012 (through the 20-year license) for this same area is 4,526, with 3,040 residing in
Platteville (FSV 1990a).
At the present time there are approximately 230 personnel working at the Fort St. Vrain
site. Of these approximately 16 full time equivalent personnel work on the Fort St. Vrain SNF
storage facility (Holmes 1995).
3.3.2.3 Cultural Resources. There are no known archaeological, cultural, or historical
resources within, adjacent to, or in the immediate vicinity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation site. The nearest landmarks fitting any of these designations are more than 2 miles
(3.2 kilometers) from the site. They include (NRC 1991a):
- The Dent site, an archaeological excavation with mammoth remains left by prehistoric
Indians, situated about 4.5 miles (7.2 kilometers) northeast of Fort St. Vrain
- The original Fort St. Vrain, located 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) northeast of the
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site
- Fort Vasquez, located 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) southeast of the Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation, and listed on the National Register of Historic Places
- Fort Jackson, situated 8 miles (12.8 kilometers) southeast of the Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation site.
3.3.2.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The topography at the Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation site is flat. It is situated on the high plains, overlooked by the foothills
of the Front Range, which rise about 20 miles (32 kilometers) to the west, and by the Front
Range crest, which rises to 14,255 feet (4,345 meters) (Longs Peak) about 45 miles
(72 kilometers) to the west. The Front Range crest due west of the Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation site is the most easterly section of the continental divide in the Rocky
Mountains. The divide runs along ridges at an altitude of approximately 12,000 feet (3,650
meters) to a high point of 13,327 feet (4,062 meters) (McHenry's Peak) (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.5 Geology. The Fort St. Vrain site is located on the east flank of the Colorado
Front Range, a complexly faulted anticlinal arch. Numerous faults and smaller folds are
superimposed on the arch and are related to the uplift of the Front Range which began in the
Late Cretaceous and continued into the Tertiary. In addition to the axes of the superimposed
folds, two groups of high angle faults have been recognized: a series of faults along the mountain
front that extend in a generally northwest-southeast direction from the Precambrian into the
Paleozoic-Mesozoic sediments, and northeast-southwest-oriented faults observed primarily in coal
mines located east of Boulder (NRC 1991a).
The Fort St. Vrain site has not experienced any observed earthquake activity (Seismic
Zone 1). A field examination and photo interpretation of the area provided no evidence of
recent movement along any of the known faults. The closest area of recent activity is about
25 miles (40 kilometers) south of the site. Between April 1962 and May 1967, there were
approximately 1,130 earthquake events in this area with magnitudes ranging from 1.0 to 5.0 on
the Richter Scale. The 5.0 earthquake produced ground accelerations in the Vrain Valley of
0.002 y 0.001 g. An earthquake with a Modified Mercalli intensity of VII (slight to moderate
damage to structures) occurred on November 7, 1882, and was felt throughout Colorado and
Southern Wyoming. Due to the sparse population in the epicentral region, the assigned intensity
may in actuality be an underestimate. A reasonable guess for its Richter magnitude is 6.5,
implying that most of the strain energy released by earthquakes of Colorado in the last century
was released in this one earthquake (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.6 Air Resources. The general climate around the Fort St. Vrain site is typical of
the Colorado eastern-slope plains region. The weather is generally mild. Most seasons are
characterized by low humidity and sunny days, with occasional brief storms bringing precipitation
to the area. Thermal radiation losses resulting from lack of cloud cover provide considerable
variation in temperature from night to day. In this semiarid region, the precipitation averages 10
to 15 inches (25 to 38 centimeters) a year, mostly from thunderstorms in late spring and summer.
Snowfall is significant; however, the snow cover is usually melted in a few days. Relative
humidity averages about 40 percent during the day and 65 percent at night (NRC 1991a).
Meteorological conditions in the local area include a preponderance of stable
meteorological conditions and rather low wind speeds. Wind speeds generally range from 1 to 7
miles per hour (0.45 to 3.2 meters per second) 80 percent of the time. Wind directions are
rather evenly distributed, although there is a preponderance of winds from the southwest and
northeast quadrants. Seasonally, winds tend to be strongest in the late winter and spring, the
season with high chinook frequency, and again in the summer, when thunderstorms occur
frequently. Strong winds, especially under chinook conditions, have been observed on various
occasions in easter Colorado. The chinook winds are strongest immediately to the east of the
mountain ridge and diminish rapidly over the plains with increasing distance from the mountains
(NRC 1991a).
The region typically experiences five tornadoes per year per 10,000 square miles (25,900
square kilometers), with peak tornado activity occurring during the month of June. According to
the National Weather Service, Weld County has had 117 tornadoes during the period 1950-1987.
A study of tornadoes in the area concluded that 100 mile (160 kilometer) per hour winds should
constitute maximum forces to be expected at Fort St. Vrain (NRC 1991a).
Northeastern Colorado has moderate thunderstorm activity. The region near Fort St. Vrain
averages 50 days a year in which thunder and lightning occur. The majority of these
thunderstorms are present from late spring through the summer (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.7 Water Resources. The topography in the immediate vicinity of the site is
relatively flat and water use is primarily agricultural. Its distribution is through the use of
irrigation ditches. The nearest major surface water features are the South Platte River, about
0.5 mile (0.8 kilometer) east of the site, and the St. Vrain Creek, about 0.75 mile (1.2 kilometers)
west of the site. Local surface water diversions from these rivers, which feed irrigation ditches to
support agriculture, are somewhat closer, about 0.33 mile (0.5 kilometer) east and west of the
site, and about 0.4 mile (0.64 kilometer) to the north. The net local topography, which controls
the direction of surface runoff, slopes slightly to the northeast toward the South Platte River.
This trend is interrupted by the irrigation ditches. There are no liquid discharges from the dry
storage facility (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.8 Ecological Resources. Wildlife indigenous to the area include several species of
ducks and geese, the mourning dove, cottontail rabbit, fox squirrel, and to a lesser extent
bobwhite quail, ring-necked pheasant, deer, and antelope. The most abundant fish species
include the white sucker, carp, notropis, creek chub, and, to a lesser extent, several types of
perch (NRC 1991a).
With most of the land dominated by agriculture, natural vegetation is minimal. Most of the
trees found along roads, in hedgerows, and around farm houses are cottonwood. Trees found in
the river area are primarily cottonwoods, willows, and Russian olives. Typical grasses and weeds
found in river bottom areas include gnat heads, golden weed, snake weed, Smith grass, Indian
grass, foxtail and big bluestem. The site does not have readily visible evidence of recent farming
but is now overrun with plants which are typically indigenous to disturbed land; plant species
include Russian thistle, cocklebur, Canada thistle, dandelion, and poor-man's pepper grass
(NRC 1991a).
The only threatened or endangered animal species known to occur within the area of the
project are the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon. However, this land has not been identified
as a critical habitat for these or any other species. The black-footed ferret, also endangered, may
be found as a transient within the region, but requires a permanent habitat which is occupied by
prairie dogs. Prairie dogs are not present at the site (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.9 Transportation. There are no airports within the immediate vicinity of the
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation site. Stapleton International is about 30 miles (48
kilometers) south of the site. County roads with their associated rights-of-way are adjacent the
exclusion area boundary or provide access to the generating station (County Roads 21, and 19
1/2, respectively). A railroad spur connects the site to the Union Pacific Railroad main line
located about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) to the west (NRC 1991a).
3.3.2.10 Public Health and Safety. Results from an Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation Site Background Radiation Study, completed by Colorado State University in October
1990, including the mean integral exposure rate of 0.34 mR per day, were consistent with data
acquired for the area during previous years of sampling by the Fort St. Vrain Radiological
Environmental Monitoring Program. With the exception of cesium-137, whose average surface
activity concentration of 0.18 pCi/g is consistent with regional levels due to global fallout, no
statistically significant concentrations of activation or fission products were detected (NRC
1991a).
The design of the modular vault dry store system is such that its operation does not result in
any water or other liquid discharges, generate any chemical, sanitary, or solid wastes, or release
any radioactive materials in solid, gaseous, or liquid form during normal operations. The primary
radiological exposure pathway associated with the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
operation is direct irradiation of nearby residents and site workers. The highest dose to the
nearest resident for any year is about 0.1 mrem. The highest collective dose commitment for any
year to the population within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation will not exceed 0.45 person-rem (NRC 1991a).
3.3.3 B&W Lynchburg
B&W Lynchburg maintains a large nuclear fuels research facility at its Mount Athos site.
This site is about 925 acres (374 hectares) in area with the research facility within a 4-acre
(1.6-hectare) fenced area. Numerous support facilities are located outside and adjacent to this
fenced area. The research facility is in Campbell County, Virginia near the James River,
approximately 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) east of the city of Lynchburg (NRC 1987).
Building A was constructed in 1956 and housed the Lynchburg pool reactor and the Critical
Experiment Facility. This facility has been decommissioned (NRC 1987).
Building B contains a hot cell facility with its associated operations area, cask handling area,
transfer canal and storage pool, and various laboratories associated with the examination of
radioactive materials. It also houses a demineralizer for the cleanup of the pool water
(NRC 1987).
Building C was used as a plutonium fuels development laboratory and for research and
development of processes for other nuclear fuels. It is undergoing decommissioning (NRC 1987).
Building J and its Annex are used for solid waste storage. High, intermediate, and low-level
wastes may be stored here. Irradiated fuel wastes are being stored until they are accepted by the
DOE in accordance with the provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NRC 1987).
3.3.3.1 Land Use. Land use in Campbell and Amherst counties is dominated by farming
and forestry. Although the site lies in an agricultural region, very few of the important
agricultural characteristics attributed to the region occur within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the site
because of unfavorable terrain. The region is characterized by mixed land use consisting of small
areas of farmland (crop and pasture) interspersed within large tracts of forested area
(NRC 1986).
3.3.3.2 Socioeconomics. The Lynchburg Research Center and the nearby City of
Lynchburg are centrally located within the area of Amherst, Appomattox, Bedford, and Campbell
counties. The combined population of these counties and Lynchburg is about 180,000
(NRC 1986).
The Lynchburg area's commercial and industrial interests provide a large percentage of the
employment in the four-county area. Although farming and forestry activities dominate the land
use in the region, they provide less than 1 percent of the economic activity and very little
permanent employment. Other principal commercial, industrial, and population centers that may
influence the four-county area or may be slightly influenced by B&W operations are Roanoke,
Charlottesville, Richmond, and Danville (NRC 1986).
The Lynchburg Research Center has about 180 employees, and the other facilities on the
B&W site employ about 2,200. The total employment on the B&W site is only about 3 percent
of the 69,000 persons employed in the Lynchburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. The
B&W operation is an important, although not critical, source of employment in the Lynchburg
region (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.3 Cultural Resources. A review of the Federal Register reveals that the only historic
site on the National Register of Historic Places located within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the B&W
facilities is the 19th-century Mt. Athos Plantation, which is across the road to the east of the site.
There are numerous historic places between 5 and 25 miles (8 kilometers and 40 kilometers)
from the B&W site, particularly in Bedford County and Lynchburg to the west. The best
known historic site is the Appomattox Court House National Historic Park, about 15 miles
(24 kilometers) to the east (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.4 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources. The topography of the plant site is generally
rolling with gentle slopes. The nominal river elevation is 470 feet (143 meters) above mean sea
level. The dominant topographic feature of the site is a hill located approximately at the center
of the property, the crest of which rises to 693 feet (211 meters) above mean sea level. The site
includes a large area of relatively flat floodplain adjacent to the river. The highest point in the
vicinity of the site is the top of Mt. Athos, where the elevation is 890 feet (271 meters) above
mean sea level (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.5 Geology. The James River Basin of Virginia includes portions of four
physiographic provinces characterized by distinct land forms and physical features. These
provinces, located west to east, are Valley and Ridge, Blue Ridge, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain.
Western or inner Piedmont, where the B&W property lies, is an upland characterized by
scattered hills, some of mountainous dimensions, lying eastward from the foot of the Blue Ridge
(NRC 1986).
No important mineral resources have been identified at the B&W site, and U.S. Geological
Survey topographic maps do not indicate any significant surface or underground mining activities
within 5 miles (8 kilometers) of the site (NRC 1986).
The B&W site is located in a western part of the central Virginia cluster region which is
classified as Zone 2 on the Seismic Risk Map of the United States. This zone corresponds to an
intensity of VII according to the Modified Mercalli scale, which implies building damages to the
extent of fallen chimneys and cracked walls. During the period 1758 through 1968, 121
earthquakes with epicenters in Virginia were reported. The largest earthquake was in 1897, with
a probable epicenter in Giles County, approximately 100 miles (160 kilometers) west of the plant
site. A maximum intensity of VIII was estimated in the epicentral region, but an intensity of only
V-VI was estimated at the plant site. The second largest earthquake was in 1875, with a
maximum epicentral intensity of VII more than 50 miles (80 kilometers) east or northeast of the
site. The estimated intensity at the site was V. No other quakes have been recorded with
intensities at the site greater than the 1875 or 1897 occurrences (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.6 Air Resources. The climate of the Lynchburg area is influenced by cold and dry
polar continental air masses in the winter and warm and humid gulf maritime air masses in the
summer. Extremes in weather conditions in the area are rare. The mean temperature is about
56.7oF (13.7oC), with normal average temperatures ranging from 76.3oF (24.6oC) in July to 38.5oF
(3.6oC) in December. Rainfall amounts at Lynchburg can be expected to reach 40.3 inches
(102.4 centimeters) in any given year. The monthly rates are nearly uniform except for a slightly
higher rate during the summer months. Snowfall in the Lynchburg area generally occurs between
the months of December and March. The mean yearly snowfall total is 19.4 inches
(49.3 centimeters). Winds at Lynchburg are predominant from the southwest with a mean speed
of 8 miles per hour (3.6 meters per second). Mean relative humidity values in Lynchburg at
7:00 am, 1:00 pm, and 7:00 pm are 78, 51, and 62 percent, respectively. Heavy fog (visibility of
less than 1,320 feet or 400 meters) can be expected to occur at the site on the average of 40 days
per year (NRC 1986).
Severe weather at the Lynchburg Research Center is generally limited to thunderstorms,
with a low probability of tornadoes. Climatological data show that the mean number of
thunderstorms occurring at Lynchburg is 22 per year. According to methods for estimating
tornado occurrence presented by Thom, the probability of a tornado's actually striking the site is
3.0 x 10-4 per year, with a recurrence interval of 3,333 years (NRC 1986).
The B&W Lynchburg Research Center is located in the Central Virginia Air Quality
Control Region, where the air is classified by the Environmental Protection Agency as "better
than national standards" for total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide. The City of
Lynchburg also meets the national standards for total suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide.
For carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and hydrocarbons, the Air Quality Control Region
cannot be classified because data are not available (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.7 Water Resources. A relatively large forested floodplain exists between the
normal elevation of the James River and the estimated highest flood state at the site. Since no
Lynchburg Research Center structures are located in the floodplain, plant operation does not
impact floodplain features (NRC 1986).
The James River is formed about 96 miles (154 kilometers) upstream of the site by the
confluence of the Jackson and Cowpasture Rivers. The James River flows generally south-
southeast from the Valley and Ridge Province to the Atlantic Ocean through the Hampton
Roads and Chesapeake Bay. On the basis of records for two U.S. Geological Survey gaging
stations, one about 20 miles (32 kilometers) upstream and the other about 21 miles
(34 kilometers) downstream of the site, the annual average flow rate of the river at the plant is
estimated to be about 3900 cubic feet per second (110 cubic meters per second). The estimated
water surface elevation at the site at the average flow rate is approximately 470 feet (143 meters)
above mean sea level (NRC 1986).
Eleven great floods of the James River occurred at the plant site in 1771, 1795, 1870, 1877,
1889, 1913, 1930, 1936, 1969, 1972, and 1985. The 1795 flood had the highest flood state, which
was 535 feet or 163 meters above mean sea level at Lynchburg and 494 feet (151 meters) above
mean sea level at the site (estimated). The largest recent flood occurred in November 1985 and
had a flood state of 534 feet (163 meters) above mean sea level at Lynchburg (NRC 1986).
The Standard Project Flood determined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the James
River would produce a discharge rate of 10,705 m3/S (378,000 cfs) and a flood state of 502 feet
(153 meters) above mean sea level at the site (NRC 1986).
Because the elevation of the plant floors at the Lynchburg Research Center is 589 feet
(180 meters) above mean sea level, which is 95 feet (29 meters) above the maximum historical
flood state or 37 feet (26 meters) above the Standard Project Flood elevation, James River floods
would not affect the research and development facility at the Lynchburg Research Center (NRC
1986).
Measurements in potable wells located in the river floodplain near the B&W Commercial
Nuclear Fuel Plant in the northeast corner of the site indicate that the groundwater elevation
ranges between 440 and 460 feet (134 and 140 meters) above mean sea level, which is 10 feet
(3 meters) below surface elevation at the annual average flow rate. Because of the relative
impermeability of the silt and clay topsoils, neither the water in surface soils nor river flood water
has a major effect on the groundwater supply or quality. B&W obtains about 100,000 gallons per
day (380 cubic meters per day) from the above-mentioned wells for drinking and industrial uses.
An average of 19,300 gallons per day (73 cubic meters per day) is used at the Lynchburg
Research Center. Continuous pumping tests on these wells indicates a plentiful supply of
groundwater. Therefore, it is not likely that the performance at nearby residential wells would be
affected by B&W's operations (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.8 Ecological Resources. Natural climax vegetation in the region is classified as
oak-hickory-pine (Quercus-Caray-pinus) forest. Dominants include white (Q. alba), post oak
(Q. stellata), hickory (Carya spp.), shortleaf pine (P. echinata) and loblolly pine (P. toeda). Other
common species include tulip poplar (Liriodendron tulipifera), sweetgum (Liquidambar
styraciflua), dogwood (Cornus florida), and several other species of oak, hickory, and pine
(NRC 1986).
The great diversity of plants and vegetative communities in the site vicinity provide a wide
variety of habitats for wildlife. There are approximately 24 species of mammals, 160 species of
birds, 19 species of reptiles, and 17 species of amphibians expected to occur in the Lynchburg
area. Species in the vicinity of the site that are economically important include game mammals,
e.g., white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) and black bear (Ursus americanus), otter (Lutra
canadensis), red fox (Vulpes vulpes), and beaver (Castor canadensis); and mourning dove (Zenaida
macroura) and several species of water fowl (NRC 1986).
The aquatic biota of the James River in the vicinity of the Lynchburg Research Center is
generally characteristic of that of a moderately polluted river. Examination of photoplankton
communities downstream of the site at Cartersville shows reasonably diverse communities
consisting of green, yellow-green (diatoms) and blue-green algae during the late summer.
Phytoplankton communities during the fall, winter, and early summer consisted almost entirely of
a few species of yellow-green algae (NRC 1986).
Most of the fish in the James River in the vicinity of the Lynchburg Research Center are
primarily members of the minnow, sucker, sunfish, perch, and catfish families. Species in these
families range from common to uncommon. There is no commercial fishery in the vicinity of the
Lynchburg Research Center site (NRC 1986).
Federally and state-listed threatened and endangered animal species whose present or
former geographic ranges include central Virginia and the B&W site are the bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus), American peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus), gray bat (Myotis
grisescens), Indiana bat (Myotis sodalis), Virginia big-eared bat (Plecotus townsendii virginianus),
and eastern cougar (Felis concolor couguar). There have been no reports of these species being
observed on the site or its vicinity (NRC 1986).
There are no species of rare or endangered fish or mollusks known to occur in the James
River in the vicinity of the site (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.9 Transportation. The site is bounded on three sides by the James River and on
the fourth side by Virginia State Route 726. The site is serviced by a spur of the CSX Railroad,
which runs through the B&W property. The site is also conveniently located for truck and
automobile access, because only about 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) from the plant, State Route 726
connects with U.S. Highway 460, a major link between Roanoke and Richmond (NRC 1986).
3.3.3.10 Public Health and Safety. The total-body dose rate for the vicinity of
Lynchburg is approximately 107 millirem per year. This dose rate includes 43 millirem per year
from cosmic rays, 45.6 millirem per year from terrestrial sources, and 18 millirem per year from
internal emitters (NRC 1986).
4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
This section presents the projected impacts of implementing the programmatic alternatives
for management of SNF for which DOE has accepted present or future responsibility. The SNF
management activities evaluated in this section only include those actions identified by the
originating sites to be implemented should the No Action Alternative be adopted, as described in
Section 2. SNF management activities planned independently of this EIS are addressed only if
they are directly affected or altered as a result of the programmatic SNF alternatives considered
in this EIS. Only Alternative 1, No Action, has any potential for affecting some of the facilities
addressed in this Appendix. Thus only the environmental consequences of SNF management
activities at originating sites under Alternative 1 will be discussed here. For the other DOE
alternatives, the environmental consequences of SNF transportation from originating sites are
analyzed in Appendix I to Volume 1. The environmental consequences at the DOE facilities that
receive the SNF originating from any facilities in this Appendix are addressed in Appendixes A,
B, C and F.
4.1 No Action
4.1.1 DOE Experimental Reactors and Small-Quantity Storage
The DOE's reactors at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories would not be affected by the No Action
Alternative through the year 2005. Between 2006 and 2035, however, implementation of this
alternative might require modifications of SNF management activities at the reactor facilities.
4.1.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory. The High Flux Beam Reactor at the
Brookhaven National Laboratory is planned to continue to operate for the foreseeable future.
The presently planned installation of a storage rack in the existing wet storage facility, providing
162 additional storage locations, will be depleted in 1998. It is expected that the arrangement of
the existing racks will be modified to provide additional storage capacity in the existing pool if
SNF cannot be shipped at that time (Carelli 1993).
Fuel storage capacities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory High Flux Beam Reactor
would be severely taxed if the No Action Alternative were selected. Selection of the No Action
Alternative could result in the eventual shutdown of the High Flux Beam Reactor as a result of
filling the existing SNF storage capacity. Implementation of the No Action Alternative would be
expected to have no operational impact on the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor (Carelli
1993).
There is no safety analysis or technical specification limit on the number of elements stored,
so the proposed addition of a new storage rack should be accompanied by a new criticality
analysis (DOE 1993c).
The fuel canal is unlined and there is no continuous and accurate way of measuring leak
detection. However, alarms for high and low water level are in the control room and the water
level is regularly monitored. Records are maintained for canal water additions, and thus any
increased amounts of canal makeup water can be detected. The canal has been sealed against
evaporation about every 5 years to measure leakage, and no leakage problems have ever been
detected. Also, there are groundwater monitoring wells near the High Flux Beam Reactor that
are sampled twice per year, and no significant amounts of radionuclides have ever been detected.
No known damaged fuel is presently stored in the fuel canal (DOE 1993c).
The fuel canal water monitoring program is adequate to control corrosion and to minimize
the release of fission products. In addition, corrosion surveillance coupon samples have been
photographed and evaluated yearly since stored in the canal in 1977. These photographs have
shown no corrosion damage (DOE 1993c).
In view of the absence of any substantive difference in SNF management operations
attributable to the No Action Alternative, effluent releases and their associated doses would be
expected to be the same as those currently being experienced there.
Potential impacts on the Nassau/Suffolk Aquifer System as a result of SNF management
alternatives described in this EIS are expected to be small. If the fuel canal were to leak, ground
water impacts would be expected, but monitoring measures would mitigate impacts by permitting
early detection of leaks.
For the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor, which has sufficient SNF storage capacity,
the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than those that
have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operation approval process.
4.1.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Omega West Reactor at Los Alamos
National Laboratory is permanently shut down. It is being decommissioned. The SNF is in
temporary storage at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research complex. Although at present the
stored fuel elements do not present a health or safety hazard, storage of fuel at the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research complex presents a potential radiological hazard at that facility. The
Los Alamos National Laboratory does not have the capability to store, handle or monitor spent
fuel for any extended length of time. The Rover casks contain no monitoring devices, and
storage of spent fuel is not addressed in the current Chemistry and Metallurgy Research complex
authorization. It is recommended that the fuel be relocated as soon as practical.
For the other Los Alamos National Laboratory facilities that have sufficient SNF storage
capacity, the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than
those that have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operation approval
process.
4.1.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories. Each of the reactors at Sandia National
Laboratories is designed so that the uranium fuel source essentially lasts the designed life of the
reactor. Consequently, none of the reactors require periodic refueling or discharge spent fuel.
Therefore, the No Action Alternative would cause no environmental consequences--other than
those that have already been addressed and accepted under the siting and operational approval
process for these facilities at Sandia National Laboratories (DOE 1993d).
4.1.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East. Essentially all of the SNF at the Argonne
National Laboratory site in Illinois is contained in the Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility. The
Alpha-Gamma Hot Cell Facility is an operating hot cell where fuel development programs have
been conducted for 29 years. The SNF located there is a combination of material in process and
the stored residues from past programs (DOE 1993d).
The condition of the stored SNF is generally good and would be an issue only if its physical
and chemical state dictates that it must be treated before it will be acceptable at a long-term
interim storage site or a final repository. Likewise, the physical condition of the facility is good,
considering its 29-year age. The SNF is contained within the hot cell, which precludes its entry
into the environment except under the most extremely low-probability events (DOE 1993d).
4.1.2 Domestic Research Reactors
In Section 2.2.1.2, it was noted that SNF storage facilities at 34 domestic research reactors
would not be overloaded were the No Action Alternative (i.e., no off-site SNF transportation) to
be implemented. For those sites, the adoption of the No Action Alternative would produce no
incremental impacts on the environment.
This conclusion is supported by NRC determinations in a number of licensing actions
related to requested increases in possession limits for U-235 in fuel at research reactor sites. In
these licensing actions, the NRC has determined that there is no significant impact on the
environment from normal operation or accidents associated with the increases in the possession
limits for U-235 at those reactor sites. The possession or storage of fuel at the domestic research
reactor sites is not considered by the NRC to be a significant activity as indicated by the
following examples of their findings.
In 1993, the NRC performed a safety evaluation in response to the University of Missouri at
Columbia request for a temporary increase in the license possession limit for U-235 from 45 to
60 kilograms. In regard to potential accidents the NRC determined: "There are no specific
accidents in this type of research reactor associated with the storage of spent fuel in accordance
with the Technical Specifications. The maximum hypothetical accident of complete fission
product release of four fuel plates in the reactor core is not affected by increasing the amount of
stored fuel. Because the fuel will be stored in accordance with the Technical Specifications,
accidents previously evaluated are not changed and no new or different kind of accident is
created. Therefore, the staff concludes that the temporary increase in the possession limit of
U-235 is acceptable."
In regard to environmental considerations of this possession increase, the NRC stated: "The
staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no
significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no
significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, this
amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment
need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment." (NRC 1993b)
In 1991, in performing a safety evaluation in response to an earlier University of Missouri
request for a temporary increase in the license possession limit for a larger amount of U-235
from 60 to 75 kilograms, the NRC reached the same determinations and conclusions as in the
1993 licensing action. (NRC 1991b)
In response to the request from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology request in 1991
to extend a temporary increase in the possession limit of U-235 of 41 kilograms until January 1,
1994, the NRC performed an evaluation and made identically the same determination as that
quoted above for the University of Missouri license amendment. (NRC 1991d)
The NRC, in its Environmental Assessment for the Training and Research Reactor of the
University of Lowell, stated: "Accidents ranging from the failure of experiments up to the largest
core damage and fission product release considered possible result in doses that are less than 10
CFR Part 20 guidelines and are considered negligible with respect to the environment.... The staff
concludes that there will be no significant environmental impact associated with the licensing of
research reactors or critical facilities designed to operate at power levels of 2 MWt or lower and
that no environmental impact statements are required to be written for the issuance of
construction permits or operating licenses for such facilities." (NRC 1985b)
In the Environmental Impact Statement for the University of Texas, TRIGA Mark II
reactor, it was stated: "Storage, processing and disposal of fuel elements is not considered a
significant activity of this facility." (NRC 1984)
Of the 11 domestic research reactors that are projected to exhaust their storage capacity, a
few facilities indicated that they might take measures to physically expand their SNF storage
capacity within their existing structures beyond what had been planned. Only one facility has
indicated that it might elect to create an 18.6-square-meter (200-square-foot) storage area outside
the existing structure. An addition of this small size would be expected to have a minuscule
impact on the previously disturbed environment.
A small number of these facilities could request deferral of their directed conversion from
highly enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel. The environmental consequences of
such an action would derive from extending the risks of theft or diversion of highly enriched
uranium fuel which the U.S. Government has tried to reduce by mandating the conversion (Jentz
1993).
An unidentified number of the research reactors may elect to discontinue operation at some
time during the next 40 years. Storage of the SNF onsite at a reactor facility that is undergoing
decommissioning would interfere with the radiological surveys conducted to ensure that the
reactor site is returned to the pristine conditions that existed before the reactor was constructed.
The consequences of premature shutdown of any of these reactors, attributable to
implementation of the No Action Alternative, would include the loss of service which the reactors
were scheduled to provide. These consequences of implementing the No Action Alternative
could include, for example:
- Loss of education and training for some nuclear engineers and scientists
- Loss of trace analysis capability supporting solar cell material research, monitoring of
atmospheric pollutants, detection of trace metals in foods, and analysis of criminal
artifacts
- Loss of specific materials research capability relating to hydrogen in metals, metglasses,
amorphous magnetic materials, and biomolecular polymers
- Loss of specific nuclear medicine and radiation therapy.
Any changes in radioactive (or other) releases or exposures to the public or to workers
would be inconsequential. More detailed analyses of radiation exposures and other impacts
would be provided in site-specific NRC licensing documents before implementation of any
changes in these facilities that were made necessary by an SNF transportation moratorium.
4.1.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
4.1.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project. It has been determined that continued use
of the SNF storage pool in the Fuel Receiving & Storage building at the West Valley
Demonstration Project is not a viable option for extended periods of time. Therefore, alternative
concepts for storing West Valley Demonstration Project SNF are being evaluated by the Project.
The options being considered at West Valley include dry storage, wet storage involving
refurbishing of a portion of the existing spent fuel storage pool, and continued use of the present
facility.
Dry storage is projected to require a maximum area of 0.003 square kilometer (0.72 acre)
(i.e., a square plot of land about 54 meters [177 feet] on each side). This area would include the
actual storage facility, approach pads, and perimeter fence. The largest base pad required for
any of the dry storage concepts would measure 9.1 by 15.2 meters (30 by 50 feet) and be
between 0.61 and 1.22 meters (2 and 4 feet) thick (WVDP 1993).
The wet storage concept and No Action Alternative assume the continued use (either
modified or as is) of the existing spent fuel storage pool. These options should have no
measurable impact on the West Valley Demonstration Project site. The actions taken to transfer
the spent fuel from the storage pool to the on-site dry storage facilities would not differ from
those taken to transfer this SNF to the INEL or any other DOE facility. Therefore, there would
be no additional environmental impact resulting from these fuel transfer activities.
Potential impacts on the Cattaraugus Creek Basin Aquifer System as a result of SNF
Management alternatives described in this EIS are expected to be small.
Keeping the SNF in dry storage on-site would result in both on-site and off-site exposures
that would not occur if the fuel were shipped off-site once it was removed from the storage pool.
Storing the fuel dry in sealed containers would not result in the production of radioactive liquid
or gaseous effluents or solid radioactive wastes. The source of the on-site and off-site radiation
doses is direct radiation from the dry spent fuel storage facility. Estimates have not yet been
developed for these doses, because a storage concept has not been selected.
The 125 fuel assemblies in the Fuel Receiving and Storage Facility have been in storage for
over 20 years. Their total heat generation rate is less than 9 kilowatt and fission product
inventory should have reached a near steady state condition. Conservative calculations in safety
analysis report estimate that failure of all 125 fuel assemblies would result in an off-site dose of
42 mrem and an on-site dose of 2.1 rem (DOE 1993c).
Doses and solid waste generation volumes resulting from implementation of the No Action
Alternative would remain the same as the current operation at the West Valley Demonstration
Project. The calculated annual effective dose equivalent resulting from the total site operations
including wet storage of SNF at the West Valley Demonstration Project are as follows: (WVNS
1994)
Maximum individual off-site dose from1.6 x 10-4 mrem/year
gaseous releases
Maximum individual off-site dose from1.1 x 10-2 mrem/year
liquid releases
4.1.3.2 Fort St. Vrain. The Fort St. Vrain facility has already constructed an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation for interim storage (with a 40 year design basis) of
the SNF from the Fort St. Vrain power plant. Onsite storage will have no additional impact on
the Fort St. Vrain site (FSV 1990a). However, under this alternative, Public Service Company of
Colorado would not achieve its goal of becoming free of radioactive materials by 1998 under this
option.
4.1.3.3 B&W Lynchburg Technology Center. The Lynchburg Technology Center
received the SNF between 1980 and 1987 as part of a "high-burnup" research program sponsored
by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy. The experiments were completed in 1989 and the
program was officially terminated in 1992. Since that time, the Lynchburg Technology Center
has stored this fuel under contract to DOE (DOE 1993c).
The DOE-owned spent fuel rods that are stored in the spent fuel storage pool are intact
and in good condition. Water quality is also good and is maintained by passing through
particulate filters and resin beds. No chemistry controls have been needed. In addition, sludge is
not present in the pool and biological contamination has not been observed (DOE 1993c).
There are no routine inspections of the condition of spent fuel rods that have been
sectioned and placed in dry storage. However, some of the fuel stored in this facility was
recently repackaged and moved; this fuel and its containers are known to be in good condition.
Other evidence that the integrity of spent fuel storage containers has been maintained in good
condition is routine monitoring of groundwater, direct radiation, and smearable contamination, all
of which indicate that leakage of radionuclides is not occurring (DOE 1993c).
Groundwater and other radionuclide monitoring have not indicated any radionuclide
releases from the SNF storage facilities at the B&W Lynchburg Technical Center. There is
currently no reason to suspect that spent fuel storage containers will degrade in the near term in
a manner that would result in a release of fission products. This facility is routinely inspected
and relicensed by the NRC every 5 years. Hence, any developing storage problems would most
likely be dealt with and corrected under the direction of the NRC (DOE 1993c).
4.2 Decentralization
The Decentralization Alternative is similar to the No Action Alternative except that limited
off-site shipments would occur from university and domestic non-DOE research reactors.
Impacts of transportation are described in Appendix I to Volume 1. Some DOE facilities would
be upgraded/replaced and additional on-site storage capacity would be required at several DOE
facilities. Essentially, there are no differences from the No Action Alternative, except impacts
from transportation, facility upgrade, and new construction.
At Brookhaven National Laboratory High Flux Beam Reactor, some land disturbance might
be anticipated from the installation of additional SNF storage capacity, whether wet or dry.
However, any such disturbance is expected to occur in previously disturbed on-site areas.
4.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would permit the shipment of the SNF currently
in storage or being generated at the originating sites. With the implementation of the 1993/93
Planning Basis Alternative, as in past practice, SNF would continue to be shipped from the
originating sites to a DOE receiving site. The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative would be
expected to have essentially no incremental impact on the originating sites. Impacts of
transportation are described in detail in Appendix I to Volume 1. The alternative of transporting
SNF by barge from Brookhaven National Laboratory is also described in Appendix I to Volume
1.
4.4 Regionalization
The Regionalization Alternative would be the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
Alternative, except for the difference in destinations. Implementation of the Regionalization
Alternative would permit the shipment of SNF from originating sites to regional DOE interim
storage facilities. The Regionalization Alternative would be expected to have essentially no
incremental impact on the originating sites. Impacts of transportation are described in detail in
Appendix I to Volume 1.
4.5 Centralization
The Centralization Alternative would be the same as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
Alternative, except for the difference in destinations. Implementation of the Centralization
Alternative would permit the shipment of SNF from originating sites to a central DOE interim
storage facility. The Centralization Alternative would be expected to have essentially no
incremental impact on the originating sites. Impacts of transportation are described in detail in
Appendix I to Volume 1.
5.0 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
This section describes the cumulative environmental impacts of the alternatives for
generating and storing SNF at the originating sites addressed in this Appendix. The emphasis is
on DOE SNF Alternative 1, No Action, under which all SNF would remain at the originating
facility. For the individual originating facilities, the cumulative impact is defined as the sum of
the incremental impacts of SNF management under the No Action Alternative and the impacts
of the other operations at the facility's reactor(s) or other activities involving radioactive
materials. For the other alternatives, the SNF cumulative impact at the originating facilities
essentially would end with the removal of the SNF from the site. The cumulative impacts of
intersite SNF transportation alternatives on transportation routes and affected communities are
analyzed programmatically in Volume 1, Appendix I. The cumulative impacts at the DOE
facilities receiving SNF are addressed in Appendixes A, B, C and F.
5.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors
Under the No Action Alternative, the cumulative environmental impacts at DOE test and
experimental reactors are derived from past environmental impacts as obtained from annual
operating reports, and estimated future impacts based on extrapolation to the year 2035 of past
impacts.
5.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory
It is expected that the High Flux Beam Reactor and Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor
would continue to operate, for all SNF management alternatives except No Action. If additional
storage were to be required on-site to accommodate High Flux Beam Reactor SNF through 2035,
current impacts would be somewhat increased by the impacts of building and operating an
additional facility. Although the nature of that facility has not been determined, the resulting
impacts are expected to be negligibly small. Should the facility propose substantial changes,
appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared in accordance with existing environmental
regulations.
5.1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory
Omega West Reactor at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is permanently shut down and
is being decommissioned. The spent fuel is in temporary dry storage at the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research complex, and resulting impacts are negligible. The spent fuel is awaiting
relocation. Cumulative impacts would not change under any alternative.
5.1.3 Sandia National Laboratories
The cumulative environmental impacts would not change from those currently experienced
at Sandia National Laboratories from the operation of the reactors and storage of small
quantities of SNF.
5.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory - East
The cumulative environmental impacts would not change from those currently experienced
from the storage of small quantities of SNF.
5.2 Domestic Research Reactors
Under the No Action Alternative, the cumulative environmental impacts at domestic
research reactors are a composite of past environmental impacts as obtained from annual
operating reports, and estimated future impacts based on extrapolation to the year 2035 of past
impacts. The following facility-specific cumulative environmental impacts have been selected as
representative of all domestic research reactor facilities that could be affected by Alternative 1.
5.2.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology
Implementation of the No Action Alternative would result in the shutdown of the National
Bureau of Standards Reactor in October 1996 due to the inability to store additional SNF. The
environmental radiological impact of such action would be a reduction of radioactive releases and
doses below those of full power operation. On-site SNF storage would meet existing facility
design criteria. There would be no other change in the cumulative environmental impact except
for the adverse socioeconomic impacts as a result of the loss of services and knowledge from
reactor operations.
A scenario of continued operation, assuming timely reissuance of the operating license,
including compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, would bound the cumulative
environmental impacts under any of the DOE-postulated SNF alternatives.
5.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
As with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology research reactor would be expected to shut down in response to the No Action
Alternative because of limited SNF storage capacity. Thus, a scenario of continued operation,
assuming timely reissuance of the operating license, would bound the cumulative environmental
impacts under any of the DOE-postulated SNF alternatives.
5.2.3 Conclusion
For all domestic research reactors, the SNF management alternatives, including the No
Action Alternative, would not increase the cumulative impacts of the originating sites above
current values. Some of the facilities could not be able to continue normal operation under the
No Action Alternative and could be forced to shut down due to the lack of SNF storage capacity.
Reactors licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are not under DOE control, and
additional storage space could be constructed under the No Action Alternative. However, except
for the negative socioeconomic impacts attributable to the loss of services and knowledge
resulting from such shutdowns, other site-specific cumulative impacts would not be increased.
5.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
The implementation of any one of DOE's five SNF management alternatives would have no
additional environmental consequences beyond those already evaluated for the Fort St. Vrain and
B&W Lynchburg facilities.
The situation is similar for the West Valley Demonstration Project, except that the DOE
has entered into an agreement with the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority which calls for the removal of SNF from the West Valley Demonstration Project.
Implementation of the No Action and Decentralization Alternatives would result in SNF
remaining at the West Valley Demonstration Project. If the fuel remains at the West Valley
Demonstration Project, the SNF may be managed in a new dry storage facility. Once the SNF is
in dry storage, there will be no releases of radioactive effluents and an indistinguishable direct
radiation exposure to the environs in excess of that which would occur were the SNF to be
moved as scheduled, and in the payment of storage costs by DOE to the State of New York.
6.0 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED
Unavoidable adverse impacts addressed here are limited to those occurring as a result of
DOE Alternative 1 (No Action) at the originating facilities discussed in this Appendix. All other
alternatives consider normal shipment of SNF from the originating site, with only transportation
routes and the receiving site possibly being subjected to unavoidable adverse impacts by
transferred SNF. Any adverse impacts at the originating sites are thus precluded for all SNF
transportation alternatives. Possible unavoidable adverse impacts on transportation routes are
analyzed in Volume 1, Appendix I. Possible unavoidable adverse impacts at the DOE facilities
that receive SNF are addressed in Appendixes A, B, C and F.
6.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors
The adverse effects that may be unavoidable caused by implementation of the No Action
Alternative would be associated with the possible premature, long-term shutdown of the High
Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory. The consequences of this shutdown
would be cessation of site specific activities involving unique experiments. These experiments are
needed for understanding materials structures, biological processes, and the behavior of super
conducting materials. Shutdown would also cause the loss of jobs associated with these
experiments and supporting site activities.
6.2 Domestic Research Reactors
The adverse effects that may be unavoidable at domestic research reactors caused by
implementation of the No Action Alternative would be associated with the possible premature,
long-term shutdown of several reactors. The consequences of these shutdowns, discussed in
Section 4.1.2, would be cessation of site-specific research and education activities and could result
in the loss of jobs associated with these activities at these sites.
6.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
Implementation of the No Action Alternative could result in adverse consequences that may
be unavoidable at West Valley Demonstration Project. Should this alternative be selected, the
adverse impact that may be unavoidable would be continued on-site and off-site radiation
exposures beyond the scheduled fuel removal date as a result of radioactive effluents and/or
direct radiation.
Since the Public Services Company of Colorado has already responded to the No Action
Alternative by licensing and constructing an independent spent nuclear fuel storage installation at
its Fort St. Vrain site, no additional consequences or additional adverse consequences would be
incurred there.
7.0 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE
COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES
The assessment of the activities undertaken at the SNF originating sites as a consequence of
the implementation of all alternatives indicates that only minor irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources would be required.
7.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors
If the Decentralization Alternative were to be implemented, the Brookhaven National
Laboratory would expect to be required to identify some way to store the SNF generated by the
High Flux Beam Reactor through the year 2035. Several scenarios are possible, but none has
been decided upon at this time. One possible SNF management scenario is to install additional
storage accommodations. Limited quantities of construction materials and fuel for construction
equipment would be required if this scenario were selected.
Implementation of the No Action Alternative would not result in any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories
or Argonne National Laboratory - East.
Implementation of any of the other proposed alternatives for SNF would not result in any
additional irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the DOE test and
experimental reactors.
7.2 Domestic Research Reactors
There are no substantial new irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the
domestic research reactors with the implementation of any of the proposed SNF alternatives for
generating and storing SNF. If, under the No Action Alternative, any NRC-licensed facility
should elect to modify its SNF storage capabilities, a site-specific license amendment would be
required. If the storage facilities were expanded, there would be a commitment of construction
materials and fuel to operate construction equipment. The other DOE SNF alternatives would
involve no commitment of resources at domestic research reactor facilities.
7.3 Nuclear Power Plant Spent Nuclear Fuel
Implementation of the Decentralization Alternative could result in irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources at the West Valley Demonstration Project site. Should
this alternative be selected, this commitment of resources would result from the construction
materials and fuels used to provide alternative on-site SNF storage capability. The magnitude of
these commitments cannot be quantified, however, until it is determined whether existing SNF
storage capacity would be modified or a new SNF storage facility would be constructed and its
type.
Implementation of any of the other proposed alternatives for SNF would not result in any
additional irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources at the commercial SNF storage
facilities.
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APPENDIX F Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs
Department of Energy Programmatic
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
and
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management Programs
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Volume 1
Appendix F
Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Programs
April 1995
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environmental Management
Idaho Operations Office
1. APPENDIX F INTRODUCTION
This appendix addresses the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at two U.S.
Department of Energy sites, the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR).
These sites are being considered to provide a reasonable range of alternative settings at which
future SNF management activities could be conducted. These locations are not currently
involved in management of large quantities of SNF; NTS has none, and ORR has only small
quantities. But NTS and ORR do offer experience and infrastructure for the handling,
processing and storage of radioactive materials, and they do exemplify a broad spectrum of
environmental parameters. This broad spectrum of environmental parameters will provide a
perspective on whether and how such location attributes may relate to potential environmental
impacts. Consideration of these two sites will permit a programmatic decision to be based upon
an assessment of the feasible options without bias to the current storage sites.
This appendix is divided into three parts. Part One is the Appendix F introduction. Part
Two contains chapters one through five for the NTS, as well as the NTS references in chapter six
and acronyms and abbreviations in Chapter 7. Part Three contains chapters one through five for
the ORR, as well as the ORR references in chapter six and abbreviations and acronyms in
Chapter 7. A Table of Contents, List of Figures, and List of Tables are included in Parts Two
and Three. This approach permitted the inclusion of both sites in one appendix while
maintaining chapter numbering consistent with Volume 1 and Appendices A, B, and C.
Currently, no SNF is stored at the NTS and only small quantities of SNF generated by
research reactors at ORR are stored there. In order to receive, handle, and store spent nuclear
fuel from other DOE sites on an interim basis, new facilities would need to be constructed at the
NTS and ORR. Since the basic facilities to receive and handle the spent fuel, as well as any
safety-related and emergency containment, cleanup, and recanning facilities, are approximately
equivalent for all alternatives being considered, only the size of the storage facility will vary for
each alternative, with the Centralization Alternative requiring the largest storage facility. As
discussed in Chapter 3, only the Centralization Alternative for spent fuel storage at either the
NTS or ORR is analyzed quantitatively in this volume; the Regionalization Alternative is
evaluated qualitatively. The results of this appendix are then summarized in Volume 1.
NEVADE TEST SITE
1. INTRODUCTION 2.1-1
2. NEVADA TEST SITE BACKGROUND 2.2-1
2.1 Overview 2.2-1
2.1.1 Site Description 2.2-1
2.1.2 Site History 2.2-4
2.1.3 Nevada Operations Office Mission 2.2-5
2.1.4 Nevada Test Site Management 2.2-6
2.1.5 Yucca Mountain Project 2.2-6
2.2 Regulatory Framework 2.2-7
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 2.2-8
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES 2.3-1
3.1 Description of Management Alternatives 2.3-1
3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action 2.3-1
3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 2.3-1
3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 2.3-2
3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 2.3-2
3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization 2.3-4
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives 2.3-7
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 2.4-1
4.1 Overview 2.4-1
4.2 Land Use 2.4-1
4.3 Socioeconomics 2.4-4
4.3.1 Region of Influence 2.4-4
4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population 2.4-5
4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and
Housing Infrastructure 2.4-8
4.4 Cultural Resources 2.4-11
4.4.1 Archaeological Sites and Historic Structures 2.4-11
4.4.2 Native American Resources 2.4-11
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources 2.4-12
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 2.4-12
4.6 Geologic Resources 2.4-13
4.6.1 General Geology 2.4-13
4.6.2 Geologic Resources 2.4-20
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards 2.4-24
4.7 Air Resources 2.4-29
4.7.1 Climatology 2.4-29
4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks 2.4-31
4.7.3 Air Releases 2.4-33
4.7.4 Air Quality 2.4-37
4.8 Water Resources 2.4-42
4.8.1 Surface Water 2.4-42
4.8.2 Groundwater 2.4-47
4.9 Ecological Resources 2.4-57
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources 2.4-57
4.9.2 Wetlands 2.4-61
4.9.3 Aquatic Resources 2.4-61
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species 2.4-62
4.10 Noise 2.4-65
4.11 Traffic and Transportation 2.4-66
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 2.4-67
4.12.1 Doses 2.4-69
4.12.2 Health Effects 2.4-69
4.13 Utilities and Energy 2.4-71
4.13.1 Water Consumption 2.4-71
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption 2.4-72
4.13.3 Fuel Consumption 2.4-72
4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal 2.4-73
4.14 Materials and Waste Management 2.4-73
4.14.1 Transuranic Waste 2.4-76
4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Wastes 2.4-76
4.14.3 Low-Level Waste 2.4-80
4.14.4 Hazardous Waste 2.4-80
4.14.5 Sanitary Waste 2.4-83
4.14.6 Hazardous Materials 2.4-83
4.14.7 Non-hazardous Waste 2.4-84
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 2.5-1
5.1 Overview 2.5-1
5.2 Land Use 2.5-1
5.2.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-1
5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-2
5.3 Socioeconomics 2.5-2
5.3.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-4
5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-9
5.3.3 Mitigation Measures 2.5-9
5.4 Cultural Resources 2.5-9
5.4.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-9
5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-10
5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 2.5-10
5.5.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-10
5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-11
5.6 Geologic Resources 2.5-11
5.6.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-11
5.6.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-11
5.7 Air Resources 2.5-12
5.7.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-12
5.7.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-15
5.8 Water Resources 2.5-19
5.8.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-19
5.8.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-24
5.9 Ecological Resources 2.5-24
5.9.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-25
5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-27
5.10 Noise 2.5-27
5.10.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-28
5.10.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-28
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 2.5-28
5.11.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-29
5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-30
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 2.5-30
5.12.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-31
5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-34
5.13 Utilities and Energy 2.5-34
5.13.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-34
5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-36
5.14 Materials and Waste Management 2.5-36
5.14.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-36
5.14.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-40
5.15 Facility Accidents 2.5-40
5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at NTS 2.5-41
5.15.2 Methodology 2.5-41
5.15.3 No Action Alternative 2.5-44
5.15.4 Centralization Alternative 2.5-44
5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative 2.5-58
5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning and Basis Alternative 2.5-58
5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-61
5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans 2.5-61
5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or Similar Actions 2.5-62
5.16.1 Centralization Alternative 2.5-63
5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-69
5.17 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided 2.5-69
5.17.1 Overview 2.5-69
5.17.2 Centralization Alternative 2.5-69
5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-70
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and the
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity 2.5-70
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources 2.5-71
5.19.1 Overview 2.5-71
5.19.2 Centralization Alternative 2.5-71
5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative 2.5-71
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 2.5-72
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention 2.5-72
5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures 2.5-72
6. REFERENCES 2.6-1
7. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 2.7-1
FIGURES
2.1-1 Nevada Test Site regional map 2.2-2
2.1-2 Nevada Test Site map 2.2-3
4.2-1 Land use at the Nevada Test Site 2.4-2
4.6-1 Location of Nevada Test Site in relation to regional fault zones 2.4-14
4.6-2 Stratigraphic column of the Nevada Test Site 2.4-16
4.6-3 Schematic cross sections portraying the geologic complexity of NTS 2.4-17
4.6-4 Geologic map of the NTS 2.4-18
4.6-5 Approximate location of proposed facility in relation to major
faults at NTS 2.4-21
4.6-6 Geologic terrains and mining districts of the Nevada Test Site 2.4-23
4.6-7 Location of the NTS in relation to the Nevada Seismic
Belt, the Intermountain Seismic Belt, and the Southern Nevada
East-West Seismic Belt 2.4-25
4.6-8 Historical seismicity of the Southern Great Basin from 1868
through 1993 for M>5 2.4-26
4.7-1 1990 10-meter (33 feet) wind rose patterns for the NTS 2.4-32
4.7-2 Source of radiation exposure, unrelated to NTS operations,
to individuals in the vicinity of NTS 2.4-40
4.8-1 NTS hydrologic basins and surface drainage direction 2.4-44
4.8-2 Groundwater hydrologic units, hydrographic areas, and well locations
of the Nevada Test Site 2.4-49
4.8-3 NTS regional potentiometric surface map 2.4-51
4.8-4 Areas of potential groundwater contamination at the NTS 2.4-54
4.9-1 Plant communities on Nevada Test Site 2.4-58
4.14-1 Existing treatment, storage, and disposal units at the NTS 2.4-75
4.14-2 Flow diagram for waste generation at the NTS 2.4-77
4.14-3 Flow diagram for waste shipment, receipt, and disposal at the NTS 2.4-78
5.3-1 Total employment effects, NTS Centralization Alternative 2.5-5
5.15-1 Typical isodose lines for an airplane crash into dry cell accident with
50 percent meteorology for northeastern Area 5 of the NTS 2.5-59
TABLES
3.2-1 Comparison of alternatives for the NTS 2.3-8
4.3-1 Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for the NTS 2.4-9
4.7-1 Nuclear test release summary - 1992 at the NTS site 2.4-35
4.7-2 Airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 at the NTS 2.4-36
4.7-3 Total nonradiological emission rates at Nm for permitted sources 2.4-38
4.7-4 Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from NTS
operations during 1992 2.4-39
4.7-5 Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable
regulations and guidelines at the Nm 2.4-63
4.9-1 Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other
special status species that may be found in the vicinity of the
Nevada Test Site 2.4-63
4.14-1 Baseline waste management for 1995 at the NTS 2.4-79
5.3-1 Socioeconomic effects - centralization of SNF at Nevada Test Site 2.5-6
5.7-1 Annual airborne radionuclide emission source terms for proposed
Nm SNF facility operational phase 2.5-13
5.7-2 Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF storage facilty
at the NTS 2.5-14
5.7-3 Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from
proposed SNF storage facility plus 1995 baseline operations
at the NTS 2.5-16
5.7-4 Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent
applicable regulations and guidelines at Nm for proposed
SNF facility plus current operations 2.5-17
5.7-5 Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air
pollutants at NTS, onsite and offsite 2.5-18
5.14-1 Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF
alternatives at the NTS 2.5-37
5.15-1 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at 95 percent
meteorology 2.5-45
5.15-2 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
50 percent meteorology 2.5-46
5.15-3 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
95 percent meteorology 2.5-47
5.15-4 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
50 percent meteorology 2.5-48
5.15-5 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
95 percent meteorology 2.5-49
5.15-6 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
50 percent meteorology 2.5-50
5.15-7 Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident
at the NTS 2.5-52
5.15-8 Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident
at the NTS 2.5-52
5.15-9 Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident
at the NTS 2.5-53
5.15-10 Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact
into a storage cask at the NTS 2.5-55
5.15-11 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry
storage facility at the NTS 2.5-55
5.15-12 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell
facility at the NTS 2.5-57
5.15-13 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an
SNF water pool at the Nm 2.5-57
5.15-14 Secondary impacts of the Centralized Alternative accidents
at NTS 2.5-60
#1. INTRODUCTION
This part assesses the impacts of construction and operation of proposed spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) facilities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is being evaluated for these facilities
because of the area available, the isolation of population centers, the apparently suitable site
environmental parameters, previous U.S. Department of Energy activities involving radioactive
materials at the site, and the planned long-term government control of the site.
This part is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction, Chapter 2 sets the stage for
the area under analysis by providing an overview of the NTS and discussions of the Regulatory
Framework and SNF Management Program, and Chapter 3 explains the SNF alternatives being
considered at the site.
Chapter 4 describes the human and natural environment that could be affected as a result
of the introduction of an SNF facility at the NTS. Environmental parameters such as water
resources, socioeconomics, biological resources and air quality are examples of those
characterized.
Chapter 5 enumerates the environmental consequences that might be anticipated, the
cumulative impacts, the unavoidable adverse impacts, the relationship between short-term use
and long-term productivity, the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources, and
possible mitigation measures that might be anticipated if an SNF facility were built at the NTS.
Chapter 6 contains the references used to develop this part of the Environmental Impact
Statement. Chapter 7 contains the abbreviations and acronyms used in this Part.
2. NEVADA TEST SITE BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 Site Description
The Nevada Test Site (NTS), located in the southeastern portion of Nevada, is operated by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as the on-continent test site for nuclear weapons testing.
The site encompasses approximately 1,350 square miles (3,500 square kilometers). The NTS is
surrounded on the north, east, and west by the Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB) Bombing and
Gunnery Range. Together with the Tonopah Test Range, these three properties provide a 15- to
65-mile (24- to 104-kilometer) buffer zone between the test areas and public lands. The Bureau
of Land Management owns land on the southern and southwestern borders of the NTS. Las
Vegas is approximately 65 miles (104 kilometers) from the southeast corner of the site
(Figure 2.1-1) (DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).
The NTS is a large, open area, tightly controlled, with the infrastructure to conduct tests
with hazardous and radioactive materials. Security at the NTS consists of security guards, often
using four-wheel drives, patrolling the site. The perimeter of the site is not fenced. Armed
guards and electronic security measures are in place for secure areas. Approximately 25 percent
of the site is unused or is used as a buffer zone for ongoing programs or projects
(DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).
The NTS is broken into numbered test areas to simplify the distribution, use, and control of
resources (Figure 2.1-2). Area 22, the site's main entrance, is located on the southeast corner of
the site and contains the Desert Rock airstrip. Area 23, adjacent to Area 22, contains the
Mercury base camp, which houses administrative operation and general support activities.
Offices for the DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Nuclear Agency,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and all supporting contractors of these organizations are
located in this area. Other facilities in this area include the cafeteria, recreation, transportation,
and housing. Area 5 (Frenchman Flat) was used in the past for nuclear testing. Area 6, north of
Figure 2.1-1. Nevada Test Site regional map. Figure 2.1-2. Nevada Test Site map. Area 5, contains the Control Point One facility which overlooks Yucca Flat, where a large
portion of the testing occurs. This facility provides control over and execution of nuclear
detonations at the NTS. Also in Area 6 there is a new work camp which is used for construction
and craft support. Other areas located on the NTS are the valley of the Yucca Flat (Areas 3, 7,
and 9), the Rainier Mesa (Area 12), which is the center of DoD/Defense Nuclear Agency
activities, and the Pahute Mesa (Areas 19 and 20) (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977;
USAF et al. 1991). Area 5 will be housing the proposed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities.
Figure 2.1-2 shows the approximate location of the proposed SNF facility. The actual location
will be determined for site-specific environmental documentation.
2.1.2 Site History
Prior to 1951, the land which is now occupied by the NTS was used for mining and grazing.
Primarily, mining was for low grades of copper, lead, silver, gold, mercury, and tungsten.
Although there were short periods of mining success at the site, the area was abandoned over
time. Grazing ended in 1955 when the Federal government acquired the water and grazing rights
of two ranches which were operating on what is now the NTS (ERDA 1977).
Since January 1951, the land now occupied by the NTS has been the primary location for
nuclear weapons testing in the United States. Land was withdrawn from the NAFB Bombing
and Gunnery Range in 1952 to form the NTS. Subsequent withdrawals occurred in 1958, 1961,
and 1962. A Memorandum of Understanding between NAFB and the NTS in 1967 allowed the
use of Pahute Mesa by the NTS (DOE/NV 1991a; USAF et al. 1991).
Most of the tests performed at the NTS in the 1950s were atmospheric tests. After 1951,
nuclear tests were carried out intermittently until a voluntary moratorium ended testing in
October 1958. The first full-scale nuclear detonation occurred in 1957 in a sealed tunnel.
Testing resumed in September 1961 following the ending of the moratorium. Atmospheric
testing ended in the summer of 1963 following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Since
1962, all testing has occurred underground. Two methods have been used for underground
testing since 1963: vertical shafts (from the valley of Yucca Flat to the top of Pahute Mesa) and
horizontal tunnels (Rainer Mesa) (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977; USAF et al. 1991).
In addition to underground testing, between 1962 and 1968, earth-cratering tests were
conducted as part of the Plowshare Program. This program explored peaceful means of using
nuclear explosives. Other tests which have occurred on the NTS have included the Bare Reactor
Experiment (1960s) and the open air nuclear reactor, nuclear engine, and nuclear furnace tests
(1959-1973). Much of the nuclear testing has been conducted on the NTS by the LANL, LLNL,
SNL and, through the Defense Nuclear Agency, the DoD. Non-nuclear testing has included
hazardous material spills. Other activities which occur on the NTS are the storage and disposal
of low-level radioactive wastes and mixed wastes (DOE/NV 1991a; ERDA 1977;
USAF et al. 1991).
As part of DOE's program to establish a national repository for high-level radioactive waste,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conducted an evaluation of the effects of radiation and
heat from radioactive decay on granite rock formations. The project, known as Spent Fuel Test -
Climax, stored 11 spent fuel elements from the Florida Power & Light Company and 6 electric
heat simulators in specially designed and constructed holes in the Climax tunnel, located in the
northeastern corner of the NTS in Area 15. The SNF, in hermetically sealed canisters, was
emplaced in the granite formation, stored for approximately 3 years, retrieved, and then
transferred, in 1986, to INEL for further testing (DOE/NV 1983, 1986a).
2.1.3 Nevada Operations Office Mission
The missions of the NTS and/or the DOE Nevada Operations Office include:
- Maintaining the capability to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests.
- Conducting all programs related to nuclear emergencies and threats.
- Supporting arms control, treaty verification, and non/counter proliferation of nuclear
weapons technology.
- Supporting research activities as part of being designated a National Environmental
Research Park.
- Conducting tests for the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Testing Program.
- Supporting studies in alternate energy sources and environmental management,
research and development, and testing.
- Ensuring that all operations are conducted in compliance with all environmental,
safety, and health laws, regulations, standards, agreements, and DOE Orders
(DOE/NV 1993b, 1992a, 1991a; ERDA 1977).
2.1.4 Nevada Test Site Management
The DOE Nevada Operations Office is currently administering NTS operations. The NTS
has multiple contractor support. The major support contractors are Reynolds Electrical &
Engineering Co., Inc., the prime contractor; EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., the electronic
and instrumentation support contractor; Raytheon Services Nevada, the architect-engineering
support contractor; and Wackenhut Services, Inc., the site security contractor.
2.1.5 Yucca Mountain Project
The DOE Office of Civilian Waste Management is conducting a program for siting the
nation's first geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes.
The Yucca Mountain Site has been designated by the U.S. Congress as a candidate site.
Although Yucca Mountain is located outside the western boundary of the NTS, a contiguous
portion of the NTS has been assigned as part of the potential repository site. Access to the site
is accomplished through the NTS and Yucca Mountain Project field offices and support facilities
are located in Area 25 (DOE/NV 1993b). Currently, Yucca Mountain is being characterized to
study its suitability as a geological repository. The characterization study includes exploratory
borings and analyses of meteorological, geological, hydrological, geochemical, erosion, tectonics,
and socioeconomics conditions. Upon completion of the characterization study, the Secretary
may recommend Yucca Mountain to the U.S. President as viable site for a repository
(DOE 1988b).
2.2 Regulatory Framework
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, as amended)
provides Federal agency decision makers with a process to systematically consider the potential
environmental consequences of agency decisions. The DOE has prepared this environmental
impact statement (EIS) in conformance with the requirements of this Act to evaluate the
potential impacts of programmatic decisions on the management of SNF. This EIS will provide
the necessary background, data, and analyses to help decision makers understand the potential
environmental consequences of each alternative.
On October 22, 1990, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
(FR 1990a) announcing its intent to prepare a programmatic EIS addressing environmental
restoration and waste management (including SNF management) activities across the entire DOE
Complex. On October 5, 1992, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
(FR 1992) announcing its intent to prepare an EIS addressing environmental restoration and
waste management and SNF activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. For
further programmatic discussion of this topic, see Volume 1.
Significant Federal and state environmental and nuclear materials management laws are
applicable to the NTS. The Federal laws are listed in Volume 1, Section 7.3. The State of
Nevada laws are listed alphabetically below:
- Air Pollution Control Law (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Air Quality Regulations (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Disposal of Hazardous Waste (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Disposal of Radioactive Material (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Facilities for the Management of Hazardous Waste (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Regulation of Highly Hazardous Substances (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Solid Waste Disposal Act (Title 40 Chapter 444)
- Storage Tanks (Title 40 Chapter 459)
- Underground Injection Control (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Water Pollution Control Law (Title 40 Chapter 445)
- Water Pollution Regulations (Title 40 Chapter 445)
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program
Currently, spent nuclear fuel is not generated, received, reprocessed, or stored at the NTS;
therefore, a SNF management program does not currently exist for activities at the NTS
(DOE 1993). There are no current or foreseeable environmental, safety, or health vulnerabilities
at the NTS associated with SNF (DOE 1993). Selection of the No-Action Alternative would not
adversely affect the operations or any planned facility modifications at the NTS.
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES
3.1 Description of Management Alternatives
This chapter describes the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives evaluated by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for Appendix F that are applicable to the Nevada Test
Site (NTS). DOE did not consider the Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for the
management of spent nuclear fuel in the Draft EIS because of the State's current role as the host
site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. DOE's identification of the preferred
alternatives also indicates that DOE does not consider the Nevada Test Site as a preferred site
for spent nuclear fuel management in the Final EIS. For the purposes of conducting a thorough
NEPA analysis, the NTS provides a contrast to other potential sites because it represents a site
that has no existing SNF management infrastructure. The NTS does not currently generate or
store any SNF. Hence, of the five alternatives discussed in this Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), only two, Regionalization and Centralization, are applicable to the NTS.
The other three alternatives -- No Action, Decentralization, and the 1992/1993 Planning Basis --
are not applicable to the NTS since they affect or involve only sites which currently generate or
store SNF.
3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action
The No Action Alternative is restricted to the minimum actions necessary for the continued
safe and secure management of SNF. As defined, this alternative stipulates no SNF shipments to
or from DOE facilities. The NTS does not currently generate or store any SNF and would not
receive any SNF under this alternative. Therefore, this alternative is not applicable to the NTS
and is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.
3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization
Decentralization involves storage of SNF at or close to generation sites, with limited
shipments to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and Savannah River Site (SRS)
as necessary to permit continued operation. Since the NTS does not generate or store any SNF
and would not receive any SNF under this alternative, it is not applicable to the NTS and is not
analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.
3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is DOE's documented 1992/1993 plan for the
management of DOE and Naval SNF. Since the NTS does not generate or store any SNF and
would not receive any SNF under this alternative, it is not applicable to the NTS and is not
analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the NTS.
3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization
3.1.4.1 Overview. The Regionalization Alternative consists of two subalternatives.
Subalternative A would distribute existing and new SNF between the Hanford Site, INEL, and
SRS by SNF type. Under Subalternative B, SNF would be distributed to either an eastern or
western regional site based on geographical location. SNF east of the Mississippi River would be
shipped to the eastern region site (i.e., SRS or Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)). SNF west of the
Mississippi River would be shipped to the western regional site (i.e., Hanford, INEL, or NTS).
Additionally, all Naval SNF would be shipped to only one of the sites, but not both. The ORR
would be the alternative to the SRS as the eastern regional site, and the NTS would be the
alternative to both the Hanford Site and INEL as the western regional site.
3.1.4.2 Regionalization Subalternative B. The following fuels would be transported to
the NTS for storage under the Regionalization Subalternative B:
- Naval-type SNF (if selected)
- All, including from the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes
- Hanford Production SNF
- From western sites including the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
- From western sites including the INEL and Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-Owned Commercial SNF
- From western sites including the Hanford and INEL
- Experimental - Stainless steel SNF
- From western sites including the Hanford, INEL, Foreign Research Reactors, and
non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
- From western sites including the INEL
- Experimental - Other
- From western sites.
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
- From western sites including INEL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the NTS stabilized and
canned to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF might need to be
uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. New
non-DOE domestic, Foreign Research Reactors, and Naval SNF would be shipped in the state
necessary for safe transportation but not necessarily canned. This fuel would be stabilized,
prepared, and canned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be cooled for a
minimum of 120 days prior to shipping and 5 years before being placed in dry storage.
Additionally, if the NTS is selected for the Expended Core Facility, Naval SNF would be
examined at the NTS before being turned over for interim storage management.
The NTS currently has no facilities that are suitable for receiving, canning, storing, or
supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a result, a new
SNF management complex would be built at the NTS under the Regionalization
Subalternative B. The SNF management complex would include the following:
- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expended Core Facility similar to the one at the INEL (if selected for Naval Fuel
Receipt).
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for
cooling SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development
facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot scale technology
development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would
consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. If NTS is
selected for Naval fuel receipt, Naval SNF would be examined at the Expended Core Facility
prior to being turned over for interim storage management.
The SNF management complex which would be built at the NTS under the Regionalization
Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Centralization Alternative.
However, the dry storage component would be somewhat smaller due to the smaller SNF
inventory that would be transported to the NTS under the Regionalization Alternative. The
other components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those
built under the Centralization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new uncanned fuel
which would be sent to the NTS under the Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would
be very similar. Additionally, since the major portion of the potential radiological and chemical
releases and waste generation rates are associated with these components, the Regionalization
Alternative will not be analyzed separately. This alternative will be compared to the
Centralization Alternative in a semiquantitative manner.
If the NTS is not chosen as the western regional site, the Regionalization Alternative would
not be applicable to the NTS.
3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization
3.1.5.1 Overview. Under Centralization, all existing and new SNF would be shipped to
one site. There are five Centralization options considered in this PEIS; Option A - Hanford Site,
Option B - INEL, Option C - SRS, Option D - ORR, Option E - NTS. If the NTS was chosen as
the centralization site, all SNF currently stored at the HS, INEL, SRS, ORR, and other sites
currently storing DOE fuel would be transferred to the NTS.
3.1.5.2 Centralization Alternative Option E. The following fuels would be transported to
the NTS for storage under the Centralization Alternative Option E:
- Naval-type SNF
- From the INEL and shipyards
- Hanford Production SNF
- From the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
- From the INEL and Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-Owned Commercial SNF
- From Hanford, INEL, West Valley Demonstration Project, and B&W Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF
- From Hanford, INEL, SRS, FRR, and non-DOE domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
- From the INEL and SRS
- Experimental - Other
- From the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
- From the INEL, SRS, ORNL, LANL, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Foreign
Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors.
All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the NTS stabilized and
canned to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need to be
uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. New
non-DOE domestic research reactor, Foreign Research Reactor, and Naval SNF would be
shipped in a state necessary for safe transportation but not necessarily canned. This fuel would
be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the NTS to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be
cooled for a minimum of 120 days prior to shipping and 5 years before being placed in dry
storage. Additionally, Naval SNF would be examined at the NTS before being turned over for
interim storage management.
The NTS currently has no facilities that are suitable for receiving, canning, storing, or
supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a result, a new
SNF management complex would be built at the NTS under the Centralization Alternative
Option E. The SNF management complex would include the following:
- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expended Core Facility similar to the one at the INEL.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for
cooling SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development
facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot scale technology
development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would
consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. Naval SNF
would be examined at a new Expended Core Facility constructed at the NTS prior to being
turned over for interim storage management.
The SNF management complex which would be built at the NTS under the Centralization
Alternative would have the same components as those built under the Regionalization
Alternative. However, the dry storage component would be somewhat larger under the
Centralization Alternative due to the somewhat greater SNF inventory that would be transported
to the NTS under this alternative. The other components of the SNF management complex
would be the same general size as those built under the Regionalization Alternative. This is
because the inventories of new uncanned fuel which would be sent to the NTS under the
Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would be very similar. Additionally, the major
portion of the potential radiological and chemical releases and waste generation rates are
associated with these components, and would not be significantly different for the two
alternatives. Therefore, this alternative will be used as the basis for a semiquantitative
comparison with the Regionalization Alternative.
If the NTS is not chosen as the centralization site, the Centralization Alternative would not
be applicable to the NTS.
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives
Table 3.2-1 shows a comparison of the alternatives. The Regionalization Alternative
column does not include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, although this
facility may be constructed at the site under this alternative. The Centralization Alternative
column does include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, which are presented
in Volume 1, Appendix D, since this facility will be built at the site under this alternative.
Table 3.2-1. Comparison of alternatives for the NTS.
Parameter Regionalization Centralization
Subalternative B Option Ea
at NTS
Land for new facilities (acres) 90 120
Site area (acres) 864,000 864,000
Percent of site area 0.01 0.01
SNF-related employmentb 556 1,118
Baseline site employment 8,563 8,563
Percent of baseline site employment 6.5 13.1
Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, SNF management 4.1 x 10-5 4.1 x 10-5
operationsc
Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, other site operations 2.6 x 10-6 2.6 x 10-6
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in a maximally exposed individual per 5.9 x 10-8 5.9 x 10-8
year, SNF management operationsc
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in a maximally exposed individual per 5.5 x 10-9 5.5 x 10-9
year, other site operations
Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, SNF 1.6 x 10-5 1.6 x 10-5
management operationsc
Estimated maximum probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, 2.0 x 10-6 2.0 x 10-6
other site operations
Water use (million gallons) per year, SNF management 3.6 6.1
Baseline water use (million gallons) per year, site operations 1,120 1,120
Percent of baseline site water use 0.32 0.54
Electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, SNF management 23,000 33,000
Baseline electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, site operations 183,100 183,100
Percent of baseline site electricity use 12.56 18.02
Sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, SNF management 3.6 6.1
Baseline sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, site operations 0 0
Parameter Regionalization Centralization
Subalternative B Option Ea
at NTS
Percent of baseline site sewage discharge NA NA
High-level waste (cubic meters) per year, SNF management 0 0
Transuranic waste (cubic meters), SNF management 16 16
Mixed waste (cubic meters), SNF management 0 0
Low-level waste (cubic meters), SNF management 203 628
Estimated maximum cancer fatalities in 80-km population from maximum risk 6.6 x 10-4
accident
Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d 1.6 x 10-1
Estimated maximum risk of cancer fatalities in 80-km population from 1.1 x 10-4
maximum risk accident (cancer fatalities per year)d
Estimated maximum worker cancer fatalities from maximum risk accidentd 1.9 x 10-3
Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d 1.0 x 10-4
Estimated maximum risk of worker cancer fatalities from maximum risk 1.9 x 10-7
accident (cancer fatalities per year)d
a. Centralization Option includes the Naval Expended Core Facility results from Volume 1, Appendix D.
b. Annual Average SNF direct construction and operation jobs over the 10-year period 1995 to 2005.
c. Excludes baseline site operations.
d. Centralization Option is the same as the Regionalization Option for the SNF Management Facility and does not
include the Naval Expended Core Facility accident analyses results from Volume 1, Appendix D.
