UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING:
"LOOKING AHEAD TO THE MEDVEDEV ADMINISTRATION"
MAY 8, 2008
COMMISSIONERS:
REP. ALCEE L.
HASTINGS, D-FLA., CHAIRMAN
REP. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, D-N.Y.
REP. MIKE MCINTYRE, D-N.C.
REP. HILDA L. SOLIS, D-CALIF.
REP.
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C.
REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J.
REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, R-ALA.
REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND.
REP.
JOSEPH R. PITTS, R-PENN.
SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD., CO-CHAIRMAN
SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.
SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
D-WIS.
SEN. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, D-N.Y.
SEN. JOHN F. KERRY,
D-MASS.
SEN. SAM BROWNBACK, R-KAN.
SEN. GORDON H. SMITH,
R-ORE.
SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, R-GA.
SEN. RICHARD BURR, R-N.C.
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED,
ACTING
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DR. CELESTE A. WALLANDER,
VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
CENTER FOR
EURASIAN, RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
DR.
STEPHEN BLANK,
MACARTHUR PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
DR. DAVID FOGLESONG,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY,
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
The hearing was held at 3:05 p.m. in Room 419 Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C., Rep. Alcee Hastings, chairman, OSCE, moderating.
[*]
HASTINGS: Thank you all so very much. We'll call this hearing to
order.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are very grateful for your being here.
Distinguished guests and colleagues, welcome to this Helsinki Commission hearing
on Russia under the new Medvedev administration.
This hearing comes at a
time when relations between the United States and Russia are at a not-so-high
point, some would say our relationships are at a low point. Russia threw off
the Soviet yoke and regained its rightful place among the free nations of the
world.
President Putin has turned the presidency over to Mr. Medvedev and
his designated successor and former subordinate in the St. Petersburg power
structures. In turn, the new president has appointed Mr. Putin as prime
minister, and the Duma swiftly confirmed Mr. Putin to this post.
Now that
Russia is officially under new management, I sincerely hope that our
administration will do its best to seize this opportunity to reinvigorate our
bilateral relations. And, for my part, I'm hopeful of assisting in a role to
boost this Congress's ties with the leaders in the Russian Duma.
To what
extent Mr. Medvedev will follow the policies of Mr. Putin seems to be an open
question. Perhaps our experts will be able to shed some light on this important
point.
I have rather lengthy remarks. I'm going to abbreviate them in the
interests of time. And the fact is that the ranking member and I are going to
have to be leaving for a vote.
So in an effort not to belabor matters, I
will include, without any objection, my full statement into the record.
I do
wish to take particular cognizance of the fact that our first witness is a
person with whom I've had an immense amount of contact and equally immense
amount of respect for his activities.
And so, Secretary Fried, I look
forward to your testimony and any questions that may follow.
With your
permission, Senator, I'll ask the ranking member if he has any opening comments.
SMITH: OK, thank you.
Thank you very much, Chairman Hastings and
Chairman Ben Cardin. Thank you for convening this very, very important hearing.
There are reasons to hope that Medvedev will lead a Russian government more
respectful of human rights. Recently, he said that, "Human rights and civil
liberties are the top priority in our society." And that's a quote.
After
taking the oath of office yesterday, he said, "I believe that my most important
aims will be to protect civil and economic freedoms. We must fight for a true
respect of the law."
Many people who know Medvedev have attributed to him a
spirit of openness. I believe it is the best approach to new world leaders to
approach them with an open mind. And this is true whatever country or party
they come from.
When we are open to making a new beginning on difficult
issues, we are often surprised at the response. Here I think of the openness
with which Ronald Reagan encountered Mikhail Gorbachev and how so many of
Reagan's supporters criticized and even mocked him for doing this.
So many
of our cold warriors knew that all Soviet leaders were the same; Gorbachev was
not a saint by any means, but neither was he a Stalin. And Reagan's openness
allowed Gorbachev to loosen the Soviet system. And we all know that this
loosening led to the collapse of communism and freedom for hundreds of millions
of people.
At the same time, we have to bear in mind that Medvedev is very
much a man of Putin's system and that Putin would not have supported Medvedev
for the presidency if he thought that he would drift far from Putin's political
trail.
In any case, the Putin system will put powerful constraints on the
new president. After all, Putin is the prime minister.
I also want to
express my hope that, under the new president and Prime Minister Putin, the Duma
will finally, at long last, pass comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation.
Last summer, I met in Moscow with a large group of Russian legislators at both
the Moscow Duma and the federal Duma level who were eager to pass comprehensive
anti-trafficking legislation. We are still awaiting that legislation,
especially as it relates to protection for the victims.
I've been informed
by our global Trafficking in Persons Office at the State Department that there
are Duma leaders who are against including protection for trafficking victims
and they construe it to be a discrimination against victims of other crimes
somehow.
This would be a missed opportunity, in my opinion, to protect
Russian women who are being victimized by international gangs and horrifically
raped in brothels abroad.
I would like to appeal to any opponents to visit
trafficking shelters in Moscow, as I have done, or in St. Petersburg, as many of
us have done, and in other countries, as well. If they do go to those shelters
and talk to the women themselves, they will see that, as horrific as many other
crimes against women are, trafficking victims are in another class.
Kidnapped, transported, raped thousands of times, living in terror for months or
years, these women have been traumatized so deeply that we cannot even
comprehend it. We have to extend them every aid and care that we can.
So,
again, I appeal to the Russian leadership to visit a shelter and to extend their
protection to these much-beleaguered Russian women.
And I thank you again
for convening this hearing. I yield back.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much,
Commissioner and Congressperson.
Senator Cardin, thank you, and thank you
for arranging for us to have the accommodations. I'm deeply appreciative.
CARDIN: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to welcome all of our
witnesses today. And I'm going to ask unanimous consent to put my entire
statement in the record.
HASTINGS: Without objection.
CARDIN: Let me
just make a couple very brief comments, because I want to hear from Mr. Fried
and the other witnesses that we have here today.
We now have a one-day
record of Mr. Medvedev's presidency of Russia. I don't think any of us was
anticipating that there would be a difference, at least certainly not in the
short term, from President Putin, who's now the prime minister of Russia.
But I think there's major concerns that we need to explore. And that's why I
particularly wanted and pleased that we're holding this hearing.
We've seen
in recent years that Russia has revived its economy. That's something I think
we all should be very pleased about. That's something that is of interest, I
think, to the entire region.
But at the same time, they have cut back and
curtailed civil liberties; they have put pressure on the media; they've had a
zeal for suppressing the slightest political opposition. And that's very, very
troublesome.
At the same time, they've adopted a more muscular approach to
foreign policy, particularly against any country that wants to show some
independence from the Russian Federation. We saw that at the Bucharest
Conference on NATO expansion, where Russia clearly had an impact on the
decisions made by our allies on the expansion of NATO.
You saw that in the
United Nations, where we attempted to resolve the longstanding problems in
Kosovo. And, clearly, Russia's influence was very much evidenced in the
inability to get the United Nations resolution that we had hoped to have had.
We see that in the OSCE, as we look at the future of our election monitoring
role and even the missions, where Russia is becoming more difficult to develop a
common strategy on the advancement of OSCE principles.
And we certainly see
that in our agenda to advance human rights, as Russia has taken steps to make it
very difficult for political opposition to have an opportunity for their voices
to be heard.
So these are matters of utmost concern. And as Russia starts a
new administration, we would hope this would be an opportunity for us to start
building on a better relationship between the United States and Russia, not just
on common agenda issues, which we have, but on the democratization and
institutions within Russia, respecting its commitments under the OSCE, and truly
becoming a leader in its region.
So, Mr. Fried, it's a pleasure to have you
here. I look forward to your assessment. You have served our nation with great
distinction. And I think it's a particularly important time to get your insight
on what's happening in Russia.
And I also welcome the second panel, because
I do think we have the ability to really develop the type of record that's going
to be important for the work of this commission and for the work of Congress.
Thank you.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much, Senator.
Secretary Fried,
before we begin with you, I'd like to make an announcement. And that is that
the CSCE has gone green.
And I don't know whether you noticed, Mr.
Secretary, but we now have everything up on our Web site. And we have a new Web
site, or at least a refreshed one. That said, we don't have a lot of paper any
longer. Therefore, we don't have the biographies and the fine paper that we
normally have.
So in anticipation of the fact that Congressman Smith and I
may leave for a vote, I want you all to know that we are very much appreciative
of all of you.
Dr. Blank, thank you so very much for being here.
Dr.
Wallander and Dr. Foglesong, thank you all.
And, Dr. Wallander, that young
man that's there with you is -- who is this young man?
WALLANDER: That's my
son, Nathaniel.
HASTINGS: Yes, welcome. I'm always very grateful to have
young people with us.
With that in mind, Acting Undersecretary of State Dan
Fried really needs no real introduction to this commission and doubtless any in
the audience.
Secretary Fried, I will be in Russia in St. Petersburg the
week after next. And I'll try to speak with you next week, prior to heading out
that way.
But at this time, I welcome any testimony that you may have. So
thank you.
FRIED: Chairman Hastings and members of the commission, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Our relationship with
Russia is of critical importance, and this hearing is timely, especially given
the inauguration of Russia's new president, Dmitry Medvedev, yesterday.
We
can only speculate at this point what this will mean for the Russian government
and Russia's policy. U.S. policy will remain constant. We seek to cooperate
with the government of Russia wherever possible when our interests overlap, but
we will stand by our principles and our friends and deal frankly with
differences when these arise.
We acted on this principle in Sochi, when
President Bush and then-President Putin issued a strategic framework
declaration, an important road map outlining cooperation between our two
countries, including steps to promote security, prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction, combat terrorism, and advance economic cooperation.
Consistent with this declaration, we signed on Tuesday a bilateral agreement on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which will open up opportunities for U.S.
industry, while strengthening our mutual nonproliferation goals.
In the area
of security, the two leaders also acknowledged the need to move beyond a Cold
War mindset and focus on the dangers that confront both of our nations today,
including the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
On
Iran, the U.S. and Russia are committed to a solution that will deny Iran a
nuclear weapons capability. And on North Korea, we will cooperate to implement
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 and the six-party agreements aimed at
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
The strategic framework declaration
also calls for expanded economic cooperation and the elimination of obstacles to
trade and investment.
