REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
IN THE “OGADEN,”
Testimony before the
Committee on Foreign
Affairs
Subcommittee on
October 2, 2007
By Dr. J. Peter Pham
Director
The Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs
I am honored to have the opportunity to
appear once again before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health and am
grateful for the opportunity to add my voice to those who have already spoken
on the worrisome developments in the Horn of Africa, especially the Somali
Regional State (the so-called “Ogaden” region) of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and the territory of the onetime Somali Democratic
Republic.
Since, aside from expressing my
admiration for the personal courage and leadership of Judge Bertukan Mideksa
and Dr. Berhanu Nega, there is little that I can add to what has already been
laid before the members of the Subcommittee on the question of democracy in
Ethiopia, and since, unlike Ms. Fowsia Abdulkadir, I do not have the benefit of
more recent firsthand knowledge of either the current conditions in the ethnic
Somali regions of Ethiopia or the disposition of some of the forces in conflict—like
many non-Ethiopians, I have not been allowed to venture into those parts of
late and has been just over two years since my most recent foray there—I would
like to concentrate on the regional context which affects the human rights and
humanitarian situation in the Somali Regional State, Somalia, and other parts
of the subregion. In fact, I would submit that without an appreciation for the
broader dynamics, it is impossible not only to chart a course past the current
conflicts to the peace, stability, development, and democracy sought by the
peoples of the Horn of Africa, but also to secure the significant national
security interests that our own United States of America has in that
geopolitically sensitive and significant subregion.
The
Ongoing Somali Crisis
The most salient feature of the
contemporary geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa subregion is the
vacuum that has existed in what was, until January 1991, the territory of the
Somali Democratic Republic. Apart from the area that was the colonial era
British Protectorate of Somaliland—a subject to which I will return later—this
area roughly the size of
From its base in Luuq, al-Itihaad
encouraged subversive activities among ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, especially
among some members of the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod, some of whom carried
out a series of terrorist attacks, including the bombing of two hotels and the 1995
attempted assassination in Addis Ababa of Ethiopia’s then Minister of
Transportation and Communications (and later Ambassador to the United Nations),
Abdul Majeed Hussein, an ethnic Somali who opposed secessionists. The
exasperated Ethiopian government finally intervened in
After that defeat, al-Itihaad changed
tack and, as the longtime scholar of Somali affairs, Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay
of the University of South Africa, has noted, “rather than prioritize a
strategy of developing an independent military base, decided instead on what
could be termed a more ‘hegemonic’ approach whereby it would be working within
Somali political and clan structures such as the Islamist Courts.” While the
courts were credited with marked improvements in security in many areas of
Thus
the situation faced by the current Ethiopian government last year was one which
any Ethiopian government would have
found untenable: a movement increasingly dominated by proven enemies—one should
not forget that Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys, the chairman of the shura council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was previously vice-chairman
and military commander of al-Itihaad and before that a colonel under the
dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre who was responsible for the “Ogaden War” of 1977-1978—was
rapidly taking over a neighboring country. (‘Aweys has long been a significant
player in the world of Islamist terrorists, making the cut onto the list of 189
terrorist individuals and organizations specially designated by the
Unfortunately, the vehicle the
Ethiopian government used to legitimize its intervention, the so-called
“Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of
And, as the opposition to it coalesces,
rather than examining the reasons for the dissatisfaction—including its failure
reach out to leaders of other clans and moderate Islamists as well as its
corruption and lack of transparency—the TFG has lashed out against independent
voices that should be pillars of any attempt at nation-building, including the
members of the press, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
other exponents of civil society. Instead, labeling these groups as “Hawiye
terrorists,” it has sidelined them where it has not shut them down and arrested
or killed their leadership. Even the TFG’s own chief justice, Yusuf Ali Harun,
is not immune from this arbitrary capriciousness as he learned to his sorrow
two weeks ago when he was taken from his home in Baidoa by security officials
and dragged along with another judge to a Mogadishu prison on orders of
“Justice Minister and Attorney-General” Abdullahi Dahir Barre after the pair
criticized the regime’s misappropriation of United Nations Development
Programme funds for legal reform. (This last maneuver has provoked a crisis in
the TFG leadership itself as “Prime Minister” Ali Mohamed Ghedi subsequently
sacked the justice minister and his deputy who, in turn, refused to accept
their dismissals saying that they were answerable only to “President” Abdullahi
Yusuf.)