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Overview
This chapter describes the existing environmental conditions in areas potentially affected by
a programmatic decision to site spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS)
under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Topics were selected for analysis
based upon their potential to be affected by the alternatives. Each topic is addressed in the
detail necessary to serve as a baseline for assessment of potential environmental consequences in
Chapter 5.
4.2 Land Use
The NTS occupies an area of approximately 1,350 square miles (3,500 square kilometers) in
southern Nevada, in a sparsely populated desert area approximately 65 miles (104 kilometers)
northwest of Las Vegas. The NTS is almost entirely surrounded by other federally owned lands
which buffer it from lands open to the public. The NTS is bordered by the Nellis Air Force Base
(NAFB) Bombing and Gunnery Range on the north, east, and west, and by Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) lands on the south and southwest (DOE/NV 1993a,b).
Existing land use on the NTS falls into four general categories: Testing Areas;
Buffer/Reserved Areas; Industrial/Research Areas; and Waste Management Areas. According to
the latest NTS land use map (Figure 4.2-1), approximately 50 percent of the land on the NTS is
buffer/reserved area for ongoing programs or projects (DOE/NV 1993a).
Land bordering the site to the north, east, and west is located on the NAFB Bombing and
Gunnery Range and is primarily vacant, unused, or used for a buffer zone. Land bordering the
site to the south and southwest is owned by the BLM and is used for recreation, grazing, forest
management, or wildlife management (DOE/NV 1993a,b).
The NTS is located in an area of sparsely vegetated desert. Beyond the federally owned
lands which surround the NTS, principal land uses in Nye County in the vicinity of the NTS
Figure 4.2-1. Land use at the Nevada Test Site. include mining, grazing, agriculture, and recreation (DOE/NV 1993a). Urban and residential
land uses occur beyond the immediate vicinity of the NTS, in fertile valley regions such as the
Owens and San Joaquin to the west of the site, the Virgin River to the east of the site, the
Pahrump to the south of the site, the Moapa River to the southeast of the site, and the Hiko and
Alamo to the northeast of the site (DOE/NV 1993b).
Clark County, to the southeast of the NTS, consists of approximately 7900 square miles
(20,220 square kilometers) of which about 95 percent is owned by the federal government
(ULI 1992). Primary land uses on these federal lands include grazing, mining, and recreation.
The remaining 5 percent of the county supports residential, state and local government,
industrial, and retail land uses (Clark County Regional Transportation Commission 1992).
Currently, Nye County does not have a zoning ordinance; therefore, no zoning classification
exists for NTS lands. The NTS is required to comply with State of Nevada regulations for air
pollution, safety, and transportation, and with Nye County traffic regulations and safety codes
(DOE/NV 1993b). Of the total area within Nye County, only a small number of isolated areas
are under private ownership and therefore subject to general plan guidelines (NEEDA 1993).
Numerous national, state, and local public recreation areas exist within the NTS region
(Figure 2.1-1). Outdoor recreational areas include the Death Valley National Monument, located
12 miles (19 kilometers) to the west/southwest, and the Desert National Wildlife Range,
approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) east. (Portions of the Desert National Wildlife Range are
located within NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range and are as close as 2 miles (3 kilometers) to
the NTS). State parks near the site include; the Red Rock Canyon Recreation Lands,
approximately 40 miles (64 kilometers) to the southeast; Spring Mountain Ranch State Park,
approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) southeast; and the Floyd R. Lamb State Park,
approximately 45 miles (72 kilometers) southeast (BLM 1990).
Other recreational areas include numerous campsites, picnic areas, and sports grounds south
of the site in the Toiyabe National Forest, approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) southeast, and
numerous camping and fishing sites north of the site which are used during the spring, summer,
and fall months (DOE/NV 1993a,b,c).
The NTS is a controlled area with public access limited to through traffic on U.S. Route 95
and on Lathrop Wells Road (DOE/NV 1993b).
The proposed SNF site is in the northeast portion of Area 5, located in the southeastern
part of the NTS. This area is currently designated as the Low-Level Waste Facility Management
Area and Buffer/Reserved Area land use categories. This area was also designated as a Non-
Nuclear Test Area in the latest NTS Future Land Use Plan (DOE/NV 1993a).
To the east of Area 5, the NTS is bordered by the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range,
which provides a buffer zone of approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) between the NTS and
lands open to the public. Beyond the NAFB Bombing and Gunnery range land, land uses to the
east of the NTS are primarily mining, grazing, and agriculture (BLM 1990; DOE/NV 1993a).
There are no onsite areas that are subject to Native American Treaty rights or contain any
prime or unique farmland.
4.3 Socioeconomics
4.3.1 Region of Influence
The socioeconomic information presented in this Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) discusses the baseline conditions in a Region of Influence comprising of Nye
and Clark Counties, Nevada. This is the region potentially affected by the principal direct and
indirect socioeconomic effects of actions on the NTS. This Region of Influence includes the
current residential distribution of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor
personnel employed by the NTS, the probable location of offsite contractor operations, and the
probable location of labor and capital supporting indirect economic activity linked to the NTS.
The residential distribution of most of the DOE and contractor personnel employed by the
NTS reflects existing commuting patterns and attractiveness of area communities. A survey of
NTS worker residential distributions in 1988 revealed that 86 percent lived in Clark County and
10 percent in Nye County (DOE 1988a). In Clark County, most NTS employees reside in the
Las Vegas vicinity.
The two-county Region of Influence includes several communities located within a driving
time of approximately 1 hour from the NTS, including Boulder City and the Las Vegas Valley
(includes the "incorporated places" of Henderson, Las Vegas, and North Las Vegas; and the
"census-designated places" of East Las Vegas, Enterprise, NAFB Bombing and Gunnery Range,
Paradise, Spring Valley, Sunrise Manor and Winchester) in Clark County, and Pahrump and
Beatty in Nye County (DOE/NV 1993a,b).
4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population
Regional economic linkage supporting production activity at the NTS occurs primarily with
Clark County, where most of the offsite supporting contractors and the labor and capital
supporting indirect economic activity linked to the NTS are located.
4.3.2.1 Clark County (Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area(1)). Clark County is
composed of five incorporated cities (Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and
Mesquite) and large expanses of unincorporated land, some of which are experiencing strong
growth. The area experiencing the majority of the county's development is the Las Vegas Valley
(ULI 1992). In addition, 95 percent of the total area within the county is owned by the Federal
government and includes several state parks, vast stretches of desert, and military installations.
Economic conditions in southern Nevada since the mid-1980s have grown continuously.
Economic growth has accelerated relative to national trends due to an expansion in hotel and
gaming markets, relocation of retirees to southern Nevada, expansion of local infrastructure, and
additional unplanned investment to house new families in the region. The overall long-term
growth pattern is forecasted to gradually change the current robust expansion to more stable
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1. At the time of the 1990 census, CLark County and the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Statistical Area were synonymous. The Census Bureau redifined the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Statistical Area to include Mohave County, Arizona. However, the
numbers provided here reflect the 1990 census definition.
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growth conditions, as seen in the United States (The Center for Business and
Economic Research 1992).
The economy in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area is driven by growth in the
hotel and gaming industry. Because of its orientation toward tourism and conventions, the
economy is highly service oriented. Service employment in the Las Vegas area is substantially
higher than the relative national share, accounting for nearly 45 percent of total employment,
with hotels and gaming accounting for approximately 30 percent of the service factor. Trade
employment accounts for 21 percent, and government and construction each account for an
additional 10 percent (ULI 1992). Construction employment has increased over 130 percent
since 1980, with 32,000 jobs in that sector in 1993 particularly due to the building and expansion
of a number of casinos in Clark County (DOE/NV 1993a). The industrial market has also
induced growth in the construction sector, causing a 50 percent increase in new construction
activity between 1990 and 1992. Growth in the industrial market is expected to continue, with
demand outpacing new construction (ULI 1992). Manufacturing employment is increasing
steadily (7 percent from 1992 to 1993); however, this sector comprises only a 2.8 percent share of
total employment (DOE/NV 1993a), still well below the national average.
Between 1980 and 1990, Clark County added an average of 15,000 jobs per year. By year-
end 1991 another 19,000 jobs had been added to the employment base for 1990, for a total of
388,000 jobs (ULI 1992). In September 1992, employment in the Las Vegas area reached
399,900. Despite the national recession during 1990-1992, the number of existing jobs in the Las
Vegas area increased rapidly, averaging an 8.1 percent gain during that period (DOE/NV 1993a).
The number of existing jobs in the Las Vegas area is projected to continue increasing for
the next several years. The State of Nevada Employment Security Research Department
estimated there would be a total of 125,190 new jobs in the Las Vegas area between 1991 and
1996, an increase of approximately 6 percent annually (DOE/NV 1993a).
The unemployment rate reached a low of 4.9 percent in 1990 and increased to 7.5 percent
as of June 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). The increase in unemployment reflected the fact that the
in-migration of labor exceeded the growth in employment opportunities. However, the
unemployment level is expected to decrease with new hotel, gaming, and amusement properties
opening at the end of 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a).
Most of the population in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area is centered in the
Las Vegas Valley, with six population groupings in the area: the Las Vegas Valley, Boulder City,
Indian Springs, Laughlin, Mesquite, and the Moapa Valley (DOE/NV 1993b). In 1990, the
population of the metropolitan statistical area totaled 735,000, growing at a rate of 4.7 percent
annually from 1980 (ULI 1992). This rate of growth, however, is lower than that near the end of
the 1980s. The population of the metropolitan statistical area was estimated at over 900,000 as
of August 1993, an increase of nearly 8 percent annually since 1990 (DOE/NV 1993b).
4.3.2.2 Nye County. The employment level in Nye County (11,310 jobs) is low relative
to Clark County, and includes opportunities in the services, mining, and government sectors
(DOE/NV 1993b).
Nye County is sparsely populated, with the two largest population groupings being in the
unincorporated communities of Pahrump and Tonopah. The populations of Pahrump and
Tonopah in 1990 were 7,424 and 3,616 (62 percent and 20 percent of the county total),
respectively (DOE/NV 1993b).
Tourist (and business traveller) activity is an important part of the Nye County economy in
communities along U.S. Route 95; however, in each community, mining is the major, even
dominant, economic force.
In the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear weapons testing at the NTS dominated the Nye County
economy when described in terms of employment by place of work. Most of the NTS work force
commutes to Mercury or forward areas from the Las Vegas Valley, and most food and other
services are provided at federally subsidized facilities onsite. However, some Nye County
businesses do provide NTS support services. In the context of the Yucca Mountain repository
oversight program, Nye County and DOE have engaged in efforts that could lead to greater
employment and procurement opportunities for Nye County residents and businesses
(NEEDA 1993).
4.3.2.3 Nevada Test Site. The NTS work force supports engineering design,
construction, and operation of the site and includes people employed by DOE and people
employed by DOE contractors. The total NTS work force in 1993 included nearly 4,000 jobs
located at the NTS and an additional 5,000 jobs in the Nevada Operations Office
(DOE/NV 1993a). As of January 1994, the work force totaled 8,563 (3,286 on NTS, 3,805 in
Las Vegas, and 1,472 in the rest of Nevada or other areas). There is currently no SNF-related
employment at NTS (DOE/NV 1994a).
4.3.2.4 Aggregate Regional Economic and Demographic Baseline. For the purposes of
establishing a regional baseline to assess potential impacts for the programmatic analyses in
Section 5.3, regional economic and demographic data for Clark and Nye counties were
aggregated to form one region (Table 4.3-1).
The total population of this Region of Influence is projected to be 998,093 persons in 1995
and to grow at an annual average rate of 2.7 percent, reaching 1,281,666 persons in 2004. The
labor force of the Region of Influence is projected to grow at an annual average rate of 3.1
percent, reaching 792,309 persons in 2004. The total employment in the Region of Influence is
projected to grow at an annual average rate of approximately 3.1 percent from 552,439 jobs in
1995 to 734,589 jobs in 2004.
4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure
4.3.3.1 Police and Fire. The NTS's fire protection capacity is structured to accommodate
current mission requirements, with a self-contained firefighting department responsible for
suppression and prevention. Other services include rescue, hazardous material response, training
of fire personnel, fire prevention inspections, installation of all fire extinguishers at the NTS, and
fire prevention awareness programs. In addition, the DOE has signed an agreement whereby the
Nye County Fire Department will assist the Clark County Fire Department in case of an
emergency at the NTS (DOE/NV 1993a).
The Las Vegas Fire Department is spending $9.7 million to build three new fire stations in
the northwest area of the city to support growing public service demand in this area. The Clark
Table 4.3-1. Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for the NTS.
Years Regional employment Regional labor force Regional population
1995 552,439 595,851 998,093
1996 573,279 618,329 1,033,234
1997 594,916 691,666 1,069,422
1998 617,450 665,968 1,107,037
1999 640,822 691,175 1,145,711
2000 665,060 717,317 1,185,766
2001 681,956 735,538 1,209,316
2002 699,258 754,197 1,233,372
2003 716,971 773,299 1,257,672
2004 734,589 792,309 1,281,666
2005 752,356 811,483 1,305,461
Average Annual 3.1% 3.1% 2.7%
Growth Rate
a. Sources: Nye County Board of Commissioners (1993); The Center for Business and
Economic Research (1992).
Note: Aggregate region includes Clark and Nye Counties. Labor force projection
developed for this study.
County Fire Department plans to add two new fire departments within the next 5 years. There is
a mutual agreement between the Clark County Fire Department and all surrounding area
departments to assist in any fire emergency when necessary (DOE/NV 1993a).
Law enforcement at the NTS is provided by the Nye County Sheriff. Security enforcement,
established to accommodate the requirements of NTS's mission, is the responsibility of a private
contractor. Regional law enforcement services are provided principally by the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department. Las Vegas ranks fourth nationally in metropolitan statistical
areas in police per capita, with 1 per 277 population (DOE/NV 1993a).
4.3.3.2 Health Care. The NTS has a self-contained medical center that provides limited
emergency treatment. Health care in the Las Vegas metropolitan area is provided through 13
full-service hospitals, with 3.44 hospital beds per 1,000 population. A major proposed health care
facility is scheduled to open in 1994 to accommodate demand (DOE/NV 1993a).
4.3.3.3 Education and Training. The Clark County School District provides education
services for the families of the majority of the employees who work at the NTS. Enrollment in
the Clark County School District was approximately 122,000 student in 1992 and was projected to
be 136,000 students in 1993. An average student/teacher ratio of 22.32 is reported for
elementary school grades K-6; the student/teacher ratio is not reported for other grades
(DOE/NV 1993a).
Higher education and training resources provided by the NTS include the support provided
by the DOE Contractor Education and Training Departments, with technical training in areas
such as Radiation Protection Training, Radiological Response Training, Environmental and
Health Training (which includes Hazardous Waste, Site Operation, and Emergency Response) to
support NTS's mission. In addition, there are a number of vocational, training, and higher
education institutions in the Las Vegas metropolitan area (DOE/NV 1993a).
Since 1990, southern Nevada has experienced tremendous growth in school enrollment. To
accommodate the influx of students, the school district was able to negotiate the largest bond sale
in Nevada history along with regular allocations from the Nevada legislature (DOE/NV 1993a).
4.3.3.4 Housing. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of housing units in Clark County
increased by 84 percent, from approximately 174,000 to approximately 320,500. The housing
market continues to flourish, as the demand for new housing has consistently exceeded the supply
(ULI 1992). The increase in demand is attributable to the influx of retirees and other in-migrant
population.
Residential building permits, which peaked in 1988 at 26,400 units, declined to 13,500 units
in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995, the number of permits issued is expected to average 15,000
units per year (ULI 1992). Demand is projected to outpace supply over the next 5 years, given
the strong projections for population and employment (ULI 1992).
4.4 Cultural Resources
4.4.1 Archaeological Sites and Historic Structures
For approximately 12,000 years, people have inhabited the lands now comprising the NTS
site. The availability of surface water was the primary determinant governing the location of past
human occupation on these lands. On what is now the NTS, access to surface water was through
springs located in canyons and at the bases of mountains and mesas. Therefore, there is very
little evidence of human occupation in valleys or playas where surface water sources were
unavailable, including the Frenchman Flat area where the proposed SNF site would be located
(DOE/NV 1993b).
Three cultural resource surveys were conducted in the vicinity of the proposed site. Two
archaeological sites were recorded but neither was considered potentially eligible for listing on
the National Register of Historic Places (DRI 1991, 1989, 1987). As a result, no prehistoric or
historic resources are expected to be located on the proposed SNF site.
4.4.2 Native American Resources
The Southern Paiute and Shoshone Native American tribes are known to have inhabited
southern Nevada including parts of what is now the NTS. These tribes are known to be affiliated
with sites located in the northern portions of NTS including the Pahute and Rainier Mesas.
However, no known Native American resources are located within the proposed SNF site
(DRI 1986a).
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources
The NTS is characterized by alluvium-filled, topographically closed valleys surrounded by
ranges composed of Paleozoic sedimentary rocks and Tertiary volcanic tuffs and lavas. Although
igneous rocks do not contain fossils, the deposits might contain late Pleistocene terrestrial
vertebrate fossils (Sandia National Laboratories 1982).
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources
Visual or scenic resources comprise the natural and manmade features that give a particular
environment its aesthetic qualities. These features form the overall impression that a viewer
receives of an area or its landscape character.
Scenic resources at the NTS are set in a landscape which is a transition area between the
Mojave Desert and the Great Basin, with vegetation ranging from grasses and creosote bush in
the lower elevations to juniper, pinyon pine and sagebrush in elevations above 5,000 feet
(1,524 meters) (DOE/NV 1993b). The topography of the NTS consists of a series of mountain
ranges arranged in a north-south orientation separated by broad valleys (DOE/NV 1993b). The
topography is also characterized by the presence of numerous craters produced by past nuclear
testing at the NTS. Of the three principal valleys located within the NTS, Frenchman Flat
surrounds the proposed location of the SNF site (BLM 1990). Access to the NTS is from U.S.
Route 95, which runs in an east-west direction along the south side of the NTS at Mercury Valley
(BLM 1990). The Mercury Highway, which runs north from the Mercury Base Camp, is a
restricted access road that is not available for public access (Figure 2.1-2).
The proposed SNF site at the NTS is set along the east side of the Mercury Highway in
Area 5, within the Frenchman Flat. The proposed SNF site is located in the vicinity of the
existing Radioactive Waste Management Site. The land cover in this area is typical desert
vegetation.
The viewshed surrounding the NTS consists of unpopulated to sparsely populated desert
and rural lands. Since the NTS is surrounded to the east, north and west by the NAFB Bombing
and Gunnery Range and to the south by lands controlled by the BLM, the only public views into
the interior of the NTS are from U.S. Route 95. Since the southern boundary of the NTS is
ringed by various mountain ranges, including the Spector Range, Striped Hills, Red Mountain,
and the Spotted Range, views to the interior of the site are generally limited to the Mercury
Valley and the Mercury Base Camp (BLM 1990).
Low sensitivity exists when the public can be expected to have little or no concern about
changes in the landscape. Little value may be ascribed to the views, or they may be similar to
others in the area. In general, due to the mixture of industrial uses, open desert, and restricted
access, the NTS could be classified as having low visual sensitivity.
4.6 Geologic Resources
This section provides a description of the general geology, geologic resources, and seismic
and volcanic hazards at the NTS and surrounding area. This section also describes any existing
impacts to the geology and geologic resources that have resulted from past and present activities
conducted at the NTS.
4.6.1 General Geology
As shown on Figure 4.6-1, the NTS is located east and north of the Walker Lane-Las Vegas
Valley Shear Zone (Eckel 1968). Walker Lane is a northwest-trending belt of right-lateral faults
that disrupts the regional structural grain in the southwestern part of the Great Basin along the
California-Nevada border. The Las Vegas Valley shear zone is a concealed zone of right-lateral
faulting along the north side of the Las Vegas Valley (DOE 1988b). Whether the Walker Lane-
Las Vegas Valley Shear Zone comprises a continuous single fault or two faults is debatable.
Most geologists consider it to be a single fault system, which in the NTS area is buried beneath
Figure 4.6-1. Location of Nevada Test Site in relation to regional fault zones. thick Tertiary strata (Eckel 1968). The NTS also lies in the southern part of the Great Basin
Section of the Basin and Range Physiographic Province. The local geology of the NTS is
characterized by mountain ranges composed of Precambrian and Paleozoic sedimentary rocks
and Tertiary volcanic tuffs and lavas that surround alluvium-filled, topographically closed valleys.
A generalized stratigraphic column of the area is shown on Figure 4.6-2 (Sandia National
Laboratory 1982). Figure 4.6-2 also shows the six aquifers and four aquitards of the NTS area
(see Section 4.8). A schematic cross section illustrating NTS geology is shown on Figure 4.6-3
(DOE 1986). A geologic map of the NTS is shown as Figure 4.6-4 (DOE/NV 1993b).
The sedimentary rocks are complexly folded and faulted and are comprised mainly of
carbonates (dolomite and limestone) in the upper and lower parts of the column and clastics
(shale and sandstone) in the middle section. Above the approximately 4,000 meters (13,000 feet)
of Precambrian to Cambrian clastic deposits are approximately 4,300 meters (14,000 feet) of
Cambrian through Devonian carbonates, 2,400 meters (8,000 feet) of Mississippian shales and
sandstones, and 900 meters (3,000 feet) of Pennsylvanian to Permian limestones (Sandia National
Laboratory 1982).
The volcanic rocks in the NTS area are predominantly Tertiary tuffs that are high in silica.
Although there are minor amounts of Tertiary basalts and a few scattered Mesozoic granitic
plutons in the area (Sandia National Laboratory 1982), the Tertiary tuffs comprise approximately
70 percent of the rocks exposed at the surface (Eckel 1968).
The valleys formed between steeply dipping faults that have become filled with alluvium and
comprise approximately 30 percent of the area (Eckel 1968). This generally unconsolidated
alluvium is derived from erosion of nearby hills composed of Tertiary and Paleozoic rocks and
ranges in thickness from 600 to 900 meters (2,000 to 3,000 feet) (DOE/NV 1992c). Some layers
are cemented by calcium carbonate (caliche) and/or clays. The alluvial materials are better
sorted and finer grained toward the center of the basins. The sediments in the playas (flat-
floored undrained desert basins that, at times, become shallow lakes) consist of very fine-grained
lacustrine deposits up to several tens of meters (feet) thick. Near the range fronts, alluvium is
generally composed of angular rubble, with individual clasts commonly a foot or more in
diameter surrounded by a matrix of silt, sand, and gravel (Sandia National Laboratory 1982).
Figure 4.6-2. Stratigraphic column of the Nevada Test Site. Figure 4.6-3. Schematic cross section portraying the geologic complexity of NTS. Figure 4.6-4. Geologic map of the NTS.(page 1) Figure 4.6-4. Geologic map of the NTS.(page 2) Faulting in the NTS area generally occurs as thrust faults (faults having shallow inclinations,
mostly between 10 and 20 degrees), normal faults (faults with downward displacement of the face
of the rock that lies above the fault), and strike-slip faults (nearly vertical faults characterized by
shear zones) (DOE/NV 1992c). The faults located at NTS are shown on Figure 4.6-5
(DOE/NV 1993b). Thrust faulting in the NTS area occurs as three major thrust faults, with the
total displacement along this fault system ranging from 40 to 48 kilometers (25 to 30 miles).
Normal faults in the NTS area exist in both ranges and valleys and generally strike northeast and
northwest, while a set of younger and potentially active faults strike north. The nearest strike-slip
structure to the NTS is the Walker Lane-Las Vegas Valley Shear Zone (see Figure 4.6-1).
Estimates of horizontal displacement along this shear zone range from 40 to 160 kilometers
(25 to 100 miles) (Sandia National Laboratory 1982).
At the NTS, recent displacement has occurred along several faults as a consequence of
underground nuclear explosions. This displacement is not attributable to naturally occurring
seismic activity. Fault displacements are thought to have occurred as a result of the added stress
produced by the explosion, the vibrations produced by the explosions, or a combination of both
(Eckel 1968).
Faults are designated as capable if they have exhibited movement at or near the ground
surface at least once within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature within the
past 500,000 years (CFR 1993a). Almost all of the natural fault movement in the NTS area
occurred several million years ago. However, movement along Yucca Fault, a north-south
striking fault known in the northeast portion of the NTS (see Figure 4.6-5), is believed to have
occurred sometime during the last tens of thousands to 250,000 years (Leedom 1994;
Sandia National Laboratory 1982). Given the broad range of time during which displacement
along Yucca Fault is believed to have occurred, Yucca Fault may or may not be an NRC capable
fault (Leedom 1994).
4.6.2 Geologic Resources
Gold, tungsten, and molybdenum may exist in carbonate rocks near igneous intrusions,
regional thrust faults, or other faults at the NTS. In other areas, these deposits have been found
Figure 4.6-5. Approximate location of proposed facility in relation to major faults at NTS. in carbonate rocks associated with this type of terrane. However, based on available information,
the NTS is assessed as having only a low to moderate potential for the occurrence of tungsten
skarn (contact metamorphic rock rich in iron) deposits and/or polymetallic replacement deposits,
and very low potential for the discovery of gold in these types of rocks. Magnetite deposits exist
in rocks at the NTS, but they are not extensive and have very low resource potential. Figure
4.6-6 shows the possible location of the SNF storage facility in relation to the types of terrains
associated with geologic resources as well as to locations of mining districts (USAF et al. 1991).
Gold and silver may exist at NTS in Tertiary volcanic rocks or in sedimentary rocks near
volcanic or intrusive centers. Based on limited information, however, NTS is assessed as having a
low to moderate potential for the development of precious metal deposits in these rocks. It is
estimated that one small to medium-sized precious metals deposit might have been developed
within the NTS had the area remained open to mineral development (USAF et al. 1991).
Much of the alluvial areas along the lower flanks of the ranges within the NTS contain sand
and gravel reserves. These materials, however, do not have any unique value over similar
material occurring in other areas throughout southern Nevada (USAF et al. 1991).
Zeolitized rocks (various hydrous silicates occurring as secondary minerals in cavities of
lavas) underlie most of the volcanic rocks and the alluvial basins at the NTS. Clinoptilolite and
mordenite, either alone or in mixtures, are the most common zeolites in these deposits, but
ferrierite, chabazite, and analcime also occur. Zeolite deposits in Nevada that have been
developed for exploitation are lakebed deposits that have been altered to zeolites under saline
water-saturated conditions. Zeolites are used in water softeners, detergent builders, and cracking
catalysts. Very little information is available on the tonnage and grade of these deposits. The
widespread occurrence of zeolite deposits, however, requires that the deposits at NTS be
assigned a low to moderate potential for development (USAF et al. 1991).
Barite is also known to occur at the NTS. The barite occurs in veins associated with quartz
and mercury, antimony, and lead mineralization. These veins cut Devonian carbonate rocks.
However, the barite veins at the NTS are small and impure, and do not represent a potential
barite resource (USAF et al. 1991).
Figure 4.6-6. Geologic terrains and mining districts of the Nevada Test Site. Fluorite is also reported to be present at the NTS, occurring in veins and replacement
bodies within Paleozoic sedimentary rock. However, little is known about this occurrence;
therefore, the NTS is assumed to have a very low to moderate potential for the development of
fluorite resources (USAF et al. 1991).
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards
The NTS lies on the southern margin of the Southern Nevada East-West Seismic Belt. This
belt connects the north-trending Nevada Seismic Belt, about 160 kilometers (100 miles) west of
the site with the north-trending Intermountain Seismic Belt about 240 kilometers (150 miles) to
the east. The location of these seismic belts are shown on Figure 4.6-7. The pattern of historic
earthquakes in the western United States is marked by relatively brief episodes of intense activity
in areas that may have been relatively inactive for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years
(DOE 1986).
The southern Nevada region is generally characterized as an area of moderate seismic
activity (DOE/NV 1993b). The proposed SNF management site is located on the eastern NTS in
a region considered to have a moderate seismic-activity level. Earthquakes in southern California
and the California desert have registered on the NTS seismic network.
Prior to the installation of a seismic network within a 160-kilometer (100-mile) radius of the
site in 1978 and 1979, 12 earthquakes (including one series of earthquakes) with Richter
magnitudes (M) of equal to or greater than 6.5 were reported within a 400-kilometer (250-mile)
radius of the site (DOE/NV 1994b). One of the largest and nearest of the earthquakes relative
to NTS was the 1872 Owens Valley shock (M = 8.25), located approximately 150 kilometers (100
miles) from the site. Figure 4.6-8 shows the location of the pre-network earthquakes with M
greater than or equal to 5 that have occurred near the NTS (DOE 1988b). Recorded seismic
activity prior to 1978 in the vicinity of the NTS also includes two earthquakes with M equals 4.3
and M equals 4.5 near Massachusetts Mountain (located just north of the proposed SNF storage
site) and in Frenchman Flat (located in the southeast corner of the NTS, an area that includes
the proposed SNF storage site) (DOE/NV 1994b).
Figure 4.6-7. Location of the NTS in relation to the Nevada Seismic Belt, the Intermountain Seismic Belt, and the Southern Nevada East-West Seismic Belt.
Figure 4.6-8. Historical Seismicity of the Southern Great Basin from 1868 through 1993 for M>5.
Between 1978 and 1981, no earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 4.3 were recorded.
Since 1981, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake was recorded near Little Skull Mountain (located near
the southwest corner of the NTS) in 1992 at a depth of 12 kilometers (7.5 miles). In 1993, a
magnitude 3.5 earthquake was recorded southeast of the town of Mercury on the NTS
(DOE/NV 1994b). However, there is some uncertainty in the seismic sources for many signals
recorded by the seismic monitoring network in the area, because underground nuclear explosions,
surface drilling, and explosions to support geophysical investigations may produce earthquake-like
signals (DOE 1986).
The most probable source for seismic activity within the area where the SNF storage facility
would be located is the Cane Spring Fault (see Figure 4.6-5). This fault is thought to be the
source of the magnitude 4.3 Massachusetts Mountain earthquake discussed above. The
maximum credible earthquake associated with the Cane Springs Fault is expected to be a
magnitude earthquake of 6.7. The recurrence interval for this magnitude earthquake is estimated
at 10,000 to 30,000 years (DOE/NV 1993a).
Predictions of future seismicity and faulting, however, are complicated by a number of
factors. Because the recurrence interval for large earthquakes on a Basin and Range fault may
be thousands of years, epicenter maps of historic earthquakes or evidence of Holocene faulting
alone may not be reliable indicators of future or long-term seismicity. Another complication is
that when long fault zones in normal fault regimes fail, they may break along segments rather
than along the entire length. Large (M greater than 7) earthquakes in the western Great Basin
tend to be followed by aftershocks lasting about a century and then seismic activity stabilizes at a
low level for centuries or thousands of years. Based on this concept, recurrence estimates based
on historic or current earthquake distributions may not be directly applicable to the problem of
identifying the most likely locations of future large earthquakes (DOE 1986).
From the historical seismicity of the southern Great Basin (two earthquakes of M equals 6)
and length of active faults, a maximum magnitude of M equals 7 to 8 is inferred for earthquakes
in the Yucca Mountain region. Estimates of recurrence intervals for major earthquakes in the
region (M is greater than or equal to 7) are on the order of 25,000 years; for magnitudes of
greater than or equal to 6, recurrence intervals are on the order of 2,500 years; and for
magnitudes of greater than or equal to 5, recurrence intervals are on the order of 250 years
(DOE 1986).
Ground motion acceleration resulting from earthquakes may cause damage to buildings and
other structures. Ground motion acceleration is represented by the unit (g), which is the
acceleration due to the force of the earth's gravitational field and is approximately equal to
986 centimeters per square second (DOE/NV 1993a). A maximum horizontal ground surface
acceleration of 0.34g at the NTS is estimated to result from an earthquake that could occur once
every 2,000 years (DOE 1994). The seismic hazard information presented in this EIS is for
general seismic hazard comparisons across DOE sites. Potential seismic hazards for existing and
new facilities should be evaluated on a facility specific basis consistent with DOE orders and
standards and site specific procedures.
The Massachusetts Mountain earthquake associated with the Cane Spring Fault (the most
probable source for seismic activity in the area of the proposed SNF storage facility) discussed
above occurred on August 5, 1971 and produced a peak ground motion acceleration of 0.05 g.
The maximum credible earthquake associated with the Cane Spring Fault is expected to produce
a peak acceleration of 0.67 g (DOE/NV 1993a).
Volcanic activity in the area is evident in the geologic record by the presence of widespread
tuffs and scattered granitic plutons deposited during the Tertiary period and basalts deposited
during the late Pliocene and Pleistocene epochs (DOE 1988b).
The potential for renewed silicic volcanism is suggested by the youngest (7- to 8-million year
old) major silicic volcanic center in the area, the Black mountain center, located just west of the
northwest corner of the NTS. However, the occurrence of silicic volcanism near the NTS during
the next 10,000 years is considered unlikely due to: no silicic volcanism in the south-central
Great Basin during at least the past 6 million years, the decrease of silicic volcanism throughout
the central and southern parts of the Great Basin during the past 10 million years, and the
restriction of silicic volcanism to the margins of the Great Basin during the Quaternary (the past
2 million years). If silicic volcanism were to occur, the most likely effect at NTS would be the
deposition of air-fall tuff from eruptions of silicic centers near the western margin of the Great
Basin, as happened at least twice during the Pleistocene. Such volcanism could result in the
deposition of fine-grained volcanic ash in layers ranging from a few millimeters to tens of
centimeters thick (DOE 1988b).
The possibility of future basaltic volcanism near the NTS is suggested by Quaternary basaltic
volcanism, notably in the Crater Flat basalt field, just west of the southwest corner of the NTS.
However, future basaltic eruptions would likely be small and short-lived judging from the
Quaternary record of basaltic volcanism due to: magma volumes for eruptions in the vicinity of
the NTS during the past 8 million years being generally less than 1.0 x 108 cubic meters (3.5 x 109
cubic feet), and of short duration; a low rate of magma generation in the south-central Great
Basin during the late Cenozoic as reflected by the small-volume, basalt eruptive cycles in the
region; and the lack of geologic or geochemical patterns indicating that the rates of volcanism in
the southern Great Basin are increasing, that such rates might increase in the future, or that
basaltic activity could evolve into more voluminous types of basalt fields. The probability for the
penetration of a repository at Yucca Mountain by basaltic volcanism was calculated based upon
studies of volcanic deposits in the vicinity. According to these calculations, the annual probability
is estimated as 3.3 x 10-10 to 4.7 x 10-8 (DOE 1988b).
4.7 Air Resources
Because the transport of airborne effluents is affected by meteorological conditions, the
climatology at the NTS is discussed in this section. A summary of air monitoring networks is
then included. Finally, the most recent air quality data available are presented.
4.7.1 Climatology
The climate at the NTS and the surrounding region is characterized by high solar radiation,
limited precipitation, low relative humidity, and large diurnal temperature ranges. The lower
elevations have a climate typical of the Great Basin.
NTS is situated at the edge of the Mojave Desert, and the arid climate is typical of the
Great Basin. The Sierra Nevada Mountains of California and the series of mountains exceeding
1,830 meters (6,000 feet) in height immediately west and north of the NTS have a marked
influence on the climate. The prevailing upper level winds are from the west; most of the
moisture associated with Pacific Ocean storms falls on the western slopes of the Sierra Nevada.
East of the Sierra Nevada, at locations such as the NTS, very little precipitation occurs.
The Weather Services Office at the NTS monitors meteorological data from numerous
observation sites within and in the vicinity of the NTS. The nearest National Weather Service
full-time meteorological monitoring station is at McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas.
At Area 6 of the NTS, the average daily maximum/minimum temperatures during the
month of January are 10.6yC/-6.1yC (51yF/21yF). The average daily maximum/minimum
temperatures are 35.6yC/13.9yC (96yF/57yF) in July. At Las Vegas, the coldest temperature on
record is -13.3yC (8yF) and the warmest temperature on record is 46.7yC (116yF).
The average annual precipitation at Area 6 is 15 centimeters (6 inches). Precipitation
amounts for each month are generally less than 1.3 centimeters (0.5 inch). At Las Vegas, the
greatest precipitation recorded in a 24-hour period is 6.6 centimeters (2.59 inches). An average
of 14 thunderstorm days occur each year, with maximum occurrence in July and August.
Thunderstorms occasionally become severe. Tornadoes are extremely rare in Nevada. The
average relative humidity at 4 AM in Las Vegas is 40 percent. The average relative humidity at
4 PM is 20 percent.
Low-level surface winds at the NTS are influenced by the large-scale weather patterns
interacting with the mountain ranges, which generally run from north to south. Predominant
winds are from the south during the summer and north during the winter. The general
downward slope in the terrain from north to south across the NTS results in a diurnal wind
reversal from the south during the day to the north during the night. At Area 6, the average
annual wind speed is 11 kilometers per hour (7 miles per hour). Occasionally, strong winds
associated with storms will exceed 82 kilometers per hour (50 miles per hour). These events are
most common in the spring. At Las Vegas, the peak wind gust on record is 145 kilometers per
hour (90 miles per hour). Strong winds interacting with dry soil conditions are responsible for
occasional duststorms or sandstorms.
Wind direction and speed are major factors in planning and conducting nuclear tests, where
atmospheric transport is the primary potential route of contamination to onsite workers and
offsite populations. Figure 4.7-1 presents 10-meter (33-feet) wind roses for the NTS in 1990. A
wind rose presents the frequency distribution of wind directions at a particular location. The
wind roses indicate that there are differences in prevailing wind directions across the NTS.
Mountain slopes and valleys are major determinants in these localized variations
(DOE/NV 1993c; National Climatic Data Center 1991).
Atmospheric dispersion improves as the wind speed increases, conditions become more
unstable, and the depth of the mixing height increases. The transport and dispersion of airborne
material are direct functions of air movement. Transport directions and speeds are governed by
the general patterns of air flow (and by the nature of the terrain), whereas the diffusion of
airborne material is governed by small-scale, random eddying of the atmosphere (i.e.,
turbulence). Turbulence is indicated by atmospheric stability classification. Data collected at
Desert Rock for calendar year 1990 indicated that atmospheric conditions were unstable (i.e.,
Stability Classes A through C) approximately 25 percent of the time, neutral (Class D)
approximately 37 percent of the time, and stable (Classes E through G) approximately 37 percent
of the time for that year.
4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks
4.7.2.1 Radiological Monitoring Network. DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental
Protection Program, established the onsite environmental protection program requirements,
authorities, and responsibilities for DOE operations. At the NTS, radiological effluents may
originate from tunnels, underground test sites, and facilities where materials are used, processed,
stored, or discharged. Airborne radiological effluents at the NTS have the greatest potential for
reaching the public. There are two radiological monitoring programs for potential airborne
radioactive effluents associated with the NTS, one onsite and the other offsite (DOE/NV 1993c).
Figure 4.7-1. 1990 10-meter (33 foot) wind rose patterns for the NTS. The onsite environmental surveillance program consists of 52 air sampling stations collecting
particulates and reactive gases; 17 samplers collecting atmospheric moisture for tritium analysis;
10 samplers collecting air samples for noble gas analysis; 63 water sampling locations that include
wells, springs, reservoirs, and ponds onsite; and 187 locations where thermoluminescent
dosimeters are positioned for measurement of external gamma exposures (DOE/NV 1993c).
The offsite radiological monitoring program is conducted around the NTS by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory, Las
Vegas, under an interagency agreement. This program consists of several extensive
environmental sampling, radiation detection, and dosimetry networks. In 1992, the Air
Surveillance Network was made up of 30 continuously operating sampling locations surrounding
the NTS and 77 standby stations (operating one week each quarter) in all states west of the
Mississippi River. During 1992, no airborne radioactivity related to current nuclear testing at the
NTS was detected on any sample from this network (DOE/NV 1993c).
4.7.2.2 Nonradiological Monitoring Network. Nonradiological environmental monitoring
of NTS operations involved only onsite monitoring because there were no nonradiological
hazardous material discharges offsite.
4.7.3 Air Releases
4.7.3.1 Radiological. The majority of radioactive effluents at NTS in 1992 originated
from underground nuclear tests designed and conducted by two national laboratories and the
Defense Nuclear Agency. The Los Alamos National Laboratory of Los Alamos, New Mexico
and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of Livermore, California conducted tests in
support of DOE nuclear testing program objectives. Sandia National Laboratories of
Albuquerque, New Mexico supported tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency, which
uses the NTS as a nuclear testing facility under an agreement with DOE (DOE/NV 1993c).
The presence of plutonium as an airborne, radioactive effluent at NTS in 1992 is primarily
due to previous atmospheric tests and tests in which nuclear devices were detonated with high
explosives (called "safety shots"). These latter tests spread low-fired plutonium in the eastern and
northeastern areas of the NTS. Three decades after the conclusion of the atmospheric test
program, higher than normal levels of plutonium in the air are still detected in several areas.
Because of operational activities and vehicular traffic in Area 3 some of the plutonium becomes
airborne and elevated levels of plutonium have been detected in Area 3 for several years
(DOE/NV 1993c).
Six underground nuclear tests were conducted at the NTS during 1992. A list of these tests
and a summary of environmental monitoring observations for each of these are provided in
Table 4.7-1.
Air emissions from nuclear testing operations consisted primarily of radioactive noble gases
and tritium released during posttest drillback, mineback, or sampling operations following each of
the 1992 underground nuclear tests. None of the tests resulted in a prompt release or venting
(release of radioactive materials within 60 minutes of the nuclear test). Onsite radiological safety
support included monitoring emissions during the six nuclear tests. Testing included detecting,
recording, evaluating, and reporting radiological conditions prior to, during, and for an extended
period after each test with provisions for aerial monitoring teams to detect airborne releases
(DOE/NV 1993c).
Following each test, when control of the test area was released by the DOE Controller,
survey personnel obtained radiation measurements using portable detection instruments. During
the postevent drillback and mining activities, continuous environmental surveillance was
maintained in the work area. For containment of radioactive releases to the atmosphere during
drillback, systems were employed to trap radioactive particles.
Radioactive waste management sites are located in Areas 3 and 5. These sites serve as
DOE defense waste disposal sites (DOE/NV 1993c).
NTS airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 are presented in Table 4.7-2.
4.7.3.2 Nonradiological. Air emissions from the NTS originate from concrete batch
plants, aggregate crushing and processing, surface disturbance, fire training exercises, motor
Table 4.7-1. Nuclear test release summary - 1992 at the NTS Site.
Event name Test org. Hole/ Location Date/ Prompt Telemetry Initial radiation surMaximum Release information
area no. time of release? measurement exposure rate
event
Start Stop Began Ended
Junction LANL U19bg Pahute 03/26/92 No 03/26/92 03/27/92 03/26/92 03/26/92 0.05 mR/h None detected
Area 19 Mesa 0830 hrs 0830 hrs 0830 hrs 1029 hrs 1108 hrs
Diamond DNA U12p.05 Rainier 04/30/92 No 04/30/92 05/11/92 04/30/92 04/30/92 0.05 mR/h Release included 0.242 Ci
Fortune Area 12 Mesa 0930 hrs 0930 hrs 1400 hrs 1109 hrs 1143 hrs Xenon-133 and 6.05-Ci
Iodine-131 (5/4/92 to
7/2/92) from low level
seepage until cavity gases
were transferred to
Distant Zenith chimney
Victoria LANL U3kv Yucca 06/19/92 No 06/19/92 06/24/92 06/91/92 06/19/92 0.05 mR/h None detected
Area 3 Basin 0945 hrs 0945 hrs 1500 hrs 1014 hrs 1040 hrs
Galena LLNL U9cv Yucca 06/23/92 No 06/23/92 06/24/92 06/23/92 06/23/92 0.05 mR/h None detected
Area 9 Basin 0800 hrs 0800 hrs 2200 hrs 0914 hrs 0923 hrs
Hunters DNA U12n.24 Rainier 09/18/92 No 09/18/92 09/22/92 09/18/92 09/18/92 3.0 mR/h Release of 0.9 Ci of noble
Trophy Area 12 Mesa 1000 hrs 1001 hrs 1300 hrs 1116 hrs 1151 hrs gases and tritium
(11/18/92 to 1/5/93) from
diagnostic studies
Divider LANL U3ml Yucca 09/23/92 No 09/23/92 09/24/92 09/23/92 09/23/92 0.05 mR/h Release of 0.11 Ci
Area 3 Basin 0804 hrs 0804 hrs 0941 hrs 0856 hrs 0915 hrs Xenon-133 on 10/14/92
during post shot
operations
Distant ZenithDNA U12p.04 Rainier 09/19/91 No 1992 releases associated with ventilation of LOS pipe and drilling in the Chimney region and
Area 12 Mesa 0930 hrs included: 1.33 Ci85Kr, 2.07 Ci37Ar, and 0.1 -Ci39Ar
a. Source: DOE/NV 1993c.
Table 4.7-2. Airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 at the NTS.
Event or facilityCuries
name (airborne
releases)
Tritiumb Argon-37c Argon-39 Krypton-85 Xenon-127d Xenon-129me Xenon-131m Xenon-133m Iodine-131 Plutonium-239,240
Area 3, DIVIDER 1.1 x 10-1
Area 3f 2.5 x 10-3
Area 5, RWMSf 6 x 10-1
Area 6g 1.3 x 10-5
Area 12,
N Tunnel 4.9 x 10-2 7.9 x 10-1 8.1 x 10-5 1.3 x 10-2 5.7 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-2 3.9 x 10-2
P Tunnel 3.6 x 10-1 2.1 x 10-0 1.3 x 10-0 2.4 x 10-1 6.0 x 10-6
Area 19 and 20,
Pahute Mesad
2.8 x 10+2
Total 1.0 x 10-0 2.9 x 10-0 8.1 x 10-5 2.8 x 10+2 5.7 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-2 3.9 x 10-1 1.9 x 10-5 2.5 x 10-3
a. Source: DOE/NV 1993c.
b. Total includes 4.9 x 10-2 Ci of molecular HT from Hunter's Trophy. Remainder is in the form of tritiated water vapor, primarily HTO.
c. Ar-37 with 35 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable Cy-37.
d. Xe-127 with 36.4 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable I-127.
e. Xe-127m with 8 day half-life not in GENII. Decays to stable Xe-129.
f. Calculated from air sampler data.
g. Assumes all radioactivity on Anti-C clothing is I-131 and all becomes airborne during drying.
vehicle operations, boilers, and fuel storage. The concrete batch plants, aggregate crushing and
processing facilities, and surface disturbance activities are sources of particulate matter. These
activities are largely intermittent and occur in support of specific testing programs on the NTS.
Fire training exercises consist of periodic open burning in designated areas with approved fuel
materials conducted by fire and emergency personnel several times per year. Motor vehicle
operations and boilers are the largest sources of air pollutants at the NTS; motor vehicles
consume gasoline, while boilers, construction equipment, and other diesel engines consume diesel
fuel. A continuous, nonradiological air monitoring network is not in place at the NTS
(USAF et al. 1991). Table 4.7-3 presents the maximum allowable nonradiological emission rates
for those NTS sources which require permits.
4.7.4 Air Quality
4.7.4.1 Radiological. Onsite surveillance of airborne particulates, noble gases, and
tritiated water vapor indicated onsite concentrations that were generally not statistically different
from background concentrations. External gamma exposure monitoring in 1992 indicated that
the gamma environment within the NTS remained consistent with that of previous years. All
gamma monitoring stations displayed expected results, ranging from the background levels
predominant throughout the NTS to the types of exposure rates associated with known
contaminated zones and radiological material storage facilities. Results of 1992 offsite
environmental surveillance indicated no NTS-related radioactivity was detected at any air
sampling station, and there were no apparent net exposures detectable by the offsite dosimetry
network (DOE/NV 1993c).
The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment model (PNL 1988) was used to
calculate the effective dose equivalents (EDE) resulting from the airborne radionuclide emissions
presented in Table 4.7-2. These results are summarized in Table 4.7-4. The maximum EDE at
the NTS boundary is 1.1 x 10-2 millirem. This is 1.1 x 10-1 percent of the corresponding National
Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The collective EDEs to the estimated
population of 15,100 persons within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility is 5.2 x
10-3 person-rem, which is 1.2 x 10-4 percent of the natural background radiation dose affecting this
population. Background radiation doses are presented in Figure 4.7-2.
Table 4.7-3. Total nonradiological emission rates at NTS for
permitted sources.
Pollutant Emission rate (g/s)
Carbon monoxide b
Nitrogen dioxide b
Particulate matter (PM10) 2.8
Sulfur dioxide 4.5
Lead b
a. Source: Engineering Science, Inc. (1990).
b. No pollutant sources indicated.
Table 4.7-4. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from NTS operations
during 1992.
Maximally exposed Collective dose to the
individual doseb population within 80 km
of NTS sourcesc
Dose 1.1 x 10-2 mrem 5.2 x 10-3 person-rem
NESHAP standard 10 mrem per year --
Percentage of NESHAP 1.1 x 10-1 --
Natural background dose 278 mrem per year 4190 person-rem
per year
Percentage of natural background 4.0 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-4
dose
a. Sources: 1992 Radionuclide emissions from DOE/NV 1993c GENII Model (PNL 1988)
used to predict EDE. Natural background dose from DOE/NV 1993c.
b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the open
continuously during the year at the NTS boundary.
c. Based on an estimated population of 15,100 persons within 80 km of the proposed SNF
facility in 1995.
Figure 4.7-2. Sources of radiation exposure, unrelated to NTS operations, to individuals in the vicinity of NTS.
4.7.4.2 Nonradiological. Air quality rules and regulations applicable to the NTS are
governed by the Clean Air Act, the Nevada Revised Statutes, and the Nevada Administrative
Code. The EPA administers the Federal regulations developed to implement the Clean Air Act,
and the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources is responsible for enforcing
the Federal and state regulations. Air quality in a given location is described as the
concentration of various pollutants in the atmosphere, generally expressed in units of micrograms
per cubic meter (-g/m3).
The Clean Air Act directed the EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for those pollutants, termed criteria pollutants, that pose the greatest threat to air
quality in the United States. The six criteria pollutants are ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur
dioxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter with an aerodynamic particle diameter less
than or equal to 10 microns, referred to as PM10. The Clean Air Act Amendments authorized
the EPA to designate geographic regions not in compliance with NAAQS as nonattainment
areas. The NTS is located within the Nevada Air Quality Control Region 147, which is in
attainment with respect to the NAAQS for the criteria pollutants (CFR 1993b; Engineering
Science, Inc. 1990). The nearest nonattainment areas to the Nevada Test Site Spent Nuclear
Fuel site are in Clark County, which includes an area in the Las Vegas planning area that is
designated serious for PM10 and an area in Las Vegas that is designated moderate for carbon
monoxide (CFR 1993b).
Under the Clean Air Act, clean air areas are divided into classes. National parks and
wilderness areas receive mandatory Class I protection. Very little pollution increase is allowed in
Class I areas. The only Class I area in Nevada, the Jarbridge Wilderness Area, is located
approximately 480 kilometers (300 miles) from the NTS, in the northwest corner of Nevada. The
nearest Class I areas to the NTS are the Grand Canyon National Park, approximately 275
kilometers (171 miles) to the southeast, and Sequoia National Park approximately 175 kilometers
(109 miles) to the west-southwest. The NTS is located in a Class II area, as are most areas
across the country.
In addition to the criteria pollutants which are regulated under the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and under various emission standards, hazardous air pollutants are regulated.
Title III of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 directed the EPA to determine maximum
available control technologies which would be used as the basis for emission limits for the
hazardous air pollutants.
Engineering Science, Inc. of Pasadena, California conducted an air quality study at the NTS
in 1990. The study examined air quality compliance of the NTS with applicable Federal and
state air quality standards. The study encompassed an air emissions inventory, ambient air
monitoring, and air pollution source testing at various sources. Based on the data collected at
the ambient air monitoring stations established for the study, air quality at the NTS is within
applicable Federal and state standards. The results of background monitoring performed by
Engineering Science, Inc. are summarized in Table 4.7-5. This is the most recent comprehensive
analysis of NTS ambient air quality.
Air dispersion modeling was performed to determine the maximum concentrations of the
criteria pollutants. These results are also summarized in Table 4.7-5. The "total existing
maximum concentrations" in Table 4.7-5 would result if all permitted sources at the NTS
operated at the maximum allowable capacity. All pollutant concentrations from this worst-case
scenario of existing emissions at the NTS are below applicable regulations.
4.8 Water Resources
This section provides a description of the surface water and groundwater at the NTS and
surrounding area. The section also describes the existing impacts to surface water and
groundwater that have resulted from past and present operations at the NTS.
4.8.1 Surface Water
The drainage basins and the generalized directions of surface water flow near the NTS are
shown in Figure 4.8-1 (USAF et al. 1991). The boundary lines of the drainage basins occur
principally along topographic divides (DOE 1988b). Figure 4.8-1 also shows other surface water
features.
Table 4.7-5. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at the NTS.
Criteria Averaging time Most stringent Maximum Maximum Total existing
pollutant regulation or background existing DOE maximum
guideline (-g/m3) concentration (-g/m3) site concentration
contribution (-g/m3)
(-g/m3)
Carbon monoxide 8-hour 10,000 2,290 b 2,290
1-hour 40,000 2,748 b 2,748
Nitrogen dioxide Annual 100 c b b
Lead Calendar quarter 1.5 c b b
Particulate matter Annual 50 c 0.43 0.43
(PM10)d
24-hour 150 78.3 6.6 84.9
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 c 1.07 1.07
24-hour 365 39.3 15.9 55.2
3-hour 1,300 65.4 104.9 170.3
Hazardous air pollutants
b b b b
a. Sources: Maximum background concentration provided by Engineering Science, Inc. (1990). Maximum existing DOE site
contribution computed by Halliburton NUS.
b. No sources indicated.
c. Not measured.
d. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM10.
Figure 4.8-1. NTS hydrologic basins and surface drainage direction. Almost all stream flow in the NTS area is ephemeral, and therefore almost no streamflow
data have been collected. The average annual runoff within the hydrographic areas in the Death
Valley Basin in Nye County was estimated at less than 164 million gallons (620,000 cubic meters)
per area (DOE 1988b).
The ephemeral character of streamflow has also limited the onsite monitoring of surface
water quality. Water samples were, however, collected from the main channel of Fortymile Wash
and two of its principal tributaries (Drill Hole Wash and Busted Butte Wash) during periods of
runoff and flooding in 1984. Due to unknown factors such as compositional variability of storms,
any quantitative interpretation is unwarranted (DOE 1988b).
Throughout the NTS, perennial surface water originates solely from springs, and it is
restricted to source pools at some large springs. Because of the extreme aridity of this region,
most of the spring discharge travels a short distance before evaporating or infiltrating back into
the ground (DOE 1986). Thus, dry washes may be the principal sources of potential
groundwater recharge inputs in the area (DOE 1988b). In addition, playas on NTS, including
Frenchman Lake located in Area 5 and Yucca Lake to the northwest of Area 5, may retain
standing water for hours to weeks following intense precipitation events. These playas represent
the only natural surface water features in the vicinity of Frenchman and Yucca Flats. The
direction of movement of water accumulated in playas is generally upward due to high
evapotranspiration (DOE/OFE 1994). However, accumulated runoff in Frenchman Lake and
Yucca Lake reportedly serves to recharge the valley fill aquifer (DOE 1988b).
Despite the arid climate, which includes high annual average potential evaporation, low
average annual precipitation, and infrequent storms, surface runoff does occur. Runoff results
from storms that occur most commonly in winter and occasionally in autumn and spring, and
from localized thunderstorms that occur mostly during the summer (DOE 1988b). The
ephemeral streams resulting from heavy precipitation fill the normally dry washes. Local flooding
may occur where the water exceeds the capacity of the channels. In contrast to the washes, the
terminal playas may retain standing water for days or weeks after severe storms (DOE 1986).
Playas in Kawich Valley and Gold Flat collect and dissipate the runoff from the northern part of
Pahute Mesa (ERDA 1977). Summer floods usually do not accumulate to cause regional floods,
but their intensive character renders them potentially destructive over limited areas
(DOE 1988b).
The western half and southernmost part of the NTS have channel systems which carry
runoff beyond NTS boundaries during infrequent, very intense storms. Fortymile Canyon is the
largest of these systems, originating on Pahute Mesa in the northwestern part of the NTS and
draining into the normally dry Amargosa River channel about 20 miles (32 kilometers) southwest
of the NTS. Within the NTS, Fortymile Canyon and its tributaries are restricted to well-incised
canyons. Flood-prone areas surround Fortymile Wash, a major tributary within Fortymile
Canyon. The other major NTS tributaries to the Amargosa River are Tonopah Wash, which runs
southwesterly from Jackass Divide in the south-central part of the NTS into the Amargosa Desert
near Amargosa Valley, and Rock Valley, which drains from the southernmost part of the NTS
westward and then southward to Ash Meadows in the east-central portion of the Amargosa
Desert (ERDA 1977).
The Amargosa River originates in Oasis Valley and continues southeastward through the
Amargosa Desert past Death Valley Junction, then southward another 45 miles (82 kilometers),
where it turns northwestward and terminates in Death Valley. The river carries floodwaters
following cloudbursts or intense storms but is normally dry, except for a few short reaches that
contain water from springs (DOE 1988b).
Two watersheds, Fortymile Canyon and Jackass Flats, have the potential of endangering
offsite public health and safety due to flooding. Regional peak-flood flow equations for the
southern Nevada area indicate that the 100-year peak flow from the Fortymile Canyon drainage
is approximately 13,000 cubic feet (370 cubic meters) per second and 8,200 cubic feet (230 cubic
meters) per second from the Jackass Flats drainage (USAF et al. 1991).
In summary, the potential exists for sheet flow and channelized flow through ephemeral
washes from intense precipitation events to cause localized flooding throughout the NTS;
however, no comprehensive floodplain analysis has been conducted on the NTS to delineate the
100- and 500-year floodplains associated with NTS drainages. No flood studies are known to
have been conducted for the proposed SNF facility in Area 5; a flood assessment was conducted
for the Radioactive Waste Management Site in NTS Area 5 on Frenchman Flat, located
southwest of the proposed SNF Site. This study determined that the southwest corner of the
Radioactive Waste Management Site is located in Federal Emergency Management Agency Zone
AO (100-year flood zone with depths between 1 and 3 feet [0.3 and 0.9 meter]) of the Barren
Wash Alluvial Fan. The remainder of the Radioactive Waste Management Site is located in
Zone X of the Halfpint Alluvial Fan (100-year flood zone with depths less than 1 foot
[0.3 meter]). Areas to the north, south, and east of the Radioactive Waste Management Site are
in Zone X or Zone AO (DOE/NV 1993d). These suggest that the proposed SNF facility area
may encompass areas in Zone X and/or areas in Zone AO associated with the Halfpint Alluvial
Fan. Probable maximum flood analyses are known to have been performed only for areas in the
vicinity of Yucca Mountain to aid in flood protection design for Yucca Mountain facilities
(DOE 1988b).
Underground nuclear testing has resulted in the release of radioactive materials at the land
surface. There is the potential for 100-year floods to transport these contaminants beyond the
boundaries of the NTS. Quantitative estimates of this potential cannot be determined without
additional studies (USAF et al. 1991).
There are no National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the
NTS, as there are no wastewater discharges to onsite or offsite surface water. NTS sanitary
wastewaters are discharged to sewage lagoons or to septic tank/leach field systems. All
wastewater discharges at NTS are conducted in accordance with permits issued by the State of
Nevada (DOE/NV 1993c).
4.8.2 Groundwater
Generally, the hydrogeology at the NTS is characterized by great depths to the groundwater
table and slow velocity of movement of water in the saturated and unsaturated zones
(DOE/NV 1992c). Depth to groundwater varies from about 660 feet (200 meters) beneath
valleys in the southern part of the NTS to more than 1,640 feet (500 meters) beneath Pahute
Mesa. The depth of the water table below Area 5 is approximately 800 feet (244 meters) below
land surface (DOE/NV 1993c). Locally, there are perched water tables at shallow depths
(USAF et al. 1991). Perched aquifers have been reported at depths of 70 feet (21 meters) in
the southwestern part of Frenchman Flat (RSN 1993). In the eastern portions of the NTS, the
water table occurs generally in the alluvium and volcanic rocks above the regional carbonate aquifer
(DOE/NV 1993c).
The NTS lies within the Death Valley Groundwater System, which is a large and diverse
area encompassing southern Nevada and adjacent parts of California composed of many
mountain ranges and topographic basins that are hydraulically connected at depth. In general,
groundwater within the system travels toward Death Valley, although much of it discharges
before reaching it. Groundwater in the Death Valley system does not enter neighboring
groundwater systems (DOE 1986). The Death Valley Groundwater System is divided into several
groundwater subbasins. The boundaries of these subbasins have been estimated from
potentiometric levels, geologic controls of subsurface flow, discharge areas, and inferred flow
paths (DOE 1988b). As shown in Figure 4.8-2, the three groundwater subbasins of the system
beneath the NTS are Ash Meadows, Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch, and Oasis Valley.
Groundwater beneath the eastern part of the NTS is in the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Most of the
western NTS is in the Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch Subbasin. Groundwater beneath the far
northwestern corner of the NTS occurs in the Oasis Valley Subbasin (DOE/NV 1993c, 1992b).
Six major aquifers occur in the area. In decreasing order of age of the geologic units in
which they are found, they are: Cambrian through Devonian lower carbonate aquifer,
Pennsylvanian and Permian upper carbonate aquifer, Tertiary bedded tuff aquifer, Tertiary
welded tuff aquifer, Tertiary lava flow aquifer, and Tertiary and Quaternary valley fill aquifer
(Eckel 1968) (see Figure 4.6-2). The hydrologic and geologic properties of these aquifers vary
(see the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Plan [DOE 1988b] for a thorough description of
the hydraulic properties of the major hydrostratigraphic units based on studies at Yucca
Mountain). For example, the carbonate aquifers and the welded tuff aquifer store and transmit
water chiefly along fractures. In contrast, the valley fill aquifer stores and transmits water chiefly
through interstitial openings. Additionally, in places in the lower carbonate aquifer, groundwater
flow is diverted laterally and vertically because of fault displacements that have juxtaposed the
lower carbonate aquifer against less permeable rocks. Where the flow is blocked, intersection of
the water table with the land surface causes springs (DOE 1986).
Figure 4.8-2. Groundwater hydrologic units, hydrgraphic areas, and well locations of the Nevada Test Site.
The lower carbonate and valley fill (alluvial) aquifers are the main sources of groundwater
in the eastern part of the NTS (DOE 1986). Groundwater withdrawals in the area of the
proposed SNF management facilities are principally from the valley fill aquifer of the Frenchman
Flat hydrographic area (DOE 1988b). The other four units in the area have relatively low
permeabilities that tend to retard the flow of groundwater. These units are called aquitards
(DOE 1986). In decreasing order of age of the geologic units that form them, these aquitards
are: Precambrian through lower Cambrian lower clastic aquitard, Devonian through
Mississippian upper clastic aquitard, Tertiary tuff aquitard, and Tertiary lava flow aquitard
(Eckel 1968) (see Figure 4.6-2).
Figure 4.8-3 is a regional groundwater potentiometric surface map of the NTS
(DOE/NV 1993d). The map does not show perched groundwater. However, perched
groundwater does occur at NTS, principally associated with the aquitards underlying the ridges
(Eckel 1968).
In general, regional groundwater flow is from the north and northeast toward the regional
discharge area near Ash Meadows in the Amargosa Desert (see Figure 4.8-2 and 4.8-3). In the
western portions of the area, the regional flow is from the northwest to the south and southwest
(DRI 1986b). Deep regional movement of groundwater south of the NTS occurs chiefly through
the lower carbonate aquifer. Because of geologic structure, flow paths in the lower carbonate
aquifer are complex and poorly defined. Groundwater from the Ash Meadow Subbasin supplies
the water entering Devil's Hole, which supports the only known population of the Devil's Hole
pupfish, a federally listed endangered species. The decline of the species has been attributed to
low water levels caused by decreasing groundwater levels (ERDA 1977).
Groundwater recharge to the Ash Meadows Subbasin occurs primarily from precipitation
over the mountainous areas in the northern, eastern, and southern portions of the basin
(DOE 1988b). As mentioned above, this recharge generally travels vertically through the vadose
zone (unsaturated zone) and the overlying aquifers to the underlying carbonate aquifers.
Specifically, in the eastern half of the NTS, groundwater flows toward the major valleys before
deflecting downward to join the regional flow in the carbonate aquifers. Beneath Yucca and
Frenchman flats, vertical flow through the underlying volcanic rocks is impeded by bedded and
Figure 4.8-3. NTS regional potentiometric surface map. zeolitized tuffs, resulting in a downward flow rate of less than 0.2 foot (0.06 meter) per year.
Vertical flow in the uppermost portions of the vadose zone in the area of Frenchman Flat is
generally upward toward the surface, due to an evapotranspiration rate which is 15 times higher
than precipitation (DOE/OFE 1994). Site characterization data for Area 5 indicate that the
vertical flow direction in the vadose zone is upward from 0 to 250 feet (0 to 75 meters) below
land surface. In the next interval (250 to 600 feet [75 to 180 meters]), a downward flow rate of
10 feet/1,000 years (3 meters/1,000 years) has been calculated. At a depth of 600 to 800 feet
(180 to 250 meters), a zone of equilibrium (a zone of no vertical movement) is present above the
water table (Johnejack et al. 1994).
Analyses have also been conducted in order to determine the travel time of water from the
vicinity of Area 5 and Frenchman Flat to the regional water table. Modeling studies for the
Radioactive Waste Management Site at Area 5 indicate that the travel time from the surface to
the water table is on the order of thousands of years (DOE/NV 1993c). Specifically, the travel
time from Area 5 to the regional water table is estimated to range from 19,000 to more than
113,000 years (USAF et al. 1991). The Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Plan (DOE 1988b)
describes in detail the hydraulic properties of the various units comprising the unsaturated zone,
based on studies at Yucca Mountain.
Three types of groundwater chemistry exist at the NTS and in its vicinity: (1) sodium and
potassium bicarbonate, which generally occurs in the tuff and valley fill aquifers composed chiefly
of tuff detritus; (2) calcium and magnesium bicarbonate, which generally occurs in the carbonate
and the valley fill aquifers composed chiefly of carbonate detritus; and (3) mixed, which is
defined as having the chemical characteristics of both type 1 and type 2 (DOE 1986).
The hydrogeologic units which supply potable water to the NTS have been classified as
Class IIA (currently a source of drinking water) and IIB (potentially a source of drinking water)
in accordance with the EPA's guidelines for groundwater classification (DOE/NV 1993d). No
aquifers at the NTS have been designated as sole source aquifers.
In general, the quality of NTS groundwater is suitable for most purposes and generally
meets EPA secondary standards for major cations and anions and the primary standards for
deleterious constituents. Specifically, groundwater in the Ash Meadows Subbasin has a total
dissolved solids concentration ranging between 275 and 450 milligrams per liter (mg/L)
(DOE/NV 1993a). Summary groundwater quality data for the period 1957 to 1990 for Well 5b,
5c, Well UE5c, and Army Well 1 which serve Area 5 reveal a pH range of 7.6 to 8.7; calcium
(2.4 to 44.0 mg/L); sodium (38.1 to 129.0 mg/L); chloride (9.1 to 23.2 mg/L); sulfate (26 to 58
mg/L); and silica (0 to 55.1 mg/L) (DRI 1993).
Contamination by radionuclides occurs below the water table as well as in the unsaturated
zone above it. This contamination is a result of underground nuclear testing. A preliminary
environmental survey of the NTS also identified a number of potential sources of groundwater
contamination. These included wastewater discharges, hazardous- or mixed-waste discharges,
solid waste landfills and trenches receiving potentially hazardous waste, and over 50 inactive
waste spill or release sites (USAF et al. 1991).
Underground nuclear testing has primarily occurred in the areas of Yucca Flat, Frenchman
Flat, Pahute Mesa, Rainier Mesa, and Shoshone Mountain. Nuclear detonations at or near the
water table have resulted in groundwater contamination. The principal confirmed or suspected
contaminants from these tests include various radionuclides (primarily tritium) and heavy metals.
A number of NTS waste disposal and testing facilities, including injection wells, leach fields, and
various waste storage facilities or disposal sites, have caused contamination of the vadose zone.
Contaminants of concern include radionuclides, organic compounds, heavy metals (primarily
lead), and hydrocarbons as well as various residues from plastics, drilling muds, and epoxy
(DOE/NV 1993e). Figure 4.8-4 depicts the areas with known or suspected groundwater and/or
vadose zone contamination. Groundwater contamination characterization activities are in
progress at NTS; at present, no contaminant plume maps are available, and available
groundwater quality data are not useful for the purposes of site-wide characterization or for
comparison with established criteria.
Groundwater contamination could be transported toward the NTS boundary by one of the
regional groundwater flow systems. Groundwater flow velocities in these systems range between
6 and 600 feet (1.8 and 183 meters) per year. Because of sorption, however, most nuclides
(other than tritium) would move at a much slower rate. The groundwater travel time from the
Figure 4.8-4. Areas of potential groundwater contamination at the NTS. NTS to the Ash Meadows Discharge Area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin Flow System is
approximately 300 years. Radioactive decay during this time, coupled with dilution and sorption,
should reduce radioactivity concentrations to well below regulatory limits (USAF et al. 1991).
Thus, there are no effects on public health and safety, nor are any expected in the foreseeable
future.
The NTS derives its complete water supply from the groundwater aquifers underlying the
site. Water supply has been developed and is managed on the basis of five service areas that
support the different NTS operating areas. Given the wastewater disposal practices on the NTS
and the depth to the groundwater system, it is reasonable to assume that all of the water pumped
on the NTS is consumed (USAF et al. 1991). Recent annual water use at the NTS has declined
substantially from the 1980's. In 1989, NTS annual water withdrawal was 1.117 billion gallons
(4.22 million cubic meters) (Leppert 1993). In 1992, NTS annual water withdrawal was 0.595
billion gallons (2.25 million cubic meters) (Leppert 1993).
In 1993, 14 wells were utilized for the NTS water supply (DOE/NV 1994c). A small portion
of the NTS receives its water from 5 onsite wells drilled in the Alkali Flat-Furnace Creek Ranch
Subbasin (DOE 1988b). Most of the NTS receives its water from 9 onsite wells drilled in the
Ash Meadows Subbasin, which encompasses Area 5 (DOE/NV 1994c). These 9 wells have a
combined production capacity of 1,813 billion gallons per year (6.86 million cubic meters per
year) (DOE/NV 1993a).
Area 5, which encompasses the proposed SNF facility site, is located within NTS water
service area C. Wells 5b, 5c, and UE5c serve the fire protection, construction, and potable water
needs of Area 5 facilities (DOE/NV 1993b). Wells 5b and 5c are completed in alluvial materials
(valley fill aquifer) with total completion depths of 900 and 1,200 feet (274 and 366 meters)
below land surface, respectively. Well UE5c is completed in volcanic rock (exact aquifer
unknown) with a total depth of 2,682 feet (817 meters) below land surface (DOE 1988b;
DOE/NV 1993b; DRI 1993).
Groundwater for construction and operation of the SNF management facilities would likely
be drawn from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Much of
the land within the Ash Meadows Subbasin is under Federal jurisdiction and has been withdrawn
from the public domain (DOE 1988b). Little of the total groundwater of the subbasin is
privately appropriated or used.
The perennial yield of the Ash Meadows Subbasin greatly exceeds water withdrawals by
DOE and all other users. For more than thirty years water withdrawals from the Frenchman
Flat hydrographic area had exceeded the estimated precipitation recharge for that area
(DOE 1988b). This study also indicates that withdrawals have caused no decline in the static
water level (DOE 1988b). However, it should be noted that numerous conditions on the NTS
preclude the accurate measurement of static water levels (Winograd 1970). Because of
hydrogeologic complexities, regional groundwater flow at the NTS is not constrained by the
hydrographic basins which are defined by local topography (USAF et al. 1991). Therefore any
potential groundwater overdrafts in the Frenchman Flat basin indicated by previous yield
estimates are likely made up by untapped groundwater from neighboring hydrographic basins.
Water in southern Nevada (excluding the Las Vegas area) is used chiefly for irrigation and
to a lesser extent for livestock, municipal needs, and domestic supplies. Almost all the required
water is pumped from the ground, although some springs supply water to establishments in
Death Valley and other areas south of the NTS. Springs in Oasis Valley near Beatty, Nevada are
a significant source of water for public and domestic needs and for irrigation (DOE 1986). The
City of Las Vegas obtains approximately 80 percent of its water from the Colorado River; the
remaining 20 percent is withdrawn from groundwater sources. There are no plans to change the
water supply sources in the near future. (Las Vegas Valley Water District 1994).
The principal water users in the area closest to the NTS are in the Amargosa Desert in and
around the Town of Amargosa Valley and in the Pahrump Valley. Aquifers in the Pahrump
Valley could support up to about 16,900 residents with no decline in usable storage, although
local effects, such as land subsidence and well interference, could result from sustained
development. The mining industry in southern Nevada also uses a small amount of water for
processing. Water for this purpose is supplied from nearby shallow wells or trucked in from
nearby towns. Many of the mines currently recycle process water, which reduces their water
demand (DOE 1986).
The volume of groundwater underlying the NTS (as well as the estimated volume of
contaminated groundwater) that has been removed from direct access to the general public is
rather large. The impaired groundwater will likely remain unusable for an extended period. The
significance of the loss of access to the NTS groundwater is diminished by the fact that even if
access were provided, the water underlying portions of the NTS might not be usable for domestic
purposes (USAF et al. 1991).