The declaration also acknowledges differences, such as
NATO expansion, and the president arrived at Sochi days after the Bucharest NATO
summit, where he championed the path to NATO for Georgia and Ukraine.
The
declaration does report progress in the one area of disagreement, missile
defense. Both leaders expressed interest in missile defense systems to deal
with potential missile threats in which Russia, the United States and Europe
could participate as equal partners.
While Russia does not agree with our
efforts to establish missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic,
Russia has acknowledged the importance of the transparency and
confidence-building measures the United States has proposed to address Russian
concerns about these potential sites.
Mr. Chairman, the declaration also
commits both governments to respect the rule of law, human rights, tolerance of
diversity, political freedom, and a free market approach to economic practices.
We intend to hold the new Medvedev administration to these commitments.
We
want Russia to be a partner and to be strong, but strong in 21st century terms,
with democratic and independent institutions in and out of government, and
working with its neighbors.
Russia is a freer country today than during
Soviet times, but this is a low standard for a great nation. We are concerned
about deterioration of democratic freedoms in Russia.
International
observers concluded that neither the December elections for the state Duma nor
the March presidential elections met international standards for free and fair
elections. Problems included ballot fraud, abuse of administrative resources,
harassment of the opposition, and lack of equal opportunity for the opposition.
We were also troubled by restrictions on political debate. Opposition
parties reported official harassment, intimidation, and an inability to obtain
rally permits. Opposition leaders were detained and arrested on questionable
charges. And both opposition activists and media outlets faced the confiscation
of campaign materials or newspapers to study whether or not they were
extremists.
As a result, as Secretary Rice has remarked, Russia's
presidential elections were essentially uncontested.
Problems extend
beyond the elections. NGOs face persistent pressure. Russia has enacted
legislation that requires them to file extensive reports on their structure,
activities, leadership and finances. The result is that many NGOs have been
prevented from effectively carrying out their work.
The pressure on Russian
journalists is also troubling. While Russians have access to largely free
Internet media, most national broadcasters are now in government hands or the
hands of entities allied with the Kremlin.
Media outlets and organizations
which oppose the administration have been raided for allegedly pirated software.
And physical attacks on journalists have had a chilling effect.
We are also
concerned by Russia's relations with its neighbors, particularly Georgia and
Ukraine, whose governments have chosen to pursue closer Euro-Atlantic ties. The
Russians have expressed their opposition to NATO membership for both countries
in strong terms.
We see such opposition as a vestige of the past. In our
view, democratic and peaceful countries on Russia's borders are a threat to no
one. In fact, thanks in part to NATO enlargement, Russia's western frontiers
have never been so secure and benign in Russia's history.
We also continue
to have differences with Russia on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty. We regret Russia's suspensions of its obligations under this binding
treaty, so we are seeking a way to ratification of the treaty by all parties, as
well as Russia's fulfillment of its commitments related to the withdrawal of its
forces from Georgia and Moldova.
Of particular concern is Russia's support
for separatist regimes in Georgia, as well as Moldova. Last month, President
Putin directed the Russian government to create mechanisms to provide a range of
Russian government services for residents of Georgia's Abkhazia and South
Ossetia regions.
Russian ministries were authorized to establish direct
contact with their separatist counterparts without the approval of the Georgian
government. On April 21st, a Russian fighter jet shot down a Georgian unmanned
aerial vehicle over Georgian territory.
We remain deeply concerned that
these developments could destabilize the entire Caucasus.
On April 29th,
Russia increased the numbers of its peacekeeping troops. As the White House
said earlier this week, these steps have significantly and unnecessarily
heightened tensions in the region and run counter to Russia's status as a
facilitator of the U.N. Friends of Georgia process, which aims to find a
peaceful resolution to these conflicts.
We will continue to urge the Russian
government and urge President Medvedev to appeal (ph) the instructions on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to work constructively to find a political
settlement to these conflicts.
There is no military solution to this
problem, not by either side. Provocations on all sides must stop. Russia needs
to help put the Abkhazia dispute on a negotiating track, not to use it to
intimidate its small neighbor.
In a similar vein, we have made clear that
the use of energy for political ends or pressure on neighbors is unacceptable.
And we encourage Russia to bring more of its oil and gas resources to markets
within a free and competitive framework.
President Medvedev thus takes
office with a U.S.-Russia relationship that is complicated, including elements
of strategic cooperation, which are ongoing, and areas of sharp differences.
As we assess the way in our bilateral relationship, the administration noted
with interest then-candidate Medvedev's speech in December when he said that
Russia's economic modernization would require support for the rule of law, a
campaign against corruption, protection of property rights, and greater
political freedom.
President Medvedev's inaugural speech emphasized these
points and referred to the need to struggle against what he termed "legal
nihilism" in Russia.
We welcome these views, which are frank and promising.
And we will work with President Medvedev to advance a constructive agenda in our
relations. And as we move forward in this relationship with Russia, we will
look at the words that Russian leaders speak and at the actions they take.
Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, I greatly appreciate the opportunity
to speak before you today and I am happy to take your questions.
HASTINGS:
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We'll turn to questions now. And I'd
like to begin by asking (inaudible) whether or not you have information that you
can share with us regarding the reports of two of our military attaches being
expelled in Russia? I believe that took place today.
FRIED: Mr. Chairman,
I can confirm that authorities in Moscow have asked two of our military attaches
to leave Russia on April 28th. They asked on April 28th for our attaches to
leave.
We object to this action, but we will comply with this request from
the government of Russia.
Another attache was requested to leave on April
14th.
I should say, to complete the record, that the United States has
asked two Russian officials to leave the United States. This was one last year
late, and one earlier this year.
I don't want to go beyond this, except to
say that we look at these incidents as something which happens from time to time
in U.S.-Russia relations. It is not, in our view, the sign of some larger
diplomatic struggle; it is not a sign of some downturn.
It happens, and we
would like to see this process -- we would like to see this process end.
HASTINGS: All right. Were there stated reasons that they gave, not anything
having to do with our response, but is there any report as to why they undertook
these actions, coming from their point of view?
FRIED: Mr. Chairman, they
did give us reasons. As I said earlier, we objected to this. We did not think
there were grounds.
HASTINGS: All right.
FRIED: And I don't want, at
this time, to go into the details.
HASTINGS: I understand. Hopefully we'll
be able to follow up with that.
Over the past few years -- and you mentioned
it in your testimony -- Russia has been issuing Russian passports to residents
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even though they live in sovereign Georgia.
Now, they claim the right to defend them by military force.
My question is:
Should other CIS states be concerned about Moscow's creeping annexation of these
regions? And what are we to think and what is our response when Moscow's
ambassador to Georgia warns, and I quote, "The Russian constitution stipulates
protecting Russian citizens wherever they may be, whether it Abkhazia, Zanzibar,
Antarctica, wherever"?
Earlier this week, I met with the just recently
parliamentary head or speaker of the Georgian parliament, Nino Burjanadze. And
I asked her to, as best she could, clarify for me what was transpiring, and with
particular emphasis on the downing of aircraft in that region, and what was the
response of Georgia.
Mr. Secretary, this, at this time, raises concerns for
a lot of us that have had a continuing interest in stability between these two
countries. And I would wonder what, if anything, can we do or say, what are we
doing and saying regarding this set of events?
FRIED: Relations between
Georgia and Russia are obviously troubled. And we're troubled by Russia's
actions against Georgia and its consistent pressure on Georgia.
The
statement by the White House earlier this week was a strong statement, and it
was thoroughly justified.
Russia continues to impose economic sanctions
against Georgia. It supports breakaway, separatist regimes. It has been
responsible for various provocations, last year, missile firing from Russian
fighter aircraft, this year, the shoot-down by a Russian fighter aircraft of an
unarmed Georgian drone.
These forms of pressure from Russia have intensified
since the Bucharest summit, at which NATO leaders took a step forward, by
stating clearly and unambiguously that Georgia and Ukraine would become members
of NATO.
I can't speculate as to Russian motives for this pressure against
Georgia, but it is our belief that Georgia and Ukraine and every other country
has a right to determine its own future and that Georgia's path to NATO should
be a function of Georgia's readiness and not a function of another country's
claim to impose a sphere of influence.
Russia has, of course, a perfect
right to protect its citizens. This is known as normal consular function, all
over the world. But Russia, by handing out passports to citizens of other
countries, and then claiming that it had a special right to protect them, under
these circumstances, is increasing tension in an area which has known too much
strife and war since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The United States
supports Georgia's territorial integrity. We also support Georgia's efforts at
a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts.
President Saakashvili has recently offered a very forthcoming plan for extensive
Abkhaz autonomy within Georgia, and we urge Russia to open the way for Abkhazia
and Georgia to discuss this plan. And we think that accelerated efforts and a
diplomatic solution are the way in which we can work together to diffuse
tensions and resolve this problem.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much.
I'd
ask you to please catalogue one question and refer to me in writing on the
levels of influence, if any, that the United States has on Russian policies. I
won't ask you to go into it now, but if you would be so kind as to do that, with
the understanding that the response that you offer to me I intend to have it
posted our Web site, if we can make that arrangement.
My final question has
to do with something, Secretary Fried, that I know that you spent a considerable
amount of time dealing with -- I know Senator Cardin and I did rather
considerably -- and that is the selection of Kazakhstan as the chair-in-office
for the year 2010.
Is there any evidence at this point that that, in some
measure, tempers Russia's criticism of OSCE? Or does Russia noticeably in any
way influence Kazakhstan's positions at the OSCE? And I guess a follow up on
that is, is it too early to tell?
FRIED: It is too early to tell
definitively, but I think it is safe to say that Russia's attitude toward ODIHR,
the human rights and democracy arm, the election monitoring arm of the OSCE, has
not changed.
That is, Russia's resistance to ODIHR's election monitoring
function for its presidential elections came after the decision had been made
about Kazakhstan. So that suggests an answer to your question.