Thus the abject failure last month of the
internationally-financed “national reconciliation congress” packed with cronies
of the TFG came as no surprise to those following developments in
It is no wonder that the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees reported last Friday that nearly 500,000 people, almost one-third
of Mogadishu’s population, have fled in recent months as the city has become
effectively partitioned between the zone where the TFG’s writ—such as it is—still
runs and the areas controlled by opponents of the regime, with the northern
part of the city turned into a battlefield while the famed open-air Bakara
market in the southern part, one of Africa’s largest, is effectively closed for
the first time in living memory (the sprawling bazaar was open for business even
through the madness of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu).
Eritrean
Meddling
Irrespective of the motivations for
their insurgency, the opponents of the TFG, Islamists and clan loyalists alike,
are only able to carry on their fight thanks to outside support, which evidence
indicates to being channeled largely through Eritrea even when it does not
originate there (much of it is). This is certainly the judgment of the international
technical experts of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee
Monitoring Group for Somalia, who concluded in June of this year that “huge
quantities of arms have been provided to the Shabaab by and through Eritrea”
and, noting that they “has observed a clear pattern of involvement by the
Government of Eritrea in arms embargo violations,” concluded that “the
Government of Eritrea has made deliberate attempts to hide its activities and
mislead the international community about its involvement.”
The conduct of the People’s Front
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)—formerly the Eritrean People’s Revolutionary
Front (EPRF)—regime in Asmara, while unjustified, has a rational basis behind
it: the tiny country with a population of under 5 million is locked in a border
dispute with its much larger neighbor, Ethiopia, with its 76 million people.
Between 1998 and 2000, the two countries fought a conventional war that claimed
over 100,000 lives and displaced 1.5 million others over a near-worthless strip
of desert around the town of
Thus Eritrea funnels arms to Somali
insurgents attacking Ethiopians in as a way to weaken its foe and potentially
open a yet another front in its proxy war against it, a front that might prove
invaluable if direct hostilities were to break out along the 912-kilometer
armistice lines between the two countries. As I noted in May to a joint hearing
of this Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have received support from the single-party PFDJ
regime for their activities within
However, presently it is in
The real problem is that the conflict
the Eritrean-backed ALS will foment in Somalia also creates an ideal operating
space in for Islamist terrorists like ‘Ayro and Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, a
long-time member of al-Qaeda in East Africa who figures on the FBI’s “Most
Wanted Terrorists” list with a $5 million bounty on his head for his role in
the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and
Nairobi, Kenya; as well as Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, an al-Itihaad
veteran who is reputed to lead al-Qaeda’s East Africa cell; Mukhtar Robow,
a.k.a. Abu Mansur, the former deputy defense minister of the ICU who fought
with the Taliban in Afghanistan; Issa Osman Issa, another al-Qaeda member
wanted for his role in the East Africa embassy bombings; Ahmad Abdi Godane, an
al-Shabaab leader trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan wanted for his role in the
murders of Western aid workers in the Republic of Somaliland; and Ibrahim Haji
Jama, a.k.a. “al-Afghani,” another al-Shabaab leader who trained with al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan and is a veteran of terrorist campaigns there as well as in
Kashmir and in Somaliland. While the Ethiopian intervention last year disrupted
al-Qaeda’s effort to establish a base of operations in
(When it is not stirring up trouble
abroad, the Eritrean regime is busies itself maintaining an ironclad grip on
its citizens at home. According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2007 country report, Eritrea is “not free,”