4.9 Ecological Resources
NTS lies within the transition area between the Mojave Desert and the Great Basin. As a
result, flora and fauna characteristics of both occur on the NTS. The NTS covers about 3,500
square kilometers (1,350 square miles) of which only 0.55 percent is developed (DOE/NV 1988).
NTS has completed numerous studies on the effects of nuclear testing on the ecology of the
area, and an extensive bibliography of these studies has been prepared (ERDA 1976). In
summary, studies (including ongoing surveys) have shown that there may be a correlation
between radioactive testing and the decline of vegetation present in an area. As a result, animals
may not have the necessary vegetation for food and cover, thus changing the fauna diversity in
those areas (USAF et al. 1991).
The following section describes the ecological resources at the NTS, including terrestrial
resources, wetlands, aquatic ecology, and threatened and endangered species. Information is also
presented on special status species other than threatened and endangered species such as
Federal Candidate and state-listed species.
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources
Plant communities on the NTS have been classified according to the dominant shrub.
Approximately 700 taxa, representing about 70 families, have been identified on the NTS
(ERDA 1976; DOE/NV 1993b, 1991b). Figure 4.9-1 presents the general plant communities
identified there.
Figure 4.9-1. Plant communites on Nevada Test Site. The Mojave Desert is located at elevations ranging up to 1,219 and 1,524 meters (4,000 and
5,000 feet). The dominant plant community is creosote bush (Larrea tridentata). Areas in which
this community occurs are located within much of the southern portion of the NTS, including
Jackass Flats and Frenchman Flat (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b; ERDA 1976; FWS 1992).
The transitional zone between the Mojave Desert and the Great Basin occurs at elevations
between 1,219 and 1,524 meters (4,000 and 5,000 feet). The dominant plant communities
associated with the transition zone are: blackbrush (Coleogyne ramosissma), desert thorn (Lycium
pallidum), and hopsage (Grayia spinosa). In general, these communities are found in upper
bajadas and in closed basins within Jackass Flats and Yucca Flat (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b;
ERDA 1976).
The Great Basin is located within the northern two-thirds of NTS at elevations above 1,524
meters (5,000 feet). The dominant plant communities are big sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata)
and black sagebrush (Artemisia nova), saltbush (Atriplex canescens), and desert thorn (Lycium
shockleyi). In areas with elevations above 1,830 meters (6,000 feet), collectively labeled as
mountains, hills, and mesas, the dominant plant communities are singleleaf pinyon (Pinus
monophylla) and Utah juniper (Juniperus osteosperma). In general, these communities are found
at Thirsty Canyon, Yucca Playa, Rainier Mesa, and Yucca Mountain (DOE/NV 1991b, 1986b;
ERDA 1976).
There is a recent trend of nonnative plant species establishing themselves in areas of
disturbance at the NTS. Cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum), an annual grass, occurs at elevations
above 1,524 meters (5,000 feet). Downey chess (Bromus rubens), another annual grass, is
becoming established in the mid-elevations. Russian thistle (Salsola iberica and S. paulsennii)
appears in areas where the native vegetation has been removed and the soil composition has
changed (DOE/NV 1991b, 1988; ERDA 1976).
Like vegetation, animals on the NTS are representative of both the Mojave Desert and the
Great Basin and the associated transition zone. There are over 30 species of reptiles and
amphibians, 190 species of birds, and 50 species of mammals on the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b;
ERDA 1976). Many animals utilize man-made reservoirs and natural springs and seeps on the
NTS. Sewage ponds have also become an important resource for wildlife.
Reptiles and amphibians on the NTS include 1 species of desert tortoise, 14 species of
lizards, and 17 species of snakes. In addition, the NTS is within the range of the Great Basin
spadefoot toad (Scaphiopus intermontanus), but this amphibian has not been identified on the
NTS (DOE/NV 1993b; ERDA 1976; Medica 1990).
Birds on the NTS are often migratory and seasonal residents. The most widely distributed
species include the black-throated sparrow (Amphispiza bilineata), house finch (Carpodacus
mexicanus), red-tailed hawk (Buteo jamaicensis), common raven (Corvus corax), loggerhead shrike
(Lanius ludovicianus), mockingbird (Mimus polyglottos), ash-throated flycatcher (Myiarchus
cinerascens), and mourning dove (Zenaida macroura) (DOE/NV 1993b; ERDA 1976;
Greger 1991).
The most abundant group of mammals on the NTS are rodents. Carnivores include coyote
(Canis latrans), kit fox (Vulpes macrotis), badger (Taxidea taxus), bobcat (Lynx rufus), mountain
lion (Felis concolor), and long-tailed weasel (Mustella frenata). Large mammals on NTS include
the mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus), pronghorn (Antilocapra americana), desert big horn sheep
(Ovis canadensis), and wild horse (Equus caballus). Hunting, grazing, and fishing are not allowed
on the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b, 1986b; ERDA 1976; Medica and Saethre 1990).
In general, the portion of Frenchman Flat in Area 5 (i.e., north and east of Mercury
Highway) within which the proposed SNF facility would be located is within the creosote bush
community. This plant community is characteristic of the Mojave Desert. Pre-activity surveys
completed for the Radioactive Waste Management Site, which is in the general area of the
proposed SNF facility, found the dominant vegetation to include creosote bush, spiny hopsage,
white bursage, desert thorn, and Nevada joint-fir (Ephreda nevadensis) (EG&G 1993, 1991,
1990, 1989).
The distribution of animals within the portion of Area 5 being considered for the proposed
SNF facility is not as well documented as for the rest of the NTS. However, species identified
within 5 kilometers (3.1 miles) of the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility include 8
reptiles, 17 bird species, and 14 mammals (Hunter et al. 1991). The Liquified Gaseous Fuels
Spill Test Facility is located within similar habitat approximately 7.6 kilometers (5 miles) south
of the proposed facility. There are no water sources located within the portion of Area 5 being
considered for the proposed SNF facility.
4.9.2 Wetlands
There are several natural springs on the NTS that feed flowing streams (Greger and
Romney nda). Some of these extend for 91 meters (300 feet) before infiltration and evaporation
cause them to dry up. Vegetation along these channels consists of willow (Salix sp.) and tamarisk
(Tamarix sp.). Reservoirs on the site which are fed by groundwater from wells have developed
wetland vegetation such as tamarisk, cattail (Typha sp.), and bulrushes (Scirpus sp.)
(Elle 1992). A wetland delineation, as defined by the 1987 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
wetlands Delineation Manual (U.S. COE 1987), has not been performed for any of these areas
(DOE/NV 1993b; Elle 1992), and National Wetlands Inventory maps are not available for the
NTS.
The portion of Area 5 under consideration for the SNF facility does not have any known
springs, seeps, or wetland vegetation (DOE/NV 1993b; Greger and Romney nda).
4.9.3 Aquatic Resources
Potential aquatic habitat on the NTS includes surface drainages, playas, man-made
reservoirs, and springs. Permanent surface water sources are limited to a few small springs.
There are two dry lake beds (playas) located in the eastern (Yucca Flat) and southeastern
(Frenchman Flat) portions of the NTS. Runoff from the eastern half of the NTS flows through
surface drainages to onsite playas and can collect for a few days to a few months. The remaining
areas of the NTS drain offsite via arroyos and dry stream beds that carry water only during
intense or persistent rainstorms. These surface drainages and playas are unable to support
permanent fish populations (ERDA 1976; Greger and Romney nda).
Reservoirs resulting from discharge of well water located on the NTS support three
introduced species of fish: bluegill (Lepomis macrochirus), goldfish (Carassius auratus), and
golden shiner (Notemigonus crysoleucas). Springs located throughout the site do not support fish
populations (Elle 1992). There are no springs, seeps, or other permanent water bodies on the
proposed SNF Site; however Cane Spring is located in Area 5, southwest of the proposed SNF
Site (Greger and Romney nda).
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species
Table 4.9-1 presents a list of federally and state-listed species that may be found in the
vicinity of NTS.
There are no known plants which have been listed as threatened or endangered under the
Endangered Species Act (16 USC 1531-1534) on NTS. However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service has identified candidate species for listing, 11 of which may occur on or in the vicinity of
the NTS. Ten of these are Candidate Category 2 species, meaning that information indicates
that they may be appropriate for listing as endangered or threatened but more information is
needed. One species, the Beatley milk-vetch, is a Candidate Category 1 species
(DOE/NV 1993b, 1991c; EG&G 1993; USAF et al. 1991). This species has been identified on
Pahute Mesa (Hunter et al. 1988). A Candidate Category 1 species is one for which there is
substantial information indicating that it is appropriate for listing as endangered or threatened
Four Candidate Category 2 species (camissona, black wooly-pod, cymopterus, and Beatley
phacelia) have been identified in Frenchman Flat, although none of these was identified during
surveys conducted near the proposed SNF facility site (EG&G 1993; Tetratech 1993).
Two listed reptile species on or in the vicinity of NTS are of concern. The chuckwalla is a
Federal Candidate Category 2 species which may occur on NTS. The desert tortoise is the only
federally listed threatened species known to occur on NTS (DOE/NV 1993b; EG&G 1993). Both
the desert tortoise and the chuckwalla are listed as reptile species of Frenchman Flat
(DOE/NV 1986b).
Table 4.9-1. Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special status species
that may be found in the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site.
Statusb
Common name Scientific name Fed. State
Plants
Amargosa penstemon Penstemon fruticiformis ssp. amargosae C2 NL
Beardtonguec Penstemon pahutensis C2 NL
Beatley milkvetchc Astragalus beatleyae C1 CE
Beatley phaceliac Phacelia beatleyae C2 NL
Black wooly-podc Astragalus funerus C2 NL
Camissoniac Camissonia megalantha C2 NL
Cymopterusc Cymopterus ripleyi var. saniculoides C2 NL
Green-gentianc Frasera pahutensis C2 NL
Kingston bedstrawc Galium hilendiae ssp. kingstonense C2 NL
Mojave fishook cactusc Sclerocactus polyancistrus NL CY
White bear desert-poppyc Arctomecon merriamii C2 NL
Birds
Bald eagled Haliaeetus leucoephalus E E
Golden eaglec Aquila chrysaetos NL P
Ferruginous hawkc Buteo regalis C2 NL
Loggerhead shrikec Lanius ludovicianus C2 NL
Mountain ploverc Charadrius montanus C2 NL
Peregrine falcond,e Falco peregrinus E E
Western least bittern Ixobrychus exilis hesperis C2 NL
Western snowy ploverc Charadrius alexandrinus nivosus C2 NL
White-faced ibisc Plegadis chihi C2 NL
Reptiles
Chuckwalla Sauromalus obesus C2 NL
Desert tortoisec Gopherus agassizit T T
Mammals
Spotted bat Euderma maculatum C2 NL
Pygmy rabbit Branchylqus idahoensis C2 NL
Fish
Devils Hole pupfishd,f Cyprinodon diabolis E E
a. Sources: CFR (1993c,d); ERDA (1976); EG&G (1993); DOE/NV (1986b); FR (1991, 1990b); FWS (1993);
Hunter et al. (1988); NV DCNR (1992); Tetratech (1993).
b. Status codes:
C1 Federal candidate - Category 1 (probably appropriate to list)
C2 Federal candidate - Category 2 (possibly appropriate to list more study required)
CE State critically endangered by authority of NRS 527.270 (State Division of Forestry)
CY State protected by authority of NRS 527.60-.120 under the Nevada Cacti and Yucca Law
E Endangered
NL Not listed
T Threatened
P State protected by NAC 503.050
c. Species recorded on the NTS.
d. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Recovery Plan exists for this species.
e. Peregrine falcon seen on the NTS; however not identified to subspecies level.
f. Only known location of this species is outside the NTS 24 miles (39 km) southwest of Mercury. This species is
included here due to potential offsite groundwater impacts.
Note: Nevada Department of Wildlife utilizes the Federal threatened and endangered species list.
The distribution and abundance of the desert tortoise have been extensively researched; the
latest research for the NTS as a whole was completed in 1991 (DOE/NV 1991c). A biological
opinion from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was completed in 1992 for NTS activities
planned for 1992 through 1995 (FWS 1992). The desert tortoise is known to exist in the
southern portion of the NTS, but its abundance on the NTS is considered to be very low to low
(DOE/NV 1991c). The northern extent of its range is from Massachusetts Mountain through
Control Point Hills and Mid Valley to Topopah Valley and west to the NTS boundary
(DOE/NV 1991c).
Two bird species which could occur on or within the vicinity of NTS are federally listed
endangered species. These are the American peregrine falcon and the bald eagle. The
American peregrine falcon has been sighted on the NTS in the past but not recently
(DOE/NV 1991c; ERDA 1976). Bald eagles may also occur on the NTS, but sightings have not
been reported in recent literature (DOE/NV 1986b; EG&G 1993; ERDA 1976;
Hunter et al. 1991). Six other bird species, all of which are Federal Candidate Category 2
species, are known to occur on or within the vicinity of NTS (DOE/NV 1991c; EG&G 1993).
Recent surveys of Area 5 (which contains the proposed SNF Site) have not identified any of
these species (DOE/NV 1986b; EG&G 1993, 1991, 1990, 1989). However, birds listed as
common to Frenchman Flat include the golden eagle and loggerhead shrike (DOE/NV 1986b;
Tetratech 1993).
There are two Federal Candidate Category 2 mammal species identified as potentially
occurring in the vicinity of the NTS. Neither the spotted bat nor the pygmy rabbit has been
observed during recent pre-activity surveys for the area (EG&G 1993; USAF 1993). They are
also not listed as mammals occurring in Frenchman Flat (DOE/NV 1986b; Tetratech 1993).
There are no known fish species indigenous to the NTS. However, it is important to note
that the only known location of the Devils Hole pupfish, a federally listed endangered species, is
approximately 39 kilometers (24 miles) southwest of the NTS. The decline of this species has
been attributed to low water levels caused by decreasing groundwater levels (ERDA 1977;
USAF et al. 1991).
Pre-activity surveys for threatened and endangered species have recently been completed
for the Radioactive Waste Management Site located in Area 5 near the proposed SNF facility.
The primary purpose of these surveys was to identify live tortoise, scat, burrows, and remains.
Although these surveys have found few tortoise or their sign, each new activity on NTS must
undergo pre-activity surveys for the desert tortoise (DOE/NV 1991c; EG&G 1993, 1991). In
addition, these surveys look for other listed species. Recent surveys have not identified any other
listed or candidate species in the portion of Area 5 surrounding the Radioactive Waste
Management Site, which is near the proposed SNF Site (EG&G 1993, 1991).
4.10 Noise
The major noise sources at the NTS occur primarily in developed operational areas and
include various facilities, equipment and machines (e.g., cooling towers, transformers, engines,
pumps, boilers, steam vents, paging systems, construction and materials-handling equipment, and
vehicles), aircraft operations, and testing. No NTS environmental noise survey data are available.
At the NTS boundary, away from most facilities, noise from most sources is barely distinguishable
from background noise levels. Some disturbance of wildlife activities might occur within the NTS
as a result of operational activities and construction activities.
Existing NTS-related noise sources of importance to the public are those from
transportation of people and materials to and from the NTS. These sources include trucks,
buses, private vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes. In addition, some air cargo and business travel
via commercial air transport through the McCarren International Airport in Las Vegas can be
attributed to the NTS operations.
The State of Nevada and Nye County have not established any regulations that specify
acceptable community noise levels with the exception of prohibitions on nuisance noise.
During a normal week, about 3,300 employees travel to the NTS each day. Most employees
commute using the contracted bus service and a small portion commute in government or private
vehicles. Both government-owned and private trucks pick up and deliver materials at the site.
Most of the private vehicles, buses, and trucks travel to and from the site each day using U.S.
Route 95. The contribution of the NTS operations to traffic volumes along U.S. Route 95,
especially during peak traffic periods, affects noise levels at residences along this route.
4.11 Traffic and Transportation
Traffic congestion is measured by level of service. Level of Service A represents free flow
of traffic. Level of Service B is in the range of stable flow, but the presence of other users in the
traffic stream begins to be noticeable. Level of Service C is in the range of stable flow, but
marks the beginning of the range of flow in which the operation of individual users becomes
significantly affected by interactions with others in the traffic stream. Level of Service D
represents high-density but stable flow. Level of Service E represents operating conditions at or
near the capacity level. Level of Service F is used to define forced or breakdown of flow of
traffic. The calculated Level of Service are for discrete locations along a segment. Level of
Service will most likely be worse in urban areas and better in rural areas along with the segment.
The Region of Influence for the following analysis includes site roads and regional roads in
Nye and Clark counties.
Vehicular access to the NTS is provided by U.S. Route 95 to the south, with off-road access
to the northeast provided via Nevada State Route 375. Baseline traffic along segments providing
access to the NTS contributes to differing service level conditions. Nevada State Route 375 and
U.S. Route 95 are projected to remain at Level of Service A. No major improvements are
presently scheduled for those segments providing immediate access to the NTS (NDOT 1992).
Regional roads and local roads providing access to NTS are presented in Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2,
respectively.
Future background traffic (defined as all future traffic not attributable to the proposed SNF
facilities) is projected to contribute to differing service-level conditions for local roads in 2001.
The year 2001 was selected for analysis because that is when the impacts from the proposed SNF
facilities would be highest. All local and regional roads are projected to operate at Level of
Service A.
The Level of Service was calculated using average daily traffic counts (NDOT 1992) and
standard parameters (ITE 1991; Rand McNally 1993; TRB 1985).
The public transit serves the heavily populated regions of Clark County. Contract buses run
to the NTS. There is no public transportation system serving the NTS; however, approximately
70 buses a day transport employees to and from the site. The nearest major railroad is the
Union Pacific, located approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the NTS. A 9-mile
(15-kilometer) standard-gauge railroad serves Area 25 of the NTS but does not connect with the
Union Pacific (ERDA 1977). No navigable waterways within the Region of Influence are
capable of accommodating waterborne transportation of material shipments to the NTS.
McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas provides jet air passenger and cargo service
from both national and local carriers. It is outside the Region of Influence. Smaller private
airports are located throughout the Region of Influence. Desert Rock Airstrip, the onsite
airport, is located near Mercury.
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
Health impacts to the public from activities on the NTS are minimal as a result of
administrative and design controls to minimize releases of pollutants to the environment and to
achieve compliance with permit requirements, e.g., air emissions and National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit requirements. The effectiveness of these controls is
verified through the use of monitoring and inspections. Health impacts to the public may occur
during normal operations at the NTS via inhalation of air containing radioactive and chemical
pollutants released to the atmosphere, immersion in this air, and ingestion of food contaminated
by these pollutants. Risks to public health from other possible pathways such as exposure to
contaminated soil are low relative to these pathways.
Health impacts to NTS workers during normal operations may include those from inhalation
of the workplace atmosphere, consumption of potable water, direct exposure, and possible other
contact with hazardous materials associated with work assignments. The potential for health
impacts varies from facility to facility and from worker to worker, and available information is not
sufficient to allow a meaningful estimation and summation of these impacts. However, workers
are protected from hazards specific to the workplace through appropriate training, protective
equipment, monitoring, and management controls. NTS workers are also protected by
occupational standards that limit atmospheric and drinking water concentrations of potentially
hazardous chemicals and that also limit radiation exposure. Monitoring ensures that these
standards are not exceeded. Additionally, DOE requirements (DOE Order 3790.1B) ensure that
conditions in the workplace are as free as possible from recognized hazards that cause or are
likely to cause illness or physical harm. Therefore, worker health conditions at the NTS are
expected to be substantially better than required by standards.
Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. This risk is in
the ratio of the health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure). The value of this
estimator for exposures to the public is 5.0 x 10-4 for fatal cancers. The corresponding estimator
for exposures to workers is 4.0 x 10-4.
The DOE Nevada Field Office published a Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention
Awareness Plan in June 1991 to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed, and
radioactive wastes generated at DOE/NV facilities. The plan is designed to reduce the possible
pollutant releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of employees and the
public. All DOE/NV contractors and NTS users that exceed the EPA criteria for small-quantity
generators are establishing their own waste minimization and pollution prevention awareness
programs that are implemented by the DOE/NV plan. Contractor programs ensure that waste
minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, state, and local environmental laws and
regulations, and DOE Orders (DOE/NV 1993c).
Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of
a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes generated, and
implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste minimization
concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, and in upgrades
of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representatives from each
contractor and NTS user has been established to coordinate DOE/NV waste minimization and
pollution awareness activities (DOE/NV 1993c).
4.12.1 Doses
4.12.1.1 Radiological Doses. Every individual is affected by natural and other
background radiation. The major sources of background radiation exposure to individuals in the
vicinity of the NTS are shown in Figure 4.7-2. All annual doses to individuals from background
radiation are expected to remain constant over time.
Releases of radionuclides to the environment from NTS operations provide another source
of radiation exposure to people in the vicinity of the NTS. Table 4.7-2 summarizes the airborne
radionuclides and quantities released in curies during baseline NTS operations. The annual
committed doses to the public resulting from these release are given in Table 4.7-4. Compared
to those from natural background radiation, these doses are very small. The doses are all less
than 1 percent of the most restrictive standard given in DOE Order 5400.5.
Workers at the NTS receive the same dose as the general population from background
radiation but also receive an additional dose from working in the facilities. The doses to the
average and maximally exposed workers due to operation in 1991 (assumed representative of
1995 operations), were approximately 5 and 500 millirem, respectively; the total dose to all
workers was about 4 person-rem (DOE/NV 1992c). The maximum dose is well within the limit
of 5,000 millirem per year specified in DOE Order 5480.11 and in 10 CFR 835.
4.12.1.2 Nonradiological Doses. Every individual is also affected by background
concentration of nonradiological pollutants. The maximum background concentrations for those
criteria pollutants which have been measured is provided in Table 4.7-5. The maximum existing
DOE site contribution concentration was then computed, as discussed in Section 4.7.
4.12.2 Health Effects
4.12.2.1 Radiological. The fatal cancer risk to the maximally exposed member of the
public due to the radiological emissions from NTS baseline operations in 1995 would be
5.5 x 10-9. The same risk estimator projects 2.6 x 10-6 excess fatal cancer to the population within
80 kilometers (50 miles) of the NTS. These values would be approximately 2.2 x 10-7 and
1 x 10-4, respectively, during the 40 years of SNF facility operations.
Because of the different age distribution of a working population, the health risk estimators
for workers are somewhat lower than for members of the general public. As a result of 1995
baseline operations at the NTS, these estimators predict a fatal cancer risk of 2.0 x 10-4 to the
maximally exposed worker, and 1.6 x 10-3 excess fatal cancer among all workers. The risk faced
by an average worker would be 2.0 x 10-6. Over the 40-year operating life of the proposed SNF
facility, and assuming a particular worker during this time, these values would be 8.0 x 10-3,
6.4 x 10-2, and 8.0 x 10-5, respectively.
4.12.2.2 Nonradiological. As discussed in Section 4.7, the maximum existing DOE site
contribution of criteria nonradiological air pollutants were computed. In Table 4.7-5 the total
existing maximum concentration (which adds the maximum existing DOE site contribution to the
maximum background concentration) is presented. The total existing maximum concentration
values represent the highest concentrations to which members of the public would be exposed.
In every case where information was available, the highest concentration was less than the
applicable health-based standard.
4.12.2.3 Health Effects Studies. The epidemiologic studies concerning the NTS have
concentrated on the health effects in soldiers and children associated with nuclear testing rather
than on plant emissions (Beck and Krey 1983; Bross and Bross 1987; Caldwell et al. 1980;
Lyon et al. 1979; Rallison et al. 1990; and others). The results regarding the observed leukemia
incidence and deaths in exposed children are contradictory, with some studies reporting an
excess and others reporting no excess. The validity of the analytical methods used in
some of these studies are subject to various opinions. For soldiers, the results regarding
leukemia and polycythemia vera differed between two studies relating to nuclear test explosions,
but reanalyses showed leukemia, respiratory, and other cancers to be associated only with
exposure to higher doses, e.g., more than 300 millirem for leukemia cases.
In March 1990, the Secretary of Energy announced that DOE would turn over responsibility
for analytical epidemiologic research on long-term health effects on workers at DOE facilities
and surrounding communities to the Department of Health and Human Services and directed
that worker health and exposure data be released. A Memorandum of Agreement with the
Department of Health and Human Services was signed in January 1991. The Department of
Health and Human Services is now conducting the ongoing health effects research program. To
develop a data base on workers, DOE has initiated an Epidemiologic Surveillance Program and a
Health-Related Records Inventory.
4.13 Utilities and Energy
4.13.1 Water Consumption
There are 14 active wells which supply water to the NTS. Figure 4.8-2 in Section 4.8 shows
the location of these wells. These 14 wells combined had a capacity of 387 liters per second
(6,139 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). From 1988 to 1993, water use at the NTS
varied from a high of 134 liters per second (2,125 gallons per minute) in 1989 to a low of
60 liters per second (949 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1994c; Leppert 1993). Water
usage projections to 1995 are unavailable; however, significant changes in the water consumption
level are not anticipated.
There are also a number of deactivated wells located on the NTS. These wells could add
additional water supply capacity if they were reactivated (Leppert 1993). It has been estimated
that the activation of these wells could increase the available water supply by 85 liters per second
(1,342 gallons per minute). Other methods to increase production of water could include
increasing pump sizes or installing new wells (DOE/NV 1993a).
The proposed SNF site would be located in Area 5. There are four wells located in Area 5,
two of which supply potable water. These two wells have a capacity of 38 liters per second
(595 gallons per minute) (DOE/NV 1994c; 1993b). A third well in the area is currently being
used to supply water for construction activities. The fourth well has been deactivated
(DOE/NV 1993b). In 1993, Area 5 used approximately 12 liters per second (191 gallons per
minute) of water, including the well used for construction purposes. Water usage for Area 5 is
not expected to change substantially from 1993 to 1995 (DOE/NV 1994c; Leppert 1994).
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption
The NTS obtains electrical power from the Nevada Power Company and Valley Electric
Association. Each company provides an independent 138 kilovolt transmission line to the site.
The capacity of these transmission lines, with scheduled upgrades, is approximately 40 to 45
megavolt-amperes. The local utilities' 138 kilovolt transmission grids have adequate capacity
within a 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the NTS to serve an additional 75 megavolt-amperes of
load. In addition, the local utilities' proposed expansion of their existing 230 kilovolt transmission
systems would make capacity in excess of 200 megavolt-amperes available within an 80-kilometer
(50-mile) radius (DOE/NV 1993a).
From 1989 to 1993, the annual consumption of electricity ranged from a high of 183,118
megawatt hours in 1989 to a low of 144,521.5 megawatt hours in 1993. The peak demand varied
from a high of 38.4 megavolt-amperes in 1989 to a low of 30.9 megavolt-amperes in 1993
(Leppert 1993; Thornton 1994). In 1995, the annual consumption of electricity is projected to be
176,440 megawatt hours, with a peak demand of 39.5 megavolt-amperes. The institution of
energy management practices can regulate the peak demands of various NTS activities so that
the maximum peak capacity is not exceeded. The predicted increase in overall electricity usage
for 1995 is attributable to the increased requirements for the Yucca Mountain Site
Characterization Project; the usage for the rest of the NTS is predicted to continue its downward
trend (Thornton 1994).
The Frenchman Flat Substation, located in Area 5, has a capacity of 12.5 megavolt-amperes
(Thornton 1994). A 34.5 kilovolt line from this substation feeds the loads at Area 6, Well C, the
Tweezer facility, and the east side of the test areas used by LANL (DOE/NV 1993b). In 1993,
the peak demand on the substation was 5.2 megavolt-amperes. This demand is not anticipated to
change substantially from 1993 to 1995 (Thorton 1994).
4.13.3 Fuel Consumption
The majority of the energy used at the NTS is provided by electricity, but diesel fuel and
fuel oil are used to provide heat in some facilities and backup power.
4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal
Currently, there are no wastewater disposal facilities in Area 5. Septic systems are used in
parts of the NTS for sanitary wastewater disposal. These septic systems discharge to
percolation/evaporation stabilization ponds. These ponds, however, are only used for the
disposal of wastewater not generated by any manufacturing processes.
4.14 Materials and Waste Management
The operations conducted at the NTS have resulted in generation of low-level radioactive
waste, hazardous waste, mixed waste (radioactive and hazardous combined), and sanitary waste
(nonhazardous, nonradioactive solid waste). In addition, the NTS stores mixed transuranic waste
received from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This section discusses the treatment,
storage, and disposal of waste at the NTS.
DOE currently operates two disposal facilities in Areas 3 and 5 at the NTS for low-level
radioactive waste generated by DOE defense facilities. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste
Management Site also serves as a interim storage area for LLNL transuranic wastes which will be
shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for final disposal. The Area 5 facility
also accepts mixed waste, which contains both low-level radioactive waste and hazardous waste
only if the waste was generated on the NTS.
All hazardous wastes generated at the NTS are disposed of offsite at commercial facilities
approved and permitted by the EPA. Hazardous wastes are temporarily stored at the NTS in
full compliance with Federal, state, and local requirements.
Mixed waste disposal facilities are presently operating under interim status, pending
completion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process.
Operation of the low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste disposal sites and the temporary
transuranic waste storage site are supported by an environmental monitoring program that
indicates waste is being safely contained in the near-surface environment in which it is emplaced.
The radioactive and mixed-waste disposal facilities are mainly shallow land burial areas.
Figure 4.14-1 shows the location of the waste management facilities at the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b,
1992b).
The DOE Nevada Operations Office developed and implemented a Waste Minimization
and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed,
and radioactive wastes generated at the NTS. The plan is designed to reduce the possible
pollutant releases to the environment. The objectives of the waste minimization and pollution
program are to:
- Identify processes generating waste streams
- Characterize and track each waste stream
- Identify, evaluate, and implement applicable waste minimization technologies
- Set numerical goals and schedules after the initial assessment of technological and
economic feasibility
- Establish an employee pollution prevention awareness and training program.
Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of
a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes generated,
implementation of recycling programs, and incorporation of waste minimization concepts and
technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities and in upgrades of existing
facilities.
The NTS manages the following waste categories: mixed transuranic waste, mixed low-level
waste, low-level waste, hazardous waste, sanitary waste, and nonhazardous waste. The NTS does
not currently manage high-level waste or SNF. The NTS waste management activities include
onsite treatment, onsite storage, onsite disposal, and preparation for appropriate offsite disposal.
Additionally, the NTS uses and manages an onsite inventory of hazardous materials, including
Figure 4.14-1. Existing treatment, storage, and disposal units at the NTS. some managed in underground storage tanks. Figures 4.14-2 and 4.14-3 present flow diagrams of
onsite generated waste management and waste shipment, receipt, and disposal, respectively.
Waste generation rates presented for each of the waste categories for the NTS represent
1993 waste generation rates unless otherwise stated and are assumed representative of the 1995
baseline year. Table 4.14-1 presents the baseline waste management for 1995 for those waste
categories currently managed at the NTS. In addition, the table presents available disposal/
storage capacity and waste disposition.
4.14.1 Transuranic Waste
Transuranic waste from the Rocky Flats Plant and mixed-transuranic waste from LLNL are
stored at the NTS at the transuranic waste storage cell located in Area 5 Radioactive Waste
Management Site. The transuranic waste has been characterized and repackaged, and the
mixed-transuranic waste has been placed in a RCRA-permitted storage area consisting of
55-gallon drums and steel boxes stored on wooden pallets fixed upon a curbed asphalt pad.
Approximately 204,663 kilograms (451,201 pounds) with a total volume of 612 cubic meters (800
cubic yards) of transuranic waste are stored at the NTS (DOE/NV 1994d). The NTS expects no
additional transuranic or mixed-transuranic wastes to be stored at this unit.
4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Wastes
The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site contains Pit 3, which is an active mixed
low-level waste management unit. Pit 3 is the only active landfill cell within the Area 5
Radioactive Waste Management Site for which a RCRA permit is being sought. Pit 3 is an
unlined, trapezoidal shaped pit occupying 3.42 x 104 square meters (8.46 acres) with a process
capacity of 1.29 x 105 cubic meters (1.69 x 105 cubic yards). The estimated disposal space for
mixed low-level waste remaining at this facility is 9.03 x 104 cubic meters (1.19 x 105 cubic yards)
(DOE/NV 1992b).
A RCRA permit is being sought for a proposed Mixed Waste Disposal Unit in the area
immediately north of Pit 3 in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. This Mixed
Figure 4.14-2. Flow diagram for waste generation at the NTS. Figure 4.14-3. Flow diagram for waste shipment, receipt, and disposal at the NTS. Table 4.14-1. Baseline waste management for 1995 at the NTS.
Waste type Volume generated Available disposal Disposition
or disposed of (m3) space (m3)
Transuranic waste 0 8,296 Interim onsite
and mixed-transuranic storage
waste
Low-level waste 10,845 438,359 Onsite disposal
Mixed low-level waste 0 90,240 Onsite disposal
Hazardous waste 252 91 90-day pad
Sanitary waste 1.1 x 104b c Onsite disposal
a. Sources: DOE/NV (1994d, 1992c).
b. 1992 data.
c. Current disposal space adequate.
Waste Disposal Unit would occupy 2.1 x 105 square meters (52 acres) and consist of ten landfill
cells. The estimated disposal space for mixed waste in this proposed unit is approximately 1.20 x
105 cubic meters (1.58 x 105 cubic yards) (DOE/NV 1992b).
In May 1990, mixed waste disposal operations ceased due to EPA issuance of the Land
Disposal Restrictions of RCRA. Active mixed waste disposal operations will commence under
interim status in Pit 3 upon completion of NEPA documentation and an approved Waste
Analysis Plan (DOE/NV 1993c). No mixed low-level waste has been received, generated, or
disposed of at the NTS since 1991 (DOE/NV 1994d, 1993c,f).
4.14.3 Low-Level Waste
Two low-level waste disposal facilities are in operation at the NTS: Area 5 Radioactive
Waste Management Site and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (DOE/NV 1992c).
The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site receives low-level waste generated at the NTS
and other DOE facilities and occupies approximately 2.9 square kilometers (730 acres) of land.
The waste is disposed of in large-diameter shafts, trenches, and shallow pits. The total volume of
low-level waste disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site between 1961 and
1991 was 3.96 x 105 cubic meters (5.8 x 105 cubic yards). Average annual low-level waste disposal
for this period was 1.3 x 104 cubic meters (1.7 x 104 cubic yards). During 1993, approximately 1.1
x 104 cubic meters (1.4 x 104 cubic yards) of low-level waste was disposed of at the NTS
(DOE/NV 1994d).
4.14.4 Hazardous Waste
The primary facilities that generate or manage nonradioactive hazardous wastes and/or use
or store nonradioactive hazardous materials are the Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility,
the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site, the tunneling facilities and operations, and various
underground storage tanks.
The Liquified Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility is located on Frenchman Lake in Area 5.
This location provides a remote, environmentally acceptable setting for atmospheric release of
hazardous materials and toxic substances for investigative purposes. The facility consists of a
tank farm, spill area, wind tunnel, and pads for conducting small volume spill tests. The facility
also includes a control building that houses data acquisition and recording instruments, a
command and control computer, and support personnel. A total of 17 spill tests were conducted
at the facility in Area 5. Discharges from the test facility occur at a controlled rate and consist of
a measured volume of hazardous test fluid released on a surface especially prepared to meet the
test requirements. Personnel monitor and record operating data, close-in and downwind
meteorological data, and downwind gaseous concentration levels. Spills involving hydrofluoric
acid were conducted in 1991 and the results monitored (DOE/NV 1992c).
The Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site consists of an impervious concrete pad with 15-
centimeter (6-inch) curbs to contain spillage and to protect the pad from precipitation runon and
runoff; a separate curbed area is provided for noncompatible wastes. A roof protects the wastes
from rain and weathering effects; there is also a fire detection system (DOE/NV 1992d). Each
operating entity at NTS is a potential satellite accumulation area for hazardous waste. Each
satellite accumulation area is allowed to accumulate up to 208.2 liters (55 gallons) of hazardous
waste or 0.95 liter (1 quart) of acutely hazardous waste. Within 3 days of reaching these
quantities, the waste is transferred to the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site. If the material is
unknown or if an offsite treatment, storage and disposal facility wishes to confirm the contents of
a waste stream, samples are collected for characterization (DOE/NV 1992d).
When the waste containers are transferred to the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site, they
are checked for proper labeling and an accumulation date is assigned to each container. An
EPA-permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facility is contacted prior to the 90-day storage
limit to collect and remove the accumulated wastes from the NTS (DOE/NV 1992d).
Nuclear devices were tested in horizontal tunnels mined into Rainer Mesa at the NTS. The
tests were conducted in zeolitized volcanic tuffs, which act as a perching layer for waters
infiltrating from the mesa surface. During normal tunneling operations, fractures containing
water are intercepted creating artificial springs in the tunnels. Periodically, these waters contain
radionuclides from previous underground nuclear tests and are drained out of the tunnels into
evaporation ponds or washes. Tunneling and related operations also may have released organic
compounds and heavy metals to the tunnel effluent. Presently, sampling of the tunnel effluent is
being conducted to characterize the effluent. The objectives of the project include identifying the
types and concentrations of radionuclides, metals, and organic compounds in the effluent of
U12t, U12e, and U12n tunnels. Variations of discharge volumes and chemical contaminants over
time are also being examined (DOE/NV 1992c).
There is a site-wide inventory of 115 underground storage tanks at the NTS. These include
24 underground storage tanks containing petroleum products that were removed, closed in place,
or temporarily taken out of service in 1991 in accordance with state statutes as well as 17
underground storage tanks which were temporarily closed in 1991 while awaiting upgrades
(DOE/NV 1992c).
As part of the 1991 underground storage tank activities, all tanks to be upgraded had soil
samples taken from the tank ends to identify any soil contamination prior to redesign and
construction. To date, overfill releases from underground storage tanks located at the Areas 6,
12, and 23 gasoline stations were observed and necessitated additional soil sampling. All
underground storage tanks that were planned to be upgraded (except a tank containing asphaltic
material) were also pressure tested for leaks. All tanks passed the test limit of 0.76 liter per hour
(0.2 gallon per hour) (DOE/NV 1992c).
Numerous underground storage tanks have been identified throughout the site as
"Undetermined Activity Status." The contents of some of these underground storage tanks is
classified as "H?" which indicates that the contents are presumed to be hazardous.
The types of possible wastes found on the surface of the NTS include radionuclides, organic
compounds, metals, hydrocarbons, and residues from plastic, epoxy, and drilling muds (not
petroleum production related and therefore considered hazardous under Subtitle C of RCRA).
A wide variety of surface facilities, such as injection wells, leach fields, sumps, waste storage
facilities, tunnel ponds and muck piles, and storage tanks, may have contaminated the local soil
and the shallow unsaturated zone of the NTS. Because of the great depths to groundwater and
the arid climate, it is assumed that the potential for mobilization of surface and shallow
subsurface contamination is minimal. However, contaminants entering carbonate bedrock from
Rainier Mesa tunnel ponds, contaminated wastes injected into deep wells, and wastes disposed
into subsurface craters have the potential to reach the regional water table. Pilot wells were to
be installed during 1992 to support the RCRA permitting process (DOE/NV 1992c).
Annual generation or disposal of hazardous waste at the NTS was approximately 252 cubic
meters (329.6 cubic yards) during 1993. Available storage space on the 90-day pad is
approximately 91 cubic meters (119 cubic yards) (DOE/NV 1994d).
4.14.5 Sanitary Waste
Sanitary wastes are expected to be generated at the current rates for several years into the
future, then decline assuming the present moratorium on underground weapons testing. Liquid
sanitary wastes are disposed of in septic tanks/leach fields, sumps, or in ponds, and solid sanitary
wastes are disposed of in landfills at various locations on the site. The NTS currently maintains
13 sewage discharge permits: Area 2, Area 6 (5), Area 22, Area 23, Area 25 (4), and Area 12
(DOE/NV 1993c). Approximately 9.1 x 103 cubic meters (11,902 cubic yards) of sanitary waste
were generated at the NTS during 1991 and 1.1 x 104 cubic meters (14,388 cubic yards) during
1992 (DOE/NV 1993c). Sufficient disposal space is available at the NTS for current needs.
4.14.6 Hazardous Materials
Polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, and asbestos have been or currently are managed at
the NTS. These wastes and materials are managed in addition to the approximately 90,000
kilograms (100 tons) of RCRA-regulated nonradioactive hazardous wastes generated annually at
the NTS, the approximately 218,000 kilograms (240 tons) of non-RCRA-regulated hazardous
waste generated annually at the NTS, and the wastes and materials managed at the facilities
discussed previously.
By the end of 1991, all known polychlorinated biphenyl transformers and other electrical
equipment had been either reclassified or appropriately disposed of, and three polychlorinated
biphenyl-contaminated transformers and regulators were under the 90-day period for
reclassification. Successful reclassification of these three polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated
transformers will complete the reclassification or disposal of all known polychlorinated biphenyl
and polychlorinated biphenyl contaminated transformers at the NTS (DOE/NV 1992c).
No unusual environmental activities relating to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act occurred in 1991 at the NTS. Pesticides are stored in an approved storage
facility located in Area 23. Pesticide usage includes insecticides, herbicides, and rodenticides.
Insecticides are applied twice a month at the food service areas, herbicides are applied once a
year, and all other pesticides are applied on an as-requested basis. General-use pesticides are
used for most applications, although restricted-use herbicides and rodenticides are used on
occasion (DOE/NV 1992c).
The Area 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Facility is a thermal treatment unit for disposal
of conventional explosives. Explosives detonated at the facility include Defense Nuclear Agency
materials and waste explosives from Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Co., Inc. tunnel
operations, the Wackenhut Firing Range (used by the NTS security force), and the resident
national laboratories. No radioactive or radioactive-contaminated materials are accepted or
detonated at the Area 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit.
The unit encompasses approximately 0.08 square kilometer (20 acres) of land located
between Frenchman Flat and Yucca Flat, with four graded areas. Only one of these graded
areas is used for detonation. Magazines are used to store detonation materials and waste
explosives. Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the explosives detonated at the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal unit during the past 10 to 12 years have been water-gel explosives; earlier,
the primary waste was gelatin-based dynamite. Other explosives detonated include small
amounts of trinitrotoluene (TNT), RDX (hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine) pellets, small
arms ammunition (from past military operations at NTS), and black powder (DOE/NV 1992b).
4.14.7 Non-hazardous Waste
Solid wastes are regulated through State of Nevada regulations NAC 444 and Federal
regulations 40 CFR 241, 257, and 258. Solid wastes generated include used petroleum products,
uncontaminated tunnel muck, drilling fluids, cement and grout wastes, construction debris, refuse,
sludge from wastewater lagoons, septic tank and chemical toilet sludge, and animal carcasses.
The NTS has several sanitary landfills and construction landfills in operation; several landfills
have been closed or abandoned (DOE 1990).
Some wastes not regulated under RCRA will be stored at the Hazardous Waste
Accumulation Site. These nonregulated wastes are shipped offsite along with the RCRA wastes
to a treatment, storage, and disposal facility. Only non-RCRA hazardous wastes that cannot be
disposed of at the NTS landfill will be stored at the Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site for
offsite shipment. Any drum containing nonregulated wastes will carry a label so specifying. The
contents of the drum will be entered on a space provided on the label. Wastes in this category
include but are not limited to epoxies, photochemicals, spent antifreeze, and oils and solvents
that do not carry EPA codes.
Recycling of paper, metals, glass, plastics, and cardboard has already resulted in some
decrease in quantities of waste and is expected to result in significant decreases over the next few
years (DOE/NV 1992b).
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
5.1 Overview
This chapter describes the potential environmental consequences from the construction and
operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under the
Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Potential environmental consequences are
assessed to the extent necessary to support a programmatic decision concerning the siting of the
proposed SNF facilities. More detailed considerations of potential environmental consequences
would be performed as necessary prior to initiating construction or operation of the facilities.
5.2 Land Use
5.2.1 Centralization Alternative
Construction and operation of SNF facilities under this alternative would require the
disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer), including buffer areas. Use of the
proposed SNF site for program activities would be consistent with existing nearby land uses and
land use policies and plans. The current land use designations for this area are Low-Level Waste
Facility Management and Buffer/Reserved Area. Use of this area for program activities would
also be consistent with future land use plans (DOE/NV 1993a).
Use of the proposed site for the construction and operation of SNF facilities could result in
irreversible or irretrievable land use impacts in those areas currently under Buffer/Reserved use.
However, the placement of SNF facilities at this location would be consistent with DOE's 1994
draft future land use plan, which designates this portion of Area 5 as a Non-Nuclear Test Area
(DOE/NV 1993a). Therefore, no mitigation measures are proposed.
5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative
As under the Centralization Alternative, use of the proposed site for construction and
operation of SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative would be consistent with
existing land uses and with all applicable land use policies and plans. Impacts would be similar in
character to those described for the Centralization Alternative, except that there could be
reduced land requirements under this alternative.
5.3 Socioeconomics
Socioeconomics as addressed in this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
encompasses the interaction of economic, demographic, and social conditions. Economic
consequences (e.g., capital requirements to support SNF research and development activities)
affect business activities, market structures, procurement methods, and dissemination of
commodities within and between regions. Demographic consequences (e.g., in-migration of
specialized human resources to support the SNF Management Program) affect size, distribution,
and composition of the population, labor force, and the housing market in the regions. Social
consequences (e.g., capacity modifications of public infrastructure to support SNF activity) affect
the overall quality of life enjoyed by the residents of a community (Murdock and Leistritz 1979).
These conditions are potentially affected either directly or indirectly by actions proposed under
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) SNF Management Program.
The importance of actions is relative to the affected region. A region can be described as a
dynamic socioeconomic system, where physical and human resources, technology, social and
economic institutions, and natural resources interrelate to create new products, processes, and
services to meet consumer demands. The measure of a region's ability to support these demands
depends on its ability to respond to changing economic, demographic, and social conditions.
Potential socioeconomic effects are addressed only to the extent that they are interrelated
with the natural or physical environment. Direct effects include those impacts that are caused by
the action and occur at the same time and place. Indirect effects include those impacts caused
by the action that are later in time or farther removed in distance but still are reasonably
foreseeable (i.e., offsite) (CFR 1993e). Direct and indirect effects are presented quantitatively
from 1995 through 2005, and qualitatively through 2035.
Socioeconomic effects are quantified for regional economic activity and population. Other
potential socioeconomic impacts to individual communities, such as public infrastructure and
housing, are discussed qualitatively to address programmatic issues.
Economic impact projections include direct and indirect jobs. Direct jobs are those jobs
needed to construct or support the operation of the SNF management complex at the NTS.
Indirect jobs are created throughout the regional economy within the Region of Influence as a
result of procurement for materials, services, and other commodities, and induced effects from
consumer spending. These direct and indirect impacts reflect both construction and operation
phase demands, which may occur concurrently or independently throughout the project planning
period. Indirect jobs were projected using parameters from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis Regional Input-Output Modeling System.
Two scenarios were analyzed to account for two potential distributions of the SNF facility
construction efforts. The construction effort consists of fabricating various structures, each with
its own construction labor need and a duration of either three or five years. The Peak Scenario
accelerates the construction labor requirements into the first two years of construction. The
Average Scenario averages the labor requirements of a structure for the duration of construction.
The total construction effort for all structures, in labor years, is the same for each scenario.
Therefore, for structures with a three year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has high
labor needs for the first two years and then a substantial reduction for the third year, while the
Average Scenario has a constant labor requirement for the three years. Likewise, for structures
with a five year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has a high labor need for the first two
years, then a lower need for the remaining three years, while the Average Scenario has a
constant requirement for all five years. Because the total construction labor years for each
structure is the same for both scenarios, the Average Scenario will have a lower requirement
than the Peak Scenario in the first two years, then will have a higher requirement then the Peak
Scenario in the remaining construction years.
Regional population projections reflect the potential change in population resulting from an
increase in regional economic activity. Detailed assumptions regarding in-migration associated
with the SNF Management Program were not developed, given the programmatic scope of this
analysis. Potential in-migration effects resulting from direct job creation are presented
qualitatively where appropriate.
5.3.1 Centralization Alternative
The upper and lower bounds of construction and operation-related jobs generated by SNF
facilities for both scenarios under the Centralization Alternative from 1995 to 2005 are illustrated
in Figure 5.3-1 and tabulated in Table 5.3-1. In its initial phase, the Centralization Alternative
may create 54 jobs (25 direct, 29 indirect) over a 5-year period beginning in 1995 and continuing
through the year 1999 to support project planning, engineering design, personnel operations
training, and environmental permitting and compliance. Construction is expected to begin in the
year 2000, requiring a total of 4,351 direct jobs (5,041 indirect jobs). In that year and 2001, the
Peak Scenario requires 1,587 construction laborers, while the Average Scenario needs 1,346.
There is no operational labor required for this time period. In 2002, after two years of
construction, the Peak Scenario decreases its construction labor requirements to 928 workers,
while the Average Scenario maintains its 1,346 laborers. Additionally, 300 operational personnel
are needed, raising the total of SNF workers to 1,228 for the Peak Scenario and 1,646 for the
Average Scenario. By 2003, the buildings with three year construction durations have been
completed; therefore, both the Peak and Average Scenario construction labor requirements
decline to 125 and 157, respectively. Operation labor requirements remain at 300 workers.
Total SNF labor requirements are 425 workers for the Peak Scenario and 457 for the Average
Scenario. In 2004, construction labor needs for both scenarios remains at their previous level,
but operational personnel increase. Total SNF labor requirements are 612 workers in the Peak
Scenario and 644 workers in the Average Scenario. By 2005, all construction has been completed
and operational personnel have increased to the full staff labor requirement of 800 workers.
The Peak Scenario reaches its maximum construction labor with 1,587 direct jobs (3,426
total jobs created) over a 2-year period from years 2000 through 2001. The Average Scenario
would have its maximum construction labor with 1.346 direct jobs (2,906 total jobs created) in a
Figure 5.3-1. Total employment effects, NTS centralization alternative. Table 5.3-1. Socioeconomic effects - centralization of SNF at Nevada Test Site.
Time period
Years 1995 - 1999 2000, 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 +
Operations
Direct jobs 25 0 300 300 487 800
Indirect jobs 29 0 344 344 559 918
Total jobs 54 0 644 644 1,046 1,718
Construction
Direct jobs
Peak 0 1,587 928 125 125 0
Average 0 1,346 1,346 157 157 0
Indirect jobs
Peak 0 1,839 1,076 145 145 0
Average 0 1,560 1,560 182 182 0
Total jobs
Peak 0 3,426 2,004 270 270 0
Average 0 2,906 2,906 339 339 0
Total
Direct jobs
Peak 25 1,587 1,228 425 612 800
Average 25 1,346 1,646 457 644 800
Indirect jobs
Peak 29 1,839 1,420 489 704 918
Average 29 1,560 1,904 526 741 918
Total jobs
Peak 54 3,426 2,648 914 1,316 1,718
Average 54 2,906 3,550 983 1,385 1,718
Population Change
Peak 91 5,664 (1,084) (2,379) 547 540
Average 91 4,804 896 (3,522) 547 447
3-year period from years 2000 through 2002. Operation requirements would be minor until 2002,
when engineering and administrative services are assumed to be in demand to accommodate
project requirements. Ancillary SNF complex operations, such as utilities and research and
development activities, are assumed to begin in 2004, taper off into 2005, and remain relatively
constant through 2035. The maximum total SNF management direct jobs under either
construction scenario would occur in 2002 with 1,346 construction jobs for the Average Scenario
and 300 operation jobs. Implementation of the Centralization Alternative would increase the
projected average annual rate of growth rate for both regional population and employment from
1995 through 2005 by 0.02 percent.
Regional businesses and the work force would benefit from increased competition for
contract procurement and jobs. Most of this activity is anticipated to be captured by Clark
County, with a smaller share occurring in Nye County. However, the impact to the regional
economy represents only a portion of the total economic activity generated by the Centralization
Alternative. For instance, purchases of specialized materials and technology acquisition may
occur even outside the State of Nevada. It has been estimated that about 50 percent of total
NTS expenditures occur within the State of Nevada (Nye County Board of Commissioners 1992).
This leakage would result in the associated economic benefits accruing outside of the regional
economy.
Most of the population change in the Region of Influence above the baseline forecast would
be due to in-migration of labor and households to support SNF management activity at the NTS.
It is likely that most of the SNF operation work force would be supplied by SNF personnel
relocating from DOE sites where SNF inventories were stored before shipment to the NTS, since
they are familiar with the processes, technologies, and research. Other demands for operational
jobs not related to SNF management would be accommodated by the regional labor market.
The regional labor market could accommodate most of the construction requirements, with the
exception of very specialized tasks. Construction employment in Clark County is twice that of
the national average. As the population continues to grow, demand on public infrastructure
grows as well. These projects will result in continued growth in construction activity
(Las Vegas Review Journal et al. 1993).
To assess potential population and housing impacts, an in-migration rate per job was
estimated using a ratio between projected employment and population figures (Table 4.3-1).
This ratio was applied to the number of total (direct and indirect) jobs created by SNF
management activities at the NTS, resulting in the total estimated number of persons in-migrating
into the Region of Influence per job created (Table 5.3-1).
With initial operation in 1995 under the both scenarios (Table 5.3-1) a total of 91 persons
could migrate into the Region of Influence. The number of persons coming in would be at its
largest for the years 2000 through 2001, (5,664 in-migrants for the Peak Scenario and 4,804 for
the Average Scenario) the period when construction starts. In the final phases of construction,
people would migrate out of the Region of Influence. However, the number of in-migrants
would increase in the years 2004 and 2005, as more of the SNF management operations start.
After 2005, in-migration due to SNF management activities would cease, since SNF management
activities would not create any more jobs.
Construction of the SNF complex could result in a temporary increase in housing demand in
Nye County. The demand for both the rental market and short-term lodging could increase.
The demands on housing would fluctuate over time, based on the various construction phases,
peak employment levels, the level of local sub-contracting, and any decision by a contractor to
develop temporary housing arrangements near the job site. Within Nye County, the communities
of Tonopah and Beatty would probably experience the most impacts related to housing demand.
Both communities support fairly large inventories of temporary housing. While such demands
are favorable for local lodging operators and landlords, they could compete with tourism
demands (Nye County Board of Commissioners 1992).
Overall socioeconomic impacts to Clark County could be absorbed within the projected
expansion of the county's economy, local infrastructure, public service, and real estate
development.
5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative
Socioeconomic impacts resulting from the Regionalization Alternative are expected to be
similar to those for the Centralization Alternative. The construction and operation cycles for
each alternative would be the same; therefore, the same issues identified for the Centralization
Alternative would apply. Labor requirements might be reduced slightly for the Regionalization
Alternative. Although the volume of SNF stored would be less for the Regionalization
Alternative, an economy of scale occurs for both alternatives, so that differences in labor and
capital between the two alternatives would be minimized.
5.3.3 Mitigation Measures
5.3.3.1 Coordination with Local Jurisdictions. To reduce construction- and operation-
related impacts, possible coordination with local communities could address potential impacts
from increased labor and capital requirements. The knowledge of the extent and effect of
growth due to SNF management activities could greatly enhance the ability of affected
jurisdictions to plan effectively. Effective planning would address changes in levels of service for
housing, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, and public services and finances.
5.3.3.2 Enhance Labor Force Availability. To alleviate potential impacts associated with
the in-migration of labor, local labor force availability could be increased through various
employment training and referral systems currently provided by the NTS. The goal of these
systems would be to reduce the potential for in-migration of labor to support SNF management
activities.
5.4 Cultural Resources
5.4.1 Centralization Alternative
Under the Centralization Alternative, the construction of SNF facilities is not expected to
require the disturbance of more than 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) on the NTS. There are no
known historical, archeological, paleontological, or Native American traditional sites in the
proposed area or its vicinity. Therefore, no impacts to cultural resources are expected due to
ground disturbance, noise, or air emissions during construction and operation of the SNF
facilities. Consultation with the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) prior to
project implementation is required under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act
of 1966. The SHPO may recommend that further archaeological studies be conducted
throughout the construction area to verify that there are no archaeological sites subject to
disturbance.
5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the SNF facilities would remain the
same but could be reduced in area. As with the Centralization Alternative, impacts are not
anticipated.
5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources
5.5.1 Centralization Alternative
The proposed SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative, when fully constructed
and under operation, would consist of a series of industrial buildings set within a security fence
on the proposed 90-acre (0.36 square-kilometer) site. The facility would have the appearance of
industrial buildings ranging in height from one to three stories. The maximum height of the
buildings contained within the site would not exceed 42 feet (13 meters) above ground level. The
proposed SNF site is located within a valley over 10 miles (16 kilometers) from U.S. Route 95,
separated by intervening hills and mountains, including Red Mountain, the Spotted Range, the
Specter Range, Hampel Hill and Skull Mountain. The site would not be visible from areas
outside the NTS or the Nellis Air Force Base Bombing and Gunnery Range. Therefore, impacts
to aesthetics and scenic resources are not anticipated.
5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, proposed SNF facilities could be reduced in area
and intensity of operations from the Centralization Alternative. Environmental effects to
aesthetics and scenic resources could also be less than that of the Centralization Alternative.
5.6 Geologic Resources
This section describes any incremental or additional impacts on geology and geologic
resources that would result from the construction and operation of the new facilities associated
with the storage of SNF at the NTS. Seismic and volcanic hazards are discussed in Section 4.6.
5.6.1 Centralization Alternative
As discussed in Section 4.6.2, precious metal deposits may exist in certain carbonate rocks
and volcanic or sedimentary rocks at the NTS. Figure 4.6-5 shows the proposed SNF site in
relation to these types of geologic terranes as well as to the locations of mining districts.
Although the proposed SNF facilities would not be located within a mining district, they would be
situated on Tertiary volcanic or sedimentary rocks near volcanic or intrusive centers (the type of
geologic terrane where small to medium-size precious metal deposits could be developed).
However, because the NTS would likely remain closed to mining operations, the impact on any
precious metal deposits that might exist at the NTS would not change if the proposed storage
facility were to be sited there.
In addition, destruction of unique geologic features are not expected to occur as a result of
construction and operation of a new SNF storage facility nor are mass movement and subsidence
and sediment runoff from land disturbances.
5.6.2 Regionalization Alternative
Impacts to geology and geological resources under the Regionalization Alternative would
generally be as described for the Centralization Alternative.
5.7 Air Resources
Both radiological and nonradiological air emissions impacts from the proposed SNF facilities
are discussed in this section.
5.7.1 Centralization Alternative
5.7.1.1 Emissions.
5.7.1.1.1 Radiological Emissions-There would be no radiological emissions from
construction of the proposed SNF facilities.
The total annual airborne radionuclide releases from
operation of the proposed SNF facilities are provided in Table 5.7-1.
5.7.1.1.2 Nonradiological Emissions-During construction of the proposed SNF
facilities, short-term emissions, such as fugitive dust and heavy equipment exhaust emissions,
would be temporary and only affect receptors close to construction areas.
Fugitive dust
emissions would be minimized by curtailing soil-disturbing activities during high winds. During
operation of the proposed SNF facilities, criteria and hazardous air pollutants would be emitted.
The total annual emissions from all modules associated with the proposed SNF facilities are
listed in Table 5.7-2.
5.7.1.2 Air Quality.
5.7.1.2.1 Radiological-The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment
model (PNL 1988) was used with 1990 meteorological data from Desert Rock Army Airfield to
determine effective dose equivalents from the radiological emissions listed in Table 5.
7-1. A
population of 15,100 persons was estimated to be within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the proposed
SNF facilities. It was also assumed that 1995 operations at the NTS would result in the same
baseline radiological emissions as the 1992 operations at the NTS. The most recent
comprehensive radiological emissions report at the NTS was based on 1992 operations.
Table 5.7-1. Annual airborne radionuclide emission
source terms for proposed NTS SNF facility operational
phase.
Isotope Release rate (Ci/yr)b,c
Tritium 7.9 x 10-1
Carbon-14 1.2 x 100
Manganese-54 2.2 x 10-8
Cobalt-60 4.2 x 10-8
Krypton-85 1.0 x 104
Strontium-90 3.3 x 10-6
Yttrium-90 2.0 x 10-6
Ruthenium-106 1.1 x 10-5
Antimony-125 3.4 x 10-4
Iodine-129 1.0 x 10-1
Cesium-134 6.2 x 10-8
Cesium-137 4.8 x 10-5
a. Source: Johnson (1994).
b. 2.0 x 10-6 Ci/yr of Barium-137m, from Wet Storage,
is not in GENII. Barium-137m, with a half-life of 2.55
min, decays to Barium-137, which is stable.
c. 7.5 x 10-8 Ci/yr of Thallium-208, from Wet Storage, is
not in GENII. Thallium-208, with a half-life of 3.10
min, decays to Lead-208, which is stable.
Table 5.7-2. Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF storage facility at NTS.
Criteria pollutants Release rate (kg/yr)
Carbon monoxide 1.7 x 103
Particulate matter (PM10)b 1.0 x 10-3
Nitrogen oxides 5.5 x 103
Sulfur dioxide 1.3 x 102
Lead 5.0 x 10-9
Hazardous air pollutants Release rate (kg/yr)
Selenium compounds 1.6 x 10-4
Mercury compounds 5.1 x 10-1
Chlorine 3.5 x 103
Hydrogen fluoride 1.6 x 101
Cadmium compounds 2.9 x 10-7
Cobalt, chrome, antimony, and nickel 2.0 x 10-10
compounds
a. Source: Johnson (1994).
b. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM10.
Table 5.7-3 summarizes the sum of the baseline and the incremental contribution from the
proposed SNF facilities to the effective dose equivalents of the maximum site boundary individual
and, collectively, to the population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the proposed facility.
These combined effective dose equivalents for operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be
less than 1 percent of the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)
standard and less than 1 percent of the natural background radiation.
5.7.1.2.2 Nonradiological-The Industrial Source Complex Short Term air
dispersion model (EPA 1992) was used with 1990 meteorological data from Desert Rock Army
Airfield to determine pollutant concentrations resulting from the Centralization Alternative
nonradiological emissions listed in Table 5.
7-2. A maximum emissions baseline was established to
characterize conditions that could result if all sources operated to the maximum extent allowed
by permit conditions. It was also assumed that 1995 operations at the NTS would result in the
same baseline nonradiological emissions as the 1990 operations at the NTS. The most recent
comprehensive nonradiological emissions report at the NTS was based on 1990 operations. The
results of modeling are in Table 5.7-4, where a comparison of the existing DOE site contribution
concentration is compared to the existing DOE site contribution concentration plus the proposed
SNF contribution. The increases in pollutant concentrations from operation of the proposed
SNF facilities would be negligible in magnitude. The concentrations of pollutants at the NTS
with the inclusion of the proposed SNF facilities would remain within regulatory guidelines.
The calculated atmospheric maximum concentrations at the site boundary and offsite for the
proposed SNF facilities are presented in Table 5.7-5. The maximum concentrations at the site
boundary reflect exposure to a maximally exposed individual, whereas the maximum onsite
concentrations reflect exposure to a worker.
5.7.2 Regionalization Alternative
As with the Centralization Alternative, construction of the proposed SNF facilities under the
Regionalization Alternative would not result in radiological air emissions, but could result in
minor, temporary emissions of fugitive dust. These emissions could be slightly less than under
the Centralization Alternative, since the extent of construction disturbance would be less.
Table 5.7-3. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from proposed SNF storage
facility plus 1995 baseline operations at NTS.
Maximally exposed Collective dose to
individual doseb population within
80 km of NTS sources
Dose 1.3 x 10-1 mrem per yearc 8.7 x 10-2 person-remd
NESHAP standard 10 mrem per year --
Percentage of NESHAP standard 1.3 --
Natural background dose 278 mrem per year 4190 person-rem
per year
Percentage of natural backgroun4.7 x 10-2 2.1 x 10-3
dose
a. Effective dose equivalents computed using GENII (PNL 1988).
b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the open
continuously during the year at the NTS boundary.
c. The SNF facility contributes 1.2 x 10-1 millirem to this dose.
d. The SNF facility contributes 8.2 x 10-2 person-rem to this dose.
Table 5.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at NTS
for proposed SNF facility plus current operations.
Criteria Averaging Most stringent Maximum Total Total projected Increase in
pollutant time regulation or background existing maximum maximum
guidelined concentration maximum concentrationf concentration
(-g/m3) (-g/m3) concentratione (-g/m3) (-g/m3)
(-g/m3)
Carbon dioxide 8-hour 10,000 2,290 2,290 2290.8 0.80
1-hour 40,000 2,748 2,748b 2754.0 6.03
Nitrogen dioxideAnnual 100 a b 0.20 0.20
Lead Calendar 1.5 a b 3.7 x 10-12 3.7 x 10-12
quarter
Particulate mattAnnual 50 a 0.43 0.43 0
(PM10)c
24-hour 150 78.3 84.9 84.9 0
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 a 1.1 1.1 0
24-hour 365 39.3 55.2 55.2 0
3-hour 1,300 65.4 170.3 170.3 0
Hazardous air
pollutants
Selenium 8-hour 4.8 a b 2.18 x 10-7 2.18 x 10-7
Mercury 8-hour 0.2 a b 2.18 x 10-3 2.18 x 10-3
compounds
Chlorine 8-hour 71.4 a b 1.52 1.52
compounds
Hydrogen fluorid8-hour 59.5 a b 3.70 x 10-3 3.70 x 10-3
Cadmium 8-hour 1.2 a b 1.81 x 10-9 1.81 x 10-9
compounds
Cobalt, chromium8-hour 1.2 a b 5.5 x 10-10 5.5 x 10-10
antimony, and
nickel compoundsg
a. Not measured.
b. No sources indicated.
c. All suspended particulate matter is assumed to be PM10.
d. Criteria pollutant regulations are National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Hazardous air
pollutant regulations are Nevada Ambient Air Quality Standards.
e. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration. This is the
baseline concentration.
f. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration plus SNF
facilities impact concentration.
g. Individual emission rates were not specified for each of cobalt, chrome, antimony, and nickel
compounds. Only a total emission rate for all four was provided. Therefore, the most stringent
standard for any of the four compounds, 1.2 -g/m3 for cobalt, was used.
Table 5.7-5. Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air pollutants at NTS,
onsite and offsite.
Hazardous air pollutant Maximum annual Maximum annual
average concentration average concentration
onsite (-g/m3) offsite
Selenium compounds 6.03 x 10-8 1.20 x 10-8
Mercury compounds 6.03 x 10-4 1.20 x 10-4
Chlorine compounds 4.2 x 10-1 8 x 10-2
Hydrogen fluoride 1.02 x 10-3 2.04 x 10-4
Cadmium compounds 5.01 x 10-10 1.0 x 10-10
Cobalt, chromium, antimony and 1.50 x 10-10 3.00 x 10-11
nickel compounds
Lead 1.21 x 10-11 2.40 x 10-12
a. All impacts from proposed source only. No hazardous air pollutant emissions information
available for existing sources.
The same types of radiological and nonradiological air emissions from operation of the
proposed SNF facilities would occur under the Regionalization Alternative as under the
Centralization Alternative. However, the magnitudes could be lower. As with the Centralization
Alternative, the combined dose equivalents from the operation of the proposed SNF facilities
would be less than 1 percent of the NESHAP and less than 1 percent of the natural background
radiation. The concentrations of non-radiological air emissions from the operation of the
proposed SNF facilities under this alternative would remain within all applicable regulatory
guidelines (EPA 1992; PNL 1988).
5.8 Water Resources
Construction and operation of the SNF modules could affect surface and groundwater
resources. Potential environmental impacts to surface water and groundwater resources during
construction include depletion of groundwater supplies, floodplain encroachment, and surface
water sedimentation from erosion runoff occurring after land clearing. Potential normal
operational impacts could include depletion of groundwater supplies and diminished surface
water and/or groundwater quality resulting from wastewater discharges from normal operations.
5.8.1 Centralization Alternative
Separate discussions are provided for surface water quantity, surface water quality,
groundwater quantity and groundwater quality.
5.8.1.1 Surface Water Quantity. Existing activities on the NTS derive their water supply
from groundwater sources, and the same would be true for construction and operation of the
proposed SNF facilities. Therefore, construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities
would have no impact on surface water availability in the region. In addition, under normal
operating conditions, there would be no wastewater discharges to Area 5 watercourses which
could affect surface water flow characteristics.
Stormwater runoff associated with construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities
is expected to have a negligible impact on surface water quantity. During construction, standard
stormwater management techniques would be employed to attenuate runoff. The impact of
stormwater runoff on the ephemeral character of Area 5 watercourses during operation of the
SNF facilities is also expected to be negligible. A site drainage and stormwater management
system consisting of a perimeter drainage ditches and a retention pond would be included as part
of the SNF facilities (Johnson 1994). This system would provide for control of runoff and
erosion, which otherwise could affect Area 5 watercourses or the SNF facilities.
As discussed in Section 4.8.1, analyses of available data indicate that the areas encompassed
by the proposed SNF facility may lie in flood Zone X (100-year flood zone with depths less than
1 foot [0.30 meter]) and/or Zone AO (100-year flood zone with depths between 1 and 3 feet
[0.30 and 0.9 meter]) associated with the Halfpint Alluvial Fan. Accordingly, the SNF facilities
would have to be located and constructed to minimize floodplain impacts and to avoid
floodplains to the maximum extent possible, as required by Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain
Management) and DOE Orders. Site-specific surveys would be performed to determine locations
of flooding elevations more accurately.
5.8.1.2 Surface Water Quality. The proposed SNF facility in the northeast portion of
Area 5 is not served by the NTS sanitary sewer system. A number of NTS facilities have self-
contained sanitary sewer systems. The nearby Radioactive Waste Management Site does have its
own septic tank and leach field system to dispose of sanitary wastewater (DOE/NV 1993a). The
proposed SNF facilities would have a sanitary sewer system comprised of a sewage treatment
facility equipped with a sewage treatment and ejection pump system with a programmable
controller and software. A pressurized sanitary sewer line would be provided to run to a sewage
lagoon at the facility (Johnson 1994). This system would be adequate to accommodate the
estimated 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) per day of sanitary wastewater generated by the SNF
facilities and personnel. This system would be operated in accordance with State of Nevada
permitting requirements.
The proposed SNF facilities are designed to generate no liquid releases of wastewater with
hazardous chemicals or radiological characteristics related to SNF management operations.
These facilities would be constructed using state-of-the art technologies including secondary
containment, and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. The normal
operation of the proposed SNF facilities is not expected to affect the quality of any surface water
on or near the NTS.
During construction, 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) would be disturbed, all of it in
previously undisturbed areas. This would create the potential for increased sediment runoff into
dry washes and shallow drainages or to spread out overland as a result of sheetflow. However,
sediment runoff from construction activities would be controlled by implementing soil erosion
control measures, which would result in negligible effects to surface water quality.
In addition, as stated in Section 4.8.1, existing onsite contaminants may be transported and
dispersed beyond the facility boundary during flooding (USAF et al. 1991). Therefore, the
potential exists for some incremental transportation and dispersion of any additional
contaminants that might result from the construction or operation of the SNF facilities. Although
this potential cannot be determined without additional studies, any additional contamination
would be unlikely, due to the design of the containment structures and leak detection system of
the SNF facilities.
5.8.1.3 Groundwater Quantity. Operation of the SNF facilities would require
approximately 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) per day. This translates to an additional 3,600,000
gallons (13,627 cubic meters) of water used at the NTS per year. It is assumed that the water
demand of the SNF facilities would be supplied via the existing NTS Area 5 supply wells and
water distribution system. If this scenario should be demonstrated to be infeasible or impractical,
a water supply and distribution system consisting of two 8-inch-diameter wells supplying two
250,000-gallon (946,333-liter) aboveground storage tanks would be constructed to service the SNF
facility complex (Johnson 1994).
Water withdrawals to support the proposed SNF facilities would likely be from the
Frenchman Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin. In 1993, 176 million gallons
(666,000 cubic meters) of groundwater was withdrawn by DOE from the Frenchman Flat
hydrographic area. An additional 3.6 million gallons (14,000) cubic meters) per year would be
required for SNF operations. The recharge due to precipitation in the Frenchman Flat
hydrographic area was estimated to be 32.6 million gallons (123,000 cubic meters) (Rush 1970).
This recharge estimate was exceeded for more than thirty years with no decline in static water
levels (DOE 1988b). Accurate measurement of static water levels are, however, precluded by
numerous conditions on the NTS (Winograd 1970). More detailed analyses of perennial yield
and total water withdrawal from the hydrographic area would be required if the NTS were
chosen as a site for SNF management facilities, but because the estimated perennial yield has
been exceeded for more than thirty years with no measurable decline in static water levels, it is
likely that increased water use for the SNF Management Facility could be sustained.
Because of hydrogeologic complexities, a regional groundwater flow at the NTS is not
constrained by the hydrographic basins which are defined by local topography
(USAF et al. 1991). Therefore any potential groundwater overdrafts in the Frenchman Flat
hydrographic area indicated by previous yield estimates are likely made up by untapped
groundwater from neighboring hydrographic areas. Localized impacts could occur if the
perennial yield of Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is exceeded. Potential impacts include
depletion of water stored locally in the regional aquifer, removal of that groundwater from other
potential uses, and the potential modification of the rate and direction of contaminant migration
resulting from underground nuclear testing. The complex issues of groundwater contamination
and use are being addressed in the Resource Management Plan being prepared in conjunction
with the NTS site-wide EIS.
The vast majority of groundwater not withdrawn from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic
area, and the Ash Meadows Subbasin as a whole, is discharged at Ash Meadows. Using 1993
water withdrawal data, NTS annual withdrawal from the Ash Meadows Subbasin would only
increase by 1% or 3.6 million gallons (14,000 cubic meters) to approximately 370 million gallons
(1.4 million cubic meters) if the proposed SNF facilities were sited on NTS. This increase in
withdrawal would have little impact on the subbasin as a whole as its perennial yield is estimated
to be 12 to 18 billion gallons (46 to 68 million cubic meters) (DOE 1988b; USAF et al. 1991).