We regret
very much that Russia has continued to put pressure on ODIHR. We are working
with Kazakhstan, of course, and will continue to do so. Kazakhstan made a
number of commitments when it accepted the offer of chairmanship in office.
It seems to me that was the right decision. And we all worked on this, Mr.
Chairman, including with considerable advice from you, which I appreciate.
This was the right decision. And I think Kazakhstan will work with us. And we
hope this will yield the right results.
HASTINGS: Thank you very much. And
I thank the State Department for their efforts.
As you know, the annual
meeting of the parliamentary assembly is going to be in Astana in July. And I
would hope that we would have active consultations and regard our efforts there.
And my great hope would be that we would have substantial bilaterals that will
assist in moving the ball forward, as it pertains to the OSCE and dealing with
the various subjects at hand.
Thank you, Secretary Fried.
And I turn
now to the ranking member, my good friend from New Jersey, Congressman Smith.
SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary, thank you for
your excellent testimony and your excellent work. We do appreciate it on this
commission. And so let me just underscore that I'm very, very grateful.
I
do have a number of questions I'd like to ask. And I'll do them rapid-fire,
just because we do have to leave, I think, pretty shortly for a vote.
The
first would be on the whole issue of the journalists. Last year, I authored a
resolution, H. Con. Res. 151. It passed overwhelmingly in the House. It made
particular mention of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya and other
journalists.
Reporters without Borders has rated, as you know, Russia as the
sixth-most-dangerous place for journalists. As a matter of fact, in the
resolution, we put a statement that I think was very telling. The president of
the International News Safety Institute has said, "Murder has become the
easiest, cheapest and most effective way of silencing troublesome reporting.
And the more the killers get away with it, the more the spiral of death is
forced upwards."
And then we went on with a operative section, calling on an
open investigation, outside law enforcement. And my first question would be,
has there been any change, any progress in any of those investigations?
Has the Russian government asked for and got any support from, for example, the
FBI or any other law enforcement asset that could be helpful in solving those
crimes? Or is it an issue that just has been left to fester and, obviously,
putting more journalists at risk?
Secondly, on trafficking, if you could,
where we are on legislation, as it deals with the protection side. We know that
the Duma moved expeditiously on criminalizing and trying to effectuate some
comprehensive law enforcement against traffickers, but on the protection side
there's still a serious lag, so the victims are not getting the services they
need, if you could update us on that.
If you could tell us briefly on
Russia-PRC relations. We all raised the issue of the Olympics, the spiraling
down, the ever-worsening situation with China when it comes to a virtually every
human rights abuse imaginable.
My question would be, we know that there's
been a forging of relations. How close is it, in your estimation? Is it
getting closer, moving apart? Is it ebb, you know, an ebb tide? But, you know,
there are ominous implications, obviously, no matter what course they take,
especially a closer collaboration.
And, finally, I join the chairman in the
deepest concern about Georgia. And I met with Nina, as well. I'm sure Ben and
others did, as well, because we all have the highest regard for her. She's been
an outstanding speaker of the Georgian parliament.
But the House did pass a
resolution, H. Res. 1166, very strongly worded, couldn't have been stronger
worded. Twenty-three or so voted no; 14 abstained. Overwhelming majority of
Democrats and Republicans voted for it.
I guess, you know, the obvious --
you've basically stated -- well, you've answered the chairman -- but the concern
we all have is, how imminent, if it is imminent, is war? I mean, there are --
the number of provocations, the signs, the sense that there's something in the
offing here is highly disturbing.
And, secondly, on that question, was there
any pretext taken by the Russians with what has happened in Kosovo and the
independence there? The territorial lines aren't necessarily sacrosanct.
And this is seen as maybe, well, if it can happen in Kosovo, the people -- lines
aren't necessarily drawn with any degree of permanence. So South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, you know, are not as protected as we would like them to be.
FRIED:
Let me try to go through those quickly. You've asked a lot of important
questions, and we could spend a lot of time on each one. So forgive the
truncated answers.
I regret to tell you that neither the murder of Paul
Klebnikov nor the murder of Anna Politkovskaya has been solved. They were
courageous journalists. They were murdered, we believe, because of their
journalism. We do not know who did it.
We have worked very closely with
Paul Klebnikov's family and with Russian authorities. But I don't have an
answer for you as to when this will be resolved or if it will be resolved. I
regret that. I wish I could...
SMITH: Is it still a center-stage issue
with our Russian relationship? Are we bringing that up...
FRIED: We bring
this up a very great deal. We have established a working group with the FBI.
On the Paul Klebnikov matter in particular, we're in close touch with his
family. This is a matter of concern.
I'm glad -- frankly, I'm glad you've
brought it up, because it gives me the opportunity to go again on the record and
say that this is important to us. Journalists being murdered is a terrible
thing, and this was a courageous young American.
The issue of trafficking is
an issue on which we think there is the -- we have the opportunity to make
progress with the Russian government. This is an issue that we care about a
great deal.
The embassy in Moscow, as you know, because you've done a
great deal of work on the ground on this, Congressman, is actively involved. We
have assistance programs which have gone to various groups which are involved in
protecting women who are at risk of or have been trafficked.
We'll
continue to make this one of our key assistance programs with the Russians and
work with Russian authorities.
Russia-China relations, there is a school of
thought in Russia among the unofficial, but officially connected foreign policy
thinkers that a Russia-China quasi-alliance or closer relations are a good way
to counterbalance the United States.
We don't believe in balance-of-power
politics. We believe the countries should work together to solve common
problems. And that's what we try to do with Russia.
But, obviously, China
is a huge, rapidly rising country, a country with which we have profound
interests. The way China develops in this century is of profound importance.
And our relationship with China is independent, obviously, of Russia.
This
is something to watch. This is a strategic factor in world affairs, and we do
watch this in general.
We also watch the relationship between Russia's very
under-populated far east and China.
You mentioned Georgia. I think that H.
Res. 1166 is a strong expression of support for Georgia, which I welcome. That
expression of support can give the Georgians confidence that they are not alone
and that that sense of confidence may enable them to work constructively and
diplomatically for peaceful resolutions for the Abkhaz and South Ossetia
situations, which are the only resolutions available to them.
So I think
this is a very constructive initiative. And I think it helps both the Georgians
and stability in the South Caucasus.
You asked about war. I do not believe
that the Russians want a full-scale war. I'm sure that the Georgians do not
want it, either. But what we fear is that, with so much tension, so many armed
people in close proximity, and a record of provocations, that there can be a
spark, setting off a wider problem, and that we're -- and suddenly you're
dealing with deaths and shooting and an out-of-control incident.
We worry
about that a great deal. We don't like the heated rhetoric that has come out of
Russia. Sometimes Georgian rhetoric is hot, as well. And while we have urged
restraint on the Georgia, there is a difference between a very small, vulnerable
country and a very large country that we have to keep in mind.
Even though
we do counsel restraint on the Georgians, they are the vulnerable party, and it
is their territory that is under threat.
You mentioned Kosovo. Tensions
between Georgia and Russia predate the Kosovo issue. The Russians may use
Kosovo as an excuse. They may argue it is a precedent. In fact, in the
Caucasus, there are a number of separatist conflicts.
The breakup of the
Soviet Union was bloody. It was terrible in many ways for the people on the
ground. And we hope that Russia will work with us to arrange diplomatic
solutions so we don't have these conflicts festering, which can hurt everyone in
the region, including Russia and, of course, the countries involved.
There's
much more to say, so forgive me that I've gone through this quickly, but I
wanted to touch on all your points, sir.
SMITH: (OFF-MIKE)
HASTINGS:
Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
CARDIN: Secretary Fried, let me see if I can
just go through this list. Russia has recently asked our two military attaches
to leave their country. And we take exception to that, but we'll comply.
Russia is interfering with Georgia sovereignty by actions, including taking down
an unmanned aircraft, and has had influence in NATO expansion, as it relates to
both Georgia -- and we haven't talked about the Ukraine, but I assume you would
agree that the decision in regards to Ukraine was also influenced by Russian
relations.
Just as a side, I thought you did a very fine diplomatic response
by supporting a third option on NATO action, in addition to the two that are
standard, to say that the statement that they will become a member had
substance.
We all know that it was a disappointment to the United States
that we did not get a more definitive route towards NATO expansion with the
Ukraine and Georgia and that Russia had an impact on that.
You've responded
by saying to Russia still is adversely affecting the work of ODIHR, particularly
as it relates to election monitoring.
In response to Mr. Smith, you said
that, in regards to Kosovo, I didn't hear anything new, which I assume Russia is
still not playing a positive role in a diplomatic solution on Kosovo, which is
an area of the world that we have invested a great deal of U.S. energy and can
be very proud of some of the achievements that we've been able to deal in the
areas of the former Yugoslavia.
The two journalists are still crimes
unsolved, with little cooperation from Russia. Russia is pressing their
journalists and the opportunity to report fairly.
So where is the positive
news in regards to Russia? Is there any area that we should be encouraged?
Because, quite frankly, it looks to me like it is one problem after the next of
whatever we are moving forward, Russia is moving in the other direction, in
fact, causing additional problems for U.S. interests.
So I'm all in favor of
engagement; believe me. I want to work with Russia. Russia is a very important
country in the world. It's a country that we need to get back on track.
But
it's somewhat discouraging when we really have very little to point to that are
bringing our two nations together.
FRIED: Senator, you cited a number of
areas where we have significant differences with Russia and where Russian
behavior and policies are troubling. And I will not tell you that this list is
wrong or that it is better than it seems on these areas, because in these areas
we have profound differences.
The strategic framework declaration that
Presidents Bush and Putin issued in Sochi in April, about a month ago now,
outlines areas that, if not wholly balanced the ledger, at least speak to the
reality of cooperation. And it does exist.
In security issues, we are
working on a post-START arms control arrangement, building on the Moscow Treaty.
In missile defense, we took a big step forward, taking an issue from one of
really hot disagreement to tentative cooperation, which is a major step forward.
CARDIN: Just to clarify that issue, because there is some disagreement in
Congress on the missile defense issues. But maybe I missed this. Is Russia
withdrawing their opposition to the U.S. request in regards to Poland and the
Ukraine?