scoring an abysmal 7 on political freedom and 6 on civil liberties—the scale is
1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
For all its problems, neighboring
The
Ogaden Conflict
Thus the conflict in
With respect to the ONLF, it should
be noted that it does not necessarily represent all ethnic Somalis in the
region which is sometimes incorrectly known as “the Ogaden.” The nature and
extent of the group’s base is difficult to determine and subject to no little
dispute. What is certain is that there are ethnic Somali sub-clans in the
region whose members the ONLF clearly does not represent as well as sub-clans,
particularly among Ogadeni lineages, which have considerably closer ties with
the eponymous group. The fact is that the total population figures for the
geographical area in question are highly contested, much less the breakdown of
any aggregate figures into non-Somalis and ethnic Somalis and, among the
latter, non-Ogadeni lineages and Ogadeni lineages—and then, among the last-mentioned,
those for whom the ONLF speaks and those who reject its claims to being their
political representative. (To cite one example, the members of the
Somali-Ethiopian Peace and Development Agency (SEPDA), which pursues “the attainment of peace, economic
development, promotion of democracy and respect for human rights in the Somali
Region of Ethiopia,” are Ogadenis who pledge to “not let the ONLF
obliterate the future of our people.”)
In any event, on April 24, the ONLF’s
“Dufaan” unit launched a massive attack on an oilfield in Abole (also known in
Somali as “Obala”), about 120 kilometers from Jijiga, the capital of the
It should be acknowledged that ONLF
had long been on the record as opposing the oil concession and other
international development projects in the region that were based on accords
with the Ethiopian government. Also, this ZPEB facility—not unlike all-too-many
Chinese natural resource extraction enterprises in
In response, the Ethiopian
government has undertaken major counterinsurgency operations in the region and
imposed, since May of this year, a trade blockade which exacerbated the
humanitarian situation of the region’s population which, given their
pastoralist economy, is particularly vulnerable. According to participants at a
recent seminar convened at Chatham House, the cumulative impact of commodity
food prices doubling and livestock prices halving is the effective price of
basic staples has increased 400 percent in recent months. There are
allegations, denied by the Ethiopian government, that having created food
dependency through the blockade, it is now selectively lifting it in a manner
which favors certain interests to the detriment of others. (Similar
accusations, likewise denied, are leveled against the ONLF for likewise abusing
food aid and not respecting the neutrality of international intergovernmental
and nongovernmental relief organizations.) There have been reports
The truth in the so-called “Ogaden”
region is hard to come by. In July, the International Committee of the Red
Cross was accused of aiding the rebels and expelled. A number of NGOs,
including the Dutch branch of Médecins Sans Frontières, have reported
difficulties with access. Even the
The irony of this is that, at least
on paper, all the elements necessary for composing the political differences in
the conflict are already present. The 1994 Constitution of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a remarkably progressive document.
Unfortunately, as my colleagues on the panel have testified, its observance has
left a great deal to be desired. Responsibility for this impasse lies not only
with the government in
The most significant national
interest at stake for the
In the long term, our objective of a
stable and secure Horn of Africa is best achieved if the countries of the
subregion and their peoples are secure within their boundaries and without,
benefiting from the rule of law, governed by leaders accountable to their
electorates, and enjoying the prospects of development. However, if we are to
have any hope of getting there from where we are today, have to be careful to
avoid the path of expedience: far from being our friend, our enemy’s enemy may
not necessarily share our intermediate, much less long-term, interests.
