NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

UNION PACIFIC PUBLIC HEARING

Springfield Hilton
6550 Louisdale Road
Springfield, Virginia
Friday, March 20, 1998
8:00 a.m.


NTSB Board of Inquiry Members

Technical Panel Members

United Transportation Union Representatives

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Representatives

Union Pacific Railroad Representatives

Federal Railroad Commission Representatives

Texas Railroad Commission Representatives


A G E N D A

AGENDA ITEM:

Adjournment

P R O C E E D I N G S
------------------------

8:05 a.m.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Good morning, everybody. Back on the record for day three of this wonderful adventure.

And the order of appearance today will be the BLEA first, the UTU second, then Mr. Dennis Holland and Dennis Richling and Dr. Mark Rosekind, and the final witness of the day -- witnesses of the day will be James Phelan and Don Itzkoff from the FRA.

So, Mr. Dunn, will you please call the next witness?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The National Transportation Safety Board calls James Bradford and George Hucker.

(Pause)

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you. Please be seated.

TESTIMONY OF
JAMES BRADFORD
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, AND
GEORGE HUCKER
VP AND CANADIAN NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Bradford, would you state for the record your full name and spell your last name?

MR. BRADFORD: Full name is James E. Bradford, B-R-A-D-F-O-R-D.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Hucker, would you state for the record your full name and spell your last name, please?

MR. HUCKER: My name is Thomas George Hucker, H-U-C-K-E-R.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Bradford, what is your present position with Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. BRADFORD: I am a special representative.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. And how long have you held that position?

MR. BRADFORD: This current time I've been on since 1992.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Are you also employed in the railroad industry?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. I'm an engineer on the Union Pacific.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And how long have you held that position?

MR. BRADFORD: I was hired as a locomotive fireman in '73.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And have you worked continuous -- was that with the Southern Pacific or Union Pacific?

MR. BRADFORD: Southern Pacific, and I was promoted to a locomotive engineer approximately in April of '76. I worked on the property until 1980. I went on the International as a special representative in 1980, worked as a special rep until '87, went back on the property in '87, and stayed there until I came back this time in '92.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. And as an engineer where have you worked geographically?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, my prior -- is in Houston, Texas, so I've worked, you know, in many ways out of Houston.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: I understand.

MR. BRADFORD: East, west, north, and south.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Hucker, what is your present position with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. HUCKER: I'm an international vice president and Canadian legislative representative for the Brotherhood of Canada.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And how long have you held that position?

MR. HUCKER: For five years now.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And could you briefly tell us about positions you have held in the railroad industry or organized labor?

MR. HUCKER: I hired on in 1966 as a treeman yardman with Canadian Pacific Railway in Thunder Bay and subsequently qualified as a conductor. And in 1975 in the first training program that CP had in regards to locomotive engineers I qualified as a locomotive engineer. I held that position in both yard and -- and on assigned freight service until 1986 when I was elected as a general chairman for the Brotherhood for Western Canada, and subsequently to that in 1993 I was elected to an international vice president and the national legislative representative for Canada.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you.

We will begin the questioning with the Technical Panel.

MR. COCHRAN: Thank you, Mr. Dunn.

Good morning, Mr. Bradford. Could you please describe your duties as a special representative?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, George, I -- I do a lot of things. I -- I do education and training out of our education and training department at the International. I present this training to our local divisions across the country. I assist secretary-treasurers with their duties, government-reporting, and things of that nature. And one of my primary responsibilities is I'm a team leader of the BLE safety task force.

MR. COCHRAN: Are you assigned to any specific geographical location?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. I have approximately 14 states. I have Texas, I have the two states west of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, and up through central -- west of the Mississippi, I've got some divisions in Illinois, but I have Arkansas, Texas, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas, Wisconsin.

MR. COCHRAN: Were you involved in any pre-merger planning with the Union Pacific-Southern Pacific merger?

MR. BRADFORD: No, sir. I was not.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you have any strategies or does the B of LE have any strategies relative to mergers anticipated?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I'm sure that they've got a strategy, George, but I'm -- I'm not involved in that level.

MR. COCHRAN: Have you an opinion on safety-related matters that should have been addressed prior to -- to such merger as the Union Pacific-Southern Pacific's merger?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir, I've got some opinions.

MR. COCHRAN: Would you care to express those?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I -- I've heard a lot about, you know, what's going on here, and I'm excited that some of these problems are being addressed. I have some concerns that they'll never make it down to the lowest level where they need to go for a lot of different reasons.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you know -- was the B of LE involved in any of the safety action plans associated with the -- the accidents that we're discussing at this hearing?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, George, I wasn't -- I wasn't directly involved in 'em, but I believe we do have people on those programs.

MR. COCHRAN: And are you aware of the assessment that was furnished in February relative to SACP process on the Union Pacific?

MR. BRADFORD: I was given a copy of that when I arrived and I've -- I've read over it, yes, sir.

MR. COCHRAN: Did the B of LE have opportunity to make comment on that assessment?

MR. BRADFORD: I wouldn't really know, George. I -- I -- I would hope that we did.

MR. COCHRAN: I have no further questions at this time, Mr. Bradford.

Mr. Weeks, do you have any questions?

DR. WEEKS: Mr. Bradford, were you present yesterday afternoon for Mr. Varvel's testimony with respect to drug and alcohol testing on the Union Pacific?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir, I was.

DR. WEEKS: In the course of his testimony he mentioned Operation Red Block, the Operation Red Block program as -- as a possible strategy to reduce or deter drug and alcohol use. Are -- are you aware of the program? And if -- if so, I'd like to get your assessment of the vigor with which that program is implemented. Is -- is it a successful program?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, yes, sir, I -- I think it's a very successful program because I -- I had the privilege of setting in a room one time when -- when the chief brought up that he would like to have good employees have a second chance in the industry. And that was a long time ago, and I think Mr. Davis is committed to that program. It's got some -- it's got some hiccups in it, but I think it's a good program.

DR. WEEKS: Do you have any recommendation as -- as to how to remove some of those hiccups or anything to enhance that program?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, there's still a level of intimidation and fear that if you do have those type of problems on the railroad -- a lot of guys still cover 'em up, still hide 'em. I -- I don't know how you make that a -- a more friendly place. That's for guys like yourself and others in that area that know those kind of answers, but for a locomotive engineer to kind of turn himself in or say he has a problem, as a rule the people he talks to sometime make that decision a little difficult.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you. I -- I have no further questions for Mr. Bradford.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Good morning, Mr. Bradford.

Questions along the line of fatigue, which was discussed pretty well in here yesterday. What kind of feedback is the BLE getting from their membership on fatigue, not only on the UP but in the industry?

MR. BRADFORD: I guess that's the number one enemy of an engineer. I get almost -- I wouldn't say all of my complaints, but if they don't start out with fatigue it's somewhere in their conversation with me when I visit the divisions and ask them, you know, if they have a message that I need to deliver back to Vice President Walpert. And you know, when am I going to go to work and how often I work, and the attitude of CMS, the attitude of the first-line officers, the condition of the equipment, the facilities at the away-from-home, and an engineer just trying to lead a normal life. He gets -- he gets pretty tired.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: I guess what I -- I know there's a lot of areas in fatigue, but is it -- is it that they're on the trains too long or they're working too much? Is the hours of service too much for 'em? I'm more interested in -- in that area.

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I think any time you ask someone like a locomotive engineer to work as much as either they like to work or the carrier makes them work and you factor in what time am I going to go to work, you never know. You factor in the time that when you do call the railroad and says, "What's your best guess?" and they don't know if you're going to go to work today or tomorrow, it -- it starts to grind on you. And it -- it has a -- you know, a direct relationship, I believe, to safety.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: And we had heard, and I know this 'cause I used to do it too, is that supervisors work 12, 14 hours a day seven days a week, 369 days a year. How about a locomotive engineer? Are they putting in them kind of hours also?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, Mr. Dunn, you know, in most cases they put in more time than that. That's -- I -- I heard some comments that the poor managers work -- working long hours, and I always enjoy the generals telling me how -- how to get my rest in the muddy foxhole. I mean, you know, I -- they don't -- they don't live that same life. They got different pressures, they've got different responsibilities. But I -- I believe when the Supreme Court ruled on the hours of service I think whoever was responsible for that, they should hang their heads in shame.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Let's switch gears just a little bit to accidents on the Union Pacific Railroad in that year period.

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: And in Texas since that's -- were you getting any kind of feedback from your members as far as them seeing something out of the ordinary that could lead to the accidents that occurred?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, a lot of engineers that were very familiar with the territory and worked it 15, 20, 30, 40 years, you know, all had some very good ideas of what happened and what caused it.

I think that there's many pieces to that puzzle, and I've heard a number of 'em spoken about here today or this week. And I think the record will speak for itself in that area of the many things that could and should be dealt with. The fatigue issue is definitely one.

There's many things. The incident at Divine. I rode the test engines at the -- the sister engines that the deceased engineer was on. The Board was kind enough to ask a series of questions, you know. What do you -- where you think that's coming at you? You know, when do you know it's engine? When do you know it's a train?

And the BLE made a recommendation to the Board. One of their recommendations was that wreck could have been prevented by an oscillating headlight because of the train there and the characteristics of the territory.

So, you know, there's -- there's a lot of things, Mr. Dunn. You know, you -- as you well know.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. To the parties. Texas Railroad Commission?

MR. MARTIN: Yes, I may just have one of Mr. Bradford.

You've heard testimony earlier in this proceeding about -- about things getting better as far as crew -- crew management, crew pickup, and that sort of stuff. Would -- in the -- in your area, would you agree with that? Would you agree with those statements that it's getting better here recently?

MR. BRADFORD: I don't -- I don't see it getting measurably better. It could be getting very better in some areas, and I'm sure that the railroad or their consultants can probably prove to you that it's better. But I don't -- I don't see it being much better.

MR. MARTIN: That's all the questions I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. GAVALLA: First of all, I'd like to thank the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for their commitment to safety and their leadership in promoting safety partnerships with FRA and railroad management of the Union Pacific Railroad and really throughout the railroad industry.

Mr. Bradford, you made a reference to comments that you have concern that some of the safety plans that were discussed during these hearings haven't made it out into the field, and -- and there's a concern as to whether they ever will. And you've certainly heard FRA -- echo those concerns as have other parties here.

Do you have any ideas, any -- any suggestions as to how we can ensure that these plans are implemented in the field at the rank-and-file level and in first-line supervision?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. I would -- I know they've got a busy schedule, but for some of these generals setting at this next table here to show up at the Englewood Yard Office in Houston, Texas and to tell people coming on and off duty that's the way it's going to be. That would be one way.

MR. GAVALLA: Okay. Thank you. I have a question for Mr. Hucker.

Sir, do you have any experience in dealing with fatigue issues in the railroad industry?

MR. HUCKER: Mr. Gavalla, I am my union's representative in regards to fatigue in the North American railroad industry and have been a part of the two original projects that -- that took place both with the FRA -- pardon me, with the AAR and with the Railways of Canada.

MR. GAVALLA: Based on your experience and expertise, do you have any recommendations to address fatigue issues, particularly among train and engine service crews?

MR. HUCKER: The original Canada Alert report that we did in Canada with Canadian National and Canadian Pacific had a number of -- I believe it was 12 outstanding or fatigue countermeasures that should be put in place. Based on -- on -- on those recommendations I would suggest that this industry should adopt all of them as part of any fatigue countermeasure program. We proved that they work. We proved that you cannot use a cookie cutter approach to fatigue in the industry. We must do it by subdivision specific and simply if we -- if we get the railways to implement these things we will have a -- a far safer workplace than we have today for locomotive engineers and conductors.

MR. GAVALLA: Thank you, Mr. Hucker. No further questions at this time.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Union Pacific?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a question. I just -- Mr. Bradford, I know that you helped in the investigation of these accidents that we had in 1997. On behalf of the Union Pacific I would like to thank you for that. I know -- I know it's not pleasant duty. We all feel that way. But certainly, we appreciate your efforts and the BLE efforts in the investigation of these accidents, and I thank you.

MR. BRADFORD: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: UTU?

MR. SULLIVAN: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. WALPERT: Yes, I have a couple of questions.

Mr. Bradford, you stated that you are a team leader for a safety task force. Would you explain your responsibilities and -- and what the safety task force is?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, the -- the -- the responsibility is to assemble my task force members who are scattered out all across the country. They are usually locomotive engineers that are working on that geographical area. We meet with the Board and the Board gives us party status, and in that party status they -- they request local knowledge or local expertise or whatever we can be value added to the investigation process. And I would like to believe that we -- we're -- we're a lot of help in that area.

MR. WALPeRT: Of the accidents that are being addressed during this hearing, did you participate in the investigation of any of those accidents?

MR. BRADFORD: I believe that I had five of those accidents during this period of questioning.

MR. WALPERT: Do you recall which ones they were?

MR. BRADFORD: The Board doesn't call it Kennefec, but I -- it's -- is it Andillia? Yeah, okay. We had Andillia. The Forth Worth incident on the runaway locomotives, the two in the Houston area, West Junction and Navasoda, and -- and Divine.

MR. WALPERT: In those accidents that -- that you investigated, Mr. Bradford, in your capacity as a team leader for a safety task force, did -- were you able to draw any conclusions as to the cause of the accidents?

MR. BRADFORD: Each one of 'em were very different. I think there is a common cause that runs through all those.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: I'm going to have to stop that question. The cause of the accidents is the purview of the NTSB, and we haven't made that determination yet.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

In -- in regard to the investigations, Mr. Bradford, did -- at any time did train line-ups come out during your investigations?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, they did.

MR. WALPERT: In what respect?

MR. BRADFORD: I can specifically identify two, one inside this 12-month period we're talking about and one outside the 12 months we're talking about. And the one outside this envelope had four fatalities in it.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

You also spoke of a Supreme Court ruling on hours of service.

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. WALPERT: Were you referring to that part of the ruling that provided that crews did not have to be relieved upon expiration of 12 hours?

MR. BRADFORD: Absolutely.

MR. WALPERT: And what has that caused in -- in the industry and in your observation?

MR. BRADFORD: I would say it was a milestone in my railroading career as a total disappointment with the Federal Government and the courts.

MR. WALPERT: Have you observed that crews are -- are required to stay on -- on trains for an inordinate amount of time?

MR. BRADFORD: I talked to one crew that was on a locomotive in excess of 24 hours.

MR. WALPERT: Is this something that occurs infrequently or is it -- does it happen on a regular basis?

MR. BRADFORD: You better prepare for it on every trip.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. That's really all I have. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: The head table? Ms. Beal?

MS. BEAL: Good morning.

MR. BRADFORD: Good morning.

MS. BEAL: I realize that volumes could be written on the question I'm about to ask you, but I'm going to ask you to try to summarize in a word or two.

MR. BRADFORD: Okay.

MS. BEAL: In your opinion, what has prevented a mutually agreeable solution to the fatigue problem in the railroad industry?

MR. BRADFORD: If I'm going to work at 3:00, tell me I am.

MS. BEAL: So, scheduling is what you're saying?

MR. BRADFORD: Call it anything you want to, but if I know I'm going to go to work at three, --

MS. BEAL: The --

MR. BRADFORD: -- my lifestyle would be totally different than if I don't know I'm going.

MS. BEAL: Okay. Mr. Hucker, could you answer that question also, please?

MR. HUCKER: The -- the changing of the -- of the way freight crews operate from -- from unassigned freight service to a scheduling environment would allow a locomotive engineer and conductor to have some regularity and predictability in their lifestyle and their -- and their work environment. It is a simple process. The problem that we have with it right now is that the railways have not been able to computerize it, and thereby, it's all done by hand in the location where we are running time windows, as we -- as we call scheduling. The -- they are difficult to demand right now because of the fact it's done without electronic aid.

MS. BEAL: And I would like to ask both of you the same -- the next question also, and that is what in your opinion can the Federal Government do to help with the resolution to the problem?

MR. HUCKER: I think that the Federal Government and its agencies should keep the railways' feet to the fire, to put it in a -- the broadest terms. This issue of fatigue should not become the flavor of the month as some of the other issues in the industry have become over the years.

I think that the fatigue issue is not a -- a -- an American issue or a Canadian issue, it's a North American issue, and thereby, what happens in this country and what happens in Canada will have a -- an effect on all of us who operate trains in North America. And so, not only should the -- the FRA and this Board ensure that the railways understand that it is a top priority to the government and keep their -- them involved and -- and continue on with the process that we've started.

MS. BEAL: Mr. Bradford?

MR. BRADFORD: Following George is a little tough to do. Let me see if I can put it my way.

Most -- most of the engineers, most of the guys that I've talked to don't have any faith in the system. They want the studying to stop. They want the FRA or whoever to fix it.

MS. BEAL: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Ellingstad?

DR. ELLINGSTAD: I'd -- I'd also like to ask a couple of questions to both of you gentlemen, both in your capacities as -- as representatives of -- of people who are working in the -- in the industry and as practicing engineers yourselves. I understand that the scheduling irregularity difficulties. I'd also like to -- to get at the issue of the amount of work that's done per unit of time, etc.

First, Mr. Hucker, when you were -- when you're operating trains, what -- what's a typical work week in terms of numbers of hours on duty?

MR. HUCKER: My experience as a -- as a -- as a locomotive engineer in Canada would be the exact opposite to what Jim Bradford's experience or any other -- locomotive engineer in the U.S. would be. When I worked in the -- freight service, we did not have hours of service. Our -- our regulations were covered by -- were in the collective bargaining agreement. My normal workday would be -- by collective bargaining they had to have the unit off duty within 12 hours into the terminal, off the train and in the terminal. It was only by two incidents in late 1993 that we ended up with hours of service in the industry in Canada.

So, my experience has been totally different from what the -- the average U.S. locomotive engineer has been when it comes to unassigned freight service. I would normally work 10 days in a month or 10 trips in a month. I'd be out and back in about 24 hours with a day off between my tours of duty just by the way the traffic patterns flowed.

And when I came down to the States as a -- as a union officer and really got involved in my -- in my union, I was -- I was appalled to see what was going on down here. Clearly, the -- the people that I represented in Canada would not accept what was going on in the U.S. rail industry as far as locomotive engineers were concerned.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. In a typical -- in a typical week, how many hours of duty would you -- I -- I realize that's difficult --

MR. HUCKER: It --

DR. ELLINGSTAD: -- given the -- the way that the scheduling was done.

MR. HUCKER: It would -- it would vary, but on a minimum, say, on a -- I worked in high speed freight trains. Over the subdivision I worked on, the -- the running time was two hours and 35 minutes. I was approximately on duty four hours on a -- on a intermodal train. On a tonnage pull train or -- train I would be four and a half to five hours on duty. Total time at the throttle would be approximately four hours, so I would on a round trip even though I was away from home for 20 to 24 hours, I would probably be at the throttle no more than nine hours at the most on -- on two tours of duty.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Mr. Bradford, could you --

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. I'm -- I'm -- I'm moving to Canada.

(Laughter)

MR. BRADFORD: You spent four hours in Englewood trying to get the train out of the yard. It takes you -- I was talking to one student. He said he'd made 30 student trips over a section of the railroad on the UP, and he'd made it to the final terminal five times.

So, you know, on a typical freight run from Houston to Lafayette, 220 miles, 12, 14, 15 hours down there, pick a number of hours off, anywhere between eight and 20, and you could almost give, maybe 10, 12, 14 hours off when you came home. So, you do that every day.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. What -- what would be your typical week, then? You're -- you're doing these things on a -- on an everyday basis?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. You're on call, and you would have -- if you came in and -- we -- we had a -- before SP went out of existence, we had a rest rule that management absolutely could not stand. And so therefore, most engineers loved it. And it gave an engineer the ability to what we call kick for a rest. "I'm -- I'm exhausted, I've had a tough trip, I need to be off longer than the FRA says I need to be off." And we had that absolute right.

The carrier will probably tell you that there was many cases of abuse. Well, I can probably show you many cases of where that engineer was able to stay awake and go that 220 miles without an incident. I can show you many more cases like that because he did have the ability to kick for rest.

But as a rule, the engineers were wore out, the conductors were wore out. There's a shortage of engineers, and laying off as a locomotive engineer, you can get -- you can do a lot of other things in life but you can't lay off. That's -- that's a -- that's a tough thing to do is to get time off.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Much of American society defines full-time work as 40 hours a week. Could an engineer on the Union Pacific or -- or any other U.S. railroad hold a job if they worked only 40 hours a week?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir. I'm -- I'm -- I'm sure that there's 40-hour-a-week jobs somewhere. I can't name you a lot of 'em. Not -- not on the western railroads. The switch engines in the -- in Englewood are -- are seven-day jobs. Road-switchers are 12-, 14-, 15-, 16-hour days. I don't -- I don't know of many 40-hour jobs.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Mr. Hucker?

MR. HUCKER: All the yard assignments in -- in Canada are 40-hour jobs. Unassigned freight service is -- has never been considered as a typical job in anywhere. And it would not be held normal by most of the population in the U.S. In fact, probably none of them would consider what Jimmy and I do for a living as -- as normal. Being -- being called in the middle of the night is not normal for the average working person. Not knowing when they're going to go to work in -- in -- in weeks ahead is not normal for the -- the average individual. But we and -- Jimmy and I and any locomotive engineer or conductor consider that as a -- a normal part of our working lifestyle. It's abnormal to everybody else.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. Finally, one -- one question, again, for both of you. Do you believe that there's a legitimate role for the -- for the U.S. Government through the FRA or whatever to establish limits on hours of service or -- which would include both amount of hours, time off, scheduling?