FRIED: Russia has made clear that it still disagrees with the U.S.
effort to establish missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
CARDIN: I meant Czech Republic. Excuse me.
FRIED: However, Russia has
acknowledged that the U.S. proposed measures on transparency and
confidence-building could be useful in assuaging Russian concerns. And that is
a major step forward from absolute, unalterable opposition to an acknowledgement
in the presidents' document that the confidence-building measures could assuage
them.
This is a step forward. It doesn't mean we have no differences, but
the way I put it is, on a scale of plus-100 to minus-100, missile defense has
gone from minus-100 to, let us say, plus-10. Now, that's either only 10 or 110
more than it was when you started. Crude analogy, but I think you see the
point.
In other areas, we are working together to prevent on
counterterrorism, to prevent nuclear proliferation, on nuclear energy. I could
go on, but we're working together on Iran. We're working together on North
Korea.
There is a set of significant issues on which we are working
together. Traditionally, the United States -- now I'm going to be -- I'm going
to indulge in a kind of rough metaphor, so forgive me -- we often fall into two
modes, one of two modes about Russia, either excessive enthusiasm and
exaggerated hopes or anger and irritation across the board.
And what is
required is neither one. What is required is a very sober look at Russia, a
clarity and realism about what it is and what it isn't, and an ability to work
with Russia where we can, but also push back where we must. And that is easier
to say than it is to do, but that is, it seems to me, the best policy approach
and one which reflects the reality of a very complicated and mixed relationship.
CARDIN: The difficulty I have with Russia is that, every time I try to
advance a particular issue of concern, it's like a denial or I must be their
enemy, because I'm criticizing them. The whole purpose of the OSCE process is
to make it legitimate for any state to question the activities in any other
state.
I know that the members of this commission are usually approached at
all of our meetings about concerns of OSCE commitments in the United States.
And we take those issues very seriously and appreciate the fact that our
colleagues are using the forum to bring up these matters so we can clarify or
can take back to our country the concerns of the international community.
But when we do this with Russia, they seem to take it rather personal. And it's
very difficult to get into a constructive dialogue.
I don't know whether you
find the same point or not in your conversations with the Russians, but I find
that very disturbing.
Let me just ask one additional question, if I might.
We now have Mr. Medvedev, who is the new president. And you have said some very
encouraging things about his speeches.
Is there any reason to believe that
he will exercise independent leadership from the new prime minister, Mr. Putin?
Or are we still dealing with Mr. Putin?
FRIED: The briefest answer I will
give is to fall back to the cliche "time will tell," which is another way of
saying we don't yet know how the balance of power and responsibilities will work
out.
Prime Minister Putin left office regarded as a success -- regarded in
Russia as a successful president. And this is the first time that a Russian
leader has left office alive and not under...
CARDIN: Mr. Secretary, I want
you to respond for the record. I apologize. There's a vote on. I'm going to
go vote, and I'll be back.
FRIED: Yes, sir.
CARDIN: But I want you to
know it was not rudeness. It's a matter of so I can make the vote and get back.
FRIED: Thank you. I'm glad my answer hasn't put you off.
(LAUGHTER)
(UNKNOWN): (OFF-MIKE)
FRIED: So President Putin retains popularity in
Russia, because he is regarded as having been a highly successful president.
The constitutional breakdown of authorities between president and prime minister
is clear in paper. How it works in practice is something which we will see.
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have been close colleagues for a
number of years and they've gone out of their way to say that they will work
well together.
On the other hand, in 20th-century Russian history -- well,
in all of Russian history -- duumvirates either did not exist or did not have a
good track record. So we don't know.
But rather than speculate, we will
work with President Medvedev, we will work with the Russian government on the
agenda, dealing forthrightly with problems in areas of disagreement, but working
to advance cooperation where we can.
And we will see the way Russian history
takes that country. It is up to them.
HASTINGS: Secretary Fried, I am
deeply grateful for your testimony here today. And as indicated at the outset,
your full statement will be included in the record.
I won't pursue further
questioning. And I am hopeful that I will have an opportunity to have telephone
communication with you next week, not pertaining to this hearing, but advancing
other things in this relationship that we are here about.
I hope our
hearings are and this hearing are helpful, and that is our intent, to be as
constructive as possible and to work with those who have the immense
responsibility, as you and your colleagues in the State Department and in the
administration, have.
So thank you so very much.
And at this time, I
will ask, if you so desire, you take your leave.
And I'd invite to the
dais at least for witness purposes Dr. Stephen Blank, MacArthur professor of
national security affairs and Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War
College; Dr. Celeste Wallander, visiting associate professor at the Center for
Eurasian, Russia and East European Studies at Georgetown University; and her
son, whose name I didn't get, Dr. Wallander.
WALLANDER: Nathaniel Anderson.
HASTINGS: Nathaniel, again, thank you for being here.
And Dr. David
Foglesong, associate professor, Department of History, at Rutgers University.
Dr. Wallander, I've been told that you should go first. And that makes sure
that I get a chance to hear (inaudible) that's my call to a vote. I'm telling
you, we are having our day here.
I'm fond of saying and the staff gets tired
of hearing me say it's hard to apologize for working. But go ahead, Dr.
Wallander.
WALLANDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And members of the
commission, thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to contribute.
I have to say, I think that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe is one of the most important and undervalued institutions for
international security in its most comprehensive sense.
And it is really
important that so many important Americans are committed to its work and
supporting its work. And I deeply admire the members of this commission for
that commitment. And thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
I'm
going to just highlight some of the points from my written testimony, which I'd
like to submit for the record, and focus on my assessment -- as it turns out,
some of the questions that have already arisen, namely, what is the Russian
political system and what does it mean for the potential of the new president,
Dmitry Medvedev, and the role of new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin?
Survey a couple of main points about Russian foreign policy and their
implications for the United States and whether we can expect continuity or
change in those polices, and then think about some pragmatic -- what I think are
some pragmatic initiatives in the next year or two that the United States could
advance to try and take advantage of the new administration on the Russian side
and, looking forward, of course, a new presidential administration on the
American side.
As we all know, Dmitry Medvedev took office as Russia's third
president yesterday, the 7th of May, and Vladimir Putin was confirmed as prime
minister today, on the 8th of May. And with this leadership transition,
Russia's put behind it the crisis of uncertainty over the succession plans that
had dominated politics in Russia for some three years now.
But far from
ending uncertainty and speculation about Russia's political system and
stability, the new lineup has shifted the issue to speculation about where real
power will lie, in the presidency, in the prime minister's office, or divided
somehow between them.
In my view -- and in my written remarks, I go through
different scenarios and lay out my analysis, but I'm going to just focus on what
I think is going to happen. In my view, the most likely outcome is a shift in
power to the prime minister's office and to the person of Vladimir Putin.
Medvedev will be president, but Putin will hold power. And to the extent that
Medvedev is an effective president, it will be because he does not contradict or
cross Putin.
The political systems that Putin created over the eight years
of his presidency enables the political leadership to exercise considerable
power without accountability to Russian citizens.
The party Putin now leads
that his Kremlin created, but which notably he's not a member, United Russia,
holds 64.3 percent of the seats in the Duma, 315 out of 450. Just Russia, the
next-largest party, a party also created by the Kremlin in order to establish a
non-opposition opposition party, holds an additional 38 seats.
The Liberal
Democratic Party, under Vladimir Zhirinovsky, which supports the Kremlin, holds
40 seats. And the only opposition party remaining in the Duma is the Communist
Party, which holds 57 seats, or just over 11 percent.
Yabloko and the Union
of Right Forces, Russia's only genuine opposition parties, in the December 2000
Duma elections, failed to gain any seats at all.
So the Putin leadership has
thus successfully eliminated competitive, pluralist politics in Russia for some
time to come. Media is either state-owned, in the hands of a Kremlin-friendly
businessman, or without access to national broadcast outlets.
Civil society
organizations can operate only if their activities and objectives are
non-political. The Kremlin has created onerous requirements for NGOs seeking
foreign funding. And most Russian NGOs subsist on donations from
Kremlin-approved businesses or from the government's NGO monitor, the Civic
Forum.
This political system is essentially authoritarian, although of a
modern cast. Putin's consolidation of power rests on two sets of parallel
processes: eliminating political opposition and building patron-client bases of
power, dependent on his leadership.
These are primarily rooted in the Soviet
security services, notably the KGB successor the FSB, and the key to holding
political power in Russia is access to wealth and resources. And the key to
access to wealth and resources in Russia is holding political power.
Among
the major figures in Putin's supporting networks of clients dependent on and
supporting his role as president were Medvedev, who was deputy prime minister
while also serving as chairman of the board of Gazprom; Sergei Ivanov, who was
deputy prime minister overseeing the defense industries; Igor Sechin, first
deputy head of the presidential administration, while at the same time serving
as the chairman of the board of Rosneft; and Viktor Ivanov, deputy head of the
presidential administration and chairman of the board of the defense firm
Almaz-Antey and of Aeroflot.
As Russia's state-owned or controlled firms in
the energy and defense sectors have extended their control of enterprises and
commerce, these close clients of Putin have come to control the most important
sectors of the Russian economy and to become very wealthy themselves. Recent
reports suggest that Putin himself may be worth as much as $41 billion.
Now,
giving Medvedev the presidency would thus appear...
HASTINGS: Was that
million or...
WALLANDER: ... $41 billion.
HASTINGS: With a "b"?
WALLANDER: With a "b." Giving Medvedev the presidency would thus appear to be
an extraordinary transfer of power, far beyond that of the process of
presidential succession in democracies where political institutions create
checks and balances, competing political parties and media allow citizens to
hold their presidents accountable, and political power is not so inextricably
linked to business and the economy.
If Putin were really truly ceding the
system he built to Medvedev, it would be extremely important to understand
Medvedev's preferences and intentions. And we've heard speculation that
Medvedev has expressed more liberal views, has talked about the rule of law, and
has talked about fighting corruption.
I think, however, a path by which
Medvedev as president is powerful is unlikely in Russia for two reasons, by
2008. First, although it's possible that Putin has decided to reverse course
and has turned political power over to Medvedev to put a velvet glove over the
iron first of the system he spent eight years building, liberalization is
ultimately contrary to how that system works and what Putin himself has
consistently and decisively declared necessary for Russia.