Water from the groundwater systems which pass beneath the NTS annually discharge
approximately 8.8 billion gallons (33 million cubic meters) to the deserts southwest of the NTS
(DOE/NV 1993b). Annual groundwater withdrawal for SNF operations would amount to 0.04
percent of this discharge. No impacts to down-gradient users and discharge areas would be
expected due to the small volume of water required and the vast amount of water in the regional
groundwater system.
Dewatering is not expected to be necessary to construct the SNF facility complex, due to
the relatively great depth to groundwater across the NTS. Although perched water table
conditions at depths of 70 feet (21 meters) have been reported for Frenchman Flat, all
excavation activities are expected to occur in the vadose zone. Consequently, there would be no
effect on groundwater quantity due to construction dewatering of wastewater with hazardous
chemical or radiological characteristics related to SNF management activities.
5.8.1.4 Groundwater Quality. As previously mentioned, the proposed SNF facilities are
designed to have no liquid release to the environment. However, for the purpose of this water
resource analysis, a conservative release scenario was evaluated to identify the potential
environmental consequences of a liquid release to the environment under normal operating
conditions. The release scenario was evaluated for information purposes only, as no normal
operating releases are planned for the proposed facility. The scenario consisted of a maximum
potential liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions such as an
undetected secondary containment failure or piping leak. The scenario was evaluated using
conservative estimates of the sensitivity of actual leak detection systems and operational source
term data from similarly functioning facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL). The conservative estimates for the hypothetical release included a point release of
5 gallons (19 liters) per day to the environment over the course of 1 month. The release volume
and durations were considerably greater than existing leak detection system sensitivities,
surveillance activities, and radiological surveys. Source terms were derived at the 95 percent
confidence level from 8 years of operational data at the INEL Fluorinel and Storage Facility at
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
The point source release as described above has been conservatively assumed to occur at a
depth of 40 feet (12 meters) below land surface (the bottom of the Wet Storage Basin for the
Receiving/Canning Facility). As detailed in Section 4.8.2, this is well within the vadose zone
underlying Area 5 at Frenchman Flat. Vertical flow in the uppermost portions of the vadose
zone at Area 5 is generally upward toward the surface, due to an extremely high
evapotranspiration rate relative to precipitation. Site characterization data for Area 5 indicate
that the vertical flow direction in the vadose zone is upward from 0 to 75 meters (0 to 250 feet)
below land surface. In the next interval (75 to 180 meters [250 to 600 feet]), a downward flow
rate of 3 meters/1,000 years (10 feet/1,000 years) has been calculated. At a depth of 180 to 250
meters (600 to 800 feet), a zone of equilibrium is present above the water table (a zone of no
vertical movement). These data, combined with the relatively extensive depth to the water table
(244 meters [800 feet]) and extreme travel times to the water table, indicate that the release
described above would be highly unlikely to reach the saturated zone. The release would likely
remain indefinitely in the vadose zone beneath the proposed SNF facilities, where it would
present a persistent source of contamination but would not affect groundwater quality.
5.8.2 Regionalization Alternative
Potential impacts to surface water and groundwater from construction and operation of the
proposed SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative would generally be as described for
the Centralization Alternative. However, the quantity of groundwater withdrawn to support
operation of the proposed facilities could be less.
5.9 Ecological Resources
The Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives could potentially affect ecological
resources primarily through the alteration or loss of habitat. Potential impacts to terrestrial and
aquatic resources and threatened and endangered species are described below for both
alternatives.
Radiation doses received by terrestrial biota from waste management activities would be
expected to be similar to those received by humans. Although guidelines have not been
established for acceptance limits for radiation exposure to species other than humans, it is
generally agreed that the limits established for humans are also conservative for other species
(NRC 1979). Evidence indicates that no other living organisms have been identified that are
likely to be substantially more radiosensitive than humans (Casarett 1968; National Academy of
Sciences 1972). Additionally, work areas where potential radiation exposure is high and
monitored site workers utilize protective equipment, have controlled access measures which limit
entry by biota. Thus, so long as exposure limits protective of humans are not exceeded, no
substantial radiological impact on populations of biota would be expected as a result of waste
management activities at the proposed SNF facility.
5.9.1 Centralization Alternative
Under this alternative, 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of the creosote bush plant
community would be disturbed during construction. The area disturbed would include
construction laydown areas, grading, and new buildings. In addition, disturbance would be
expected along access roads and other rights of way which have not been included in the 90
acres. This plant community is common to the southern portion of NTS. To obviate any impacts
to this plant community, ground-disturbing activities would be kept to a minimum. This would
also serve to reduce the number of non-native species, such as Russian thistle, to the area.
However, non-native species would probably become established in some areas, for example,
along the access road.
Impacts to wildlife would occur as a direct result of habitat loss and/or an indirect result of
increased human presence. There could be a decrease in the number of small mammals and
reptiles during the construction period due to ground-disturbing activities. More mobile animal
species would be able to move to other areas on the NTS during construction. Depending upon
the carrying capacity of these areas, there could be increased competition for food and water
resources. After construction activities are complete, it is expected that species which adapt to
developed areas would become established.
Impacts to birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are expected to be minimal
during construction, since there are no water sources at the proposed site. However, surveys
prior to construction may be required by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. During operation,
there may be an increase in migratory birds utilizing the area due to the increase in water
sources.
There would be no impact on wetlands or aquatic habitats due to the construction of the
facility because these habitats do not exist in the area. The operation of the proposed SNF
facilities would increase water sources for wildlife species due to retention ponds and a sewage
lagoon area. This could bring an increase in species, especially migratory birds, seeking aquatic
habitats. The addition of new species to the area would impact upon the general ecology by
increasing diversity of species. Since these areas would be within fenced enclosures, it is
expected that the larger mammals would be unable to directly utilize these water sources.
Noise and activity associated with construction would be expected to have short-term effects
on most wildlife. Studies on the effects of noise on wildlife have shown varying responses by
different species. Responses include becoming frightened and running away, altering migration
or breeding patterns, changing home ranges (often decreasing them), or adapting to the noise
and activity (EPA 1980). These effects would continue indefinitely during the operating life of
the proposed SNF facilities.
Potential impacts to threatened and endangered species would be the direct result of
increased human presence and the loss or alteration of habitat. Any Federal Candidate or
state-protected species on the site would result in further consultation with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Nevada State Forester. Mitigation plans would be developed in
cooperation with the appropriate agencies if any of these species were identified on the project
site.
Although positive identification of most of the species listed on Table 4.9-1 has not occurred
during prior studies, the addition of water sources to the area could increase the suitability of
habitat for some endangered, threatened, or candidate bird species. These might include birds of
prey (bald eagle, peregrine falcon, ferruginous hawk, and golden eagle), and species which
inhabit water areas such as shorebirds (mountain plover, western least bittern, western snowy
plover, and white faced ibis). An increase in loggerhead shrikes may occur due to the fencing
that would be erected around the facility and would serve as posts for this bird.
The project area is located within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally listed
threatened species. Recent pre-activity surveys for other nearby projects have not identified the
desert tortoise in the general area of the project site. However, a pre-activity survey for this
project would be needed to determine the presence or absence of the desert tortoise and other
species of concern. If present, the desert tortoise could be impacted during construction of the
proposed SNF facilities due to increased vehicular traffic, construction of trenches for utilities,
and other temporary construction excavations. Prior to and during construction activities, fencing
of the areas and removal of tortoises within the fence would decrease the potential to bring harm
to the desert tortoise. All activities with this species must be completed by a qualified biologist.
5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative
Impacts under this alternative are expected to be generally the same as under the
Centralization Alternative. The major difference between the two is the total area to be
disturbed. The Regionalization Alternative is expected to involve construction of fewer buildings
and, therefore, to require disturbance of less land.
5.10 Noise
As discussed in Section 4.10, noises generated on the NTS do not propagate offsite at levels
that impact the general population. Thus, the NTS noise impacts for both the Centralization and
Regionalization Alternatives would be limited to those resulting from the transportation of
personnel and materials to and from the site, which affect the nearby communities, and those
resulting from onsite sources which may affect some wildlife near these sources. The effect of
noise on wildlife near SNF management facilities under the Centralization or Regionalization
Alternatives would be addressed in a project-specific environmental assessment.
The transportation noises are a function of the size of the work force (e.g., an increased
work force would result in increased employee traffic and corresponding increases in deliveries by
truck and rail, and a decreased work force would result in decreased employee traffic and
corresponding decreases in deliveries). The analysis of traffic noise took into account noise from
the major roadway which provides access to the NTS. Vehicles used to transport employees and
personnel on roadways would be the principal sources of community noise impacts near the NTS
from the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives.
This analysis used the day-night average sound level to assess community noise, as suggested
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1982, 1974) and the Federal Interagency
Committee on Noise (FICON 1992). The change in the day-night average sound level from the
baseline noise level for each alternative was estimated based on the projected change in
employment and traffic levels from the baseline levels. The baseline is comparable to current
activity at the NTS for 1993. The combination of construction and operation employment was
considered. The traffic noise analysis considered U.S. Route 95, which employees use to access
the NTS from Las Vegas. Changes in noise level below 3 decibels would not be expected to
result in a change in community reaction (FICON 1992).
5.10.1 Centralization Alternative
Under the Centralization Alternative, the projected NTS work force would increase by
about 48 percent of existing onsite employment in the years 2000 to 2002, the peak construction
period, and decrease thereafter (Section 5.3). There would be a corresponding increase in truck,
private vehicle, and bus trips. The day-night average sound level at 50 feet (15 meters) from
U.S. Route 95 would be expected to increase by about 1 decibel. No change is expected in the
community reaction to noise along this route. No mitigation efforts are necessary.
5.10.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, traffic noise impacts would be the same as for the
Centralization Alternative.
5.11 Traffic and Transportation
The proposed SNF management activities would involve a small increase in the number of
employees commuting to the NTS and the transportation of SNF and hazardous chemicals on the
NTS. This section summarizes potential transportation impacts due to the proposed SNF
facilities on the NTS.
5.11.1 Centralization Alternative
5.11.1.1 Levels of Service. Levels of service were calculated for construction and
operation of the SNF facility at the NTS. The maximum reasonably foreseeable scenario for
construction and operations occurs when the combined number of employees and population are
at their highest. This would occur in 2001, when there would be 3,426 employees and a
projected baseline population in the Region of Influence of 1,209,316. The Region of Influence
includes Nye and Clark counties. Direct employees associated with the proposed SNF facility
generate direct trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are distributed to the Region of
Influence road network according to percentages based on a traffic flow between the site and
where employees historically have lived. Increases in baseline population and indirect site-related
employees generate indirect trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are distributed based
on the current average daily traffic per present population in the region of influence for a given
segment. Direct and indirect average daily traffic are added and a new level of service is
determined. Construction and operation employees contribute little to the future traffic because
they represent such a small percentage of the Region of Influence population growth.
None of the future baseline levels of service would change due to SNF-related impacts.
5.11.1.2 Rail Transportation. The generic facility design would require rail access for
Naval fuel delivery. The rail spur would most likely be built from the Union Pacific line, located
approximately 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the NTS. Impacts from construction and
operation of the rail spur would be evaluated in detail if the site were selected for the SNF
facility.
5.11.1.3 Transportation Impacts of Hazardous Chemicals. It is assumed that the
hazardous chemicals required and hazardous waste generated by the proposed SNF facility
operation would be transported by truck. The onsite transportation impacts for these hazardous
chemicals and wastes shipments are calculated based on the assumptions that they do not have
any incident free impacts, the material would not leak during transport, only risk is due to traffic
fatalities, and the material spill of entire contents is bound by the risk evaluated for the
Expended Core Facility, considered under facility accidents.
The total distance for onsite shipment of these hazardous chemicals is assumed to be the
maximum site boundary distance from the proposed SNF facility to the nearest highway. Based
on the unit risk factor (Cashwell et. al. 1986), occupational and non-occupational fatalities
considering a rural setting the onsite transportation risks are calculated, assuming 10 annual
shipments.
The maximum one-way distance from the site to the NTS gate by which trucks would
deliver hazardous wastes is 20 miles (32 kilometers). Based on 1.5 x 10-8 accident occupational
fatalities per kilometer per shipment, 4.0 x 10-4 accident occupational fatalities are estimated over
a 40-year period. Based on 5.3 x 10-8 accident non-occupational fatalities per kilometer per
shipment 1.4 x 10-3 accident non-occupational fatalities are estimated over a 40-year period.
5.11.1.4 Transportation Impacts of Radioactive SNF. The definition of offsite
transportation include transportation of radioactive material from the shipping facility to the
storage facility at the receiving site; therefore, local transportation does not separately address
the onsite transportation impacts due to radioactive material shipment.
5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative
The impacts due to the Regionalization Alternative would be less than those described for
the Centralization Alternative due to the smaller size of the facility and the smaller amount of
waste expected.
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
The Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Plan at the NTS would be
implemented within the SNF Management Program. While more chemicals per year would be
used, health impacts to the public would continue to be minimal as a result of administrative and
design controls to minimize releases of radioactive and chemical pollutants to the environment
and to achieve compliance with permit requirements and applicable standards. Workers would
continue to be protected from hazards specific to the workplace through appropriate training,
protective equipment, monitoring, management controls, and occupational standards that would
limit atmospheric and drinking water concentrations of potentially hazardous chemicals as well as
limit radiation exposures. This would include protection from wastes generated from the
increased use of the chemicals needed to accommodate spent fuel storage and from radioactivity
associated with this storage. The NTS Emergency Preparedness Plan would continue to operate
as designed to minimize or mitigate the impact of any emergency upon the health and safety of
employees and the public.
Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. This risk is in
the ratio of their health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure). The value of
this estimator for exposures to the public is 5.0 x 10-4 for fatal cancers. The corresponding
estimator for exposures to workers is 4.0 x 10-4.
5.12.1 Centralization Alternative
This section evaluates the impacts to human health resulting from both contaminated air
emissions and direct exposures associated with the proposed SNF facility under the
Centralization Alternative. Pathways assessed include inhalation of air, ingestion of food,
submersion in plumes, and direct exposure.
5.12.1.1 Radiological Doses. Releases of additional radionuclides to the environment
from operations at the proposed SNF facilities are summarized in Table 5.7-1. The annual
committed doses to the public resulting from the proposed SNF facilities plus baseline operations
in 1995 are provided in Table 5.7-3. The doses would be approximately 1 percent of the most
restrictive health standard, and less than 0.1 percent of the natural background radiation. The
dose to the maximally exposed member of the public is assumed to remain constant over the
40-year operational lifetime of the SNF; the population dose would increase slightly (less than
3 percent) due to population growth during this 40-year period.
Doses to SNF facility workers are assumed to be similar to those presently received by
major DOE facility Waste Processing/Management personnel. Based on data for the years 1989
through 1991 for the Hanford Site, INEL and the Savannah River Site (SRS) (DOE 1992), it is
estimated that the average dose to a worker from annual SNF operations at the NTS would be
approximately 40 millirem and the maximum dose would be about 3,000 millirem. Assuming that
800 persons were involved at the peak of these operations, the total worker dose from annual
SNF operations would be approximately 32 person-rem. Adding the baseline contribution, the
total dose to all workers at the NTS would be about 36 person-rem.
5.12.1.2 Nonradiological Doses. Releases of additional nonradiological airborne
pollutants from operations at the proposed SNF facilities are summarized in Table 5.7-2. The
concentrations from these releases have been calculated and are presented in Tables 5.7-4 and
5.7-5.
5.12.1.3 Radiological Health Effects. The fatal cancer risk to the most exposed member
of the public due to operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be 5.9 x 10-8. The fatal
cancer risk to the most exposed member of the public due to operation of the proposed SNF
facilities plus baseline operations (1995 levels) would be 6.5 x 10, over 40 years (estimated
storage duration), the risk to this individual would be approximately 2.6 x 10-6. The estimated
number of fatal cancers to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed facility
would be 4.4 x 10-5 for the operation of SNF facilities plus baseline operations and 4.1 x 10-5 for
the operation of the SNF facilities without baseline operations. The number of increased fatal
cancers from total NTS operations to the public during the estimate storage duration of the SNF
would be approximately 1.8 x 10-3. The number of fatal cancers from all causes that would
normally be expected to occur during this same time period to the 80-kilometer population is
1,500.
The calculation of the number of health effects to SNF workers from annual operations is
based on somewhat lower risk estimators than for the general public. The estimators are lower
as the result of different age distributions among workers and members of the public. The risks
of fatal cancer to the average worker is estimated to be 1.6 x 10-5. The corresponding risk to the
maximally exposed worker is estimated to be 1.2 x 10-3. An excess of 0.013 fatal cancer among
all SNF facility workers is projected from peak annual operations. It is projected that exposures
to radiation over the lifetime of SNF operations could result in an excess of 0.40 fatal cancer
among these workers and an increased risk of 6.4 x 10-4 to an individual worker who is present
over this time period. The risks and numbers of excess fatal cancers, both from annual and
lifetime operations, would be increased by about 15 percent if the impacts to workers associated
with baseline activities (Section 4.12.2.1) were included. The health effects due to radiological
doses to a noninvolved worker, i.e., an NTS worker involved in activities other than SNF, would
be on the order of 1 percent of the occupational exposure to an SNF worker, based on analyses
for the SRS and INEL sites.
5.12.1.4 Nonradiological Health Effects. As indicated in Table 5.7-4, the concentrations
of all measured nonradiological pollutants at the NTS together with the inclusion of the Proposed
Action would remain well within the health-based regulatory guidelines. The increases in
pollutant concentrations from the Proposed Action would be negligible, compared to the existing
baseline concentration; no adverse health effects from these pollutants would be anticipated.
The calculated maximum atmospheric concentrations of hazardous chemicals at the site
boundary and onsite for the proposed action are presented in Table 5.7-5. The maximum
concentrations at the site boundary are used to evaluate an exposure to a maximally exposed
individual, whereas the maximum onsite concentrations could result in an exposure to a worker.
Of the potential hazardous chemicals identified for the proposed action, cadmium, nickel and
chromium VI (chrome) are carcinogens for which a total cancer risk was calculated. The
remaining seven chemicals are noncarcinogens for which a hazard index was calculated. A
hazard index value greater than 1 indicates a potential for adverse health effects.
Based on the maximum hazardous chemical concentrations at the site boundary, the lifetime
fatal cancer risk and the hazard index to the maximally exposed member of the public would be
only 5.4 x 10-13 and 2.5 x 10-3, respectively. Based on the maximum concentrations onsite, the
lifetime fatal cancer risk and hazard index to a worker would be only 2.7 x 10-12 and 1.3 x 10-2,
respectively. This indicates that there would be virtually no health impacts from nonradiological
releases.
5.12.1.5 Industrial Safety. The measures of impacts for workplace hazards used in this
analysis are (1) total reportable injuries and illnesses and (2) non-exposure-related fatalities in
the work place.
Based on hazard rates for personnel of DOE and its contractors, it is estimated that 270
injuries and illnesses would be reported and 0.48 fatality would occur from all SNF construction
activities. It is further estimated that 807 injuries and illnesses would be reported and 0.81
fatality would occur among SNF workers during lifetime operations.
5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, the radiological and nonradiological doses from
operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS could generally be lower than those
described under the centralization alternative. Any corresponding health effects may also
decrease.
5.13 Utilities and Energy
Direct changes in utility demand as a result of the Centralization and Regionalization
Alternatives were compared, depending on available data, against either projected 1995 demand
or the peak usage for the years 1988 through 1992 for each utility resource. Since utility usage at
NTS is projected to decrease, this comparison is conservative. Impacts to provision of a utility
are considered to occur if the demand for a utility is equal to or exceeds the available capacity
within the designated Region of Influence. For the purpose of analysis, the Region of Influence
for each resource is defined as the area served by the utility provider responsible for meeting the
service demands of the NTS.
5.13.1 Centralization Alternative
5.13.1.1 Water Consumption. For the Centralization Alternative, approximately
0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of water would be required to operate the
modules within the facility (Harr 1994). The 14 active wells had a capacity of 387 liters per
second (6,139 gallons per minute) in 1993 (DOE/NV 1993a). The SNF facilities would require
0.1 percent of this amount. NTS wells would operate at 35 percent of total capacity, when the
1989 peak water usage of 134 liters per second (2,125 gallons per minute) was combined with the
SNF facility requirements.
The active wells at Area 5 have a capacity of 38 liters per second (595 gallons per minute)
(DOE/NV 1994c). The SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative would require
1 percent of this amount. Water usage in Area 5 would increase to approximately 33 percent of
the pump yield if the 1993 water usage of 12 liters per second (191 gallons per minute) for
Area 5 is combined with the SNF facility requirements under the Centralization Alternative.
5.13.1.2 Electrical Consumption. Under the Centralization Alternative, the SNF
facilities would require approximately 23,000 megawatt hours of electricity per year, or
approximately 2.63 megavolt-amperes average demand (Harr 1994). The annual consumption of
electricity of the SNF facilities would be approximately 12 percent of the 1995 annual
consumption of electricity at NTS. The average electric demand of the SNF facilities would
represent 6 to 7 percent of the projected 1995 peak electrical capacity of NTS. The average
electric demand of the SNF facilities, combined with the peak electric demand of
39.5 megavolt-amperes, would utilize 94 to 105 percent of the transmission lines' current capacity.
The 2.63 megavolt-amperes required for the SNF facility represents approximately 61 percent of
the operating capacity of the substation at Area 5. The energy requirements of the SNF facility
under the Centralization Alternative combined with the 1993 electric demand on the Frenchman
Flat substation would utilize 63 percent of the substation capacity. It might be necessary to
construct additional transmission lines or another substation to support the SNF facilities.
5.13.1.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the SNF facilities under the
Centralization Alternative were calculated assuming electrical power purchased from a utility was
the primary source of energy; however, fossil fuels may be used to power backup generators and
during construction activities. The amount of fuel that would be required for these operations
would have little effect on fossil fuel usage at the NTS site.
5.13.1.4 Wastewater Disposal. Under the Centralization Alternative, approximately
0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of wastewater would be generated (Harr 1994).
Currently, Area 5 has no wastewater facilities. A sewage treatment facility would need to be
constructed for the SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative.
5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative
The proposed SNF facilities under the Regionalization Alternative could consume less
water, electricity, and fuel than under the Centralization Alternative. Less wastewater may also
be generated; however, a sewage treatment facility would still need to be constructed.
5.14 Materials and Waste Management
Operation of the proposed SNF facilities would contribute transuranic, solid low-level, and
sanitary waste as a consequence of transport, receipt, unloading, handling, and storage at the
NTS. Under the SNF program, sources of potential contaminants would continue to be limited
to construction support and site operation activities.
SNF storage activities would require the use of chemicals, and the majority of these would
be expected to eventually become waste. Provisions would have to be made for the storage of
the chemical raw materials used within the SNF complex as well as the waste material resulting
from use. It was conservatively assumed that all chemical raw materials used by SNF would
become hazardous wastes. Table 5.14-1 presents the estimated waste generation by waste
classification for each of the two alternatives (Centralization and Regionalization) and by each of
the two options (wet storage and dry storage).
5.14.1 Centralization Alternative
The Centralization Alternative would generate the greatest amount of waste from the SNF
complex, since it is the alternative that contributes the larger amount of spent nuclear fuel to be
stored. On an annual basis, the amount of waste generated by the SNF complex for this
alternative would generally be greater than under the Regionalization Alternative. The handling
capacity of the SNF complex is the factor that determines the amount of waste generation.
Table 5.14-1. Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives at the
NTS (m3).
Time Period 1995-2004 2005-2014 2015-2024 2025-2034
Centralization Alternative
Wet Storage Option
Transuranic waste 160 160 160 160
Low-level waste 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Hazardous waste 7.4 x 101 7.4 x101 7.4 x 101 7.4 x 101
Sanitary waste 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105
Dry Storage Option
Low-level waste 76 76 76 76
Sanitary waste 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104
Regionalization Alternative
Wet Storage Option
Transuranic waste <160 <160 <160 <160
Low-level waste <1,950 <1,950 <1,950 <1,950
Hazardous <7.4 x 101 <7.4 x 101 <7.4 x 101 <7.4 x 101
Sanitary waste <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105
Dry Storage Option
Low-level waste <76 <76 <76 <76
Sanitary waste <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104
Source: Harr (1994).
5.14.1.1 Wet Storage Option.
5.14.1.1.1 Transuranic Waste-A small quantity (16 cubic meters, or 20.
9 cubic
yards) of transuranic waste would be generated per year due to the recovery and purification of
transuranic products from the wet storage option (Harr 1994). Placement of this waste into the
transuranic waste storage cell would have minimal impact on the current transuranic waste
management at the NTS.
5.14.1.1.2 Low-Level Waste-The wet storage option would contribute liquid low-
level waste as a result of its interim storage in water.
This underwater storage would require
filtered and deionized water to prevent possible corrosion problems with fuel elements and
storage hardware; further waste would be generated from deionizer resin regeneration, filter
backflushing, and chemical cleaning of the filter. An estimated 195 cubic meters (255 cubic
yards) per year of low-level waste would be generated due to operation of the wet storage
facility. Placement of this waste into the Radioactive Waste Management Site would be a viable
option (see subsection 4.15.3). This quantity of low-level waste represents a minimal impact to
the management of low-level waste at the NTS.
5.14.1.1.3 Hazardous Waste-Installation of the SNF complex would require
additional management of hazardous wastes, including the placement of satellite storage areas
within the SNF complex and more frequent offsite shipments of hazardous waste.
An evaluation
of the impact that the additional hazardous wastes generated by the wet storage option would be
conducted as part of the required National Environmental Policy Act evaluation.
Additional hazardous waste accumulated would be transferred to the Hazardous Waste
Accumulation Site, collected, and removed to an offsite EPA-permitted treatment, storage, and
disposal facility. The potential for hazardous waste to adversely affect the environment as a
result of an accidental spill would be limited due to the great depth to groundwater and the arid
climate, thereby minimizing the likelihood of migration of surface and shallow subsurface
contamination. Similarly, any leaks from new underground or aboveground storage tanks would
have limited potential to affect the environment (DOE/NV 1992c).
It is estimated that the wet storage option would generate approximately 7.4 cubic meters
(9.7 cubic yards) of hazardous waste annually. This quantity of hazardous waste represents a
minimal impact to the management of hazardous wastes at the NTS.
5.14.1.1.4 Sanitary Waste-The SNF wet storage option would generate
approximately 1.
2 x 104 cubic meters (15,696 cubic yards) of sanitary waste annually. This
quantity of sanitary waste would double the current sanitary waste disposal quantity at the NTS.
This would require construction of additional septic/leach field capacity and/or additional sewage
lagoon capacity, creating the need for additional land area for sanitary waste disposal.
5.14.1.2 Dry Storage Option. Unless a hazardous material were added to the fuel at the
point of origination, hazardous material or mixed hazardous wastes would not be expected to be
produced at a dry storage facility. With administrative controls applied at the storage facility to
prevent hazardous material from coming in, the generation of mixed hazardous waste could be
reduced or precluded. Any hazardous liquid and solid waste produced at the dry storage facility
would be collected in a satellite accumulation area located inside the facility. Mixed waste would
be stored onsite unless offsite storage and disposal facilities were licensed to accept radioactive
waste.
Nonradioactive hazardous waste, such as oils, solvents, gloves, rags, and other materials
associated with plant operation and maintenance, would be stored onsite until there were enough
containers for shipment to an approved offsite treatment, storage, and disposal facility
(Hale 1994).
5.14.1.2.1 Low-Level Waste-The low-level radioactive contaminated waste stream
would result mainly from wastes generated during the decontamination operations of the cask,
crane, and contaminated areas, from disposed personal protective equipment and clothing that
would be used and disposed of during decontamination operations, and from the filters and ion
exchange resins used to decontaminate the decontamination liquids.
This waste would be sent to
the waste packaging unit, where it would be compacted into drums for disposal. Old cans and
lids removed in the canning process would be collected and placed into solid waste containers
(Hale 1994). Approximately 7.6 cubic meters (9.9 cubic yards) of low-level waste would be
generated annually from the dry storage facility. This quantity of low-level waste represents a
minimal impact to the management of low-level waste at the NTS.
5.14.1.2.2 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary sewage is the only liquid effluent to be
released from the facility.
The SNF dry storage option would generate approximately 1.9 x 103
cubic meters (2.5 x 103 cubic yards) of sanitary waste annually. This quantity of sanitary waste
would double the current sanitary waste disposal quantity at the NTS. This would require
construction of additional septic/leach field capacity and/or additional sewage lagoon capacity,
creating the need for additional land area for sanitary waste disposal.
5.14.2 Regionalization Alternative
The Regionalization Alternative would generate less waste from the SNF facility than would
the Centralization Alternative, since it would contribute the smaller amount of SNF to be stored.
The handling capacity of the SNF complex determines the amount of waste generation. For
either the wet storage option or dry storage option, the wastes generated would be less than
those presented for the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, Table 5.14-1 presents the
estimated waste generation for SNF for this alternative as less than that generated for the
Centralization Alternative. The impacts presented for each of the waste categories for the
Centralization Alternative apply to the Regionalization Alternative as well.
5.15 Facility Accidents
A potential exists for accidents at facilities associated with the handling, inspection, and
storage of spent nuclear fuel at the NTS. Accidents can be categorized into events that are
abnormal (for example, minor spills), events a facility was designed to withstand, and events a
facility is not designed to withstand. These categories are termed abnormal, design basis, and
beyond design basis accidents, respectively. Summarized here are consequences of possible facility
accidents for a member of the public at the nearest site boundary and at the nearest road, for
the collective population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), for workers, and for the environment.
See Section 5.11 for a summary of the assessment of transportation accidents.
A review of the historical record of accidents at the NTS is summarized in the following
section. Methods used to assess potential future events are summarized in Section 5.15.2.
Evaluations of accident impacts by alternative are summarized in Section 5.15.3 through 5.15.7.
A summary comparison of accident impacts by alternative is given in Section 3.2. Additional
supporting documentation for the accident impacts is given in a separate report (HNUS 1995).
This section examines the various activities that have been performed to assess the potential
for accidents and their consequences for workers and the public for each alternative. A set of
potential reasonably forseeable accidents over the 40-year period are described which envelop all
accidents. Secondary impacts of accidents pertaining to cultural resources, economics, land use,
endangered species, water resources, and ecology are also addressed. This section also covers
emergency preparedness plans that have been established to mitigate the primary and secondary
effects of accidents.
5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at NTS
There have been no SNF operations in the past several years at the NTS upon which to
base an accident history.
5.15.2 Methodology
There are no facilities currently at the NTS for receiving, handling and storage of SNF that
can be used as a basis for accident analysis. In the absence of suitable design details for the
proposed SNF facilities during this stage of the SNF Management Program upon which to base
an accident analysis, the approach makes use of accident scenarios and associated data that have
been analyzed and documented for similar facilities. They include spent nuclear fuel facilities at
INEL, the Hanford Site, SRS, and Naval sites.
5.15.2.1 Assumptions and Approach. A number of postulated accidents for similar
facilities have been selected to serve as a common basis for estimating accident consequences for
workers and the public at the NTS. Although the accident scenarios, source terms, and related
assumptions are similar to those for other sites, the estimated consequences are unique to the
NTS because of site differences in modeling parameters pertaining to distances to site boundaries
and population centers, population distributions, and meteorology. The GENII code (PNL 1988)
was used to estimate accident consequences for the general public and for individuals onsite or at
the site boundary, based on both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology. Accident
consequences and risk are described in terms of dose, latent cancer fatalities, and total health
detriments for workers, for an individual at the site boundary, for a transient individual at the
nearest public access, and for the public residing out to 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the
proposed SNF facility. The estimated frequency of each selected accident is based on the
reference source documentation.
The probability of an airplane crash into the facility is considered very small, because there
are no nearby airports with large aircraft activity. For calculational purposes, the probability of
such an accident is conservatively estimated at 10-6 per year. Potential accidents initiated by an
airplane crash into the SNF facilities and the estimated consequences have been analyzed.
The secondary impacts of accidental releases of radioactive and hazardous materials are
also addressed in a qualitative manner. Secondary impacts pertain to effects of accidents on land
use, endangered species, water resources, cultural resources, and ecology.
5.15.2.2 Accident Screening. The potential accidents associated with existing SNF
facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in the accident
analysis for the NTS. The source documentation for this effort was primarily Appendices A, B,
C, and D of Volume 1 that were selected by a screening process for existing SNF facilities.
Initiating events were reviewed, including natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes and tornadoes)
and human-initiated events (e.g., human error, equipment failures, fires, explosives, plane crashes,
and terrorism). Accidents associated with Expended Core Facility (ECF) operations at the NTS
were analyzed separately, and the results are documented in Appendix D. For the NTS the
maximum reasonably foreseeable criticality and nonradiological accidents are associated with the
ECF. The potential for a criticality exists while the fuel is in dry storage, during handling, and in
the wet storage pool. Although the probability of any criticality is very low, a hypothetical
criticality of 1 x 1019 fissions was postulated in the ECF wet pool as a basis for estimating the
maximum reasonably foreseeable consequences of a criticality.
The selected accidents include beyond-design-basis events in order to reflect the magnitude
of accident consequences that envelop all other accidents having a reasonable probability of
occurrence. They also include other accidents with lower consequences and typically higher
probabilities of occurrence, to show a range of accident types and consequences. The accidents
included in this set are reasonably foreseeable, meaning that there are one or more sequences of
events that will lead to their occurrence, and the sequence with the highest probability of
occurrence is greater than 1 x 10-7 per year. Accidents falling outside of this envelope, such as a
meteorite impact, have been judged unreasonable because the probability of occurrence of less
than 1 x 10-7 per year.
5.15.2.3 Accident Prevention and Mitigation. Under the Centralization and
Regionalization Alternatives, the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS will be of new design and
construction and incorporate the latest technology for safety. The accidents postulated for the
SNF facilities are based on operations and safety analyses that have been performed at similar
facilities. One of the major design goals for the proposed SNF facilities is to achieve a reduced
risk to facility personnel and to public health and safety relative to that associated with similar
functions at existing SNF facilities. Significant improvements would exist between the design
criteria and safety standards of the new SNF facilities and those for the current facilities,
reducing total risk. These would include changes in design to current DOE structural and safety
criteria and to planned throughput and storage capacity.
The SNF facilities would be designed to comply with current Federal, state, and local laws,
DOE Orders, and industrial codes and standards. This would provide facilities that are highly
resistant to the effects of severe natural phenomena, including earthquakes, floods, tornadoes,
high winds, as well as credible events as appropriate to the site, such as fires and explosions, and
man-made threats to its continuing structural integrity for containing materials.
An emergency preparedness plan will also be prepared to lower the potential consequences
of an accident to workers and the public. All workers receive evacuation training to ensure
timely and orderly personnel movement away from high-risk areas. Plans and arrangements with
local authorities will also be inplace to evacuate the general public that may be at risk of
exposure to hazardous materials that are accidently released.
5.15.3 No Action Alternative
There are currently no SNF operations at NTS. The No Action Alternative is not
applicable for NTS.
5.15.4 Centralization Alternative
There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances during various
stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations begin with the receipt of an SNF
shipment by truck or rail carrier followed by the unloading of the shipping cask from the
transport vehicle. If the SNF requires cooling, the cask is placed into an unloading pool where
the SNF is withdrawn from the cask, moved to a temporary wet storage basin, and placed into a
fuel rack. Some SNF that does not require cooling will be handled in a special cell, where it will
undergo canning and/or characterization. SNF that does not have to be cooled and does not
require canning and/or characterization will be loaded into a dry storage canister within a
transfer cask and transported to modular above-grade dry storage. Accidents that may occur
during these handling operations and storage may involve the release of radioactive material to
air or water pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, such as operator
error, terrorism, and equipment failure or external initiators, such as an aircraft crash into a
facility.
5.15.4.1 Radiological Impacts. The set of accidents described below have been chosen
to envelop the consequences of potential accidents for the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS.
Although other accidents may occur, their estimated consequences are bounded by the accidents
in the envelop or their probability of occurrence would be less than 1 x 10-6 per year. If such
accidents were to occur, the dose and risk would be as shown in Tables 5.15-1 and 5.15-2 for 95
percent and 50 percent meteorology, respectively. Similarly, cancer fatalities are shown in
Tables 5.15-3 and 5.15-4, and the health effects are shown in Tables 5.15-5 and 5.15-6.
5.15.4.1.1 Fuel Assembly Breach-Physical damage and breach of a fuel assembly
could accidentally occur from its being dropped, from objects falling on it, or from the fuel part
being cut.
The fuel-cutting accident that has been postulated to occur at SRS SNF facilities is
Table 5.15-1. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site at
95 percent meteorology.
95 Percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Dose Risk
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/yr) (rem/year) (rem/yr) (person-rem/yr)
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 d 2.0 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-3 1.3 x 100 3.2 x 10-4 3.0 x 10-6 2.4 x 10-4 2.1 x 10-1
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 e 1.3 x 100 2.7 x 10-2 4.7 x 100 2.8 x 102 1.3 x 10-4 2.7 x 10-6 4.7 x 10-4 2.8 x 10-2
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 f 9.3 x 100 9.9 x 10-2 3.5 x 100 5.8 x 103 9.3 x 10-6 9.9 x 10-8 3.5 x 10-6 5.8 x 10-3
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 3.5 x 10-3 3.2 x 10-4 1.2 x 10-2 5.7 x 10-1 3.5 x 10-8 3.2 x 10-9 1.2 x 10-7 5.7 x 10-6
missile impact
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 f 1.5 x 100 7.7 x 10-2 1.2 x 101 5.6 x 102 1.5 x 10-6 7.7 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-5 5.6 x 10-4
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 f 1.2 x 101 2.4 x 10-1 2.3 x 101 7.0 x 103 1.2 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-7 2.3 x 10-5 7.0 x 10-3
into dry cell
facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 f 2.2 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-4 2.4 x 10-2 5.8 x 101 2.2 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-10 2.4 x 10-8 5.8 x 10-5
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
e. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-2. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site
at 50 percent meteorology.
50 Percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Dose Risk
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/yr) (rem/year) (rem/yr) (person-rem/yr)
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 5.0 x 10-5 2.9 x 10-7 4.7 x 10-5 3.4 x 10-2 8.0 x 10-6 4.6 x 10-8 7.5 x 10-6 5.4 x 10-3
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 3.2 x 10-2 4.1 x 10-4 1.5 x 10-1 6.9 x 100 3.2 x 10-6 4.1 x 10-8 1.5 x 10-5 6.9 x 10-4
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 2.3 x 10-1 1.5 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-1 1.4 x 102 2.3 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-9 1.1 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-4
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 8.7 x 10-5 4.7 x 10-6 3.7 x 10-4 1.3 x 10-2 8.7 x 10-10 4.7 x 10-11 3.7 x 10-9 1.3 x 10-7
missile into dry
storage area
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 3.7 x 10-2 1.2 x 10-3 3.9 x 10-1 1.4 x 101 3.7 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-9 3.9 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-5
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 3.1 x 10-1 3.7 x 10-3 7.4 x 10-1 1.7 x 102 3.1 x 10-7 3.7 x 10-9 7.4 x 10-7 1.7 x 10-4
into dry cell
facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 5.6 x 10-4 2.0 x 10-6 7.4 x 10-4 1.4 x 100 5.6 x 10-10 2.0 x 10-12 7.4 x 10-10 1.4 x 10-6
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-3. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada
Test Site at 95 percent meteorology.
95 Percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk (cancer fatalities/yr)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 9.8 x 10-7 9.3 x 10-9 6.0 x 10-7 6.6 x 10-4 1.6 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-9 9.6 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-4
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 6.4 x 10-4 1.4 x 10-5 1.9 x 10-3 2.8 x 10-1 6.4 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-9 1.9 x 10-7 2.8 x 10-5
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 4.7 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-5 1.4 x 10-3 5.8 x 100 4.7 x 10-9 5.0 x 10-11 1.4 x 10-9 5.8 x 10-6
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 1.7 x 10-6 1.6 x 10-7 4.9 x 10-6 2.9 x 10-4 1.7 x 10-111.6 x 10-12 4.9 x 10-11 2.9 x 10-9
missile impact
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 7.4 x 10-4 3.9 x 10-5 4.8 x 10-3 5.6 x 10-1 7.4 x 10-103.9 x 10-11 4.8 x 10-9 5.6 x 10-7
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 6.1 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-4 1.8 x 10-2 7.0 x 100 6.1 x 10-9 1.2 x 10-10 1.8 x 10-8 7.0 x 10-6
into dry cell
facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.1 x 10-5 7.1 x 10-8 9.6 x 10-6 5.8 x 10-2 1.1 x 10-117.1 x 10-14 9.6 x 10-12 5.8 x 10-8
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-4. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Nevada
Test Site at 50 percent meteorology.
50 Pecent meteorology
Accident Frequency Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk (cancer fatalities/yr)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 2.5 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-10 1.9 x 10-8 1.7 x 10-5 4.0 x 10-9 2.2 x 10-11 3.0 x 10-9 2.7 x 10-6
breach
Dropped fuel cask1.0 x 10-4 f 1.6 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-7 6.0 x 10-5 3.5 x 10-3 1.6 x 10-9 2.1 x 10-11 6.0 x 10-9 3.5 x 10-7
Severe impact and
fire 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.2 x 10-4 7.5 x 10-7 4.5 x 10-5 1.4 x 10-1 1.2 x 10-10 7.5 x 10-13 4.5 x 10-11 1.4 x 10-7
Wind-driven
missile impact 1.0 x 10-5 4.4 x 10-8 2.4 x 10-9 1.5 x 10-7 6.7 x 10-6 4.4 x 10-13 2.4 x 10-14 1.5 x 10-12 6.7 x 10-11
into dry storage
Airplane crash
into dry storage 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.8 x 10-5 6.0 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-4 6.8 x 10-3 1.8 x 10-11 6.0 x 10-13 1.6 x 10-10 6.8 x 10-9
Airplane crash
into dry cell 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.5 x 10-4 1.9 x 10-6 3.0 x 10-4 1.7 x 10-1 1.5 x 10-10 1.9 x 10-12 3.0 x 10-10 1.7 x 10-7
facility
Airplane crash
into water pool 1.0 x 10-6 g 2.8 x 10-7 1.0 x 10-9 3.0 x 10-7 7.0 x 10-4 2.8 x 10-13 1.0 x 10-15 3.0 x 10-13 7.0 x 10-10
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-5. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test
Site at 95 percent meteorology.
95 Percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk (detriments/yr)
scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workerd Populatione MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly breach 1.6 x 10-1 f 1.4 x 10-6 2.1 x 10-10 8.4 x 10-7 9.7 x 10-4 2.2 x 10-7 3.4 x 10-11 1.3 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-4
Dropped fuel cask 1.0 x 10-4 g 9.3 x 10-4 3.0 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-3 4.1 x 10-1 9.3 x 10-8 3.0 x 10-11 2.6 x 10-7 4.1 x 10-5
Severe impact and fire 1.0 x 10-6 h 6.8 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-6 2.0 x 10-3 8.5 x 100 6.8 x 10-9 1.1 x 10-12 2.0 x 10-9 8.5 x 10-6
Wind-driven missile impact1.0 x 10-5 2.5 x 10-6 3.4 x 10-9 6.9 x 10-6 4.2 x 10-4 2.5 x 10-11 3.4 x 10-14 6.9 x 10-11 4.2 x 10-9
into dry storage
Airplane crash into dry st1.0 x 10-6 h 1.1 x 10-3 8.8 x 10-7 6.7 x 10-3 8.2 x 10-1 1.1 x 10-9 8.8 x 10-13 6.7 x 10-9 8.2 x 10-7
Airplane crash into dry ce1.0 x 10-6 h 8.9 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-6 2.6 x 10-2 1.0 x 101 8.9 x 10-9 2.7 x 10-12 2.6 x 10-8 1.0 x 10-5
facility
Airplane crash into water 1.0 x 10-6 h 1.6 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-9 1.3 x 10-5 8.5 x 10-2 1.6 x 10-11 1.5 x 10-15 1.3 x 10-11 8.5 x 10-8
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer non fatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
f. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
h. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-6. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Nevada Test Site
at 50 percent meteorology.
50 Percent meteorology
Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk (detriments/yr)
Accident Frequency
scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workerd Populatione MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly breac1.6 x 10-1 f 3.7 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-8 2.6 x 10-8 2.5 x 10-5 5.9 x 10-9 2.2 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-9 4.0 x 10-6
Dropped fuel cask 1.0 x 10-4 g 2.3 x 10-5 2.0 x 10-5 8.4 x 10-5 5.1 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-9 2.0 x 10-9 8.4 x 10-9 5.1 x 10-7
Severe impact and f1.0 x 10-6 h 1.7 x 10-4 7.2 x 10-5 6.2 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-1 1.7 x 10-10 7.2 x 10-11 6.2 x 10-11 2.1 x 10-7
Wind-driven missile1.0 x 10-5 6.4 x 10-8 2.3 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-7 9.7 x 10-6 6.4 x 10-13 2.3 x 10-12 2.1 x 10-12 9.7 x 10-11
impact into dry
storage
Airplane crash into1.0 x 10-6 h 2.7 x 10-5 5.6 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-4 9.9 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-11 5.6 x 10-11 2.2 x 10-10 9.9 x 10-9
dry storage
Airplane crash into1.0 x 10-6 h 2.2 x 10-4 1.8 x 10-4 4.2 x 10-4 2.5 x 10-1 2.2 x 10-10 1.8 x 10-10 4.2 x 10-10 2.5 x 10-7
dry cell facility
Airplane crash into1.0 x 10-6 h 4.1 x 10-7 1.0 x 10-7 4.1 x 10-7 1.0 x 10-3 4.1 x 10-13 1.0 x 10-13 4.1 x 10-13 1.0 x 10-9
water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer non fatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
f. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
h. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
chosen as representative of the fuel assembly breach accident (E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 1983). During normal SRS operations, the inert, non-uranium-containing extremities of some
SNF elements are cut off in the repackaging basin before the elements are bundled. The
accident occurs when the actual uranium fuel is inadvertently cut, causing a radioactive release.
The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-7. The estimated frequency of
occurrence for this accident is 1.6 x 10-1 per year, based on SRS operating experience with SNF.
Because of anticipated differences in operations and facilities at the NTS, however, the actual
frequency is expected to be much less than 1.6 x 10-1 per year.
5.15.4.1.2 Dropped Fuel Cask-The dropped fuel cask accident that has been
postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen as
representative of the dropped fuel cask/fuel handling accident for the new Centralization
Alternative facility at NTS.
This accident is initiated when a fuel cask is dropped and overturned
in the fuel transfer area. Broken fuel elements spill out of the cask, within the pool building but
away from the pool. It is assumed that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all of the broken
fuel elements in three canisters: 42 fuel elements, each containing 22.5 kilograms (50 pounds) of
fuel. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-8. The probability of this accident
is estimated to be less than 1 x 10-4 per year.
5.15.4.1.3 Severe Impact and Fire-The severe impact and fire accident that has
been postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen as
representative of the severe impact and fire/onsite transportation accident for the new
Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.
This accident assumes an unspecified initiating event
that subjects the fuel assemblies to a severe impact, breach of the transport cask, and a fire.
During the accident, the fuel pins rupture on impact or upon heating in the fire, which burns for
an hour before being extinguished. Volatiles, particulates, and noble gases are released to the
atmosphere. The source term for a release of 540 curies is shown in Table 5.15-9. The
estimated probability of occurrence for this accident, reflecting the fact that the facilities of this
site would be new, is less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.4 Wind-driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks-The wind-driven
missile impact into storage casks accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval
Reactors Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the wind-driven
Table 5.
15-7. Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly
breach accident at the NTS.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Iodine-131 7.1 x 10-2
Iodine-133 1.4 x 10-30
Krypton-85 1.8 x 102
Xenon-133m 1.1 x 10-8
Xenon-133 1.1 x 100
a. Source: E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1983).
Table 5.15-8. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident
at the NTS.
Release (Ci)
Radionuclide
Onsite (2 hours) Offiste (8 hours)
Plutonium-236 1.3 x 10-8 5.4 x 10-8
Plutonium-238 2.9 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-2
Plutonium-239 6.7 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-2
Plutonium-240 3.5 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-2
Plutonium-241 2.7 x 10-1 1.1 x 100
Plutonium-242 1.3 x 10-6 5.1 x 10-6
Americium-241 5.7 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-2
Curium-244 2.8 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-3
Europium-154 5.4 x 10-3 2.1 x 10-2
Cesium-134 7.9 x 10-3 3.2 x 10-2
Cesium-137 4.5 x 10-1 1.8 x 100
Cerium-144 1.7 x 10-3 6.8 x 10-3
Praseodymium-144 1.7 x 10-3 6.8 x 10-3
Praseodymium-144m 2.0 x 10-5 8.1 x 10-5
Promethium-147 1.2 x 10-1 4.9 x 10-1
Antimony-125 7.3 x 10-3 2.9 x 10-2
Tellurium-125m 1.8 x 10-3 7.3 x 10-3
Ruthenium-106 3.2 x 10-3 1.3 x 10-2
Strontium-90 3.5 x 10-1 1.4 x 100
Yttrium-90 3.5 x 10-1 1.4 x 100
a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix A, Table A-1.
Table 5.15-9. Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident
at the NTS.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Tritium 4.6 x 101
Krypton-85 4.0 x 102
Strontium-90 2.7 x 10-2
Ruthenium-106 1.3 x 100
Cesium-134 1.7 x 101
Cesium-137 8.0 x 101
Plutonium-238 8.9 x 10-4
Plutonium-239 1.6 x 10-3
Plutonium-240 1.8 x 10-3
Plutonium-241 7.3 x 10-2
Americium-241 1.0 x 10-3
a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix A, Table A-14.
missile accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS. This accident is initiated
by natural phenomena, a major wind storm or tornado in excess of facility design basis. In this
scenario, a large object is propelled by the wind into a storage container, causing the container
seal to be breached. No fuel damage results from the impact because of the strength of the
containers used. The source term is based on the spent nuclear fuel corrosion film. One percent
of the original corrosion film on the fuel is released from the cask to the atmosphere. The
source term is shown in Table 5.15-10. The probability of this event is estimated to be less than
1 x 10-5 per year, based on a design basis tornado probability of 1 x 10-3 per year and a missile
impact with damage probability of less than 1 x 10-2.
5.15.4.1.5 Airplane Crash Into Dry Storage-The airplane crash into dry storage
accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Reactors Site (reference Volume 1,
Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the dry storage area accident
for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.
This accident initiated by an airplane
crash into the SNF dry storage facility. The accident is postulated to cause damage to a single
storage cask. Due to the severity of the impact, the cask seal is assumed to be breached,
resulting in damage to the fuel and the release of corrosion products, located on the SNF
exterior, to the environment. The impact also causes a fire and a release of fission products. It
is assumed that 1 percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged either by the
impact or by the fire, and that those fission products are available for release. Of the available
fission products, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent of the
cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to the environment. Also, 10 percent
of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from the cask to the
atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-11. The probability of this
accident is small and is assumed to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.6 Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Facility-The airplane crash into the dry
cell facility accident that has been postulated to occur at the naval Reactors Site (reference
Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the canning and
characterization cell accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.
This
accident is initiated by an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. The accident is postulated to
cause significant damage to the building, resulting in the loss of containment and filtered exhaust
Table 5.15-10. Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact into a
storage cask at the NTS.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Cobalt-60 9.58 x 10-2
Iron-55 1.76 x 10-1
Cobalt-58 3.54 x 10-2
Manganese-54 5.98 x 10-3
Iron-59 5.11 x 10-4
a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix D, Section F.1.4.2.2.1.
Table 5.15-11. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry storage facility
at the NTS.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Cesium-134 2.6 x 101
Cesium-137 3.6 x 101
Plutonium-238 5.9 x 10-2
Barium-137m 3.1 x 100
Strontium-90 3.1 x 100
Cerium-144 7.2 x 100
Niobium-95 4.4 x 100
Yttrium-90 3.1 x 100
Ruthenium-106 6.1 x 10-1
a. Source: Volume 1, Appendix D, Section F.1.4.2.2.2.
systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell are damaged by the impacts and fire. The impact also
results in the release of corrosion products to the environment. For this accident scenario, 1
percent of the fuel units stored inside the dry cell are assumed to be damaged by either the
impact or the resultant fire and those fission products would be available for release. Of the
fission products available for release, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens,
1.1 percent of the cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to the
environment. Ten percent of the available corrosion products are released to the environment.
The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-12. The probability of this accident is
estimated to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.7 Airplane Crash into Water Pool-The airplane crash into the SNF water
pool accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Reactors Site (reference Volume 1,
Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the SNF water pool accident
for the new Centralization Alternative facility at NTS.
This externally initiated accident occurs
when an airplane crashes into an SNF water pool and damages the fuel units stored there.
Fission products and corrosion products are released from the fuel units into the water pool, but
the pool water is not released to the environment. The presence of the pool water results in only
a release of gaseous fission products to the atmosphere. In this accident scenario 1 percent of all
the fuel units stored inside the pool are postulated to be damaged and those fission products are
available for release. Of the available fission products, 100 percent of the noble gases and
25 percent of the halogens are released to the pool water. Due to the presence of pool water,
there is a reduction of the halogen release by a factor of 10 prior to release to the atmosphere.
The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-13. The probability of this accident is
estimated to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological
hazards are a chemical spill and fire and a diesel fuel fire. Both of these accidents are associated
with the Expended Core Facility operations and the accident frequencies and impacts are
addressed in Volume 1, Appendix D. The analyses of these accidents considered the impacts to
workers on the site as well as to the offsite population. The impacts were measured in terms of
potential heath effects due to exposure to toxic chemicals released during these accidents. Since
the ECF at this site will be a new design and construction, it will incorporate all applicable
Table 5.15-12. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry facility at the NTS Table 5.15-13. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crach into an SNF water pool at the NTS standards and regulations and therefore limit the potential exposures to the workers and the
public in the event of an accident.
5.15.4.3 Secondary Impacts. In the event of an accidental release of radioactive
substances, there is a potential for secondary impacts to cultural resources, endangered species,
water resources, and public and agricultural land use, the ecology in the vicinity of the accident,
national defense, and local economics. In order to assess the impacts, a severe accident and the
resulting release of radioactive material were evaluated. The accident chosen for evaluation was
an airplane crash into the Centralization Alternative canning and characterization (dry) cell.
Utilizing the 50 percent meteorology and the typical flat topography of the proposed SNF site,
the dispersion of radioactive material and the resulting dose were calculated. Figure 5.15-1
shows the isodose lines ranging from 870 millirem per year down to 87 millirem per year, which
is approximately equivalent to cosmic and terrestrial background radiation. The farthest distance
between the accident site and the 87 millirem per year line is 8,000 feet (2,400 meters).
Therefore, in order to minimize the potential impact of an accident on the non-NTS personnel
and the public, the SNF facility should be located at least 8,000 feet (2,400 meters) from the NTS
boundary. Given the available space within Area 5 and the large buffer zone surrounding the
proposed SNF site and the NTS, the final siting location could easily accommodate this design
constraint. This design constraint could be applied to other environmental resources during the
final siting process. The secondary impacts in other environmental resources which would not be
accommodated as easily are summarized below. Table 5.15-14 presents a summary of the
postulated severe accident secondary impacts on the environment, economy, and national
defense. The evaluation was performed using 50 percent meteorology.
5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative
The Decentralization Alternative is not applicable for the NTS.
5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning and Basis Alternative
There are currently no SNF operations at NTS. The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
is not applicable for NTS.
Figure 5.15-1. Typical Isodose lines for an airplane crash into a dry cell accident with 50 percent meteorology for northeastern Area 5 of the NTS.
Table 5.15-14. Secondary impacts of the Centralized Alternative accidents at NTS.
Environmental orImpact
social factor
Land Use Possible minor impact. The dispersion of radioactive material
would be limited within the NTS boundaries. The major NTS
facilities in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site include the
Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Liquified Gaseous
Fuels Spill Test Facility.
Cultural Resource Possible minor impact. Surveys conducted for other Area 5
activities have indicated only scattered artifacts in the vicinity of
the proposed SNF site. No major prehistoric/historic sites are
anticipated to be located in the vicinity of the proposed SNF
site. Access to any random artifacts found during the accident
investigation and cleanup would have to be restricted until
radioactive decay had occurred.
Aesthetic and No impact. The area of contamination does not envelop
Scenic Resources aesthetic and scenic resources.
Water Resources No impact. The nuclear testing program has dispersed
radioactive material in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site
during aboveground nuclear tests. Due to the great depths of
the groundwater, the groundwater was not contaminated. It is
anticipated that an accident would not alter the pathways to the
groundwater.
Ecological Possible impact. Many threatened or endangered plants and
Resources animals, except fish species, are potentially on or near the NTS.
Treaty Rights No impact. There are no onsite areas subject to Native
American Treaty rights.
National Defense No impact. The area of contamination does not envelop U.S.
military or defense industry facilities.
Economic Impacts Possible minor impact. The dispersion of radioactive material
would be limited within the NTS boundaries. The major NTS
facilities in the vicinity of the proposed SNF site include the
Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Liquified Gaseous
Fuels Spill Test Facility.
5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, new facilities would be constructed and operated for
SNF. Details for the new facilities have not been defined, but it is reasonable to expect that they
would be similar to but with less throughput and storage requirements than those needed for the
Centralization Alternative. Due to smaller throughput and storage requirements, the potential
for accidents (i.e., probability of occurrence) will be similar to but less than those described for
the Centralization Alternative. The accident consequences would be similar for both alternatives.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume the accident consequences and risks described for the
Centralization Alternative envelop the Regionalization Alternative.
5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans
DOE has issued a series of Orders specifying the requirements for emergency preparedness
(DOE Orders 5500.1A, 5500.2A, 5500.3, draft 5500.3A, 5500.4, and 5500.9), and each DOE site
has established an emergency management program. These programs are developed and
maintained to ensure adequate response for most accident conditions and to provide the
framework to readily extend response efforts for accidents not specifically considered. The
emergency management program incorporates activities associated with planning, preparedness,
and response.
Officials at each DOE site have specified the emergency preparedness requirements for the
DOE facilities under their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the relevant DOE Orders. All
existing facilities have emergency plans and procedures that either implement the DOE and site
requirements or are integrated with the site planning.
The Nevada Operations Office Emergency Preparedness Plan is designed to minimize or
mitigate the impact of any emergency upon the health and safety of employees and the public.
The plan integrates all emergency planning into a single entity to minimize overlap and
duplication, and to ensure proper responses to emergencies not covered by a plan or directive.
The plan is based upon the concept that the Manager, Nevada Operations Office, has the
capability to manage, counter, and recover from an emergency occurring within the Nevada
Operations Office responsibility.
The Nevada Operations Office plan provides for (1) identification and notification of
personnel for any emergency that may develop during operational or nonoperational hours;
(2) the receipt of warnings, weather advisories, or any other information that may provide
advance warning of a possible emergency; and (3) prearranged actions which may be taken to
minimize the effect of the emergency. The plan is based upon current Nevada Operations Office
vulnerability assessments, resources, and capabilities regarding emergency preparedness.
5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or
Similar Actions
The NTS already contains several major DOE and non-DOE facilities, unrelated to SNF,
that would continue to operate throughout the operating life of the proposed SNF management
facilities. The activities associated with these existing facilities produce environmental
consequences that have been included in the baseline environmental conditions (Chapter 4)
against which Sections 5.1 through 5.15 have assessed the environmental consequences of the
Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. This section uses the environmental baseline
conditions presented in Chapter 4 to assess potential cumulative impacts from the proposed SNF
management facilities, if constructed at the NTS, plus other reasonably forseeable activities.
In addition to the proposed SNF management facilities, reasonably foreseeable activities
considered in this cumulative impact assessment include the proposed Expended Core Facility
(described in Volume 1, Appendix D), activities included in the present Five-Year Plan and
Master Plan for the NTS (DOE/NV 1993b), and the potential geologic repository at the Yucca
Mountain site. Major programmatic initiatives consist of constructing the following: facilities and
site improvements for a new consolidated testing area sponsored by Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories; a Transuranic Waste Certification Building; refurbishment or
expansion of several existing facilities; construction of several small office buildings; several site
assessment and remediation projects; several roadway upgrading or improvement projects;
several flood control projects; and several utility installation or upgrade projects. In addition, a
number of communications, security, an safety improvements identified in the Master Plan are
under consideration throughout the NTS.
Specifically with respect to Area 5, a number of projects are proposed (DOE/NV 1993b).
Continued use of the Radioactive Waste Management Site and the Spill Test Facility is proposed.
Providing storage for transuranic waste and hazardous waste prior to offsite disposal is also
proposed. Additional projects have also been proposed to provide utility and infrastructure
upgrades and improvements. These projects include replacing the Frenchman Flat power
substation and a number of construction projects for water Service Area C including connecting
the Yucca Flat and Frenchman Flat water systems, and adding additional tanks and water lines in
the area. Nearby proposals identified for Area 6 include following a formal, expansion-oriented
land-use plan for the Control Point, Yucca Lake, and the Construction Facilities.
The potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, which could involve
construction and operation of a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste on
NTS land and other federal land on the western boundary of the NTS, is also considered in this
cumulative impacts analysis. Considering the relatively isolated location of the NTS, future new
offsite activities (other than the potential geologic repository at Yucca Mountain) are assumed to
be of limited scope.
The following cumulative impacts analysis considers the potential incremental effects from
the proposed SNF management facilities and the proposed Expended Core Facility in detail.
The potential incremental impacts from activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan, and Master
Plan the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, and from future offsite
activities are assessed in a more qualitative manner.
5.16.1 Centralization Alternative
Separate analyses of potential cumulative impacts from the Centralization Alternative
against the environmental baseline conditions presented in Chapter 4 are provided below.
5.16.1.1 Land Use. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would
require the dedication of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land on
the NTS. Construction of the proposed Expended Core Facility would require the dedication of
an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of undeveloped land, increasing the total land
requirement to 120 acres (0.48 square kilometer). This represents less than 1 percent of the
roughly 450,000 acres (1,800 square kilometers) of undeveloped land remaining on the 864,000
acre (3,500 square kilometers) NTS. Additional unknown areas of undeveloped land, generally
parcels of under 100 acres (0.4 square kilometer), might have to be dedicated to some of the
activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan. Many of these proposed activities do
not require the dedication of undeveloped land. Land on the southwestern part of the NTS has
already been allocated for the potential Yucca Mountain repository and current site
characterization for a potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site.
Considering the large area of undeveloped land on the NTS, the cumulative dedication of
land to all reasonably foreseeable activities on NTS would not likely serve to further limit the
availability of land on the NTS for future development. Large areas of undeveloped land are
available for development off of the NTS, and any future offsite development coupled with the
proposed onsite development discussed above is not likely to create regional land shortages that
could severely limit future regional development.
5.16.1.2 Occupational and Public Health. The annual collective effective dose
equivalent from the existing NTS facilities to the population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of
the NTS is 0.0052 person-rem. Added to this baseline, operation of the proposed SNF
management facilities might contribute an additional 0.082 person-rem, increasing the cumulative
effective dose to 0.087 person-rem.
The annual collective effective dose equivalent from the existing NTS facilities to a potential
maximally exposed individual at the site boundary is 0.011 millirem per year. Operation of the
proposed SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 0.12 millirem per year,
resulting in a cumulative annual dose of 0.13 millirem per year to this maximally exposed
individual.
The total annual baseline worker dose seen from normal NTS operations is about 4 person-
rem. The total annual SNF management facility worker dose is expected to be roughly
32 person-rem. Hence, the cumulative annual dose might be 36 person-rem.
Over the planned 40-year operational lifetime of the SNF management facility, a total
population dose of 3.5 person-rem will be observed from continuous operation of the existing
NTS facilities and the SNF management facility. This equates to a risk of fatal cancer of
4.4 x 10-5 over the 40-year span. For the maximally exposed individual, the total dose over the
40-year period equates to a risk of fatal cancer of 2.6 x 10-6. For the SNF management worker,
the total dose over the 40-year span corresponds to a risk of fatal cancer of 6.4 x 10-4.
Additional radiological impacts are not expected from operation of the proposed Expended
Core Facility. Analysis has shown that the dose to all individuals considered (workers, and offsite
individuals) from Expended Core Facility operations might be much less than one millirem per
year.
5.16.1.3 Noise. Increases in noise levels from construction and operation of the SNF
management facilities and the Expended Core Facility would be limited to temporary, minor
construction noise and small increases in traffic noise occurring along various access routes to the
NTS due to increases in employment. Because of the NTS's large size and sparsely inhabited
surroundings, any cumulative noise levels generated on the NTS by the proposed SNF
management facilities, the proposed Expended Core Facility, the potential geologic repository at
the Yucca Mountain site, and activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan would
not propagate offsite at levels that would impact the general population. Although the
cumulative offsite noise level attributed to future offsite activities can not be estimated, the
potential incremental addition attributable to the proposed SNF management facilities would be
minimal. Minor increases in traffic noise on U.S. Route 95 could be possible due to increases in
activity on and near the NTS.
5.16.1.4 Groundwater and Surface Water Resources. Operation of the proposed SNF
management facilities would require the withdrawal of an estimated 3.6 million gallons per year
(13.6 million liters per year) of groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Operation of the
proposed Expended Core Facility would require the withdrawal of an estimated additional
2.5 million gallons per year (9.5 million liters per year) from that subbasin, resulting in a
combined withdrawal of an estimated 6.1 million gallons per year (23.1 million liters per year).
The water demands for the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site would be
met by the Alkali Flat Furnace Creek Ranch Subbasin and therefore would not contribute to the
cumulative water withdrawals from the Ash Meadows Subbasin. Information concerning the
water demands of activities in the Five-Year Plan, Master Plan, or future offsite activities is not
available.
Although total withdrawals of groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin have not
exceeded the subbasin perennial yield, localized withdrawals of groundwater in the Frenchman
Flat hydrographic area of the Ash Meadows Subbasin have exceeded the estimate of
precipitation recharge for the area. This recharge estimate was exceeded for more than thirty
years with no decline in static water levels. Accurate measurement of static water levels are,
however, precluded by numerous conditions on the NTS. Because of hydrogeologic complexities,
regional groundwater flow at the NTS is not constrained by the hydrographic basins which are
defined by local topography. Therefore any potential groundwater overdraft in the Frenchman
Flat hydrographic area indicated by previous yield estimates are likely be made up by untapped
groundwater from neighboring hydrographic basins. Localized impacts could occur if the
perennial yield of Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is exceeded. Potential impacts include
depletion of water stored locally in the regional aquifer, removal of that groundwater from other
potential uses, and the potential modification of the rate and direction of contaminant migration
resulting from underground nuclear testing. The complex issues of groundwater contamination
and use are being addressed in the Resource Management Plan being prepared in conjunction
with the NTS site-wide EIS.
5.16.1.5 Biotic Resources. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities
would require the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of desert habitat
supporting flora and fauna characteristic of the ecotone between the Mohave Desert and the
Great Basin. Construction of the proposed Expended Core Facility would require the
disturbance of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of desert habitat, resulting in a
combined conversion of 120 acres (0.48 square kilometer) of terrestrial habitat to developed uses.
Additional areas of desert habitat would be lost during construction of activities proposed in the
Five-Year Plan and Master Plan, during construction of the potential geologic repository at the
Yucca Mountain site, and during future offsite construction activities. Considering the broad
extent of desert habitat on and surrounding the NTS, the cumulative loss of desert habitat would
be minimal.
The NTS lies within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally listed threatened species. If
the desert tortoise occurred in areas subject to development, tortoises could be injured from
construction activities. The proposed SNF management facilities (and the proposed Expended
Core Facility) would be constructed at the edge of the tortoise's range, however, and few have
been found in the affected area. Habitat losses due to construction of the proposed SNF
management facilities and other proposed onsite and offsite construction activities could result in
a slight cumulative loss of habitat for the desert tortoise. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
would be consulted in accordance with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act prior to
construction of the potential SNF management facilities to ensure that any potential cumulative
effect on desert tortoise populations would be minimal. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
would also have to be similarly notified and given an opportunity to comment prior to
construction of the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site and prior to any
other major construction activities.
5.16.1.6 Air Quality. The potential cumulative air emissions from the proposed SNF
management facilities and the proposed Expended Core Facility would not result in an
exceedance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Nevada state criteria. Also, there
would be no exceedance of Federal National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
or DOE radiological standards. Air emissions from the other planned activities have not yet
been defined.
5.16.1.7 Socioeconomics. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might
generate up to 800 new jobs during the year 2005 and beyond. Operation of the proposed
Expended Core Facility might generate up to 562 additional jobs during that year, resulting in a
combined increase of up to 1,362 new jobs. The 7,091 jobs presently forecasted for the NTS in
the year 2005 might be increased by 19 percent, to as much as 8,453 jobs. The 752,356 jobs
presently forecasted for the surrounding area in the year 2005 might be increased by less than 1
percent, to as much as 753,718 jobs. Additional employment increases could also result from the
potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site, activities proposed in the Five-Year
Plan and Master Plan, and new offsite activities, but specific estimates are not available.
The cumulative effect of the employment increases discussed above would depend on future
actions at the NTS and throughout the regional economy. These employment increases could
cause minor fluctuations in employment and housing demands. However, activities at the NTS
generally have a relatively modest effect on long-term regional economic growth and productivity
in Clark County because of the implicit growth projections in the services and retail trade sectors
driving long-term growth in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical Area. Additionally, in recent
years the shutdown of nuclear testing activities at the NTS has caused employment levels to fall.
These losses have not been considered in long-term employment forecasts. If nuclear testing
activities do not resume at the NTS, the projected employment increases noted above could be
offset by employment losses.
5.16.1.8 Transportation. An estimated 4.0 x 10-4 and 1.4 x 10-3 accident occupational
fatalities and accident nonoccupational fatalities might occur over the 40-year life of the
proposed SNF management facilities due to the transportation of hazardous material to the
facilities. This does not include fatalities due to leakage of hazardous waste. Similar data are
not available for the other planned activities.
5.16.1.9 Waste Management. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities
would generate an estimated 203 cubic meters (266 cubic yards) per year of low level waste and
an estimated 16 cubic meters (21 cubic yards) per year of transuranic waste. Operation of the
proposed Expended Core Facility would generate an additional 425 cubic meters (556 cubic
yards) of low level waste (for a combined total by both facilities of 628 cubic meters (821 cubic
yards)) but would not generate any additional transuranic waste. No other radioactive waste,
including high level waste or mixed waste, would be generated by either facility. Comparable
data for the potential geologic repository at the Yucca Mountain site or for offsite activities or
activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan and Master Plan is not available. All wastes generated
by the proposed SNF management facilities and other planned activities on the NTS would be
treated and disposed of in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulations.
5.16.1.10 Other Resources. The absence of impacts, or very minimal impacts, from the
proposed SNF management facilities to cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources,
utilities, and geologic resources ensures that their potential contribution to cumulative impacts
affecting these resources would be negligible.
5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative
Because impacts from the proposed SNF management facilities under the Regionalization
Alternative would be equal to or less than those under the Centralization Alternative, the
potential cumulative impacts would also be equal or less. Generally, the Regionalization
Alternative requires less construction and smaller scale operations, and the potential for
cumulative impacts is therefore less.
5.17 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided
5.17.1 Overview
This chapter discusses potentially unavoidable adverse impacts to the environment resulting
from construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS under the
Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Unavoidable adverse impacts are impacts which
cannot be mitigated by changes in project design, operation, or construction, or by other
measures.
5.17.2 Centralization Alternative
Operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the NTS under the Centralization Alternative
would increase the radiation dose rate to the maximally exposed individual by 0.12 millirem/year,
resulting in only a minimal increase in cancer risk. The number of fatal cancers per year of
operations on the NTS from existing sources and the SNF facilities would be 4.4 x 10-5.
Construction of the proposed SNF facilities would require the disturbance of approximately
90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land. Although this represents less than 1
percent of the undeveloped land on NTS, it would eliminate potential terrestrial wildlife habitat,
including habitat potentially suitable for the federally listed desert tortoise. It would also require
the dedication of a small land parcel potentially suitable for other construction projects, but
similar land parcels are abundant on the NTS.
Operation of the proposed SNF facilities would require the withdrawal of an estimated
3.6 million gallons (13.6 million liters) per year of groundwater from the Ash Meadows Subbasin.
Existing localized withdrawals of groundwater from Frenchman Flat hydrographic area of this
subbasin already exceed the estimate of precipitation rechange for the area. However, the total
withdrawal from the Ash Meadows Subbasin does not exceed its total perennial yield. Any water
withdrawn would therefore not be discharged at Ash Meadows and the other discharge points in
the deserts southwest of NTS.
The potential impacts from the Centralization Alternative to the other environmental
resources discussed in Chapter 5 are not unavoidable adverse impacts.
5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative
Potential unavoidable adverse impacts associated with the Regionalization Alternative would
resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. The extent of the impacts
could be less due to the reduced land requirements, reduced extent of construction disturbance,
and reduced scale of operations.
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment
and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity
Implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse
impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. These resources include
use of the environment and those associated with construction and operation of the SNF
management facilities.
The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of
resources including energy, construction materials, and labor in order to achieve the objective of
safety managing SNF to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.
Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to those uses
from the time of construction through the cessation of operations, at which time the facilities
could be converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site restored to its
original land use.
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources
5.19.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources resulting
from the use of materials that can not be recovered or recycled, or that must be consumed or
reduced to irrecoverable forms.