MR. HUCKER: You're putting me at a disadvantage because I disagree with hours of service, and that's my opinion because I believe it's -- based on faulty logic. I don't -- I don't -- do not believe that -- that a number is where we should be at, but if a number is going to be there, then unless we can do some things with -- fatigue side people who are far more knowledgeable of what goes on in the U.S. Government and what is necessary in the -- in the industry down here should answer that question.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Thank you.

Mr. Bradford?

MR. BRADFORD: 12 hours on a locomotive is a long time. Something needs to be done by the Government to make this long periods of duty -- on a locomotive go away, if it's fatigue gurus that says, you know, that it should change or if it's -- if the courts decide different or management decides that it's different or the Government decides that it's going to be different. That issue needs to be taken care of.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Lauby?

MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much. I just have a couple of questions. Dr. Ellingstad, you know, really got into the heart of -- of what I -- what I wanted to find out about.

But first of all, I'd like to -- to say that Mr. Bradford and -- and the BLE and also the UTU, how valuable their participation in our accident investigations has been through -- through their respective task force, and -- and we really appreciate the help and the expertise that -- that's available for us to draw on in our accident investigations to make sure that we're not overlooking anything or to make sure that we totally understand the situation. And -- and the quality of some of the reports that we're able to put out are directly related to that participation, so I do want to thank you for that.

The other area I just want to talk about shortly, this is a question for -- for Mr. Hucker.

Mr. Hucker, you stated that in Canada because of a couple of incidents there now is hours of service. Can -- can you tell us a little bit about the incidents that drove that?

MR. HUCKER: There were two passenger train assignments. One was working north out of Winnipeg, which is roughly about where North Dakota is, just above there. The -- we -- we have two locomotive engineers in the -- in the cab of the locomotive, and in one assignment one had -- the crew had been on duty for 23 hours, and the last hour of the -- of the tour of duty with a Transport Canada rider in the cab of the locomotive. The engineer did not acknowledge one of the fixed signals that had been called up to him by the second engineer.

The second incident was about four days later where a locomotive engineer -- in fact, the crew worked 1000 miles and roughly went through change-off points. It was a combination of -- I hate to use this word but greed and -- and dumb management that put us in this position, and we had hours of service when the -- when the two incidents came up. Up until that time we had had all of our rest put in place by collective bargaining provisions.

MR. LAUBY: Were those crews working excessive hours? You said they went through -- through three crew change points?

MR. HUCKER: Yes, sir, they were.

MR. LAUBY: How many hours are we talking about in this case?

MR. HUCKER: The second -- the second crew change was probably around 22 hours.

MR. LAUBY: 22 hours continuous?

MR. HUCKER: Yes, sir.

MR. LAUBY: The hours of service that you have in place in Canada, what's -- what's included in that?

MR. HUCKER: All -- the covered service is all freight and passenger service, road -- road-switcher service. Yard service is not covered in the hours of service regulations.

The hours of service regulations are almost identical to here with the exception that we can work up to 16 hours in emergencies and a -- we must have at least six hours off between tours of duty before we can be called to work again. So in other words, we have eight hours, it'd be six with a two-hour call.

MR. LAUBY: How often do crews in Canada work 16 hours?

MR. HUCKER: It is the exception. It would only be in emergency situations where there were -- by an act of God or something that was unforeseen at the -- at the call or the beginning of the trip that a crew could be required. The railways have to justify it to Transport Canada that indeed there was a need to -- to use the crew in excess of 12 hours.

MR. LAUBY: So, in general are the labor agreements in Canada that -- that cover on-duty time, are they what rule how crews are assigned or -- or does it fall back to the hours of service?

MR. HUCKER: No, the collective bargaining agreements provide for tour of duty to be not in excess of 12 hours and crews must be in and off-duty within the 12th hour. The -- there is a responsibility on the crew to notify the railway that they will be requiring rest because we are allowed to book up to eight hours rest en route, also to book eight hours rest and -- at the away-from-home terminal, and 24 hours rest at the home terminal to ensure that we have time at home if -- if the -- the engineer or the conductor will need -- they need -- those two individuals or two classifications are the judge of their condition as to whether or not they need rest.

MR. LAUBY: So -- so, the Canadian hours of service regulations represent more of a ultimate worst case condition? That's -- that's really not a day-to-day practice?

MR. HUCKER: Oh, no, it -- it is a day-to-day practice. It is -- we live with those regulations. We also have another regulation that came out of the Hinton inquiry. I'm sure you're aware of -- of that accident where 23 people were killed when a -- a freight train ran into the head end of a -- of a passenger train.

We had mandatory off-duty time. When the Transportation Safety Board looked at the work scheduling of the locomotive engineer in freight service they found that he had been in an inordinate time on -- on duty and had -- really had not had any time off in the last 30 days because of the fact that we -- his mileage periods had overlapped. And they by regulation came up with a -- it's after 10 hours of duty locomotive engineers and conductors will be required by regulation to have eight hours off.

MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much. No more questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Dunn?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple questions for Mr. Bradford following up on the -- some of the things the Technical Panel brought out.

You may be in a unique position, Mr. Bradford, in the sense that Houston is your home terminal, you're in a position with organized labor, you have good contact with the -- the rank-and-file, and as you stated and as I know having worked with you, you investigated I think it was five of the 15 accidents we're looking at.

In the last two days we've had some rather thorough, intensive discussions on could we see this coming, this erosion or safety or time of turbulence, and we've looked at it from statistics which didn't seem to provide the forecast and efficiency testing which didn't seem to provide the forecast. What do you think? Could -- could you see it coming? Could you in your position as a -- in organized labor or did you receive information from your membership? Could they see it coming?

(Pause)

MR. BRADFORD: You didn't tell me you were going to ask me that one.

Yeah, I -- I guess I can say yes, I did see it coming, Mr. Dunn. I'm sure that Mr. Davis and Mr. Walpert both are going to take me behind the woodshed and talk to me.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: No, they're not.

MR. BRADFORD: And I -- I'll say this, Mr. Dunn. If something's not fixed, if something's not made right, we could be back in here again.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Could you help us with that? When you say you saw it coming and -- and -- and I appreciate you being candid, what -- what did you see? What --

MR. BRADFORD: Well, Mr. Dunn, you know, I -- I'm not ashamed to tell you that I've been so tired behind the throttle that some of the decisions I had to make was a little bit blurry because of fatigue. And I'm sure that there's engineers out there right now today doing it.

And I -- I was very fortunate by growing up among some very senior qualified engineers like -- like George and -- and other senior engineers that took a lot of pride in teaching you how to run a locomotive. And "familiarization" was not a term when I grew up because you worked it and you knew it.

The engineers today under the FRA rules don't get an opportunity to make little bitty mistakes. They -- they have to pay a death penalty for a little mistake. You're asking engineers to go out there and handle big, big, dangerous trains through downtown Houston that have made maybe two, three trips over that territory. And due to the pressure everybody says they're qualified.

We'll be back in here again, Mr. Dunn, if -- if -- if everybody in this room doesn't get together and fix whatever's wrong.

Now, what is it that's wrong? I think there's a lot smarter people in this room to tell me -- tell you what's wrong. I think there's many thing wrong.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Do you think that -- that you, or maybe more importantly, your membership, and I'm talking about the rank-and-file now, the guys that -- that run the trains, the -- the men and women that run the trains. Do they have good opportunity to provide the proper -- the proper persons the feedback that you just gave me? What I'm driving at here is if you felt you -- and I'm sure you're correct when you say it -- if you felt that you could see this coming for a variety of reasons, was there the opportunity to provide feedback to those people such as the carrier, the FRA, the Texas Railroad Commission?

MR. BRADFORD: There could have been possibly someone somewhere I could have talked to. I'm -- I'm very fortunate by working with two -- two good and two caring individuals, Brother Walpert and Clarence Monit, and they support this process 100 percent. But could I go in and tell them that, you know, that there was going to be a wreck somewhere or it was going to happen somewhere? No, I -- I couldn't do that.

But, Mr. Dunn, if you take a tired, sleepy engineer with a train coming out of -- Galveston into Houston -- I've handled trains into Houston with little or no rest with 200 cars and every one of those cars had a placard on it. I don't think you want that train on the ground. I know you don't want it involved in an accident.

But something has to be done here, Mr. Dunn. And the rank-and-file have very little or no confidence in the FRA and management. And if it's you guys, the NTSB, that have got the keys to that lock I think it's time to try.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. Thank you.

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: That's all the questions I have at this time.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: We'll revisit the Technical Panel. Any questions?

DR. WEEKS: Two questions for Mr. Hucker.

Firstly, later this morning we'll be hearing from some witnesses who will be describing the Union Pacific's alertness management program to help give the Board a wider context. My question to you is are you aware of other alertness management programs in the rail industry? And if so, I'd be especially interested in hearing about your activities on behalf of your organization in planning and implementation of those programs.

MR. HUCKER: Mr. Weeks, I will deal with UP first of all and then I'll talk about the other -- other projects that are ongoing right now.

I guess about a year ago I had the -- the pleasure of meeting Mr. Davis in his office, and at that point in time we had approached him in regards to -- to doing something to come up with some fatigue countermeasures on the UP. He -- he was very interested and very concerned with what was going on with his property, with the -- the fatigue of the locomotive engineer.

As part of my duties -- and one of the committees I sit on is a work rest task force that is part of the AAR. And the UP was more interested in -- in -- while Mr. Davis was very concerned about it, at that point in time, the -- the UP was more concerned about putting on the -- the responsibility on the employee and training the employee to handle fatigue.

That was about eight months ago. Where the UP today is light years from where they were eight months ago. When I sat first with -- on one of the meetings on the SACP and fatigue, I was very happy to see that Dr. Mark Rosekind had been hired to handle the -- the project at UP. Subsequent to that, my -- my president has assigned me to -- to be the -- the BLE's representative on that fatigue process. What I saw at the first SACP fatigue meeting was very encouraging to where they -- they were -- they were trying to go.

I guess what I have to say is I haven't yet seen the budget, and when I see how much money the -- the railway is prepared to put into the process I will have a much -- much more fuzzy feeling about where fatigue and fatigue countermeasures will go in the UP, but I think that they're headed in the right direction with the people that they've hired to -- to do the job.

Mark Rosekind has got a tremendous reputation in the fatigue industry. Him along with Martin Morit from CTI are probably the two outstanding people who can look at fatigue countermeasures and -- and put them into the operating practices of the railway.

The other -- other class ones, Burlington-Northern Santa Fe is ahead of UP right now because they've been at it longer. Myself and Rick Marceau from the United Transportation Union have been the two individuals who have been at the design level of the fatigue countermeasures. My background is because of the -- I was involved with the CanAlert project on Canadian National-Canadian Pacific, our three-year project along with -- with Via Rail Canada, Limited that really put together the -- the -- the definitive study on fatigue.

I don't take any credit for that. I was just simply the lucky person to be sitting at the table at the right time when -- when it all came along. There were 40 locomotive engineers that put on -- put it all on the line for a couple years to be able to put together the report -- the study and the report and gave us data that we did not have before in regards to napping, in regards to what the work environment in the cab of the locomotive was like.

I, like Jimmy, by the grace of God could have been involved in any of those accidents that happened in Texas because we work in a -- in a constant state of jet lag. While I may not have a lot of time behind the throttle on a tour of duty, the unpredictability of when I do go to work and trying to measure all of that against a lifestyle of a wife and two -- and two children puts me in a position where if I don't know exactly when I'm going to work, then the chances are that -- that I'll be fatigued going to work and then trying to -- to operate long, heavy trains in today's railway environment puts not only myself but my fellow employees at risk.

The -- we have -- we have some real concerns with a couple of railways that are not doing any -- anything right now, and they may very quickly ruin all of the actions and -- and all of the efforts that we've tried to do both with -- Northern, Conrail, and now with UP, and that is my -- one of my concerns.

I also have very serious concerns if we don't fix this fatigue problem so that the next generation of conductors and locomotive engineers coming along to hire on, they won't be there to man the trains because anybody who gets into this lifestyle that -- that we have found ourselves in -- my career is 30 years. I suggest to you that if somebody told me that I was going to be working in an operation 24 hours, seven days a week, 365 days a year and they expected me to be there for all of that time, I probably would be doing something else right now. And I don't expect that my children will want to get themselves in the position that I today find myself in and my membership.

And so, that will be a huge impact on our -- the ability of this industry to -- to continue to grow the way it is.

I believe that the FRA and -- and -- and this Board has to ensure that the railways understand how really important this is. It's one thing to espouse it; it's quite another thing at the end of the day to have those programs in place that will -- will alleviate fatigue.

I hear at a number of meetings that people talk about train line-ups. For approximately 125 years this industry has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to figure out where the trains are, and yet they can't tell a locomotive engineer or conductor where they're going to work. I think they're useless. I think they're only meant there for -- for dispatchers to have something to do sometimes -- I know they're overworked -- and to be able to tell their customers that they have some idea where their trains are.

To a locomotive engineer they're useless because normally what is showing on a -- on a -- an afternoon line-up is not there on the evening line-up because something has changed.

I as -- as the union representative have been involved in -- in planning at Burlington-Northern Santa Fe with a lot of very good people who are very concerned people, individuals such as Thad Dayham and -- and George Smallwood and -- and Bill Cappin have been very instrumental in -- in putting together programs such as the napping strategy for systemwide to allow all employees, not just the locomotive engineers and the conductors, to have a nap when it's necessary. We found out in the original -- project that it does work. We don't have to study it. We know that it's there and it does work.

That -- there are -- as I said earlier, there are a number of countermeasures that should be in place. We can only ensure by our involvement with the -- with the railways and the -- and the regulators that these countermeasures do get in place and that the next -- generation of railroaders have a lot better life than what Jimmy Bradford and I have been accustomed to.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you, Mr. Hucker. I -- I did say that I had two questions for you, and actually, the second question I think should be for -- for both of you since I'm going to use some of Mr. Bradford's words. He mentioned earlier that fatigue is a problem when some people work as much as they like to work or as much as the carrier makes them work, and I think that's a fair, balanced portrayal that there are two sides to the problem.

My specific question is if we can take one side out of the equation, the part that as much as the carrier makes them work and reduce the carrier demands, what are your views and what -- what does labor do about the other side of the problem? The people who perhaps like to work too much.

MR. HUCKER: Dr. Weeks, I'm here to tell you that I will tell my membership that they're going to get a day off. They may not like it. They may think that it's going to impact upon their economic standing, but they will have a day off. At the end of the day they have a choice. If they don't agree with me they can -- not reelect me and I'll go back to operating the locomotive. But from where I sit and where my president sits, the locomotive engineer will have a day off in his work schedule, bottom line.

DR. WEEKS: Mr. Bradford?

MR. BRADFORD: Dr. Weeks, you know, that -- that's a real tough question for me to ask because I'm not elected, I'm appointed. And you know, for anyone to take a pay cut is a pretty volatile with my members. I'm sure that -- I'm -- I'm sure that a locomotive engineer would really appreciate knowing what time he went to work. And if that required a pay cut we have a very democratic process to express that opinion, and I'd like for that democratic process to answer that question if it ever comes.

DR. WEEKS: Okay. I have no further questions.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: I only have a couple, Mr. Bradford.

Just for the record, there are five-day assignments on -- on the railroad, is that right?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir, they are.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Okay. How many weeks vacation does an engineer get in a year?

MR. BRADFORD: That depends on his time and service. It goes anywhere from one week to -- I could qualify for six, but it's five under the national schedule so you could say five weeks on most railroads.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: How many year -- how many years do you need?

MR. BRADFORD: I believe it's 25.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: To get the five?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: How about personal days? Do you get paid a personal -- do they have personal days?

MR. BRADFORD: Mr. Dunn, personal days on my railroad are at the discretion of the railroad to give 'em to you, and for all practical purposes, you can't get 'em when you need 'em.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Is it a paid personal day?

MR. BRADFORD: Yeah, you can -- you can -- you can miss a trip in ID service for one day's pay, yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: How many personal days does a locomotive engineer get?

MR. BRADFORD: Once again, it depends on your seniority. Most railroads base it on seniority. If you don't have much seniority you don't get many personal days. If you've got a lot, you can get up to eight, nine, 10, 11. I'm not sure about the numbers.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: I understand that there is a -- a problem marking off. How about in Canada? What's -- what's -- what's -- can -- how is it for you there? Your engineers to be able to get off?

MR. HUCKER: A locomotive engineer by collective bargaining agreement has the ability to book "not fit" at the end of -- of a tour of duty, and he is the -- he or she is the judge of their own condition until they want to mark back on -- back on the board again. Normally, it's -- it's -- it's a tour of duty that -- that they -- they would mark off for, but it's their discretion.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: And I think Mr. Weeks asked this one, but I'm going to say it anyway. If I was the one that could write the law and said here's how it's going to be, you're going to work 40 hours a week, eight hours a day, how would the brotherhood react to that?

MR. HUCKER: Sir, I don't believe --

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: I have no further questions.

MR. HUCKER: -- I don't -- I don't believe in prescriptive legislation. But if it came down to that, I would suggest to you that we would have a different opinion than just a strict 40-hour work week. It -- my membership enjoys what they do on -- on ID service, and I think there's a better way of doing it through sort of the parties who are -- who control the operation to come up with a way of doing it.

But having said that, if we can't, we may be back asking you to do just that.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: You don't have to answer that, Mr. Bradford, 'cause you answered it with Mr. Weeks.

Thanks. I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the parties. Texas Railroad Commission?

MR. MARTIN: Just one, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bradford, you talked about when you -- the Southern Pacific engineer had the right to -- to kick -- I think that's the term you used. Are -- are you aware if there are other differences between the pre-merger UP and SP as far as crew line-ups and that -- that procedure? Are you aware were there differences?

MR. BRADFORD: No, there -- it -- as far as -- as far as I know, there's not a lot of difference between the two. Both of 'em -- both of 'em can tell you when to go to work. They're pretty consistent on that.

MR. MARTIN: They -- they -- they could tell you when --

MR. BRADFORD: They could not tell you.

MR. MARTIN: Oh, they could not. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. GAVALLA: Mr. Hucker, you mentioned that you believe that fatigue in the railroad industry is a North American transportation issue. To your knowledge, is there a group or forum that addresses fatigue in the railroad industry on a North American-wide basis?

MR. HUCKER: Yes, there is. The FRA approached the -- the -- pardon me, the AAR work rest task force, of which the UTU and the BLE sit on, and formed the NARAP, North American Rail Alertness Partnership. This has brought together both the regulatory bodies in both -- both countries plus all of the rail labor plus all the rail -- management, and we are trying now to deal with it in a North American context.

We are in the -- the building stage of -- of what we hope will be a -- a very good way of -- of dealing with fatigue. It will allow us to look at the best practices in regard to all modes of transportation and see how they can be applied to the rail industry.

I -- I think that from rail labor's point of view it is a very good forum and -- and really that Minister -- and -- and her staff should be commended for -- for coming out to talk about this and to try to put it together. It takes a great deal of coordination to put all the parties in a room for two days to discuss our -- our relative concerns with -- with fatigue, but it is working. And hopefully, at the end of day we will have a real forum to put out to the membership so that their cynicism will -- will evaporate from what we can do through the -- through this new -- this new partnership.

MR. GAVALLA: Thank you.

Mr. Bradford, did you have opportunity to read the FRA's SACP report of the Union Pacific that we put out in February?

MR. BRADFORD: Only when I got here, and it was briefly.

MR. GAVALLA: Okay. Are you aware that virtually all the fatigue issues that you discussed as -- as being problematic on the Union Pacific were also discussed as concerns by FRA in that report?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir, I -- I -- I assume that most of 'em were in there, yes, sir.

MR. GAVALLA: And for the record, you made reference to the number of hours that train -- service crews are allowed to work as being FRA requirements. Are you aware that they're Federal statutes mandated by Congress? Specifically, the hours of service law's a Congressional statute. Are you aware of that?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. GAVALLA: Okay. Thank you. No further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Union Pacific?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: UTU?

MR. SULLIVAN: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. WALPERT: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just had a couple of questions.

First of all, Mr. Bradford, Jim, I appreciate your -- your candor. I think you expressed the -- the viewpoint of the locomotive engineer in -- in the words of a locomotive engineer and I think you -- you were right on point.

A couple of questions. In regard to the UP policy on -- with -- after working seven consecutive days, you get one day off. Have you in your contact with BLE members and UP employees had the opportunity to discuss this layoff policy with them?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, I have.

MR. WALPERT: And what have they told you about this policy?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure I can clean it up enough to put it on public record, but --

(Laughter)

MR. BRADFORD: It -- it's pretty close to the barnyard stuff.

They don't think -- they don't think a lot of it. I think it lost the industry more credibility than it gained.