Putin's political
leadership is viewed by Russian society as extraordinarily successful, with
Putin's approval ratings above 80 percent. In recent weeks, Putin has prepared
to leave the presidency with statements affirming what he has achieved in
strengthening the Russian state, establishing Russian power on the international
scene, and completing the work of limiting private foreign investment in the
strategic sectors of the Russian economy.
There do not appear to be any
regrets that Russia has been turning firmly away from political and economic
liberalization.
Second, and more importantly, why I don't believe that
President Medvedev will be a powerful president in Russia, the idea of a
powerful President Medvedev is based upon a faulty premise, that political power
and how the Russian system works are based solely upon the constitution, rule of
law, and institutions.
The functioning of political power is as much, and I
would argue even more, dependent on these networks of patron-client
relationships and the clans of long-held regional and professional associations
of the Russian elite.
Most important of these are the men who served in the
KGB in the late Soviet period, the siloviki, who constitute Putin's inner circle
and network of associates.
Medvedev does not share that background. And
while the members of the regional clan who came from St. Petersburg to Moscow to
work for Putin have become wealthy and powerful because of their deep regional
connection to Putin, they are dependent upon him and lack a vital power resource
exercised by the siloviki, which is access to information and the ability to
investigate and imprison opponents.
Furthermore, it is not only that
Medvedev does not have the resources for this change of course. It is likely
that those with resources under the current system would very actively fight to
prevent any change that would threaten their hold on power.
A loosening of
state control of the economy, a reduction of corruption, and an effective rule
of law would break apart the patronage-based authoritarianism that has installed
Russia's current leadership in power and enriched them and their clans.
Now,
Medvedev and Putin are clearly close associates with a long history and
relationship, so they may hold a level of trust and unity of political purpose
sufficient to make a two-headed leadership work. But it would work only if they
were of the same mind on policies, personnel, and ultimately the goals they
seek.
In any difference that might emerge in any of those areas, someone
would have to lose, and I don't think it's going to be Vladimir Putin.
That,
in turn, means that real power will lie in the office and person of Vladimir
Putin. The informal, but real patronage-based authoritarian system created in
the past few years already favors Putin's power, even as he shifts to the
position of prime minister.
Furthermore, in the past few weeks, Putin and
the Duma have been busy enhancing the power of the prime minister. Large blocks
of responsibilities are being pushed down to the ministerial level -- from the
prime ministerial level down to the ministries, freeing the prime minister from
the kind of administrative, day-to-day oversight that kept Putin's prime
ministers busy and subject to criticism and rebuke.
When president, Putin
slimmed the administrative offices of the prime minister. Word now is that the
number of deputy prime ministers will grow to as many as 11 serving under Putin.
In his move to the prime minister's offices in the Russian White House,
Putin has created a press office, a speechwriting office, and a protocol office,
suggesting that the new prime minister will not be absent from foreign policy.
The rules which limited press access in the president's Kremlin offices have
been extended to the White House, indicating that Putin's style of
non-transparent and personalistic politics will move to the prime ministership.
And just this week, there have been reports from Moscow that the likely
candidate -- the likely person to move to the Russian security council, which is
an office of the Kremlin overseeing foreign and defense policy, is Sergei
Ivanov, at one time considered to be a contender for the position of president,
one of Putin's associates from the KGB, a member of the siloviki, and likely, if
he does end up in that position in the Kremlin, likely to be Putin's man in the
presidential administration.
So all the indications are that Putin is not
merely remaining in politics, but that he is remaining in power. This is not
surprising. Experts on Russia's political system are in substantial agreement
that it is not one rooted in institutions and law.
The Russian state is
Putin's state, whether he sits in the Kremlin or the White House. Insofar as
Dmitry Medvedev is Putin's trusted ally, he will be a strong president. But if
Medvedev remains Russia's president, it will be because Russia's president is
not the figure who wields power and determines policy.
And I've taken a lot
of time, so I won't go through a lot of detail on Russian foreign policy. But
the obvious implication of my assessment is that we are going to see primarily
continuity in Russian policy, in foreign policy, in the three areas I talk about
in my written testimony as being Russian priorities, namely in re-establishing
Russia as a Eurasian great power; preventing the United States from eroding
Russia's power from within, namely Russian concern about democracy promotion,
what the Russians call "color revolutions"; and Russia's efforts to build good
political and economic relations with Eurasian major and great powers,
especially emerging powers of the 21st century, China, India and, in particular,
Iran.
So I'm going to skip over the analysis, because I don't want to
impinge on the time of my colleagues or the opportunity to answer questions, and
point nonetheless to some degree of optimism. And that optimism arises from
precisely the fact that the Russian political leadership is feeling more secure
and more certain about its own future.
The insecurity about the succession,
about American democracy promotion, about the real fear that the Russian elites
had that the United States was somehow planning some kind of internal Russian
democratic revolution to follow upon the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, is behind them.
They've managed the
transition. They've managed it to their liking. It appears that President
Putin as now Prime Minister Putin will remain in control.
And so the
opportunity for constructive cooperation, although there might be a small window
for that opportunity before the next round of elections in four years begins to
loom, is real.
And I will just refer to exactly something that came up with
Undersecretary Fried's testimony, which is namely the missile defense proposal,
just to highlight the point, rather than going through many examples.
Back
at the end of 2000, the very same sorts of proposals for transparency and
confidence building that the U.S. government brought to Moscow on missile
defense, on U.S. plans for missile defense, were criticized as being
irresponsible, inadequate, disrespectful, not caring about Russian security
interests.
When Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates were in Moscow a couple
of months ago, it was essentially the very same proposals. The response was
much more welcoming, much more approving. And we heard Foreign Minister Lavrov,
actually, comment that these were proposals that Russia could work with, because
they took into account Russian interests and Russian concerns.
To me, that's
an indication that the Russian government is feeling more secure and is willing
to lower the rhetoric, lower the tone of hostility and fear and threat, that was
so characteristic of President Putin's foreign policy in the last two years and,
also, of the other officials of the Russian government.
And it creates the
opportunity for initiatives in the area of security cooperation, restarting
talks about the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, taking seriously the need
to negotiate a follow-on to the START Treaty, which expires in 2009, and by
which we will lose the verification procedures, and monitoring infrastructure
that was so valuable for confidence building and for interaction between our
defense and security establishments.
So the United States, although having a
very clear eye about the nature of the Russian political system, ought to be
ready to take the initiative in offering some pragmatic areas of cooperation,
such as graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment, supporting Russian
integration in the World Trade Organization, advancing the cause of conventional
arms control, and also re-establishing a basis for strategic arms control, and
welcoming the newly signed civilian nuclear agreement between the United States
and Russia, which will allow the United States and Russia to cooperate in the
area of nuclear technology in a way that serves both countries.
So thank you
very much for the opportunity to present my views. And I look forward to your
questions.
CARDIN: Thank you for your testimony.
Dr. Blank?
BLANK:
Senator Cardin, members of the commission, it is a distinct honor and privilege
to appear again before this committee that works to uphold the fundamental
principles of Western civilization, not just the United States.
With that
said, my remarks do not reflect the opinion or policy of any U.S. governmental
institution, including the Department of Defense and the Army.
We meet
today to grapple with problems of advancing the national interests relative to a
state and society that resists these principles, yet whose cooperation and even
partnership is sometimes necessary to secure for ourselves, our allies, and
Russia's peoples the blessings of a lasting peace.
Relations with Russia
represent a perennial problem for the United States. Even as the U.S. seeks to
engage Russia to advance its security interests, it does so knowing that it is
interacting with a government that steadfastly opposes American interests and
values.
Any U.S. administration seeking to advance those interests also
simultaneously faces the problem of reconciling that activity with the
difficulty of adhering to its own fundamental principles and of engaging Moscow
in a candid discussion of them.
For in the present political climate --
and with good reason -- America cannot conceive of a true partnership with
Russia absent a rapprochement on values and principles. Otherwise, the
relationship will inevitably end in mutual recriminations and disappointment,
not to say frustration.
This conundrum has affected the Bush
administration's relationship with Vladimir Putin's Russia and will affect the
next administration's relationship with Dmitry Medvedev's Russia.
There is
no easy solution for the problem. But it is essential that we understand that,
as many American and European scholars, diplomats, and even intelligence
analysts understand we are dealing with a mafia-like regime whose tactics are
predatory and rely on corruption and intimidation to secure its objectives.
Those goals are a free hand for Russia to do as it pleases throughout Eurasia
and the concurrent corruption or even subversion of Western public institutions
to deter the West from interfering with this grand design.
The present
crisis in Russo-Georgian relations, for example, reveals once again that Russia
has no respect for the sovereignty, independence and integrity of its neighbors.
And Mr. Putin made this clear in his remarks at Bucharest.
Furthermore,
Russia believes that it is or should be free to disregard its own international
agreements if it wants to do so, just as it has established a domestic autocracy
that answers to nobody and does as it pleases within Russia.
This challenge
requires of us the most intimate and systematic coordination of U.S. government
agencies and coordinated action with our European allies against this
fundamentally long-term and even insidious threat.
But even as we pursue
engagement and even accord with Russia on key interests of national security,
the nature of its regime and the challenge it poses cannot ever be forgotten.
Nor can we let the necessary pursuit of such agreement deflect us from
confronting Russia's unprecedented challenge to our interests, allies and our
shared values and institutions.
Often pursuing our overriding national
interests will take precedence over the pursuit of a dialogue on values, leaving
administrations open to the charge of hypocrisy. But those interests also
include encouraging the greater democratization, transparency, legal
accountability, et cetera, of European and Russian political and economic
institutions, as stipulated in international treaties, like the Helsinki treaty,
and they must be pursued with equal vigor in Russia and among its neighbors.
So to the extent that we succeed in such initiatives in places like Ukraine,
Georgia and Russia, we advance both interests and values at the same time.
Bearing in mind that the only answer to the conundrums outlined here is a
long-term strategy that combines patience with vigilance, candor with
engagement, and realism about what can be expected at any given time, in my
written statement I have striven to outline a long-term strategy for relating to
the Medvedev government that pursues both American and allegedly common
Russian-American interests, while simultaneously upholding our democratic
principles and values abroad.