5.19.2 Centralization Alternative
Construction and operation of SNF facilities under the Centralization Alternative would
require commitments of electrical energy, fuel, concrete, steel, sand, gravel and miscellaneous
chemicals. Groundwater to operate the SNF facilities would not be discharged in the deserts to
the southwest of NTS. More detailed analyses would be required to determine irreversible
effects on localized groundwater availability. The land dedicated to the SNF facilities would
become available for other rural uses following closure and decommissioning.
5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative
Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources associated with the Regionalization
Alternative would resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. However,
the extent of these resource commitments could be less, due to the reduced land requirements
and reduced scale of operations.
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention
The DOE Nevada Field Office (DOE/NV) published a Waste Minimization and Pollution
Prevention Awareness Plan in June 1991 to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed,
and radioactive wastes generated at DOE/NV facilities. The plan is designed to reduce the
possible pollutant releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of employees and
the public. All DOE/NV contractors and NTS users that exceed the EPA criteria for small-
quantity generators are establishing their own waste minimization and pollution prevention
awareness programs that are implemented by the DOE/NV plan. Contractor programs ensure
that waste minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, state, and local environmental
laws and regulations, and DOE Orders (DOE/NV 1993c).
Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of
a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of wastes generated, and
implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste minimization
concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, and in upgrades
of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representatives from each
contractor and NTS user has been established to coordinate DOE/NV waste minimization and
pollution awareness activities (DOE/NV 1993c).
5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures
Potential impact avoidance and mitigation measures are addressed in Chapter 5, Sections 1
through 15 as appropriate.
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ULI (Urban Land Institute), 1992, ULI Market Profiles: 1992, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Land
Institute.
USAF (U.S. Air Force), 1993, Environmental Assessment for Southern Nevada Relay Node, Site No. RN
8W918NV, Air Force Material Command Electronics System Center, Hanscomb Air Force Base,
Massachusetts, March 5.
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Department of Interior (USAF et al.), 1991, Special Nevada Report,
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, September.
U.S.COE (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), 1987, Corps of Engineers Wetlands Delineation Manual,
Technical Report Y-87-1, U.S. Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., January.
Winograd, I. J., 1970, "Noninstrumental Factors Affecting Measurement of Static Water Levels in
Deeply Buried Aquifers and Aquitards, Nevada Test Site," Ground Water, 8, 2. pp. 19-28.
7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
oC degrees Celsius
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
Ci curie(s)
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EIS environmental impact statement
ECF Expended Core Facility
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
yF degrees Fahrenheit
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
g gram
gal gallon(s)
hr hour
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
kg kilogram
km kilometer
kv kilovolt
y liter
m meter
m3 cubic meter
mi mile
mi2 square mile
min minute
mph miles per hour
mR milliroentgen
mrem millirem
MTHM metric tons of heavy metal
MW Megawatt
nCi nanocurie
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTS Nevada Test Site
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR Oak Ridge Reservation
PCB polychlorinated biphenyl
pCi picocurie(s)
PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PM10 particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter
ppm parts per million
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SNF spent nuclear fuel
SRS Savannah River Site
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
ug micrograms
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
yr year
OAK RIDGE RESERVATION
1. INTRODUCTION 3.1-1
2. OAK RIDGE RESERVATION SITE BACKGROUND 3.2-1
2.1 Overview 3.2-1
2.1.1 Site Description 3.2-1
2.1.2 Site History 3.2-5
2.1.3 Mission 3.2-6
2.1.4 Oak Ridge Reservation Operations Management 3.2-6
2.2 Regulatory Framework 3.2-7
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program 3.2-8
2.3.1 Building 3525 - Irradiated Fuels Examination
Laboratory 3.2-10
2.3.2 Building 4501 - High Level Radiochemical Laboratory 3.2-10
2.3.3 Building 7920 - Radiochemical Engineering Development
Center 3.2-10
2.3.4 Dry Storage Facilities 7823A, 7827, and 7829 3.2-10
2.3.5 Research Reactors 3.2-12
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES 3.3-1
3.1 Description of Management Alternatives 3.3-1
3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action 3.3-1
3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization 3.3-2
3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis 3.3-3
3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization 3.3-3
3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization 3.3-6
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives 3.3-9
4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 3.4-1
4.1 Overview 3.4-1
4.2 Land Use 3.4-1
4.3 Socioeconomics 3.4-6
4.3.1 Region of Influence 3.4-6
4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population 3.4-6
4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing
Infrastructure 3.4-9
4.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources 3.4-11
4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures 3.4-11
4.4.2 Native American Resources 3.4-11
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources 3.4-12
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 3.4-12
4.6 Geologic Resources 3.4-14
4.6.1 General Geology 3.4-14
4.6.2 Geologic Resources 3.4-20
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards 3.4-21
4.7 Air Resources 3.4-25
4.7.1 Climatology 3.4-25
4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks 3.4-29
4.7.3 Air Releases 3.4-29
4.7.4 Air Quality 3.4-32
4.8 Water Resources 3.4-38
4.8.1 Surface Water 3.4-38
4.8.2 Groundwater 3.4-44
4.9 Ecological Resources 3.4-47
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources 3.4-48
4.9.2 Wetlands 3.4-51
4.9.3 Aquatic Ecology 3.4-51
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species 3.4-53
4.10 Noise 3.4-56
4.11 Traffic and Transportation 3.4-58
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 3.4-61
4.12.1 Atmospheric Emissions and Doses 3.4-62
4.12.2 Groundwater/Surface Water Contamination and Doses 3.4-62
4.12.3 External Gamma Radiation 3.4-64
4.12.4 Radiation Dose and Health Effects Summary 3.4-64
4.12.5 Health Effects Studies 3.4-65
4.12.6 Chemical Dose and Health Effects Summary 3.4-66
4.13 Utilities and Energy 3.4-67
4.13.1 Water Consumption 3.4-67
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption 3.4-68
4.13.3 Fuel Consumption 3.4-68
4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal 3.4-68
4.14 Materials and Waste Management 3.4-69
4.14.1 Transuranic Waste 3.4-72
4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Waste 3.4-72
4.14.3 Low-Level Waste 3.4-83
4.14.4 Hazardous Waste 3.4-83
4.14.5 Industrial Solid Waste 3.4-83
4.14.6 Hazardous Materials 3.4-83
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 3.5-1
5.1 Overview 3.5-1
5.2 Land Use 3.5-1
5.2.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-1
5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-2
5.3 Socioeconomics 3.5-2
5.3.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-4
5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-9
5.3.3 Mitigation Measures 3.5-10
5.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources 3.5-10
5.4.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-10
5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-10
5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources 3.5-11
5.5.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-11
5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-11
5.6 Geologic Resources 3.5-11
5.7 Air Resources 3.5-12
5.7.1 Releases 3.5-13
5.7.2 Air Quality 3.5-17
5.8 Water Resources 3.5-19
5.8.1 Surface Water Quantity 3.5-22
5.8.2 Surface Water Quality 3.5-23
5.8.3 Groundwater Quantity 3.5-25
5.8.4 Groundwater Quality 3.5-25
5.9 Ecological Resources 3.5-26
5.9.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-26
5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-28
5.10 Noise 3.5-28
5.11 Traffic and Transportation 3.5-30
5.11.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-30
5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-32
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety 3.5-32
5.12.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-32
5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-36
5.13 Utilities and Energy 3.5-36
5.13.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-37
5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-38
5.14 Materials and Waste Management 3.5-38
5.14.1 Methodology 3.5-39
5.14.2 Materials and Waste Management 3.5-39
5.15 Facility Accidents 3.5-42
5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at ORR 3.5-43
5.15.2 Methodology 3.5-43
5.15.3 No Action Alternative 3.5-47
5.15.4 Centralization Alternative 3.5-56
5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative 3.5-70
5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative 3.5-73
5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-73
5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans 3.5-73
5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts from Connected or Similar Actions 3.5-74
5.16.1 Centralization Alternative 3.5-75
5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-80
5.17 Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided 3.5-80
5.17.1 Overview 3.5-80
5.17.2 Centralization Alternative 3.5-80
5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-81
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and the
Maintenance of Long-Term Productivity 3.5-81
5.19 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources 3.5-82
5.19.1 Overview 3.5-82
5.19.2 Centralization Alternative 3.5-82
5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative 3.5-83
5.20 Potential Mitigation Measures 3.5-83
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention 3.5-83
5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures 3.5-83
6. REFERENCES 3.6-1
7. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 3.7-1
FIGURES
2.1-1 Oak Ridge Reservation Regional Map 3.2-2
2.1-2 Oak Ridge Reservation Site and Transportation 3.2-3
4.2-1 Generalized Land Use at the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-3
4.2-2 Recreation Areas in the Vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-4
4.6-1 Generalized Map of the Southern Appalachian Geologic Provinces
Showing the Location of the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-15
4.6-2 Geologic Map of the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-16
4.6-3 Stratigraphy of the ORR on the Whiteoak Mountain and
Copper Creek Thrust Sheets 3.4-17
4.6-4 Generalized Geologic Profile Beneath the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-18
4.6-5 Oak Ridge - Site Specific Uniform Hazard Response Spectra
for Horizontal Rock Motion 3.4-24
4.7-1 Wind Roses for Y-12 West Tower (@1O and 60m) for 1992 at ORR 3.4-27
4.7-2 Sources of Radiation Exposure, Unrelated to Oak Ridge
Reservation Operations, to Individuals in the Vicinity of ORR 3.4-35
4.8-1 Locations of the Clinch River and Tributaries on the
Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-40
4.9-1 Oak Ridge Reservation Plant Communities 3.4-49
4.11-1 Oak Ridge Reservation Regional Transportation Map 3.4-59
4.14-1 Flow Diagram of Y-12 Plant Storage and Disposal Units at ORR 3.4-70
4.14-2 Flow Diagram of K-25 Waste Storage Units at ORR 3.4-73
4.14-3 Flow Diagram of ORNL Waste Treatment Units and
Storage and Disposal Units at ORR 3.4-75
5.3-1 Total Employment Effects - ORR Centralization Alternative 3.5-5
5.15-1 Isodose Lines for an Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Accident with
50 Percent Meteorology at Oak Ridge Reservation 3.5-71
TABLES
2.3-1 Oak Ridge Reservation SNF Storage Facilities 3.2-11
3.2-1 Comparison of alternatives at the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.3-10
4.3-1 Aggregate regional economic and demograph indicators for ORR 3.4-10
4.7-1 Radioactive atmospheric emissions from the ORR during 1992 3.4-30
4.7-2 Nonradiological emissions at ORR 3.4-33
4.7-3 Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from
ORR operations during 1992 3.4-34
4.7-4 Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent
applicable regulations and guidelines at the ORR 3.4-36
4.8-1 1992 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
noncompliance at the ORR 3.4-43
4.9-1 Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other
special-status species that potentially occur on or in the
vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation 3.4-54
4.10-1 City of Oak Ridge maximum allowable noise limits applicable to
the ORR 3.4-57
4.12-1 Summary of estimated radiation dose to public from 1992 operations
at ORR 3.4-63
4.14-1 Projected 1995 transuranic waste management activities
at the ORR (ORNL complex) 3.4-77
4.14-2 Baseline transuranic waste management activities as of 1995 at the
ORR (ORNL complex) 3.4-78
4.14-3 Projected 1995 mixed low-level waste management activities at the
ORR 3.4-79
4.14-4 Baseline mixed low-level waste management activities as of 1995
at the ORR 3.4-81
4.14-5 Projected 1995 low-level waste management activities at the ORR 3.4-84
4.14-6 Baseline low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at
the ORR 3.4-86
4.14-7 Projected 1995 hazardous waste management activities at the ORR 3.4-88
4.14-8 Baseline hazardous waste management activities as of 1995 at the
ORR 3.4-90
4.14-9 Projected 1995 industrial solid waste management activities at
the ORR 3.4-93
4.14-10 Baseline industrial solid waste management activities as of 1995
at the ORR 3.4-94
5.3-1 Socioeconomic effects - Centralization of SNF at
Oak Ridge Reservation 3.5-6
5.7-1 Isotopic release additions due to SNF management facility presence
at ORR 3.5-14
5.7-2 Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF management
facility at ORR 3.5-16
5.7-3 Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR
operations and the proposed SNF management facility 3.5-18
5.7-4 Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent
applicable regulations and guidelines at ORR and proposed
SNF management facility plus current operations 3.5-20
5.7-5 Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous
air pollutants at ORR for offsite receptors 3.5-21
5.12-1 Critical Interim Storage Facility impacts on radiation dose
and cancer risks at ORR 3.5-34
5.14-1 Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF
alternatives at the ORR 3.5-40
5.15-1 Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk
estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology 3.5-48
5.15-2 Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk
estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology 3.5-49
5.15-3 Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis cancer
fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95
percent meteorology 3.5-50
5.15-4 Summary of No Action Alternative accident cancer fatality and
risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology 3.5-51
5.15-5 Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects
and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent
meteorology 3.5-52
5.15-6 Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects
and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent
meteorology 3.5-53
5.15-7 Estimated radionuclide releases for the High Flux Isotope Reactor
fuel pool dam drop accident at ORR 3.5-55
5.15-8 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose
and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent
meteorology 3.5-57
5.15-9 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose
and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent
meteorology 3.5-58
5.15-10 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer
fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent
meteorology 3.5-59
5.15-11 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at
50 percent meteorology 3.5-60
5.15-12 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at
95 percent meteorology 3.5-61
5.15-13 Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis
health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50
percent meteorology 3.5-62
5.15-14 Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel assembly breach accident
at ORR 3.5-64
5.15-15 Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident
at ORR 3.5-64
5.15-16 Estimated radionuclide releases for a severe impact and fire accident
at ORR 3.5-65
5.15-17 Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven missile impact
into a storage cask at ORR 3.5-67
5.15-18 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry
storage facility at ORR 3.5-67
5.15-19 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell
facility at ORR 3.5-69
5.15-20 Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an SNF
water pool at ORR 3.5-69
5.15-21 Secondary impacts of Centralization Alternative accidents at
the ORR 3.5-72
#1. INTRODUCTION
This part assesses the impacts of contruction and operation of proposed spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge Resevation (ORR). The ORR is being evaluated for these
facilities because of the area available, the appparently suitable site environmental parameters,
previous U.S. Department of Energy activities involving radioactive materials at the site, and the
planned long-term government control of the site.
This appendix is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction, Chapter 2 sets the
stage for the area under analysis by providing an overview of the ORR and a discussion of the
Regulatory Framework and the SNF Management Program, and Chapter 3 explains the SNF
alternatives being considered at the site.
Chapter 4 describes the human and natural environment that could be affected as a result
of the introduction of an SNF facility at the ORR. Environmental parameters such as water
resources, socioeconomics, biological resources, and air quality are examples of those
characterized.
Chapter 5 enumerates the environmental consequences that might be anticipated,
summarizes the cumulative impacts, describes unavoidable adverse impacts, and describes the
irreversible and irretrievable committment of resources that might be anticipated if an SNF facility
were built at the ORR. Chapter 6 contains the references used to develop this part of the
environmental impact statement. Chapter 7 contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in
this part of the environmental impact statement.
2. OAK RIDGE RESERVATION SITE BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 Site Description
The Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) is located on approximately 34,667 acres (140 square
kilometers) of federally owned land within the incorporated city limits of Oak Ridge, Tennessee
(see Figure 2.1-1). The City of Oak Ridge and the ORR lie between the Cumberland and
Southern Appalachian mountain ranges. Knoxville is located approximately 25 miles (40
kilometers) southeast of the ORR and is the largest city in the area. The population varies within
the five counties surrounding the ORR. The area around Knoxville is a heavily populated and
highly developed urban area, whereas the area surrounding the ORR is sparsely populated, with
the exception of the city of Oak Ridge, which is considered to have medium density population.
The two main land uses in the five counties surrounding the ORR are forestry and agriculture.
Within the ORR there are three primary complexes: the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site
(formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant), and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) (see Figure 2.1-2). Currently these facilities are being used for research, development,
and production.
The Y-12 Plant is located on the eastern portion of the ORR known as Bear Creek Valley.
The Y-12 Plant serves as a key manufacturing technology center for the development and
demonstration of unique materials, components, and services of importance to DOE and the
nation. This mission is accomplished through the reclamation and storage of nuclear materials,
the manufacture of components to the nation's defense capabilities, support to national security
programs, and services provided to other customers as approved by DOE (MMES 1994a).
The K-25 Site is located on the northwestern portion of the ORR. Its mission is to provide
a base of operation for the Energy Systems Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
programs, thus serving as the "platform" for the restoration of the environment and management
of DOE wastes through leadership and central management of the Environmental Restoration
Figure 2.1-1. Oak Ridge Reservation regional map. Figure 2.1-2. Oak Ridge Reservation site and transportation. and Waste Management and Technology Development Programs in support of DOE, sites
managed for DOE by Energy Systems, other elements of the Federal Government, and the
public. The Toxic Substances Control Act incinerator is managed by and located on the K-25
Site (MMES 1994a).
The ORNL is located in the southern portion of the ORR. The primary mission of ORNL
is to perform leading edge research and development in support of nonweapons roles of DOE
(MMES 1994a). The ORNL uses test and experimental reactors to perform research and for
small-scale radioisotope production activities. The amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated
by these facilities, the amount expected to be generated through the year 2035, and
accommodations being undertaken at the present time to store the fuel currently being generated
are discussed in the following sections.
The buildings located off the ORR but owned and/or operated by the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) are 1) the Scarboro Facility, 2) the Central Training Facility, 3) the
Transportation Safeguards Division Maintenance Facility, and 4) some ancillary and
administrative facilities and structures. The majority of the facilities used by various plant
protection and security groups are located within the plant's boundary. Other offsite facilities
include the DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office, the DOE Office of Scientific and Technical
Information, the Oak Ridge Associated Universities facilities, the American Museum of Science
and Energy, the prime contractor's "Townsite" facilities, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's Atmospheric Turbulence and Diffusion Laboratory, and others. With the
exception of the Federal Office Building and space leased from the private sector, all facilities
are located on DOE-owned land.
The proposed site of the SNF management facility is located on 100 acres (0.40 square
kilometer) of land designated as the West Bear Creek Valley site (see Figure 2.1-2)
(La Grone 1994; MMES 1994b). The proposed SNF storage facility will require 90 of the 100
acres (0.36 of the 0.40 square kilometer) set aside for the facility (Johnson, V. 1994).
The proposed SNF management facility is on Bear Creek Road adjacent to the Clinch
River on the west end of the ORR. The westernmost boundary of the proposed SNF facility is
less than 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) from the ORR boundary. Across Bear Creek Road from the
proposed SNF management facility there is a privately owned industrial park (MMES 1994b).
2.1.2 Site History
The ORR was originally purchased in the early 1940s to house the large-scale production of
fissionable material for the first nuclear weapon in the world. The original tract of land
purchased was 56,833 acres (230 square kilometers). Portions of the original tract were used to
build the City of Oak Ridge for the people who constructed and operated the ORR. Residential
and business areas of the city were sold, and the ORR has been reduced to its present size.
ORNL began in 1943 as the Clinton Laboratories, a pilot plant for testing and development
of the plutonium-239 production and chemical separations processes. Major facilities at the
ORNL included the X-10 Graphite Reactor, a chemical pilot plant, and numerous support
laboratories and shops. The ORNL's initial mission was fulfilled by 1945, but because of its
unique capabilities, new research and development programs were initiated in energy, materials,
and environmental technology (DOE 1988).
Since 1945 emphasis at ORNL has been on exploration of the use of nuclear science and
technology, which continues as a major component of research and development of the
laboratory. A number of additional nuclear reactors and supporting facilities have been built and
operated at ORNL since the original mission associated with the Manhattan Project. Research
and development in nuclear science and technology is supported currently by one operating
research reactor, the High Flux Isotope Reactor. ORNL has proposed the Advanced Neutron
Source, which would take over many of the tasks now carried out by the High Flux Isotope
Reactor (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
In 1943 the Y-12 Plant was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project. The Y-12 Plant
separated fissionable isotopes of uranium-235 by the electromagnetic process, which was used in
the world's first atomic bomb, detonated on August 5, 1945 (MMES 1990; DOE 1987). Since
that time Y-12 has developed into a highly sophisticated nuclear weapons component
manufacturing and development engineering organization and currently is used for weapons
disassembly.
The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, now the K-25 Site, was used to produce enriched
uranium for U.S. nuclear weapons. It also provided an industrial toll enrichment service, in
which uranium was enriched for use in nuclear-powered reactors around the world. In 1987, the
Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant was permanently shut down.
2.1.3 Mission
The missions of the primary plant complexes within ORR are:
- Energy Research and Development at ORNL.
- Reclamation and Storage of Nuclear Material, Manufacturing of Defense Hardware,
and National Security, Technology Transfer, and Work for Others Programs at Y-12.
- Environmental Restoration and Waste Management at the K-25 Site (MMES 1994a).
The mission of ORNL includes services that only research reactors provide, including, 1) the
production of transuranium isotopes used in basic research, medical, defense, and industrial
applications, 2) neutron scattering research to determine fundamental structure and properties of
materials, 3) production of unique isotopes for medical treatment and research, 4) production of
special commercial isotopes, and 5) irradiation of structural and fuel materials for fusion energy
reactors and advanced nuclear reactors (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
2.1.4 Oak Ridge Reservation Operations Management
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., operates the major facilities at the ORR (Y-12 Plant,
K-25 Site, and ORNL). They are under contract to and administered by the DOE Oak Ridge
Operations Office. Current missions and functions can be grouped into the following four
categories: defense production activities; environmental management activities; other DOE
activities; and work for others.
2.2 Regulatory Framework
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 USC 4321-4347, as amended)
provides Federal agency decision makers with a process to systematically consider the potential
environmental consequences of agency decisions. The DOE has prepared this environmental
impact statement (EIS) in conformance with the requirements of NEPA to evaluate the potential
impacts of programmatic decisions on the management of SNF. This EIS provides the necessary
background, data, and analyses to help decision makers understand the potential environmental
consequences of each alternative.
On October 22, 1990, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
(FR 1990) announcing its intent to prepare a programmatic EIS addressing environmental
restoration and waste management (including SNF management) activities across the entire DOE
complex. On October 5, 1992, the DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
(FR 1992) announcing its intent to prepare an EIS addressing environmental restoration and
waste management and SNF activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. For
further programmatic discussion of this topic, see Volume 1.
Significant state environmental and nuclear materials management laws applicable to the
ORR include the following (listed alphabetically):
- Air Pollution Control Regulations (Chapter 1200-3)
- Air Quality Act (Title 68 Chapter 201-101)
- Emergency Rules--Hazardous Substance Remedial Action (Chapter 1200-1-13)
- Emission Standards and Monitoring Requirements for Additional Control Areas
(Chapter 1200-3-19)
- Hazardous Substance Site Remedial Action (Chapter 1200-1-13)
- Hazardous Waste Management (Chapter 1200-1-11)
- Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Chapter 1200-2-11)
- New Source Performance Standards (Chapter 1200-3-16)
- Prevention of Hazards and Pollution (Chapter 1200-1-6)
- Rules and Regulations Applied to Tennessee Codes Annotated -69-1-1
(Chapter 1200-4-8)
- Solid Waste Processing and Disposal (Chapter 1200-1-7)
- Underground Storage Tank Program (Chapter 1200-1-15)
- Visible Emission Regulations (Chapter 1200-3-5)
- Volatile Organic Compound (Chapter 1200-3-18)
2.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program
In the past, reactor-irradiated nuclear materials, which include SNF and reactor-irradiated
target material, have been stored prior to reprocessing activities to recover plutonium, tritium,
and other isotopes. In the past several years, however, the DOE has either phased out or
stopped its reprocessing of these materials. With this change, reactor-irradiated nuclear
materials were being stored for longer periods of time than originally planned. The amount of
reactor-irradiated nuclear materials and the conditions of storage for the materials were in
question throughout DOE facilities.
In an effort to assess whether extended storage conditions for reactor-irradiated nuclear
materials are safe (i.e., whether protection exists for workers, the public, and the environment),
the DOE commissioned a study. This assessment also grouped any vulnerabilities of the storage
conditions into three categories where management attention could be directed: less than 1 year,
1 to 5 years, and greater than 5 years. In November 1993, the DOE published the Spent Fuel
Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and other
Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and Their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities,
hereafter referred to as the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, as a result of the assessment
efforts (DOE 1993b; 1994b).
As a result of the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, a Plan of Action to Resolve Spent
Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities was also commissioned to address what was discovered in the original
Working Group Report. Phase I of the Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel
Vulnerabilities was published in February 1994. Phase II and Phase III were issued April 1994
and October 1994, respectively. To address the vulnerabilities identified in the Spent Fuel
Working Group Report, individual action plans were developed to reflect the DOE's sense of
urgency, concern for worker protection, commitment to minimize environmental impacts, and
need for compatible long-term solutions.
The ORR was assessed as part of the Spent Fuel Working Group Report. SNF located on
the ORR is currently stored in facilities at the ORNL. The SNF at ORR is primarily spent fuel
from research or experimental reactors that are operating or have operated at ORNL. Samples
of SNF left over from research on fuel elements removed from commercial or demonstration
reactors utilized by DOE predecessor agencies for advancement of nuclear science are also
present. In the past, most of the SNF from the Oak Ridge research and experimental reactors
was chemically processed to recover fissile materials at Savannah River Site (Brown, 1994a;
Hoel 1994).
This section describes the status of the SNF at the ORR using the information presented in
the Spent Fuel Working Group Report, the Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel
Vulnerabilities, the Spent Fuel Inventory Data developed for the SNF EIS, and through discussions
with ORR. If fuel can be contact handled, it has not been listed in the Spent Fuel Inventory as
SNF. The SNF management program at ORR utilizes 10 facilities for storage. These facilities
and their SNF contents are summarized on Table 2.3-1.
2.3.1 Building 3525 - Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory
This two-story brick structure was built in 1963 and contains hot cells. The facility mission
continues to be disassembly and examination of irradiated fuel and components. Building 3525
contains 1 unit of research reactor fuel in the form of fuel samples and targets (DOE 1993b;
Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.2 Building 4501 - High-Level Radiochemical Laboratory
Constructed in 1951, this facility contains centrally located hot cells supported by various
laboratories capable of handling radioactive materials. SNF is in dry storage at this facility.
Building 4501 contains 0.006 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of DOE-owned commercial
fuel (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.3 Building 7920 - Radiochemical Engineering Development Center
The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center is a multipurpose hot cell facility with
equipment, shielding, and containment provisions to safely process and store significant quantities
of highly radioactive targets. This facility was specifically built to prepare and process targets
from the High Flux Isotope Reactor. Building 7920 contains 0.024 MTHM of research reactor
fuel in the form of fuel samples in dry storage (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.4 Dry Storage Facilities 7823A, 7827, and 7829
Now closed to further storage, these shielded, retrievable storage facilities are stainless-steel
dry wells placed in the ground in Solid Waste Storage Area 5 North. They vary from 8 to 30
inches (20 to 76 centimeters) in diameter and from 10 to 15 feet (3 to 4.6 meters) in depth. The
wells are placed on a concrete pad and are held in place by concrete collars or slabs and are
surrounded by dirt. Spent fuel and other materials were placed in the wells beginning in 1972.
Table 2.3-1. Oak Ridge Reservation SNF Storage Facilities.
Facility name Material stored Heavy metal mass
at facility (MTHM)
High Flux Isotope Reactor HFIR fuel 0.45
(HFIR) Pool
Bulk Shielding Reactor BSR & ORR fuel 0.01
(BSR) Pool
Molten Salt Reactor MSRE fuel 0.037
Experiment (MSRE)
Bldg. 4501 Misc. LWR fuels 0.006
Tower Shielding Reactor TSR fuel 0.0092
(TSR)
Facility 7823A Misc. fuel 0.0008
Facility 7827 Misc. fuel 0.0837
Facility 7829 Peach Bottom 0.0137
Bldg. 7920 Dresden-1 fuels 0.024
Bldg. 3525 Misc. fuels
Solid Waste Storage Area KEMA Suspension Test Reactor 0.037
6
fuela
Source: Wichmann (1995a,b)
a. See Section 2.3.5.6.
Facility 7823A contain 0.0008 MTHM; facility 7827 contains 0.0837 MTHM; and facility 7829
contains 0.0137 MTHM. Activities to address the vulnerabilities in these facilities include 1)
transferring the fuel, 2) adding a new inner liner and relocating fuel in modified units, and 3)
overpacking any fuel in suspect condition. These activities are expected to be completed in fiscal
year 1996 (DOE 1994b; 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.5 Research Reactors
Six existing reactors and one planned reactor are expected to be generating and storing SNF
at the ORNL. They are the High Flux Isotope Reactor (currently operating), the Tower
Shielding Reactor No. II (shut down in 1992), the Bulk Shielding Reactor (shut down in 1991),
the Oak Ridge Research Reactor (shut down in 1987), the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (shut
down in 1969), the KEMA Suspension Test Reactor, and the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor
(planned to start up in 2002 or 2003) (ANS 1988).
2.3.5.1 High Flux Isotope Reactor. The High Flux Isotope Reactor is a beryllium-
reflected, light water cooled and moderated, flux-trap-type reactor. The reactor uses aluminum-
clad fuel plates containing highly enriched uranium-235. The reactor became operational in 1965
and its current power level is 85 megawatts. Reactor missions include production of isotopes for
medical and industrial applications, neutron-scattering experiments, and various material
irradiation experiments (ANS 1988; DOE 1993b).
The High Flux Isotope Reactor is operating. At the present time there are 62 fuel
assemblies amounting to 0.45 MTHM from the research reactor fuel in onsite wet storage. The
High Flux Isotope Reactor currently does not use onsite dry storage. If the reactor continues
operation through the year 2035, the predicted SNF production will be an additional 110 fuel
assemblies totalling 1.58 MTHM. (Holt 1993; ORNL 1992a; Wichmann 1995a, b).
Onsite storage at the reactor facility would have to be expanded to accommodate this
projected SNF generation rate. At the present time, reracking the existing storage facility and
installing modular dry-storage units at the High Flux Isotope Reactor are being considered. With
the installation of the dry-storage units, the potential for future expansion of storage facilities is
expected to continue indefinitely (ORNL 1992a).
In the past, SNF assemblies were shipped in casks via truck to the Savannah River Site, and
the baseline plan is to continue shipments there. However, the Savannah River Site has limited
space and plans to accept only 20 fuel assembly shipments from the High Flux Isotope Reactor.
If shipment of SNF to another DOE storage facility is precluded or the commencement of
reracking at the High Flux Isotope Reactor is not approved by the DOE, the reactor will be
required to shut down because the present pool storage racks cannot accommodate additional
fuel after early 1995 (Clark 1994).
2.3.5.2 Tower Shielding Reactor No. II and Tower Shielding Facility Building 7708.
The 1 megawatt Tower Shielding Reactor No. II is a light water moderated, movable tank,
research reactor which was shut down in 1992. There are no plans for resuming operations at
this time. Tower Shielding Reactor No. II has no containment and was used at ground level or
suspended from towers. The research included testing shielding designs and obtaining associated
data (ANS 1988; DOE 1993b).
The Tower Shielding Reactor No. II was placed in standby in September 1992 pending
DOE direction to prepare the facility for shutdown. At that time, the only existing Tower
Shielding Reactor No. II fuel assembly was being stored in the reactor core. For handling and
storage purposes, an element is an integral core assembly composed of 4 upper central plates,
4 lower central plates, 12 annular plates, a central plug, and 4 fuel plates. One element, 0.0092
MTHM, is being stored in the reactor core. The corrective actions associated with the
vulnerabilities identified in the Spent Fuel Working Group Report for the Tower Shielding Reactor
No. II and Tower Shielding Facility Building 7708 are: 1) implement access control to the Tower
Shielding Reactor No. II area; 2) implement emergency operating procedures for the Tower
Shielding Reactor, i.e., those applicable to a seismic event requiring the experimental area to be
checked for hazards by knowledgeable staff before personnel enter the area; 3) implement
radiation protection controls requiring that a survey be completed by Radiation Protection
personnel to verify acceptable radiation levels prior to granting access to a radiological area; and
4) remove the fork-lift from Building 7708 to eliminate a potential fire hazard and transfer the
fuel pins to the Y-12 area for long-term storage to eliminate the potential of an activity release in
the same building (completed January 1994). All of these corrective actions plans have been
completed and are being implemented (Holt 1993; ORNL 1994; DOE 1994b; Wichmann 1995a,
b).
Present options being discussed for storage of this fuel include shipment to the Savannah
River Site or onsite dry storage at ORNL. Because this reactor is shut down, no additional
elements are expected to accumulate through the year 2035 (Holt 1993; ORNL 1994).
2.3.5.3 Bulk Shielding Reactor. The 2 megawatt Bulk Shielding Reactor is an open pool,
light water moderated and reflected, training and research reactor. This reactor was built in 1951
and shut down in 1991; there are no plans for resumption of operations at this time (ANS 1988;
DOE/OSTI 1993; DOE 1993b).
The Bulk Shielding Reactor is shut down and currently has no elements in the reactor or in
on-site dry storage. Seventy-three of 90 storage locations are occupied in the onsite wet storage.
There are 41 elements from the Bulk Shielding Reactor and 32 elements from the Oak Ridge
Research Reactor for a total of 0.010 MTHM in the storage area. As the reactor is shut down,
no additional fuel is expected to be added to the inventory through the year 2035; therefore, no
expansion of storage facilities onsite is expected (DOE 1993b; Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.5.4 Oak Ridge Research Reactor. The Oak Ridge Research Reactor was shut down
permanently in 1987 and has been defueled. Most of the fuel was transported to the Savannah
River Site, but some of the fuel was transferred to the Bulk Shielding Reactor pool. Refer to the
discussion of the spent fuel inventory in subsection 2.3.5.3 (Holt 1993; ANS 1988; ORNL 1992b).
2.3.5.5 Molten Salt Reactor Experiment. The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment
operated from June 1965 to December 1969 at a nominal power level of 8 megawatts. The
purpose of the reactor was to test the practicality of a molten-salt reactor concept for central
power station applications. The circulating fuel solution was a mixture of fluoride salts containing
uranium fluoride as the fuel. The initial charge was uranium-235, but this was later replaced with
a charge of uranium-233. Processing capabilities were included as part of the facility for on-line
fuel additions, removal of impurities, and uranium recovery. Following reactor shutdown, the
fuel and flush salts were drained to critically safe storage tanks and isolated (Hargrove 1993).
The inventory at the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment consists of approximately
4,650 kilograms (9,514 pounds) of fuels salt mixture. The uranium salt is predominantly uranium-
233 (31 kilograms [68 pounds]) with lesser amounts of uranium-234, uranium-235, and uranium-
238. The balance of the fuel salt is composed of lithium fluoride (LiF, 64.5 percent), beryllium
fluoride (BeF2, 30.3 percent), and zirconium fluoride (ZrF4, 5.0 percent). The Molten Salt
Experiment contains 0.037 MTHM as the reactor is shutdown, no additional SNF is expected to
be generated through the year 2035 (DOE 1993b; Hargrove 1993; Wichmann 1995a, b).
Radioactive material migration has been detected from the storage tanks. This vulnerability
could result in unnecessary personnel exposure. If left unabated, radiation levels could increase
to a point where access would be difficult. ORNL is determining appropriate corrective actions
and expects to implement its corrective action plan during fiscal year 1995 (DOE 1994b; 1993b).
2.3.5.6 KEMA Suspension Test Reactor. The KEMA Suspension Test Reactor was an
experimental fluidized bed test reactor. The fuel, consisting of one core, was placed in Solid
Waste Storage Area 6 and totals 0.037 MTHM. The area of Solid Waste Storage Area 6 where
the fuel was placed is being managed by DOE as part of waste area grouping 6, an
environmental restoration program activity, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act. As the reactor is shutdown, no additional SNF is expected to
be generated through the year 2035 (Wichmann 1995a, b).
2.3.5.7 Advanced Neutron Source Reactor. The Advanced Neutron Source Reactor is
currently in the conceptual design stage and has been proposed to be operational in the year
2002 or 2003. Its principal purpose will be for neutron beam experiments, but it will also be
used for some isotope production (Holt 1993; DOE/OSTI 1993).
Since the current schedule projects initial operation of the Advanced Neutron Source
Reactor in the year 2002 or 2003, spent fuel is not expected to be generated until 2004.
Estimates are that 18 elements per year will be discharged. (For handling and storage purposes,
an element is an integral core assembly composed of two concentric fuel plates.) A total of
576 SNF elements are predicted to be produced if the reactor is in operation from the years
2002 through 2035 (Holt 1993). As this reactor is in the conceptual design stage, the SNF
expected to be generated is not included in the SNF Inventory Data.
3. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL ALTERNATIVES
This chapter describes the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management alternatives evaluated by
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) that are applicable to the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The ORR generates and stores
SNF as a result of reactor research activities. Unlike the Hanford Site, the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the Savannah River Site (SRS), SNF management is only a
minor part of the ORR mission. Therefore, the No Action, Decentralization, and 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternatives could have minimal to no impact on ORR operations. However, the
Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would produce major impacts on ORR
operations.
3.1 Description of Management Alternatives
3.1.1 Alternative 1 - No Action
The No-Action Alternative is restricted to the minimum actions necessary for the continued
safe and secure management of SNF. As defined, this alternative stipulates no SNF shipments to
or from DOE facilities. While the ORR generates and stores SNF as a result of reactor research
activities, it does not receive SNF from offsite generators except occasionally in small quantities
for specific research assignments. No offsite SNF would be shipped to the ORR under this
alternative, nor would SNF be shipped offsite, which could affect the planned shipment of High
Flux Isotope Reactor assemblies to the SRS. SNF storage capacity at the ORR for the existing
High Flux Isotope Reactor would be adequate only through the year 2002. This could result in
the shutdown of this reactor after this date. The proposed Advanced Neutron Source Reactor
would need to consider this situation in the design and operation activities.
The environmental effects of the No-Action Alternative are essentially the same as those of
current onsite SNF storage and are included in the affected environment discussions covering
current site operations.
Implementation of the No-Action Alternative at ORR could lead to the shutdown of the
High Flux Isotope Reactor as a result of filling the SNF storage capacity. If the High Flux
Isotope Reactor were shutdown, it would eliminate the national capacity to provide transuranic
isotopes, eliminate the only western-world source of some medical isotopes, and eliminate the
nationally and internationally important capability for research and development in the structure
of materials and irradiation effects on materials (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
This alternative for the ORR is not analyzed or discussed further in this or subsequent
chapters except in the Facility Accidents section, 5.15.
3.1.2 Alternative 2 - Decentralization
Decentralization involves storage of SNF at or close to generation sites. Under this
alternative no offsite SNF would be shipped to the ORR nor would SNF be shipped offsite. The
environmental effects of this alternative are the same as those of the No-Action Alternative. The
environmental effects of current onsite SNF storage are included in the affected environment
discussions covering current site operations. Consequently, this alternative is not analyzed or
discussed further in this or subsequent chapters for the ORR. Construction of new SNF storage
facilities could be initiated under this option.
The Decentralization Alternative would allow DOE to upgrade and/or replace facilities for
the management of the SNF currently located on site. This alternative would allow for continued
operation of the High Flux Isotope Reactor by allowing new dry-storage facilities for newly
generated and existing SNF in the High Flux Isotope Reactor pool. To allow the High Flux
Isotope Reactor to continue operations until a dry storage facility is available, a dry-storage cask
may be acquired. DOE could propose an interim, retrievable, aboveground, dry-storage facility
for consolidating the SNF at ORR. DOE could also prepare facilities as necessary for the
characterization and packaging of SNF for interim storage. The fuel in the Molten Salt Reactor
Experiment reactor would need conditioning and stabilization before being relocated to the new
facility, or the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment fuel would need special storage facilities
(Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
3.1.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative is DOE's documented 1992/1993 plan for the
management of DOE and Naval SNF. This plan would include the shipment of SNF from the
ORR to other DOE sites as necessary to permit continued operation of ORR research reactors.
The environmental effects of current onsite SNF storage are included in the affected
environment discussions covering current site operations. Under this alternative, the amount of
SNF storage at ORR would not increase. Therefore, this alternative would not have a
measurable impact on the environment since there would be no changes to current ORR
operations. Consequently, this alternative is not analyzed or discussed further in this or
subsequent chapters for the ORR.
At ORR, this alternative would be very similar to the Decentralization alternative except that
some SNF would be shipped to SRS. The SNF currently stored at the High Flux Isotope
Reactor and Bulk Shielding Reactor pools, and at the Tower Shielding Reactor would be shipped
to SRS. Only 20 elements from the High Flux Isotope Reactor can be shipped to SRS unless
other arrangements can be made. If the quantity of High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel that can be
shipped to SRS is limited to 20 elements, then the High Flux Isotope Reactor will require dry-
storage facilities to continue operation. DOE could prepare an interim, retrievable,
aboveground, dry-storage facility for consolidating the SNF remaining at ORR. This facility
would be similar to the one built under Alternative 2 except it would probably be smaller
(Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
3.1.4 Alternative 4 - Regionalization
3.1.4.1 Overview. The Regionalization Alternative consists of two subalternatives.
Subalternative A would distribute existing and new SNF between the Hanford Site, INEL, and
SRS by SNF type. Under Subalternative B, SNF would be distributed to either an eastern or
western regional site based on geographical location. SNF east of the Mississippi River would be
shipped to the eastern regional site (i.e., SRS or ORR). SNF west of the Mississippi River would
be shipped to the western regional site (i.e., Hanford Site, INEL, or Nevada Test Site [NTS]).
Additionally all Naval SNF would be shipped to only one of the regional sites, but not both. A
regional site will only receive all the Naval fuel if also selected as the Naval site. The ORR
would be the alternative to the SRS as the eastern regional site, and the NTS would be the
alternative to both the Hanford Site and INEL as the western regional site.
3.1.4.2 Regionalization Subalternative B. The following fuels would be transported to
the ORR for storage under the Regionalization Subalternative B:
- Naval-type SNF (if selected)
- All, including from the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes
- Hanford Production SNF
- From eastern sites
- Graphite SNF
- From eastern sites
- DOE-owned commercial SNF
- From eastern sites, including the West Valley Demonstration Project and B&W
Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF
- From eastern sites, including the Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE
domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium SNF
- From eastern sites, including the SRS
- Experimental - Other
- From eastern sites
- SRS Production and Aluminum SNF
- From eastern sites, including SRS, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Foreign
Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic research reactors.
All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the ORR stabilized and
canned to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need to be
uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the ORR to ensure safe interim storage. New
non-DOE domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF would arrive in a state necessary for safe
transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the ORR to
ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be cooled for a minimum of 120 days prior to
shipping and 5 years before being placed in dry storage.
The ORR currently has only limited-capacity facilities suitable for receiving, canning,
storing, or supporting the research activities necessary for the safe management of SNF. As a
result, a new SNF management complex would be built at the ORR under the Regionalization
Subalternative B. The SNF management complex would include the following:
- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expended Core Facility similar to the one currently at the INEL (if selected for Naval
fuel receipt).
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for
cooling SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development
facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-scale technology
development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would
consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. If ORR is
selected for Naval fuel receipt, Naval SNF would be examined at the Expended Core Facility
prior to being turned over for interim storage management.
The SNF management complex which would be built at the ORR under the Regionalization
Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Centralization Alternative.
The dry storage component would be smaller, however, due to the smaller SNF inventory that
would be transported to the ORR under the Regionalization Alternative. The other components
of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built under the
Centralization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new uncanned fuel which would be
sent to the ORR under the Regionalization and Centralization Alternatives would be very similar.
Additionally, since the major portion of the potential radiological and chemical releases and
waste generation rates are associated with these components, the Regionalization Alternative is
not analyzed separately but is compared to the Centralization Alternative in a semiquantitative
manner.
If the ORR was not chosen as the eastern regional site, all SNF at the ORR would be
shipped to the SRS. An exception would be those fuels for which there is no available
technology for stabilization to permit safe transport. There is a small quantity of SNF from the
Molten Salt Reactor Experiment that is stored in tanks at the ORR. Currently, technology to
stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if ORR were to ship SNF
to the SRS, this Molten Salt Reactor Experiment SNF would continue to be stored at the ORR
until it could be stabilized for safe shipment.
Based on the projected schedule for operation of additional regional SNF storage facilities,
the option for acquiring dry storage facilities at the ORR would be maintained to ensure
continued High Flux Isotope Reactor operation (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
3.1.5 Alternative 5 - Centralization
3.1.5.1 Overview. Under the Centralization Alternative, all existing and new SNF would
be shipped to one DOE site. There are five Centralization options considered in this EIS: the
Hanford Site, the INEL, the SRS, the NTS, and the ORR. If the ORR was chosen as the
centralization site, all SNF stored at the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, and other sites currently
storing DOE fuel would be transferred to the ORR.
3.1.5.2 Centralization Alternative Option D. The following fuels would be transported
to the ORR for storage under Centralization Alternative Option D:
- Naval-type SNF
- From the INEL, shipyards, and prototypes
- Hanford Production SNF
- From the Hanford Site
- Graphite SNF
- From the INEL and the Public Service of Colorado
- DOE-owned commercial SNF
- From the Hanford Site, INEL, West Valley Demonstration Project, and B&W
Lynchburg
- Experimental - Stainless Steel SNF
- From the Hanford Site, INEL, SRS, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE
domestic research reactors
- Experimental - Zirconium Clad SNF
- From the INEL and SRS
- Experimental - Other
- From the ORNL
- SRS Production and Aluminum Clad SNF
- From the INEL, SRS, ORNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, Foreign Research Reactors, and non-DOE domestic
research reactors.
All SNF presently in storage at DOE facilities would arrive at the ORR stabilized and
canned to the extent necessary for safe transportation. However, this SNF may need to be
uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the ORR to ensure safe interim storage. New
non-DOE domestic, Foreign Research Reactor, and Naval SNF would arrive in a state necessary
for safe transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the
ORR to ensure safe interim storage. All fuel would be cooled a minimum of 120 days prior to
shipping and 5 years before being placed into dry storage. Additionally, Naval SNF would be
examined at the ORR before it was turned over for interim storage management.
Although the ORR has a number of experimental and pilot facilities, probably none of them
is suitable for receiving, canning, storing, or supporting research activities necessary for the safe
management of SNF, unless they are extensively upgraded and expanded. As a result, a new
SNF management complex would be built at the ORR under the Centralization Alternative
Option D. The SNF management complex would include the following:
- SNF receiving and canning facility
- Technology development facility
- Interim dry storage area
- Expended Core Facility for Naval-type fuel similar to the one currently at the INEL.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for
cooling SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The technology development
facility would investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-scale technology
development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would
consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. Naval SNF
would be examined at a new Expended Core Facility constructed at the ORR prior to being
turned over for interim storage management.
The SNF management complex which would be built at the ORR under the Centralization
Alternative would have the same components as that built under the Regionalization Alternative.
However, the dry storage component would be about 10 times larger, due to the larger SNF
inventory that would be transported to the ORR under the Centralization Alternative. The other
components of the SNF management complex would be the same general size as those built
under the Regionalization Alternative. This is because the inventories of new uncanned fuel
which would be sent to the ORR under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives
would be very similar. Additionally, the major portion of the potential radiological and chemical
releases and waste generation rates are associated with these components and would not be
significantly different for the Regionalization Alternative. Therefore, this alternative is used as
the basis for a semiquantitative comparison with the Regionalization Alternative.
If the ORR is not chosen as the centralization site, all SNF at the ORR would be shipped
to the selected centralization site. An exception would be those fuels for which there is no
available technology for stabilization to permit safe transport. There is a small quantity of SNF
from the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment that is stored in tanks at the ORR. Currently,
technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if ORR were
to ship SNF to the SRS, this Molten Salt Reactor Experiment SNF would continue to be stored
at the ORR until it could be stabilized for safe shipment.
Based on the projected schedule for operation of additional centralized SNF storage
facilities, the option for acquiring dry storage facilities at the ORR would be maintained to
ensure storage facilities at the ORR would be maintained to ensure continued High Flux Isotope
Reactor operation (Brown 1994a; Hoel 1994).
3.2 Comparison of Alternatives
Table 3.2-1 shows a comparison of the alternatives. The Regionalization Alternative
column does not include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, although this
facility may be constructed at the site under this alternative. The Centralization Alternative
column does include the requirements of the Naval Expended Core Facility, which are presented
in Volume 1, Appendix D, since this facility will be built at the site under this alternative.
Table 3.2-1. Comparison of alternatives at the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Parameter Regionalization Centralization Option
Subalternative B at ORR Da
Land for new facilities (acres) 90 120
Site area (acres) 34,667 34,667
Percent of site area 0.26 0.35
SNF-related employmentb 556 1,118
Baseline site employment 17,082 17,082
Percent of baseline site employment 3.3 6.5
Estimated maximum latent cancer fatalities in 80-km population per 2.5 x 10-3 2.5 x 10-3
year, SNF management operationsc
Estimated cancer fatalities in 80-km population per year, other site 2.7 x 10-2 2.7 x 10-2
operations
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in MEI per year, SNF 3.1 x 10-6 3.1 x 10-6
management operationsc
Estimated probability of cancer fatalities in MEI per year, other site 9.2 x 10-6 9.2 x 10-6
operations
Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, SNF 1.6 x 10-5 1.6 x 10-5
management operationsc
Estimated probability of cancer fatality in average worker per year, 1.1x 10-6 1.1x 10-6
other site operations
Water use (million gallons) per year, SNF management 3.6 6.1
Baseline water use (million gallons) per year, site operations 6,680 6,680
Percent of baseline site water use 0.05 0.09
Electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, SNF management 23,000 33,000
Table 3.2-1. (continued).
Parameter Regionalization Centralization Option
Subalternative B at ORR Da
Baseline electricity use (megawatt-hours) per year, site 1,000,000 1,000,000
operations
Percent of baseline site electricity use 2.30 3.30
Sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, SNF management3.6 6.1
Baseline sewage discharge (million gallons) per year, site 200 200
operations
Percent of baseline site sewage discharge 1.8 3.1
High-level waste (cubic meters) per year, SNF management 0 0
Transuranic waste (cubic meters), SNF management 16 16
Mixed waste (cubic meters), SNF management 0 0
Low-level waste (cubic meters), SNF management 203 628
Estimated maximum cancer fatalities in 80-km population 2.1 x 10-2
from maximum risk accidentd
Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d 1.6 x 10-1
Estimated maximum risk of cancer fatalities in 80-km 3.4 x 10-3
population maximum risk accident (cancer fatalities per year)d
Estimated maximum worker cancer fatalities from maximum 1.9 x 10-3
risk accidentd
Frequency of occurrence (number per year)d 1.0 x 10-4
Estimated maximum risk of worker cancer fatalities from 1.9 x 10-7
maximum accident (latent cancer fatalities per year)d
a. Centralization Option includes the Naval Expended Core Facility (ECF) results from Volume 1, Appendix D. Centralization
without ECF would be the same as for Regionalization.
b. Annual average SNF direct construction and operation jobs over the 10-year period 1995 to 2005.
c. Excludes baseline site operations.
d. Centralization Option is the same as the Regionalization Option for the SNF Management Facility and does not include the
Naval Expended Core Facility accident analyses results from Volume 1, Appendix D.
4.0 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Overview
This chapter describes the existing environmental conditions in areas potentially affected by a
programmatic decision to site spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
under the Centralization and Regionalization alternatives. Topics were selected for analysis based upon
their potential to be affected by these alternatives. Each topic is addressed in the detail necessary to
serve as a baseline for assessment of potential environmental consequences in Chapter 5.
4.2 Land Use
The ORR occupies an area of approximately 34,667 acres (140 square kilometers) in eastern
Tennessee, in a predominantly rural area about 25 miles (40 kilometers) west of Knoxville. The ORR,
which is bordered on the southeast and southwest by the Clinch River, is within the jurisdictional
boundaries of the City of Oak Ridge, and also lies within Roane and Anderson Counties (MMES 1989).
The ORR consists of three plants located on three separate sites: the Y-12 Plant (1.3 square miles
or 3.4 square kilometers); the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) (1.8 square miles or 4.7 square
kilometers); and the K-25 Site (1.1 square miles or 2.8 square kilometers) (MMES 1989).
Land use activities at the ORR have historically occurred within the boundaries of the three main
plant sites. However, more recently, other ORR lands have also begun to be used. ORR land was first
utilized for waste storage in the mid-1940s and for environmental research in the 1950s. A forestry
management program was initiated in 1964, and the first comprehensive forest management program
was released in 1965. The ORR has been used by research institutions, universities, and government
agencies as a site for the study of terrestrial ecology, aquatic ecology, forestry, and agriculture. In 1980,
Department of Energy (DOE) designated approximately 21 square miles (54 square kilometers) of
undeveloped ORR land as a National Environmental Research Park, which today provides protected land
areas for research and education in the environmental sciences (MMES 1989).
Land use outside the three main plant sites falls into seven general categories: multi-purpose
research and development; support services; waste management; environmental restoration; natural
areas; public recreational park; and national environmental research park (Figure 4.2-1). Approximately
58 percent of the land on the ORR (20,051 acres or 31 square miles) can be classified as undeveloped
due to its current land use designation (MMES 1994a).
Land uses bordering the ORR are primarily forest and agricultural. Residential and commercial are
the only other significant uses of land in the vicinity, and occur along the northeast and northwest
boundary of the ORR in the City of Oak Ridge. The land areas bordering the ORR comprise woodlands
(mostly hardwood forests), small farms, and rural residences. Commercial forestry and agriculture
account for approximately 76 percent of the total land use in this region (MMES 1994a).
The entire ORR has been placed under the forestry, agriculture, industry, and research zoning
classification by the City of Oak Ridge, although this designation does not bind DOE land use decisions
on the site. DOE land use plans applicable to the ORR include the Oak Ridge Reservation Site
Development and Facilities Utilization Plan, issued in 1989 and updated in 1990; the City of Oak Ridge
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance, issued in 1985 and updated in 1988; and the Resource
Management Plan for the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge Reservation, first issued in 1984.
The region surrounding the ORR has numerous local, state, and national public recreation areas
(Figure 4.2-2). Federal outdoor recreation facilities include the Great Smoky Mountains National Park;
the Cherokee National Forest; the Cumberland Gap National Historic Park; the Big South Fork National
River and Recreation Area; and the Obed Wild and Scenic River (MMES 1994a). State parks near the
ORR site include the Frozen Head State Natural Area; the Big Ridge State Park; the Cove Lake State
Park; the Fall Creek Falls State Park; the Pickett State Rustic Park; the Panther Creek State Park; and the
Hiwassee State Scenic River (MMES 1994a).
Figure 4.2-1. Generalized land use at the Oak Ridge Reservation. Figure 4.2-2. Recreation areas in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Several lakes exist within the ORR surrounding region, offering year-round recreational activities
such as fishing and boating. Wildlife management areas that allow in-season hunting include the Big
South Fork National River and Recreation Area, Catoosa Wildlife Management Area, Chuck Swan
Wildlife Management Area, and the ORR (MMES 1994a).
Numerous locally funded recreational areas exist near the ORR, the closest being in the City of Oak
Ridge. The City of Oak Ridge has 2 golf courses, 11 athletic fields, 36 tennis courts, 12 playground
areas, and a public outdoor swimming pool (MMES 1994a).
Clark Center Recreational Park, located on the ORR, is a 90-acre (0.36-square-kilometer)
recreational area that is open to the public. The park consists of three shelters, a boat ramp, two softball
fields, a swimming area, and a paved access road. It is located approximately 2 miles (3.2 kilometers)
south of the Y-12 Plant (MMES 1994a).
The ORR is a controlled area with public access limited to through traffic on Tennessee State
Routes 95, 58, 62, 162, and 170 (MMES 1991b).
The site proposed for SNF activities is located within the West Bear Creek Valley Area, located in
the western portion of the ORR site near the site boundary. This area of the ORR is currently in the
Natural Areas land use category and is designated for future Waste Management land use (MMES
1994a). The area is designated as a Potential Site for a Future Programmatic Initiative in the most recent
ORR Master Plan (MMES 1994a). With the exception of an industrial park, land uses bordering the
ORR in the area of West Bear Creek Valley are primarily agricultural farmland and commercial forest,
with sparsely located residences (MMES 1994a).
The industrial park located just to the south of the proposed SNF management facility on Bear
Creek Road houses two organizations. The Scientific Ecology Group, Inc., employs about 700 to 800
people and is a low-level radioactive waste incinerator who's commercial operation began in 1989.
International Technology, Inc., operates a hazardous and radioactive waste geotechnical laboratory and a
pilot lab, also on Bear Creek Road. This International
Technology, Inc., operates a hazardous and radioactive waste geotechnical laboratory and a pilot lab,
also on Bear Creek Road. This International Technology, Inc., facility is an extension of the Knoxville
office and employs about 10 people at the facility (IT undated a, undated b; SEG undated).
There are no onsite areas that are subject to Native American Treaty rights or contain any prime or
unique farmland.
4.3 Socioeconomics
4.3.1 Region of Influence
The socioeconomic information presented in this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
covers the baseline conditions in the Region of Influence. The Region of Influence is defined as the
region in which the principal direct and indirect socioeconomic effects of actions at the ORR are likely to
occur and are expected to be of consequence for local jurisdictions. The Region of Influence includes
the current residential distribution of the DOE and contractor personnel employed by the ORR, the
probable location of offsite contractor operations, and the probable location of labor and capital
supporting indirect economic activity linked to the ORR. The Region of Influence includes the counties
where 92 percent of DOE and contractor personnel employed by ORR reside. The Region of Influence
includes the counties of Anderson, where 34 percent of ORR personnel reside, Knox (36 percent), Roane
(16 percent), and Loudon (6 percent) (Truex 1991 [Table J]).
4.3.2 Regional Economic Activity and Population
Regional economic linkage supporting production activity at the ORR occurs primarily with
Anderson, Knox, and Roane counties, where most of the supporting contractors offsite and labor and
capital supporting indirect economic activity linked to the ORR are located.
4.3.2.1 Anderson County. Most of the industrial and commercial development, dominated by
energy-related companies specializing in manufacturing and research and development in support of the
ORR, has occurred in the City of Oak Ridge in Anderson County and Roane County.
The major employment sectors in Anderson County in 1990 were services, manufacturing,
government, and retail trade. As a percentage of Anderson County wage and salary employment, the
service and manufacturing sector each accounted for 30 percent, the government sector 13 percent, and
retail trade 11 percent. The number of employed persons in Anderson County in 1990 was 39,596. Jobs
in Anderson County have increased 3 percent annually between 1980 and 1990, and are projected to
continue to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1993). Since 1988, the unemployment level for Anderson County has
remained below the national unemployment rate. The unemployment rate reached a low of 4.4 percent
in 1990 and has slowly increased to 5.6 percent in 1992 (Anderson County 1993; Department of
Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division 1993).
Approximately 40 percent of the Anderson County population resides in the City of Oak Ridge,
with an additional 42 percent in rural areas, and the remaining 18 percent in other municipalities in
Anderson County (Anderson County 1993). Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Anderson
County increased by over 1 percent from 67,500 to 68,250 persons (0.10 percent annually). The
population in Anderson County is projected to continue to grow at an average rate of less than 1 percent
annually over the next several years, reaching 76,100 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department of Commerce
1993).
4.3.2.2 Knox County. In Knox County, the major employment sectors in 1990 were service,
manufacturing, retail trade, and government. As a percentage of Knox County wage and salary
employment, the service sector accounted for approximately 27 percent, retail trade 20 percent,
manufacturing 12 percent, and government 17 percent. The total number of persons employed in Knox
County in 1990 was 215,948. Jobs have increased 2 percent annually between 1980 and 1990, and are
projected to continue to grow at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Knox County was 4.6 percent in
1992 (Department of Economic and Community Development Industrial Development Division 1992).
Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Knox County increased 5 percent from 319,700 to
335,750. The population in Knox County is projected to continue to increase at an average rate of less
than 1 percent annually for the next several years, reaching 377,130 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1993).
4.3.2.3 Roane County. Development that has occurred in Roane County has been
predominantly residential. In Roane County, the major employment sectors in 1990 were retail trade,
manufacturing, services, and government. As a percentage of wage and salary employment in Roane
County, retail trade accounted for approximately 26 percent, manufacturing 24 percent, services 22
percent, and government 15 percent. The total number of persons employed in Roane County in 1990
was 24,640. Jobs have increased less than 1 percent annually between 1980 and 1990, and are projected
to continue to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the next several years (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Roane County was 6.8 percent in 1992
(East Tennessee Development District 1993).
Between 1980 and 1990, the population in Roane County decreased 2.5 percent, from 48,430 to
47,230. The population in Roane County is projected to increase at an average rate of less than 1 percent
annually for the next several years, reaching 52,670 persons by 2004.
4.3.2.4 Loudon County. Total employment in Loudon County in 1990 was 12,560 persons. In
1990, the farming sector accounted for a considerably larger percentage, while the services and
government sector accounted for a smaller percentage of total jobs than in Anderson, Knox, and Roane
counties (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). The unemployment rate for Loudon County was 6.7
percent in 1992, dropping from 7.2 percent in 1991 due to increase in construction and mining jobs (East
Tennessee Development District 1993).
The population of Loudon County increased by 1 percent annually, from 28,700 in 1980 to 31,300
in 1990. The population of Loudon County is projected to increase at an average rate of less than 1
percent annually for the next several years, reaching 32,900 persons by 2004 (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1993).
4.3.2.5 Oak Ridge Reservation. The employment level at the ORR in 1994 was 18,200
persons (Truex 1995). In 1993, there were approximately three full-time-equivalent employment
positions involved in SNF operations on the ORR (Brown 1994b). Employment levels are expected to
decrease to 16,980 by the year 1999 and are projected to remain constant through the year 2004 (Fritts
1994).
4.3.2.6 Aggregate Regional Economic and Demographic Baseline. For the purposes of
establishing a regional baseline to compare potential impacts for the programmatic analyses in Section
5.3, regional economic and demographic data for the four-county Region of Influence were aggregated to
form one region (Table 4.3-1).
The total population of the Region of Influence, shown in Table 4.3-1, is projected to be 489,230
persons in 1995, and is projected to grow at an annual average rate of less than 1 percent, reaching
538,820 persons in 2004. The labor force of the Region of Influence is also projected to grow at an
annual average rate of less than 1 percent, growing to 360,000 persons in 2004. The total employment in
the Region of Influence is projected to grow at an annual average rate of approximately 1 percent,
growing from 292,700 jobs in 1995 to 338,070 jobs in 2004.
4.3.3 Public Service, Education and Training, and Housing Infrastructure
4.3.3.1 Police and Fire. ORR fire protection services are provided by the fire departments on
the reservation. The ORR fire departments have mutual aid agreements among themselves and with the
City of Oak Ridge (MMES 1989).
Twelve city, county, and state law enforcement agencies provide police protection in the Region of
Influence. In 1990, the largest law enforcement agency in the four-county Region of Influence was in
Knoxville, with 296 sworn officers (FBI 1991). Law enforcement on the ORR is provided by the City of
Oak Ridge Police Department. Security enforcement, established to meet the Atomic Energy Act and
mission requirements, is provided by the prime management and operations contractor (MMES 1989).
Table 4.3-1. Aggregate regional economic and demographic indicators for ORR. a
Years Regional Regional labor force Regional population
employment
1995 311,700 332,000 506,600
1996 315,100 335,700 510,300
1997 318,600 339,400 51,400
1998 322,100 343,100 517,900
1999 325,700 346,900 521,700
2000 329,300 350,700 525,500
2001 331,500 353,000 528,800
2002 333,700 355,400 532,100
2003 335,900 357,700 535,500
2004 338,000 360,000 538,800
2005 340,300 362,400 542,200
Average Annual 0.9% 0.9% 0.7%
Growth Rate
a. Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; East Tennessee Development District 1993.
Note: Aggregate region includes the Roane, Anderson, Loudon and Knox Counties. Labor
force projection developed for this study.
4.3.3.2 Education and Training. Four school districts, Anderson, Knox, Loudon, and Roane,
provide public education services in the Region of Influence. In 1990, the four school districts had an
average daily membership of 66,510 students. Knox County had the highest average daily membership
of 50,324 students (Tennessee Department of Education 1992).
4.3.3.3 Housing. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of housing units in the Region of
Influence increased 14 percent from 181,299 to 206,234. In 1980 and 1990, the homeowner vacancy
rates in the Region of Influence averaged 1.4 and 1.5 percent, respectively (Census 1982, 1991).
Housing additions in the Region of Influence peaked at 3,882 units in 1990, but declined to 3,662
in 1991. In 1992, however, housing additions increased to a total of 3,880 units (East Tennessee
Development District 1993).
4.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
4.4.1 Archeological Sites and Historic Structures
For approximately 10,000 years, people have inhabited the ORR site. A cultural resources survey
conducted in 1975 did not identify any cultural resources on the proposed site for the SNF management
facilities. Therefore, no prehistoric or historic resources are expected to be located on the proposed site
for the SNF management facilities (Fielder 1975).
4.4.2 Native American Resources
In the early 1700s, the Overhill Cherokee lived in the area that is now the ORR. The tribe
remained in the area until 1838, when it was moved forcibly to Oklahoma under Federal orders (Oakes et
al. 1984a). While the Cherokee may retain cultural affiliation with their ancestral home, there are no
known Native American resources on the proposed site for the SNF facilities.
4.4.3 Paleontological Resources
The ORR is underlain by nine geologic formations or groups ranging in age from Early Cambrian
to Early Mississippian. On the ORR, the only formations known to contain fossils are the Knox Group
(which does not usually contain fossils but does contain small coiled gastropods in a limestone bed); the
Chickamauga Limestone (which contain many fossils including brachiopods, bryozoans, gastropods,
cephalopods, crinoid stems, corals, and trilobites); the Sequatchie Formation (which does not have an
abundant supply of fossils in the formation, but does contain large brachiopods, colonial corals, and
bryozoans within several thin beds of gray limestone); the Rockwood Formation (which contains crinoid
stem fossils in the upper half of the formation); and the Fort Payne Chert, which contains many casts of
crinoid stems (McMaster 1988). No unusual paleontological remains from the ORR were identified.
4.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources
Visual or scenic resources comprise the natural and man-made features that give a particular
environment its aesthetic qualities. These features form the overall impression that a viewer receives of
an area or its landscape character. Visual sensitivity is assessed by considering the activities, awareness,
and expectations of the public within a given area. High visual sensitivity exists when a view is rare,
unique, or in other ways special to viewers. Medium visual sensitivity exists when a view is similar to
others in the area or is of secondary importance relative to other significant aspects of the area. Low
visual sensitivity exists when a view has little value to viewers and an intrusion or alteration of that view
would have no impact on viewers.
Scenic resources at the ORR and the surrounding area are set in a landscape of heavily forested,
predominantly parallel ridges with steep slopes interspersed with relatively flat valleys, known
physiographically as the Ridge and Valley Province. Due to the rolling topography at the ORR,
approximately 62 percent of the reservation is located on slopes of less than 14 percent (MMES 1994a).
The reservation is framed by the Clinch River at the west, south, and eastern boundary, and by Poplar
Creek to the north. The vegetation present at the reservation is primarily a mixture of deciduous and
coniferous forest covering approximately 80 percent of the site (MMES 1989). Roads providing public
access to the interior of the site include State Routes 95 and 58, along with Bethel Valley Road (Figure
4.2-1).
The location of the proposed SNF management facilities, under the Centralization Alternative, is
set along the north side of Bear Creek Road west of State Route 95, between the extension of Blair Road
and State Route 95, at the western end of the reservation. The public has access to Bear Creek Road west
of State Route 95. As a result, the entrance to the site will be visible to traffic on Bear Creek Road
(MMES 1994a). The proposed facilities would consist of 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer), 85 of which
would be located within security fencing. The facility would have the appearance of industrial buildings
ranging in height from one to three stories. The site would receive and unload up to one truck shipment
per day, or a total of 5,500 truck shipments over the 40-year operation period. The site would be set on
the south side of Pine Ridge midway between the top of the ridge, with elevations ranging between 900
and 1,100 feet (274 and 335 meters), and Bear Creek Valley, with an elevation of approximately 700 feet
(213 meters) (TVA 1987). Chestnut Ridge, located south of Pine Ridge on the reservation, faces the site.
Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the proposed SNF facility would remain the
same but would be reduced in area and extent. Operation of the facilities would also be reduced,
resulting in the receipt of fewer truck shipments over the 40-year operation period.
The viewshed surrounding the ORR consists mainly of sparsely populated rural land. The City of
Oak Ridge, along the northeast portion of the site, is the only adjacent urban area. Views of DOE
facilities from areas surrounding the reservation include those from public roadways such as Interstates
40 and 75, U.S. Route 70, and State Routes 62, 162, and 95. The reservation can also be viewed from the
south bluffs along the Clinch River. The Great Smoky Mountains National Park and the Blue Ridge
Mountains are approximately 70 miles southeast of the ORR and are generally not visible from the
reservation (MMES 1989). In general, views are limited by the rolling terrain, heavily forested
vegetation, and hazy atmospheric conditions.
The developed areas of the ORR could generally be classified as having low visual sensitivity. The
remainder of the site ranges from low to moderate visual sensitivity. Of the jurisdictions that may be
affected by the construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities, only the City of Oak Ridge in
its Comprehensive Plan has provided policies that promote elements of scenic resource enhancement and
preservation through streetscape design, landscaping, lighting, and signage improvements at entrances to
the urban area and the city center. One entrance to the urban area that promotes scenic resource
enhancement and preservation is Illinois Avenue, crossing the northeast portion of the ORR (City of
Oak Ridge 1989).
4.6 Geologic Resources
This section provides a general description of the geology, soils, geologic resources, and seismic,
volcanic, and other geologic hazards at the ORR and surrounding area. This section also describes any
existing impacts to the geology and geologic resources resulting from past and present human activities
at the ORR.
4.6.1 General Geology
As shown in Figure 4.6-1, the ORR lies entirely within the western portion of the Valley and Ridge Province,
near the boundary with the Cumberland Plateau. The Valley and Ridge Province, a zone of folded and faulted sedimentary
rocks in the Appalachian mountain belt, is characterized by numerous linear ridges and valleys that trend
approximately southwest-northeast as shown on Figure 4.6-2. The rocks of the Valley and Ridge Province in eastern
Tennessee are Early Cambrian to Early Mississippian in age. A stratigraphic column for the ORR southeast of
East Fork Ridge (south of Interstate 95) is shown on Figure 4.6-3. A generalized geologic map of the ORR is
shown on Figure 4.6-2. Most of the ORR is underlain by the Rome Formation and Conasauga, Knox, and Chickamauga
Groups, sedimentary rocks of Cambrian and Ordovician age (Hatcher et al. 1992). A geologic cross-section of the
ORR is shown on Figure 4.6-4.
The Rome Formation consists of interbedded sandstone, siltstone, and shale. The base of the Rome
is not exposed in the Oak Ridge area, but consideration of regional structural trends suggests that the
Rome Formation is in fault contact with younger rocks. On the Copper Creek and Whiteoak Mountain
thrust sheets the Rome is 120-180 meters (390-590 feet) thick, and on
Figure 4.6-1. Generalized map of the southern Appalachian geologic provinces showing the location of the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Figure 4.6-2. Geologic map of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Figure 4.6-3. Stratigraphy of the ORR on the Whiteoak Mountain and Copper Creek Thrust Sheets. Figure 4.6-4. Generalized geologic profile beneath the Oak Ridge Reservation. the Kingston thrust sheet it is over 450 meters (1,500 feet) thick (Hatcher et al. 1992). Thrust sheets
carry the name of the fault at their front, or northwest edge. Faults are shown on Figure 4.6-4. The
transition between the sandstones of the Rome Formation and the overlying Pumpkin Valley Shale of the
Conasauga Group occurs rather abruptly, as the more resistant sandstones grade into the less resistant
shales.
The formations of the Middle to Upper Cambrian Conasauga Group are primarily limy shales
interlayered with shales, limestones, and siltstones. At the ORR, the Conasauga Group is divided into
six units (see Figure 4.6-3). Approximately 450 meters (1,500 feet) of the Conasauga Group is exposed
at the ORR. The transition from the Conasauga Group to the overlying Knox Group is gradational, with
the dominant rock type shifting from shale and dolomitic limestones in the Conasauga Group to
dolomites with occasional limestones in the Knox Group.
At the ORR, as in the rest of eastern Tennessee, the Upper Cambrian to Lower Ordovician Knox
Group is divided into five formations, which are shown on Figure 4.6-3. The Knox Group is
approximately 914 meters (3,000 feet) thick on the ORR and consists primarily of thick beds of silty
dolomite (Hatcher et al. 1992). Above the Knox Group is the Middle to Upper Ordovician Chickamauga
Group. See Figure 4.6-3 for the units that comprise the Chickamauga on the Whiteoak Mountain thrust
sheet.
Surface relief at the ORR typically ranges from a ridge crest to valley floor relief of 30 to 69 meters
(100 to 225 feet) (Lee and Ketelle 1987). Surface elevations on the ORR range from a maximum of 413
meters (1,356 feet) National Geodetic Vertical Datum at the crest of Melton Hill (see Figure 2.1-2) to a
minimum of 226 meters (740 feet) National Geodetic Vertical Datum near Mile 10 on the Clinch River
(Boyle et al. 1982). A series of crests and ridges that trend northeast and southwest make up the ORR
(Figure 4.6-2). In general, the crests or ridges are composed of resistant sandstone or dolomite beds.
Limestone and shale generally form the ridge flanks and valley bottoms.