And you know, being -- being quizzed about the hours of service, I'm -- I'm familiar with hours of service. I've had to spend a lot of time out there on the railroad. I think I'm -- I think I'm qualified to speak on the 12 hours. I think I'm qualified.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Jim, you also spoke about familiarization trips and -- and the fact that when you were coming up in the railroad it really wasn't a factor because you operated constantly over the same territory but now it is a factor. Can you be a little more specific? Is -- is there a problem with engineers on Union Pacific from what you hear in your discussions with the engineers, BLE members with qualification or familiarization over territory on Union Pacific?

MR. BRADFORD: No doubt about it, Bill. I mean, you know, I speak to guys all the time, but I don't know how they do it. You know, you -- you take five trips over the rabbit and that's from Houston to Shreveport. And it's a tricky railroad. And I don't -- I don't see how any engineer can say that he is qualified unless his pride just gets in the way. I have known road foremen to insist that you're qualified after five trips. So, yeah, I don't think I could qualify up the rabbit in five trips. Hell, I'm such a bad engineer I don't know if I qualify it after 50 trips.

But it's a tough piece of railroad. I don't -- I don't see how you learn as much as you need to know in these hub-and-spoke concepts. I just don't see how you do it.

MR. WALPERT: So, when you're speaking about hub-and-spoke concepts you're -- you're talking about the new arrangement due to the UP-SP merger?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. And that has to do with location of operating crews, is that right?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Also, in your dealings with the locomotive engineers and BLE members on -- on Union Pacific, have you gauged a sense of urgency about moving trains at all costs? In other words, is there pressure or intimidation or harassment if we want to use those terms applied to engineers to get -- get the train over the road?

MR. BRADFORD: Oh, absolutely, Brother Walpert. I mean, you know, it was -- one of the FRA officials said something about Jerry's boys yesterday or Jerry's kids or something like that. We got a little different term for the guys that tell us how to railroad. Yeah, they -- they do everything they know how.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you, Jim.

MR. BRADFORD: Sure.

MR. WALPERT: George, I have -- I have just one question for you. We've -- we've covered a lot of discussions in regard to the hours of service. In your capacity as the BLE spokesman in regard to fatigue countermeasures, do you believe that tinkering with hours of service is an answer to the fatigue problem in the industry?

MR. HUCKER: No, Bill, it's not. There are -- fatigue is the -- is the unwanted third person in the cab of a locomotive, and tinkering with the hours of service is not going to resolve what -- what the problems are in there. You -- there's just -- it's just -- I mean there are far more knowledgeable people in this -- in the fatigue industry to come up here and tell you that -- that just tinkering with the -- with this problem is not going to resolve the problem. It's not going to go away. There has to be a -- a total rethinking of -- of how we work in the cab of the locomotive. That's the bottom line. If we don't get there, we're in trouble, all of us.

MR. WALPERT: So, how do we get there?

MR. HUCKER: We get there through the efforts that -- that the railway industry and particular carriers are -- are -- are doing the -- the efforts of -- of Burlington-Northern Santa Fe, Conrail, UP now, CN and CP to -- to understand that -- that we have to change. It's a slow process.

I, like Jimmy, every day have members talk to me about -- about the seeming lack of progress, but it is slow-going. We're changing a culture. We're changing the -- the opinion of our -- our membership. We -- we have a lot of -- a lot of first-line supervisors who -- who don't believe that -- that we should change. They don't understand the problem. We have a lot of -- a lot of locomotive engineers in our -- in our members who -- who are kind of -- are not prepared to make those -- those kind of changes.

But I think through the efforts of -- of a lot of different people and a -- and a lot of very knowledgeable and concerned and smart people we will eventually change how we work in this industry. As I said, if we don't, we're in trouble. We're in serious trouble. We will -- we will think that the -- the 1980s was -- was the golden age of railway if we don't change how we operate in the cab of the locomotive because the young children coming into the industry today are not going to accept the bullshit, pardon the expression, that we went through get -- climbing up through this industry. It's not going to happen.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you, George. Thank you, Jim. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Back to the head table. Ms. Beal?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Dr. Ellingstad?

DR. ELLINGSTAD: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Lauby?

MR. LAUBY: A couple of questions.

First of all, you described the seven-and-one program. There's some resistance to that program. Can you be a little bit more specific of what -- what some of the concerns are with that program, Mr. Bradford?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, Bob, it just -- you know, it's -- it -- it just -- it just doesn't work. I mean, you know, it just -- you know, you have a problem with getting off. If you do work seven you can't get off. And what do you do? Just work until you drop and then you drop for 24? It's -- I -- you know, most guys that I talk to just say that it was a deal that was cooked. You know, it -- it -- it met some deadline or --

MR. LAUBY: But you can't --

MR. BRADFORD: -- some notion.

MR. LAUBY: You cannot get off after -- after seven days?

MR. BRADFORD: Well, Bob, yeah. If -- if everything's perfect you can get off at seven days, but, you know, there's -- there's many times -- I mean you work three or four bad trips, can you make it till the seventh day?

MR. LAUBY: Okay.

MR. BRADFORD: And if the seventh day falls on a weekend or a holiday, I can guarantee you what the answer is going to be.

MR. LAUBY: One other question, and we've heard a lot from Mr. Hucker concerning collective bargaining agreements to handle the fatigue issue on the Canadian railroads. Does the BLE have any collective bargaining initiatives going on with any of the railroads to handle fatigue as a collective bargaining issue? Either one.

MR. HUCKER: Yeah, out of the -- out of the last round of negotiations at Canadian Pacific we had a letter of -- of understanding placed in the agreement to ensure that -- that the CanAlert recommendations would be -- would be implemented, and that's the only one that I know of that's there, and it's -- and it's there solely because I'm the chief spokesman for my union in collective bargaining at that railway.

MR. LAUBY: What about on U.S. railroads?

MR. HUCKER: No, there's not.

MR. LAUBY: None whatsoever?

MR. HUCKER: None that I know -- that I'm aware of.

MR. LAUBY: Has the BLE tried to initiate any collective bargaining agreements or has this been put on the table?

MR. HUCKER: I think it was three -- pardon me, my schedule just kind of runs together. This is my third trip in four days. I think it was three weeks ago I met with the National Carriers Conference along with -- and made a presentation to them along with Conrail and Burlington-Northern Santa Fe on fatigue countermeasures in the industry, and I -- I believe that was the first time that -- that -- that I know of that it was brought to -- to the -- the chief spokesman for the carriers. But as it is now I don't -- I -- there is nothing that I know of in -- in collective bargaining agreements that handles fatigue in that manner.

MR. LAUBY: Thank you. No more questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Dunn?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Yes, I have a few, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bradford, I believe it was a person that accompanied your group here, the BLE, that I understand has a computer program forecasting lineups or -- are you aware of what I'm getting at? I think it's the lady from the BLEA. Are you aware of that program?

MR. BRADFORD: Mr. Dunn, did you say a lady?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Yeah.

MR. BRADFORD: That's with the BLE?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Yeah, I think she's at your table.

(Laughter)

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: If you're not sure what I'm --

MR. BRADFORD: I -- I don't -- I don't know.

MR. HUCKER: Nice try.

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I --

(Laughter)

MR. BRADFORD: No, sir, I'm not aware of that. Now, maybe I should be aware of it but I'm not.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. I'll talk to you about that --

MR. BRADFORD: All right.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: -- at the break.

More specifically, in -- in light of this conversation and discussion about sleepy engineers rest seven-and-one and so forth, what happens if you simply mark off? We've talked about engineers that are tired, that are fatigued, and can you simply just mark off?

MR. BRADFORD: I've heard a lot of stories that, you know, that that -- that vehicle is out there. And I always considered myself somebody that wouldn't run and hide, but that was one of the things you did not do when the crew -- called you.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Is it a discipline problem?

MR. BRADFORD: Yeah. They -- the -- they'll ratchet it up to one. They'll start their nonsense about, "Are you refusing to go to work?"

And you say, "No, I'm not refusing to go to work. You told me I was going to go to work tomorrow morning. It's 10:00 tonight. You know, I've been in bed 30 minutes."

"Are you refusing to go to work?"

"No, I'm not. What happened to the -- going to work until after daylight tomorrow?"

Usually, you get yourself out of bed and you go to work with a bad taste in your mouth, mad at the world. Your conductor usually crawls under the table when he sees you walk in. So, it's -- it's a long night.

I don't know if -- I don't know of that -- of that hand ever being offered in sincerity. I wish more engineers would do it.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. We have had some discussions about the percentage of time that FRA inspectors are on the property, state inspections. From your perspective, how often do you interact with the FRA on the property?

MR. BRADFORD: As a locomotive engineer?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Yes, that's what I'm talking about. As an engineer.

MR. BRADFORD: As a locomotive engineer, the chances of me seeing an FRA inspector on the ground was about the same chances of me seeing Mr. Davis on the ground.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. A question about -- in -- in this testimony you talked about five trips on the rabbit. That was in the context of qualification and familiarization -- I'll call it familiarization. We used to call it qualification trips.

MR. BRADFORD: Right.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: At least from my perspective, there seems to be a disconnect here because we have had, oddly enough, some testimony from what you might call the players in this issue. We've had the FRA testify that -- that they are involved in that and that they have actually brought the individuals together.

MR. BRADFORD: Mm-hmm.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Green -- the testimony, of course, will bear it out, but I -- as I recall, Mr. Green talked about addressing the issue with Mr. Carter and an engineer and getting it resolved.

MR. BRADFORD: Mm-hmm.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Carter gave us testimony about he's actively in that, and as I recall, that the engineer tells him when he's qualified, that that -- that didn't seem to be a problem from his perspective. But yet, you say that this is a big problem. Could you help us with where there appears to be a disconnect from the FRA, the carrier, and the rank-and-file?

MR. BRADFORD: I've worked a lot with Mr. Green, and Mr. Green is a very caring individual. I got a lot of respect for Mr. Green.

I haven't worked really with Jimmy Carter but I've worked around a lot of 'em.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: I want to say one thing. This is not about personalities.

MR. BRADFORD: Yes.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: I'm just bringing it up because these people --

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: -- happened to testify at our proceedings, so I --

MR. BRADFORD: I -- I think -- I think that five trips up that railroad at my skill level, I'd be a pretty shaky engineer. I could get up there and get back if something happened up there. Half the territory's dark. I mean the other half's either uphill or downhill.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: When you say "dark," it's not a signal --

MR. BRADFORD: Non-signal. I haven't been up there in a long time, but the last time I was up there, you know, they had the wrong train orders.

So, you know, Mr. Dunn, there's just -- there are just a lot of subtle hints that after what the road foreman considers the number of trips, you need to be qualify -- you know, you're qualified. And if you're a good fast learner or a slow learner, I mean it's about the same pressure. And I don't see how a young engineer -- they're not in training for three years.

I talked to an engineer yesterday in this hotel that was an engineer within less than two years total time on the railroad. That's from conductor to engineer. And then he's expected to go, you know, what, five different ways of Houston. And I'm -- I'm sure he can do it, Mr. Dunn. I mean he's -- he's very qualified and very capable.

But familiarization needs to be lengthened and needs to be done in a more friendly manner. And I think that the engineer needs to be the one telling the road foreman when he's qualified and not vice versa.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. The last question that I have, your previous testimony -- questions that I asked you, you gave us a very chilling comment -- very candid I might add, and I thank you for that -- that this will happen again, referring to what happened in '97. Now, you talk about familiarization that you see as the problem. Where do you go with that? Where -- where -- how can you communicate that to the people that need to handle it? Do you feel you have a way to -- to bring that to somebody's attention that can fix it?

MR. BRADFORD: I communicate this to -- to a very competent and qualified person in Bill Walpert. Bill Walpert has daily contact -- contact with your office on an as-needed basis. And I truly believe that this problem is fixable. Who's going to be on duty when that happens? I don't know. Is it the FRA? Is it the carrier? Is it everybody in this room?

There's got to be an answer somewhere, Mr. Dunn. I'm not sure that I'm -- I can tell you where that answer is.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you very much.

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Bradford, I have a -- a clarification question for you. When you were asked about how often you would see an FRA inspector you had said is it often -- as often as you would see Mr. Davis. Well, that's not really quantitive. For some reason, when I go on the property I would see Mr. Davis or those people quite often. So, --

(Laughter)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Could you quantify that a little bit?

MR. BRADFORD: Let's see. I went back on the engine in '87, and I worked interdivisional run most of that time for a period of five years. And I might have saw some representatives from the Railroad Commission at the yard office and I might have seen a railroad inspector at the yard office drinking coffee with the road foreman. And that happened maybe two times in five years.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. I have another question. I don't know if you can answer this, but recently as a result of NAFTA there's now trains running in and out of Mexico. If you have a -- a UP train going down, who drives it when it gets into Mexico? Who's the engineer? Do we change engineers at the border?

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: And do you know what the hours of service for the engineers in Mexico happens to be? If you don't know --

MR. BRADFORD: I would just be guessing. They --

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: No, I don't want a guess.

MR. BRADFORD: -- they probably don't have one down there.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: I don't -- I don't guess.

Don, before you come up, would you get an answer to that? I'm going to ask you that question. And while you're at it, if you're going to call in there, would you get a comparison between Europe, say France and the U.K.?

Okay. One last question. Serious illness. Do you have any idea what the rate of heart attacks or other serious illness is amongst engineers?

(Pause)

MR. BRADFORD: Yes, sir, I have some idea. I can't give you the numbers. I can say that -- I can name four of my friends who have died of a heart attack, and one of 'em died in the same hotel I was in at our away-from-home terminal. You know, did they take care of themselves? It's kind of tough to do on a -- on a IB run.

There's -- there's very little emphasis on eating good, sleeping good, taking care of yourself. It's -- there's no emphasis placed on that.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions, and thank you both for your testimony. You're released.

(Whereupon, the witnesses were excused.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Dunn, would you call the next witness, please?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Thomas Sullivan.

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you. Please be seated.

TESTIMONY OF
THOMAS SULLIVAN
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Sullivan, would you state for the record your full name and spell your last name?

MR. SULLIVAN: Thomas Sullivan, S-U-L-L-I-V-A-N.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And what is your present position with the United Transportation Union?

MR. SULLIVAN: I'm a legislative representative and local chairman.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And -- and where are you headquartered?

MR. SULLIVAN: In North Platte, Nebraska.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And do you have a position with the Union Pacific Railroad?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I do.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And what is that position?

MR. SULLIVAN: I'm a locomotive engineer.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. How long have you held your present position that you have with the union?

MR. SULLIVAN: I've been a legislative rep and local chairman approximately 18 years.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. Does that cover your positions with the union? Those 18 years?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. With --

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Have you had --

MR. SULLIVAN: -- with the union. That's what --

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. And would you briefly describe your work history with the railroad carriers, etc., any predecessor carriers and positions you've held?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, the only position I've held is I've been a locomotive engineer for approximately 29 years. I hired out in 1969 as an engine service employee and was promoted to engineer, I believe, in 1973 after I had a two-year hiatus for -- Uncle Sam wanted my services for a couple years, so I gave them to him. And when I came back, then I -- I took my promotion to engineer, and I've been involved in engine service ever since.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. And these almost 30 years, is that with the --

MR. SULLIVAN: 29 years.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: -- Union Pacific -- 29 --

MR. SULLIVAN: All -- all 29 with the Union Pacific in North Platte, Nebraska.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Very good. Thank you.

We will begin the questioning with the Technical Panel.

MR. COCHRAN: Good morning, Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Good morning, Mr. Cochran.

MR. COCHRAN: Could you briefly describe your duties as a legislative representative, please?

MR. SULLIVAN: A legislative representative, I handle safety issues on -- on a local level with either the carrier officers in -- in the terminal or if we believe it to be a -- an alleged Federal violation, then I would write up the alleged violation to -- to the FRA.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you also interface with state regulatory agencies in Nebraska?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, we do, with the Public Service Commission.

MR. COCHRAN: And were you involved in any pre-merger planning with the UP-SP merger?

MR. SULLIVAN: Not that I'm aware of, no.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you know if the UTU has any strategies for pre-merger planning?

MR. SULLIVAN: None that I'm aware of.

MR. COCHRAN: Did you have the opportunity to read the FRA's assessment, their SACP assessment that was issued in February?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I -- I -- I had a -- an opportunity to -- to read them. We did not have a -- an opportunity to comment on them, though, I believe.

MR. COCHRAN: Did you not have that opportunity because you didn't have time or were you offered an opportunity?

MR. SULLIVAN: I -- I do not believe we were offered an opportunity to comment.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you feel that you're fully involved in the SACP process?

MR. SULLIVAN: I -- I believe like in -- in that area we just talked about -- about commenting on -- on the issues that were presented to the UP by FRA that -- that -- maybe that should have been an area or arena that we should have been involved in but were not, but the SACP process itself while scratching the surface and getting started is -- is -- is in my opinion a very good process.

MR. COCHRAN: What's your assessment of the 12-month period that's under investigation at this hearing relative to the accidents that have occurred?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I don't have any firsthand knowledge. You know, I'm -- I'm based out of -- out of Nebraska, not out of Texas. So, I -- I -- I have an opinion on it but whether that opinion matters I don't know.

MR. COCHRAN: It certainly does. Could you please give us your opinion?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I -- I think that what happened in -- in -- in Texas could have happened anywhere else and it could have happened on any other railroad.

MR. COCHRAN: The conditions in -- in the North Platte area, do you -- how do you find the fatigue issues in that area?

MR. SULLIVAN: The fatigue is -- is -- is a very big, volatile issue, has been for a while. But under the SACP process we are -- we're -- we are seeing light at the end of the tunnel, and it's not a headlight. But we've got a long ways to go. Manpower is -- they are hiring.

MR. COCHRAN: There was some testimony yesterday that middle management should be more involved. What -- what's your opinion about that?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, after talking to the middle managers and the first-line officers and -- and -- and that's -- that's -- that's very true. They haven't seen in any of the -- the effects of SACP yet. Most of the middle managers that -- that I've talked to and the -- the first-line officers or whatever you want to call 'em are looking for as much relief as we are. They are -- there's a fatigue issue with -- with middle managers, also.

MR. COCHRAN: Did -- do you or your organization, do you have -- have any suggestions to -- to make that happen?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, probably none other than what has been commented on here in the last two days, which is you have to address your manpower situation. If you address your manpower situation you've addressed a lot of issues. You address manpower, you've addressed fatigue to a certain extent.

MR. COCHRAN: I have no further questions at this time. Dr. Weeks, do you have any questions?

DR. WEEKS: Yes, I have one question.

Mr. Sullivan, did you or any of the other members of the UTU participate in preparing the UP alertness management program plan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Could you repeat that?

DR. WEEKS: I'm sorry. I didn't have the mike.

My question was did you or any of the other members of the UTU participate in preparing the UP's alertness management program plan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Not -- not that I'm aware of. There may have been other UTU members involved, but not -- not that I'm aware of.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the parties? Texas -- Texas Railroad Commission? Oh, I thought you were done, Dunn.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: I am done.

(Laughter)

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Almost.

Mr. Sullivan, do you have the same agreements that BLE does as far as vacation time --

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: -- vacation time, personal days?

MR. SULLIVAN: We -- as -- as locomotive engineers we just recently got the personal leave days. The conductors and trainmen had 'em prior to us, but vacation rights are -- are -- are -- are equal.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: In the United Transportation Union, since you're engineer but -- you also have the conductors and the trainmen, right?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Fall under the United Transportation Union?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Okay. What's the problem like for you fellas to get off -- mark off duty? The same as the engineers?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I -- I am an engineer, but, excuse me, as a -- as a legislative rep I represent approximately 3- to 400 locomotive engineers that work in and -- and -- enginemen, hostlers, firemen, and training in and out of the North Platte area. And yeah, there -- there is -- there's a big fatigue issue, and it -- and it not only involves locomotive engineers, it involves road conductors, it involves yard switchmen. It involves everybody that's a covered service employee.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: If I was able to give Mr. Davis millions and millions of dollars to hire as many people as he could and allow you to be worked five days -- five days a week, would -- how would your membership react to that if we had enough people to allow you to be off and only work five days a week?

MR. SULLIVAN: That's kind of a -- I guess I'd have to ask. Are you talking about a -- a regular standard workweek with -- with starting times and -- and things like that?

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Yeah, whatever I could do so that you would only work eight hours a day, five days a week. If I could give him enough people to -- to cover so that you could be off. Let's say, 12 hours a day but five days a week. We could fill your boards so that that would happen, that you wouldn't have to be called out.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's a pretty technical issue. I'd -- I'd -- I'd -- I guess I don't really know how to answer that.

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Okay. I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. To the parties. Texas Railroad Commission?

MR. MARTIN: Mr. Chairman, we have no questions of Mr. Sullivan.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. GAVALLA: Yes, Mr. Sullivan, at this time I'd like to take the opportunity to thank the United Transportation Union also for their leadership in the safety partnership process, particularly in supporting and helping establish the SACP on the Union Pacific Railroad and many of the partnership activities that we have throughout the nation.

You indicated you don't have a tremendous familiarity with the SACP process on -- on the UP, is that correct?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, no. I -- I have a -- a -- a good working relationship with the SACP process on -- on the Union Pacific, and -- and what -- what I meant by my remarks is that the SACP process in my opinion is -- is just getting started. It has a long ways to go and there's a sense of urgency that needs to be reaffirmed by the Union Pacific.