The objective of this strategy is to overcome
what I call the agenda of discord, an agenda that comprises not only human
rights and arms control issues, but that also seeks to engage Moscow on a wide
variety of issues where it has interests and a voice: energy and regional
security in Europe and Asia.
A strategy that negates the importance of the
energy and regional security issues, the latter of which also includes
proliferation, implies that Moscow has no legitimate interests and remains stuck
in the agenda of the past generation.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency
to overlook the fact that global energy problems cannot be successfully
addressed without taking Russia into account. Neither can we ignore the impact
of Russia investing abroad into foreign businesses, all too often in order to
subvert and corrupt them on Moscow's behalf.
It can do so because energy is
the main lever by which the Putin regime and the forthcoming Medvedev regime
have pursued and will pursue their goals of undermining the post-Cold War
settlement in Eurasia.
Yet we can safely say that we have no energy or
investment policy for Russia, or at least none that has ever been publicly
articulated and implemented by the current administration. Neither have we
taken Russia's ability to influence European governments by these means
sufficiently into account in timely fashion.
It took an enormous exertion
of last-minute presidential power to secure the gains in regional security
consummated at the last NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. But our
day-to-day foreign policy should be more active and engaged with our allies,
local governments, and Russia on these issues without waiting for the last
minute and committing the president so publicly.
Our Russian and European
policies must be both multi-dimensional and closely integrated. They cannot run
on separate tracks. They must be multi-dimensional to confront the new
dimensions of Russia's challenges, which in their method and scope require a
coordinated effort of all the institutions responsible for international
security, and not just diplomats, armed forces, and intelligence agencies to
overcome them.
Ultimately, President Bush succeeded handsomely at
Bucharest, but it must be recognized that Moscow remains unreconciled to the
post-Cold War status quo and will seek every opportunity to revise it.
Understanding that requires that we have a comprehensive strategy that goes
beyond haranguing Moscow on human rights and pursuing arms control and
nonproliferation agreements that we want toward a broader understanding of where
and how Moscow stands and plays in contemporary world affairs.
For such a
strategy to succeed, it must express the policy of a unified administration and
a unified transatlantic alliance, while also being comprehensive in scope and
oriented to enduring long-term gains. That strategy also must fully engage our
ability to speak for our values abroad or, in other words, a rejuvenated public
diplomacy that has sadly atrophied since President Reagan's time.
As Pope
John Paul II said, quote, "In a world without truth, freedom loses its
foundation," end of quote. If our policy towards Moscow does not meet these
criteria, it will inevitably fall short, whether we are discussing human rights,
arms control, energy, regional security in Europe or in Asia.
Thus, our
strategy must transcend the facile notion that a good relationship with the
Russian president is the objective or sufficient. While such a relationship is
decidedly beneficial, we relate to the Russian government and must engage that
entire government in the pursuit of common interests where feasible.
And
where it is not feasible, both governments should be engaged in an ongoing and
unceasing dialogue. It is on this basis that I have offered such a strategy to
you in my written testimony, and I welcome your questions.
Thank you.
CARDIN: Dr. Blank, thank you very much for your testimony.
Dr. Foglesong?
FOGLESONG: Senator Cardin, thank you for the opportunity to speak at this
hearing. This is a first for me, coming down to Washington to testify.
As a
historian, not an expert on current relations, like the two previous witnesses,
I think the most useful contributions that I can make to this hearing are,
first, to highlight some of the major causes of American misperceptions of
Russia in the past; second, to show how those assumptions and expectations
continue to distort perceptions of Russia today; and, third, to suggest some
ways to move beyond these misunderstandings as we engage with Russia in the
future.
As I show in a recent book, the one I handed you earlier, American
views of tsarist, Soviet, and now post-Soviet Russia have been distorted by a
number of unrealistic beliefs and unwarranted attitudes, particularly: first, a
messianic faith that America could inspire a sweeping, overnight transformation
of Russia from autocracy to democracy in 1905 and 1917 or from totalitarianism
to liberty, as in 1991; second, an extreme antipathy to leaders who are blamed
for thwarting the natural triumph of an American mission; and, third, scorn for
the ordinary people of Russia when they seem to submit meekly to authoritarian
governments.
These ideas and emotions continue to skew American views of
Russia today.
Many Americans who were thrilled by the supposed
transformation of Russia from communism to free-market democracy in the early
1990s have now veered to bitter hostility to Russian leaders whom they blame for
obstructing the dream of a democratic Russia.
Confounded by opinion polls
that show that the majority of Russians vastly prefer today's Russia to the
Russia of the 1990s, influential Western commentators assert that Russians have
been hypnotized by a Kremlin-propagated myth or claim that they have been duped
by Kremlin propaganda.
In reality, Russians have quite rational and
pragmatic reasons for saying that they would prefer to live in contemporary
Russia than in the Yeltsin era.
Senior citizens like to receive their
pensions on time. Teachers prefer to get paid. People like to have some
confidence that their life savings will not be wiped out tomorrow by some
government currency reform or financial crisis.
The greatest challenge
today to the Helsinki ideal of promoting fundamental freedoms in Russia is not
that gullible Russians have been mystified by Kremlin spin doctors. It also is
not that DNA or history have doomed Russians to submit to centralized authority.
In the last three years, when pensioners, automobile drivers, and other
Russians have felt that their material interests and personal rights were
threatened, they have demonstrated, often effectively.
Polls have shown
that the overwhelming majority of Russians continue to value freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of political choice, though they
tend to rank those rights as lower priorities than protection from violence,
access to medical care, and receipt of pensions.
Instead of being
frustrated by Russians' current priorities, we can be, I think, cautiously
optimistic that as more Russians achieve a level of economic security more of
them will assert their interests and demand respect for their rights.
There are severe limits to what Washington can do to promote freedoms in Russia
at a time when the Kremlin has tightened control over the mass media and sharply
restricted opportunities for political activity by critics of the government.
Lecturing Russia about democracy provokes resentment, as you noted earlier in
your remarks.
Publicly excoriating human rights violations in Russia will
have little positive impact. Not only top Russian officials, but also the
majority of Russians dismiss State Department criticism of Russian rights
violations as a product of prejudice, stereotypes, and a desire to discredit
Russia.
That does not mean that we must abandon all hopes to influence the
development of Russia in a positive way. It does mean that we must reconsider
some deeply entrenched assumptions and shift to a more gradual and subtle
approach.
I can offer five specific suggestions.
First, be patient.
There are different ways to be a missionary. One way is to go to a foreign
country with little knowledge of the language or culture, but much fervor and
high hopes to reap rich rewards in a short period of time.
Many Americans
-- secular reformers and financial investors, as well as Christian missionaries
-- took that approach to Russia in the 1990s and wound up frustrated,
disillusioned and embittered.
Another and wiser way to be a missionary is
to make a long-term commitment, learn the language, understand the culture,
cultivate connections in the foreign society, and hope to see benefits not in
weeks or months, but in years or decades.
Second, one of the most promising
ways to pursue that patient approach is, of course, to increase funding for
educational cooperation and cultural exchanges.
During the Cold War,
scholarly exchanges were effective means of building relationships and
influencing the ideas of Russian intellectuals, some of whom eventually had
significant impact on changes in Soviet government policies. It's particularly
important to maintain and, if possible, expand such contacts at a time of
tensions between the American and Russian governments.
Third, don't
ostracize Russia. When Russian leaders have done things that seemed morally
repugnant or politically frustrating, many Americans have been inclined to
excommunicate Russia. In recent months, for example, we've heard many calls to
throw Russia out of the G-8.
We've tried that sort of approach before, and
it hasn't worked. I think the best example -- there are many that I could cite
-- but I think the best example of the ineffectiveness of excommunication is the
U.S. policy of not recognizing Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1933.
That
policy did not hasten the collapse of Bolshevism or lead to the compensation of
American companies whose assets had been nationalized. The main short-term
effect was to direct more Soviet trade to European countries.
Fourth,
engage Russia. In contrast to the ineffectiveness of isolation, there is a
positive model of genuine engagement: the policy of Ronald Reagan and George
Shultz.
Twenty years ago this month, Ronald Reagan flew to Moscow.
Walking with Gorbachev on Red Square, Reagan said that the Soviet Union had
changed so much in the preceding years that it was no longer an evil empire.
If Reagan had heeded the pessimists in his administration who insisted that
Gorbachev's words were merely deception and that Russia was an irredeemable
enemy, he would not have gone to Geneva in 1985 or Reykjavik in 1986, much less
to Moscow in 1988. Fortunately, Reagan believed that even communists could
change, and he learned that genuine dialogue could encourage reform.
One of
the things Reagan talked with Gorbachev about was the importance of religious
freedom. The U.S. president can follow that example today by encouraging
President Medvedev to speak publicly in Russia about the importance of religious
freedom and the value of all Russian citizens, regardless of their religious
affiliations.
Although Medvedev can be expected, at least in the near
term, to follow President Putin's policies in most areas, his youth, legal
training, and recent statements provide some reason to hope that he will be
inclined to make more expansive affirmations of religious liberty and other
human rights.
Fifth, keep an open mind about Russia. Almost 60 years ago,
one of America's wisest diplomats offered advice about how to think about
Russia's future that is worth recalling today.
When the Soviet regime fell
or mellowed, George F. Kennan cautioned in 1951, Americans should not "hover
nervously" over the new Russian leaders, examining "their political complexions
to find out whether they answer to our concept of democratic." Instead,
Americans should, quote, "let them be Russians."
Kennan did not mean that
Americans should shrug their shoulders and give up all hope of influencing
developments in Russia. Rather, he counseled that Americans should conduct
themselves in ways that would facilitate, rather than impede, the emergence of
the kind of Russia they wanted to see.
In addition, Kennan recognized
that, quote, "the most important influence that the United States can bring to
bear upon internal developments in Russia will continue to be the influence of
example."
In recent years, some of the policies of the United States have
greatly reduced the attractiveness of the American example. Yet the United
States continues to be a touchstone for what is "normal" to many Russians,
including, it seems, Medvedev.