This being said, we also do not have
complete freedom of choice in our partners either. The fact is that
While respecting
Furthermore, despite
The
I would be remiss if I did not avail
myself of this opportunity to raise the question of the remarkable reemergence
of the
While a full discussion of the case
of
Conclusions
I hope that I have been able to
sketch out some of the regional dimensions of influencing the human rights and
humanitarian conditions in the Somali-inhabited regions of
(1) If, as I noted at the beginning, “most salient feature of the
contemporary geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa” is the ongoing
statelessness and chaos in the territory of the former Somali Democratic
Republic, with their accompanying human rights and humanitarian costs as well
as the potential for terrorist penetration and the spread of conflict
throughout the region, then the international community must devote the
attention and resources necessary to help the people of Somalia rebuild a
stable political base. This means encouraging within Somali society inclusive
dialogue of all stakeholders willing to renounce violent recourse. It also
means making recognition of the TFG—the only coin it really has—conditional on
the would-be interim regime meeting clear benchmarks, including respecting the
rights of its prospective citizens and actually proving itself an effective
government, rather than simply according it legitimacy. After all, thirteen
transitional arrangements have come and gone. Pulling the plug on the life
support of another one that fails to live up to its promise should not prove
particularly difficult.
(2) The United States Government should make clear that it
remains committed to the international accords governing relations between states
in this geostrategically vital subregion, including the Algiers Agreement on
the demarcation of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, as the basis for security and
stability in the Horn of Africa. Of course, support needs to be concrete,
including real resources for the demobilization and reintegration of forces as
well as the restoration of traditional regional trade patterns and the
development of new opportunities for economic integration.
(3) We should likewise make clear that America will not look
kindly on any escalation of conflict, whether through direct military action or
indirectly through state sponsorship of or activities carried out by
organizations and individuals—whatever their name and irrespective of their
grievance—that gives terrorists a greater opening into the region. We ought to
encourage peaceful competition through electoral processes and, where
absolutely necessary, even support nonviolent resistance; we should never
reward armed violence, especially by non-state actors.
(4) We should make our non-humanitarian aid to all parties in the
region—those with whom we currently have partnerships as well those with whom
we may enter into relations at some future point—conditional on their receptivity
to the range of concerns that the United States has, including counterterrorism
and security cooperation, respect for fundamental human rights, effective
governance, and commitment to progress on democratization at home and
peacebuilding abroad. Respect for the sovereignty of countries with which we
interact requires neither our abandoning America’s legitimate security interests
nor prohibits us from maintaining the standards by which we have traditionally judge
those who would be our friends.
(5) To these ends, the
I look forward to your questions and
observations. And I renew my thanks to you and the Members of the Subcommittee
for the honor to come before you again today, especially alongside the members
of this distinguished panel you have assembled.
* * * * *
Addendum
Partial List of Ogadeni Civilians Killed in Recent
Operations
by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
April
24, 2007:
In addition to the Chinese oil workers and their Ethiopian guards, thirty
civilians were killed in the attack on Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau oilfield:
1. Mahad Ciise
2. Mohamed Nuur
Nabad-diid
3. Ahmed Mahdi Cabdi
4. Mohamed Muhumed
5. Mohamed C/laahi Faarax
6. Nuur Cumar Xirsi
7. Fadxi Dayib Muxed
8. Asad Cabdi Raasin
9. C/raxmaan Abiib
Ibraahin
10. Mohamed M Gaas
Dimuqradi
11. Mohamed Ahmed Nuur
12. Xasan Jaamac Cabdi
13. Mowliid Mux’ed Aadan
14. Mowliid Kayd Muuse
15. Iid Muhumed Nuux
16. Dawlad Carabeey Ahmed
17. Ina Aadan Muhumed
18. C/laahi Cumar Hul-hul
19. Cagewayne Muhumed
Ahmed
20. Ahmed Cabdi Xuseen
21. Ahmed Xasan Madoobe
22. Ahmed Dhagoole Yuusuf
23. Jamaal Siyaad Furunle
24. Xabiib Mohamoud
25. Xasan Cumar Shiifoow
26. Cabdi Mohamed Ciise
27. Macalin Xasan Sh.
Mohamed
28. C/rashiid Qabri-Dahar
29. Mohamed Yuusuf
30. Ina Gaacuur Cali
May 28,
2007: An
ONLF grenade attack on a cultural gathering in Jijiga killed four middle school
students:
1. Ahmed Mohamed Aftaag
2. Abdiwali Mohamed Tuluh
3. Ahmed Mohamoud Bucul
4. Leyla Sharif Hassan
May 28,
2007: In
a separate attack, fifty civilians were injured, including the regional
president Abdullahi Hassan, and three artists were killed:
1. Abdi Kaamil Awale
2. Aw-Ganbad
3. Kalid Nur
July 1,
2007: An
attack on the town of
1. Muhumed Abdi Dol
2. Sigale Usman
3. Dilif Mahamoud Usman
4. Abdirahman Allele
5. Aydid Gallery
6. Abdulahi Abdisamad
7. Mohamed Guled
(Gamacur)
8. Dubad Barkab
9. Kabe Umar Un-un
10. A young daughter of
Sheikh Isman
September
20, 2007: An
attack on the town of
1. Duulane Guuleed Carab
2. Aadan Mohamed Cashuur
3. Kaamil Kaydsane Iishaar
4. Saynab Ali Gurxan
5. Duulane Ali Xagaa
September
21, 2007: An
ONLF-planted landmine near Aware in Dagahbour region exploded, killing three
civilians traveling in automobile:
1. Dayib Abaade
2. Guled Abdi Dheeg
3. Anab Hirsi-Jini
September
25, 2007: An
attack on another vehicle near El-Har, just outside of Kebridahare, destroyed
the vehicle, killing two civilians:
1. Dhadoon Abdullahi Nur
2. Mohmaed Mohamoud Dahir
September
27, 2007: An
ONLF unit attacked district of Lahelow nearby the Ethiopia-Somalia border,
targeting members of the Isma’il Gum’adle sub-clan, twelve of whom were slain:
1. Jamaal Garaad Haashi
2. Gooni Gaydh Muhamed Ereg
3. Ali Nuur Mohamed
4. Ahmed Atoobe
5. Faarah Sahardiid Gabay
6. Aadan Abdulaahi Diiriye
7. Faarah Qawdhan Aadan Cade
8. Carab Istabool Biihi (Guuleed Hagoog)
9. Nadiir Ahmed Hirsi
10. Awaale Ali Guray
11. Abdirahman Carab Maxamed Guure
12. Abdinuur Goofadhe Gasay
* * * * *
Exhibit 1
Leaders of the “
(From
left to right) Suleiman Roble, organizer of the “Congress for Somali
Liberation and Reconciliation” in Asmara, Eritrea; Admiral Mohamed O. Osman,
chairman of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF); and Sharif Hassan
Sheikh Adan, former Transitional Federal Government of Somalia parliamentary
speaker and chairman of the Central Council of the “
* * * * *
Exhibit 2
Ogadeni Leaders Meeting in
(From
left to right) General Abdullahi Mukhtar, a member of the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) Central Committee; Sheikh Abdalla Ibrahim, onetime
leader of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a predecessor and ally of
the ONLF; Sadiq Abdirahman of the Ogaden Human Rights Committee (U.S.A.); and ONLF
chairman Admiral Mohamed O. Osman.
[1] See the image (Exhibit 1) of ONLF
leader Admiral Mohamed O. Osman (
[2] In addition, thirty local Somali
Ethiopian civilians lost their lives. While human rights violations
attributable to the Ethiopian government have been widely disseminated, those
for which the Ogaden National Liberation Front is responsible are less
reported. To balance the record, a partial list of civilians killed in ONLF
actions is appended to this statement. (The civilians whose names are listed
all hail from Ogadeni lineages.)
[3] See the image (Exhibit 2) of Sadiq
Abdirahman of the Ogaden Human Rights Committee (U.S.A.) with ONLF chairman
Admiral Mohamed O. Osman; Sheikh Abdalla Ibrahim, onetime leader of the Western
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a predecessor and ally of the ONLF; and General
Abdullahi Mukhtar, a member of the ONLF Central Committee.