MR. GAVALLA: Did you have the opportunity to read the FRA SACP report that was put out in February?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I did.

MR. GAVALLA: Is it safe to say that many of the issues being addressed through the working groups that you're familiar with are also covered in that report?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, yes, yes. Many of the issues.

MR. GAVALLA: Would it be safe to say that there was the -- the parties who've been participating in that group, the UTU, the other organizations had input into that -- into that process that -- that fed into that report?

MR. SULLIVAN: I don't believe it. I don't know who prepared the report.

MR. GAVALLA: It was FRA.

MR. SULLIVAN: FRA prepared the report, but I -- whether they had involvement by other UTU officers in preparing the report, I -- I don't know if they did or not.

MR. GAVALLA: Okay. No further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Union Pacific?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, maybe more of a comment than a question.

Mr. Sullivan, I would also like to thank you and the UTU for your help at Union Pacific in the investigation of the accidents that we had.

Also, I'd like to stress my appreciation to you, Mr. Linewebber and many other UTU representatives who are on our SAC team -- SACP teams. It's you that's going to make this work. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: BLE?

MR. WALPERT: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, how many engineers work in a terminal in North Platte?

MR. SULLIVAN: That's kind of on again, off again question. I'd say approximately in both directions around the neighborhood of 800.

MR. WALPERT: 800, okay. Of those engineers, how many have been promoted in, let's say, the last 10 years? Approximately.

MR. SULLIVAN: Half of 'em.

MR. WALPERT: And how about in the last five years?

MR. SULLIVAN: Probably 200.

MR. WALPERT: So, 200 engineers have less than five years experience as locomotive engineers, is that correct?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. That's -- that's an approximate guess.

MR. WALPERT: Right. I understand.

In your opinion, is there a problem due to the influx of new engineers with familiarization qualification?

MR. SULLIVAN: We do not have the problems there and -- and -- and out of my terminal that were expressed here like they were in Texas. The problems we have about familiarization are addressed at a local level.

I have my opinions about the trainmen's issue on that. There's no issue -- there's no regulation or no requirement or no policy in effect that says a conductor who's -- a trainman who's just got hired, he's went to school for three weeks, they put him on an extra board, and they send him out in road service. Now he's a promoted qualified conductor but he's worked for the railroad for 60 days but he can go over the same territory with me and had never been there before. There's no -- there's no policy to that effect, and it's something that's -- we try to handle on a -- on a local issue and -- and it's issues we're -- we're trying to work through.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

In a -- in a 24-hour period, how many trains approximately would move through North Platte?

MR. SULLIVAN: At least in North Platte where I run, I run from North Platte to now Missouri Valley, Iowa, and that corridor between North Platte, Nebraska and Gibbon, Nebraska is -- is -- to my understanding is the highest tonnage corridor anywhere in the world, and -- and by the scanner at Gothamberg I think they probably average 130 trains per day.

MR. WALPERT: All right. 130 trains per day, so that's -- let me ask this question. Is that -- is there any pressure on -- on the operating crews to -- to move the trains out of the terminal to get over the road regardless of safety issues that -- that may exist?

(Pause)

MR. SULLIVAN: In a word, no. I mean our people are not pressured to violate any safety rules. Certainly, there's a lot of pressure on our end of the railroad due to manpower shortages. There's -- there's morale issues. There's -- there's a lot of people running around short-fused 'cause they're working an -- an awful lot. But are my people pressured to -- to violate safety regulations? No, I don't believe they are.

MR. WALPERT: Good. You spoke of morale issues. What do you attribute the cause of the morale issues?

MR. SULLIVAN: Define morale, I guess. Fatigue. It's not knowing when you're coming, when you're going. It's trying to plan something, have those plans fall apart. It's arguing with the crew management system, trying to get off. I -- I -- I know -- for instance -- let's -- I'll give you a for instance.

I've got something I want to do. I really want to do it. It's family-oriented. So, I call and I want to lay off personal. I'm not sick. Nobody in my family's sick. I just want to lay off -- lay off personal. I -- I've really been pounding hard and I need some time off.

But they're not going to allow me to lay off personal. "We have a manpower shortage. I cannot allow you to do that. I can allow you to lay off sick."

"Yeah, but I'm not sick."

"Yeah, but that's the only way I can let you off."

"Well, I guess I'm sick."

And there's just a lot of issues like that. And all -- it all goes back to manpower, you know. The manpower -- they got behind on the manpower curve and they got behind it everywhere. And there was some -- in my opinion, there were some management decisions made in -- in other areas of the come -- country that compounded the problems that we ended up with at North Platte, and they obviously ended up that way in Houston.

MR. WALPERT: How is the -- the policy of working seven consecutive days and getting one day off working in your opinion at North Platte?

MR. SULLIVAN: You want to know if it's working or you want to know my opinion of the policy?

MR. WALPERT: Both.

(Pause)

MR. SULLIVAN: In -- in -- in a way, it's -- well, it -- it's -- it's just not working.

MR. WALPERT: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: It's not working. And my opinion of the policy, it's -- it's -- could have been planned better.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: UTU?

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

Mr. Sullivan, I'd like to ask you a few questions concerning your involvement in a number of programs as a representative of the United Transportation Union as it relates to matters of safety and safety initiatives.

First of all, you were selected by -- I understand that you were selected by President Little to serve on the RSAC committee. Is that true?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I was selected by President Little. I served on RSAC committee, which is Rail Safety Advisory Committee. We just finished the Part 240 regulation on certification of locomotive engineers. I'm involved in the RSAC process on, again, locomotive crash worthiness, locomotive cab working conditions, vent recorders, positive train control, and there other -- a couple other RSAC processes going on now.

Some of those processes, say, locomotive cab working conditions, we're looking at arenas of the -- the locomotive cab where we can improve the cab, which hopefully will, you know, under -- sanitation standards, the -- the heating and cooling of the locomotive, all these things to -- to -- to bring Federal regulation to it and to improve the working conditions for the -- for the locomotive engineers and -- and train crews.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: You've described briefly your involvement with the -- the SACP process. Did you have occasion to attend any of the UTU region meetings last year where UTU in conjunction with the Burlington-Northern Santa Fe made a SACP presentation? Did you have occasion to see any of those?

MR. SULLIVAN: There's been various ones that -- where -- where the Burlington was -- had -- had -- had a little involvement with some of it, yes.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Okay. And would you describe briefly the issues that you're involved in with the SACP on the Union Pacific, please?

MR. SULLIVAN: Two or three that I'm -- I'm -- I'm real familiar with are the equal TL process, which is the -- is the train lineup process; the equal TE process, which is the -- the -- the tie-up process; and then there's a process called crew utilization, and that became a part of SACP but originally the crew utilization issue was called a hours of service re-crew issue. It started in January of 1997. That's when the state director of UTU Ray Linewebber contacted Jerry Davis and he -- and -- and he told Mr. Davis that we had a -- a real concern over our locomotive engineers, conductors, and brakemen being on duty and not being picked up off of their trains after their expiration of hours of service or if their train terminated short of a -- of a -- of a final terminal.

And so, Mr. Davis gave -- gave Ray the authority to -- to get a hold of Mr. David Barnes and some other people at the Harriman Dispatch Center and -- and we set up a -- a -- a team to address these issues. And after, oh, six or eight months then SACP came into play and we rolled the crew utilization as it's called now in -- into the SACP process.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: All right. So, the issues that you're addressing in SACP are -- and also in the RSAC process are issues that are before this -- this investigation today, aren't they?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, an awful lot of 'em. An awful lot of 'em, yes, sir.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Are you familiar with the United Transportation involvement with the National Carriers Conference Committee and our -- the regular monthly meetings that we have with respect to all of the issues before the Board?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Are you aware of the fact that -- that there is a panel addressing and involving experts in many of the fields of -- of endeavor with respect to the issues before NTSB today?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, a lot of 'em are -- are parallel.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: You were -- a question was raised by Mr. Dunn that was of interest to me, and it had to do with if you could create a world of 40-hour week, how would the employees respond. Isn't it really true that this is a piecework industry, that people are drawn to this industry because it's more than a 40-hour week job? That you have the ability to make more than an average job? And it's those economics that do draw people to this industry, and they come with it with the expectation of making more than average money?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, absolutely. There's -- there's -- there's no question about that.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Okay. You raised a question of hiring and -- and do you have any comments with respect to the history of separations, buy-outs, and the effect they may have had? Is it true to say that railroad mergers oftentimes lead to buy-out arrangements to -- to buy down not only operating employees but managers as well or to buy them out? And do you see this as a -- as perhaps an element in the process of the manpower shortage?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, I -- I do, and I -- I -- I -- yes, I do. And I -- I also see it as a -- I believe that when a lot of the mergers took place, a lot of the buy-outs happened at the management level, at the agreement and non-agreement level. I believe that there was some serious mistakes made buying out agreement people and non-agreement. I believe that the carrier made some -- that they bought off a lot of their experience, and when they went to replace -- you can't replace experience. And -- and that was the beginning of -- of a lot of things that -- getting behind the curves on a lot of issues.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: A question was posed to you concerning matters of safety in your working -- as a working engineer, and you indicated that you -- you know, you -- you don't work in an environment where you're encouraged to violate safety but there is this -- a certain urgency. Does that have -- you know, to get the work done. Do those -- does that become a gray area of getting the work done as opposed to the -- the overt suggestion of -- of violation of rule? Is there -- are there -- do you believe that our engineers, our conductors fall under some kind of a pressure that's just perhaps unstated with respect to expediting the operation?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, there's -- there's no doubt about that. And -- and everybody has -- has a common goal when they depart a terminal, and that is to get to the final terminal. And everybody tries to work together as much as they can, and -- and -- and at times there's perceived pressure and -- and other times there is real pressure. But those are everyday issues within the industry.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Let -- let's go back to participation in some of these safety programs because I think it's important. The industry has a history of inviting labor to the table and safety programs and the like and many of those really didn't go anyplace. Do you have a sense that's going on today is -- is generally -- genuine and meaningful? Certainly, from our perspective we want to believe that as an organization. Do you feel that your involvement is -- is meaningful, that you're getting the kind of participation from the FRA, the railroads, Union Pacific with respect to these as they're -- are you comfortable that there's a legitimacy to it?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, yes, I am. Some of the issues that are before us today in -- in my career are unprecedented. We've been invited to the table where we've -- where we've never been asked before. And I believe that our participation in all these processes, whether it's RSAC or SACP or -- or what -- or whatever program it is or whatever you want to call it, if -- if -- if you don't have all the players there, I mean it -- it's -- it's like playing solitaire with a deck of 51. You're never going to win.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Are you familiar with International President Little's agenda that -- that, you know, if we don't do this collectively, meaning both management and labor, that it's going to be done for us and being done for us may be in the form of regulation, regulatory authority?

MR. SULLIVAN: That's -- that's a personal fear that I have.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Do you believe that the people who participate are committed to avoiding involvement of the regulatory authorities with respect to the -- the lives and working conditions of railroad workers?

MR. SULLIVAN: Again?

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Do you -- do you believe in the sincerity of those people that -- that you're dealing with? They share that view?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, yes, I do. Yes.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: I have no more questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the head table. Ms. Beal?

MS. BEAL: I have no questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Dr. Ellingstad?

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Mr. Sullivan, I'd like to just ask you the same couple of questions that I had asked Mr. Hucker and Mr. Bradford based on your experience as an engineer and your experience with the 800 engineers operating out of North Platte. What's a -- if could characterize a typical working day, working week, number of hours, number of trips?

MR. SULLIVAN: A typical characterization based on the manpower shortages that we have -- at present, we -- you do not know when you're coming and when you're going. On an average I suppose of the road locomotive engineers are -- are putting in maybe averaging 80 hours a week.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Is it possible for a road locomotive engineer -- I'd ask these other gentlemen if there was anybody that could work a 40-hour week. Let's -- let's forget about that and -- and boost that. Is there -- are there any road locomotive engineers that work a 48-hour week?

MR. SULLIVAN: Not without laying off. Not without taking the time off. Not without buying their time off. When you -- when you -- when you lay off, you're buying your time off. You're saying, "Hey, I'm -- I'm will -- willing to forego. Lay me off sick, lay me off personal. I'm going to miss this trip. This trip cost me 600 dollars. I'm buying my time off."

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. So, did that -- that workweek that would be considered above average for most working Americans basically can't sustain an over-the-road railroader?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, but it's -- it's typical of the industry.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. Thank you. No further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Lauby?

MR. LAUBY: Just a couple of questions, Mr. Sullivan. Again, I was very interested in -- in hearing some of the testimony of Mr. Hucker from the BLE talking about collective bargaining as -- as a way to handle some of the fatigue issues.

Does the -- the UTU have collective bargaining activities addressing the fatigue issue with any of the ray -- any of the railroads in the United States right now to your knowledge?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, sure they do.

MR. LAUBY: Can you -- can you give us some details of those?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I mean the -- let's just say, for instance, one -- if you talk about a collective bargaining issue where they have an agreement that a conductor can go in and when he reaches the terminal he says, "I'm going to tie up for 24 hours rest," and a carrier grants him that right by agreement, yes, there are -- there are CBAs in effect on different --

MR. LAUBY: So --

MR. SULLIVAN: -- at least the carrier I'm --

MR. LAUBY: So, these are elements of some of the fatigue problems that we've talked about, I -- I would assume. Is -- is there any comprehensive agreements to -- to change the basic way in which locomotive engineers are working in your union? Is there any collective bargaining planned or taking place on that issue? And by comprehensive, I mean putting the whole fatigue problem on the table.

MR. SULLIVAN: At an international level I guess you'd have to address that to -- question to Mr. Little.

MR. LAUBY: Okay. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Lauby? I mean Mr. Dunn?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple questions, Mr. Sullivan. What's your interface with the FRA on the property?

MR. SULLIVAN: As far as what?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: How often do you see them? And when you do, what -- what's that like?

MR. SULLIVAN: We see 'em -- we have an inspector assigned to North Platte now with -- just recently within the last two years. We have a inspector assigned to North Platte.

We don't very often see FRA inspectors, but I don't spend -- I don't spend a -- a large amount of time in the terminal. My time is spent on the road, and so --

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: It doesn't -- it doesn't matter. On the property, on the road --

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: -- on the terminal, wherever.

MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Not very often, but occasionally you'll see 'em or you'll hear -- or you'll hear from somebody that FRA is on the property.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. Is there an interface there? Do you talk to them? What's it like when you see 'em?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, it depends on what -- on what reason they're there for. You know, I mean if they're -- if they're checking my certification and --and, you know, seeing when was the -- my last check ride and -- and whether I've got my operating rule cards with me and my code of general operating rules is updated and I have my timetable, and -- and they'll check all that. And -- and they'll -- the interface is, you know, how's -- how are things going, you know. It's just -- it's a code of the industry, I guess, or a -- a language of the industry when one -- person familiar with the railroad industry's talking to another one. You're railroading.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. We had some discussion this morning about familiarization. Is it an issue for you and what are the problems for you and the people you represent? When I say is it an issue, is it a problem?

MR. SULLIVAN: It has been in the past. It is not presently. It was an issue that was recently addressed in RSAC 240. I'm sure it'll probably become an issue again. And again, it all goes back to manpower. If you've got the man -- if you've got the -- the manpower, you've got time to train your people properly.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Ms. Beal?

MS. BEAL: Yes, Mr. Sullivan, is the UTU involved in any way with the development of the program being put together by Alertness Solutions for UP?

MR. SULLIVAN: If they are, I'm -- I'm -- unaware of it. That issue -- that question could be asked to the International and -- and if they are, they could answer that for you.

MS. BEAL: We'll ask Dr. Rosekind. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. We'll go through a second round of questions. To the Tech Panel?

MR. COCHRAN: I have one further question.

Mr. Sullivan, you expressed some concerns about qualifications and -- familiarization of territory by conductors in the North Platte area earlier.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

MR. COCHRAN: Do you feel certification of conductors would alleviate that?

MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, absolutely.

MR. COCHRAN: The same as the engineer certification program?

MR. SULLIVAN: Exactly.

MR. COCHRAN: In that area?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. I -- I would -- I would strongly suggest and promote -- promote that, yes.

MR. COCHRAN: I have no further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Texas Railroad Commission?

MR. MARTIN: We have no questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: FRA?

MR. GAVALLA: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: UP?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: BLE?

MR. WALPERT: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Two quick questions, please. Indulge me. Because I think there's some confusion over the 80 hours a week and I -- and I -- I would like to take advantage of this witness to explain when we're talking about 80 hours a week that doesn't represent 80 hours on duty per week but that may very well mean that there's -- and I would like for the witness to explain.

So, if you will indulge me, please explain a workweek in a way that the panel can understand it when you say, "I work 80 hours a week" or -- so, describe that. An on-duty day, lay-over time over, say, the course of a week so everybody understands where you're at and -- and when you're there. You go to -- go to work on Monday morning and -- ?

MR. SULLIVAN: You just take a seven-day period. I mean it's not Sunday through Monday or -- I mean it's -- it may -- you know, you can take seven days, Christmas through New Year's, you know, and it's not a week. Seven days -- if you just want to pick out a seven-day period.

But the 80-hour workweek that I -- that I was referring to, a lot of that has -- what I mean is actually -- one -- one -- once you become first out or second out or third out or fourth out, you know, you become captive to -- to -- to -- to going to work and your total time spent on duty after that, you know, you've got an hour and a half call prior to your report time, and you've got both ends of the terminal. You factor in all your on-duty time -- on the particular run that I'm on, I can work that run, again based on manpower shortages. Those manpower shortages are -- are being addressed.

But I can work that job seven days a week, and there's very few times that I'm less than 12 hours on duty each way. So, that's 12 hours a day. At times.

But the collective bargaining agreements don't -- if -- if -- if you fall into the -- if -- if we had the manpower, we could fall back on our collective bargaining agreements and -- and slot that in and you certainly wouldn't have the fatigue issue that you have out there today. You wouldn't be working eight hours -- 80 hours a week, you wouldn't be working 60 hours a week. You would have something of a -- of a -- of a normal cycle time regardless of when the cycle started, but you -- you can -- you can figure it out.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Are you --

MR. SULLIVAN: You know, it's just --

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Are you familiar with an agreement that's in effect that has to do with an -- an eight-hour call time and I think it's an agreement in effect between the -- both the BLE and UTU enjoy that agreement at a particular location. Are you familiar with that kind of an arrangement and -- and could you describe to the best of your knowledge the significance of that on the rail operation?

MR. SULLIVAN: I'm -- I'm aware of -- been aware of a eight-hour call that -- that is in effect I -- I believe on the -- on the Burlington-Northern Railroad or -- or the Union Pacific, somewhere. And -- and I believe Wyoming State Director T. R. Shelby -- he -- he knows more about the eight-hour call than I do. I guess -- Mr. Shelby is with us today.

I -- I support the issue of an eight-hour call. I think an eight-hour call would certainly go a long, long ways in relieving the fatigue issue.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Thank you very much. No more questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: No more questions. Any other questions from the head table?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Hearing none, you are released, Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Our next witnesses will be Mr. Dennis Holland, Mr. Dennis Richling, and Dr. Mark Rosekind.

But before they come up, why don't we take a short facilities break as I see everybody wiggling.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Mr. Dunn, we are back on the record. Would you please call the next witness?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Dennis Holland, Dennis Richling, and Mark Rosekind.

Whereupon,

DENNIS RICHLING

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

TESTIMONY OF
DENNIS RICHLING
AVP-HEALTH SERVICES
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,
DENNIS HOLLAND
DIRECTOR OF ALERTNESS MANAGEMENT
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, AND
MARK ROSEKIND
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF SCIENTIST
ALERTNESS SOLUTIONS
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Richling, would you state your full name and spell your last name for the record?

DR. RICHLING: Dr. Dennis E. Richling, R-I-C-H-L-I-N-G.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Holland, would you state your full name and spell your last name for the record, please?

MR. HOLLAND: Dennis W. Holland, H-O-L-L-A-N-D.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Rosekind, would you state your full name and spell your last name for the record, please?

DR. ROSEKIND: Dr. Mark R. Rosekind, R-O-S-E-K-I-N-D.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you.

We will start the questioning with the Technical Panel. Dr. Weeks?

DR. WEEKS: Thank you, Mr. Dunn.

The Technical Panel's interest and area of inquiry will go generally to the areas of fatigue and the Union Pacific's alertness management program. That's kind of an administrative matter. However, what we'd like to do first is ask for Dr. Richling and Mr. Holland to each of you state your duties and responsibilities with the Union Pacific Railroad, and in the case of Dr. Rosekind as a contractor, if you'd provide us with your -- an overview of your background and experience in the science, research, and implementation in fatigue and alertness management. And then we'll circle back and get into the areas of interest.

If you'd start, please, Dr. Richling?

DR. RICHLING: I am the assistant vice president of Health Services. Those duties are to provide the leadership and management of the health and behavioral programs for the company. That includes the medical director's activities, the health promotion activities, disability management, also some computer resources with regard to risk management, and additionally, the alertness management program.

I started with the Union Pacific Railroad in -- in 1986 as the assistant medical director. I was then medical director and -- in early 1990s became assistant vice president of Health Services and medical director, and more recently someone else took over the responsibilities as medical director.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you. Mr. Holland?