If the United States alters the policies
that have tarnished its global appeal and damaged its credibility as a champion
of human rights, it may enhance its influence in the future.
I think today
many Americans yearn for a reaffirmation of a positive sense of America's
mission in the world. An easy and familiar way to do that is to exaggerate real
problems in Russia and draw a stark dividing line between Russian autocracy and
American democracy.
That is likely to exacerbate tensions and impede the
emergence of the kind of Russia we would like to see.
A more difficult,
but in the long term more effective way to pursue America's mission is to reach
across the gap between the two countries, broaden the dialogue, and creatively
expand exchanges, in order to facilitate the positive evolution of Russia.
Thank you.
CARDIN: Well, let me thank all three of you for your testimony.
I can assure you that the members of this commission want to engage the
Russians in dialogue. In fact, one of the reasons I was looking forward to your
testimonies is that I expect we'll have that opportunity at some international
meetings this summer.
And I'm trying to get a better understanding on how to
communicate with friends I have in the Duma that have gained some important
positions where I think they can be influential in trying to advance some of
these matters. So I found the testimony here today to be very, very helpful.
I must tell you, if I could start perhaps with Dr. Foglesong, let me just tell
you some of the concerns I have about your testimony. I said I believe in
engagement. I think we need to be able to deal with the Russians.
But I
know that there are times you have to stand up for principle and you have to be
-- you shouldn't be naive in your negotiations. I think back about how the
United States handled the apartheid government of South Africa, how we handled
the emigration of dissidents and Soviet Jews from the Soviet Union.
And
there's no question in my mind the strength of Americans standing up for human
rights at the cost of normalized trade brought about results.
I look at
what we've done in China, and I think the United States has given up an awful
lot of leverage in China and gotten very little in return. We have normalized
trade relations with China, and yet China continues to do things in trade that
are not fair, on currency, and on intellectual property, and on subsidies, and I
can go through the list. And they also -- their commitments on human rights
have been just ignored.
So you suggest that we should sit down and encourage
the Russians leadership to speak out more for religious freedom. And then I
think about the populism of the current government that you point out. And it
is a very popular government.
And I think about how that would be reflected
among the Russian people or the Moscow patriarch of the Orthodox Church. And I
question whether this government is prepared to take on those types of issues;
they haven't in the past.
So why do you think there's any hope that, by
peaceful and non-intimidating discussions with the Russians, that all of a
sudden they're going to put aside their popularism approach to stand up for
human rights or stand up for other values that we've been trying to promote?
FOGLESONG: I didn't mean to leave the impression that we should never stand up
for human rights. I merely was trying to suggest that we shouldn't have the
expectation that in the Russian case that's going to produce a positive result,
because the negative reaction it has been generating, both from Russian
government officials and from ordinary Russians who are surveyed about their
reaction, for example, to the State Department criticism.
I think what's
encouraging is to look at Medvedev's speeches and to see the vision of a Russia
with greater respect for human rights and freedoms that he lays out, a vision, I
think, of a modern Russia that will require all of Russian citizens to be able
to contribute their energy to the development of the society.
That's what
gives me some hope that engagement with them in dialogue could -- there's no
guarantee of it -- but it could, through engagement and dialogue, encourage him
to move to match his words with actions.
I think it will be a gradual
process. As you rightly note, with his connections to the Russian Orthodox
Church, it will not be easy for him to affirm the rights of all Russian citizens
to religious freedom, regardless of their religious affiliation. But I think
that's a direction for us to seek to work, for us to try to move in, as
creatively as we possibly can.
CARDIN: I guess my point is, why do you
believe there will be any interest in the individuals we talk with to move
forward on speaking out in favor of religious freedom? Where is there an
indication that the Russian leadership really is interested in taking on this
issue?
FOGLESONG: Well, I think there have been affirmations, not only by
Medvedev, but earlier by Putin, of respect for the religious freedom of the
traditional, the defined four traditional religions in Russia. And I think the
challenge...
CARDIN: They also speak out for the freedom of the press, but
look what they do.
FOGLESONG: Well, Senator, I think that, when we look at
the question of anti-Semitism, for example, I don't think that it's simply a
matter of rhetoric, in the case of Putin. I think that has record with regard
to dealing with anti-Semitism has been an encouraging one. And I think that
many Jewish-Americans would agree on that.
So I think there is a record with
regard not only to the Orthodox Church, but also with regard to Muslims and to
Jews, that there is a much greater respect for religious freedom than there was
in Soviet times.
CARDIN: I happen to think that the progress made against
anti-Semitism is mainly because of Europe and the fact that the United States
was able to highlight this as a major priority within OSCE.
And Russia
wanted to be a player in this discussion with Europe and felt that it was not a
major problem within their own country for leadership to come out and support
the international efforts. I'm not so sure the initiation came from Russian
leadership.
Let me get back to the mid-'90s, when Russia entered the Council
of Europe. I think there was an expectation at that time that, through that
type of dialogue, that issues such as Russian troops in Moldova would be able to
be engaged and the Russians would remove their troops, but it hasn't happened.
I guess I'm just giving you examples. I believe in engagement, but I'm not so
sure I agree that we should be making any concessions at all to Russia at this
point.
And I think one of you mentioned the normal trade relations, and I
couldn't argue more that the original justifications for Jackson-Vanik no longer
exists in Russia.
However, Russia's trade policies and Russia's human rights
records to me are very difficult for us to go out of our way to make
accommodations for Russia.
So let me, perhaps, turn to you, if I might, Dr.
Wallander. You said something in your statement that really caught my
attention, that there are reports that Mr. Putin has accumulated $41 billion.
That's kind of shocking.
Now, I take it he didn't have $41 billion when he
became a president of Russia?
WALLANDER: That is an analysis and an
estimate -- and he won't mind my citing him -- from my friend and colleague and
scholar, Anders Aslund. And it's based upon reports, public reports in the
Russian press of Putin's ownership of stocks in companies of associates, some
state-controlled companies, some quasi-state-controlled companies, some private
companies. So it's not cash on hand.
CARDIN: I understand.
WALLANDER:
It's control of assets of companies. And it's not unusual. Many Russian
leaders in the Putin elite control large swaths of stock of very lucrative
companies, energy companies, defense companies, and banks, as well.
So an
assessment of the Russian elite and the wealth it holds and controls would yield
maybe not quite those numbers, but numbers -- pretty substantial numbers. And
these are not businessmen, so they didn't come -- well, some of them were
businessmen.
For example, Dmitry Medvedev actually ran a business in St.
Petersburg for a time, before he moved to Moscow. But for the most part, the
leaders around Putin were not businessmen. They were from the security services
and came into government.
CARDIN: And let me try to combine all three of
you here for a moment. Dr. Blank suggests that the leadership in Russia are
comparable to -- let me use the more traditional -- to gangsters.
Putting
together the wealth accumulation, putting together the widespread concerns of
corruption within the Russian government, and knowing the progress we've made in
other former Soviet republics on dealing with establishing democratic
institutions and taking on the corruption issue as a major prerequisite in order
to develop the democratic institutions that are necessary, can you just give me
an evaluation as to how significant corruption is in the Russian government at
the current time? How big of a problem is it?
BLANK: Well, I can give you
some examples, because obviously this is not the kind of thing for which
accurate statistics exist.
But it was reported last month, at a program here
in Washington on the Russian military, that, in 2006, Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov commissioned an audit of the Defense Ministry's budget for that year and
reported to Mr. Putin that 40 percent to 50 percent of it was stolen. Other
estimates are even higher.
The government is awash in corruption. And as
Professor Wallander indicated, by virtue of a system whereby the state owns at
least the commanding heights of the national economy, the elite is able to
enrich itself at an extraordinary rate, which is visible to anybody who travels
to Moscow or sees them in action.
It must be added, as well, that this
corruption does not stay in Russia. This is systematic attempt, which is
reported both officially and in journalism, of states across Europe, from the
Baltic to the Balkans and Central Europe, of Russian organized crime, business,
intelligence and government working together in an integrated fashion, as one
official said, like a fist, in order to corrupt European public institutions,
corrupt governments, buy influence, and so on, using mafia-like -- that was his
term -- using mafia-like tactics.
And this is a widespread view in European
chancelleries as to what's really going on in Russia.
CARDIN: Yes, Dr.
Wallander?
WALLANDER: I would argue -- I agree with the analysis. For me,
the implication, though, is not -- and here I would agree with my colleague --
the response is not to further isolate Russia, because that actually helps the
elite continue to do this.
If you have -- if the Russian elite is able to
control companies that are not subject to international business practices,
international standards of corporate governance, reporting, transparency, these
sorts of -- the demands that foreign investors would make of companies, the
Russian elite can keep the system working the way it is.
That's why it's not
by accident that the Russian state has tried to prevent foreign investment in
the energy sector and in other lucrative sectors that want -- the isolation
helps the elite maintain the system.
The long-term strategy for
transforming Russia is to create a stake in transformation in liberalization in
the international economy and in interaction on the part of Russian businesses,
Russian students, Russian society, Russian media, brave journalists who do
continue to work there.
So isolating Russia is not only not the right
response; it's actually counterproductive. And the more we can...
CARDIN:
That sounds counterintuitive.
WALLANDER: Right.
CARDIN: So let me
just challenge you there for a moment. It seems like that, perhaps on the short
term, that's accurate, but that, on the long term, Russia's ability to maintain
-- the Russian leaders' ability to maintain and their support, based upon
popular approval of what they're doing -- and I acknowledge that the Putin
government's popular with the people, was popular with the people of Russia.
They want their pensions paid. They want their economy to grow. They see how
their neighbors are doing. And they want to be able to enjoy a better life for
themselves and for their families. And if the government can't deliver that,
over time, it will lose the support of the people.
If Russia isolates
itself, if it's not able to get international investment, if it's unable to
enter the international marketplace, it seems to me that, over a period of time,
they cannot -- their economy cannot grow the way it needs to.
We saw that
with rather strong economies, such as in South Africa, that there was a huge
price to pay for the failure of the South African leaders to deal with the
apartheid of its government. We found that the Soviet Union paid a heavy price
for being isolated economically with the United States.