Sinkholes, large springs, caves, and other karst features are common in the Knox Group, and those
parts of the ORR underlain by limestones and dolomites (certain units in the Conasauga, Knox, and
Chickamauga Groups) are for the most part classified as karst terranes. In a karst terrane there is very
little surface drainage because of the diversion of surface waters to subterranean (underground) flow
routes. These subterranean routes are caves and other enlarged openings that have formed through
dissolution of the carbonate rock. Four major karst zones exist at the ORR that appear to be related to
distinct stratigraphic horizons (Ketelle 1982). These four karst zones all occur in the Knox Group,
specifically in the Copper Ridge Dolomite, near the base of the Chepultepec Dolomite, near the top of
the Chepultepec Dolomite, and in the Kingsport Formation (Ketelle 1982). Karst development is also
present to varying degrees in the carbonate rocks of the Conasauga Group, most notably in the
Maynardville Limestone. In Bear Creek Valley, karst development in the Maynardville Limestone
causes variations in discharge along Bear Creek as the surface water and groundwater components vary
in dominance (Lee et al. 1988). Bear Creek Valley is underlain by calcareous shale and limestone of the
Conasauga Group (Bailey and Lee 1991). Although no site-specific geologic characterization has been
conducted at the West Bear Creek Valley site, it appears the proposed SNF management facility is
located over the lower Conasauga Group strata not normally characterized by karst development.
The soils occurring in the ORR are predominantly clay, although chert and quartz are also present.
Soils developed in the Conasauga are clay. Hatcher et al. (1992) provides detailed information on soils.
Many of the soils belong to the broad group of Ultisols, which are reddish or yellowish, moderately
acidic soils. Entisols, which are thin surface soils over bedrock that show little development of soil
horizons, are found locally in steeply sloping areas. In addition, small areas of inceptisols are found in
alluvial areas adjacent to streams (Boyle et al. 1982). These are young soils, also with minimal horizon
development. Soils on the ORR tend to retain moisture and are typically 90 percent saturated below a
depth of 3 meters (10 feet) (Ketelle and Huff 1984). Depths of soil profiles on the ORR vary from 15
centimeters (6 inches) on slopes to 18 meters (60 feet) over dolomites in the Knox Group (Boyle et al.
1982).
4.6.2 Geologic Resources
The known resources of the geologic units exposed on the ORR are limited to industrial minerals,
including quarry rock and clay. These industrial minerals are of low unit value and can be found
elsewhere. Quarry rock has been mined at several major locations throughout ORR, but no quarries are
currently in operation (Oakes et al. 1984b).
There has been extensive seismic testing by private companies along roads traversing the ORR to
explore for deep accumulations of oil and gas. Land has been leased by major oil companies west and
northwest of K-25 off the ORR; no exploratory wells have been drilled and the status of oil and gas
resources underlying the ORR is unknown at this time (Oakes et al. 1984b).
4.6.3 Seismic and Volcanic Hazards
There is no evidence that there has been volcanic activity in the vicinity of the ORR for more than
1 million years.
4.6.3.1 Historical Seismic Activities. From 1811 to 1975, only five major earthquakes or
earthquake series have affected the ORR area. These are the New Madrid, Missouri, earthquake series,
and the Charleston, South Carolina; Knoxville, Tennessee; Strawberry Plains, Tennessee; and Kingston,
Tennessee earthquakes. The New Madrid earthquake series of December 1811 to February 1812
produced maximum Modified Mercalli Intensity disturbances of V to VI in the ORR area. A Modified
Mercalli Intensity V earthquake is felt by everyone. Typical damage includes some dishes, windows,
etc. being broken, a few instances of cracked plaster, and unstable objects being overturned. A Modified
Mercalli Intensity VI earthquake is also felt by all, and many become frightened and run outdoors.
Typical damage includes some heavy furniture moved and a few instances of fallen plaster or damaged
chimneys. A Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI is approximately equal to a Richter Magnitude 4.7
(Griggs and Gilchrist 1977).
The 1844 Knoxville earthquake, which occurred approximately 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the
ORR, had an epicenter shaking of Modified Mercalli Intensity VI. The Charleston earthquake of 1886
had a Modified Mercalli Intensity of V to VI at the ORR, as did the 1913 Strawberry Plains earthquake.
The 1930 Kingston earthquake, 8 kilometers (5 miles) northwest of the ORR, had an epicenter shaking of
Modified Mercalli Intensity V (Boyle et al. 1982). When intensities are reported at epicenters, they
would have been less at the ORR, as intensities diminish with distance.
A Modified Mercalli Intensity VII earthquake does not typically cause severe damage, but rather
causes breaking of weak chimneys at the roof line, cracks in masonry, and the falling of plaster, loose
bricks, and stones. No Modified Mercalli Intensity VII earthquakes have been recorded at the ORR
during the 165-year period from 1811 to 1975. Earthquakes with a Modified Mercalli Intensity of VII
generally occur one order of magnitude less frequently than earthquakes with a Modified Mercalli
Intensity of V to VI. Seismic records indicate that the ORR is located in a region of moderate seismic
activity having an average of one to two earthquakes per year, with seismic activity occurring in bursts
followed by long periods of no activity. No deformation of recent surface deposits has been detected,
and seismic shocks from the surrounding, more seismically active areas are dissipated by distance from
the epicenters (Boyle et al. 1982).
The underlying structure of the ORR is complex due to the extensive faulting and deformation
characteristic of the region. There are three regional thrust faults in the ORR area, the Kingston,
Whiteoak Mountain, and Copper Creek Faults (see Figure 4.6-4). All three strike to the northeast and
dip to the southeast. Latest movement on the faults was Late Pennsylvanian/Early Permian (280 to 290
million years ago); consequently, they are not considered to be capable faults at present (Oakes et al.
1984b). According to 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, capable faults include those faults that have
exhibited movement at or near the ground surface at least once during the past 35,000 years or movement
of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years.
4.6.3.2 Seismicity Studies. Four seismic studies have been specifically conducted for the
ORR for which the results have been published. Three of these studies have been summarized by
Beavers et al. (1982), and were performed by Blume in 1973, Dames and Moore in 1973, and TERA in
1981. The first two studies were directed toward the seismic hazards at the K-25 Site (formerly the Oak
Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant), and the latter focused on ORNL (Beavers et al. 1982).
These three early studies presented preliminary analysis and conclusions. The fourth study
(McGuire et. al. 1992), is a more recent seismic analysis for the entire ORR. DOE Standards 1020 (DOE
1994a) and 1024 (DOE 1992b) summarize the results of recent seismic analyses at DOE sites and show
that the peak ground accelerations for the ORR for 500-year, 1,000-year, 2,000-year and 5,000-year
seismic events are 0.08g, 0.13g, 0.19g and 0.29g, respectively.
Figure 4.6-5 presents the site specific uniform hazard response spectra for horizontal rock motion
which were approved by DOE Headquarter's Office of Nuclear Energy on August 25, 1993 (Benedict
1993). The response spectra noted on Figure 4.6-5 are for top of rock sites.
4.6.3.3 DOE Seismic Design Criteria. DOE Order 5480.28 requires that the Design and
Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena Hazards,
UCRL-15910 (Kennedy et al. 1990), be used for natural phenomena hazards design and evaluation
criteria until a DOE standard is issued. In April 1994, DOE-STD-1020 was issued to replace UCRL-
15910.
At the SNF management facility site the categorization of each structure, system and component
would be determined in accordance with DOE Standard DOE-STD-1021, Performance Categorization
Criteria for Structures, Systems and Components at DOE facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena
Hazards.
A maximum horizontal ground surface acceleration of 0.19g at ORR is estimated to result from an
earthquake that could occur once every 2,000 years (DOE, 1994a). The seismic hazard information
presented in this EIS is for general seismic hazard comparisons across DOE sites. DOE orders, standards
and site specific procedures require that potential seismic hazards for existing and new facilities be
evaluated on a facility specific basis.
Figure 4.6-5. Oak Ridge- Site Specific Uniform Hazard Response Spectra for Horizontal Rock Motion 4.7 Air Resources
4.7.1 Climatology
Except where indicated, the information presented in this section is derived from Fitzpatrick 1982
and NOAA 1991.
The ORR site is located within the Great Valley of Tennessee in which the Cumberland Plateau
borders to the northwest and the Great Smoky Mountains lie to the southeast. Climate at the ORR is
influenced by these terrain features.
The climate and meteorology in the lowlands are generally unlike those that occur in the more
mountainous regions of the southeastern United States. Daytime winds are usually southwesterly, while
night-time winds are northeasterly, at least during periods of light wind. The elevated ridges of
the Cumberland Plateau and Great Smoky Mountains encompassing the valley impede wind speeds to a
moderate degree. The Cumberland Plateau retards the drainage of cold air from the northwest into
the valley during winter, thus reducing the probability of extremely cold temperatures.
The average daily temperature at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service Station, considered
representative of the ORR, was 14.2oC (57.5oF) for the period of record 1961-1990. The average daily
temperatures varied from a low of 2.6oC (36.7oF) in January to a high of 24.8oC (76.6oF) in July.
Humidity data are maintained at the Knoxville National Weather Service with a period of record
from 1961-1990. Records are reported for humidity readings during the hours 0100, 0700, 1300, and
1900 (local time). The 0700 and 1900 values will be reported here. The mean 0700 relative humidity
was 86 percent with the mean monthly maximum of 92 percent occurring in July and August, and the
mean monthly minimum of 80 percent occurring during February and March. The mean 1900 relative
humidity is 63 percent with the mean monthly maximum of 68 percent occurring in September and
December, and the mean monthly minimum of 52 percent occurring in April.
The mean wind speed measured at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service over the period 1969 to
1984 was 2.0 meters per second (4.4 miles per hour) at an average height above ground of about 13
meters (41 feet). At a meteorological tower at the ORR the mean wind speed was 2.1 meters per second
(4.7 miles per hour) at about 10 meters (33 feet) above ground level. Wind speeds in the ORR area are
influenced by local topographic conditions and are generally higher on top of the ridges than in the
valleys.
The wind direction above the ridgetops and within the valleys tends to follow the orientation of the
valleys. The prevailing wind direction is from the southwest, with a secondary maximum from the
northeast during the winter, spring, and summer months. The situation is reversed in the fall.
Figure 4.7-1 shows 1992 wind roses for the 10- and 60-meter levels of the Y-12 west
meteorological tower. The annual 10-meter level on the Y-12 west meteorological tower shows
peak wind direction frequencies from the west-southwest, with the secondary peak from the
northeast. The annual 60-meter level shows wind direction frequencies from the northeast and a
secondary peak from the southwest. Since the valley floor is inclined, cold air will drain down the valley
during stable periods. Both wind rose levels show the influence of the topography on the wind direction.
Damaging winds are uncommon in the region. Peak gusts recorded in the Great Valley are
generally in the 27- to 31-meter-per-second (60- to 70-mile-per-hour) range for the months of January
through July; in the 22- to 27-meter-per-second (50- to 60-mile-per-hour) range for August, September,
and December; and in the 16- to 20-meter-per-second (35- to 45-mile-per-hour) range in October and
November. The maximum gust reported in the region was about 37 meters per second (82 miles per
hour); it occurred during the month of March at Chattanooga. Knoxville has reported a peak gust of
about 33 meters per second (73 miles per hour) and Oak Ridge a gust of about 26 meters per second (59
miles per hour).
Winter is the wettest of the seasons in the ORR area; March and December are the wettest months
and October the driest. The annual average precipitation measured at the ORR in Bethel Valley from
1944 through 1964 was 130.9 centimeters (51.5 inches), while the annual average precipitation for the
Figure 4.7-1. Wind Roses for Y-12 west tower (@ 10 and 60m) for 1992 at ORR. National Weather Service in Oak Ridge from 1961 through 1990 was 137.2 centimeters (54.0 inches).
The maximum monthly precipitation was 48.9 centimeters (19.3 inches) in July 1967, while the
maximum rainfall in a 24-hour period observed at the Oak Ridge National Weather Service was recorded
in August 1960 at 19.0 centimeters (7.5 inches).
On average there are about 51 thunderstorm days per year at the Oak Ridge National Weather
Service station. The summer thunderstorms, which may be accompanied by strong winds, heavy
precipitation, or, less frequently, hail, occur primarily during the late afternoon and evening hours.
Summer thunderstorms are attributable primarily to convective activity resulting from solar heating of
the ground and generally moist atmospheric conditions. Thunderstorm activity in the winter months is
attributable mainly to frontal activity.
The Great Valley of Tennessee is infrequently subject to tornadoes. The western half of the state
has experienced three times as many tornadoes as the eastern half, where the ORR is located. The ORR
did experience a tornado from a severe thunderstorm on February 21, 1993
(MMES 1993b). The tornado path passed the Y-12 Plant in an east-northeast direction for approximately
21 kilometers (13 miles), ending just north of Knoxville. The wind speeds associated with this tornado
ranged from 18 meters per second (40 miles per hour) to nearly 58 meters per second (130 miles per
hour), depending on the location along the path (MMES 1993b).
Hurricanes are rarely sustained once they reach as far inland as the Great Valley due to the rapid
loss of energy when they are cut off from their source of moisture. The remnants of nine hurricanes that
were classified as devastating after crossing the coastline of the United States have traversed the borders
of Tennessee in the last 70 years.
Atmospheric dispersion improves as wind speed increases, conditions become more unstable, and
the depth of the mixing height increases. The transport and dispersion of airborne material are direct
functions of air movement. Transport directions and speeds are governed by the general patterns of air
flow (and by the nature of the terrain), whereas the diffusion of airborne material is governed by small-
scale, random eddying of the atmosphere (i.e., turbulence). Turbulence is indicated by atmospheric
stability classification. Data collected at Y-12 for calendar year 1992 were classified using the vertical
temperature difference (i.e., between 60- and 10-meter levels) in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Regulatory Guide 1.23 (NRC 1986). The atmospheric conditions are unstable (i.e.,
Stability Classes A through C) approximately 5 percent of the time, neutral (Class D) approximately 43
percent of the time, and stable (Classes E through G) approximately 52 percent of the time at the 10-
meter level.
4.7.2 Air Monitoring Networks
This section discusses the air monitoring networks of the ORR. Atmospheric emissions from the
ORR facilities are monitored by stack monitors and by a network of ambient air monitoring stations on
the perimeter of each major ORR operations area (ORNL, the Y-12 Plant, and K-25 Site), as well as on
the ORR perimeter and throughout the surrounding communities.
4.7.2.1 Radiological Monitoring Network. Twelve of the ambient air monitoring stations on
the perimeter of the Y-12 Plant routinely monitor total suspended uranium particulates. The ORNL
perimeter monitoring network consists of four stations that monitor radiation parameters (i.e., gross
alpha, gross beta, iodine, and gamma-emitting radionuclides). Samples of atmospheric tritium are also
collected monthly at selected perimeter stations.
4.7.2.2 Nonradiological Monitoring Network. The perimeter ambient air monitoring
network for K-25, which was upgraded in 1986, consists of five stations that monitor airborne particulate
contaminants such as nickel, lead, and chromium. In 1988, two additional ambient air monitoring
stations were installed at the K-25 Site. These stations measure polychlorinated biphenyls, furans,
dioxins, and hexachlorobenzene that may accidentally be released due to the Toxic Substance Control
Act incinerator (located in the K-25 area).
4.7.3 Air Releases
4.7.3.1 Radiological Emissions. Table 4.7-1 presents the radioactive emissions to the atmosphere
from each of the three ORR areas (ORNL, K-25, and Y-12) during 1992.
Table 4.7-1. Radioactive atmospheric emissions (curies/yr) from the ORR
during 1992.
Isotope ORNL K-25 Y-12
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium2.14 x 103 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Beryllium-7 8.91 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Potassium-40 0.0 x 100 1.01 x 10-3 0.0 x 100
Cobalt-57 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Cobalt-60 2.97 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Bromine-82 1.02 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-83m 7.32 x 101 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-85 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-85m 1.73 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-87 3.50 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-88 4.94 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Krypton-89 6.27 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Strontium-90 1.19 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Niobium-95 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Technetium-97 0.0 x 100 6.10 x 10-2 0.0 x 100
Ruthenium-106 0.0 x 100 4.36 x 10-4 0.0 x 100
Iodine-129 2.70 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Iodine-131 1.25 x 10-1 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Iodine-132 1.36 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Iodine-133 6.48 x 10-1 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Iodine-134 2.05 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Iodine-135 1.22 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Xenon-133 8.81 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Xenon-133m 2.74 x 10 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Xenon-135 2.82 x 10 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Xenon-135m 1.55 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Xenon-138 8.50 x 102 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Cesium-134 6.03 x 10-7 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Cesium-137 6.13 x 10-4 8.16 x 10-5 0.0 x 100
Cesium-138 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Barium-137 3.84 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Barium-137m 6.13 x 10-4 8.16 x 10-5 0.0 x 100
Barium-140 1.00 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Lanthanum-140 1.39 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Isotope ORNL K-25 Y-12
Cerium-144 0.0 x 100 1.23 x 10-6 0.0 x 100
Europium-152 1.86 x 10-12 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Europium-154 5.87 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Europium-155 3.02 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Osmium-191 2.27 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Gold-194 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Lead-212 1.56 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Thorium-228 9.52 x 10-6 1.54 x 10-3 0.0 x 100
Thorium-230 6.49 x 10-7 7.41 x 10-4 0.0 x 100
Thorium-232 1.86 x 10-7 2.96 x 10-5 0.0 x 100
Thorium-234 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Protactinium-234m 0.0 x 100 4.07 x 10-1 0.0 x 100
Uranium-234 2.24 x 10-5 2.55 x 10-2 4.70 x 10-2
Uranium-235 4.79 x 10-7 1.12 x 10-3 1.49 x 10-3
Uranium-236 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 1.86 x 10-4
Uranium-238 7.57 x 10-7 3.74 x 10-2 4.11 x 10-3
Neptunium-237 0.0 x 100 1.10 x 10-4 0.0 x 100
Plutonium-238 7.40 x 10-6 6.02 x 10-4 0.0 x 100
Plutonium-239 2.06 x 10-5 1.12 x 10-4 0.0 x 100
Americium-241 1.37 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Curium-244 2.05 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
4.7.3.2 Nonradiological Emissions. Table 4.7-2 presents the nonradiological emissions to the
atmosphere from each of the three ORR areas during 1992.
4.7.4 Air Quality
4.7.4.1 Radiological. A summary of ORR airborne radionuclide emissions for 1992 is
presented in Table 4.7-1. The GENII environmental transport and dose assessment model was used to
calculate the effective dose equivalent resulting from these radionuclide emissions. These results are
summarized in Table 4.7-3. The maximum effective dose equivalent at the ORR boundary is 3.3 millirem.
This is 33 percent of the corresponding National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The
collective effective dose equivalents to the estimated population of 910,000 persons within 80 kilometers
(50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility is 52 person-rem. This dose is 0.019 percent of the natural
background radiation affecting this population. Background radiation doses are presented in Figure 4.7-2.
4.7.4.2 Nonradiological. The ORR is located in Anderson and Roane Counties, in the Eastern
Tennessee-Southwestern Virginia Interstate Air Quality Control Region 207. As of 1993, the areas
within this Air Quality Control Region were designated as attainment with respect to all National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (CFR 1993a).
One Prevention of Significant Deterioration ambient air quality Class I area can be found in the
vicinity of ORR. That is the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, located approximately 48
kilometers (30 miles) southeast of ORR. Since the promulgation of the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration regulations, no such permits have been required for any emissions source at the ORR.
Ambient air quality within and near the ORR is monitored for total suspended particulates,
particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10), fluorides, lead, and sulfur dioxide, which was
monitored until August 1990 (MMES 1993a). Ambient air quality monitoring data collected at the ORR
are summarized in Table 4.7-4.
Table 4.7-2. Nonradiological emissions at ORR (kg/yr).
Pollutant Y-12 ORNL K-25
Carbon monoxide 36,807 45,872 12,119
Nitrogen dioxide 648,746 201,090 20,065
Particulates 1,576 5,599 1,137
Sulfur dioxide 268,894 703,419 302
Volatile organic compound1,582 1,068 1,011
Chlorine 91 b 1,567
Hydrochloric acid 6,959 b 42
Methanol 26,407 b b
Nitric acid 9,491 30 b
Perchloroethylene 12,245 b b
Sulfuric acid 2,424 0 130
Hydrogen fluoride 73 b b
Mercury 0.01 b b
Trichloroethane 745 b b
a. Source: MMES (1993a).
b. No source indicated.
Table 4.7-3. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operations
during 1992.
Maximum exposed Collective dose to
individual doseb the population within
80 km of ORR sourcesc
Dose 3.3 mrem 52 person-rem
National Emission Standards 10 mrem per year --
for Hazardous Air Pollutants standard
Percentage of National 33 --
Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants
Natural background dose 295 mrem per year 279,000 person-rem
per year
Percentage of natural 1.1 0.019
background dose
a. Sources: MMES (1993a); PNL (1988).
b. The maximum boundary dose is to the hypothetical individual who remains in the open
continuously during the year at the ORR boundary.
c. Based on estimated population of 910,000 persons within 80 kilometers of the proposed
SNF facility site location in 1995.
Figure 4.7-2. Sources of radiation exposure, unrelated to Oak Ridge Reservation operations, to individuals in the vicinity of ORR.
Table 4.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations and guidelines at the ORR.
Criteria pollutant Averaging time Most stringent Maximum(a) Maximum existing Total existing
regulation or background site contribution maximum
guideline (-g/m3) concentration (-g/m3) concentration
(-g/m3) (-g/m3)
Carbon monoxide 8-hour 10,000 b 6.9 6.9
1-hour 40,000 b 24.1 24.1
Nitrogen dioxide Annual 100 b 2.1 2.1
Lead Calendar quarter 1.5 b c c
Particulate matter lessAnnual 50 8 4.0d 12.0
than 10 microns in 24-hour 150 54 43.9d 97.9
diameter
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 27 2.3 29.3
24-hour 365 146 31.8 177.8
3-hour 1,300 321 80.5 401.5
Total suspended Annual 50 32 4.0 36.0
particulatesf 24-hour 150 73 43.9 116.9
Hydrogen 30-day 1.2 0.06 c 0.06
Fluoride 7-day 1.6 0.03 c 0.03
Hydrogen fluorides (as 24-hour 2.9 b c c
fluorides) 8-hour 3.7 b c c
Hazardouse air pollutants
Chlorine 8-hour 150 b 0 c
Selenium 8-hour 20 b c c
Mercury 8-hour 0.5 b c c
Chromium 8-hour 5 b c c
Chrome 8-hour 5 b c c
a. Ambient air quality data (MMES 1992a, 1991a).
b. Not monitored.
c. Not estimated because the potential release is negligible.
d. It is conservatively assumed that data for particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10) are total suspended
particulates data.
e. State standard.
f. State guideline.
Table 4.7-4 presents the effects of site emissions on local ambient air quality. Concentrations of
pollutants obtained from ambient air quality monitoring data are added to pollutant concentrations
determined from air dispersion modeling using site-specific emission rates. The resulting sum is used to
compare total concentrations to applicable Federal and state criteria pollutant and hazardous/toxic air
pollutant guidelines and regulations. All pollutant concentrations of existing emissions at the ORR are
below applicable regulations.
4.8 Water Resources
4.8.1 Surface Water
The hydrologic system on the ORR is controlled by the Clinch River (MMES 1994a). The Clinch
River flows about 350 miles (560 kilometers) from its headwaters in southwest Virginia, near Tazewell,
to its confluence with the Tennessee River at Kingston, Tennessee. Its drainage area is about 4,410
square miles (11,340 square kilometers) (Boyle et al. 1982). All water that drains from the ORR enters
the Clinch River and subsequently the Tennessee River.
Flow in the Clinch-Tennessee River system is regulated by multipurpose dams of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). Three dams operated by the TVA control the flow of the Clinch River. Norris
Dam, approximately 31 miles (50 kilometers) upstream of the ORR, was constructed to provide flood
control and low-flow regulation. Melton Hill Dam, south of the ORNL site, controls the flow of the
Clinch River near the ORR. Its primary function is power generation. Flood control is a secondary
function. Watts Bar Dam, also used for power generation, is located on the Tennessee River and
influences the lower reaches of the Clinch River by creating backwaters that can extend as far upstream
as Melton Hill Dam (Oakes et al. 1987).
Heavy precipitation in the area causes localized flooding, primarily in the City of Oak Ridge
(MMES 1994a) and along the Clinch River. A flood analysis was prepared by the TVA for the ORR
(TVA 1991). This analysis provides flood elevations for flooding events in the Clinch River and major
tributaries on the ORR. Flooding events analyzed ranged from the 25-year flood (a flood with a 1 in 25
chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year) to probable maximum flooding events.
Approximate 500-year floodplains (1 in 500 chance in any given year) are shown on Figure 4.8-1. Site-
specific surveys should be performed to more accurately determine locations of flooding elevations.
The average discharge from Melton Hill Dam between 1963 and 1979 was 5,300 cubic feet (150
cubic meters) per second (Boyle et al. 1982). The average summer (June-September) discharge for the
same period was 4,730 cubic feet (134 cubic meters) per second. However, power is generated at Melton
Hill Dam to help meet peak loads and, as a result, flow in the Clinch River is pulsed. Periods of no flow
at the dam can be followed by periods of flow of up to 20,000 cubic feet (560 cubic meters) per second.
Variations in the flow of the Clinch River affect the flow of the tributaries on the ORR. For example,
during peak periods of power generation at Melton Hill Dam, flow from White Oak Creek can be
blocked or even reversed. The 1992 minimum monthly release at the Melton Hill Dam occurred in May
and was 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meters) (MMES 1994a).
The ORR is drained by a network of tributaries of the Clinch River (Figure 4.8-1). A statewide
stream classification system based on water quality, water use, and resident aquatic biota designates most
streams on the ORR for fish and aquatic life, irrigation, and livestock watering (MMES 1992a). For each
designated classification, specific water quality criteria are applied, forming the basis for facility-specific
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. No rivers designated as wild and scenic occur
on the ORR.
Stream flow on the ORR varies primarily with seasonal precipitation (MMES 1994a). Precipitation
varies throughout the year, with the winter months and July experiencing the highest rainfall. Five-year
cycles of wet and dry seasons are also evident. Precipitation is lost through evaporation, vegetation
uptake, runoff to streams, and to groundwater recharge through the soil.
The drainage pattern on the ORR is a weakly developed "trellis" pattern (Lee and Ketelle 1987).
The majority of the small streams are located in the northeast-southwest-trending valleys. Some streams
flow across the ridges through water gaps that may have formed due to the presence of structural features
(Golder Associates 1988). Karst topography also affects the appearance of surface drainage patterns,
Figure 4.8-1. Locations of the Clinch River and tributaries on the Oak Ridge Reservation. primarily because of the presence of sinkholes in areas underlain by the Knox Group.
A number of wetlands occur on the ORR (MMES 1994a). Wetlands are surface features
periodically saturated with or covered by water, and have hydric soils and hydrophytic plants. With
regards to water resources issues, wetlands absorb flood waters and improve groundwater quality.
Characteristic wetlands of the ORR region include forested wetlands along creeks, wet meadows and
marshes associated with streams and seeps, and emergent communities in shallow embayments and
ponds.
The abundance of limestone and dolomite is reflected by the presence of calcium bicarbonate in the
surface waters at the ORR. Water hardness is typically moderate, and the concentrations of total
dissolved solids normally range between 100 and 250 milligrams per liter (Rogers et al. 1988).
Measurements of surface water quality and flow are made at a number of sampling stations on and
around the ORR. Reference surface waters, ORR surface waters receiving effluents, off-reservation
surface waters, and effluents are all sampled and analyzed as part of the surface water monitoring
program. Water samples are collected and analyzed for radiological and nonradiological content, and the
results are reported yearly in publicly available environmental reports (e.g., MMES 1993a; 1992a;
1991a).
Although bedrock characteristics differ somewhat among the watersheds of these streams, most of
the observed differences in water quality are attributed to different contaminant loadings (Rogers et al.
1988). Both wastewater discharges and the groundwater transport of contaminants from waste disposal
sites affect water quality in ORR streams. Consequently, a number of surface streams have been
contaminated by activities at the ORR (DOE 1992c). In the past, contaminants have been directly
released to surface waters on the ORR. Indirect releases via shallow groundwater discharge to surface
water streams have occurred in the past and continue to date. For example, activities at the ORNL have
contaminated reaches of the White Oak Creek system and Melton Branch with radionuclides, metals, and
other hazardous chemicals. The stream channel of Upper East Fork Poplar Creek in the Y-12 Plant area
has been contaminated from past activities at the Y-12 Plant. Activities at the Y-12 Plant have also
contaminated surface water and groundwater in the Bear Creek Valley with nitrates, volatile organics,
radionuclides, and metals beyond the ORR boundary. Operations at the Y-12 Plant have also
contaminated Lower East Fork Poplar Creek beyond the ORR boundary with mercury, other metals,
organics, and radionuclides. Ultimately, contaminants from all these streams have been discharged to
the Clinch River, where sediment contamination is a primary concern.
All effluent discharges to streams are required to meet specified National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit limits (MMES 1994a). For example, the quality of water in East Fork Poplar
Creek partially reflects the influence of the Y-12 Plant and the City of Oak Ridge municipal wastewater
treatment facility. Each of the ORR installations has a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permit. In 1992, more than 400 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System stations were sampled,
requiring more than 65,000 water analyses. Significant reductions in the number of noncompliances for
the ORR between 1991 to 1992 were engineered especially with respect to the Y-12 Plant. The K-25
Site was in 99.9 percent compliance with discharge limits. The Y-12 Plant was in 99.5 percent
compliance with discharge limits. The ORNL was in 99 percent compliance with discharge limits.
Table 4.8-1 lists the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System noncompliances by installation
and discharge point. At the Y-12 Plant, ORNL, and the K-25 Site, radiological effluents were
well within limits at all effluent monitoring locations (MMES 1993a).
Water quality in the Clinch River is affected by ORR activities, by contaminants introduced
upstream from the ORR, and by flow regulation at the Tennessee Valley Authority dams. Stream
impoundment has resulted in a rise in water temperatures, sediment retention, and contaminant
adsorption. Several institutions routinely monitor water quality in the Clinch River. Both the Tennessee
Valley Authority and the U.S. Geological Survey monitor just below Melton Hill Dam. The Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation maintains a monitoring station on the Clinch River about
2 miles (3.2 kilometers) below the mouth of Poplar Creek and the K-25 Site (Rogers et al. 1988).
The Clinch River supplies most of the water to the ORR, the City of Oak Ridge, and other cities
along the river (MMES 1994a). Major surface water uses in the Oak Ridge area include withdrawals for
Table 4.8-1. 1992 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System noncompliance at the ORR.
Installation Discharge point Parameter Percent Number of
compliance samples
Y-12 302 (Rogers Quarry) pH 99 53
501 (Central Pollution Control Total toxic organics 91 23
Facility [CPCF-1])
502 (West End Treatment Total suspended solids 98 54
Facility)
503 (Steam Plant Wastewater Iron, total 99 158
Treatment Facility) Oil and grease 99 157
Category IV outfalls (untreated pH 95 107
process wastewaters)
506 (9204-3 sump pump oil) Oil and grease 98 53
pH 98 53
512 (Groundwater Treatment Polychlorinated 97 37
Facility) biphenyls
Creek Outfalls Visual not 22a
applicable
ORNL X01 (Sewage Treatment Plant) Oil and grease 99 157
Total suspended solids 96 157
X02 (Coal Yard Runoff Oil and grease 94 34
Treatment Facility)
Category I outfalls Oil and grease 33 3
Category II outfalls Oil and grease 87 166
Total suspended solids 91 166
Cooling systems Chlorine, total residual 98 45
Copper, total 98 45
Zinc, total 98 45
K-25 001 (K-1700 discharge) Aluminum 96 not available (4)b
Oil and grease 99 not available (1)b
005 (K-1203 sanitary treatment Chlorine, residual 99 not available (1)b
facility) Fecal coliform, 99 not available (2)b
No./100 milliliter
Settleable solids, 99 not available (1)b
milliliter/liter
006 (K-1007-B holding pond) Chemical Oxygen 99 not available (1)b
Demand
007 (K-901-A holding pond) Chromium, total 98 not available (1)b
Suspended solids 98 not available (2)b
Dissolved oxygen 98 not available (6)b
Storm drain Unpermitted discharge not 4b
applicable
a. Source: MMES (1993a).
b. Number of noncompliances.
industrial and public water supplies, commercial and recreational navigation, and other recreational
activities such as fishing, boating, and swimming. Five public water supplies are located downstream of
the ORR (MMES 1994a). The two nearest are the K-25 Site water treatment plant and the Kingston
water treatment plant. These are located 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) above and 21 miles (34 kilometers)
below the mouth of Poplar Creek, respectively.
4.8.2 Groundwater
Groundwater beneath the ORR is heavily influenced by the site geologic structure (Solomon et al.
1992). Geologic units of the ORR are assigned to two broad hydrologic groups: (1) the Knox aquifer,
formed by the Knox Group and the Maynardville Limestone (carbonate rocks), in which flow is
dominated by solution conduits and which stores and transmits relatively large volumes of water; and (2)
the ORR aquitards, made up of all other geologic units of the ORR (sandstones, siltstones, and shales), in
which flow is controlled by fractures. These aquitards may store fairly large volumes of water, but they
transmit only limited amounts.
The hydrologic groups are divided into the near-surface stormflow zone, the vadose zone, the
groundwater zone, and the aquiclude (Solomon et al. 1992). Flow in the 3- to 7-foot-deep (1- to 2-meter)
deep stormflow zone accounts for approximately 90 percent of the water moving laterally through the
subsurface. The stormflow zone can transmit some water laterally to surface streams at approximately
39 feet (12 meters) per hour through large pores; however, less than 1 percent of the total void volume of
the zone is large pores. Most water mass resides and migrates through smaller pores in the stormwater
zone at rates 10 to 100 times slower. Advective-diffusive exchange between pores substantially reduces
contaminant migration rates. A vadose zone between the stormflow and groundwater zones exists at the
ORR except where the water table is at the land surface, such as along perennial stream channels. The
vadose zone is thickest beneath ridges and thinnest or non-existent in valleys. Most groundwater
movement through the vadose zone occurs vertically during precipitation events and occurs along
discrete features such as fractures in the bedrock. Measurements of permeability, recharge, and
conductivity vary considerably by locality in the vadose zone. Generally, conductivity is less than an
inch (on the order of millimeters to centimeters) per day. The groundwater zone is the continuously
saturated area in which the remaining 10 percent of lateral sub-surface water movement occurs. Very
little water movement occurs in the deep aquiclude layer.
The Knox aquifer is the only true aquifer of the ORR and is the primary source of sustained natural
flow in perennial streams such as Upper White Oak Creek, East Fork Poplar Creek, and Bear Creek
(Solomon et al. 1992). In some places the Knox aquifer can supply large quantities of water to wells.
Flow volumes are significantly larger than in the aquitards, and flow paths are deeper. The potential
groundwater flow path length in the Knox aquifer is also substantially greater than in the aquitards--on
the order of a few miles or kilometers. The one strongly suspected instance of groundwater flow across
the ORR boundary occurs along the northeastern portion of Chestnut Ridge, where water in the Knox
aquifer travels along a geological strike northeastward from the Y-12 Plant accross the ORR boundary.
In March 1994, DOE announced that elevated levels of four industrial solvents (carbon tetrachloride,
chloroform, tetrachloroethylene, and trichloroethylene) had been found in groundwater wells in the Knox
aquifer, 2,500 feet east of the Y-12 Plant in the Union Vally Industrial Park (Bowdle 1994). The same
solvents are found in groundwater monitoring wells at the Y-12 Plant. DOE is currently investigating the
size and direction of the solvent plume. No proposed SNF management facilities would be sited in areas
overlying the Knox aquifer.
Virtually all mobile water in the aquitards is discharged to local streams within the ORR. Flow in
the ORR aquitards is shallow; about 98 percent occurs at depths of less than 100 feet (30 meters)
(Solomon et al. 1992). Water in the aquitards travels through the uppermost part of the groundwater
zone along flow paths of up to 1,000 feet (300 meters) in length before being discharged to local surface
waters. Groundwater flow volume decreases and solute residence times increase sharply with depth.
Mean solute transport rate in the stormflow zone is on the order of meters per hour, but in the
intermediate and deep intervals of the groundwater zone, representative transport rates are as low as a
few centimeters per year. Additionally, the mobility of most contaminants on the ORR is greatly
reduced by sorption onto subsurface solids. Residence times of solutes near the water table in the
aquitards range from a few days to a few years. In the intermediate and deep intervals, estimates of
residence times range from hundreds to tens of thousands of years. Most groundwater flow in the
aquitards occurs through a few widely spaced (23-164 feet [7-50 meters]) permeable regions.
Water in the aquitards is at best a marginal resource (Solomon et al. 1992). A typical well yields
under 0.25 gallon per minute (0.02 liter per second). In many places, wells are incapable of producing
enough water to support a typical household.
Background groundwater quality at the ORR is generally good in the surficial aquifer zones and
poor (because of high total dissolved solids) in the bedrock aquifer at depths greater than 1,000 feet (300
meters) (DOE 1993a). Water in the surficial aquifer is typically a nearly neutral to moderately alkaline
calcium bicarbonate type. Transport processes in the subsurface (including diffusion from fractures to
the rock matrix, sorption, and exchange) have resulted in an accumulation of contaminants downgradient
of the sources (Solomon et al. 1992).
Contaminated sites in need of environmental restoration include past-practice waste disposal sites,
waste storage tanks, spill sites, and contaminated inactive facilities (DOE 1993a). Principal groundwater
contaminants that exceed applicable standards at the Y-12 Plant include volatile organics, nitrates, heavy
metals, and radioactivity (MMES 1993a). Exact rates and extent of the contamination have not been
quantified. However, data indicate that most contamination remains relatively close to the source. As an
example of the maximum extent of groundwater contamination, nitrate has been detected in wells 3,000
feet (920 meters) southwest of the source. Nitrate is relatively mobile in groundwater and may therefore
define the maximum horizontal migration of contamination. At the ORNL, 20 waste area groupings
have been identified and are being monitored for groundwater contamination. Monitoring data from
each waste area group will direct further groundwater studies. At the K-25 Site, organics are the most
commonly detected groundwater contaminants. Elevated levels of gross alpha and gross beta have also
been detected in a number of wells. Uranium and technetium-99, respectively, appear to be primarily
responsible for the elevated gross alpha and gross beta levels. The metals chromium, lead, arsenic, and
barium have been detected in a number of wells at concentrations exceeding drinking water standards.
Elevated levels of fluoride and polychlorinated biphenyls have also been detected in some wells.
In 1989, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory implemented an off-site residential drinking water
quality monitoring program (MMES 1993a). The program objective is to document groundwater quality
near the ORR and to monitor the potential impact of ORR operations on groundwater quality.
Parameters monitored under the program include volatile organics, metals, anions, and various
radioactive parameters. Radionuclides and organics have been detected in some of the off-site
monitoring wells, however, concentrations have been below drinking water standards. Fluoride has been
detected at concentrations exceeding drinking water standards in one of the off-site wells. The high
fluoride concentrations and accompanying high pH are most likely attributed to natural chemical
reactions in the substrate. No sources or flow paths have been identified for the other constituents
detected.
Although surface water sources provide the main portion of potable water supplies in the area,
groundwater does provide for some domestic, municipal, farm, irrigation, and industrial use (MMES
1993a). Single-family wells are common in areas not served by public water supplies (MMES 1992a).
However, because of the abundance of surface water and its proximity to the points of use, almost no
groundwater is used at the ORR (DOE 1993a). Only one supply well exists on the reservation; it
provides a supplemental supply to an aquatics laboratory.
All aquifers at the ORR are classified as Class II (DOE 1993a). Class II groundwaters are current
and potential sources of drinking water and those waters having other beneficial uses. There are no sole-
source aquifers beneath the ORR (DOE 1993a). Water rights are not an issue in the region.
4.9 Ecological Resources
Land for the ORR was primarily in agricultural use at the time of acquisition by the DOE's
predecessor agencies. Clearings for orchards and pastures were on some of the upper slopes, rocky
areas, and ridgetops; tillage crops were raised on the lower slopes and bottomland. Severe soil erosion
also occurred in some areas. Except on very steep slopes, most of the forests had been cut for timber,
though not necessarily cleared for agricultural uses. Natural plant communities have since reestablished
themselves on most of the ORR, although many areas are maintained as pine plantations or nonforested
areas (ORNL 1988). Plant communities at the ORR are characteristic of the intermountain regions of
central and southern Appalachia. Approximately 10 percent of the ORR has been developed since it was
withdrawn from public access; the remainder of the site has reverted to or been planted with natural
vegetation (MMES 1989).
Biotic media, such as fish and deer, that may be affected by the releases or that might provide
pathways of exposure to people are included in the environmental surveillance programs at the ORR.
Bluegill (Lepomis macrochirus) and whitetail deer (Odocoileus virginianus) are routinely analyzed for
radionuclide contamination. In 1992, the maximum doses to man projected from actual measurements
were within the applicable regulatory requirements (see Section 4.12.4 and 4.12.5) (MMES 1993a).
The following describes biotic resources at the ORR, including terrestrial resources, wetlands,
aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species. Within each biotic resource area, the
discussion focuses first on the ORR as a whole and then on the proposed site.
4.9.1 Terrestrial Resources
The vegetation of the ORR has been categorized into seven plant communities (Figure 4.9-1)
(Parr and Pounds 1987). The pine and pine-hardwood forest is one of the most extensive
plant communities on the ORR. Important species of this community type include loblolly pine (Pinus taeda),
shortleaf pine (Pinus echinata), and Virginia pine (Pinus virginiana) (Parr and Pounds 1987). Another
abundant plant community is the oak-hickory forest, which is commonly found on ridges throughout the
ORR. Northern hardwood forest and hemlock-white pine-hardwood forest are the rarest plant
community types on the ORR. Currently, timber on the ORR is managed by thinning young stands and
harvesting mature stands. Timber is also sold when an area is to be cleared for development (Bradburn
1994). A total of 899 species, subspecies, and varieties of plants have been identified on the ORR (Mann
et al. 1985; Cunningham and Pounds 1991).
Thirty areas on the ORR that are representative of the vegetational communities of the southern
Appalachian region or that possess unique biotic features have been designated by DOE as National
Environmental Research Park Reference Areas (Pounds et al. 1993). Several of these areas are wetlands.
Figure 4.9-1. Oak Ridge Reservation plant communties. The ORR provides habitat for a large number of animal species. Twenty-six species of
amphibians, 33 species of reptiles, 169 species of birds, and 39 species of mammals have been recorded
(Parr and Evans 1992). Habitats dominated by hardwood trees support the greatest number of wildlife
species, followed in order by wetlands, old fields, and pine plantations (ORNL 1988).
Game animals present on the ORR include the whitetail deer, which has been hunted on the
reservation since 1985 (MMES 1992b). Animals commonly found on the ORR include the American
toad (Bufo americanus), eastern garter snake (Thamnophis sirtalis), Carolina chickadee (Parus
carolinensis), northern cardinal (Cardinalis cardinalis), white-footed mouse (Peromyscus leucopus), and
raccoon (Procyon lotor). Raptors, such as the red-shouldered hawk (Buteo lineatus) and great horned
owl (Bubo virginianus), and carnivores, such as the gray fox (Urocyon cinereoargenteus) and mink
(Mustela vison), are ecologically important groups on the ORR (Loar et al. 1981).
The surrounding countryside has much greater proportions of cultivated fields, pastures, and
residential areas than the ORR, and much more fragmented forest cover. Because of the greater
continuity of forests and a lack of human disturbance over much of the ORR, wildlife species that are
affected by forest fragmentation offsite may find an abundance of suitable habitat on the ORR. Thus, the
ORR may serve as a refuge for wildlife and as a source of wildlife migration (ORNL 1988).
Vegetative communities of the West Bear Creek site are typical of the ORR as a whole, composed
of second-growth oak-hickory forest and mixed pine-hardwood forest. There are some loblolly pine
plantations adjacent to the northern edge of the powerline right-of-way and between the right-of-way and
Bear Creek Road (Rosensteel 1994). There are no National Environmental Research Park Reference
Areas on the SNF site. Fauna of the site would also be similar to those expected throughout the ORR.
4.9.2 Wetlands
Wetlands on ORR have recently been evaluated based on National Wetland Inventory maps and
field surveys of vegetation (Cunningham and Pounds 1991). Soils and hydrology were not specifically
considered in this survey. Wetlands on the ORR include emergent, scrub/shrub, and forested wetland
located in embayments of the Melton Hill and Watts Bar Reservoirs that border ORR; along all the major
streams, including East Fork Poplar Creek, Poplar Creek, Bear Creek, and their tributaries; in old farm
ponds; and around groundwater seeps.
Several well-developed emergent communities greater than 1 acre (0.004 square-kilometers) occur
in shallow embayments of the reservoirs. The emergent communities typically grade into marshy areas
adjoining forested wetlands. Most forested wetland sites are typically less than 1 acre, although forested
wetlands greater than 1 acre are found along the East Fork Poplar Creek and the Clinch River near
Gallahar Bridge. Ponds on the ORR vary in size and support diverse flora and fauna. Other wetland
areas exist along utility rights-of-way, especially in Bear Creek and Melton Valleys (Cunningham and
Pounds 1991).
Originating on the lower slopes of Pine Ridge are several headwater tributary systems of Grassy
Creek that flow from north to south across the West Bear Creek site. The stream valleys contain forested
wetlands. A powerline right-of-way crosses the stream bottoms, where the vegetation is dominated by
wetland scrubs and herbaceous species, of which a portion adjacent to the west boundary has been
designated a National Environmental Research Park Natural Area for the protection of state-listed rare
plant species.
4.9.3 Aquatic Ecology
Aquatic habitats on or adjacent to the ORR range from small, free-flowing streams in undisturbed
watersheds to larger streams with altered flow patterns because of dam construction. These aquatic
habitats include tailwaters, impoundments, reservoir embayments, and large and small perennial streams.
Sixty-four fish species have been collected on or adjacent to the ORR. The minnow family has the
largest number of species and is numerically dominant in most streams (ORNL 1988). Representative
fish species of the Clinch River in the vicinity of the ORR are shad (Dorosoma sp.), herring (Alosa sp.),
common carp (Cyprinus carpio), catfish (Ictalurus sp.), bluegill, crappie (Pomoxis sp.), and drum
(Aplodinotus sp.) (Loar et al. 1981). Important fish species taken commercially in the ORR area are
common carp and catfish. Recreational species include crappie, bass (Micropterus sp.), sauger
(Stizostedion canadense), sunfish (Lepomis sp.), and catfish (Rector 1994).
Results from the ORNL monitoring program indicate varying degrees of impact on the benthic
communities of the small perennial streams resulting from past waste disposal practices. Portions of
these streams are dominated by pollutant-tolerant insect species (Loar 1992).
Portions of certain streams on the ORR have been designated by DOE as National Environmental
Research Park Aquatic Natural or Reference Areas. These areas generally represent nonimpacted
streams or reaches of streams and are used primarily for reference areas as part of the biological
monitoring and abatement programs or environmental remediation efforts at ORR facilities. There are
presently eight Aquatic Natural Areas and nine Aquatic Reference Areas (Pounds et al. 1993). Many of
the Aquatic Natural Area streams contain the Tennessee dace, a species listed as in need of management
by the State of Tennessee.
The aquatic resources occurring in the area of the West Bear Creek site are limited to several
headwater tributary systems of Grassy Creek originating on the lower slopes of Pine Ridge and flowing
from north to south across or adjacent to the site. Fifteen fish species have been recorded in Grassy
Creek.
A National Environmental Research Park Aquatic Reference Area is located along Grassy Creek
and its tributaries, one of which runs through the eastern portion of the proposed site. Grassy Creek has a
diverse assemblage of invertebrates and fish species for a stream its size. The ORR uses Grassy Creek as
a reference area for studies of other streams affected by site development (Pounds et al. 1993).
4.9.4 Threatened and Endangered Species
Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, or other special-status species designated by the
Endangered Species Act and/or the state's Nongame and Endangered Species and the Rare Plant
Protection and Conservation Laws that have a reasonable potential for occurrence on the ORR are listed
in Table 4.9-1. The table indicates that 25 of these species have recent records of occurrence on the ORR.
The potential occurrence of the other 22 species listed is due to historical record, proximity to geographic
ranges, and migratory nature of species. No critical habitat for threatened and endangered species, as
defined in the Endangered Species Act (U.S. DOI 1992), exists on the ORR.
Although not all of the ORR has been surveyed for rare species, 33 different areas harboring rare
plant species (federally or state-listed) have been designated as National Environmental Research Park
Natural Areas by DOE (Pounds et al. 1993). The plant species listed in Table 4.9-1 are scattered among
these Natural Areas but are not excluded from other areas on ORR. These Natural Areas are designated
to provide protection for rare plant and animal species. The designated areas include river and creek
bluffs, calcareous barrens, mesic forests, flood plains, and wetland cover classes.
No animal species listed by the Federal Government as threatened or endangered are known to
reside on the ORR (Kroodsma 1987). The bald eagle (Federal, endangered) is a winter visitor to Watts
Bar Lake and Melton Hill Lake. None of the species listed in Table 4.9-1 have been recorded on the
proposed West Bear Creek Valley site. The purple fringeless orchid occurs in a Natural Area adjacent to
the western border of the site (Pounds et al. 1993). Pink lady's-slippers are expected to occur throughout
the Pine Ridge area (MMES 1992a). Preferred habitat within the site indicates a greater potential for
occurrence of the barn owl, black vulture, Cooper's hawk, red-shouldered hawk, and sharp-shinned hawk.
Surveys of the proposed site will be required to verify the presence of these and other plant and animal
species.
Table 4.9-1. Federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special-status species that
potentially occur on or in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Statusb
Common name Scientific name
Federal State
Plants
Appalachian bugbanec Cimicifuga rubifolia C2 T
Butternut Juglans cinerea C2 T
Canada (wild yellow) lilyc Lilium canadense NL T
Carey's saxifragec Saxifraga careyana NL S
Fen orchidc Liparis loeselii NL E
Ginsengc Panax quinquefolius NL T
Golden sealc Hydrastis canadensis NL T
Gravid sedgec Carex gravida NL S
Lesser lady's tressesc Spiranthes ovalis NL S
Michigan lily Lilium michiganense NL T
Mountain witch alderc Fothergilla major NL T
Northern bush honeysucklec Diervilla lonicera NL T
Nuttall waterweedc Elodea nuttallii NL S
Pink lady's-slipperc Cypripedium acaule NL E
Purple fringeless orchidc Platanthera peramoena NL T
Spreading false foxglovec Aureolaria patula C1 T
Tall larkspurc Delphinium exaltatum C2 E
Tubercled rein-orchidc Platanthera flava var. herbiola NL T
Virginia spiraea Spiraea virginiana T E
Fish
Flame chub Hemitremia flammea NL D
Tennessee dacec Phoxinus tennesseensis NL D
Amphibians
Green salamander Aneides aeneus NL D
Hellbenderc Cryptobranchus alleganiensis C2 D
Tennessee cave salamanderd Gyrinophilus palleucus C2 T
Reptiles
Cumberland turtle Chrysemys scripta troosti NL D
Eastern slender glass lizard Ophisaurus attenuatus longicaudus NL D
Northern pine snake Pituophis melanoleucus C2 T
Six-lined racerunnerd Cnemidophorus sexlineatus NL D
Birds
Bachman's sparrow Aimophila aestivalis C2 E
Bald eaglee Haliaeetus leucocephalus E E
Table 4.9-1. (continued).
Common name Scientific name Statusb
Federal State
Birds (continued)
Barn owlc Tyto alba NL D
Bewick's wren Thyromanes bewickii altus C2 T
Black-crowned night heronc Nycticorax nycticorax NL D
Black vulturec Coragyps atratus NL D
Cooper's hawkc Accipiter cooperii NL T
Grasshopper sparrow Ammodramus savannarum NL T
Northern harrier Circus cyaneus NL T
Ospreyc Pandion haliaetus NL E
Peregrine falcon Falco peregrinus E E
Red-shouldered hawkc Buteo lineatus NL D
Redheaded woodpecker Malanerpes erythrocephalus NL D
Sharp-shinned hawkc Accipiter striatus NL T
Mammals
Eastern woodrat Neotoma floridana magister C2 D
Gray bat Myotis grisescens E E
Indiana bat Myotis sodalis E E
Smoky shrew Sorex fumeus NL D
Southeastern shrew Sorex longirostris NL D
a. Sources: Barclay (1990, 1992); Bay (1991); Cunningham et al. (1993); Hardy (1991), Hardy et al. (1992);
Kitchings and Story (1984); Kroodsma (1987); ORNL (1981); ORNL (1988); TDEC (1992a, 1992b,
1992c, 1992d); TWRC (1991a, 1991b); U.S. DOI (1990, 1991, 1992).
b. Status codes:
C1 = Federal Candidate - Category 1 (probably appropriate to list)
C2 = Federal Candidate - Category 2 (possibly appropriate to list, more study required)
D = species deemed in need of management
E = endangered
NL = not listed
S = species of special concern
T = threatened, more study required
c. Recent record of species occurrence on the ORR.
d. Species collected on the ORR in 1964 (ORNL 1988).
e. Observed near ORR on Melton Hill and Watts Bar Lakes.
4.10 Noise
The major noise sources within the ORR occur primarily in developed operational areas and
include various facilities, equipment, and machines (e.g., cooling towers, transformers, engines, pumps,
boilers, steam vents, paging systems, construction and materials-handling equipment, and vehicles).
Major noise sources outside the operational areas consist primarily of vehicles and railroad operations.
At the site boundary, away from most of these activities, noise from these sources would be barely
distinguishable from background noise levels. Some disturbance of wildlife activities might occur on the
ORR as a result of operational activities and construction activities.
Sound-level measurements have been made around the ORR in the process of testing sirens and
preparing support documentation for the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation site (Cleaves 1991).
The acoustic environment along the ORR site boundary in rural areas and at nearby residences away
from traffic noise is typical of a rural location, with the average day-night sound level in the range of 35
to 50 decibels, A-weighted. Areas near the site within Oak Ridge are typical of a suburban area with the
average day-night sound level in the range of 53 to 62 decibels, A-weighted (EPA 1974). The primary
source of ORR noise at the site boundary and at residences near the site boundary is traffic, including
trucks, private vehicles, and freight trains. During peak hours, plant vehicular traffic is a major
contributor to traffic noise levels in the area. In addition, some noise due to air cargo and business travel
via commercial air transport through the airport at Knoxville can be attributed to ORR operations.
Section 4.11 (Traffic and Transportation) discusses vehicular, air, and rail transportation.
The State of Tennessee has not established specific numerical environmental noise standards
applicable to the ORR. The City of Oak Ridge has specified allowable noise levels at property lines as
shown in Table 4.10-1.
During a normal week, about 17,000 employees travel to the ORR each day in private vehicles
from surrounding communities. In addition, both government-owned and private trucks pick up and
deliver materials at the site. Based on the number of employees, it was estimated that about 33,000
vehicle trips are generated to and from the site each day; mostly on Tennessee State Routes 58, 62, 95,
Table 4.10-1. City of Oak Ridge maximum allowable noise limits applicable to the ORR.
Adjacent uses Where measured Maximum sound level
(dBA)b
All residential districts Common lot line 50
Neighborhood business Common lot line 55
district
General business district Common lot line 60
Industrial district Common lot line 65
Major streets Street lot line 75
Secondary residential Street lot line 60
streets
a. Source: City of Oak Ridge (1984).
b. Decibels, A-weighted.
and 162, which pass through the ORR and are open to the general public. Both government-owned and
private trucks pick up and deliver materials at the site. The contribution of ORR operations to traffic
volumes along these routes, especially during peak traffic periods, affects noise levels in the immediate
vicinity of the ORR and through the City of Oak Ridge.
Use of the railroad branches from the CSX and the Norfolk Southern Corporation lines to deliver
and pick up shipments at the ORR may cause some noise impacts along these routes. Twice a week
service is scheduled to Y-12 from the CSX line. However, only 60 cars were delivered in 1993. Service
to K-25 is provided as needed. Only three or four trains serviced K-25 in 1993. However, two or three
trains per week may be required beginning in 1994 (Pearman 1994). Noise sources from rail transport
include diesel engines, wheel-track contact, and whistle warnings at rail crossings.
4.11 Traffic and Transportation
Traffic congestion is measured by level of service. Level of service A represents free flow of
traffic. Level of service B is in the range of stable flow, but the presence of other users in the traffic
stream begins to be noticeable. Level of service C is in the range of stable flow, but marks the beginning
of the range of flow in which the operation of individual users becomes significantly affected by
interactions with others in the traffic stream. Level of service D represents high-density, but stable, flow.
Level of service E represents operating conditions at or near the capacity level. Level of service F is
used to define forced or breakdown flow. The calculated level of service are for discrete locations along
a segment. Level of service will most likely be worse in urban areas and better in rural areas along the
segment.
The Region of Influence for the ORR includes site roads and regional roads in Anderson, Blount,
Knox, Loudon, and Roane counties. Regional and local transportation routes are presented in Figure
4.11-1 and Figure 2.1-2.
Primary roads on the ORR include Tennessee State Routes 95, 62, 162, and 170 (Bethel Valley
Road), and Bear Creek Road. Except for Bear Creek Road, all are public roads. The remaining roads on
the ORR are private. Interstate 75 and Tennessee State Routes 162, 62, and 61 form a loop around ORR.
Figure 4.11-1. Oak Ridge Reservation regional transportation map. Bear Creek Road, Bethel Valley Road, Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 experience high average traffic
and peak hour volume. Other areas on the site that have traffic problems include Scarboro Road, security
entrances, and intersections.
Current baseline traffic (i.e., 1995) along segments providing access to the ORR is projected to
contribute to differing service level conditions (TDOT 1993). Tennessee State Route 61 would operate
at level of service D between Interstate 75 at Norris and U.S. Route 25W at Clinton, and at level of
service C between U.S. Route 25W at Clinton to Tennessee State Route 62 east of Oliver Springs.
Tennessee State Routes 58 and 170 (providing access from the east), as well as Bear Creek Valley Road,
would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate at
widely varying levels of service in the vicinity of ORR. Tennessee State Route 62 would operate at a
level of service E between Tennessee State Route 95 at Oak Ridge and Tennessee State Route 170.
Tennessee State Route 95 would operate at a level of service E between Tennessee State Route 61 and
Tennessee State Route 62 at Oak Ridge.
Road reconstruction, widening, modification of interchanges, and new interchange construction
projects are planned for segments of Bear Creek Valley Road, Scarboro Road, and Tennessee State
Routes 58, 62, and 95 (Johnson, C. 1994; MMES 1991b).
Current baseline traffic along segments providing regional access to the ORR is projected to
contribute to differing service level conditions. Interstate 40 passes within 5 miles (8 kilometers) to the
south of the ORR. It has a level of service of A to B between U.S. Route 27 at Harriman to Interstate 75,
which passes northeast about 11 miles (18 kilometers) and south about 3 miles (5 kilometers) of the
ORR. U.S. Route 25W passes the ORR about 10 miles (16 kilometers) to the east and northeast. It has a
level of service of D to E between Interstate 75 at Lake City to Tennessee State Route 131.
In 2001, when site-related impacts are at their highest along segments providing access to the ORR,
background traffic is projected to contribute to differing service level conditions for local roads.
Tennessee State Route 61 would operate at level of service D between Interstate 75 at Norris and U.S.
Route 25W at Clinton and level of service C between U.S. Route 25W at Clinton to Tennessee State
Route 62 east of Oliver Springs. Tennessee State Routes 58 and 170 as well as Bear Creek Valley Road
would operate between level of service D and B. Tennessee State Routes 62 and 95 would operate at
widely varying levels of service in the vicinity of the ORR, with a level of service F between Tennessee
State Route 95 at Oak Ridge and Tennessee State Route 162. U.S. Routes 11/70 would operate at level
of service F between Tennessee State Route 131 and U.S. Routes 11E/11W Split. All other local roads
operate at level of service E or better (University of Tennessee 1993). Interstate 40 has a level of service
B to D between U.S. Route 27 at Harriman to Tennessee State Route 162.
The level of service was calculated using average daily traffic counts (TDOT 1990) and standard
parameters (ITE 1991; TRB 1985; Rand McNally 1993).
No public transportation service exists in the City of Oak Ridge. Other modes of transportation
within the Region of Influence include railways and waterways. Railroad service in the Region of
Influence is provided by CSX Transportation and the Norfolk Southern Corporation. Two main lines
serve the ORR. A CSX Transportation spur line serves the ORR site as well as the City of Oak Ridge.
Waterborne transport in the Region of Influence is via the Clinch River, which provides an alternative
mode of transportation to the Oak Ridge area. The Clinch River waterway has rarely been used for DOE
business, and no designated port facilities exist for such purposes (Corps 1991).
McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, 40 miles (64 kilometers) from the ORR, receives jet air
passenger and cargo services from both national and international carriers. The closest air transportation
facility to ORR is Atomic Airport in Oliver Springs. Numerous other private airports are located
throughout the Region of Influence (DOT 1991).
4.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
The Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation released chemicals and small quantities of
radionuclides to the environment from operations at all facilities during 1992. These releases are
quantified and characterized in detail in the Oak Ridge Environmental Report for 1992. This release
information, along with estimates of the potential consequences resulting from these releases, is
summarized in greater detail within sections 4.7, 5.7, 4.8, and 5.8 for the purpose of characterizing the
existing radiation and chemical environment. The ORR baseline data presented within this section are
expected to remain essentially constant between 1992 and 1995 (the year in which SNF operations are
expected to commence).
Health effects from radiation are presented here as the risk of fatal cancer. This risk is in the ratio
of the health risk estimator (risk of fatal cancer per rem of exposure). The value of this estimator for
exposures to the public is 5 x 10-4 for fatal cancers. The corresponding estimator for exposures to
workers is 4 x 10-4.
4.12.1 Atmospheric Emissions and Doses
Table 4.7-1 in Section 4.7 illustrates the breakdown of radioactive emissions to the atmosphere
from each of the three ORR operations areas (ORNL, K-25, and Y-12), during 1992. The calculated total
dose of 3.3 millirem/year due to 1992 operations, to the maximally exposed individual at the site
boundary, is well within the 10 millirem/year limit given in 40 CFR Part 61 (the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) (MMES 1993a).
The concentrations at the ORR boundary of all radionuclides released to the atmosphere from the
three operations areas in 1992 were less than 1 percent of the DOE Derived Concentration Guide, which
is based upon an exposure of 100 millirem; this equates to a dose of less than 1 millirem (MMES 1993a).
The associated isotopic gaseous release cancer risks are presented within Section 4.12.4.
Table 4.7-2 in Section 4.7 presents the chemical releases for 1992 in a fashion analogous to Table
4.7-1. All of these releases are within permitted levels. The associated chemical release cancer risks are
presented within Section 4.12.6.
4.12.2 Groundwater/Surface Water Contamination and Doses
Referring to the various water contamination data presented in Section 4.8, it was found that a
plausible 0.62 mrem/year of site operation could be incurred by a potential maximally exposed
individual at the site boundary due to water ingestion, fish ingestion, and other associated factors (see
Table 4.12-1) (MMES 1993a).
Additionally, a dose of 17 mrem/year of site operation could be incurred by this potential
maximally exposed individual, due to external exposure from contaminated liquid effluents (see Table
Table 4.12-1. Summary of estimated radiation dose to public from 1992 operations at
ORR.
Pathway Location of Committed Collective
maximally exposed effective dose committed
individual equivalent to effective dose
maximally exposed equivalent
individual (mrem) (person-rem)a
Gaseous effluents Nearest resident to
Inhalation plus direct Y-12 Plant 2.7 29
radiation from air, ORNL 0.06 2
ground, and food K-25 Site 0.53 21
chains ORR 3.3 52
Liquid effluents
Drinking water Gallaher 0.2 0.85
Eating fish Poplar Creek 0.4 1.0b
Other activities Poplar Creek 0.02
Direct radiationb Clinch River shoreline 2
Poplar Creek (K-25 Site) 15
a. Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the ORR.
b. Includes doses from all liquid pathways (MMES 1993a).
4.12-1). Fifteen mrem/year of this dose would result from a hypothetical individual fishing for 250
hours/year along Poplar Creek near the K-25 storage areas (MMES 1993a).
The associated cancer risks related to these doses are presented in Section 4.12.4.
4.12.3 External Gamma Radiation
External gamma radiation measurements were made with thermoluminescent dosimeters at
locations coinciding with the ambient air locations. The average external gamma radiation level at the
ORR perimeter for 1992 was 7.6 microroentgens per hour. All of the measurements were well within the
range of typical values for cities in the United States (MMES 1993a).
4.12.4 Radiation Dose and Health Effects Summary (Public and ORR Workers)
A summary of the effective dose equivalents to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual
from the important pathways of exposure during 1992 is presented in Table 4.12-1. If the resident who
receives the highest effective dose equivalent (3.3 millirem) from gaseous effluents also drank water
from the Gallaher area (0.2 millirem), and went fishing at Poplar Creek (for 250 hours/year) near the K-
25 site (15 millirem), that individual would receive a total effective dose equivalent of approximately
18.5 millirem, which is roughly 6.3 percent of the annual dose (295 millirem) from natural background
radiation (see Figure 4.7-2). All of these doses are within the applicable regulatory requirements, (i.e., 4
millirem/year from the drinking water pathway, 10 millirem/year from the airborne release pathways,
and 100 millirem/year total for all pathways) (MMES 1993a).
The risk of fatal cancer to the maximally exposed individual at the site boundary (due to
atmospheric emissions only) is 1.7 x 10-6 per year of operation, and the corresponding (ingestion) risk to
this maximally exposed individual from drinking water is 1.0 x 10-7 per year of operation. The risk of
fatal cancer from direct radiation due to an individual's spending 250 hours/year fishing at Poplar Creek
(K-25 Site) is 7.5 x 10-6 per year of exposure. A more realistic maximally exposed individual scenario
from direct radiation, an individual spending 250 hours/year along the Clinch River shoreline near a field
on which cesium-137 experiments were performed, yields an associated risk of 1 x 10-6. The resulting
risk to the maximally exposed individual is 9.2 x 10-6 per year of operation; over the 40-year SNF
management facility lifetime this risk would be 3.7 x 10-4. Table 4.12-1 also includes the collective
doses to the general population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the ORR. It was found that
approximately 54 person-rem (which translates to an expected 0.027 fatal cancer) were received (from
liquid and gaseous effluents) by this population from 1992 ORR operations. Thus, over a 40-year period,
there would be approximately 1.1 fatal cancers expected.
Doses to onsite workers at the ORR have been reported by DOE for 1991 operations. Of the
approximately 17,000 workers monitored, the maximally exposed individual was reported to receive 1 to
2 rem (assumed as 2 rem), which is well below the DOE guidelines of 5 rem (DOE 1992a). The average
dose to workers at the site was 2.8 mrem/yr. The risk of fatal cancer to the average worker is 1.1 x 10-6
per year of operation; the risk to a worker who spent 40 years at ORR is approximately 4.5 x 10-5.
Additionally, the total collective (population) dose received by these workers was 48 person-rem, which
corresponds to 0.019 fatal cancers per year of exposure. Over a 40-year period, there would be an
expected 0.76 fatal cancer to this worker population.
4.12.5 Health Effects Studies
Two epidemiologic studies were conducted to determine whether the ORNL facility contributed to
any excess cancers in the communities surrounding the facility. One study found no excess cancer
mortality in the population living in counties surrounding ORNL when compared to the control
populations located in other nearby counties and elsewhere in the United States (Jablon et al. 1991). The
other found slight excess cancer incidences of several types in the counties near ORNL, but none of the
excess risks were statistically significant (Sharpe 1992).
An Oak Ridge health assessment study is ongoing. This study will include a reconstruction of
doses received by the public from historical releases of radioactivity from the reservation. To date, a
Phase I report has been issued (Tennessee Department of Health and the Oak Ridge Health Agreement
Steering Panel 1993).
Studies of workers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Jablon et al 1991; Wing et al. 1993) showed
an excess of leukemia deaths among maintenance workers and engineers who had worked for more than
10 years, suggesting a possible excess attributed to exposures other than radiation. An increase of 2.68
percent in deaths from all causes and 4.94 percent for all cancers with every rem of cumulative dose
exposure with a 20-year exposure lag was also reported. Excess cancer deaths were associated with
working in radioisotope production and chemical operations but not with work in physics, engineering,
or unknown job categories. Cancer mortality was also associated with exposure to beryllium, lead, and
mercury.
In March 1990, the Secretary of Energy announced that DOE would turn over responsibility for
analytical epidemiologic research on long-term health effects on workers at DOE facilities and
surrounding communities to the Department of Health and Human Services, and directed that worker
health and exposure data be released. A Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Health and
Human Services was signed in January 1991. The Department of Health and Human Services is now
conducting the ongoing health effects research program. To develop a database on workers, DOE has
initiated an Epidemiologic Surveillance Program and Health-Related Records Inventory.
4.12.6 Chemical Dose and Health Effects Summary
Table 4.7-2 in Section 4.7 presents the ORR chemical releases for 1992. Exposure to chemicals
released from the ORR was compared with acceptable levels of exposure (no adverse effect from
noncarcinogens) for the ingestion exposure pathway via drinking water and consumption of fish.
Aluminum, nitrate, and polychlorinated biphenyls were measured above acceptable levels in upper Bear
Creek; the ratios of their doses to acceptable doses were 3.4, 2.2, and 11.1, respectively. The only other
chemical exposure attributable to ORR operations that was found to exceed acceptable levels was
mercury. This noncarcinogen was found in fish caught from the Clinch River. The ratio of the mercury
dose to acceptable dose levels was found to be 1.1 (MMES 1993a).
Because of concerns for possible contamination of the population by mercury, the Tennessee
Department of Health and Environment conducted a pilot study in 1984. The study showed no
difference in urine or hair mercury levels between individuals with potentially high mercury exposures
(residence or activity in contaminated areas based on soil measurements or consumption of fish caught in
the contaminated areas) and those with little potential exposure. Mercury levels in some soils measured
as high as 2,000 parts per million. Analysis of a few soil samples showed that most of the mercury in the
soil was inorganic, however, thereby lowering the probability of bioaccumulation and health effects.
Planned occupational studies at the ORR include a 24-month clinical follow-up of 111 heavily exposed
mercury workers (Wing et al. 1991).
4.13 Utilities and Energy
4.13.1 Water Consumption
Both the Clinch River and the Melton Hill Reservoir supply water to the ORR. Because they are a
part of the TVA flood control system, they are capable of maintaining a constant volume of water well in
excess of the demands of the ORR (MMES 1993a).
In 1995, water supply facilities at the ORR will have a capacity of approximately 1,761 liters per
second (27,916 gallons per minute). In 1993, the average demand for water on the ORR water supply
facilities was approximately 801 liters per second (12,708 gallons per minute) (Fritts 1994).
A pumping station near Y-12 on the Melton Hill Reservoir supplies untreated water to the DOE
water treatment plant. After treatment, the water is stored in two reservoirs with a combined capacity of
26 million liters (7 million gallons). From the reservoirs, water is supplied by gravity flow to the Y-12
operations site, ORNL, the Scarboro Facility (which houses the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and
Education's Energy/Environmental Systems Division), and the City of Oak Ridge (MMES 1994a).
A pumping station on the Clinch River provides water to the K-25 water system. After treatment,
the water is stored in two water storage tanks on Pine Ridge. This system provides water to the K-25
Site, the Transportation Safeguards Facility, and the city's Clinch River Industrial Park (MMES 1994a).
The SNF facilities will be supplied with water from the K-25 water system. In 1995, the K-25
water system will have a capacity of approximately 184 liters per second (2,917 gallons per minute). In
the years 1988 to 1994, K-25 water usage varied from a high of 97 liters per second (1,533 gallons per
minute) in 1990 to a low of 78 liters per second (1,235 gallons per minute) in 1988. In 1994, the average
demand was 84 liters per second (1,324 gallons per minute). Significant growth in water capacity or
demand is not expected (Fritts 1994).
4.13.2 Electrical Consumption
The ORR electrical system is supplied power from four major power sources in the TVA system:
Kingston Steam Plant, Bull Run Steam Plant, Wolf Creek Hydroelectric Plant, and Fort Loudon
Hydroelectric Plant. The K-25 Power Operations Department manages and operates the electrical
transmission and substation system of the ORR (MMES 1994a).
Three substations located at the K-25, Y-12, and ORNL sites comprise the ORR power system.
The substations are tied together onsite by five DOE 161-kilovolt transmission lines. Power is supplied
to ORR substations by six TVA electrical lines at 161 kilovolts, which is reduced to 13.8 kilovolts for
distribution (MMES 1994a).
In 1995, the connected capacity of ORR facilities would be approximately 920 megavolt-amperes.
From 1989 through 1993, the peak demand of electricity varied from a high of 116 megavolt-amperes in
1989 to a low of 98 megavolt-amperes in 1993 (Fritts 1994).
4.13.3 Fuel Consumption
The East Tennessee Natural Gas Company supplies natural gas to the ORR, transporting the gas
from the supply areas through upstream pipelines and then through its own pipeline system for ultimate
delivery to the ORR (MMES 1994a). By contract, ORR natural gas capacity is 7,600 decatherms. This
amount can be increased if necessary. In 1994, the average daily usage of natural gas was 3,600
decatherms (Fritts 1994).
Coal is used to produce steam at ORNL and as a backup fuel at the Y-12 steam plant. Y-12 plans
to use more coal in the future as a replacement for natural gas (Fritts 1994).
4.13.4 Wastewater Disposal
The ORR does not have a centralized sewage system for all facilities. The K-25 Site and ORNL
have their own sewage systems, while Y-12 shares sewage lines with the City of Oak Ridge (MMES
1994a).