MR. HOLLAND: Yes, I'm director of Alertness Management, and my primary responsibility is the day-to-day management and implementation of our Alertness Management program.

My background in the railroad industry is 31 years ago I was employed as a maintenance away B & B and gandydancer. I eventually went into train service, was a brakeman conductor for 19 years. 12 of those years I was a local and general officer for the United Transportation Union. Six years ago I went into management in the human resources department, and last September I was appointed to this position as the director of Alertness Management.

DR. ROSEKIND: My academic and professional background include degree with honors from Stanford, my Ph.D. from Yale, post-doctoral training at Brown. I was then the director of the human -- research component at the Stanford Sleep Center at the Stanford Medical School, led the NASA fatigue countermeasures program for seven years, and currently am the president and chief scientist of Alertness Solutions.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you for that background information, gentlemen.

Dr. Richling, I understand that you and your colleagues are prepared to provide us with a -- an overview and perhaps some detail of Union Pacific's fatigue efforts and more specifically your proposed alertness management program. If you'd care to provide that to us at this time?

DR. RICHLING: Yes, Dr. Weeks. I -- I think the best way to -- to talk about that is -- is let me talk a little bit about what we've done in the past and where we're at right now, and then we're going to have Mr. Holland talk about what's -- what we have been doing over the last six, eight months, and then Dr. Rosekind will talk about our program and -- and what it will look like comprehensively and how that matches with some of the science.

At Union Pacific our understanding of the science of fatigue has been steadily progressing, evolving since the late 1980s or early 1990s. Our interest at that time was because we felt the railroad environment was changing, but it went beyond that. We also thought that the overall cultural environment that our employees worked in was changing.

You know, I -- I -- it seems to me that -- that when I bought on to raising children I was thinking about doing the four Rs, and now I've found out that I have to actually do the three Cs as well, which is computers and communication issues and drugs and alcohol and chemicals. Those things now are real parts of our lives, and we knew that that was going to impact our workforce as well.

We've done a variety of projects over the last several years, including several education efforts. We've changed some of our lodging facilities, and we've had several crew scheduling projects as well. In the 1990s, we were the first railroad to distribute a video and a book developed by an expert group known as Synchrotech to 14,000 of our train service -- train and engine service employees and 3000 mechanical department employees.

After we distributed that videotape, we asked really where the next -- where do we go next? And we realized at that time that using a videotape or even a day-long class or a couple hour class to raise the awareness level of fatigue is a good start but it's not what was going to create the changes in attitude and behavior and culture that were needed to manage fatigue long-term.

We had a considerable amount of experience in doing health education or health behavior education with our workforce. Since the late 1980s we've been doing a number of programs with working with the health behaviors of our employees, and those have been very successful. We've been able to demonstrate we've been able to change behaviors, and we've been -- actually able to demonstrate we were able to change attitudes of our employees towards certain health behavior.

The approach is different. It'd be like thinking that we could actually get people to do things that are traditionally viewed as unhealthy like smoking or eating properly or exercising regularly by just doing a class. We know most of that will not change. And we have found ways to educate our employees that would change that.

So, utilizing that -- that thought, we said would this apply to fatigue? And in the early 19 -- after our first program and through the -- 1994, we actually asked whether we could apply the same technology to -- to fatigue and get changes in behaviors in individuals. We used that approach, and we actually found that -- that irrespective of environmental issues we could get people to be less fatigued, more alert, and reduce inappropriate sleeping -- sleepiness in our population by exercising those education activities.

But we were also thinking about our work environment at the same time. As -- as early as 1995 we began to look for opportunities to put in agreements that would set up crew scheduling projects within our pilot crew scheduling project, and in 1996 we were able to institute actually two crew scheduling pilots. The Union Pacific and the BLE entered into agreement in Milford, Utah first for the extra boards then with the pools of -- the pool freight for 11 days on and four days off. That's 11-4 work-rest cycle. A similar arrangement was made in North Little Rock. At this time only the North Little Rock project continues.

Now, you may ask what happened with the Milford project? And I can give you a very simple answer and say the people who were involved with it, the -- the crews, the BLE did not wish to continue that. We -- they found that there was an improvement in predictability in their work schedules and that they also found that the crews liked it, and I could simply say that the -- that they were not willing to make a long-term agreement.

But that doesn't characterize the situation adequately. There were a variety of different other things that happened. There were changes in the amount of traffic that was going through the territory. There were some problems -- administrative problems that arose. And basically, people became dissatisfied with it.

It was at that point in mid-1996 when we got the results of that pilot that we really learned that we were going to have to do something different in order to create the organizational change needed to reduce fatigue throughout the organization. And that means employees at all levels, that managers and the -- the crews that -- that run our trains. We needed a partnership we felt with -- with the scientific expertise and the operational expertise combined.

This required a commitment for -- from us to collaborate with a consultant with the expertise of Alertness Solutions and Dr. Rosekind. Our entering into a four-year partnership with Alertness Solutions will allow us to rapidly change a culture, and I believe that is true because they've got the expertise to help us do that, both in fatigue and also in the -- area of behavioral change. They also have a work -- they have real work experience of applying fatigue measures and their approach fit very well with ours because it was comprehensive in -- in how they planned on doing that.

We also -- we realized we needed a partnership with our employees and their labor organizations and the FRA. And the SACP allows us that opportunity to do just that.

Fatigue is a complex issue to resolve because it involves this merger of science and a constantly changing operational -- constantly changing operational issues. Because of these complexities, it is not a problem that will be fixed with a singular, quick fix. It require a comprehensive and systematic approach. It -- it's a much -- it is this broader approach that we've chosen to adopt with a development of a variety of projects that will be implemented over the next four years.

The cultural change that is needed to obtain the objective of reducing fatigue and improving the quality of life of our employees can only be achieved through a long-term commitment.

I would now ask Dr. -- Mr. Holland to expand on our activities that we have planned and -- and have been performing over the last several months.

MR. HOLLAND: Thank you, Dr. Richling.

Before I begin, I -- I'd like to mention that -- that this is not theoretical to me. As I said, I was a conductor brakeman for 19 years. I and my family lived this.

One of the reasons I accepted this position is because I felt that there was a significant commitment from the people who were charged with developing, supporting, and sponsoring this program. Certainly, Dr. Richling was one of those people. And I was very impressed with the level of commitment at the -- the company.

Also, I think one of the reasons I was selected is that my past experience with the union. My educational background is in the area of human relations. My current doctoral program is -- is human relations, and that is a matter of becoming a change agent in organizational transformation.

In the area of commitment, as -- as I've been in this position the last six, seven months and I've been able to get out and talk to people, and as the language has become more common as people become educated and have an understanding of who we are and what we're going to do with this program, there's a certain sense of commitment and excitement growing out there at all levels. Again, though, it's a matter of translating that into the language that everyone can speak commonly. That underscores the importance of education.

Currently, our program is being developed in conjunction with the -- the SACP process. We're developing implementation teams based on recommendations that are coming out of the SACP process and primarily in six categories: education and communications, crew scheduling, napping, markup and undisturbed rest, lodging, and healthy sleep initiatives. And what I'd like to do is just go through briefly and explain the programs of what we're planning, where they're at now, and then I'll let Dr. Rosekind continue with the -- what we propose for the future.

In the area -- area of education and communications, our -- our intent there is to keep employees as aware of the program as possible through a variety of methods. We have I think it's been communicated a significant communication program at the Union Pacific, and we keep it in front of our employees. We allow them to know what's going on. We want their input. We want them to understand this program.

We have begun education initiatives in the area of -- we're providing basic training to all our employees through the Session B process, the rules examination process, and we've targeted special education for implementation in our napping program which began last week.

In the area of crew scheduling, this will probably be our most significant program, and again, education will be foundational here. We need to explain to people what's going on, get everyone speaking in the same language.

This is the area that will require significant collective bargaining. We already have begun collective bargaining initiatives with identified UTU and BLE general chairmen.

One thing we intend to do is something that I don't believe has been done before is when we go into an area and identify and begin working on the crew scheduling initiatives we're also going to identify and work on manager issues as well.

Right now we're in the stage of initial negotiations, analyzing and developing critical data, and we intend to have town hall programs where we not only talk to the employees and explain to them our program but we're going to bring in the families as well. We feel that the families are critical, and it -- a basic I think ethical need there to provide this education to families as well, considering our current society.

As I said, our napping program began last week. It was implemented in the St. Louis service unit. It's the initial phase. We'll do evaluation. It will be rolled out. Eventually, we'll have a napping policy for all employees on the Union Pacific Railroad.

This to me was one of my most positive experiences in labor management of all the years I've been in the railroad. I had a great team of BLE and UTU representatives in our -- our SACP subgroup. We worked together very closely. We benchmarked, we -- we brainstormed, we came up with things that we thought were a practical way to initiate this in -- in a culture that needs to -- to begin to change. They worked very well with me.

We went to the St. Louis service unit and I asked the managers there to bring in the local chairmen, and again, it was a very positive experience. The local managers that we had involved were excited about being involved in this. They brought in the local chairmen. They worked together with our operations rules program, and they had input, they made several changes, and it went very well. The local chairmen are working with our local managers down there to -- to monitor and identify any changes that'll -- that'll be needed.

I think it's significant that out of this process will become a series of these local encounters with management and -- and local unions to develop the program. That was excite -- exciting to me and it was empowerment to all of our employees, management and labor as well.

Markup and undisturbed rest, those are our -- again, collective bargaining issues that are being identified out there as ways of -- there are some pilot programs to identify ways of -- of having undisturbed rest and coinciding with the science as to when people mark up. And we've identified some general chairmen from the BLE and the UTU who have agreed to work on it with us.

Lodging. Alertness Solutions presented some significant guidelines together with their work with a SACP subcommittee. Again, it was a positive experience for all involved including managers, labor, not just BLE and UTU but it was the BMWE and other unions as well. And they had the opportunity to work with our consultants, so it was really a partnership of all the factions in this.

Finally, we have a healthy sleep program. That will move along as -- as we get into the program. It's addressing the fact that up to 30 percent of the general population has sleep disorders. We want to address and develop simple ways of identifying these and providing the needed help to all of our employees. An example of that could be individual counseling or ensuring that people see their -- their personal and private physician.

Finally, I'd like to say that -- that we are experiencing a great enthusiasm, and -- and what's critical there is getting out that educational foundation and allowing us all to speak the same language of understanding and fatigue.

And I think on a personal note that, as I said with the napping policy, I come from both sides of this. And it -- it was a great deal of personal satisfaction to be able to work in partnership with all the factions and -- and see a -- an accomplishment that everyone was proud of.

With that, I'll pass on to Dr. Rosekind and let him fill you in on where we're going.

DR. ROSEKIND: Two introductory comments. One, I want to commend the Board because one of the comments I'm going to make at the end has to do with follow-through, and I think the Board has talked about fatigue for a long time but its action and as small and simple as it seems I think moving this fatigue panel to the morning rather than keeping us all here wondering about long drives home is a way to act on those recommendations. I really commend you for that.

The other is while I may be only semi-crippled by not being able to stand up and walk while I talk, I do have permission to use slides, so I have a couple that I'm going to flip on.

(Pause)

DR. ROSEKIND: See, if we turned the lights out last night we would have all been gone.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: I have really three major comments I wanted to address. One has to do with putting fatigue in the context of the science that's available. Second, to give some detail of the Union Pacific's alertness management program as it currently stands, including some of the activities already underway. And third is the very last slide which I think addresses issues which I think are relevant really to all the parties involved in trying to manage this issue in the rail industry.

So, this first slide is -- really kind of refers to what people have already been talking about, but fatigue really is a safety risk across all modes. I think what's important is this is not a new issue. This has been around for a considerable amount of time. What's new is its visibility. What's also new are some of the technologies and strategies that are available to try and address these in operational settings.

I think it's important just to add to the record in 1995 when the NTSB and NASA held a symposium on managing fatigue in transportation, -- Chairman Hall and others were -- able to cite that since 1972 the Board has made 80 recommendations over a 20-plus year period regarding fatigue, and that's not just identifying what's going on but recommendations to actually change things. Those include recommendations from educational activities through review and updating of the hours of service across all modes of transportation. So, this is an issue that's been around for a long time.

I also think that it's important to acknowledge there are two major physiological factors we're dealing with here. One has to do with sleep as with the internal body clock or the circadian clock. I mention that because there's a lot of concern about other factors that can also affect fatigue like diet, like stress, like workload, etc. But in my personal opinion, I think that sleep and circadian factors when you look at the science clearly count for anywhere from 70, 75 to 95 percent of the issue we're talking about.

So, those other factors are important, but they modulate, they contribute, they exacerbate the issue, and I raise this because if we don't deal with the most basic of then we're going to miss this issue completely.

And I'm not going to go through -- quote all the educational activities, but there are a couple of things I want to highlight because they're relevant to some of the issues that have already come up.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: One is that sleep alone is a very complex physiological state. And I think just as you look -- I'm not going to review all of these, but if you look at this list, we know there's a biological requirement for sleep. We know if you don't get it there's a cumulative sleep debt so when people talk about acute versus chronic fatigue we know these things can build up.

There are recovery needs. If you've lost sleep you need a certain amount of time, quote, "to make it up."

We also know that people are inaccurate at their reporting. So, in fact one of the worst people you can ask, "How alert are you? How good is your performance?" is somebody who's already fatigued.

And the last thing is that sleep is affected by a whole range of factors, including age, alcohol, other sleep disorders, etc.

So, I put this up here 'cause right away there's a tremendous amount of science and knowledge about sleep alone that addresses many of the issues that have been raised. And while I won't deal with it now, some of the things that have been raised, for example, whether it be 14 and 2 or seven and one get to the recovery needs issue.

One of the things I want to point out, and it's already been mentioned, if you don't deal with this in a comprehensive way, then what happens is you go to one issue and you miss all these others. And if you -- I -- I dislike the metaphor, but if you think about it like a battery, if you will, you know, it starts with getting the battery charged. So, if you haven't started with a minimum sleep requirement in the first place and then you have to look at how long people are awake, the time of day, it's very complex. You deal with one, think you have it handled, and there are all these other areas essentially that require being addressed as well.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: I think sleep loss affects all aspects of human performance, and I put this up here because I think these are the risks. The signs and symptoms listed here are just some examples that create the risks for errors, incidents, and accidents to occur.

Fatigue is insidious. And because people are so inaccurate at reporting how they're doing they don't often know that it's creeping up on them.

One of the other things is we don't have a blood test for fatigue, so unlike alcohol you go to an accident or any kind of situation, because we can't pull a blood level of fatigue I think it's often underestimated in what role it plays because it can affect so many different aspects of performance. But it's clearly this foundation that creates the vulnerability or the risk, if you will, for things to happen.

As one concrete example in rail, Professor Ackerstan in Sweden did a very interesting study where he actually wired up and recorded brain activity and eye movements of train engineers in Sweden. And on the night runs, 36 percent showed evidence of physiological sleep, and half of those periods -- during half of those periods they actually went through a warning signal, stop light if you will, with no response. Now, there was no incident or accident that occurred, but clearly, having those microsleeps occur put those people at risk.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: The other thing just to consider as I mentioned is that there's a clock in the brain, an internal body clock or circadian clock. It affects all of our physiology and our performance. And I think what's important to know is that there are certain periods of vulnerability that are very well documented. It ends up -- it doesn't matter what shift work environment, what transportation mode you want to look at, that three to five a.m. period is the time when most errors occur, most incidents occur, and more accidents occur. And again, it does not matter what environment you want to look at. And there's data back 40, 50 years that demonstrate this.

I think what's also important is to realize we have another window of vulnerability in the afternoon between three and five, and that occurs whether you eat lunch or not. So, that big lunch does not put you to sleep, but rather there's a vulnerability. And the disruption of the clock is critical because I think one of the things we've heard a lot about that's very important has to do with predictability, and the more you switch the clock back and forth, day and night, around the clock, etc., you create circadian disruption as well.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: I think there's some challenges, and this is why -- well, the next slide deals with this, but there's some challenges that everybody has to deal with. One is the operational requirements of the rail industry are very diverse. You look at the individuals that make up the workforce and you have a large -- just in UP alone you've got 53,000 people doing the job. So, you have very high level individual differences among the workforce. And finally, the physiology is very complex. When you put those three things together essentially, the idea that you're going to fix this issue easily is fairly naive.

In fact, you put all those things together, and it really precludes the fact that there's going to be a simple solution, that there'll be a single solution.

And now, let me take potshots at two things. Saying that there's going to be one number that fixes the fatigue issue, whether it be regulation or collectively negotiated, thinking there's going to be one number will not handle this solution.

And I'll take a potshot. I think napping's a tremendous strategy. We're going to talk about it. But that strategy will not fix this either.

So, again, the idea that it'll be simple or single is naive for us to think about.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: One size fits all. Again, because of the diversity of the population, the diversity of the operational requirements, and the complex physiology one size will not fit all. This is one of the issues with hours of service, if you will, and I'm sure we'll get to that later. But again, the idea that you'll come up with one number in one area that solves this is just not possible, which is why, again, there's just not going to be a magic bullet here. And the issue, of course, is if there's not -- the unfortunate problem here is people say, "Okay. It's a real issue. Tell me what to do and give me the magic bullet." And it's not simple.

Well, what can you do about this?

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: First of all, if you can't do it in a single way then using multiple components allows you to address this. I think it has to be comprehensively, though. You can't just look at one of those issues and think you've got it handled. And there has to be integration across the components. And just as an example, if you're doing education you have to have a core set of information that's consistent across all of your population. You don't want one people here -- one group hearing one thing, others hearing others.

Clearly, there has to be a scientific foundation to all of this. Again, I think what's interesting about fatigue is that everyone who's human sleeps so everybody's an expert in this area. You read an article or two and pretty much everyone's got their personal way on how it should be solved. There's a lot of science that can be applied to this.

Finally, I think as far as addressing this issue that's starting to come up is this is a shared responsibility. Unfortunately, when addressing this issue there's a lot of finger-pointing that goes on as to who's responsible for this. And I think we'll talk about this later, but there is this idea that, you know, if you have a macho, right-stuff attitude you can just overcome fatigue, and I continually point out that attitude is not a strategy to deal with this and regardless of professionalism and motivation you can't just, quote, "overcome fatigue." It's a physiological thing you have to deal with.

When I think about that, hearing all the testimony over the last couple days, is if you want macho and right-stuff in this industry, let's step to the table and deal with this in a responsible way 'cause, frankly, that's where the courage is going to come to really make the changes necessary to deal with this issue effectively.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: Let me talk specifically about some of the activities at Union Pacific. Let me just as a contact say that they have at least with us made a four-year commitment to deal with this issue. We consider this a partnership, so it's not like we're doing the work, if you will. I think that was part of the attraction both for Union Pacific and us, which is that we want to help lend our scientific expertise. But the company has a very significant role not only in planning but clearly in execution.

Let me just go over each of these elements to give you a sense of some of the activities that are going on. I'm sure there'll be questions later, but I want to give a bit of an overview and a current status.

One thing we want to do is create a strategic plan. This is a communication tool to be used both internally and externally, and I think it's important for two reasons. One is it sets a path for the program. It's very visible again internally and externally for people to know what's supposed to be going on. The second is it establishes a public commitment, if you will, to deal with this issue.

The first draft regarding content and format was presented in January to the SACP fatigue working group. They had a chance to review that along with others at UP. It's currently under revision and hopefully will be out for its sort of next look for folks the middle of next month.

There's also an operational plan that's being developed, and frankly, that's a more concrete -- if you're going to actually pull this off, how you're going to do it, and that's dealing with resources and timelines and all that sort of thing just so we have a sense of how we're actually going to accomplish all of this.

Most people know that I have been professing and supporting education as the most critical foundation for any activity in this area. If people don't have a common language, if they don't understand what's going on, there's no way you can have success in changing all of this. We're going to talk later a bit about cultural change. Well, that starts by people understanding the physiological issues, the science, what can be done about it, and really where the responsibilities lie to deal with this issue, which again are shared.

One of the things just to be concrete about that is we've developed a program, and Dr. Richling's referred to this, that's really comprehensive and that it's dealing with both general -- it's three things. General education, specifically focused on different work groups within UP but then also gets literally to the individual level as well.

We started in December just doing presentations to bring people up to speed not just about the program but the science. I'd say that we've probably done a dozen to 15 different presentations, Mr. Holland and myself, and that includes the senior management groups, that includes Harriman Dispatch Center. We've done presentations to everything from peer support to mixed operational groups, and those range anywhere from an hour to four hours worth of information, which is a pretty significant amount of science to be covered in that amount of time.

Having created the NASA education activities, I think what's been challenging about this is actually trying to take the education to the next level. So, we've developed a new module that has about an 80 percent core that we'll be able to adapt to the different groups. That's been drafted in February. It's been revised and is actually the -- the core, if you will, for the rules classes which have already begun. We've already done a video that was used to help train some of the facilitators for that class as well.