So I don't know if
I'm going to just accept your statement. And I want to give you another chance
to come back as to why you're right on this issue.
WALLANDER: If I can do
an analysis of the success of your strategy, the problem would be that it would
-- we can't even get the Europeans to agree to cooperate on an energy security
strategy...
CARDIN: You're absolutely right about that. There's no
question...
(CROSSTALK)
WALLANDER: So we wouldn't be successful in
creating that kind of isolation...
(CROSSTALK)
CARDIN: And nor are we
trying to. So, I mean, that's not our strategy at this point, nor is it my
strategy.
WALLANDER: So the argument would be -- excuse me -- would simply
be to the extent that they interact with the international economy on our terms,
by being members of the WTO, and having to live up to those standards, it's
better to hold them to the standards and make clear to them -- and I'm not an
advocate of kicking Russia out of the G-8. The deal is done; the decision was
made.
But I do think we shouldn't have let Russia into the G-8 before it was
a qualified member. We have standards for membership in NATO. We have
standards for membership in the WTO. And those standards should mean something,
because once a country is in, that leverage is gone.
So the WTO creates
leverage for working against that kind of corruption, against those kind of
practices. And if we're playing the long game, which at this point we have to
do, because we don't really have much leverage now because of the state that
Putin -- the kind of state that Putin has created, we have to be thinking about
engagement of interests in society and in the economy, which over time, then,
will have their capacity enhanced and their interests motivated to make demands
of their own state, to be able to pursue the wealth that is out there in the
international system by playing by the rules.
BLANK: If I could jump into
this discussion, I can give you an example, Senator, from this commission
itself. If there was no Helsinki treaty and no Helsinki Commission, then, 30
years ago and up to the present, we would have no formalized means of exposing
Russia's derelictions with regard to human rights and democracy, which were so
instrumental in encouraging both dissidents and people who wished to leave in
the Soviet regime, and human rights campaigners now.
So, as Justice Brandeis
said, sunshine is the best disinfectant. And it also gets to the question of
the popularity of the Putin regime. There is no doubt that Mr. Putin is
reported to enjoy great popularity, and it may well be the case. But he also
enjoys great popularity because there is no alternative capable of being
expressed in Russia.
And the Russian government does not trust that
popularity. When officials from the presidential administration go out to the
provinces and tell governors of the province, "You will deliver 70 percent of
your votes for Mr. Putin or else," it indicates that they don't trust in his
popularity, they don't believe that it is legitimate or solidly based.
And
the government of Russia itself acts like a government that is fully aware of
its own illegitimacy. Therefore, exposing their activities, integrating them
into operations and organizations where they have to conform to standards like
the WTO, like the OSCE, and so on, is much more productive than allowing them to
hide behind impenetrable structures which we cannot clarify or leverage.
We
see this, you know, dissenting (ph) with sanctions regimes that have been
imposed in many other countries for various reasons. They've had a
counterindicated effect, because they did not give us really leverage on the
economy or politics of those countries, and allowed those leaders to carry on
the way they wanted to and, if anything, exacerbated violations of human rights,
violence, criminality, and so on.
Yugoslavia, Serbia are perfect examples,
Iraq before 2003 is another. So it is necessary to have an engagement with
Russia to advance international security interests, because we are the two
greatest nuclear powers, and because Russia is a legitimate player in European
and Asian security.
But at the same time, it is necessary for us to expose
the lie, to expose the violations of international courts that Russia has
signed, and to try and increase our leverage on them to do so.
It's not
simple. It never will be. But there's no better alternative.
CARDIN: Let
me ask one final question, and I'd invite all three of you to respond, and
getting back to the subject of our hearing for one moment, and that is, under
the Medvedev administration, can we expect a change?
My question is,
Russia's history has shown that it generally has one dominant leader. Is there
any expectation whatsoever that Mr. Medvedev could have significant impact,
independent of Mr. Putin, in the policies in Russia?
BLANK: Well, I believe
Russia is going to change, because change is the law of life. And the question
will be whether those changes come about from largely internal or from
externally generated sources.
But I would argue that the balance of opinion
weighs against Mr. Medvedev being able to act independently, given the kinds of
operations that Celeste has discussed here and which are widely reported, trying
to transfer power from Medvedev to Putin.
That said, we don't know what the
future, obviously, is going to hold, and things can happen that they can't
expect. I fully believe that the system, which is inherently suboptimal from a
political and economic point of view, will reach a crisis within a few years.
And I do believe that there will be changes. We just don't know what the
nature is. Therefore, we have to be prepared and flexible enough to respond
should opportunities make themselves felt.
The changes that might come
about, though, cannot be foreseen at the present. And it would be a very rash
analyst that would speculate that the balance of the odds, so to speak, favors
Mr. Medvedev over Mr. Putin.
CARDIN: OK.
WALLANDER: Yes, I would
agree.
And I think that it's likely that we'll see more indications of a
shift in power to Prime Minister Putin, that to the extent that President
Medvedev is influential it will be through his relationship with Prime Minister
Putin, and that that probably means, for the most part, a substantial continuity
in policy, both domestic and foreign, with the exception that I suggested, that
the elite is feeling itself -- or to the extent that the elite is feeling secure
in the succession process that it has successful -- that it believes that has
successfully managed, that is creates less of a need to talk about the United
States as a foreign enemy set upon breaking Russia apart from within and,
therefore, creates a set of opportunities for some initiatives in the next year
or two for pragmatic cooperation, which could change the tone in a way that
might sort of encourage these -- what I think we've made the argument for -- the
opportunity for ending or breaking apart the isolation that the elite has
created and engaging more of Russian society, thinking about the long term.
FOGLESONG: I defer to my colleagues who have greater expertise on current
relations than I do as a historian. I think the short answer is: We don't
know. And I think my two colleagues have made a compelling case for why there
are doubts about Mr. Medvedev's ability to demonstrate an independent impact.
CARDIN: Dr. Wallander, one final point in regards to -- you've referenced in
your written statement several of the international organizations, but I want to
specifically reference OSCE. Can you just give us your view as to how
significant you believe Russia places on OSCE and its foreign policy?
WALLANDER: As you yourself have clearly experienced, OSCE has gone through a
bad patch in its relations -- in Russian foreign policy.
And ironically,
it's precisely because an organization that a lot of security experts might not
have put at the top of the pantheon of security institutions actually ended up
being highly effective and important for security in Eurasia through the support
of democratic processes and helping the transformation of countries, like
Georgia, Ukraine, in the Baltics, and other countries.
The success stories
are very substantial. Those success stories can help Russia, too, Russian
society, Russian citizens, Russian business. But the problem is the successes
inherently threaten the Russian elite, because the Russian elite has created a
political system that is not consistent with the principles of political
security, human rights, openness, and liberalization.
So I think that the
more that the Russian elite doesn't like the OSCE and the more trouble it gives
the OSCE, the better sign it is for the OSCE.
CARDIN: That's a very nice
way of putting it. Is there anything that OSCE should be doing to strengthen
the Russian participation without jeopardizing the principles of OSCE?
WALLANDER: I think that Russia, more than -- even the Russian elite needs
Europe. They need Europe both to be able to sell energy to Europe; they need
Europe to be able to invest, either cleanly or corruptly; they need Europe for
the political associations.
They see themselves as European. And Europe
is a way to kind of manage the United States, which is not necessarily a bad
thing. You know, from the American point of view, a Russia that's not feeling
aggrieved and threatened can cooperate with us.
So I think that getting the
Europeans to focus once again on what a success story the OSCE is and how that
is so consistent with European values and the peaceful end of the Cold War,
which, I think, again, as Americans we tend to overlook the importance of Europe
and Europe's principled commitment to the Helsinki process and its role in the
end of the Cold War.
So, really, working with the Europeans, I think, is a
way to re-attract attention from some Russian constituencies and seeing a space
for the legitimacy of the OSCE and Russia's commitments to the OSCE.
CARDIN:
Russia verbalizes their concern as the OSCE only looking east of Vienna for its
critical oversight. Is that a real concern within Russia? Or do you think
that's just a way of trying to diminish the OSCE's role today, because it sees
it inconsistent with its own agenda?
WALLANDER: In my view, it's a tactical
argument that the Russian elite has used to try to undermine the legitimacy of
the OSCE. But it's an argument that can be relatively easily dismissed or
exposed as not having a basis by encouraging the OSCE to issue reports on human
rights in European countries...
(CROSSTALK)
CARDIN: Which it does.
WALLANDER: ... and to highlight those, and to encourage, I think -- we have an
American presidential election coming up in the fall -- encourage active OSCE
election monitoring that shows the standards, the appropriate standards.
I
know that there often are monitors, but I don't think that they're highlighted
enough. And I don't think people know -- I know many educated experts on the
region who have given me that Russian argument back...
CARDIN: It's a good
point, yes.
WALLANDER: ... because they don't know that the OSCE actually
does send monitors to Western countries, as well.
CARDIN: Well, the 2004
elections got tremendous international coverage. So there was significant
attention to it, but I think that's good advice, and I appreciate that.
Let
me thank all three of you for your testimony. This has been extremely helpful
to us. We are obviously very much interested in having an effective
relationship with Russia.
They're a major country of interest to the United
States, as Secretary Fried pointed out, in so many different areas. It's just
very frustrating when we see so many of their activities running counter to what
we think is in the best interest of Russia and the United States.
And within
the OSCE, it's been very difficult, because the OSCE has been effective. It's
been effective in bringing about free and fair elections. It's been effective
in avoiding confrontation in so many countries through its missions. And it's
been very helpful in helping to establish the democratic institutions in
countries so that they can transition to full integration within Europe.
So
all that is the record of OSCE. And it's frustrating to see Russia now taking
some of the energy that should be used to advance the goals of OSCE in order to
respond to some of the problems that it has created within OSCE.
So I think
this has been a very helpful hearing to us. And I really do thank you all for
your patience and your testimony. And I can assure you that we will be
following up with you, as we try to develop and affect the policy within the
commission, to further the goals of OSCE with Russia.
This hearing will
stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon the hearing
ended at 5:00 p.m.]
END
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