The sanitary sewage effluent from the Y-12 operations area flows to the Oak Ridge West End
Treatment Plant. DOE maintains the sewage lines extending from Y-12 to the east end of the security
road (Bear Creek Road). The City of Oak Ridge maintains the sewage lines from the end of the security
road to the treatment plant on West Oak Ridge Turnpike (MMES 1994a).
The sewage treatment plant for ORNL discharges treated effluent into White Oak Creek in full
compliance with all permit requirements (MMES 1994a). There are no anticipated capacity problems
with the K-25 sanitary sewage system, which is permitted by the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination system (MMES 1994a).
The SNF management facility could use the K-25 sanitary sewer treatment system, located directly
north of the proposed SNF site. The K-25 system has a capacity of 26 liters per second (417 gallons per
minute). From 1988 to 1994, wastewater production peaked at 24 liters per second (378 gallons per
minute) during wet conditions in 1994 (Fritts 1994). As an alternative, a new onsite sanitary sewage
system and wastewater treatment plant might be required for the proposed SNF management facility.
4.14 Materials and Waste Management
This section describes the hazardous materials management (chemical raw materials), the waste
categories, and the ongoing waste management activities, including onsite treatment, onsite storage,
onsite waste disposal, and preparation for appropriate offsite disposal, for the three primary complexes
within the ORR: the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site, and the ORNL (see Figure 2.1-2). Ongoing nuclear-
related activities at the ORR have resulted in the generation of low-level, mixed low-level, hazardous,
transuranic, spent nuclear fuel (see Chapter 2 for discussion), and industrial solid waste categories, which
are discussed in this section. Section 4.8 discusses nonhazardous liquid waste treatment. A description
of the Y-12 Plant, the K-25 Site, and ORNL waste categories and the waste management process unique
to each of these complexes follows.
Facilities at the Y-12 Plant are being used to manage low-level radioactive, hazardous (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous/mixed polychlorinated biphenyl and polychlorinated
biphenyl/uranium), and nonhazardous solid wastes. Figure 4.14-1 shows the waste management process
at the Y-12 Plant.
Figure 4.14-1. Flow diagram of Y-12 Plant storage and disposal units at ORR (Page 1 and 2). Figure 4.14-1. Flow diagram of Y-12 Plant storage and disposal units at ORR (page 2 of 2). Facilities at the K-25 Site are being used to manage low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed
wastes. Nonhazardous solid wastes are disposed at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill. Figure 4.14-2
shows the waste management process at the K-25 Site.
Facilities at the ORNL are being used to manage transuranic, low-level radioactive, hazardous, and
mixed waste. Nonhazardous solid wastes are disposed at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill. Figure 4.14-3
shows the waste management process at the ORNL.
The overall ORR waste management activities, as well as details on the facilities used to manage
wastes, are presented by waste category (transuranic, mixed low-level, low-level, hazardous, and
industrial solid) in Sections 4.14.1 through 4.14.5 respectively. Note that the 1995 waste generation rates
presented in tables associated with these sections are a representation of the annual generation rates for
operations until the year 2035. Section 4.14.6 describes the management of the chemical raw materials
used for ORR activities.
4.14.1 Transuranic Waste
The ORNL is the only complex at the ORR that generates and manages transuranic waste. Table
4.14-1 presents a summary of transuranic waste management activities projected for 1995, and details
on the facilities used to manage transuranic wastes are presented in Table 4.14-2.
4.14.2 Mixed Low-Level Waste
All three complexes at the ORR generate and manage mixed low-level wastes. The Y-12 Plant, K-
25 Site, and the ORNL manage non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act wastes (polychlorinated
biphenyls, beryllium, and asbestos) contaminated by low-level radioactive materials as dangerous
substances and include them with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-regulated radionuclide-
contaminated materials as mixed wastes. Table 4.14-3 presents a summary of mixed low-level waste
management activities projected for 1995, and details on the facilities used to manage mixed
low-level waste are presented in Table 4.14-4.
Figure 4.14-2. Flow diagram of K-25 waste storage units at ORR (Page 1 of 2). Figure 4.14-2. Flow diagram of K-25 waste storage units at ORR (page 2 of 2). Figure 4.14-3. Flow diagram of ORNL waste treatment units and storage and disposal units at ORR (Page 1 of 2).
Figure 4.14-3. Flow diagrams of ORNL waste treatment units and storage and disposal units at ORR (Page 2 of 2).
Table 4.14-1. Projected 1995 transuranic waste management activities at the ORR (ORNL complex).
Waste category Generation rateb Treatment Treatment Storage method Storage capacity Disposal method Disposal capacity
method capacity
Transuranic
(Solid)
Contact 10.7 m3 None Not available Staged 611.7 m3 WIPPc, in future To be determined
handled
Remote 5.4 m3 None Not available Shielded storage 221.7 m3 WIPPc, in future To be determined
handled
a. Sources: Snider (1993); Turner (1994).
b. 1991 data.
c. WIPP = Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Table 4.14-2. Baseline transuranic waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR (ORNL complex). ,b
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
description description capacity space
Transuranic 7802N TRUc trenches 199 concrete casks None
7855 RH-TRUd waste storage 108 concrete casks 6 concrete casks
facility
7878 Interim storage facility Not applicable Not applicable
(inspection facility) (inspection facility)
7824 Waste examination and Not available Not available
assay facility (dual use
facility)
7879 CH-TRUe/LLWf solids 372 m2 Facility full
storage (dual storage
facility)
a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993a); Turner (1994).
b. 1993 data.
c. TRU = Transuranic waste.
d. RH-TRU = Remote-handled transuranic waste.
e. CH-TRU = Contact-handled transuranic waste.
f. LLW = Low-level (radioactive) waste.
Table 4.14-3. Projected 1995 mixed low-level waste management activities at the ORR.
Complex Waste Generation Treatment Treatment Storage method Storage capacity Disposal Disposal
category rate method capacity method capacity
Y-12 Mixed solidb 242,869 kgc None N/A Staged for 1,730 yd3 d None, offsite to N/A
Plant (573 m3/yr) shipment NTS pending
Mixed liquidb 1,537,234 kge Settlement and 8,716 m3 yr Tanks 573 m3 f None, offsite to N/A
(426,120 gal/yr) filtration (2.3 million gal/yr) (152,000 gal) NTS pending
K-25 SiteMixed liquidg 47,022.9 m3 h Settlement and 58,400,000 gal Onsite 97,167 m3 i Not applicable Not applicable
filtration/
incineration
Mixed solidg 535.2 m3j Planned Planned Onsite 120,206 m3 None Not applicable
ORNL Mixed liquidg Not reported Ion exchange 259,199.4 m3 None Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Mixed solidg 48.9 m3 k Planned Planned Staged for 22,000 gal l None, offsite to Not applicable
shipment NTS pending
a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).
b. 1992 data.
c. Includes 37,434 kg of contaminated (radionuclides) asbestos beryllium oxide waste and 28,948 kg of polychlorinated biphenyl/uranium waste.
d. RCRA/PCB Warehouse (Building 9720-9), RCRA and PCB Container Storage Area (Building 9720-58), Container Storage Facility (Building
9720-12) and PCB Drum Storage Facility (Building 9407-7).
e. Includes 13,152 kg of polychorinated biphenyl/uranium waste.
f. OD-9 and OD-10.
g. 1991 data.
h. TSCA (Toxic Substances Control Act) incinerator waste water.
i. Includes permitted container (solid/sludges/liquid wastes) and tank (liquids) storage capacity.
j. May include some polychlorinated biphenyl-tainted waste.
k. Includes polychlorinated biphenyl and asbestos waste.
l. Mixed Waste Drum Storage Pads - Bldg 7507 W, Part A permit, 22,000 gal.
Table 4.14-4. Baseline mixed low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR.
Complex Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
identification description capacity space
Y-12 Plant Mixedb 9201-4 Mixed waste storage area 350 55-gal drums 17 55-gal drums
9404-7 PCB storage facility (dual See hazardous wastes See hazardous waste
storage/use)
9720-9 Mixed and PCBc storage area See hazardous wastes See hazardous waste
(dual storage/use)
9720-31 RCRAd staging and storage See hazardous wastes See hazardous waste
facility (dual storage/use)
9720-58 RCRAd and PCBc container See hazardous waste See hazardous waste
storage area (dual storage/use)
9811-1 Waste oil tank storage area, See hazardous waste See hazardous waste
OD-7 (dual storage/use)
9811-8 Waste oil solvent drum storage See hazardous waste See hazardous waste
facility OD-8 (dual storage/use)
9811-8 Organic liquid storage area, See hazardous waste See hazardous waste
OD-9 (dual storage/use)
None Containerized waste storage See low-level waste See low-level waste
area (dual storage/use)
K-25 Sitef Mixede K-1065A, B, C, D, E Container storage 5097 m3 970 m3
K-1419 Liquid waste storage facility 61 m3 Facility full
K-31 Waste piles (dual storage/use 6623 m3 Facility full
facility)
K-33 Waste piles (dual storage/use 8,506 m3 Facility full
facility)
K-27 Withdrawal alleys and vaults 2,640,000 gal Future facility
K-27 Vault 31X 660,000 gal Future facility
ORNL Mixed 7075 Used oil storage tank 4,200 gal Tank full
(undergoing RCRAd closure)
7507W Mixed waste storage facility 82 m3 Facility full
Complex Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
identification description capacity space
7654 Long term hazardous waste 62 m3 Facility full
storage facility
7823 Mixed waste storage facility 390 m3 117 m2
7830A Waste storage tank 5,000 gal Tank full
a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); Turner (1994).
b. 1993 data.
c. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.
d. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
e. 1994 data.
f. For additional mixed waste facilities see hazardous waste facilities at the K-25 Site (Table 4.14-8).
4.14.3 Low-Level Waste
The Y-12 Plant, K-25 Site, and the ORNL generate and manage low-level wastes. Table 4.14-5
presents a summary of low-level waste management activities projected for 1995,
and details on the facilities used to manage low-level waste are presented in Table 4.14-6.
4.14.4 Hazardous Waste
All three complexes at the ORR generate and manage hazardous wastes. The Y-12 Plant, K-25
Site, and the ORNL manage non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act wastes (asbestos, oils, and
polychlorinated biphenyls) as dangerous substances and include them with the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act-regulated wastes as hazardous wastes. Table 4.14-7 presents a summary of mixed
hazardous waste management activities projected for 1995, and details on the facilities used
to manage hazardous waste are presented in Table 4.14-8.
4.14.5 Industrial Solid Waste
The K-25 Site and the ORNL industrial solid wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary
Landfill (PAI Corporation 1994; PAI Corporation 1993a). Table 4.14-9 presents a summary of
industrial solid waste management activities projected for 1995 at the Y-12 Plant,
and details on the facilities used to manage industrial solid waste are presented in Table 4.14-10.
4.14.6 Hazardous Materials
The ORR uses a variety of chemical raw materials for activities associated with metal
finishing/plating, uranium recovery, laboratory services, cooling tower operation, and facility
cleaning/maintenance operations. Examples of chemicals used at the ORR include acids (hydrochloric,
nitric), organics (methanol, perchloroethylene), and inorganics (hydrogen fluoride, chlorine). Currently,
309 specific chemicals and 20 chemical categories are being reviewed for possible reporting under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Section 313 requirements. For 1992, the ORR reported
7 extremely hazardous substances and 39 hazardous chemicals for the Y-12 Plant; 5 extremely hazardous
substances and 16 hazardous chemicals for the K-25 Site; and 20 extremely hazardous substances and
hazardous chemicals for ORNL (MMES 1993a).
In addition, diesel fuel and gasoline, used to fuel site service and construction vehicles, are stored
in bulk containers (55-gallon drums, aboveground storage tanks, and underground storage tanks).
The Y-12 Plant underground storage tank program includes seven in-service petroleum tanks. In
addition, there are seven active petroleum underground storage tanks at the K-25 Site. At the ORNL
there is one active underground storage tank containing heating oil and 22 active underground storage
tanks that will be taken out of service or upgraded by 1998. The contents of these tanks was not reported
(MMES 1993a).
Table 4.14-5. Projected 1995 low-level waste management activities at the ORR.
Waste Generation Treatment Treatment Storage method Storage capacity Disposal Disposal
Complex category rateb method capacity method capacity
Y-12 Low-level 1,438,680 kgc Compaction/ Offsite Stored onsite at See mixed solids N/Ad N/A
Plant solidb (5,793 m3/yr) incineration Y-12 or K-25
Low-level 565,929 kg Settlement and 20,644m3/yre Stored onsite See mixed liquids N/A N/A
liquidb (148,186 gal/yr) filtration (5,400,000 gal/yr)
K-25 SiteLow-level Included in mixed Settlement and See mixed liquid None Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
liquidf filtration
Low-level 978.7 m3 g Compaction/ Offsite Onsite See mixedh Planned onsite Planned
solidf smelting non-metallic
Planned offsite
metallic
ORNL Low-level 2,064.4 m3 Neutralization 1.5292M m3 i Stored onsite in 573.5 m3 None Not applicable
liquidf & precipitation underground
tanks
Low-level 130 m3 j Compaction Offsite Onsite 32,770.8 m3k Onsite burial Not applicable
solidf
a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).
b. 1992 data.
c. Includes 649,429 kg of contaminated scrap metal.
d. N/A = not applicable.
e. West End Treatment Facility and Central Pollution Control Facility.
f. 1991 data.
g. Includes contaminated scrap metal.
h. Does not include 6.9 acre scrap metal storage site.
Table 4.14-5. (continued)
i. NPDES discharge limit for the ORNL Non-rad Wastewater Treatment Facility.
j. Includes scrap metal only. Does not include low-level radioactive waste solid sludge from Process Waste Treatment Facility, or from Sanitary
Wastewater Treatment Plant.
k. Solid Waste Storage Area.
Table 4.14-6. Baseline low-level waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR.
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
Complex identification description capacity space
Y-12 Plant Low-levelb 9720-12 Low-level waste storage
Indoor area 465 m2 Not accepting waste
Outside area 557 m2 139 m2
9720-44 Low-level waste storage pad Not reported Not reported
9825-1, 2 Uranium oxide storage 906 m3 544 m3
vaults I and II (each vault) (each vault)
None Contaminated scrap metal Not reported 5% of area available
storage area
None Outside low-level waste 359 m3 Not reported
storage
None Above grade low-level 3,948 m2 3,553 m2
waste storage facility
9720-25 Classified waste storage 340 m3 170 m3
facility
None Containerized waste storage 2,323 m2 929 m2
area (dual use/storage)
K-25 Site Low-levelc K-770 Contaminated scrap metal 31,857 m3 2,230 m3
storage yard
K-1035-A Temporary drum storage 2.5 m3 Varies
K-1066-H LLWd storage 3,830 m3 627 m3
K-1417 Sludge-drum storage yard 8,846 m3 Facility full
RUBB-2 LLWd storage 138 m3 83 m3
K-25 Process vaults (dual 2,469 m3 837 m3
storage/use facility)
K-33 Waste piles (dual 961 m3 24 m3
storage/use facility)
K-1232 Container storage area 42.5 m3 34 m3
(dual storage/use facility)
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
Complex identification description capacity space
ORNL Low-levelb 7831 Waste compaction facility Not applicable Not applicable
(treatment facility) (treatment facility)
7841 Contaminated equipment Not reported Scheduled to undergo
storage yard closure under RCRAe
7856 Cask storage site Not reported Not reported
7823A, B, C, D, E RUBB buildings Not reported Not reported
7824 Waste examinations and Not available Not available
assay facility, dual use
facility
7879 CH-TRUf/LLWd solids 372 m2 Facility full
storage facility
(dual storage facility)
7842 SWSA-6g staging and 297 m2 Not applicable
equipment building Facility is a staging area
None Tumulus I and II Not reported Facilities undergoing
closure
a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation (1993a); Turner (1994).
b. 1993 data.
c. 1994 data.
d. LLW = Low-level (radioactive) waste.
e. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
f. CH-TRU = Contact-handled transuranic waste.
g. SWSA-6 = Solid Waste Storage Area - 6.
Table 4.14-7. Projected 1995 hazardous waste management activities at the ORR.
Waste category Generation Treatment Treatment Storage method Storage capacity Disposal Disposal
Complex rate method capacity method capacity
Y-12 PlantHazardous 511,421 kgc None Not applicable Staged for 4,741m3 d Offsite Not applicable
solidb (846 m3/yr) shipment
Hazardous 767,874 kge Settlement and See low-level liquid Tanks 670 yd3 f Offsite Not applicable
liquidb (215,492 gal/yr) filtration (136,000 gal)
K-25 Site Hazardous 8,410.6 m3 h Neutralization/ See mixed Stored for Not applicable Planned offsite Not applicable
liquidg precipitation processing
Hazardous 680.5 m3 Compaction for Offsite Onsite See mixed Planned offsite Not applicable
solidg non-
RCRA/TSCAi
incineration
ORNL Hazardous 0.8 m3 Neutralization/ Not applicable Tanks 588.7 m3 Offsite Not applicable
liquidg detonation
Hazardous 84.1 m3 j None Not applicable Staged for 23,375 galk Planned Planned
solidg shipment onsite/offsite
a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c).
b. 1992 data.
c. Includes 420,192 kg of uncontaminated (radionuclides) asbestos/beryllium oxide (BeO) waste and 42,434 kg of uncontaminated polychlorinated biphenyl
waste.
d. Remaining West End Tank Farm sludge storage capacity.
e. Includes 55,624 kg of uncontaminated (radionuclides) polychlorinated biphenyl waste.
f. Liquid Organic Waste Storage Facility OD3, Building 9418-9, and OD9.
Table 4.14-7. (continued)
g. 1991 data.
h. Hydrogen softener blowdown from the steam plant.
i. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act.
j. Includes polychlorinated biphenyls and asbestos.
k. Hazardous Waste Storage Facility.
Table 4.14-8. Baseline hazardous waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR.
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
Complex identification description capacity space
Y-12 Plant Hazardousb None Interim reactive waste Not applicable Not applicable
treatment area (open burning)
9720-45 Organic liquid storage facility Two 3,000-gal tanks Variable
Four 6,500-gal tanks
1,000, 55-gal drums
9720-9 Mixed and PCBc storage area 311 m3 62 m3
(dual storage/use)
9720-31 RCRAd staging and storage 37,000 gallons 9,250 gallons
facility (dual storage/use)
9720-58 RCRAd and PCBc container Not reported Not reported
storage area (dual storage/use)
9811-1 Waste oil tank storage Area Two 30,000-gal tanks 38,000 gallons
OD-7 (dual storage/use) One 10,000-gal tank
Two 3,000-gal tanks
9811-8 Waste oil solvent drum storage 1,000 55-gal drums/containers Not reported
facility, OD-8 (dual
storage/use)
9811-8 Organic liquid storage area, Five 40,000-gal tanks 50,480 gallons
OD-9 (dual storage/use) Thirty-five 55-gal drums (projected to be used
until the year 2010)
9404-7 PCBc storage facility 334 m2 84 m2
None East Chestnut Ridge Waste Not reported Not reported
Pile (dual use/storage facility)
K-25 Site Hazardous/ K-25 Process vaults (dual storage/use 6,810 m3 1,282 m3
mixed facility)
K-711 Container storage building 234 m3 188 m3
(dual storage/use facility)
K-1025C Container storage (dual 7 m3 1 m3
storage/use facility)
K-1036A Container storage facility (dual 134 m3 44 m3
storage/use facility)
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
Complex identification description capacity space
K-1202 Storage tanks (dual storage/use 108 m3 76 m3
facility)
K-1302 Compressed gas cylinder 0.6 m3 Facility full
storage (dual storage/use
facility)
K-1420A Hazardous waste storage tank 108 m3 108 m3
(dual storage/use facility)
K-1425 Container storage/tank 529 m3 357 m3
management units (dual
storage/use facility)
K-726 Container storage building 86 m3 Facility full
(dual storage/use facility)
K-33 TSCAf (dual storage/use 961 m3 24 m3
facility)
Hazardousb 7659-A Gas cylinder venting facility Not applicable Not applicable
(venting facility)
ORNL 7667 Chemical waste detonation Not applicable Not applicable
facility (treatment facility) (treatment facility)
7507 PCBsg, liquids and solids 31 m3 Facility full
storage facility
7651 Used oil storage facility 27 m3 13 m3
7652 Hazardous waste storage 57 m3 8.5 m3
facility
7653 Chemical waste storage facility 60 55-gal drums 9 55-gal drums
a. Sources: PAI Corporation (1993b); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation (1993a).
b. 1993 data.
c. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.
d. RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
e. 1994 data.
f. TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act.
g. PCB = Polychlorinated biphenyl.
Table 4.14-9. Projected 1995 industrial solid waste management activities at the ORR.
Waste category Generation Treatment Treatment Storage method Storage capacity Disposal Disposal
Complex rateb method capacity method capacity
Y-12 Plant Industrial solidb 5,554,873 kg None N/A None N/A Landfill (onsite) 5.3522Mc m3d
(48,518 m3/yr)
K-25 Site Industrial solide 3,899.5 m3 None Not applicable None Not applicable Y-12 landfill 5.3522Mc m3f
Other solide 5,046.4 m3g Compaction Not applicable None Not applicable Y-12 landfill See industrial
solid
ORNL Industrial solide 13 m3 None Not applicable None Not applicable Y-12 landfill 5.3522Mc m3f
Other solide 30.6 m3h None Not applicable None Not applicable Y-12 landfill See industrial
solid
a. Sources: Snider (1993); Brown (1994c); PAI Corporation (1994); PAI Corporation (1993a).
b. 1992 data.
c. M = million
d. New sanitary landfill to open in 1994.
e. 1991 data.
f. Wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill.
g. Includes construction/demolition spoil and scrap metal.
h. Includes construction/demolition spoil; scrap metal estimates not available.
Table 4.14-10. Baseline industrial solid waste management activities as of 1995 at the ORR. ,b
Waste Facility number Facility Facility storage Available disposal
Complex identification description capacity space
Y-12 Plant Industrial None New salvage yard 4,046.9 m2 1,619 m2
solid
None Industrial landfill IV Not reported Estimated useful life of
(classified waste landfill) the landfill is until the
year 2034
9983-44 Industrial landfill II Storage capacity depleted Storage capacity depleted
None Spoil Area 3 Facility closed Facility closed
(construction debris)
9720-25 Classified waste storage Not applicable Not applicable
(dual use facility) (nonhazardous solid waste
staging area)
K-25 Site Industrial
solidc
ORNL Industrial
solidc
a. Source: PAI Corporation (1993b).
b. 1993 data.
c. Wastes are disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill.
In addition, diesel fuel and gasoline, used to fuel site service and construction vehicles, are
stored in bulk containers (55-gallon drums, aboveground storage tanks, and underground storage
tanks).
The Y-12 underground storage tanks program includes seven in-service petroleum
tanks. In addition, there are seven active ptroleum underground storage tanks at the
K-25 Site. At the ORNL there is one active underground storage tank containing heating oil and
22 active underground storage tanks that will be taken out of service or upgraded by 1998.
The contents of these tanks was not reported (MMES 1993a).
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
5.1 Overview
This chapter describes the potential environmental consequences from the construction and
operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) under the
Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives. Potential environmental consequences are
assessed to the extent necessary to support a programmatic decision concerning the siting of the
proposed SNF facilities. More detailed considerations of potential environmental consequences
would be performed as necessary prior to initiating construction or operation of the facilities.
Impacts on the operation of the current facilities at ORR that create or store SNF are
discussed in Chapter 3.
5.2 Land Use
The proposed site for SNF activities is in the eastern portion of the West Bear Creek Valley
area, located in the western portion of the ORR. The SNF program's land requirements are
assumed to be 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer), including all facilities and buffer areas. The
majority of the land in the West Bear Creek Valley Area can be characterized as vacant, unused,
and developable.
5.2.1 Centralization Alternative
Use of the West Bear Creek Valley area of the ORR for program activities would be
consistent with the current land use and land use policies and plans for that area. The current
land use designation for this area is Natural Areas, a generic category that includes all lands
within the ORR not under any other specific land use designation (DOE 1993a). Use of this
area for program activities would also be consistent with proposed future land uses as set forth in
the ORR Site Development Plan (MMES 1989).
Future land uses proposed for the area of Roane County adjacent to the ORR near the
proposed SNF site are low-density residential and public/semi-public uses (Roane County
Regional Planning Commission 1992). These low intensity uses would be compatible with
development in the western portion of the ORR.
Use of the West Bear Creek Valley site for the placement of SNF facilities may result in
irreversible and irretrievable impacts to land use in that area by precluding all but waste
management-type uses in the future. However, the placement of SNF facilities at this location
would be consistent with U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 1994 future land use plan, which
designates the West Bear Creek Valley site for these uses (MMES 1989). Therefore, no
mitigation measures are proposed.
5.2.2 Regionalization Alternative
As under the Centralization Alternative, land use impacts resulting from the Regionalization
Alternative would not be expected to be significant. Impacts would be similar in character to
those described for the Centralization Alternative.
5.3 Socioeconomics
Socioeconomics as addressed in this programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS)
encompasses the interaction of economic, demographic, and social conditions. Economic
consequences (e.g., technology requirements for operation of an SNF management facility) affect
business activities, market structures, procurement methods, and dissemination of commodities
within and between regions. Demographic consequences (e.g., in-migration of specialized human
resources to support the SNF management program) affect size, distribution, and composition of
the population, labor force, and the housing market in the regions. Social consequences (e.g.,
capacity modifications of public infrastructure to support SNF activity) affect the overall quality
of life enjoyed by the residents of a community (Murdock and Leistritz 1979). These conditions
are potentially affected either directly or indirectly by actions proposed under the DOE SNF
Management Program.
The significance of actions and their intensity are relative to the affected region. A region
can be described as a dynamic socioeconomic system, where physical and human resources,
technology, social and economic institutions, and natural resources interrelate to create new
products, processes, and services to meet consumer demands. The measure of a region's ability
to support these demands depends on its ability to respond to changing economic, demographic,
and social conditions.
Potential socioeconomic effects are addressed only to the extent that they are interrelated
with the natural or physical environment (CFR 1993c). Direct effects include those impacts
caused by the action and occurring at the same time and place. Indirect effects include those
impacts caused by the action that are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still
reasonably foreseeable (i.e., offsite) (CFR 1993b).
Socioeconomic effects are quantified for regional economic activity and population.
Potential impacts to individual communities such as public infrastructure and housing are
discussed qualitatively to address programmatic issues.
Economic projections include direct and indirect jobs. Direct jobs are those jobs needed to
construct or support operation of the SNF management complex at ORR. Indirect jobs are
created throughout the regional economy within the Region of Influence as a result of
procurement for materials, services, and other commodities; and induced effects from consumer
spending. These direct and indirect impacts reflect both construction and operation phase
demands that may occur concurrently or independently throughout the project planning period.
Indirect jobs were projected using parameters from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Regional Input-Output Modeling System.
Two scenarios were analyzed to account for two potential distributions of the SNF facility
construction efforts. The construction effort consists of fabricating various structures, each with
its own construction labor need and a duration of either three or five years. The Peak Scenario
accelerates the construction labor requirements into the first two years of construction. The
Average Scenario averages the labor requirements of a structure for the duration of construction.
The total construction effort for all structures, in labor years is the same for each scenario.
Therefore, for structures with a three year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has high
labor needs for the first two years and then a substantial reduction for the third year, while the
Average Scenario has a constant labor requirement for the three years. Likewise, for structures
with a five year construction duration, the Peak Scenario has a high labor need for the first two
years, then a lower need for the remaining three years, while the Average Scenario has a
constant requirement for all five years. Because the total construction labor years for each
structure is the same for both scenarios, the Average Scenario will have a lower requirement
than the Peak Scenario in the first two years, then will have a higher requirement then the Peak
Scenario in the remaining construction years.
Regional population projections reflect the potential change in population resulting from an
increase in regional economic activity. Detailed assumptions regarding in-migration associated
with SNF Management Program were not developed given the programmatic scope of the
analysis. Potential in-migration effects resulting from direct job creation are presented
qualitatively where appropriate.
5.3.1 Centralization Alternative
The upper and lower bounds of construction and operations related jobs generated from
implementation of the Centralization Alternative from 1995 to 2005 are illustrated in Figure 5.3-1
and tabulated in Table 5.3-1. In the initial phases, the Centralization Alternative may create
90 jobs (25 direct, 65 indirect) beginning in 1995 and continuing through the year 1999 to support
project planning, engineering design, and environmental permitting and compliance.
Construction is expected to begin in the year 2000, requiring a total of 4,352 direct jobs (7,1232
indirect jobs). In that year and 2001, the Peak Scenario requires 1,587 construction laborers,
while the Average Scenario needs 1,346. There is no operational labor required for this time
period. In 2002 after two years of construction, the Peak Scenario decreases its construction
labor requirements to 928 workers, while the Average Scenario maintains its 1,346 laborers.
Additionally, 300 operational personnel are needed, raising the total of SNF workers to 1,228 for
the Peak Scenario and 1,646 for the Average Scenario. By 2003, the buildings with three year
construction durations have been completed; therefore, both the Peak and Average Scenario
construction labor requirements decline to 125 and 157, respectively. Operation labor
Figure 5.3-1. Total employment effects- ORR Centralization Alternative. Table 5.3-1. Socioeconomic effects - Centralization of SNF at Oak Ridge Reservation.
Time period
Years 1995-1999 2000, 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 +
Operations
Direct jobs 25 0 300 300 487 800
Indirect jobs 65 0 780 780 1,265 2,079
Total jobs 90 0 1,080 1,080 1,752 2,879
Construction
Direct jobs
Peak 0 1,587 928 125 125 0
Average 0 1,346 1,346 157 157 0
Indirect jobs
Peak 0 2,597 1,519 205 205 0
Average 0 2,203 2,203 257 257 0
Total jobs
Peak 0 4,184 2,447 330 330 0
Average 0 3,549 3,549 414 414 0
Total
Direct jobs
Peak 25 1,587 1,228 425 612 800
Average 25 1,346 1,646 457 644 800
Indirect jobs
Peak 65 2,597 2,299 984 1,470 2,079
Average 65 2,203 2,983 1,036 1,522 2,079
Total jobs
Peak 90 4,184 3,527 1,408 2,082 2,879
Average 90 3,548 4,629 1,493 2,166 2,879
Population Change
Peak 82 4,366 (1,001) (3,214) 1,022 2,011
Average 82 3,688 1,640 (4,759) 1,022 1,797
requirements remain at 300 workers. Total SNF labor requirements are 425 workers for the
Peak Scenario and 457 for the Average Scenario. In 2004, construction labor needs for both
scenarios remains at their previous level, but operational personnel increase. Total SNF labor
requirements are 612 workers in the Peak Scenario and 644 workers in the Average Scenario.
By 2005, all construction has been completed and operational personnel have increased to the
full staff labor requirement of 800 workers.
The peak scenario reaches it maximum construction labor with 1,587 direct jobs (4,184 total
jobs created) over a 2-year period from years 2000 through 2001. The average scenario would
have its maximum construction labor with 1,346 direct jobs (3,549 total jobs created) from 2000
through 2002.
Ancillary operation (Table 5.3-1) activity associated with the Centralization Alternative will
begin in the year 2002; the initial operations might create approximately 1,080 phase-related jobs
(300 direct, 780 indirect). Additional operation activity would also begin, creating an additional
187 phase-related jobs (485 indirect jobs). The remaining operation activities are expected to
start in 2005, after construction is finished, creating a total of 2,879 phase-related jobs (800
direct, 2,079 indirect), and the jobs will continue through 2035.
Regional businesses and the workforce will benefit from increased competition for contract
procurements and jobs associated with SNF Centralization Alternative. Most of this activity is
anticipated to be captured by Anderson, Knox, and Roane counties, with a small share occurring
in Loudon County. The impact to the regional economy, however, only represents a portion of
the total economic activity generated by the Centralization Alternative. For instance, specialized
materials purchases and technology acquisition may occur outside Tennessee. The economic
activity occurring outside the region might result in economic benefits for that region. This
indirect effect is not captured by this analysis since it occurs outside of the Region of Influence as
defined in Section 4.3.
Most of the population change in the Region of Influence above the baseline forecast will
be driven by the in-migration of labor and households to support SNF management activities at
ORR. It is likely that most of the operation jobs will be filled by SNF personnel relocating from
other DOE sites where SNF inventories were stored prior to shipments to ORR. These
personnel would be familiar with the processes, technologies, and research involved with SNF
operations elsewhere. Other operational jobs not associated with SNF management will probably
be filled by the regional labor force. The regional labor force would be likely to fill the demand
for construction jobs, except for specialized tasks.
To assess potential population and housing impacts, an in-migration rate per job was
estimated using a ratio between forecasted employment and population figures (Table 4.3-1).
This ratio was applied to the number of total (direct and indirect) jobs created by SNF
management activities at ORR, giving the total estimated number of persons migrating into the
Region of Influence per job created (Table 5.3-1).
With initial operation in 1995 under both scenarios, a total of 82 persons will migrate into
the Region of Influence. The number of persons migrating into the Region of Influence would
be at its largest when construction starts, for the years 2000 through 2001; (a total of 4,366
in-migrants for the peak scenario and 3,688 for the average scenario). For the years 2002 and
2003, after most of the construction has finished, people might migrate out of the Region of
Influence. The number of in-migrants might increase as more of the SNF management
operations start in the years 2004 and 2005. After the year 2005, in-migration due to SNF
management activities would cease due to the fact that SNF management activities would not
create any more jobs.
Assuming one housing unit per household, and an average family size of 2.6 persons per
family (U.S. Department of Commerce 1991), the number of houses demanded in 1995, when
preliminary operations start, might be 32. Between the year 2000 and 2002, a total of 1,679
housing units might be demanded. Even though this demand is only a temporary demand, the
Region of Influence may have difficulty providing new housing during this time period. By the
year 2003 and 2004, however, there might be a surplus of 1,236 housing units due to the phasing
out of construction. In 2005, once SNF operational activities are under way, there will be a
demand for 1,167 housing units associated with SNF management activities.
The greatest impact to the Region of Influence housing market may occur between the
years 2000 and 2002, when construction starts. The demand for housing during the SNF facility
construction period would be for transitional housing. While the population in the Region of
Influence under baseline conditions has historically been growing and is projected to grow at less
than 1 percent annually, recent vacancy rates for housing in the Region of Influence have been
low (Census 1982, 1991). Therefore the in-migration associated with SNF construction might
cause shortages in the housing market, and might cause shortages in construction supplies.
However, due to decreasing employment levels on ORR between 1990 and 1999 (Section
4.3.1.5), additional housing units above the baseline may be available, thus reducing the potential
strain on the housing market. Since construction will only be temporary, there may be excess
capacity in the regional infrastructure when all SNF management operations begin in 2005.
5.3.1.1 Potential Public Service and Education Impacts. Given the population growth
associated with the SNF Management Program, increases in capital expenditure may be required
to meet the increased demand of housing utilities, including electricity generation, wastewater
treatment, and water (see Section 5.13), transportation infrastructure (see Section 5.11), and
education or service levels, assuming current conditions are constant through the analysis.
Assuming that the Centralization Alternative would be an addition to the ORR's current
operations, security and fire protection on the site would need to be investigated at a minimum
to determine whether or not current capacity could accommodate the requirements of the SNF
Management Program.
5.3.2 Regionalization Alternative
Socioeconomic impacts resulting from the Regionalization Alternative are expected to be
similar to the Centralization Alternative. The construction and operation cycles for each
alternative would be the same; therefore, the same issues identified for the Centralization
Alternative would apply. Labor requirements may be slightly reduced for the Regionalization
Alternative. Although the volume of SNF stored would be less for the Regionalization
Alternative, an economy of scale occurs for both alternatives, so that differences in labor and
capital between the two alternatives would be minimized.
5.3.3 Mitigation Measures
5.3.3.1 Coordination with Local Jurisdictions. To reduce construction- and operation-
related impacts, possible coordination with local communities could address potential impacts
from increased labor and capital requirements. The knowledge of the extent and effect of
growth due to SNF management activities could greatly enhance the ability of affected
jurisdictions to plan effectively. Effective planning would address changes in levels of service for
housing, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, and public services and finances.
5.3.3.2 Enhance Labor Force Availability. To alleviate potential impacts associated with
the in-migration of labor, local labor force availability could be increased through various
employment training and referral systems. The goal of these systems would be to reduce the
potential for in-migration of labor to support SNF management activities.
5.4 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
5.4.1 Centralization Alternative
Under the Centralization Alternative, the proposed construction area for the SNF facilities
is not expected to exceed 100 acres. There are no known historical, archeological,
paleontological or Native American traditional sites in the proposed area (Fielder 1975). No
impacts to cultural or paleontological resources are expected due to ground disturbance, noise, or
air emissions during construction or operation of the SNF facilities. Consultation with the
Tennessee State Historic Preservation Officer prior to project implementation is required by
section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
5.4.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, the location of the SNF facilities would remain the
same, but would be reduced in area. As with the Centralization Alternative, impacts are not
anticipated.
5.5 Aesthetics and Scenic Resources
5.5.1 Centralization Alternative
When fully constructed and under operation, the proposed SNF facilities associated with the
Centralization Alternative would consist of a series of buildings set within a 90-acre site. The
maximum height of the buildings contained at the site would not exceed 42 feet above ground
level, or two to three stories. The entrance to the site and security fencing will be visable to
traffic on Bear Creek Road.
Since the buildings would be set into the south face of Pine Ridge, between Pine Ridge and
Chestnut Ridge, the site would not be visible from areas outside the reservation, with the possible
exception of a limited section of Gallaher Road on the west side of the Clinch River, looking
east along Bear Creek Valley (TVA 1987). However, since the approximate distance from the
boundary of the reservation to the proposed location is in excess of 2 miles, and includes hilly
terrain and heavy vegetation, public views looking on to the site from off-site are not expected to
be affected. Impacts to aesthetics and scenic resources on and off ORR are not anticipated.
5.5.2 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, proposed SNF facilities are reduced in area and
intensity of operations, and environmental effects to aesthetics and scenic resources would be less
than those under the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, adverse environmental impacts from
the Regionalization Alternative are also not anticipated.
5.6 Geologic Resources
This section describes any incremental or additional impacts on geology and geologic
resources that might result from the construction and operation of the new facilities associated
with the storage of SNF at the ORR.
For the most part, geologic impacts from construction activities would be limited to soil
disturbance, although in some areas, ripping or blasting of limestone, dolomite, or chert layers
might be required. Since no extensive or unique geologic or mineral resources are known to
occur on the West Bear Creek Valley site, impacts to geologic resources would not be expected.
Because previously undisturbed areas would be used for new construction, some soil impacts
from siting SNF facilities at the West Bear Creek Valley site would occur as a result of grading.
Potential impacts from sediment runoff generated during construction activities would be
minimized by implementation of soil erosion and sediment control measures. During operations,
impacts to soil resources would be controlled by the planting or landscaping of land surfaces not
covered by pavement and buildings.
Major seismic activity and associated mass movement and subsidence are unlikely to occur
during the construction or operation phases, because although ground-shaking has occurred at
the ORR due to earthquakes in other parts of the country, faults in the area have not been
active since the late Paleozoic.
5.7 Air Resources
The proposed SNF management facility would be composed of a wet and dry storage
facility and a technology development facility, with construction to take place in the calendar
years 2000-2004. Air quality is assessed for construction and operation with regard to
radiological and nonradiological air emissions. This section characterizes the impacts and
expected air quality effects resulting from an SNF facility. This section also discusses the
quantitative impacts under the Regionalization Alternative. The Centralization Alternative
qualitative impacts are compared with the regionalization impacts in order to determine
exceedances, if any, of existing local and Federal standards for both alternatives.
5.7.1 Releases
Emissions of radiological and nonradiological air pollutants might result from the
construction and operation of a SNF management facility. These emissions might include
airborne radionuclides, criteria pollutants, and hazardous air pollutants.
The impact of air emissions from construction activities might include criteria air pollutants
of particulate matter (fugitive dust) primarily from the moving of soil, and exhaust emissions of
particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter equal to or less than 10 microns (PM10); carbon
monoxide; sulfur dioxide; volatile organic compounds; and nitrogen dioxide from earth-moving
and equipment-handling machinery and equipment. During construction, a small increment in
traffic volume above existing levels might result in a small increase in air pollutant emissions.
(Section 5.11 discusses the level of traffic activity projected for the construction and operation
phases of the SNF facility.)
During operations, the transport of SNF within the ORR from points of generation or
storage sites to the disposal site would result in emissions of criteria air pollutants from various
vehicles as well. Some emissions of air pollutants from worker vehicles would also occur both
within and beyond the ORR.
5.7.1.1 Radiological Emissions. There are no expected contributions to radiological air
emissions during the construction phases of the proposed SNF management facility. During
operations, the facility would be expected to generate negligible radiological emissions. The
potential radiological emissions associated with the proposed SNF management facility and those
associated with the baseline are presented in Table 5.7-1 by isotope.
5.7.1.2 Nonradiological Emissions. The construction phase of the SNF facility for the
Receipt/Storage Facility and Canning Factory is estimated to be complete in about 8-10 years.
Short-term emissions, such as fugitive dust and heavy equipment exhaust emissions, would be
generated temporarily, and would only affect receptors close to construction areas. Fugitive dust
emissions would be minimized by watering. Under the operational phase of the SNF
management facility, criteria and hazardous air pollutants might be emitted. Table 5.7-2 lists
total expected annual emissions associated with the SNF storage facility. These nonradioactive
emissions are primarily from the technology development facility and were estimated based on a
previous design for a similar facility proposed at INEL.
Table 5.7-1. Isotopic release additions due to SNF management
facility presence (Ci/yr) at ORR.
(Baseline) (SNF) ORR+
ORR ISF ISF
Hydrogen-3 2.1 x 103 7.9 x 10-1 2.1 x 103
Beryllium-7 8.9 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 8.9 x 10-6
Carbon-14 0.0 x 100 1.2 x 100 1.2 x 100
Potassium-40 1.0 x 10-3 0.0 x 100 1.0 x 10-3
Manganese-54 0.0 x 100 2.2 x 10-8 2.2 x 10-8
Cobalt-60 3.0 x 10-5 4.2 x 10-8 3.0 x 10-5
Bromine-82 1.0 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 1.0 x 10-5
Krypton-83M 7.3 x 101 0.0 x 100 7.3 x 101
Krypton-85 0.0 x 100 1.0 x 104 1.0 x 104
Krypton-85M 1.7 x 102 0.0 x 100 1.7 x 102
Krypton-87 3.5 x 102 0.0 x 100 3.5 x 102
Krypton-88 4.9 x 102 0.0 x 100 4.9 x 102
Krypton-89 6.3 x 102 0.0 x 100 6.3 x 102
Strontium-90 1.2 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-6 1.2 x 10-4
Yttrium-90 1.2 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-6 1.2 x 10-4
Technetium-99 6.1 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 6.1 x 10-2
Ruthenium-106 4.4 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-5 4.5 x 10-4
Antimony-125 0.0 x 100 3.4 x 10-4 3.4 x 10-4
Iodine-129 3.1 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-1 1.0 x 10-1
Iodine-131 1.2 x 10-1 0.0 x 100 1.2 x 10-1
Iodine-132 1.4 x 100 0.0 x 100 1.4 x 100
Iodine-133 6.5 x 10-1 0.0 x 100 6.5 x 10-1
Iodine-134 2.1 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 2.1 x 10-2
Iodine-135 1.2 x 100 0.0 x 100 1.2 x 100
Xenon-133 8.8 x 102 0.0 x 100 8.8 x 102
Xenon-133M 2.7 x 101 0.0 x 100 2.7 x 101
Xenon-135 2.8 x 101 0.0 x 100 2.8 x 101
Xenon-135M 1.6 x 102 0.0 x 100 1.6 x 102
Xenon-138 8.5 x 102 0.0 x 100 8.5 x 102
Cesium-134 6.3 x 10-7 6.2 x 10-8 6.9 x 10-7
Cesium-137 7.0 x 10-4 4.8 x 10-5 7.5 x 10-4
Cesium-144 1.2 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 1.2 x 10-6
(Baseline) (SNF) ORR+
ORR ISF ISF
Barium-140 1.0 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 1.0 x 10-4
Lanthanum-140 1.4 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 1.4 x 10-6
Europium-152 4.4 x 10-11 0.0 x 100 4.4 x 10-11
Europium-154 5.9 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 5.9 x 10-6
Europium-155 3.0 x 10-6 0.0 x 100 3.0 x 10-6
Osmium-191 2.3 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 2.3 x 10-2
Lead-212 1.6 x 100 0.0 x 100 1.6 x 100
Thorium-228 1.5 x 10-3 0.0 x 100 1.5 x 10-3
Thorium-230 7.4 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 7.4 x 10-4
Thorium-232 3.0 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 3.0 x 10-5
Protactinium-2341.2 x 10-3 0.0 x 100 1.2 x 10-3
Uranium-234 7.2 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 7.2 x 10-2
Uranium-235 2.6 x 10-3 0.0 x 100 2.6 x 10-3
Uranium-236 1.9 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 1.9 x 10-4
Uranium-238 4.1 x 10-2 0.0 x 100 4.1 x 10-2
Neptunium-237 1.1 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 1.1 x 10-4
Plutonium-238 6.1 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 6.1 x 10-4
Plutonium-239 1.3 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 1.3 x 10-4
Plutonium-240 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100 0.0 x 100
Americium-241 1.4 x 10-5 0.0 x 100 1.4 x 10-5
Curium-244 2.0 x 10-4 0.0 x 100 2.0 x 10-4
a. Source: Johnson, V. (1994).
Cm241 with 35 day half-life included with AM241 with 458 yr half-life.
Os194 with 8.0 yr half-life decays to Ir194 with 17.4 hr half-life, then to P1194 which is stable.
ISF: Interim Storage Facility.
Table 5.7-2. Total annual nonradioactive emissions for the SNF management facility at ORR.
Criteria pollutants Release rate (kg/yr)
Carbon monoxide 1.7 x 103
Particulate matter, PM10b 1.0 x 10-3
Nitrogen oxides 5.5 x 103
Sulfur dioxide 1.3 x 102
Lead 5.0 x 10-9
Hazardous air pollutants
Selenium compounds 1.6 x 10-4
Mercury compounds 5.1 x 10-1
Chlorine 3.5 x 103
Hydrogen fluoride 1.6 x 101
Cadmium compounds 2.9 x 10-7
Cobalt, chromium, antimony, and nickel 2.0 x 10-10
compounds
a. Source: Johnson, V. (1994).
b. It is assumed that PM10 (particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter) data are total
suspended particulate data.
5.7.2 Air Quality
5.7.2.1 Radiological. The GENII Environmental Transport and Dose Assessment Model,
along with 1992 Y-12 west meteorological data and 1992 source terms (Table 5.7-1), was used to
calculate the effective dose equivalent for the year 2005. A population of 988,754 persons within
80 kilometers (50 miles) is estimated. A radiation background level of 306 millirem per year is
used.
Based on model results, 1 year of operation at the SNF management facility might result in
a calculated dose of 9.5 millirem per year to the maximally exposed member of the public. This
dose is below the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants limit of 10 millirem
per year and is 3.1 percent of the natural background radiation received by the average person
near the ORR.
The annual population dose from operation in the year 2005 was calculated to be 5.7 x 101
person-rem. The population dose from operation of this option in 2005 is approximately
2.1 x 10-2 percent of the dose received by the surrounding population from natural background
radiation.
Table 5.7-3 summarizes the effective dose equivalents for the maximum boundary dose and
to the population with 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the proposed SNF facility. Compared to the
background radiation, these increased doses are very small. The total doses are well within the
regulatory limits.
5.7.2.2 Nonradiological. The Industrial Source Complex Short-Term Air Dispersion
model was used with 1992 meteorological data from the Y-12 west meteorological monitoring
station at ORR to determine pollutant concentrations resulting from the centralization portion of
nonradiological emissions listed in Table 5.7-2. An emissions baseline was established to
Table 5.7-3. Summary of effective dose equivalents to the public from ORR operations and
the proposed SNF management facility.
Maximally exposed Collective dose to population
individual dosea within 80 km of ORR sources
Dose 9.5 mrem per yearb 5.7 x 101 c
Location Site boundary 1.2 km 9.1 x 105 people within 80 km of
SW of ORR storage SNF storage facility
facility
NESHAPb standard 10 mrem per year -
Percentage of 95 -
NESHAP
Natural background 306 mrem 2.79 x 105 person-rem
dose
Percentage of 3.1 2.1 x 10-2
natural
background dose
a. The maximum boundary dose is the hypothetical individual exposed continuously during the
year at ORR boundary located 1.2 km SW from the SNF site.
b. The SNF management facility contributes 6.2 mrem to this dose.
c. The SNF management facility contributes 5.2 person-rem to this dose.
NESHAP: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.
km: kilometer
mrem: millirem
Note: Effective dose equivalents computed using GENII (PNL 1988).
characterize conditions at ORR using actual emission rates (MMES 1993a). It is also assumed
that 1995 operations at the ORR will result in the same baseline nonradiological emissions as the
1992 operations at the ORR. The results of modeling are presented in Table 5.7-4, where the
existing ORR site contribution concentration is compared to the existing DOE site contribution
concentration plus the proposed SNF contribution. Table 5.7-5 presents the annual maximum
concentration for hazardous air pollutants for offsite receptors. These concentrations are used in
Section 5.12 for calculation of health effects. The increases in pollutant concentrations from the
proposed action are negligible in magnitude. The concentrations of nonradiological air pollutants
from operation of the SNF facilities, under that alternative, and from existing sources would
remain within all applicable regulatory guidelines.
If a Regionalization Alternative SNF facility is operated at the ORR, the incremental
contribution to maximum concentrations of pollutants would be less than for the Centralization
Alternative. The concentrations of nonradiological air pollutants from operation of the SNF
facilities, under this alternative, and from existing sources would remain within all regulatory
guidelines.
5.8 Water Resources
Construction and operation of SNF management facilities could potentially affect water
resources. Potential environmental impacts to surface water and groundwater resources during
construction include depletion of water supplies, floodplain encroachment, and surface water
sedimentation from erosion runoff occurring after land clearing. Potential normal operational
impacts would include depletion of water supplies, and diminished water quality resulting from
wastewater discharges from normal operations.
Impacts are analyzed for the Centralization Alternative, which would cause the most
impacts to water resources at the ORR, if chosen. However, for the Centralization Alternative,
no significant impacts are identified with respect to water resources issues. Therefore, no
significant impacts are expected from the Regionalization Alternative as the Centralization
Alternative is the bounding case.
Table 5.7-4. Comparison of baseline concentrations with most stringent applicable regulations
and guidelines at ORR and proposed SNF management facility plus current operations.
Criteria pollutant Averaging Most stringent Total Total projected Increase in
time regulation or existing maximum maximum
guidelinea maximum concentration concentration
(-g per m3) concentrationb including SNF (-g per m3)
(-g per m3) (-g per m3)
Carbon monoxidec 8-hour 10,000 6.9 6.9 0
1-hour 40,000 24.1 33.5 9.4
Nitrogen dioxide Annual 100 2.1 2.7 0.6
Lead Calendar 1.5 d 3.7 x 10-12 3.7 x 10-12
quarter
PM10e Annual 50 12.0 12.0 0
24-hour 150 97.9 97.9 0
Sulfur dioxide Annual 80 29.29 29.34 0.05
24-hour 365 177.8 178.0 0.2
3-hour 1,300 401.5 401.5 0
Total suspended Annual 50a 36.0 36.0 0
particulates
24-hour 150a 116.9 116.9 0
Hydrogen fluoride 30-day 1.2a 0.06 0.06 0
(as
fluorides) 7-day 1.6a 0.03 0.03 0
24-hour 2.9a d f f
8-hour 3.7a d f f
Hazardous air pollutants
Selenium 8-hour 20 d 2.18 x 10-7 2.18 x 10-7
Mercury compounds 8-hour 0.5 d 2.18 x 10-3 2.18 x 10-3
Chlorine compounds 8-hour 150 d 1.52 1.52
Cadmium compounds 8-hour 5 d 1.81 x 10-9 1.81 x 10-9
Cobalt, chromium, 8-hour 5 d 5.5 x 10-10 5.5 x 10-10
antimony, and nickel
compounds
a. State standard.
b. Includes background concentration plus existing DOE facilities impact concentration. This is the baseline
concentration.
c. Existing maximum and projected maximum did not occur in the same location.
d. Zero release (no sources indicated).
e. It is assumed that PM10 (particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter) data are total suspended
particulate data.
f. Not estimated because the potential release is negligible.
Table 5.7-5. Calculated annual maximum concentrations for hazardous air
pollutants at ORR for offsite receptors.
Hazardous air pollutant Maximum average
concentration(-g/m3)
Selenium compounds 8.85 x 10-8
Mercury compounds 8.85 x 10-4
Chlorine compounds 0.62
Hydrogen fluoride 1.53 x 10-3
Cadmium compounds 7.35 x 10-10
Cobalt, chromium, antimony and 2.21 x 10-10
nickel compounds
a. Offsite includes public access roads within the ORR. All impacts from
proposed source only. No hazardous air pollutant emissions information
available for existing sources.
5.8.1 Surface Water Quantity
The ORR currently receives its water supply from the Clinch River basin. Construction and
operation of SNF management facilities would have very minimal impact on the quantity of water
in the river and in local surface streams.
Construction of SNF management facilities would require some water consumption.
However, the amount of water required would not significantly affect the Clinch River water
level.
Stormwater runoff associated with both the construction and operation of SNF facilities is
expected to have a negligible impact on surface water quantity. During construction, standard
stormwater management techniques would be employed to attenuate runoff. A site drainage and
stormwater management system consisting of perimeter drainage ditches and a retention pond
would be included as part of SNF operations (Johnson, V. 1994). This system would provide for
runoff and erosion control, which could otherwise affect receiving water courses or SNF
operations.
As discussed in Section 4.8.1, analysis of available data indicates that the proposed SNF
management facilities would be sited outside the 500-year floodplain. The SNF management
facilities would be located and constructed to minimize any floodplain impact, as required by
Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) and DOE Orders. Site-specific surveys would
be performed to more accurately determine precise locations of flooding elevations.
Operation of SNF management facilities would require approximately 9,863 gallons (37,335
liters) of water per day. This would mean that an additional 3.6 million gallons (13.6 million
liters) of water would be used at the ORR per year. This figure is significantly less than the
minimum monthly release for 1992 which was 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meters) in
May of that year (MMES 1993a). Therefore no impacts to water supply from SNF operations
are expected.
Operation of SNF management facilities would involve the discharge of almost all water
withdrawn, as very little would be consumed. A new onsite sanitary wastewater treatment plant
would be required at the SNF facility. If all water withdrawn were to be treated and released at
a constant rate over the course of a year, the increased flow from SNF operations would be
approximately 0.13 gallon (0.5 liter) per second. Flow in Grassy Creek at its confluence with the
Clinch River has been estimated at 20 gallons (80 liters) per second. Water discharge points and
other appropriate mitigation measures would be selected in accordance with state and Federal
requirements so as not to impact surface water quantity and flow in streams receiving discharges.
5.8.2 Surface Water Quality
During construction of SNF management facilities, 90 acres (36 hectares) would be
disturbed, all in previously undisturbed areas. This would create the potential for increased
sediment runoff into wetlands, adjacent to the site and along the downstream reaches of Grassy
Creek as well as into Grassy Creek and its tributaries, which drain to the Clinch River. However,
sediment runoff from construction activities would be controlled and minimized by implementing
soil erosion control measures.
Under the Centralization Alternative, SNF management facilities would require a sanitary
sewer system comprising a sewage treatment facility equipped with a sewage treatment and
ejection pump system with a programmable controller and software. A pressurized sanitary
sewer line would be provided that would run to a permitted stream discharge point
(Johnson, V. 1994). This would accommodate the estimated 9,863 gallons (37,335 liters) per day
of sanitary wastewater generated by SNF facilities and personnel, and would result in no
appreciable impact to surface water quality. This system would be operated in accordance with
State of Tennessee permitting requirements.
The proposed SNF management facilities are designed to have no liquid release of
wastewater with hazardous chemical or radiological characteristics related to SNF management
operations. These facilities would be constructed using state-of-the-art technologies, including
secondary containment, and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. Therefore
no environmental consequences related to surface water resources are anticipated from the
normal operation of SNF management facilities.
A very low probability release scenario was evaluated to identify the potential
environmental consequences of a liquid release to the environment under normal operating
conditions. The release scenario was evaluated for information purposes only, as no normal
operating releases are planned for the proposed facilities. The scenario evaluated consisted of a
maximum potential liquid release to the environment under normal operating conditions such as
an undetected secondary containment failure or piping leak. The scenario was developed using
conservative estimates of the sensitivity of actual leak detection systems and operational source
term data from similarly functioning facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL). The estimates for the hypothetical release included a point release of 5 gallons (19
liters) per day to the environment over the course of 1 month. The release volume and
durations are considerably greater than existing leak detection system sensitivities, surveillance
activities, and radiological surveys. Source terms were derived at the 95 percent confidence level
from 8 years of operational data at the INEL Fluorinel and Storage Facility at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant.
This release was assumed to occur at 40 feet (12 meters) below the land surface. This
would be at either the depth of the vadose zone or the groundwater zone in most cases where
SNF management facilities would be sited on the ORR. Any release to the vadose zone would
migrate downward to the groundwater zone as described in Section 4.8.2. The upper layers of
the groundwater zone in the ORR aquitards (where SNF management facilities would be sited)
flow laterally to discharge points in nearby streams.
Most radiological constituents would be below drinking water standards at the point of
release. Those radiological constituents above drinking water standards would be diluted in
movements through the vadose zone, groundwater zone, and immediately upon entry into the
receiving surface water body. Migration of contaminants through the vadose and groundwater
zones would also be greatly reduced by sorption.
The short-term scenario evaluated would result in a long-term release of dilute
contaminants to local streams and the Clinch River. Any release from the SNF management
facilities would discharge to Grassy Creek through the subsurface. Although there are no
continuous records of stream discharge for Grassy Creek, the average discharge of Grassy Creek
to the Clinch River has been estimated at 20 gallons (80 liters) per second (Bailey and
Lee 1991). The worst-case undetected release from the SNF facilities (5 gallons [19 liters] per
day) would constitute less than 0.0003 percent of the estimated daily creek discharge to the
Clinch River. Therefore, any hazardous constituents would be well below established standards
at the confluence of Grassy Creek and the river. Even if a release were to occur during a period
of low flow in Grassy Creek, the percentage would still be very small. Additionally, the 1992
minimum monthly release (in May) of 3.5 billion cubic feet (100 million cubic meters) at the
Melton Hill Dam on the Clinch River averages to approximately 10,000 gallons (40,000 liters) per
second (MMES 1994a). Therefore, no significant contaminant concentrations would be expected
at the confluence of Grassy Creek and the Clinch River, or in the river itself.
5.8.3 Groundwater Quantity
No groundwater would be used for SNF management activities given the plentiful surface
water supplies at the ORR. Therefore no impacts to groundwater quantity are expected.
5.8.4 Groundwater Quality
As previously mentioned in Section 5.8.2, the proposed SNF management facilities would be
designed to have no liquid release to the environment of wastewater with hazardous chemical or
radiological characteristics. However, for the purpose of this analysis, a conservative release
scenario was analyzed.
As discussed in Section 4.8, virtually all mobile groundwater in the ORR aquitards is
discharged to local streams through the upper layers of the groundwater zone. The deeper
intervals of groundwater have extremely high residence times. Therefore, even the conservative
scenario of a release to groundwater would have negligible impacts to these resources, and no
significant impacts to offsite groundwater.
5.9 Ecological Resources
The Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives could affect ecological resources
primarily through the alteration or loss of habitat. Potential impacts to terrestrial and aquatic
resources and threatened and endangered species are described below for both alternatives.
Radiation doses received by terrestrial biota from SNF activities would be expected to be
similar to those received by man. Although guidelines have not been established for acceptance
limits for radiation exposure to species other than man, it is generally agreed that the limits
established for humans are also conservative for other species (NRC 1979). Evidence indicates
that no other living organisms have been identified that are likely to be significantly more
radiosensitive than man (Casarett 1968; National Academy of Sciences 1972). Thus, so long as
exposure limits protective of man are not exceeded, no significant radiological impact on
populations of biota would be expected as a result of SNF activities at the West Bear Creek Site.
5.9.1 Centralization Alternative
Under this alternative, construction of the proposed SNF management facility would result
in the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometers), or less than 1 percent of
the ORR. It is assumed that the area to be disturbed includes construction laydown areas,
grading, and new buildings, and that the access road or other rights-of-ways have not been
included in total area to be disturbed. Vegetation within the area proposed for the SNF
management facility would be destroyed during land clearing activities but may be mitigated by
revegetating with native species where possible. Vegetation cover in this area is predominantly
oak-hickory forest or pine and pine-hardwood forest. Both forest types are common on the ORR
and within the region.
Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would have some adverse effects on
animal populations. Less mobile animals, such as amphibians, reptiles, and small mammals,
within the project area would be destroyed during land-clearing activities. Larger mammals and
birds in construction and adjacent areas would be disturbed by construction activities and would
move to nearby suitable habitat. The long-term survival of these animals would depend on
whether the area to which they moved was at or below its carrying capacity. Areas that would be
revegetated upon completion of construction would be of minimal value to most wildlife but may
be repopulated by more tolerant species.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act is primarily concerned with the destruction of migratory
birds, as well as their eggs and nests. It may be necessary to survey construction sites for the
nests of migratory birds prior to construction and/or avoid clearing operations during the
breeding season.
Activities associated with operation, such as noise, increased human presence and traffic,
and night lighting could affect wildlife living immediately adjacent to the site. While these
disturbances may cause some sensitive species to move from the area, most animals should be
able to adjust.
Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would likely displace the forested
wetlands adjacent to tributaries of Grassy Creek flowing through the proposed site. This
unavoidable displacement of wetlands would be accomplished in accordance with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and Tennessee Water Quality Control Administration requirements. The
potential also exists to disturb wetlands further down stream through erosion and sedimentation.
Such impacts would be controlled through implementation of a soil erosion and sediment control
plan. Construction-related discharges to Grassy Creek would be relatively low and have
negligible impacts to wetlands associated with the creek. No impacts to wetlands are anticipated
during facility operations.
Construction of the proposed SNF management facility would require the rechanneling of
tributaries to Grassy Creek that cross the proposed site and, thus, the loss of this aquatic habitat.
In addition, soil erosion due to construction could cause water quality changes (primarily
sediment loading) to Grassy Creek and its tributaries. These impacts could be minimized by
implementation of soil erosion and sediment control measures. No operational impacts to
aquatic resources are anticipated. It is assumed that the proposed project will have a water
retention pond and a sewage lagoon area within the security fence that may provide minimal
habitat for amphibians in the area.
No federally listed species are expected to be affected by construction and operation of the
SNF management facility. Site surveys will be required to verify the presence of state-listed or
other special status species. Land clearing activities may destroy protected plant species, such as
purple fringeless orchid and pink lady's-slippers, that may occur within the site. State-listed
species including the Cooper's, sharp-shinned, and red-shouldered hawks, the barn owl, and the
black vulture, which potentially occur in the area, could be impacted by project activities.
Approximately 90 acres (36 hectares) of potential nesting and foraging habitat would be lost as a
result of construction activities. Because this type of habitat is abundant in the area, the loss is
not expected to affect the viability of populations of these species. However, appropriate steps
would be taken to prevent nest disturbance. The DOE would consult with the Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation as appropriate to avoid or mitigate imminent
impacts to state-listed species.
5.9.2 Regionalization Alternative
Impacts under this alternative are expected to be generally the same as under the
Centralization Alternative. The major difference between the two is the total area to be
disturbed. The Regionalization Alternative is expected to have fewer buildings required and,
therefore, fewer acres to be disturbed.
5.10 Noise
As discussed in Section 4.10, noises generated on the ORR do not propagate offsite at
levels that impact the general population. Thus, ORR noise impacts for both the Centralization
and Regionalization Alternatives are those resulting from the transportation of personnel and
materials to and from the site that affect the nearby communities, and those resulting from onsite
sources that may affect some wildlife near these sources. The effect of noise on wildlife near
SNF management facilities under the Centralization or Regionalization Alternatives would be
addressed in a project-specific environmental assessments.
The transportation noises are a function of the size of the work force (e.g., an increase in
the size of the work force would result in increased employee traffic and corresponding increases
in deliveries by truck and rail, and a decreased work force would result in decreased employee
traffic and corresponding decreases in deliveries). This analysis of traffic noise took into account
noise from the major roadways that provide access to the ORR. Vehicles used to transport
employees and personnel on roadways would be the principal sources of community noise
impacts near the ORR from the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives.
This analysis used the day-night average sound level to assess community noise as suggested
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1974, 1982) and the Federal Interagency
Committee on Noise (FICON 1992). The change in day-night average sound level from the
baseline noise level for each alternative was estimated based on the projected change in
employment and traffic levels from the baseline levels. The baseline levels are those for 1995.
The combination of construction and operation employment was considered. A change in noise
level below 3 decibels would not be expected to result in a change in community reaction
(FICON 1992).
Under the Centralization Alternative the projected ORR work force might increase by
about 9 percent in the years 2000 to 2002, during the peak construction period, and might
decrease thereafter (Section 5.3). There would be a corresponding increase in private vehicle
and truck trips to the site. The day-night average sound level at 15 meters (50 feet) from the
roads that provide access to the ORR would be expected to increase by less than 1 decibel. No
change is expected in the community reaction to noise along these routes. No mitigation efforts
are necessary.
Under the Regionalization Alternative the traffic noise impacts would be the same as for
the Centralization Alternative.
5.11 Traffic and Transportation
5.11.1 Centralization Alternative
The proposed SNF management activities would involve a small increase in the number of
employees commuting to the ORR and the transportation of SNF and hazardous chemicals
onsite. This section summarizes the potential transportation impacts due to the proposed SNF
facilities on the ORR.
5.11.1.1 Level of Service. Levels of service were calculated for construction and
operation of the SNF facility at the ORR. The maximum reasonably foreseeable scenario for
operations occurs when the projected combined employees and population are at the highest
level. This occurs in 2001, when there are 4,184 employees and a projected population in the
Region of Influence of 528,800. The Region of Influence includes Anderson, Blount, Knox,
Loudon, and Roane counties. This is the region from which employees can be expected to
commute. The employees and population associated with the proposed action generate direct
trips in the Region of Influence. These trips to the site are distributed to the Region of
Influence road network according to percentages based on a traffic flow to the site from where
employees historically have lived. Increase in baseline population and indirect site-related
employees will generate indirect traffic trips in the Region of Influence. These trips are
distributed based on the current average daily traffic per present population in the region of
influence for a given segment. Direct and indirect average daily traffic is added and a new level
of service is determined. Construction and operation employees contribute little to the future
traffic because they represent such a small percentage of the Region of Influence population
growth.
The following segment has a poorer level of service due to site-related impacts over the
future baseline. Tennessee State Route 61 between Interstate 75 at Norris and 25W at Clinton
will worsen to a level of service of E while Tennessee State Route 62 between Interstate 75 at
Knoxville and US 441/TN 33 at Knoxville will worsen to a level of service of F. There are no
other site-related impacts on any other segment.
Road reconstruction, widening, modification of interchanges, and new interchange
construction projects are planned for segments of Bear Creek Valley Road, Scarboro Road, and
Tennessee State Routes 58, 62, and 95 (Johnson, C. 1994; MMES 1991b).
Possible mitigation of impacts on local and regional roads having level of service of F could
include adding lanes or employing traffic demand management.
The generic facility design would require rail access for Naval fuel delivery. This would
create impacts that would be evaluated in detail if the site were selected for the SNF facility.
5.11.1.2 Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals. The hazardous chemicals required
and hazardous waste generated by the proposed SNF facility operation are assumed to be
transported by truck. The onsite transportation impacts for these hazardous chemicals and
wastes shipments are calculated based on the assumptions that (a) they do not have any incident
free impacts, (b) the material would not leak during transport, (c) only risk is due to traffic
fatalities, and (d) the material spill of entire contents is bound by the risk evaluated for the
Expended Core Facility considered under facility accidents.
The total distance for onsite shipment of these hazardous chemicals is assumed to be the
maximum site boundary distance from the proposed SNF facility to the nearest highway. Based
on the unit risk factor (Cashwell et al. 1986) and occupational and nonoccupational fatalities
considering a rural setting, the onsite transportation risks are calculated, assuming 10 annual
shipments.
The maximum one-way distance from the site to the ORR gate by which trucks would
deliver hazardous waste is 16 kilometers (10 miles). Based on 1.5 x 10-8 accident occupational
fatalities per kilometer per shipment, 1.92 x 10-4 accident occupational fatalities are estimated
over a 40-year period. Based on 5.3 x 10-8 accident non-occupational fatalities per kilometer per
shipment, 6.8 x 10-4 accident non-occupational fatalities are estimated for a 40-year period.
5.11.1.3 Transportation of Radioactive SNF. The definition of offsite transportation
includes transportation of radioactive material from the shipping facility to the storage facility at
the receiving site; therefore this local transportation does not separately address the onsite
transportation impacts due to radioactive materials shipment except for handling at the storage
facility. Based on current inventories and expected future generation, DOE estimates
approximately 480 spent nuclear shipments over 40 years (1995-2035) from the High Flux Isotope
Reactor. The distance between the High Flux Isotope Reactor and the proposed SNF
management facility at ORR is about 6 miles (9.75 km). Incident-free onsite radiological
transportation impacts from the estimated 480 shipments were calculated for transportation crew
members (occupational) and general population. Occupational dose of 0.34 person-rem over
40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 7.16 x 10-5 person-rem per kilometer
(Appendix I). This dose results in 1.36 x 10-4 fatal cancers. The general population dose of 8.56
x 10-3 person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 1.83 x 10-6 person-
rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 4.28 x 10-6 fatal cancers.
5.11.2 Regionalization Alternative
The impacts due to the Regionalization Alternative would be less than those described for
the Centralization Alternative.
5.12 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
5.12.1 Centralization Alternative
This section evaluates the impacts to human health resulting from both contaminated
emissions and direct exposures associated with the proposed SNF management facility under the
Centralization Alternative. Based on current inventories and expected future generation, DOE
estimates approximately 480 spent nuclear shipments over 40 years (1995 - 2035) from the High
Flux Isotope Reactor. The distance between the High Flux Isotope Reactor and the proposed
SNF management facility at ORR is about 6 miles (9.75 km). Incident-free onsite radiological
transportation impacts from the estimated 480 shipments were calculated for transportation crew
members (occupational) and general population. Occupational dose of 0.34 person-rem over 40
years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 7.16 x 10-5 person-rem per kilometer
(Appendix I). This dose results in 1.36 x 10-4 fatal cancers. The general population dose of 8.56
x 10-3 person-rem over 40 years was calculated based on a unit risk factor of 1.83 x 10-6 person-
rem per kilometer (Appendix I). This dose results in 4.28 x 10-6 fatal cancers.
5.12.1.1 Radiological Dose and Cancer Impacts. Computation and modeling (see
Table 5.7-1) have shown that the dose rate (due to atmospheric effluents only) to the maximally
exposed individual, conservatively taken to be at the site boundary of the ORR (without the
presence of the interim storage facility), is 3.3 millirem per year of site operation with an
associated risk of fatal cancer of 1.7 x 10-6 to this maximally exposed individual. It has also been
established (see Section 4.12.4) that liquid effluents may present an additional plausible dose rate
of 15.2 millirem per year of site operation (MMES 1993a) to a potential maximally exposed
individual at the site boundary (due to both water consumption [0.2 millirem] and exposure from
liquid material [15 millirem]), yielding a corresponding risk of 7.6 x 10-6 per year of operation.
Subsequently, an additional 6.2 millirem per year to the postulated maximally exposed individual
at the site boundary has been tabulated due to the presence of interim storage facility gaseous
effluents (no radioactive liquid effluents are expected from the interim storage facility). Thus, if
the spent fuel were brought to the ORR, it could result in a total cumulative dose rate (ORR +
interim storage facility) to the maximally exposed individual at the site boundary of 24.7 millirem
per year of site operation (see Table 5.12-1), with an associated total risk from ORR operations
of 1.2 x 10-5 for fatal cancer; the resulting increase in risk to this individual from ORR operations
with SNF management included is 34 percent. The total dose (24.7 millirem) to the maximally
exposed individual is well within all applicable DOE limits (i.e., 4 millirem per year from the
drinking water pathway, 10 millirem per year from the airborne release pathways, and 100
millirem per year total for all pathways). Table 5.12-1 shows the relationship among the various
sources of radiation doses to the maximally exposed individual. The risks are presented there for
both 1 and 40 years of exposure. The latter values are approximate and correspond to the
operating lifetime of the SNF facility.
The annual population dose (80-kilometer [50-mile] radius) from total site operations
(without the interim storage facility) is 54 person-rem, resulting in an increase of fatal cancer of
0.027. The increase in annual population dose from SNF operations is 5 person-rem, resulting in
an increase of 2.5 x 10-3 for fatal cancer.
Over 40 years the increase in fatal cancers from SNF operations is 0.10. The increase of
9 percent in fatal cancers to the population from site operations with SNF results in an increase
from 0.019 to 0.021 percent in the comparison of the dose received from ORR to that received
from background. Table 5.12-1 also includes a summary of these population health impacts.
Table 5.12-1. Critical Interim Storage Facility impacts on radiation dose and cancer risks at ORR.