And again, I'm hitting the highlights of some of the current. I'm not going over everything, which is when you think about comprehensive training we're talking about Mr. Davis doing some lead-ins to certain things, we're talking about using the television, brochures, a huge -- in fact, there's a communication group to deal specifically with distribution of the information. And there's a -- a lot of things going on. Jack Martin, who's one of the communications people, is doing an article, and he wants to be doing something every month at minimum or more regular just to get information out.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: Strategy implementation. Let me make a general comment, which is while there is more research that needs to be done when most of this happened -- the first part is since if we can apply now -- and by that we're talking implementation here. This is not research. This is applied to -- apply what we know. And a good example of that is the strategy implementation. I'll just talk about two activities currently going on.

One is napping, and UP's made a commitment to a companywide planned nap program. And so, that's not just the operating crafts, that is also dispatch, clerical, even management. Talk about cultural change, if you will.

And what we've done is create a document that includes an introduction about this issue, it includes the scientific background for this issue, it talks about general policies, general procedures, and then there are appendices. One's already been written for TNY. And then the other one's for the different crafts, and other areas will also be written that go to specific policy procedures for those groups.

There's also an evaluation form in there that's going to be used to determine how people are using the planned nap and its effectiveness, ways to improve the program, and there's another article in there as well.

This is one of the things. We've also created the 10-minute video to bring people up to speed, and this is one of the things that's already unrolled. And Ms. Gross yesterday, part of her comment was that she's actually talked to people who've already started using this as of the beginning of this week essentially and are really talking about using this effectively.

And we'll talk about this later, but I think the napping is a great example of the science, pardon the expression, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out this is a useful strategy, but if you want to use it effectively in this environment, it's a cultural change where it's okay to actually use this.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: Another activity is lodging. What we did was create a document that outlines about nine different factors you have to look at in -- in evaluating environmental factors that can affect sleep in lodging and then a range of other factors that can affect that as well. We again created an evaluation form to look at both current and future lodging facilities and a way to essentially analyze that as well.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: Let me spend just a moment on the scheduling. I think scheduling, like hours of service, is one of the most complex and contentious issues, and it doesn't matter what transportation industry that you're looking at. And it's complex for a variety of different reasons, but let me just as an overall comment make a general description of the approach.

In many ways people try and deal with scheduling by going to a particular environment and going to a specific site and fixing that scheduling -- whatever scheduling issues exist at that site. What we've suggested in the current approach underway is to come up with essentially more general systemic ways of addressing scheduling issues at Union Pacific. We have some experience in creating what we're calling principles and guidelines, if you will, general scheduling principles and what kind of guidelines would -- could apply. We want to try and come up with systemic ways of addressing these issues and then apply that at a specific site.

A site has already been identified. We're in the process of collecting data. It took about a month to get the first pass. We reviewed that. Now we're collecting more data, if you will, and what we're going to try and do essentially is come up with a matrix and then generalized solutions on how to deal with these issues applying 'em to the specific requirements at that site.

Part of the reason I mention that is you can take one of two approaches. You can go to a site, try and deal with the scheduling issues, but then you've got to go to every other site on the system. The other way to deal with it is step back and try and come up with more systemic kinds of approaches and then figure out how you deal with the idiosyncratic aspects of a particular site. That's going to have much greater generalizability than having to go site to site to site, etc.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: The healthy sleep program is something that we put in there. Mr. Holland's already mentioned this, but in any given year anywhere from a third to half the population's going to have a sleep disturbance. We know some of those like sleep apnea are associated with two to seven times increased risk for car accidents. It's a predisposition for difficulties with alertness and performance.

What's really interesting is that this is an education issue for everybody: physicians who treat these people, the workforce, etc. What we want to do first of all is actually develop policies of how we're going to deal with this from a health viewpoint if you will. And the reason I mention this is the whole idea is to identify people at risk and then to help provide interventions that essentially help these people. And I mention this because -- and this has already been discussed -- the intent is not to have a witch hunt. And I think there's other industries where people have gone out and tried to look for these things and only negative consequences have come about. What we want to do is identify these and get help for some of these folks as well.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: The final thing on the list here is the scientific advisory council, and I'll just comment that there's a lot of research that's going on right now, and part of the agenda is to bring the latest findings to UP. One of the other things that we've done just as one example of activities of that council is everybody in this room and UP, whenever you have fatigue in a headline people send you stuff that's going to cure it. And that ranges from a videotape to a drink to scheduling algorithm to a relaxation tape.

And one of the things that we have done is create some criteria to evaluate these things, and we have the first four or five that have been sent to the company, and we have a scientific associate group, about five people. One of those, Dr. Dingis and I have already created a criteria to evaluate these things when they come to the company and have evaluated the first four or five, which we'll get back to the company in just a couple of weeks. So again, that's our way of trying to make sure that where they decide to go will be scientifically based.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: Let me just make a comment that when the program was put together timing was critical. If you don't do your education first the other stuff will fail. And so, things like scheduling are not put off. It's so we have an opportunity to do things we know can be successful like the education, like the napping, like the lodging, etc. so we get to the more complex issues in the time ahead.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: These are issues that I've put up here that I think are really relevant to any success.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: The rail industry took over 130 years to evolve the current operational practices. The idea that you're going to deal with fatigue and changes tomorrow is absurd. So, I don't care if we all took a vote and said fatigue's a problem, change it tomorrow, it could not be done. And while we haven't spent a lot of time here, it's just too complex. And I think we've had plenty of the contentious already portrayed here, if you will, the number of issues that we're trying to deal with. And so, the idea that you're going to do it tomorrow I think is just absurd.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: When we talk about cultural changes we're not just talking about the rail industry, we're talking about our entire society. I think what's interesting is the issue we're talking about in rail is reflected in our society in general. It's not just the modes of transportation. Frankly, these are issues in health care, military operations, you name it. Everybody's trying to deal with these issues of how long you should stay awake and how much fatigue is a safety problem.

And that's why we're talking about a cultural change not just in rail but clearly across our society. But I think you can point -- you know, when you say what needs to change, you know, in the old days if you were found sleeping on a railroad it meant you got fired. And so, to come in and say, "No, we think napping's a good idea," "Is this a trick?" I mean this is where education is so critical. We have to have people turning it around. This doesn't mean it wasn't going on. What we're talking about is telling people this is a good idea and here's the structure you need to actually use it.

Just think of the size of the industry. I think that's been portrayed in the FRA comments, etc. And you look at UP alone, you're talking about 53,000 people spread out all over the country. So, it's not like we're going to do that tomorrow.

One of the examples I like to use is American Airlines was one of the first companies to actually use our NASA module. They trained all of their pilots, 10,000 pilots in a mandatory recurrent training class, and it took them three years to do that. Now they're talking about getting to the 20,000 flight attendants and the rest of the people. So, even if you decide one thing and it's really important, it takes you a while to accomplish that.

Need an opportunity for action I'm going to talk about in just a moment.

Proactive versus reactive. I think it's clear that UP has a lot of service requirements and service recovery that's going on where they've got to be reactive. But fatigue's an issue where if it's purely reactive we're not going to get into the planning and opportunity, if you will, to decide how to proactively deal with this issue. And that's why I want to make really three comments to all parties involved.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: I mean all parties. That's not just Union Pacific. It's all companies. It's FRA, it's all the labor organizations. I think there are three critical comments.

One, science needs to guide the activities that are coming. I think it's absolutely -- really critical that this -- the -- the science of sleep, circadian rhythms, and everything else we know is incorporated into the activities. Okay?

Now, I mention that because I didn't say that the science should dictate. Another modal agency one time made a comment, "Let's put a bunch of scientists in a room and let them feel -- figure out what the hours of service should be." Boy, that would be tragic, you know. They don't know how to do that. But the science is available to help guide the activities that are going on, and there's a very clear foundation of information that could be used.

Two other comments. One is I think the pressure ought to be kept on. And that pressure should be for accountability, follow through, and maintain visibility. Because again, we can come and talk about all this stuff and people can point fingers and people can make commitments, but it's the follow-through that's going to actually address this issue. And I think the pressure should be kept on to maintain that accountability and follow-through.

But my third comment is I also think the pressure needs to come off a bit. I think the focus needs to be effective at successful strategies and activities. And one of the things I've seen already is that there's been a huge pressure for schedule and deadlines. And in fact, Mr. Gavalla made a great comment yesterday that we need to evaluate the safety program based on results. Well, the results are going to be based on effective, successful strategies and activities, not whether you met a deadline or not.

And I just want to give you a couple examples that have already been raised here. Positive ones. Forget the -- I'll give you some positive ones.

We started the education activities at UP, created a brand new education training module, and that -- the whole idea was to create a core of information that would be scientifically accurate and could be consistent across all the activities. Well, went out and spent a couple of days delivering the module, going through it, creating a video. When they're ready to rule -- to roll the rules class out, we had a chance to review the material that was supposed to be used and there was a disconnect. And the information was not accurate, it was sort of misleading, etc.

Well, I called Dr. Richling, wrote him a couple pages, it stopped immediately. And we went back to the information that we had available.

But I'm bringing that up 'cause that took courage, you know. I have heard so much about, "Well, they're rolling out the class. It's got to be done." Instead, he did the right thing, if you will, and made sure that we have in place what should be an effective and successful strategy and information rather than just going to meet the deadline.

I think Ms. Gross brought up another example yesterday. She talked about being on a committee that was trying to deal with transportation issues for relief crews. They were going to fix it in 30 days. Lo and behold, they got into the issue and it couldn't be done in 30 days. It took them two or three months to analyze the data, put it together, but what she was able to report was a 22 percent improvement in the situation. And they're trying to go better, and now it's extending to other sites.

What I think you need to do, as Mr. Gavalla said yesterday, is go to the results. And my concern is there's been so much pressure -- reactive pressure, and again, that may be appropriate for the service recovery side, but I really think it's clear that there's got to be time to act, if you will, not just to make the plans but for follow-through as well. And if that's purely schedule-driven, then we're going to miss the mark rather than trying to come up with effective and successful strategies.

(Slide)

DR. ROSEKIND: My last two comments. One is I think you have to acknowledge the efforts of everybody so far. In fact, the Board made a recommendation to Public Transit to review fatigue. Well, they had a symposium just a few weeks ago. Administrator Molitoris was there. She made some comments there. She made some comments yesterday. Mr. Gavalla made some comments. I'm absolutely impressed that we've got people up talking about fatigue the way they are now. It warms my heart to think that not only education is successful but we've got people actually up talking about this stuff.

And part of my last bullet up here is that I think rail is poised right now to make innovations in dealing with fatigue that nobody else has done yet. No one else has any modal regulatory agency or Federal agency stepping forward with activities that NARAP. I don't think there's any other administrator, frankly, on the record talking about fatigue the way we've had comments made as well.

But there's a -- there's sort of a double edge here again, which is I think there's tremendous opportunity but the push has to be for successful and effective activities and the follow-through. We've got to make sure this actually happens so that we don't come back in a period of time and say, "By the way, what happened to that?" Instead, we've got to be able to come back and say, "Here's what happened. This activity was not only accomplished, but here's the outcome it had and it was a positive result." And if it's not positive, we know that before and we have to tell someone else, and we correct it so that at the end of the day we're going to actually be able to identify specific changes that helped to improve the situation.

In many ways, this is a win for everybody. This is a win for safety for everybody. That's for personnel on the job, that's for the traveling public, that's for the people that live around all these areas. This is a win-win for everybody if we deal with it effectively. Thank you.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you, Dr. Rosekind.

Turning to some specific questions, and the first question is for Dr. Rosekind. Since I'm the first questioner I get to ask the question that everybody wants to ask that was raised yesterday. Does science support the seven-and-one work schedule?

DR. ROSEKIND: You know, I think it's already been portrayed here accurately. Mr. Green, Mr. Gavalla. If people think that this is an interim issue that deals with recovery, which is one of the items, then I think it's a step in the right direction to acknowledge that recovery is one of the issues that have to be dealt with.

Whether the science supports seven-and-one, I can't say where that number came from specifically. I would say that recovery and some sense of that has to be included in the overall way to address this. And -- and people say, "Well, what do you mean?" Let me just say you have to deal with minimum rest, you have to deal with how long you're on duty, you've got to deal with recovery, seven-and-one or anything other -- any other numbers in there are only one way of doing it. You've got to deal with circadian times, you've got to deal with other kinds of cumulative aspects, you've got to deal with reserve.

So, I think that, you know, if you're trying to deal with it from scheduling or hours of service, you have to deal with every one of those elements if you want to deal with it successfully.

DR. WEEKS: Given all of those elements, let me pose a scene -- scenario, and it's not really a hypothetical scenario since I'm drawing it from one of the accident investigations I'm involved with to get your input on it.

Imagine a -- a crewman who has gone on duty at 6:00 in the morning and his final tie-up is 2:30 in the afternoon. Now, since he's worked less than 12 hours he's "rested," quote, unquote, under the law or at 10:30 that evening. Given what we know about circadian rhythms, etc., how likely -- or how much meaningful sleep is that employee likely to get between 2:30 in the afternoon and 10:30 that evening?

DR. ROSEKIND: There's enough literature to show us that people who can obtain eight hours at night will be getting somewhere between five and a half or six and a half if they try and move to a day sleeper. So, there'll be a significant decrease in both the quality and quantity of sleep.

And if I can just elaborate, I think the other part you have to look at is report time. It's becoming the issue of society now. Besides the 24 hour part, it's that people that have early report times means that they're missing their last one or two cycles of sleep. And there's this misnomer that somehow if you have, quote, "a day job" fatigue won't be an issue. But if you've got to report to duty too early or are then on duty too long, fatigue could significantly play a role.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you.

A question for Dr. Richling, and I think it was you that mentioned it and if not you would know. The specific question: is there a strategic and operational planning document that more fully describes this program?

DR. RICHLING: Dr. Rosekind mentioned earlier that it is our plan to have an operational and strategic plan but it will probably be the middle part of next month before we have that completed. At this time in Exhibit 5-H there's Attachment 13 which really lays out the details of what we intend to do, and our plans will very closely follow that. It will just be an expansion of what's already listed in Attachment 13.

DR. WEEKS: Okay. Upon completion of that plan will you provide the Board with a copy for the record?

DR. RICHLING: Yes.

DR. WEEKS: Thank you. Those are the questions I have at the moment.

Other members of the Technical Panel?

MR. NARVELL: I just had a few for Mr. Holland.

And Mr. Holland, this is going to refer to the period that would be for the partnership that you entered in with Dr. Rosekind.

At any point prior to this had the fatigue management program been evaluated for its effectiveness?

MR. HOLLAND: I didn't hear you. I can't hear you.

MR. NARVELL: At any time before this current partnership we're -- we've been discussing, has the fatigue management program been evaluated for its effectiveness? And that would be either internal and/or external.

MR. HOLLAND: You mean our -- our plan?

MR. NARVELL: Yes. Just -- just the components of the plan, the -- the elements of it.

MR. HOLLAND: Oh, I -- okay. The plan has been under -- or what we -- as we developed it, it's been under a great deal of scrutiny and -- and certainly through SACP. As we created the plan and had drafts I took it to our SACP committee -- oversight committee. It was reviewed by all the partners there. Suggestions were put in.

Also, our educational -- basic components of that were reviewed through SACP. There was considerable input by members of BLE, UTU. Certainly, the other parts of the program are under -- under a great deal of scrutiny from various departments internally and certainly the FRA and the -- the other SACP partners externally.

MR. NARVELL: Okay. Was there any kind of report issued on that procedure? Written document?

MR. HOLLAND: Report -- I -- I think that would be the Attachment 13, the -- the FRA document would be the most formal report that's been done on our program.

MR. NARVELL: Okay. Earlier Dr. Richling mentioned the -- the video and the material circa 1990 that was disseminated to some 17,000 employees, I believe. What would happen in the case of a employee hired after that date? How would he or she obtain that material?

MR. HOLLAND: Was that for me or Dr. Richling?

MR. NARVELL: Either you or Dr. Richling.

DR. RICHLING: There was no formal program to distribute it to -- to new hires after that date.

MR. NARVELL: Did the UP have any mechanism to document who in fact received this? What families or households or employees? Was there a procedure in place at that time?

DR. RICHLING: I don't recall -- that was quite some time ago, and I don't recall how we did that. I do remember because I was involved -- I was intimately involved with several projects were distributing information. We had some mechanisms for measuring it, but I don't remember the -- how we did that.

MR. NARVELL: Since this initiative was undertaken in the late '80s, early '90s, has the company received any feedback from employees and/or family members on this program?

DR. RICHLING: My -- my best recollection or -- we -- is I don't recall if we did a formal survey to determine how people viewed it. We have anecdotally received some positive comments. It's been some time since -- since I've heard them because it's been several years since we distributed that. But when we first distributed it we got quite a few form -- informal comments as we talked with people who had received it.

MR. NARVELL: Okay. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the parties? Texas --

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. To the parties?

MR. MARTIN: No questions, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. GAVALLA: Mr. Holland, you indicated that you became director of Alertness Management sometime in September of '97, is that correct?

MR. HOLLAND: Yes, sir, it is.

MR. GAVALLA: Was that after FRA initiated its first sweep of the UP and raised the issue of fatigue with UP?

MR. HOLLAND: It was -- would probably have been in that time frame. It probably would coincide. I was interviewed, I think, in August.

MR. GAVALLA: Okay. Did they -- UP have a director of Alertness Management prior to your appointment?

MR. HOLLAND: No, I'm the first one.

MR. GAVALLA: No further questions at this time.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. WALPERT: Yes. Thank you.

Dr. Rosekind, can you tell me is napping an effective strategy?

DR. ROSEKIND: Absolutely.

MR. WALPERT: Where does the rail industry stand in relationship to other modes of -- of transportation in regard to use of the napping strategy?

DR. ROSEKIND: You're way ahead. I can -- having led the group at NASA that did really the first field demonstration of how effective a nap can be, which is that in a group of pilots that received a brief nap they had a 34 percent improvement in their performance and were twice as alert compared to a group that didn't get the nap.

There are other modal agencies that are still reviewing that policy, if you will, and therefore, it is not actually sanctioned for use in the United States airlines though other non-U.S. airlines are using it.

So, frankly, to have the FRA considering it as part of NARAP, etc., as one of the legitimate strategies that needs to be applied and to have the other companies that are already have pilot in other programs and UP's acceptance, there's not a question about it. It was more how do we use it?

MR. WALPERT: That then brings up the next question. How do we use it? Do you have a plan or is there an implementation procedure for how it would be utilized, for example, for an operating crew over the road?

DR. ROSEKIND: Yes, and I think there's two parts of that. One is what we've done is to design some general policies and procedures regarding hand-off kinds of procedures, how long the nap should be, some, you know, fairly straightforward things. It's not a hard procedure. And then what we're trying to do, actually, is identify the specific requirements for each environment. And so, in fact, Mr. Pugmire's been involved with some of the general order considerations, etc.

Part of the evaluation is to figure out if we're using it effectively or not. You know, as a part of going out is trying to figure out did you take one or not? If you didn't, what prevented you? I mean did you want to but you didn't, why not? And that way we can try and feed that back into improvements in the program.

MR. WALPERT: Typically, how long would -- would a nap occur during the tour of duty?

DR. ROSEKIND: The recommendation for a short nap is 45 minutes or less. That's to try and avoid some of the deep sleep that might cause some sleepiness. But again, even less than that, you know, if that can help, quote, "take the edge off," then that's a useful opportunity for people.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

Dr. Richling, in regard to fatigue education, is the emphasis of the education centered towards operating employees or is management included in -- in the training?

DR. RICHLING: Both will be included in our training.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. What types of training are envisioned? Is it video, one-on-one, classroom, what?

DR. RICHLING: It will be all those that you mentioned. The training will be all those that you mentioned as well the training we envision something like a voluntary questionnaire to help people identify if there are fatigue issues or issues with regard to sleep behavior that may be of relevance to them. It will include the opportunity if they so choose to get self-directed materials or even utilize a counselor to help them work through certain issues if they -- so if they need one-on-one counseling they can receive that.

Again, in our past experience with people it's been best if those things have been done voluntarily, and we've been fairly successful. And in fact, in our health education programs we've seen participation rates that have been quite high when we offer 'em voluntarily, and that would be our plan in the future.

DR. ROSEKIND: Can I -- excuse me. Can I just add to that?

MR. WALPERT: Certainly.

DR. ROSEKIND: Two things. One, the intent is to educate all 53,000 UP employees, so this is not trying to pick on any -- like, a specific operator. This is everybody needs to learn this stuff.

The second is you actually asked the question yesterday whether two hours in a rules class was a sufficient way to handle this. It is not.

Now, I will just say that I mentioned American Airlines. They have a one-hour class to train their 10,000 people. So, again, in a way what other railroads have done in rail you're ahead, but it's not sufficient yet. And I constantly bring that up because fatigue I hope will not become sort of the safety issue du jour, if you will, that we'll say we included it that year and now we're done. And so, I think the intent that you're hearing is that every possible communication mechanism and training mechanism available will be utilized, and that includes both employees and families to my understanding.

MR. WALPERT: Well, that brings up another question, Dr. Rosekind, and I'll address this to you. Fatigue has been in the rail industry for -- since the beginning, 130 years I guess you -- you used on your slide. Why is it that in the last few years there has been such an emphasis on addressing fatigue?

DR. ROSEKIND: I think there's probably two big factors. In a sense, some of the science is new in that a lot of the sleep and circadian stuff that's coming out of the '30s, '40s, '50s. When you look at all the rest that we understand about physiology and medicine that goes back thousands of years, and what we know about sleep and stuff is, you know, 40, 50 years.

But I think that more important is what has really just happened in maybe the last five to 10 years, frankly, is the acknowledgement of those factors in the real world. And so, what's really been lagging and what we're seeing a huge influx right now is a focus on trying to understand how all that applies in our lives every day. And that's what I'm saying. This is not unique to rail. This is happening in all modes of transportation. This is happening in health care. I'm fortunate enough to go to meetings across all these different 24-hour aspects of our society, and everybody's struggling with this.

So, I think it's a combination of the new science and the application part, if you will, is the newest part of that.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Holland, can you speak to the work environment specifically for operating crews, the locomotive cab? What are UP efforts to address locomotive cab conditions as it may pertain to fatigue?

MR. HOLLAND: There have been a number of initiatives already, pilot projects, if you will, some intercab communications type things, some experimentation with bringing tapes, having music, having background noise to ensure alertness. There's been discussion and work with things like alerters and that -- those sorts of issues.

I think what's important now, now that we have a formal program, that we have consultants on board, that we have a scientific advisory panel to work with us that we'll be better coordinated as we look at these new technologies, as we look at all the options out there, ways of creating cabs that are -- that are comfortable yet not monotonous so that people aren't kind of lulled into that sense of false security or -- or that would contribute to fatigue in itself. I'm excited that -- that we will have these scientists here to guide us as we look at these things and guide us in developing them scientifically.

MR. WALPERT: All right. Thank you. Also, Mr. Holland, does UP have such a thing as a nap room for crews awaiting trains?

MR. HOLLAND: We -- we just started the napping policy on the St. Louis service unit, and one of the things that the SACP subcommittee -- one of the things we looked at is identifying terminals where there's significant wait time for trains whether that's because of interchange with other railroads or -- or whatever. We'd like to then -- and maybe even do something that hasn't been done before is look at switchmen's needs. I think that's -- that would be unique in the industry, too.

And so, we want to next as we get our evaluations make sure that scientifically we're doing the right things, that we're on the right track as we -- we spread out, identify things as terminals that might have those significant wait times, what kind of environment is needed, what about length of time, that sort of thing to allow crews to get sleep before they even get on a train.

Actually, I think the first person on the St. Louis service unit took a nap while waiting for their train, so it's already begun and there wasn't a queen-size bed there at this time but those are things we'll look at down the road.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

One final question for you, Mr. Holland, and that is undisturbed rest. Can you -- can you explain what undisturbed rest is?

MR. HOLLAND: Well, that -- that's one aspect of this that -- where the hours of service says that you'll have -- if you've been on duty 10 hours or -- you'll have eight hours off. And in the past a crew caller could call you at six and a half hours to be on duty at the eight hours. We're looking at -- there's already collective bargaining agreements out there that provide for the fact you won't be called until your eight hours or 10 hours is up. There are places where that's not part of the collective bargaining system. And we're identifying pilots so that we can gather that critical data and analysis to see how it works, how the employees feel about it.

There are some employees out there that look forward to this and are -- are -- are bargaining with us on it. There are some places -- and again, this is how highly individual it is. There are some places where they don't necessarily want that. So again, it -- it's -- it's very individual. It's district by district, that sort of thing. Did that answer your question?

MR. WALPERT: Yes. But to follow up on that, in regard to the places that do have undisturbed rest, are there restrictions placed on it? What I mean by that is are there cases where that rest can be interrupted because of a shortage of crews or -- or things of that nature?

MR. HOLLAND: Not to my knowledge. There's a number of collective bargainings out there and I just couldn't speak from a labor relations perspective on -- on what all those entail. I can just speak generally and I can speak on the ones that we're trying to start now so that we can kind of watch 'em from the beginning. And we've identified some places with former Southern Pacific general chairmen to begin those efforts I think primarily in Tucson, Arizona right now.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

One final question. Dr. Richling, is -- is there any provision to diagnose sleep disorders that may exist among operating employees?

DR. RICHLING: I under -- I don't think I quite understand your question. I know you're looking at sleep disorders. Are -- are you asking whether there's a test to diagnose this or is there a -- a mechanism now to -- to diagnose it?

MR. WALPERT: Yeah. Is -- is there a provision in place now that would -- that -- whereby crews can be diagnosed if they would have some sort of sleep disorder such as sleep apnea?

DR. RICHLING: The -- the current mechanism is, which -- which is about the same as it is almost in all industries right now is the individual will go to their private doctor and there -- there are health insurance provisions that will take care of it being diagnosed and treated. So, it's very common to what we have elsewhere.

Our healthy sleep program is -- or -- is really to identify is there other simpler means of identifying it, which is something that's not -- not largely available at this time. There's been no proven methodology to come up with an easy test other than the traditional method of going in to the doctor, identifying the symptom, and frankly, in most cases going through a three -- sleep lab for diagnosis.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you. That -- that's all I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Union Pacific Railroad?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: No questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: The UTU?

MR. LARRY DAVIS: No questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Did I miss anybody else?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Ms. Beal?

MS. BEAL: Thank you.

Mr. Holland, I'd like to ask you a question. Does the UP use the Federal regulations as its guidelines for developing its schedules?

MR. HOLLAND: For develop -- for developing schedule, you mean crew scheduling?

MS. BEAL: Correct.

MR. HOLLAND: Do you mean the -- the Hours of Service Act?

MS. BEAL: Right. Do they use the -- the provisions of the Act as the guidelines, the parameters --

MR. HOLLAND: Oh.

MS. BEAL: -- within which --

MR. HOLLAND: Absolutely. By law we would have to work within that framework. Absolutely. And then most of the rest of what we're doing will be collective bargaining with the -- the UTU and the BLE and BMWE. We will address maintenance way issues beyond just train service employees, too.

MS. BEAL: Okay. Thank you.

Dr. Rosekind, please. On the panel before yours we heard Mr. Sullivan suggest that his union doesn't really want any Federal intervention on the hours of service because, quite frankly, workers rely on the overtime that they're able to -- the money that they're able to collect and -- and have become dependent on living. Are the -- effects of fatigue -- the detrimental effects of fatigue any different if somebody is working voluntarily long hours versus being required to work long hours?

DR. ROSEKIND: No. It's the same physiology.

MS. BEAL: And I know that you've worked in all of the modes of transportation. To the best of your knowledge, does any other mode of transportation -- commercial transportation allow work schedules similar to those that we've heard over the past few days in this room?

DR. ROSEKIND: I have been most impressed and, in fact, I reviewed the NTSB NASA symposium proceedings 'cause there was a working group, which some of you served on, looking specifically at rail issues. And the introductory comment there I think holds with your question is that rail presents greater unpredictability I think than any other mode of transportation in my opinion. And I think that is the biggest issue to try and address. And again, I think what's interesting about that is that's -- that's a train issue and a human issue. And I think that's where the challenge is.

MS. BEAL: So, what I hear you saying is this is not a problem that's unique to the UP? This is a problem that is widespread nationally?

DR. ROSEKIND: Absolutely. And again, I think the issue of unpredictability is not just UP, and that's why I'm referring to the NTSB NASA -- there was a working group specifically from rail, and their big issue that they brought up had to do with unpredictability of report times and schedules and -- and whatever.

And I think you get that in every operational environment. You have to have that to survive to some extent. As was mentioned, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 a year, you know, you've got to get it covered. And then there's emergencies and weather and everything else. I think what's interesting in rail is that there are other things that create an environment that's more unpredictable than some of these other operational environments.

MS. BEAL: So, despite and -- and despite the activities that are going on at UP, and -- and certainly the progress has been enormous, while the SACP process and your involvement with UP may make great strides in solving the problem at UP it really does not at this point address the national problem. Do you agree with that?

DR. ROSEKIND: Not at this time. I believe that is my comment about keeping the pressure on for follow-through and accountability. I cannot say enough about the people and the activities at the companies or the FRA, you know, putting groups together to start talking about this stuff. This is unprecedented. But -- but I really think the proof will be when we can all meet again in a certain amount of time and show effective strategies are in place. That I think will be the key to success.

MS. BEAL: I don't want to keep pounding on this, but I want to make sure I'm clear in my question. You see this as a national issue that needs to be dealt with on a national level so that everybody is playing on the same safe, level playing field, right?

DR. ROSEKIND: That would be important, yes.

MS. BEAL: Okay. And in your expert opinion, is there sufficient scientifically-based information upon which revised and constructive hours of service rules can be completed -- period?

DR. ROSEKIND: Yes.

MS. BEAL: And --

DR. ROSEKIND: Can I --

(Laughter)

MS. BEAL: Go ahead.

DR. ROSEKIND: Well, I just -- I always think it's important in these kinds of forums to be succinct and direct if you can. Excuse me for just saying that, but -- so, yes, I think there's plenty of science available to do that.

But a general comment is that I think -- and again, this is a personal opinion across all modes, including my involvement in some very difficult and carried over many months of activity in other modes. I think hours of -- everybody's struggling with hours of service, and I think the way you have to think about them at this point in time is necessary but not sufficient. There needs to be some structure or boundary 'cause there's enough science to help guide what's going on there. Most of them -- Rail 1907, Aviation 1930 -- I mean these were written a long time ago, so there are clearly ways.

But I think there's a misnomer to think that we're going to handle the fatigue issue by just having a perfect regulation because I don't actually -- just based on my experience, I don't think the perfect regulation can be written. And the problem right now is I think, again, at this point in time we're stuck with, well, what else do you do? Well, we have other activities. My hope is in the future there'll be other alternatives, but I think that's going to be an evolutionary process.

MS. BEAL: But as the -- if the current scheduling is being done using the hours of service as the parameters, is there a need for a change?

DR. ROSEKIND: And again, yes. I think there's a need. The science clearly can help establish what some of those boundaries could be within the operational context and requirements of the industry.

MS. BEAL: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Dr. Ellingstad?

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Thank you.

I'd like to follow up on a couple of the things with respect to scheduling that Ms. Beal started in on, but -- but before that, Dr. Rosekind, what in -- in your scientific judgment is -- is the average human requirement for sleep on a -- a daily basis?

DR. ROSEKIND: An -- it's actually not in my scientific judgment. There are papers in the literature that clearly establish eight hours and about 15 minutes is the human -- the average human requirement for sleep. And I say average because, yes, there is a range around that. But for average, it's eight hours of physical need for sleep.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: And we'd expect over the 53,000 employees at Union Pacific that that would be --

DR. ROSEKIND: The average physical requirement.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: -- about -- requirement.

DR. ROSEKIND: I say that because in our society most people don't get that.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: I recognize that, and -- and I think it's become fairly obvious that that would be a challenge in this industry. Could you -- could you comment -- then also, I assume that you've had a significant opportunity to evaluate your work schedules of railroaders here in your activities recently. Would you comment on -- on the typical cumulative sleep debt circumstance that -- that -- that effects these railroad workers?

DR. ROSEKIND: That's a good question, and actually, unfortunately, I can't comment on this point. I mean I -- I will just say that the data regarding our scheduling project is just sort of coming in, and that's one of the things that we're trying to look at is, again, what the minimum rest requirement be, what the recovery needs would be based on what's kind of currently going on. But I actually have -- I have not looked at that data enough to make a reasonable comment about that.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. Well, getting into that, to what extent is -- is scheduling and establishing minimum rest requirements, etc. in operations research or lunar -- linear programming a problem?

(Pause)

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Is it -- is it prone to being solved by -- by, you know, those -- those kinds of methodologies? You've got a resource?

DR. ROSEKIND: I'm sorry. I'm not --

DR. ELLINGSTAD: I'm trying to get at -- you're dealing with the scheduling problem. You've got a resources available for a certain period of time. There are, you know, mathematical methods to -- to optimize those kinds of things. What I'm trying to get at is -- is are these kinds of -- of resources and these kinds of -- of tools being applied to the scheduling issues in -- in this project?

DR. ROSEKIND: Thank you. Yes, and in fact, what's interesting is, in fact, Mr. Duffy has already talked to us not only about their large sort of current -- the CAD development that's been discussed here previously but how that would then actually impact the -- the crew side and -- and has talked -- instead of doing it separately, how would we actually find a way to do those together, if you will, which is a -- a much more rational way of trying to come at this.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Is -- is there an expectation that with respect to the -- the scheduling part of this fatigue plan that -- that some kinds of algorithms are going to be developed for the scheduling that -- that would be available on a widespread basis?

DR. ROSEKIND: Yeah, I -- I think that's -- that is officially beyond the scope of the identified activity. But what's clear is we've identified trying to come up with systemic approaches, what I called principles and guidelines, if you will, that we would try and then use at specific sites so you could tweak them to actually get them to work in the real world. Obviously, those would be the basis for what you're talking about.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Okay. Finally, given what we've heard about work schedules, etc. in your judgment can you eliminate fatigue in this -- in this railroad or -- or in the industry generally given the requirement for what -- what seems to be something like a minimum of an 80-hour workweek?

DR. ROSEKIND: That's a really critical question because I have over the last years sort of developed the opinion that for most of our 24-hour transportation modes I'm not sure we can eliminate fatigue. The issue's going to be more to manage it and reduce the associated risks if possible.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Does that suggest that -- that basically what we're left with is a kit full of Band-Aids?

DR. ROSEKIND: I hope not. I mean I -- I think there's tremendous progress to be made, but I think the demands of going 24 -- humans aren't programmed to go 24 hours a day forever. That's why certain boundaries are needed. That's why some of the examples you're giving have to be addressed.

But I -- I just think if you want to maintain that -- I'm taking a -- briefly, I'm still trying to take an operational view. I have academic colleagues that might make a comment, "Well, you know, if you really want to eliminate fatigue, you should never work between three and five in the morning." Park the airplane, park the truck, but it's not going to happen. You want to go to the hospital; sorry, the doc's not here. In our society, to meet the demands that are there we're going to have to deal with these.

Physiologically, we're not built for that. And so, the challenge is going to be, well, you know, how do we -- and that's what I'm saying. I don't think you can eventually eliminate all that risk, but we can certainly do a much better job than we are right now.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: And finally, are the boundaries that you suggest there a legitimate public policy responsibility of our regulatory agencies like FRA?

DR. ROSEKIND: And I'll refer to Ms. Beal's questions. You know, I agree. I think in every industry hours of service provide some boundary or structure, and they could be guided by science that's currently available to really be updated to reflect what we know about physical requirements for sleep, the circadian clock, etc.

DR. ELLINGSTAD: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Lauby?

MR. LAUBY: Thank you.

Well, Dr. Ellingstad asked all the good questions, so let me see what I have left here.

(Pause)

MR. LAUBY: Just -- just a clarification. You know, we've -- we've talked about the hours of service. We all know what it is. We heard from the Canadians that they're not really in favor of an hour of service law. We've heard from the labor on the U.S. side. They seem to be in favor of -- of it.

My question is that is it possible to provide a rested, alert human being within the current hours of service requirements? Within that box?

DR. ROSEKIND: Do you want to comment? Was that --

MR. LAUBY: Anybody who wants to take a crack, I'd appreciate.

DR. RICHLING: I think that you can -- as -- as Dr. Rosekind suggested just a few minutes ago, I think that you can develop schedules based off of what we've seen in -- in some of our pile -- some of our pilots and seen in pilots in other railroads that increased predictability of schedules for individuals within a -- within the hours of service that we currently have and can bring a worker to work with more rest.

MR. LAUBY: So, is that -- is that a matter of controlling fatigue or -- or preventing fatigue?

MR. HOLLAND: Can I --

MR. LAUBY: Mr. Holland?

MR. HOLLAND: One -- one of the things I think is so critical of our education piece is our whole society, and that's been brought up here, doesn't understand what we're doing. You know, look at your children. Your children -- time's going faster than what it was when I was a child. They're carrying beepers, they're carrying cell phones. I mean the whole world has turned into a 24-hour society.

My father and my grandfather worked for the railroad. When they came home that time was honored. They slept. We didn't talk. We didn't make noise. They looked at it differently. Their job was a -- in a different frame. They didn't have the Internet. They didn't have cable TV. That's why educational -- education is so critical is that the -- I'm not putting it on the employee because we have a great deal of responsibility here, and one of those responsibilities is to educate our employees and educate their families so that we're able to use that time in a valuable way to get -- to get our rest as is necessary.

In that context, I think some of the problems I had years ago when I worked and had fatigue issues were, you know, had I had a better education I would have known how to handle it differently. That's not to let anyone off the hook, but that's one piece of it that I think is very critical, the employees understanding, the managers understanding. That's why everybody needs to have the education piece so that we're all speaking the same language and we all understand how valuable it is.

That's why I want to see our families get that education, too, because I want my wife to understand her fatigue needs and what happens in her life and her job. Did that answer --

MR. LAUBY: Yeah, ye, somewhat.

Do you have a comment on that, Dr. Rosekind?

DR. ROSEKIND: I'm just -- I'm sitting here -- those that have worked with me know that if I have an answer or opinion I would tell you, and I realized there are actually two things.

One, I'm not familiar -- even though I -- I know some of them, I'm not familiar enough with all of the hours of service stuff or the data from actual -- I don't base my opinions on anecdotes. You know, I mean there's always extremes, good and bad, in both directions. And that's why I like -- with Dr. Ellingstad's question, you know, I would like to base an opinion or even, rather, more a stance based on hours of service versus actual data, if you will, and how those fit together. So, I can't -- if there's an opportunity in the future, we come together and I have that information, I would answer that directly if I could.

MR. LAUBY: Well, in asking the question my concern is that the box that -- that's built with the current hours of service may be too small to -- to allow a program where -- where fatigue is not just -- where you just don't have fatigue countermeasures, napping -- strategic napping or scheduling to -- to help prevent or help control fatigue but -- but a method where people can work day in and day out on a schedule where -- where they're not fatigued to the point of -- of severely impairing their performance.

So, that's -- that's how I'm asking the question. Is the box too small? Does it need to be larger?

DR. ROSEKIND: I don't know. The only -- the only thing I will say is that we have a green light in our scheduling project at UP to think out of the box. And -- and what that means is it too broad? Is it too small? And what could we do that might be much more restrictive or some totally innovative way to deal with this issue that hasn't come forward yet? And I just don't know what all of those are.

One thing I will just say, kind of interesting on both sides, is in some ways things need to shrink sometimes, in other ways, frankly, there also needs to be enough play, flexibility in the statutes that allow you to try innovative things to see if there are other solutions. I've seen that get in the way in napping, you know. Both the FAA and the NTSB had to come forward and say it's okay to do this study 'cause it wasn't currently sanctioned. In trucking they're trying to look at some alternatives. The reality is FHWA doesn't actually have certain -- they're trying to figure out how to do certain waivers to allow 'em to do stuff out of the box, which would be both potentially more restrictive but also a little different than the way things are structured.

MR. LAUBY: Well, certainly, the UP stance and -- and UP's actions on this seem to be making some progress. But have you been contacted -- has your company been contacted by any of the other 700 railroads to -- to do similar things on their property?

DR. ROSEKIND: We have not been. I don't want -- I don't want to speak for them, but I believe that's -- that's the FRA's intent with NARAP, having sat in on a couple of those meetings, is to try and have some industry initiatives, but we have not been.

MR. LAUBY: I have a couple questions for Mr. Holland and Dr. Richling concerning manpower, and -- and we've heard quite a bit of testimony about one of the big problems is manpower shortage. We don't have enough people. And then we talked a little bit about how trains are scheduled, and I believe Mr. Holland indicated that we use the hours of service to -- to basically -- that's the parameter that we use to schedule trains.

Do either one of you have any input to -- through the chain of command at Union Pacific as to what an adequate locomotive engineer workforce would consist of? What -- what parameters would you use to -- to decide that?

DR. RICHLING: We -- we do have the -- the avenue to -- to provide input in that area. As we -- as we look at our crew scheduling projects, as Dr. Rosekind suggested, we -- we can think out of the box about how we're going to figure out solutions for each of these, and -- and if we find out manpower's an issue we feel we have the ability to go to our senior management and identify those issues and write into the manpower planning group that that's what's needed.

MR. LAUBY: Well, on -- on the current assessment of manpower we're talking about hiring additional engineers. I would -- I would assume if I were doing that I would -- I would have a certain amount of man-hours available to use to run trains. I -- I'd have to provide sick days, vacation days, relief days, etc. and come up with a formula that says based on this and -- and running this number of trains I need, you know, 2000 engineers. Has anybody developed that type of information within UP to your knowledge?

DR. RICHLING: I can't tell you whether that's been developed because we have not been directly involved with developing that piece up to this time.

MR. LAUBY: Mr. Holland, is that -- you have not been involved in that, either?

MR. HOLLAND: No, not directly.

MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Dunn?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Dr. Rosekind, you participate in the SACP process on Union Pacific?

DR. ROSEKIND: I've been both at general meetings and on the fatigue working group, and, in fact, myself or somebody from our company has been on every one of the subcommittees that they're dealing with on fatigue.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: So, you participate regularly?

(No response)

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you. That's all the questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. We will return for a -- a round of clarification questions. On the Tech Panel?