Dose rate to Associated fatal Associated Population dose Associated total Associated facility
the maximally exposed cancer risk facility lifetime from total site cancer increase lifetime fatal cancer
individual (mrem per yr) (yr of operation)a fatal cancer risk operations (person per yr increase (person per
(40 years)a (person-rem per yr) of operation) 40 years)
Natural 295 1.5 x 10-4 5.9 x 10-3 279,000 140 5,580
background
Public
Baseline site 18.5 9.2 x 10-6 3.7 x 10-4 54 0.027 1.1
operations
SNF operations 6.2 3.1 x 10-6 1.2 x 10-4 5.2 2.5 x 10-3 0.10
Baseline & SNF 24.7 1.2 x 10-5 4.9 x 10-4 59 0.030 1.2
Percent increase34 34 34 9 9 9
SNF over baseline
Workers
Baseline site 2.8b 1.1 x 10-6 4.5 x 10-5 48 0.019 0.76
operations
SNF operations 40b 1.6 x 10-5 6.4 x 10-4 32 0.013 0.40a
a. Facility lifetime fatal cancer risk accounts for time-varying number of workers.
b. Dose rate to an average worker.
It has been assumed that the additional doses to SNF workers (due to interim storage
facility operations) will be similar in nature to those for major DOE facility Waste
Processing/Management personnel. Hence, by examining the dose data from 1989, 1990, and
1991 for Richland, INEL, and Savannah River Site and assuming that the nuclear activity of the
SNF would remain fairly constant until it is dealt with at the interim storage facility, it may be
asserted that a maximally exposed interim storage facility worker could plausibly receive an
additional (above background) annual dose of 3 rem from normal operations; this is equivalent to
a risk of 1.2 x 10-3 for fatal cancer per year of operation. However, the average calculated dose
(incurred in 1989, 1990, and 1991) to SNF workers was approximately 40 millirem per year; this
is equivalent to a risk of 1.6 x 10-5 for fatal cancer per year of operation, and to an approximate
risk of 6.4 x 10-4 to a worker who is present during the entire 40-year facility lifetime.
An excess of 0.013 fatal cancer among all SNF facility workers is projected from peak
annual operations; exposures to radiation over the lifetime of SNF operations could result in an
excess of 0.40 fatal cancer. The maximum health effects due to radiological doses to a
noninvolved worker, i.e., an ORR worker at a faciity other than SNF, would be on the order of
1 percent of the occupational exposure to an SNF worker based on analyses for the SRS and
INEL sites. Table 5.12-1 includes a summary of the doses and fatal cancer risks to SNF workers.
5.12.1.2 Chemical Exposure Health Impacts. The calculated atmospheric maximum
concentrations of hazardous chemicals (at the site boundary) for the proposed action are
presented in Table 5.7-5 in Section 5.7. The maximum concentrations at the site boundary
reflect an exposure to a maximally exposed individual, whereas the maximum onsite
concentrations reflect an exposure to a worker. Of the potential hazardous chemicals identified
for the proposed action, cadmium, nickel and chromium VI (chrome) are carcinogens for which a
total cancer risk is calculated. The remaining seven chemicals are noncarcinogens for which a
hazard index is calculated. A hazard index value of greater than 1 serves as an indicator for
potential adverse health effects.
The offsite concentrations in Table 5.7-5 represent values at public access roads within the
reservation. However, a maximally exposed individual is assumed to be unable to take up
residence on these roads, but instead takes up residence along the reservation fence line. The
concentrations at the fence line are 62 percent of those listed as offsite. On the other hand, the
concentrations at the roads, being the highest listed within the fence line, are used here to
represent maximum concentrations for ORR workers.
Based on the maximum hazardous chemical concentrations at the site boundary, the lifetime
fatal cancer risk and hazard index to the maximally exposed member of the public are 2.5 x 10-12
and 1.2 x 10-2, respectively. Based on the maximum concentrations onsite, the lifetime fatal
cancer risk and hazard index to a worker are 4.0 x 10-12 and 1.9 x 10-2, respectively. This indicates
that there will be virtually no health impacts from nonradiological releases.
5.12.1.3 Labor and Construction Health Risks. There are expected to be 25,212 total
occupational/total labor worker-years for the 40-year duration of the interim storage facility.
Hence, over the 40-year interim storage facility life span, it is estimated that 807 total
injuries/illnesses and 0.81 fatality to DOE and contractor personnel would result. The expected
4,352 total construction worker-years for the 40-year duration of the interim storage facility
results in 270 total injuries/illnesses and 0.48 fatality to DOE and contractor personnel.
5.12.2 Regionalization Alternative
Although the Regionalization Alternative is not explicitly analyzed, its impacts will be less
than those from the Centralization Alternative.
5.13 Utilities and Energy
Direct changes in utility demand as a result of the Centralization and Regionalization
Alternatives were compared against the current capacity and peak demand for each utility
resource. Impacts to provision of a utility are considered to occur if the current demand, average
annual demand, or peak demand for a utility is equal to or exceeds the current available capacity
within the designated Region of Influence. For the purpose of analysis, the Region of Influence
for each resource area is defined as the area served by the utility provider responsible for
meeting the service demands of the ORR.
5.13.1 Centralization Alternative
5.13.1.1 Water Consumption. For the Centralization Alternative, approximately 0.43
liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of water is required to operate all the modules within
the facility (Harr 1994). The K-25 plant, which would provide water to the site, has a capacity of
184 liters per second (2,917 gallons per minute) (Fritts 1994).
The proposed SNF management facilities would require approximately 0.2 percent of the
K-25 plant's water capacity. The K-25 plant would operate at 53 percent of its capacity when the
SNF facilities' water requirements are combined with the 1990 peak water usage of 97 liters per
second (1,533 gallons per minute).
5.13.1.2 Electrical Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the
Centralization Alternative would require approximately 23,000 megawatt hours of electricity per
year or approximately 2.63 megavolt-amperes average demand (Harr 1994). This represents
0.3 percent of ORR's 920 megavolt-ampere connected capacity. Thirty-one percent of the
connected capacity of ORR would be utilized when the peak electric requirement of 285
megavolt-amperes was combined with the electrical requirements of the Centralization
Alternative.
5.13.1.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the proposed SNF management
facilities under the Centralization Alternative were calculated assuming that electrical power
purchased from a utility provider was the primary source of energy; however, fossil fuels may be
used to power backup generators and during construction. The amount of fuel required for these
operations would be small and should not substantially increase ORR fuel requirements.
5.13.1.4 Wastewater Disposal. Under the Centralization Alternative, approximately
0.43 liter per second (6.85 gallons per minute) of wastewater would be generated (Harr 1994). A
new onsite sanitary sewage system and wastewater treatment plant might be required at the SNF
facility. If a new system is not built, and sanitary sewage and wastewater are treated at K-25, this
addition would represent approximately 2 percent of the K-25 sanitary sewer treatment system
capacity of 26 liters per second (417 gallons per minute). Ninety-four percent of the wastewater
capacity of the K-25 sanitary sewer treatment system would be utilized when the peak wastewater
production of 24 liters per second (378 gallons per minute) was combined with the wastewater
production of the SNF management facilities.
5.13.2 Regionalization Alternative
5.13.2.1 Water Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the
Regionalization Alternative would require less water than the facilities under the Centralization
Alternative; therefore, the impacts would be less.
5.13.2.2 Electrical Consumption. The proposed SNF management facilities under the
Regionalization Alternative would require less electricity than the facilities under the
Centralization Alternative; therefore, the impacts would be less.
5.13.2.3 Fuel Consumption. Energy requirements for the proposed SNF management
facilities under the Regionalization Alternative were calculated assuming that electrical power
purchased from a utility provider was the primary source of energy; however, fossil fuels may be
used to power backup generators and during construction activities. The amount of fuel required
for these operations would be small and should not substantially increase ORR fuel
requirements.
5.13.2.4 Wastewater Disposal. The proposed SNF management facilities under the
Regionalization Alternative would produce less wastewater than the Centralization Alternative;
therefore, the impacts would be less.
5.14 Materials and Waste Management
This section discusses the potential environmental consequences of the Centralization and
Regionalization Alternatives for the management of chemical raw materials and transuranic, low-
level radioactive, and hazardous waste at the ORR. Nonhazardous (sanitary) wastes are
discussed in Section 5.8. Section 4.14 describes the waste categories and outlines the ongoing
waste management activities for the ORR. These waste management activities include onsite
and offsite waste treatment, onsite and offsite waste disposal, and onsite waste storage.
Section 4.14 also describes the chemical raw material management activities for the ORR.
5.14.1 Methodology
This analysis considers the impact of the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives on
current waste management activities at the ORR (baseline conditions). In addition to requiring
land area for SNF management, both alternatives would generate transuranic, low-level
radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes. Neither alternative is projected to generate
mixed wastes or high-level wastes. This analysis is based on a comparison of the projected
amounts of waste generated by the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives versus the
current waste generation rates and storage capacity at the ORR.
5.14.2 Materials and Waste Management
SNF management activities would require the use of chemicals, and it is conservatively
assumed that all chemical raw materials used within the proposed SNF management facility
would become hazardous wastes. The proposed SNF management facility would contribute
transuranic, solid low-level, and sanitary (sewage) wastes. Table 5.14-1 presents the estimated
waste generations by waste classification for each of the two alternatives (Centralization and
Regionalization) and by each of two storage options (wet storage, dry storage).
5.14.2.1 Centralization Alternative. Under the Centralization Alternative, all DOE SNF
(including Naval and domestic and foreign research reactors) will be transferred to and managed
at the ORR.
5.14.2.2 Wet Storage Option. The wet storage option would generate transuranic, low-
level, hazardous, and sanitary wastes. The effect that the projected amounts of each of these
wastes would have on the ORR waste management is discussed below.
5.14.2.2.1 Transuranic Waste-Over a period of 40 years of operation the
projected amount of transuranic waste generated due to the recovery and purification of
transuranic products would be 644 cubic meters (22,750 cubic feet).
The current storage capacity
at the ORR (ORNL) is 833.4 cubic meters (295,000 cubic feet). ORNL will continue to generate
transuranic waste, and disposal is eventually planned for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant unit. If
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant unit does not come on line, the ORR transuranic waste storage
Table 5.14-1. Ten-year cumulative estimated waste generation for SNF alternatives
at the ORR (m3).
Time period
Alternative/
storage option
1995-2004 2005-2014 2015-2024 2025-2034
Centralization
Alternative
Wet storage option
Transuranic waste161 161 161 161
Low-level waste 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Hazardous waste 74 74 74 74
Sanitary waste 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105 1.2 x 105
(sewage)
Dry storage option
Low-level waste 76 76 76 76
Sanitary waste 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104 1.9 x 104
(sewage)
Regionalization
Alternative
Wet storage option
Transuranic waste<161 <161 <161 <161
Low-level waste <1,950 <1,950 <1,950 <1,950
Hazardous waste <74 <74 <74 <74
Sanitary waste <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105 <1.2 x 105
(sewage)
Dry storage option
Low-level waste <76 <76 <76 <76
Sanitary waste <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104 <1.9 x 104
(sewage)
a. Source: Harr (1994).
capacity may have to be expanded to accommodate transuranic waste generated at the SNF
facility.
5.14.2.2.2 Low-Level Waste-The wet storage option would generate liquid low-
level waste as a result of its interim storage in water.
Over a period of 40 years of operation, an
estimated 7,800 cubic meters (over 2 million gallons) of low-level liquid waste might be
generated. The total ORR (Y-12, K-25, ORNL) storage capacity for liquid low-level wastes is
about 98,300 cubic meters (about 26 million gallons) (see Tables 4.14-1, 4.14-3, and 4.14-5).
Impacts would be small.
5.14.2.2.3 Hazardous Wastes-Installation of the proposed SNF management
facility would require additional management of hazardous wastes, including the placement of
satellite storage areas within the SNF complex and more frequent offsite shipments of hazardous
wastes.
It is estimated that the wet storage option will generate approximately 7.4 cubic meters
(261 cubic feet) of waste annually. Currently ORR manages about 10,000 cubic meters (about
353,000 cubic feet) of hazardous waste annually (see Tables 4.14-1, 4.14-3, and 4.14-5); therefore,
the impact of SNF generated hazardous waste on the management of hazardous waste at the
ORR would be minimal.
5.14.2.2.4 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary wastes are covered in Section 5.
8.
5.14.2.3 Dry Storage Option. The dry storage option would generate low-level waste
and sanitary waste. The effects that the projected amounts of each of these wastes would have
on the ORR waste management is discussed below.
5.14.2.3.1 Low-Level Waste-The low-level radioactive contaminated waste stream
would result from wastes generated during decontamination operations.
Over a period of
40 years of operation, an estimated 304 cubic meters (10,700 cubic feet) of low-level waste might
be generated. As reported in Section 5.14.2.2.2 the total ORR storage capacity for liquid low-
level waste is about 98,300 cubic meters (about 26 million gallons). Impacts from SNF
operations on low-level waste management would be minimal.
5.14.2.3.2 Sanitary Waste-Sanitary wastes are covered in Section 5.
8.
5.14.2.2 Regionalization Alternative. Under the Regionalization Alternative, the ORR
would be the alternate site for the SRS. This alternative would generate less waste from the
SNF complex than the Centralization Alternative since it is the alternative that stores less SNF.
For either the wet storage or dry storage option, the waste generated would be less than those
presented for the Centralization Alternative. Therefore, Table 5.14-1 presents the estimated
waste generation for the SNF for the Regionalization Alternative as less than those generated for
the Centralization Alternative. The impacts presented for each of the waste categories for its
two options (wet storage, dry storage) for the Centralization Alternative apply to the
Regionalization Alternative as well.
5.15 Facility Accidents
A potential exists for accidents at facilities associated with the handling, inspection, and
storage of spent nuclear fuel at the ORR. Accidents can be categorized into events that are
abnormal (for example, minor spills), events a facility was designed to withstand, and events a
facility is not designed to withstand. These categories are termed abnormal, design basis, and
beyond design basis accidents, respectively. Summarized here are consequences of possible facility
accidents for a member of the public at the nearest site boundary and at the nearest road, for
the collective population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), for workers, and for the environment.
See Section 5.11 for a summary of the assessment of transportation accidents.
A review of the historical record of accidents at the ORR is summarized in the following
section. Methods used to assess potential future events are summarized in Section 5.15.2.
Evaluations of accident impacts by alternative are summarized in Sections 5.15.3 through 5.15.7.
A summary comparison of accident impacts by alternative is given in Section 3.2. Additional
supporting documentation for the accident impacts is given in a separate report (HNUS 1995).
This section examines the various activities that have been performed to assess the potential
for accidents and their consequences for workers and the public for each alternative. A set of
potential reasonably foreseeable accidents over the 40-year period are described which envelop
all accidents. Secondary impacts of accidents pertaining to cultural resources, economics, land
use, endangered species, water resources, and ecology are also addressed. This section also
addresses emergency preparedness plans that have been established to mitigate the primary and
secondary effects of accidents.
5.15.1 Historical SNF Accidents at ORR
The records of unusual events, including accidents, at the ORR have been reviewed to
determine whether there have been any accidents with offsite impacts. The results indicate that
there have been no accidents at the ORR associated with SNF that have had significant offsite
consequences for the general public.
5.15.2 Methodology
5.15.2.1 Existing Facilities.
5.15.2.1.1 Assumptions and Approach-The potential accidents associated with
the existing SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to
include in the accident analysis for the No Action Alternative.
Source terms were developed for
each accident analysis. The GENII code (PNL 1988) was used to estimate accident
consequences for the general public and for individuals onsite or at the site boundary based on
both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology. Accident consequences and risk are described in
terms of dose, cancer fatalities, and total health detriments for workers, an individual at the site
boundary, and the public residing as far as 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the proposed SNF
management facility.
5.15.2.1.2 Accident Screening-The potential accidents associated with the existing
SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in
the accident analysis for the No Action Alternative.
Initiating events were reviewed including
natural phenomena (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.), human initiated events (human error),
equipment failures, fires, explosions, airplane crashes, and terrorism. One reference design basis
fuel handling accident was selected for detailed analysis.
The dam in the High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel pool is removed and stored within the pool
during refueling operations. The reference design basis fuel handling accident postulated that
during refueling operations, the dam falls and damages all the 62 spent fuel cores, including the
most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission products from all 62 spent fuel
cores are released to the water in the pool (ORNL 1992b).
A beyond design basis tornado accident was considered that resulted in collapse of the High
Flux Isotope Reactor bay roof and the roof's major structural member falls into the fuel pool and
damages all the 62 spent fuel cores located in the pool. The fission products from all 62 spent
fuel cores are released to the water in the pool (Flanagan 1994).
Additional beyond design basis accidents initiated by an airplane crash were postulated for
the High Flux Isotope Reactor and Bulk Shielding Reactor but were screened out because the
probability of an airplane crash into the fuel pool was estimated to be less than 1.0 x 10-7 per
year.
The consequences of postulated operational and reference design basis accidents for the
existing facilities are enveloped by the accident consequences presented in Subsection 5.15.4 for
the Centralization Alternative.
5.15.2.2 New Facilities. In the absence of suitable design details for new SNF
management facilities during this stage of the SNF Management Program upon which to base an
accident analysis, the approach makes use of accident scenarios and associated data that have
been analyzed and documented for similar facilities. They include spent nuclear fuel facilities at
INEL, Hanford, Savannah River Site, and Naval sites.
5.15.2.2.1 Assumptions and Approach-A number of postulated accidents for the
similar facilities have been selected to serve as a common basis for estimating accident
consequences for workers and the public at the ORR site.
Although the accident scenarios,
source terms, and related assumptions are common for both sites, the estimated consequences
are unique to the ORR site because of site differences in modeling parameters pertaining to
distances to site boundaries and population centers, population distributions, and meteorology.
The GENII code was used to estimate accident consequences for the general public and for
individuals onsite or at the site boundary based on both 50 percent and 95 percent meteorology.
Accident consequences and risk are described in terms of dose, cancer fatalities, and total health
detriments for workers, an individual at the site boundary, a transient individual at the nearest
public access, and the public residing as far as 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the proposed SNF
facility. The estimated frequency of each selected accident is based on the reference source
documentation.
The probability of an airplane crash into the new SNF management facility is considered
small because there are no nearby airports with large aircraft activity. The probability is
expected to be in the 1 x 10-6 to 1 x 10-8 per year range. For calculational purposes the
probability of this accident is conservatively estimated at 1 x 10-6 per year. Potential accidents
initiated by an airplane crash into the SNF management facilities and the estimated
consequences have been analyzed.
The secondary impacts of accidental releases of radioactive and hazardous materials are
also addressed in a qualitative manner. Secondary impacts pertain to effects of accidents on land
use, endangered species, water resources, cultural resources, and ecology.
5.15.2.2.2 Accident Screening-The potential accidents associated with existing
SNF management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in
the accident analysis for the ORR.
The source documentation for this purpose was primarily
Appendices A, B, C, and D of Volume 1 of this EIS. The source documentation describes
potential accidents for existing and planned SNF management facilities that were selected by a
screening process. Initiating events were reviewed including natural phenomena (earthquakes,
tornadoes, etc.), human initiated events (human error), equipment failures, fires, explosions,
airplane crashes, and terrorism. Accidents associated with the Expended Core Facility operations
at the ORR, were analyzed separately and the results are documented in Appendix D of this
EIS. For the ORR the maximum reasonably foreseeable criticality and nonradiological accidents
are associated with the Expended Core Facility. The potential for a criticality exists while the
fuel is in dry storage, during handling, and in the wet storage pool. Although the probability of
any criticality is very low, a hypothetical criticality of 1 x 1019 fissions was postulated in the
Expended Core Facility wet pool as a basis for estimating the maximum reasonably foreseeable
consequences of a criticality.
The selected accidents include beyond reference design basis events to reflect the
magnitude of accident consequences that envelop all other accidents that have a reasonable
probability of occurrence. They also include other accidents with lower consequences and
typically higher probabilities of occurrence to show a range of accident types and consequences.
The accidents included in this set are reasonably foreseeable, meaning that there are one or
more sequences of events that will lead to their occurrence and the sequence with the lowest
probability of occurrence is greater than 1 x 10-7 per year. Accidents falling outside of this
envelope, such as a meteorite impact, have been judged unreasonable because the probability of
occurrence in less than 1 x 10-7 per year.
5.15.2.2.3 Accident Prevention and Mitigation - Under the Centralization and
Regionalization alternatives, the SNF management facilities at the ORR will be of new design
and construction and incorporate the latest technology for safety.
The accidents postulated for
the SNF management facilities are based on operations and safety analyses that have been
performed at similar facilities. One of the major design goals for the SNF management facilities
is to achieve a reduced risk to facility personnel and to public health and safety relative to that
associated with similar functions at the existing SNF management facilities. Significant changes
exist between design criteria and safety standards for the new SNF management facilities and
those for the current facilities, thus reducing total risk. These changes include design to current
DOE structural and safety criteria and to planned throughput and storage capacity.
The new SNF management facilities would be designed to comply with current Federal,
state, and local laws, DOE Orders, and industrial codes and standards. This would provide
facilities that are highly resistant to the effects of severe natural phenomena, including
earthquake, flood, tornado, high wind, as well as credible events as appropriate to the site, such
as fire and explosions, and man-made threats to its continuing structural integrity for containing
materials.
Emergency preparedness plans have also been prepared for existing facilities and will be
revised for new facilities to lower the potential consequences of an accident to workers and the
public. All workers receive evacuation training to ensure timely and orderly personnel movement
away from high-risk areas. Plans and arrangements with local authorities are also in place to
evacuate the general public that may be at risk of exposure to hazardous materials that are
accidentally released.
5.15.3 No Action Alternative
There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances during various
stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations begin with discharge of SNF
from the reactor during refueling operations. The discharged SNF is placed in the fuel pool for
cooling and short term storage. After an adequate cooldown period, SNF is removed from the
pool and transported offsite for long term storage. Accidents that may occur during these
handling operations and storage may involve the release of radioactive material to air or water
pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, such as operator error,
equipment failure, and terrorism, or external initiators, such as an earthquake.
In the event that SNF can not be transported offsite for long term storage, reactor
operations will cease when the fuel pool is full. Presently the SNF stored in the ORR fuel pools
is sound and has not deteriorated. If the existing SNF were to remain in the ORR fuel pools for
an extended period of time and deterioration of the aluminum fuel cladding occurred, there are
no existing facilities at the ORR to characterize the SNF.
5.15.3.1 Radiological Impacts. The potential accidents associated with the existing SNF
management facilities and operations were screened to determine which ones to include in the
accident analysis for the No Action Alternative. One reference design basis accident and one
beyond design basis accident were selected for detailed analysis. Although other accidents may
occur, their estimated consequences are bounded by this beyond design basis accident or their
probability of occurrence is less than 1.0 x 10-7per year. If these accidents were to occur, the
dose and risk to the onsite worker and the general population are shown in Tables 5.15-1 and
5.15-2 for 95 percent and 50 percent meteorology respectively. Similarly, cancer fatalities are
shown in Tables 5.15-3 and 5.15-4, and the health effects are shown in Tables 5.15-5 and 5.15-6.
5.15.3.1.1 Reference Design Basis Accident-The dam that separates the High
Flux Isotope Reactor pool from the clean center pool during normal reactor operation is moved
to a position between the east and center clean pools prior to defueling the reactor.
The dam is
lifted approximately 3 feet above the water over its slot between the reactor and center pools,
then moved with the crane across the center clean pool, and then lowered into its slot between
the east and center pools. During this movement, and when the dam is being moved back, the
fuel in the center pool is subjected to the possibility of dropping the dam and mechanically
Table 5.15-1. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95 percent
meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Dose Risk
Accident Frequency
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerd Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/yr) (rem/yr) (person-rem/yr)
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 e 3.7 x 10-1 6.2 x 10-1 2.3 x 10-2 3.5 x 103 c 3.7 x 10-5 6.2 x 10-5 2.3 x 10-6 3.5 x 10-1
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 4.9 x 100 d7.5 x 101 2.6 x 101 4.5 x 104 d 9.3 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-5 4.9 x 10-6 8.6 x 10-3
basis tornado
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI) - Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
Table 5.15-2. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent
meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Dose Risk
Accident Frequency
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerd Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/yr) (rem/yr) (person-rem/yr)
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 e 8.6 x 10-2 1.9 x 10-1 5.7 x 10-3 1.2 x 103 c 8.6 x 10-6 1.9 x 10-5 5.7 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-1
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 9.5 x 10-1 1.9 x 101 4.0 x 100 7.2 x 103 d 1.8 x 10-7 3.6 x 10-6 7.6 x 10-7 1.4 x 10-3
basis tornado
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
Table 5.15-3. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95
percent meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk
Accident Frequency (cancer fatalities/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerd Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 e 1.8 x 10-4 3.1 x 10-4 9.2 x 10-6 1.7 x 100 c 1.8 x 10-83.1 x 10-8 9.2 x 10-10 1.7 x 10-4
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-3 7.5 x 10-2 2.0 x 10-2 2.3 x 101 d 4.8 x 10-11.4 x 10-8 3.8 x 10-9 4.4 x 10-6
basis tornado
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
Table 5.15-4. Summary of No Action Alternative accident cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50 percent
meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk
Accident Frequency (cancer fatalities/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerd Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 e 4.3 x 10-5 9.5 x 10-5 2.3 x 10-6 6.2 x 10-1 c 4.3 x 10-99.5 x 10-9 2.3 x 10-10 6.2 x 10-5
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 4.8 x 10-4 9.5 x 10-3 1.6 x 10-3 3.6 x 100 d 9.1 x 10-11.8 x 10-9 3.0 x 10-10 6.8 x 10-7
basis tornado
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
Table 5.15-5. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 95
percent meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk
Accident Frequency (detriments/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workere Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 f 2.7 x 10-4 4.6 x 10-4 1.3 x 10-5 2.5 x 100 d 2.7 x 10-84.6 x 10-8 1.3 x 10-9 2.5 x 10-4
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 3.6 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-1 2.9 x 10-2 3.3 x 101 e 6.8 x 10-12.1 x 10-8 5.5 x 10-9 6.3 x 10-6
basis tornado
a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
f. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
Table 5.15-6. Summary of No Action Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at 50
percent meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk
Accident Frequency (detriments/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workere Population MEI NPAI Worker Population
Dropped dam 1.0 x 10-4 f 6.3 x 10-5d1.4 x 10-4 3.2 x 10-6 9.0 x 10-1 d 6.3 x 10-91.4 x 10-8 3.2 x 10-10 9.0 x 10-5
Beyond design 1.9 x 10-7 6.9 x 10-4 1.4 x 10-2 2.2 x 10-3 5.3 x 100 e 1.3 x 10-12.7 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-10 1.0 x 10-6
basis tornado
a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI).
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
f. The value is expected to be in the 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 range. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
damaging the fuel. There is also a possibility that the dam could somehow be dropped as it is
being lowered into (or raised from) its place between the clean pools and then fall in a way that
would damage the fuel in either pool. The reference design basis fuel handling accident
postulated that during refueling operations, the dam falls and damages all the 62 spent fuel cores,
including the most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission products from all 62
spent fuel cores are assumed to be instantaneously released into the water in the pool. The
analysis assumed that the pool area exhaust system was operational, it carried off all evaporated
fission products, it filtered the stream, and it released the remaining fission products up the stack.
The source term released up the stack is shown in Table 5.15-7. The frequency of occurrence for
this accident is in the range of 1.0 x 10-4 to 1.0 x 10-6 per year (ORNL 1992b).
5.15.3.1.2 Beyond Design Basis Accident-The beyond design basis accident
postulated that a beyond design basis tornado with wind speeds of approximately 300 mph struck
the High Flux Isotope Reactor reactor bay.
The reactor bay roof collapses and the major
structural member in the roof falls into the fuel pool and damages all the 62 spent fuel cores,
including the most recently discharged core, located in the pool. The fission products from all
62 spent fuel cores are assumed to be instantaneously released into the water in the pool. The
analysis assumed that all evaporated fission products are released directly to the environment at
ground level. The source term is similar to the reference design basis accident source term
present in Table 5.15-7 except that no credit was taken for filtration of the iodine evaporated
from the pool. The iodine released in the beyond design basis source term is 100 times greater
than the iodine released in the reference design basis accident source term (Flanagan 1994).
The annual return frequency of a tornado with wind speeds of approximately 300 mph at
ORR is 1.4 x 10-5. The conditional probability for collapse of the reactor bay roof during a
300 mph tornado is 0.46. The ratio of the spent fuel area to the reactor bay floor area (i.e., the
probability that the falling structural member will fall into the spent fuel area of the fuel pool) is
0.03. The frequency of occurrence for this beyond design basis accident is 1.9 x 10-7 per year
(Flanagan 1994).
Due to the dose consequences associated with the postulated accident, protective actions
were assumed for the offsite population. The analysis took no credit for evacuation of the public
from the affected area. However, credit was taken for removing contaminated food from the
general public.
Table 5.15-7. Estimated radionuclide releases for the High Flux
Isotope Reactor fuel pool dam drop accident at ORR.
Release Duration
Isotope
0-2 hr 0-30 day
Curies Curies
Hydrogen-3 3.5 x 102 3.5 x 102
(Tritium)
Krypton-83m 1.9 x 102 1.9 x 102
Krypton-85 1.0 x 104 1.0 x 104
Krypton-85m 3.6 x 103 3.6 x 103
Krypton-87 4.2 x 10-1 4.2 x 10-1
Krypton-88 1.1 x 103 1.1 x 103
Iodine-151 3.8 x 100 1.5 x 101
Iodine-132 5.0 x 100 5.1 x 100
Iodine-133 4.7 x 100 6.2 x 100
Iodine-134 2.2 x 10-7 2.2 x 10-7
Iodine-135 7.4 x 10-1 8.1 x 10-1
Xenon-131m 2.3 x 103 2.3 x 103
Xenon-133 8.7 x 105 8.7 x 105
Xenon-133m 2.5 x 104 2.5 x 104
Xenon-135 1.7 x 105 1.7 x 105
Xenon-135m 1.2 x 103 1.2 x 103
Source: ORNL 1992b
5.15.3.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological
hazards postulated for the Centralization Alternative in subsection 5.15.4.2 are assumed to be
bounding for the No Action Alternative. SNF operations under the No Action Alternative
should not introduce any nonradiological hazards unique to the ORR SNF facilities.
5.15.4 Centralization Alternative
There is a potential for the accidental release of radioactive substances during various
stages of SNF handling operations and storage. The operations at the new SNF management
facilities begin with the receipt of an SNF shipment by truck or rail carrier, followed by the
unloading of the shipping cask from the transport vehicle. If the SNF requires cooling, the cask
is placed into an unloading pool where the SNF is withdrawn from the cask, moved to a
temporary wet storage basin, and placed into a fuel rack. Some SNF that does not require
cooling will be handled in a special cell where it will undergo canning and/or characterization.
SNF that does not have to be cooled and does not require canning and/or characterization will
be loaded into a dry storage canister within a transfer cask and transported to modular above-
grade dry storage. Accidents that may occur during these handling operations and storage at the
existing or new SNF management facilities may involve the release of radioactive material to air
or water pathways. The cause of accidents may be due to internal initiators, such as operator
error, terrorism, and equipment failure, or external initiators, such as an airplane crash into a
facility.
5.15.4.1 Radiological Impacts. The accidents described below have been chosen to
envelop the consequences of potential accidents for the proposed new SNF management facilities
at the ORR. Although other accidents may occur, their estimated consequences are bounded by
the accidents in the envelope or their probability of occurrence is less than 1 x 10-7 per year. If
these accidents were to occur, the dose and risk would be as shown in Tables 5.15-8 and 5.15-9
for 95 percent and 50 percent meteorology respectively. These doses are in addition to the
average natural background radiation exposure of 360 millirem per year. Similarly, cancer
fatalities are shown in Tables 5.15-10 and 5.15-11, and the health effects are shown in Tables
5.15-12 and 5.15-13.
5.15.4.1.1 Fuel Assembly Breach-Physical damage and breach of a fuel assembly
could accidentally occur from dropping, objects falling on the assembly, or cutting into the fuel
Table 5.
15-8. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge
Site at 95 percent meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Dose Risk
Accident Frequency
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/year) (rem/year) (rem/year) (person-rem/year)
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 1.2 x 10-2 3.8 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-3 2.1 x 101 1.9 x 10-3 6.1 x 10-4 2.4 x 10-4 3.4 x 100
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 7.8 x 100 1.2 x 101 4.7 x 100 1.9 x 104 7.8 x 10-4 1.2 x 10-3 4.7 x 10-4 1.9 x 100
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 5.6 x 101 8.8 x 100 3.4 x 100 1.0 x 105 5.6 x 10-5 8.8 x 10-6 3.4 x 10-6 1.0 x 10-1
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-2 2.9 x 10-2 1.2 x 10-2 5.2 x 101 2.2 x 10-7 2.9 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-7 5.2 x 10-4
missile impact
into dry
storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 9.0 x 100 3.4 x 101 1.2 x 101 1.7 x 104 9.0 x 10-6 3.4 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-5 1.7 x 10-2
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 7.6 x 101 5.8 x 101 2.3 x 101 1.2 x 105 7.6 x 10-5 5.8 x 10-5 2.3 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-1
into dry cell
facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.4 x 10-1 5.9 x 10-2 2.3 x 10-2 5.6 x 103 1.4 x 10-7 5.9 x 10-8 2.3 x 10-8 5.6 x 10-3
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-9. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis dose and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at
50 percent meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Dose Risk
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
(rem) (rem) (rem) (person-rem) (rem/year) (rem/year) (rem/year) (person-
rem/year)
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 1.2 x 10-3 6.7 x 10-4 3.2 x 10-4 2.5 x 100 1.9 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-4 5.1 x 10-5 4.0 x 10-1
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 7.5 x 10-1 2.2 x 100 1.0 x 100 2.7 x 103 7.5 x 10-5 2.2 x 10-4 1.0 x 10-4 2.7 x 10-1
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 5.5 x 100 1.6 x 100 7.5 x 10-1 1.2 x 104 5.5 x 10-6 1.6 x 10-6 7.5 x 10-7 1.2 x 10-2
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-3 5.5 x 10-3 2.5 x 10-3 7.7 x 100 2.1 x 10-8 5.5 x 10-8 2.5 x 10-8 7.7 x 10-5
missile impact into
dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 8.9 x 10-1 6.2 x 100 2.7 x 100 2.5 x 103 8.9 x 10-7 6.2 x 10-6 2.7 x 10-6 2.5 x 10-3
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 7.2 x 100 1.1 x 101 5.1 x 100 1.5 x 104 7.2 x 10-6 1.1 x 10-5 5.1 x 10-6 1.5 x 10-2
into dry cell
facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 1.3 x 10-2 1.1 x 10-2 5.0 x 10-3 5.2 x 102 1.3 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-8 5.0 x 10-9 5.2 x 10-4
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Dose received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Dose received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-10. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak
Ridge Site at 95 percent meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk (cancer fatalities/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 6.0 x 10-6 1.9 x 10-6 6.0 x 10-7 2.1 x 10-2 9.6 x 10-7 3.0 x 10-7 9.6 x 10-8 3.4 x 10-3
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 3.9 x 10-3 6.0 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-3 1.9 x 101 3.9 x 10-7 6.0 x 10-7 1.9 x 10-7 1.9 x 10-3
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 5.6 x 10-2 4.4 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-3 1.0 x 102 5.6 x 10-8 4.4 x 10-9 1.4 x 10-9 1.0 x 10-4
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 1.1 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-5 4.9 x 10-6 5.2 x 10-2 1.1 x 10-101.5 x 10-10 4.9 x 10-11 5.2 x 10-7
missile impact into
dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 4.5 x 10-3 3.4 x 10-2 4.8 x 10-3 1.7 x 101 4.5 x 10-9 3.4 x 10-8 4.8 x 10-9 1.7 x 10-5
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 7.6 x 10-2 5.8 x 10-2 1.8 x 10-2 1.2 x 102 7.6 x 10-8 5.8 x 10-8 1.8 x 10-8 1.2 x 10-4
into dry cell facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 6.9 x 10-5 3.0 x 10-5 9.2 x 10-6 5.6 x 100 6.9 x 10-113.0 x 10-11 9.2 x 10-12 5.6 x 10-6
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-11. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis cancer fatality and risk estimates for the Oak
Ridge Site at 50 percent meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Cancer fatalities Cancer fatality risk (cancer fatalities/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIa NPAIb Workerc Populationd MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 e 6.0 x 10-7 3.4 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-3 9.6 x 10-8 5.4 x 10-8 2.1 x 10-8 2.1 x 10-4
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 f 3.7 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-3 4.0 x 10-4 2.7 x 100 3.7 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-7 4.0 x 10-8 2.7 x 10-4
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 g 2.8 x 10-3 8.1 x 10-4 3.0 x 10-4 1.2 x 101 2.8 x 10-9 8.1 x 10-10 3.0 x 10-10 1.2 x 10-5
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 1.0 x 10-6 2.7 x 10-6 1.0 x 10-6 3.8 x 10-3 1.0 x 10-112.7 x 10-11 1.0 x 10-11 3.8 x 10-8
missile impact into
dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 4.4 x 10-4 3.1 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-3 2.5 x 100 4.4 x 10-103.1 x 10-9 1.1 x 10-9 2.5 x 10-6
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 3.6 x 10-3 5.5 x 10-3 2.0 x 10-3 1.5 x 101 3.6 x 10-9 5.5 x 10-9 2.0 x 10-9 1.5 x 10-5
into dry cell facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 g 6.4 x 10-6 5.5 x 10-6 2.0 x 10-6 5.5 x 10-1 6.4 x 10-125.5 x 10-12 2.0 x 10-12 5.5 x 10-7
into water pool
a. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
b. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
c. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
e. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
f. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-12. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge
Site at 95 percent meteorology.
95 percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk (detriments/year)
Scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workerd Populatione MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 f 8.8 x 10-6 2.8 x 10-6 8.4 x 10-7 3.1 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-6 4.5 x 10-7 1.3 x 10-7 5.0 x 10-3
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 g 5.7 x 10-3 8.8 x 10-3 2.6 x 10-3 2.7 x 101 5.7 x 10-7 8.8 x 10-7 2.6 x 10-7 2.7 x 10-3
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 h 8.2 x 10-2 6.4 x 10-3 1.9 x 10-3 1.5 x 102 8.2 x 10-8 6.4 x 10-9 1.9 x 10-9 1.5 x 10-4
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 1.6 x 10-5 2.1 x 10-5 6.8 x 10-6 7.5 x 10-2 1.6 x 10-102.1 x 10-10 6.8 x 10-11 7.5 x 10-7
missile impact into
dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 6.6 x 10-3 5.0 x 10-2 6.7 x 10-3 2.4 x 101 6.6 x 10-9 5.0 x 10-8 6.7 x 10-9 2.4 x 10-5
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 1.1 x 10-1 8.5 x 10-2 2.6 x 10-2 1.8 x 102 1.1 x 10-7 8.5 x 10-8 2.6 x 10-8 1.8 x 10-4
into dry cell facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 1.0 x 10-4 4.3 x 10-5 1.3 x 10-5 8.2 x 100 1.0 x 10-104.3 x 10-11 1.3 x 10-11 8.2 x 10-6
into water pool
a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
f. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
h. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
Table 5.15-13. Summary of the Centralization Alternative accident analysis health effects and risk estimates for the Oak Ridge Site at
50 percent meteorology.
50 percent meteorology
Accident Frequency Total health detrimentsa Total health detriment risk (detriments/year)
scenario (per year)
MEIb NPAIc Workerd Populatione MEI NPAI Worker Population
Fuel assembly 1.6 x 10-1 f 8.8 x 10-7 4.9 x 10-7 1.8 x 10-7 1.8 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-7 7.8 x 10-8 2.9 x 10-8 2.9 x 10-4
breach
Dropped fuel 1.0 x 10-4 g 5.5 x 10-4 1.6 x 10-3 5.6 x 10-4 4.0 x 100 5.5 x 10-8 1.6 x 10-7 5.6 x 10-8 4.0 x 10-4
cask
Severe impact 1.0 x 10-6 h 4.0 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-3 4.2 x 10-4 1.8 x 101 4.0 x 10-9 1.2 x 10-9 4.2 x 10-10 1.8 x 10-5
and fire
Wind-driven 1.0 x 10-5 1.5 x 10-6 4.0 x 10-6 1.4 x 10-6 5.6 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-11 4.0 x 10-11 1.4 x 10-11 5.6 x 10-8
missile impact into
dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 6.5 x 10-4 4.5 x 10-3 1.5 x 10-3 3.6 x 100 6.5 x 10-10 4.5 x 10-9 1.5 x 10-9 3.6 x 10-6
into dry storage
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 5.2 x 10-3 8.0 x 10-3 2.9 x 10-3 2.2 x 101 5.2 x 10-9 8.0 x 10-9 2.9 x 10-9 2.2 x 10-5
into dry cell facility
Airplane crash 1.0 x 10-6 h 9.3 x 10-6 8.0 x 10-6 2.8 x 10-6 8.0 x 10-1 9.3 x 10-12 8.0 x 10-12 2.8 x 10-12 8.0 x 10-7
into water pool
a. The estimated number of cancer fatalities, cancer nonfatalities, and genetic defects resulting from the radiation exposure.
b. Maximum exposed individual (MEI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
c. Nearest public access individual (NPAI). Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
d. Radiation exposure received from inhalation and external pathways.
e. Radiation exposure recieved from inhalation, external, and ingestion pathways.
f. The value is <1.6 x 10-1. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.6 x 10-1.
g. The value is <1.0 x 10-4. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-4.
h. The value is <1.0 x 10-6. For calculational purposes, the value is assumed to be 1.0 x 10-6.
part of an assembly. The fuel cutting accident that has been postulated to occur at Savannah
River Site facilities is chosen as representative of the fuel assembly breach accident
(E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 1983). During normal operations at the Savannah River Site,
the inert, non-uranium-containing extremities of some spent nuclear fuel elements are cutoff in
the repackaging basin before the bundling of the elements. The accident occurs when the actual
uranium fuel is inadvertently cut, causing a radioactive release. The source term for this accident
is shown in Table 5.15-14. The estimated frequency of occurrence for this accident is 1.6 x 10-1
per year based on the Savannah River Site's operating experience with SNF. However, because
of anticipated differences in operations and facilities at the ORR, the actual frequency is
expected to be much less than 1.6 x 10-1 per year.
5.15.4.1.2 Dropped Fuel Cask-The dropped fuel cask accident that has been
postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen as
representative of the dropped fuel cask/fuel handling accident for the new Centralization
Alternative facility at the ORR.
This accident is initiated when a fuel cask is dropped and
overturned in the fuel transfer area and broken fuel elements spill out of the cask, within the
pool building but away from the pool. It is assumed that the shipping cask ruptures, exposing all
of the broken fuel elements in three canisters--42 fuel elements, each containing 22.5 kilograms
(50 pounds) of fuel. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-15. The
probability of this accident is estimated to be less than 1 x 10-4 per year.
5.15.4.1.3 Severe Impact and Fire-The severe impact and fire accident that has
been postulated to occur at the Hanford Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix A) is chosen as
representative of the severe impact and fire/onsite transportation accident for the new
Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.
This accident assumes an unspecified initiating
event that subjects the fuel assemblies to a severe impact, breach of the transport cask, and a
fire. During the accident, the fuel pins rupture on impact or upon heating in the fire, which
burns for an hour before being extinguished. Volatiles, particulates, and noble gases are released
to the atmosphere. The source term for a release of 540 curies is shown in Table 5.15-16. The
estimated probability of occurrence for this accident, reflecting the fact that the facilities at this
site would be new, is less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.4 Wind-driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks-The wind-driven
missile impact into storage casks accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site
Table 5.
15-14. Estimated radionuclide releases for a fuel
assembly breach accident at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Iodine-131 7.1 x 10-2
Iodine-133 1.4 x 10-30
Krypton-85 1.8 x 102
Xenon-133m 1.1 x 10-8
Xenon-133 1.1 x 100
a. Source: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1983).
Table 5.15-15. Estimated radionuclide releases for a dropped fuel cask accident at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Onsite Offsite
(2 hours) (8 hours)
Plutonium-236 1.3 x 10-8 5.4 x 10-8
Plutonium-238 2.9 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-2
Plutonium-239 6.7 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-2
Plutonium-240 3.5 x 10-3 1.4 x 10-2
Plutonium-241 2.7 x 10-1 1.1 x 100
Plutonium-242 1.3 x 10-6 5.1 x 10-6
Americium-241 5.7 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-2
Curium-244 2.8 x 10-4 1.1 x 10-3
Europium-154 5.4 x 10-3 2.1 x 10-2
Cesium-134 7.9 x 10-3 3.2 x 10-2
Cesium-137 4.5 x 10-1 1.8 x 100
Cerium-144 1.7 x 10-3 6.8 x 10-3
Praseodymium-144 1.7 x 10-3 6.8 x 10-3
Praseodymium-144M 2.0 x 10-5 8.1 x 10-5
Promethium-147 1.2 x 10-1 4.9 x 10-1
Antimony-125 7.3 x 10-3 2.9 x 10-2
Tellurium-125M 1.8 x 10-3 7.3 x 10-3
Ruthenium-106 3.2 x 10-3 1.3 x 10-2
Strontium-90 3.5 x 10-1 1.4 x 100
Yttrium-90 3.5 x 10-1 1.4 x 100
a. Source: Appendix A, Table A-1.
Table 5.15-16. Estimated radionuclide releases for a
severe impact and fire accident at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium) 4.6 x 101
Krypton-85 4.0 x 102
Strontium-90 2.7 x 10-2
Ruthenium-106 1.3 x 100
Cesium-134 1.7 x 101
Cesium-137 8.0 x 101
Plutonium-238 8.9 x 10-4
Plutonium-239 1.6 x 10-3
Plutonium-240 1.8 x 10-3
Plutonium-241 7.3 x 10-2
Americium-241 1.0 x 10-3
a. Source: Appendix A, Table A-14.
(reference Volume 1, Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the wind-driven missile
accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR. This accident is initiated by
natural phenomena: a major wind storm or tornado in excess of the facility design basis. In this
scenario, a large object is propelled by the wind into a storage container, causing the container
seal to be breached. No fuel damage would result from the impact because of the strength of
the containers used. The source term is based on the spent nuclear fuel corrosion film. One
percent of the original corrosion film on the fuel would be released from the cask into the
atmosphere. The source term is shown in Table 5.15-17. The probability of this event is
estimated to be less than 1 x 10-5 per year based on a design basis tornado probability of 1 x 10-3
per year and a missile impact with damage probability of less than 1 x 10-2.
5.15.4.1.5 Airplane Crash Into Dry Storage-The airplane crash into dry storage
accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Volume 1, Appendix D)
is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the dry storage area accident for the new
Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.
This accident is externally initiated by an airplane
crash into the SNF dry storage facility. The accident is postulated to cause damage to a single
storage cask. Due to the severity of the impact, the cask seal is assumed to be breached,
resulting in damage to the fuel and the release of corrosion products, located on the SNF
exteriors, to the environment. The impact also causes a fire and a release of fission products. It
is assumed that 1 percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged either by the
impact or by the fire and that those fission products are available for release. Of the available
fission products, 100 percent of the noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent of the
cesium, and 0.1 percent of the remaining solids are released to the environment. Also,
10 percent of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from the cask to
the atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-18. The probability of
this accident, based on analyses of other facilities at the site (Flanagan 1994), is small and
assumed to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.6 Airplane Crash into Dry Cell Facility-The airplane crash into the dry
cell facility accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Volume 1,
Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the canning and
characterization cell accident for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.
This
accident is initiated by an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. The accident was postulated to
cause significant damage to the building, resulting in the loss of containment and filtered exhaust
Table 5.15-17. Estimated radionuclide releases for a wind-driven
missile impact into a storage cask at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Cobalt-60 9.6 x 10-2
Iron-55 1.8 x 10-1
Cobalt-58 3.5 x 10-2
Manganese-54 6.0 x 10-3
Iron-59 5.1 x 10-4
a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.2.1, Appendix D to Volume 1.
Table 5.15-18. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash
into dry storage facility at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Cesium-134 2.6 x 101
Cesium-137 3.6 x 101
Plutonium-238 5.9 x 10-2
Barium-137m 3.1 x 100
Strontium-90 3.1 x 100
Cerium-144 7.2 x 100
Niobium-95 4.4 x 100
Yttrium-90 3.1 x 100
Ruthenium-106 6.1 x 10-1
a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.2.2, Appendix D to Volume 1.
systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell could also be damaged due to mechanical impacts and
potential fire. The mechanical impact also could result in the release of corrosion products to
the environment. For this accident scenario, 1 percent of the fuel units stored inside of the dry
cell are assumed to be damaged by either the impact or resultant fire and those fission products
would be available for release. Of the fission products available for release, 100 percent of the
noble gases, 3 percent of the halogens, 1.1 percent of the cesium, and 0.1 percent of the
remaining solids could be released to the environment. Ten percent of the available corrosion
products could be released to the environment. The source term for this accident is shown in
Table 5.15-19. The probability of this accident is estimated to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.7 Airplane Crash into Water Pool-The airplane crash into the SNF water
pool accident that has been postulated to occur at the Naval Site (reference Volume 1,
Appendix D) is chosen as representative of the airplane crash into the SNF water pool accident
for the new Centralization Alternative facility at the ORR.
This externally initiated accident
occurs when an airplane crashes into an SNF water pool and damages the fuel units stored there.
Fission products and corrosion products are released from the fuel units into the water pool but
the pool water is not released to the environment. The presence of the pool water results in a
release only of gaseous fission products into the atmosphere. In this accident scenario, 1 percent
of all the fuel units stored inside the pool were postulated to be damaged and those fission
products are available for release. Of the available fission products, 100 percent of the noble
gases and 25 percent of the halogens are released to the pool water. Due to the presence of
pool water, there is a reduction of the halogen release by a factor of 10 prior to release into the
atmosphere. The source term for this accident is shown in Table 5.15-20. The probability of this
accident is estimated to be less than 1 x 10-6 per year.
5.15.4.1.8 Integration of Existing Facilities- Existing SNF management facilities
will be integrated into the Centralization, Regionalization, and Planning Basis Alternative SNF
storage functions until the existing ORR operating reactors are shutdown.
The accident
consequences postulated for the No Action Alternative in subsection 5.15.3 can occur as long as
the High Flux Isotope Reactor is operational. After the High Flux Isotope Reactor is no longer
operational, the accident consequence will decrease as the spent reactor cores, stored in the pool,
age. The reference design basis accident frequency of occurrence and risk will be reduced
because refueling operations have ceased and requirements for movement of the dam are
reduced. Since the beyond design accident is initiated by natural phenomenon (i.e., tornado), the
Table 5.15-19. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into dry cell facility at
ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Cesium-134 4.5 x 101
Cesium-137 6.2 x 101
Plutonium-238 1.0 x 10-1
Barium-137m 5.4 x 100
Strontium-90 5.5 x 100
Cerium-144 1.3 x 101
Niobium-95 7.7 x 100
Yttrium-90 5.5 x 100
Ruthenium-106 1.1 x 100
a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.3.3, Appendix D to Volume 1.
Table 5.15-20. Estimated radionuclide releases for an airplane crash into an SNF water pool
at ORR.
Radionuclide Release (Ci)
Iodine-129 7.6 x 10-4
Iodine-131 1.6 x 10-2
Hydrogen-3 (Tritium) 4.3 x 102
a. Source: See Section F.1.4.2.1.4, Appendix D to Volume 1.
beyond design basis accident frequency of occurrence will remain the same as long as spent High
Flux Isotope Reactor cores remain in the spent fuel pool area.
5.15.4.2 Nonradiological Hazards. The two bounding accidents involving nonradiological
hazards are a chemical spill and fire and a diesel fuel fire. Both of these accidents are associated
with the Expended Core Facility operations and the accident frequencies and impacts are
addressed in Volume 1, Appendix D. The analyses of these accidents considered the impacts to
workers on the site as well as to the offsite population. The impacts were measured in terms of
potential health effects due to exposure to toxic chemicals released during these accidents. Since
the Expended Core Facility at this site will be a new design and construction, it will incorporate
all applicable standards and regulations and therefore limit the potential exposures to the
workers and the public in the event of an accident.
5.15.4.3 Secondary Impacts. In the event of an accidental release of radioactive
substances, there is a potential for secondary impacts to cultural resources, endangered species,
water resources, public and agricultural land use, the ecology in the vicinity of the accident,
national defense, and local economics. Figure 5.15-1 illustrates the radiological impacts to the
environment in the event of a severe accident at a new SNF management facility and the release
of radioactive material with 50 percent meteorology. The accident chosen for this purpose is an
airplane crash into the Centralization Alternative canning and characterization (dry) cell.
Figure 5.15-1 shows several isodose lines ranging from 870 millirem per year down to 87 millirem
per year. The solid line represents the site boundary, and it can be seen from the figure that
some doses exceeding background would exist outside the site boundary.
Table 5.15-21 presents a summary of the postulated severe accident secondary impacts on
the environment, economy, and national defense. The evaluation was performed using
50 percent meteorology.
5.15.5 Decentralization Alternative
The Decentralization Alternative is not applicable for the ORR.
Figure 5.15-1. Isodose lines for an airplane crash into dry cell accident with 50 percent meteorlogy at Oak Ridge Reservation.
Table 5.15-21. Secondary impacts of Centralization Alternative accidents at the
ORR.
Environmental or Impact
social factor
Land use Yes. Major portions of the ORR, including the ORNL and
K-25 areas, will be contaminated. Offsite contamination will
occur. Industrial, residential, forest, and agricultural areas will
be contaminated.
Cultural Yes. Archaeological sites, cemeteries, and historic sites will be
resources contaminated.
Aesthetic and Possible impact. Scenic public viewing areas are within 2 miles
scenic of the ORR border.
resources
Water resources Yes. The Clinch River will be contaminated. It is used for
industrial and public water supplies, navigation, fishing, boating,
and swimming.
Ecological Possible impact. Many endangered or threatened plants and
resources animals are potentially on or near the ORR.
Treaty rights No impact. There are no ORR areas subject to Native
American Treaty rights.
National Possible impact. With the 50 percent meteorology, the area of
defense contamination does not envelop U.S. military facilities or the Y-
12 area. However, with the 95 percent meteorology, the Y-12
area will be contaminated.
Economic Yes. Offsite contamination will occur. Industrial, residential,
impacts forrest, and agricultural areas will be contaminated. Major
portions of the ORR will be contaminated. The accident
consequences may require the evacuation and cleanup of onsite
facilities, including but not limited to the ORNL and K-25 areas,
and adjacent residential, industrial, forest, and agricultural areas.
The Clinch River will be contaminated. The associated
industrial and residential water supplies will be contaminated.
The commercial and recreational fishing industries may be
impacted.
5.15.6 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
The facility accident consequences and risks for the ORR No Action Alternative envelop
the facility accident consequences and risks for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative.
5.15.7 Regionalization Alternative
Under the Regionalization Alternative, new facilities will be constructed and operated for
SNF. Details for the new facilities needed have not been defined, but it is reasonable to expect
that they will be similar to but with less storage requirements than those needed for the
Centralization Alternative. Due to smaller throughput and storage requirements, the potential
for accidents (i.e., probability of occurrence) will be similar to but less than those described for
the Centralization Alternative. The accident consequences will be similar for both alternatives.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the accident consequences and risks described for
the Centralization Alternative envelop the Regionalization Alternative.
5.15.8 Emergency Preparedness and Plans
The DOE has issued a series of Orders specifying the requirements for emergency
preparedness (DOE 5500.1A, DOE 5500.2A, DOE 5500.3, draft DOE 5500.3A, DOE 5500.4, and
DOE 5500.9), and each DOE site has established an emergency management program. These
programs are developed and maintained to ensure adequate response for most accident
conditions and to provide the framework to readily extend response efforts for accidents not
specifically considered. The emergency management program incorporates activities associated
with planning, preparedness, and response.
Officials at each DOE site have specified the emergency preparedness requirements for the
DOE facilities under their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the relevant DOE Orders. All
existing facilities have emergency plans and procedures that either implement the DOE and site
requirements or are integrated with the site planning.
DOE-Oak Ridge Operations has overall responsibility at the plant and laboratory sites for
emergency response. However, primary authority for event response has been delegated to
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., DOE's operating contractor. Although their primary
responsibility is onsite, they have agreed to provide offsite assistance if requested under the terms
of existing mutual aid agreements or Martin Marietta policies. If a hazardous materials event
occurs at a DOE-Oak Ridge Operations facility, the Governor of Tennessee is responsible for the
State's response efforts. The Governor's Executive Order No. 4 establishes the Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency as the agency given responsibility for coordinating state
emergency services. If a hazardous materials accident at DOE-Oak Ridge Operations facilities is
beyond the capability of the local government, and assistance is requested, the Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency Director may direct that assistance from state agencies be
provided to local governments. To accomplish this task and ensure prompt initiation of
emergency response actions, the Director may cause the State Emergency Operations Center and
Field Coordination Center as well as any local Emergency Operations Center to be activated.
5.16 Cumulative Impacts and Impacts From Connected
or Similar Actions
The ORR already contains several major DOE and non-DOE facilities, unrelated to SNF,
that would continue to operate throughout the operating life of the proposed SNF management
facilities. A number of offsite industrial and research facilities in surrounding areas would also
continue to operate throughout this period. The activities associated with these existing facilities
produce environmental consequences that have been included in the baseline environmental
conditions (Chapter 4) against which Sections 5.1 through 5.15 have assessed the environmental
consequences of the Centralization and Regionalization alternatives. This section uses the
environmental baseline conditions presented in Chapter 4 to assess potential cumulative impacts
from the proposed SNF management facilities, if constructed at the ORR, plus other reasonably
foreseeable activities planned by government agencies or private concerns for areas on or near
the ORR.
In addition to the proposed SNF management facilities, reasonably foreseeable activities
considered in this cumulative impact assessment include the proposed Expended Core Facility,
proposed hazardous waste remediation activities on the ORR, and activities proposed in the
present Five-Year Plan for the ORR. Major programmatic initiatives planned for the ORR in
the Five-Year Plan (MMES 1994a) consist of constructing the following: the proposed Advanced
Neutron Source Facility; the proposed Uranium-Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Facility;
facilities proposed for construction as a part of Complex-21; proposed low-level waste disposal
facilities; the proposed Mixed Waste Treatment Facility; the proposed Environmental, Life, and
Social Sciences Complex; the proposed Materials, Science, and Engineering Complex; and the
proposed Solid Waste Storage Area-7. Several minor construction projects such as the
refurbishment or expansion of existing facilities, widening of roadways, and installation of utilities
are also included in the Five-Year Plan.
The ORR is part of the City of Oak Ridge, which also includes an urban area to the north
of the ORR and several industrial areas in various locations around the perimeter of the ORR.
Additional construction and expanded operational activities is anticipated in these industrial
areas. For example, the Scientific Ecology Group, a private business in the Bear Creek Industrial
Park on Bear Creek Road west of the ORR, is considering expanding its operations and is
presently constructing a second radioactive waste incinerator. The City of Oak Ridge
Comprehensive Plan encourages further development of several presently undeveloped lots in
several industrial parks (City of Oak Ridge 1989). The Comprehensive Plan also anticipates
additional residential and commercial development in the City. The City of Oak Ridge is
presently proposing construction of a golf course and residential development on approximately
700 acres (2.8 square kilometers) east of the ORR.
The following cumulative impacts analysis considers in detail the potential incremental
effects from the proposed SNF management facilities; the proposed Expended Core Facility; and
the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility. Adequate information is not available to
consider in detail the other proposed Five-Year Plan activities or the proposed activities for areas
in the City of Oak Ridge outside of the ORR. The potential incremental impacts from these
activities are therefore assessed in a more qualitative manner.
5.16.1 Centralization Alternative
Separate analyses of potential cumulative impacts from the Centralization Alternative to
each of the environmental resources addressed in Chapter 5 are provided below.
5.16.1.1 Land Use. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would
require the dedication of 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of undeveloped land on Bear Creek
Road in the western part of the ORR. Construction of the proposed Expended Core Facility
would require the dedication of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer) of undeveloped
land on the ORR. Construction of the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities would
require the dedication of an additional 75 to 115 acres (0.30 to 0.46 square kilometer) of land on
the ORR (MMES 1992c). The cumulative land area dedicated to these three projects would
total as much as 235 acres (0.95 square kilometer), which represents only about 1 percent of the
roughly 20,600 acres (83 square kilometers) of undeveloped land remaining on the 34,667-acre
(140 square kilometer) ORR. Additional unspecified areas of undeveloped land, generally
parcels of under 100 acres (0.40 square kilometer), would have to be dedicated to some of the
activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan. Many of these proposed activities do not require the
dedication of undeveloped land. Additional undeveloped land on the ORR might have to be
dedicated to the other planned activities, but their land requirements have not yet been
quantified.
Although large areas of undeveloped land remain both on the ORR and in the City of Oak
Ridge, much of this land is steep or otherwise has constraints that limit its future development
potential. The City of Oak Ridge indicates in its Comprehensive Plan that it seeks to have
additional ORR land declared excess by the DOE and made available for urban expansion by the
City (City of Oak Ridge 1989). Demand for buildable land on the ORR by the City of Oak
Ridge represents another cumulative demand for ORR land. The site of the proposed
residential development and golf course east of the ORR is land recently sold by the DOE to the
City of Oak Ridge since adoption of the Comprehensive Plan.
5.16.1.2 Occupational and Public Health. The annual collective effective dose
equivalent from the existing ORR facilities to the population within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of
the ORR is 52 person-rem (MMES 1994a). Added to this baseline, operation of the proposed
SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 5 person-rem, and operation of the
proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities might contribute an additional 4.3 person-rem
(MMES 1992c), resulting in a cumulative effective dose of 61 person-rem to the population
within 50 miles of the ORR.
The annual collective effective dose equivalent from the existing ORR facilities to a
potential maximally exposed individual at the site boundary is 3.3 millirem per year. Operation
of the proposed SNF management facilities might contribute an additional 6.2 millirem per year,
resulting in a cumulative annual dose of 9.5 millirem per year to this maximally exposed
individual.
The total annual baseline worker dose seen from normal ORR operations is about 48
person-rem. The total annual SNF management facility worker dose is expected to be roughly 32
person-rem. Hence, the cumulative annual dose might be 80 person-rem.
Over the planned 40-year operational lifetime of the SNF management facility, a total
population dose of roughly 2,500 person-rem will be observed from continuous operation of the
existing ORR facilities and the SNF management facility. This equates to a total health
detriment (the summated risk of fatal cancer, nonfatal cancer, and genetic effects) of 1.8 over the
40-year span. For the maximally exposed individual, a total dose of 380 millirem will be observed
over the 40-year period, which equates to a total detriment of 2.8 x 10-4. For the SNF
management worker, a total dose of 3,200 person-rem will be observed over the 40-year span;
this corresponds to a total health detriment of 1.8.
Additional radiological impacts are not expected from operation of the proposed Expended
Core Facility. Analysis has shown that the dose to all individuals considered (workers and offsite
individuals) from Oak Ridge Expended Core Facility operations might be much less than
1 millirem per year.
5.16.1.3 Noise. Cumulative increases in noise levels from the proposed SNF
management facilities, the proposed Expended Core Facility, and the proposed Advanced
Neutron Source facilities would be limited to temporary, minor construction noise and small
increases in traffic noise occurring along various access routes to the ORR due to increases in
employment. This increase is not expected to result in any increased annoyance to the public.
Noise levels from other planned activities have not yet been determined. Each would, at a
minimum, involve temporary periods of construction noise, but information on operational noise
is not available.
5.16.1.4 Groundwater and Surface Water Resources. Operation of the proposed SNF
management facilities would require the withdrawal of an estimated 4 million gallons per year
(15 million liters per year) of groundwater. Operation of the proposed Expended Core Facility
would require the withdrawal of an estimated additional 2 million gallons per year (8 million
liters per year). Although the specific water demands of the proposed Advanced Neutron Source
facility and other proposed activities are not known, the combined water demands would likely
represent a small percentage of the total average discharge of the Clinch River, as measured at
Melton Hill Dam, of 5,300 cubic feet per second (150 cubic meters per second).
Discharges of wastewater from the SNF management facilities would increase the flow of
Grassy Creek by an estimated average of less than 1 percent. Discharge points would be
selected in accordance with permit requirements to minimize impacts to surface water resources.
The sanitary wastewater and cooling water from the Advanced Neutron Source facility would be
discharged to separate streams and therefore would not contribute to cumulative impacts to
Grassy Creek. Discharges from other planned facilities have not yet been designed. There are
no expected cumulative impacts to groundwater quality and quantity.
5.16.1.5 Biotic Resources. Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities
would require the disturbance of approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of mostly
forested terrestrial habitat, construction of the proposed Expended Core Facility would require
the disturbance of an additional 30 acres (0.12 square kilometer), and construction of the
proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities would require the disturbance of an additional
75 to 115 acres (0.30 to 0.46 square kilometer). This would result in a combined conversion of as
much as 235 acres (0.94 square kilometer) of forested habitat to developed uses. Additional
areas of forested habitat on the ORR would be lost during construction of activities proposed in
the Five-Year Plan. Additionally, losses of similar forested habitat off of the ORR are
anticipated due to future construction in the City of Oak Ridge. For example, construction of
the proposed golf course and residential development east of the ORR by the City of Oak Ridge
would result in the conversion of several hundred acres of forested habitat to structures and
lawns.
The total losses would represent only a small percentage of the total forested area on the
ORR and in the surrounding vicinity. However, the several scattered areas of habitat disturbance
planned for the ORR, including that associated with the SNF management facilities, would
increase fragmentation of the relatively contiguous forest cover over much of the ORR. This
fragmentation could affect the suitability of the forested habitat on the ORR for several species.
5.16.1.6 Air Resources. The potential cumulative air emissions from the proposed SNF
management facility, Expended Core Facility, and Advanced Neutron Source facilities would not
result in an exceedance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Tennessee state
criteria. Also, there would be no exceedance of Federal National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants or DOE radiological standards. Air emission data for the other
planned activities (Five-Year Plan or offsite) are not available.
5.16.1.7 Socioeconomics. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities might
generate up to 800 new jobs during the year 2005. Operation of the proposed Expended Core
Facility might generate up to 562 additional jobs during that year, resulting in a combined
increase of up to 1,362 new jobs. The 16,980 jobs presently forecasted for the ORR in the year
2005 would be increased by 8 percent, to as much as 18,342 jobs. The 360,000 jobs presently
forecasted for the surrounding area in the year 2005 might be increased by less than 1 percent, to
as much as 361,352 jobs. Additional employment increases could also result from the proposed
Advanced Neutron Source facility project, activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan, and new
offsite activities, but specific estimates are not available.
The proposed SNF management facilities could cause cumulative growth-inducing effects
when coupled with the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facilities or with other planned
activities on the ORR. Previous actions at the ORR have had a modest effect on long-term
growth and productivity in Knox County and Loudon County, but they did not have a greater
effect on long-term growth and productivity in Anderson County and Roane County.
5.16.1.8 Transportation. For transportation, minor levels of service changes might occur
due to employment increases associated with the proposed SNF management facilities, the
proposed Expended Core Facility, the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility, some of the
proposed onsite activities in the Five-Year Plan, and some of the proposed offsite activities.
Maps included in the Five-Year Plan show several road improvements on the ORR to
accommodate presently projected regional traffic increases.
5.16.1.9 Waste Management. Operation of the proposed SNF management facilities
would generate an estimated 203 cubic meters per year of low-level waste and an estimated 16
cubic meters per year of transuranic waste. Operation of the proposed Expended Core Facility
would generate an additional 425 cubic meters of low-level waste (for a combined total by both
facilities of 628 cubic meters) but would not generate any additional transuranic waste. No other
radioactive waste, including high-level waste or mixed waste, would be generated by either
facility. Although it is known that the proposed Advanced Neutron Source facility would
generate low-level waste, comparable quantitative data are not available for it or for offsite
activities, or for activities proposed in the Five-Year Plan. All wastes generated by the proposed
SNF management facilities and other planned activities on the ORR would be treated and
disposed of in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulations.
5.16.1.10 Other Resources. The absence of impacts, or the potential for very minimal
impacts, from the proposed SNF management facilities to cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic
resources, utilities, and geologic resources ensures that their potential contribution to cumulative
impacts affecting these resources would be negligible. No further analysis is necessary.
5.16.2 Regionalization Alternative
The Regionalization Alternative would have similar or fewer cumulative impacts than the
Centralization Alternative. Generally, the alternative requires less construction and smaller scale
operations, and the potential for cumulative impacts is therefore less.
5.17. Adverse Environmental Effects That Cannot Be Avoided
5.17.1 Overview
This section discusses potentially unavoidable adverse impacts to the environment resulting
from construction and operation of the proposed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management facilities
at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) under the Centralization and Regionalization Alternatives.
Unavoidable adverse impacts are impacts that cannot be mitigated by changes in project design,
operation, construction, or by other measures.
5.17.2 Centralization Alternative
Operation of the proposed SNF facilities at the ORR under the Centralization Alternative
would increase the radiation dose rate to the maximally exposed individual by 6.2 millirem per
year, resulting in a 34 percent increase in cancer risk to this individual from ORR operations.
These cancer risks still would be minimal. The number of fatal cancers resulting from 1 year of
operations on the ORR from all sources (including baseline and the SNF facilities) would be
3.0 x 10-2, the number of nonfatal cancers per year would be 5.9 x 10-3, and the number of genetic
effects per year would be 7.7 x 10-3.
Construction of the proposed SNF management facilities would require the disturbance of
approximately 90 acres (0.36 square kilometer) of mostly forested undeveloped land and the
long-term dedication of approximately 85 acres (0.34 square kilometer) of land. Although this
represents less than 1 percent of the undeveloped land on ORR, it would eliminate potential
foraging and nesting habitat and would destroy plant species in the area. It would also require
the dedication of a reasonably level land parcel that could have otherwise accommodated other
construction projects.
The potential impacts from the Centralization Alternative to the other environmental
resources discussed in Chapter 5 are not unavoidable adverse impacts.
5.17.3 Regionalization Alternative
Potential unavoidable adverse impacts associated with the Regionalization Alternative would
resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. The extent of the impacts
could be less due to the reduced land requirements, reduced extent of construction disturbance,
and reduced scale of operations.
5.18 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment and
the Maintenance of Long-Term Productivity
Implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse
impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. These resources include
use of the environment and those associated with construction and operation of the SNF
management facilities.
The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of
resources including energy, construction materials, and labor in order to achieve the objective of
safety managing SNF to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.
The premature shutdown of research reactors due to a lack of sufficient SNF interim
storage space under the No Action Alternative could have an impact upon the ORR regional
communities. The ORR High Flux Isotope Reactor is an important source of
radiopharmaceuticals. The reactors are unique research and training facilities for researchers
and students in many fields of research and development: materials science, environmental
science, physics, biology, and electronics.
Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to those uses
from the time of construction through the cessation of operations, at which time the facilities
could be converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site restored to its
original land use. Existing SNF management facilities could also be converted to other uses, or
the lands could be restored following decommissioning.
5.19. Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources
5.19.1 Overview
This section discusses the irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources resulting
from the use of materials that cannot be recovered or recycled, or that must be consumed or
reduced to irrecoverable forms.
5.19.2 Centralization Alternative
Construction and operation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management facilities under the
Centralization Alternative would require commitments of electrical energy, fuel, concrete, steel,
sand, gravel, and miscellaneous chemicals. Most of the water that would be withdrawn from the
Clinch River to operate the SNF management facilities would be returned to surface water in the
Clinch River watershed, although some evaporative losses would be unavoidable. The land
dedicated to the SNF management facilities could become available for other urban uses
following closure and decommissioning. However, the soils on the site would have to be
amended to support land uses such as agriculture, forestry, or wildlife management.
5.19.3 Regionalization Alternative
Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources associated with the Regionalization
Alternative would resemble those discussed above for the Centralization Alternative. However,
the extent of these resource commitments could be less due to the reduced land requirements
and reduced scale of operations.
5.20 Potential and Mitigation Measures
5.20.1 Pollution Prevention
The DOE Oak Ridge Field Office established a Waste Minimization and Pollution
Prevention Awareness Plan to reduce the quantity and toxicity of hazardous, mixed, and
radioactive wastes generated at Oak Ridge. The plan is designed to reduce the possible pollutant
releases to the environment and thus increase the protection of employees and the public. All
contractors and users that exceed the EPA criteria for small-quantity generators are establishing
their own waste minimization and pollution prevention awareness programs. Contractor
programs ensure that waste minimization activities are in accordance with Federal, state, and
local environmental laws and regulations, and DOE Orders.
Additional goals include the promotion and use of nonhazardous materials, establishment of
a baseline of waste generation data, calculations of annual reductions of waste generated, and
implementation of recycling programs. Goals also include incorporation of waste minimization
concepts and technologies in planning and design of new processes and facilities, and in upgrades
of existing facilities. A waste minimization task force composed of representatives from each
contractor has been established to coordinate waste minimization and pollution awareness
activities.
5.20.2 Potential Mitigation Measures
Potential impact avoidance and mitigation measures are addressed in Chapter 5, Sections 1
through 15 as appropriate.
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Tennessee Department of Health and the Oak Ridge Health Agreement Steering Panel, 1993, Oak Ridge
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7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
yC degrees Celsius
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
Ci curie(s)
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EIS environmental impact statement
ECF Expended Core Facility
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
yF degrees Fahrenheit
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
g gram
gal gallon(s)
hr hour
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
kg kilogram
km kilometer
kv kilovolt
y liter
m meter
m3 cubic meter
mi mile
mi2 square mile
min minute
mph miles per hour
mR milliroentgen
mrem millirem
MTHM metric tons of heavy metal
MW Megawatt
nCi nanocurie
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTS Nevada Test Site
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR Oak Ridge Reservation
PCB polychlorinated biphenyl
pCi picocurie(s)
PEIS Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PM10 particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter
ppm parts per million
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SNF spent nuclear fuel
SRS Savannah River Site
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
ug micrograms
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
yr year