MR. GARBER: Yeah, I'd like to follow up on a question that was -- on an issue that was raised by the representative from BLE. Very quickly, Dr. Richling, has -- has any UP employee in a safety-sensitive position to your knowledge ever been diagnosed with a sleeping disorder -- sleep disorder?

DR. RICHLING: I don't -- I don't have statistics on that, and so I don't know the number. I'm trying to think of anecdotally of whether I know that's occurred. I can't think of a case where that -- where that's occurred.

MR. GARBER: Okay. And Dr. Rosekind, are you aware of any screening tests for sleep disorders, simple screening tests which have been shown to be effective in identifying sleep disorders in the general population or in any specific populations?

DR. ROSEKIND: That's actually a challenge to sleep disorders medicine right now. You know, the -- the full-blown lab polysonographic evaluation is the gold standard. There are controversies even within sleep disorders medicine about home screening. And I think really the revolutionary discussion we're having here is can you actually bring that to a workforce in a constructive brief but validated so that you look at specificity sensitivity. To my knowledge, those things are just sort of being thought of right now.

MR. GARBER: So -- so, at this time would the panel agree that in spite of the relative -- relatively high percentage of sleep disorders which may exist in the population it may be at this time very difficult to identify those in safety-sensitive positions?

DR. ROSEKIND: Across the board.

DR. RICHLING: Yes.

MR. GARBER: Okay.

(Pause)

MR. NARVELL: I just have one for Dr. Richling.

Dr. Richling, earlier you testified that there was no formal mechanism to -- to follow up, if you will, from the materials that were mailed in the early 1990s to employees. And my specific question is is measurement and follow-up an integral part of these new initiatives? And if so, how will that be accomplished?

DR. RICHLING: Yes. Measurement on the effectiveness of the program and -- and a very broad base look at that. Not only are we reducing fatigue but also measurement of are we seeing cultural changes that we were looking for. Those types of measurements will be built. We have plans -- planned activity that measurement will be looked at early part of this summer. We're going to develop a team that will have a -- a variety of disciplines that will come together so that we can -- build basically a comprehensive measurement package.

As well, the follow-up activity, as I -- as we noted, we have a four-year plan for how we're going to communicate, and our intention is is that no single individual receive a -- a singular message but they'll receive multiple messages. We'll also develop mechanisms for -- for new employees to be educated as well.

MR. NARVELL: Would -- would this also include having an -- having employees have the opportunity to learn about new developments in this -- in this area?

DR. RICHLING: Yes. In fact, one of -- one of the advantages that Alertness Solutions brings to us is with their technical panel they'll be able to provide us the latest information and we'll be able to translate that into meaningful messages for our population.

MR. NARVELL: Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Now to the United Transportation Union?

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Yes, just one question. What assurance do you have that you're really going to get the buy-in that's necessary to make this work? Are you really satisfied you're going to get both company and labor buy-in? Are you satisfied that -- whoever wants --

MR. HOLLAND: With any kind of organizational transformation or -- or cultural change -- let me give you an example. When I started talking about napping -- I remember one audience I talked about it. Half the people there were going, "Yes!" and the other half were covering their heart, you know, like "Oh my God! How can we do this?" I've been called an anarchist a number of times, but --

(Laughter)

MR. HOLLAND: -- I mean that's where education is going to be so critical that -- what I've seen when the education pieces are out there -- and I recently did one for a group of general chairmen for the UP. They were there for the Hospital Association. Once the awareness is there and people have an understanding of what we're doing and why we're doing it, what the physiology truly is, kind of explode those myths, then we get support, then we get enthusiasm, then we get buy-in. But that's a process.

You know, when I was a conductor everybody I knew had an opinion of what caused fatigue. And from where I'm at now I see that they were probably all right, that this is just so broad and so comprehensive, and we have to just go out there and communicate this and educate people, and it's going to be a process.

But like I said, what I saw with the SACP process, what I saw when we implemented that napping where labor and management were working together and were saying, "We want to do this to help ourselves," I thought that was great. It really -- it showed me this is all possible, very possible.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Thank you. That's all.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. WALPERT: Yes, just a -- a couple of questions. I want to follow up on the line of questioning advanced by Ms. Beal and -- and Ms. -- Mr. Lauby.

Dr. Rosekind, is there any sort of a magic number for the hours of service within scheduling?

DR. ROSEKIND: There are no magic numbers, and the double edge is, you know -- let me just give on concrete example. You have to be careful because while, you know, I'm saying there's science and it could clearly guide what currently exists, but it's also possible to create an environment where you get a number there and it can be almost as destructive, if you will, if it's not applied correctly. And so, that's what I'm saying.

And I'll just give you an example. We can say there's an eight-hour sleep requirement. There's some, you know, discussion about an eight-hour call. Well, you know, if you're calling somebody at 4:00 in the morning to let 'em know they're going be on, duh duh duh duh, that -- that totally undoes the whole idea of why you started it in the first place. And -- and it's not that it was wrong to have an eight-hour call. That's a great concept. I support somebody -- what I support is they need eight hours sleep, and that's what I'm trying to point out. You may do something you think that's really great that's going to give 'em that, but if you're not careful, in the operational world its translation might actually undo what you were after -- whichever one would agree is the right thing, but when it gets translated actually undoes what you were after in the first place.

And that, again, is the "one size fits all" inherent problem that every modal agency is trying to deal with with hours of service.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you.

Just one final question for anyone on the panel. Do you know of any other railroads that -- that have a -- a -- a fatigue project where they are using consultants?

DR. RICHLING: Yes. In one way or another I think many of the railroads are using a -- are using consultants. There are some railroads that use 'em to a much larger extent, some a lesser extent. BN-Santa Fe, Conrail, Canadian Railroads all have consultants that are advising them.

MR. WALPERT: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: FRA?

MR. GAVALLA: No further questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: UP?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, if it be appropriate, I don't have a question to the panel, but in the question that Mr. Lauby had, if I could refer him to Attachment 8 in the Union Pacific's response to the FRA's SACP blitz or study of the railroad I think you'll find some information on our manpower planning forecast. If that would not be sufficient, we'd be very happy to --

MR. LAUBY: Thank you. I'll review that.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. We're back to the head table. Any further questions? Mr. Lauby?

MR. LAUBY: In -- in putting together your program -- well, first of all, we heard -- we heard testimony from lots of different people, in -- including Greg Garrison who told us that he worked 12 hours a day, 12 on, two off, and when things got bad that went up to 18 hours a day. Is any of this program with the UP, is any of this being applied to the management folks? The people that are out there doing the oversight? Or are they left out of this program?

MR. HOLLAND: As I -- I mentioned, one of the unique things we're going to do with our crew scheduling program is when we go into an area and determine the needs of the -- the crews, we're also going to look at the management needs, and we'll do that specifically on the same areas that we're working with the crews. And we're going -- we're beginning to look at that in a broader focus, too, for the entire railroad. I've already talked with various people in Medical, Employee Assistance, people on -- on some of our predecessor railroads such as the CN & W, SP. I've asked them what has been done in the past. We're kind of benchmarking ourselves at -- at this moment.

And I think we're -- we're among the first, if not the first, to address this issue.

MR. LAUBY: What -- what type of issues do you hear from -- from management? Are they -- are they safety-related or performance-related?

MR. HOLLAND: I -- I think in my informal kind of gathering, when I talk to managers -- I talk to a lot of employees from different crafts, labor and management. They'll call me, "What do you do?" and they want an update on what we're doing.

Management -- I think there's a concern that they're not forgotten in this, that we're -- it's great that you're addressing the crews' needs, are you going to address ours? Then I begin a dialogue of "Yes, we are. That's fully part of our program. And what's your input?" I would like their input on -- you know the job, you know what you do, what can we do to -- to work with that here?

I think, first of all, again, I go back to education as just critical. What kind of personal strategies can they develop themselves, and just an understanding and awareness of it is a beginning. Beyond that, we hope to have focus groups of managers and, like I said, different factions within the company to -- to help us with that. And certainly, our -- our consultants are working on that issue, also.

DR. ROSEKIND: Can I -- let me just -- a general comment. Your comment is critical because it's such a pervasive issue. If you leave out any component of the company, you're at risk.

And I used to never raise this but now that I'm outside I'll just make the comment, you know, if you read the Rogers's Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, what's really interesting is, you know, pressures, operational pressures, you know, to launch is part of what pushed that. And there's an appendix in there that talks specifically about the managers who had been up for way too long making decisions in the middle of the night about whether the data were good or not.

And so, for all of the other stuff focused on, you know, were other people rested, you know, the whole company's got to be involved because that bad decision somewhere could have tragic consequences potentially. And I just -- I think that's really critical, again, that the push has to be across the board and not just, say, to one or all the operating crafts. It's got to be across the board.

MR. LAUBY: So, Mr. Garrison can look forward to a 40-hour week someday, is that correct?

(No response)

MR. LAUBY: That's all the questions. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: All right, gentlemen. There's no further questions. Thank you very much for your testimony. You are all released.

(Whereupon, the witnesses were excused.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Our next witnesses will be the FRA witnesses, so would you please make your way to the table?

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Don Itzkoff and James Phelan.

(Pause)

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Whereupon,

was called as a witness, and first having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

TESTIMONY OF
DON ITZKOFF
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, AND
JAMES D. PHELAN
SAFETY PROJECT COORDINATOR
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Itzkoff, would you state for the record your full name and spell your last name, please?

MR. ITZKOFF: Donald M. Itzkoff, I-T-Z-K-O-F-F.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Phelan, would you state for the record your full name and spell your last name, please?

MR. PHELAN: Yes, sir. James D. Phelan, P-H-E-L-A-N.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Mr. Itzkoff, what's your present position with the Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. ITZKOFF: I'm the deputy administrator.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And how long have you held that position?

MR. ITZKOFF: Four years.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And what other positions have you held in the -- either the railroad industry or the Government?

MR. ITZKOFF: Previous to assuming my position as deputy administrator I was first counsel and then senior counsel of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, responsible for all issues before the Surface Transportation subcommittee. Prior to that I was in private practice in a law firm.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you.

Mr. Phelan, what's your present position with the FRA?

MR. PHELAN: I'm a safety project coordinator with the FRA, sir.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And how long have you held that position?

MR. PHELAN: Just over three years.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: And what other positions have you held with the FRA or in the railroad industry?

MR. PHELAN: None with the FRA, sir. I entered my railroad career in '72 as an operating personnel conductor brakeman. I was in the labor relations department for Conrail and Amtrak for 10 years. I was an elected union official with the United Transportation Union for another eight. I was put on the -- appointed to the National Mediation Board panel of arbitrators as well as the American Association of Arbitrators.

MR. JAMES P. DUNN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Mr. Itzkoff, do you have a statement that you'd like to read into the record?

MR. ITZKOFF: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

We are pleased again to have the opportunity to appear today. I don't have a formal statement but I do have some points I would like to make initially for the record, and I'd be glad to take your questions.

We at FRA commend you for holding this hearing, and we hope that this inquiry will be productive and constructive, and we have cooperated fully with the NTSB based on that expectation.

In order to ensure that the findings that you reach are indeed truly helpful and positive and help us to advance safety in the future, I would like to point out a couple of issues for your consideration. First of all, I think the focus on fatigue has been very positive from what I have heard this morning, and I'll be pleased to address some additional concerns that you may have about that in my time with you today.

Second, I want to point out that I understand that many of the questions yesterday focused very specifically on FRA's role and our actions in 1997. And that is appropriate because we have an inquiry about the terrible tragedies of last year that we do not ever want to repeat. I again want to express the condolences of Administrator Molitoris and the entire agency to all of those who have lost their loved ones in those tragedies of last year. I know that Ms. Yarborough is here today, and we are deeply sorry. We wish that those things never happened. And our role is to assure that they do not happen again.

What I hope when the NTSB reviews this report and goes through the record that the recommendations that you will make will focus on how we can improve our present safety initiative with the Union Pacific and other railroads and so that we can move forward to address and help these present-day initiatives and not just look only at what we did last year. Recommendations that only look at what we did last year and in 1996 and previous years aren't alone going to be helpful because what we need are recommendations that focus on what we are doing today and the policies we have put in place for what we are going to do tomorrow. That is going to save lives.

It's an important distinction, and the reason I'm so concerned about this point is that so many of the questions on the record appear to suggest a central supposition that somehow FRA failed to spot a obvious indicator of potential safety hazards and that as a result these tragedies occurred. I want to restate again what Administrator Molitoris stated at the opening of this hearing, that the safety trends on the Union Pacific until mid-1997 were head in the right direction. And even when you include the 15 tragedies that we are reviewing today in detail as we should, between 1995 and 1997 the train accident rate on the Union Pacific declined from 3.88 to 3.36, the total number of train accidents fell from 694 to 476, and that's based on the 10 months of data.

Even in Texas, the overall system -- number of train accidents in Texas on the combined UP system fell during the period we are looking at.

And so, as the administrator said, after eight months, eight months of reviewing and analyzing the turn of events on UP that began in June of 1997 I can honestly say to you that there were no apparent indicators. No one appears to have foreseen what happened on the UP, not the railroad itself, not FRA, and with all due respect, not even the National Transportation Safety Board.

Prior to 1997 railroads had successfully integrated mergers and -- acquisitions, and we anticipated based on the Union Pacific's very successful track record and their long positive history and their positive safety performance that the same would occur here. And the confluence of safety and service concerns that affected the UP, frankly, was unanticipated.

I again want to stress that in response to the breakdown we acted immediately. We issued the critical safety advisories which Mr. Gavalla had the opportunity to describe yesterday. These advisories were intended to correct conditions that we saw not only on the Union Pacific but on other railroads across the country. We sent teams of inspectors on the property and have identified the key safety concerns that we have discussed. And we engaged the UP and their employees in a team process as part of the SACP in which the railroad has developed a comprehensive safety action plan which I think the record already reflects significantly and Mr. Phelan will be here to amplify and -- more detail to give you a fuller picture of how that process works.

My point again is that a review of the accidents on the Union Pacific that occurred last year that only assesses what should have been done at that time, who should have known what when, by this person or that entity standing alone will simply draw media attention and that we will be left to figure out how to apply it to our current processes and systems that we have put in place today.

And so, I ask for your help for what is going to be the most helpful thing for us, which is to focus on how we can take the lessons that we have learned from past and apply it to what we are doing today in order to assure that we can have a higher level of safety in the future to save lives tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that this is the report that you will be able to deliver because such an approach has the power to make our SACP process even better. You yourself have recognized potential of the SACP process and have noted the significant results we have already achieved in it.

On other railroads, not just the UP, we have taken the SACP process to a new level. The Burlington-Northern, for example, we heard a little bit about this in the record about their new employee safety empowerment policy in which they are attempting to eliminate the fear and intimidation that has been a historical part of the railroad industry, their improved discipline policy that focuses on individual behavior modification as opposed to punishment, their own fatigue mitigation and countermeasures program which includes some of the concepts that we have talked about today, and improved accident and injury report process which has resulted in a much improved defect reporting rate.

We have talked about the initiatives on the CSX in which we have moved forward and some similar areas to improve their discipline policy, to put together a locomotive engineer mentor program so that new employees will have senior members in the crew with them. Administrator Molitoris has talked about all of the 250 initiatives that have taken place there, the 1-800 call-in program for both employees as well as to put this on grade crossing initiatives. All of those pieces have been part of this general new process we have put in place at the FRA to address systemic safety on the new mega-railroads in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, in the past the FRA has often been criticized for failing to be proactive. And I would admit that in the past and in some cases that may well have been the case. But we have taken the lessons of the past and have tried to apply them to the future, and that is why we believe that the safety integration plans that we have called for in merger and acquisition of Conrail by Norfolk-Southern and CSX are so very important.

These are the plans, Mr. Chairman, right here. There's one for Norfolk-Southern, there's one for CSX, and there is one for the shared asset areas that will be operated by the surviving Conrail organization. They've already been entered into the record yesterday, and I invite you and your staff to review them, and I will be pleased to answer questions about them because these plans represent our best effort standing here today to anticipate what will be the safety issues that are most likely to arise in a merged railroad situation of the new kinds of mega-railroads of the kind that the Union Pacific faced and the challenges they faced in integrating a new railroad into their system.

They're extraordinarily detailed. They go from every aspect of railroad operations, from training to inspection to staffing levels to facilities management, and they extend each for 150 pages. Our challenge is going to be to assure that they are implemented appropriately, and that is a responsibility that we take and we take it seriously.

But I do invite you and the Board to review these plans, to let us know if there are areas that, frankly, we may have missed or have neglected to focus on because now is the time to change them, not after a terrible tragedy occurs.

So, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the findings and recommendations coming out of this inquiry will ultimately focus on what we can learn from the tragedies of last year and how we can make our current safety programs even more effective. Our safety program that we have in place at the Federal Railroad Administration represents a collaborative effort among the FRA, railroad labor, and railroad management to reach on every property in the nation our ultimate safety goal, and that is zero incidents, zero injuries, and zero fatalities.

We look forward to working with you and the Board to achieve that goal, and I'll be pleased to answer your questions.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. Before we go to questions, I would like Mr. Phelan to update us on the SACP process.

MR. PHELAN: Very good. I'd be glad to, Mr. Chairman.

This -- I think, as you've heard over the last couple of days, that the SACP process is in a state of evolution, and I've hit it at a point where I happen to get very excited about it, so I naturally have co-opted some of it to believe that it's my own so that everything that I say when I get enthusiastic I'm governed, of course, if there's any kind of conflict between what occurs in our literature and certainly what the administrator and the associate administrator have already expressed.

What I'd like to do is point out those things that you haven't already been inundated with. You've got a lot of information already, so I'll just pirate over documents that have already been put into the record and just to try to shore up those areas that may not have been addressed over the last couple of days.

I begin the SACP process not necessarily with the assessments or any of that. I know I'm not morbid and I don't have the corner on this market, but I begin it with the fatalities. I personally have a job where my -- where my role is to investigate that and to be sure that they don't happen again. I believe that the public and the employees have an expectation that when they go to work they'll come home from work. And I take that very seriously, as I think everybody in this room does.

So, I begin with the deaths somehow, if I somehow fail those people by my actions or inactions, and that's really what colors this.

The second part of it is the opportunity that's here. I think Dr. Rosekind used the word of --that the parties are uniquely poised to make some really great developments in the industry, and I see that on the SACP. When I stepped onto the Union Pacific property I noticed that every -- all the ingredients for success are there. The railroad has the attention, they have the motivation, and they certainly have the will to -- to subsidize that. The labor organizations are hungry for improvement, and they're also willing to sit up and participate. And at the same time, FRA was certainly motivated. From my point, I know that a lot more than I do the others.

So, all the ingredients are there. I -- I feel it's almost a privilege to be associated with that project for what's going to come out of it. That's the beginning side of it.

FRA did not invent collaborative dispute resolution. I hope nobody in the room thinks that we even think that. Just like Henry Ford certainly didn't invent the wheel, but he certainly modified. And I believe that what we've done is develop dispute resolution -- collaborative dispute resolution to a point where it'll be incredibly useful for the parties.

This is happening in the -- in the Federal Railroad Administration. It's not happening in the Department of Justice. It's not -- happening in the Department of Labor or the National Mediation Board, places where you would normally expect that to happen. So, for me that's good news and it shows that people have the ability to rise above their parochial interests to get started.

But I think that the SACP approach has to begin with those parochial interests, as it were. The Union Pacific management folks that I run into have this odd idea that they have an obligation to their shareholders. The labor organizations have an obligation to their constituents. The FRA has an obligation to enforce the regulation in law.

The SACP does not presume to intrude on those basic responsibilities or obligations at all. We begin at the next step. But I think that everybody involved in SACP has to make a gargantuan effort to understand what the other person's obligations are. It doesn't do me any good to go over to the Union Pacific Railroad and tell them that have to divert tremendous resources to accommodate a napping strategy, for example, without thinking in terms of the fact that they're there to carry their -- to serve their customers. I have to know those, I have to acknowledge 'em, and primarily, I have to respect them, and that is absolutely the first step of SACP.

I treat the job of any FRA person involved in this as I would a marriage counselor. My job is to get out there -- in this particular situation the parties have not volunteered for counseling. We happened to arrive there by fiat.

But my point is there -- I have to respect what they bring to the party. And that -- and that's the very first part of this.

The second part of it is is that the -- there's two ways to address all the problems they have out there. I think you've heard from -- from Mr. Gavalla and Mr. Kutch that there's a certain approach that FRA is not going to abandon its obligation to enforce, and if there's some problems that -- that appear that require swift and decisive action by the agency, they'll take that action.

On the other hand, it's clear from stuff that you've heard today and over the last few days that Union Pacific is not sitting back waiting to just let other people tell 'em how to run their railroad. I personally believe that the Union Pacific's goal, at least the ones of the people that I do business with, is to put me out of business. They look forward to the day when they'll no longer see me. Now, usually people have to get to meet me before they're so eager to see me leave. But I respect that. And actually, that's my goal as well.

I believe that the FRA is a safety net and at this point of this process we're there as a permanent fixture, and I say "permanent" advisably. Our job is to put the process back where it belongs. Employees and management have to solve their own problems by themselves. That's the goal, I think, like any healthy or robust employee relationship deserves. So, our goal is to hit the property and do what we can to get the parties to that point.

I think you've heard that the characterization of the accidents over the last year were four. There was an acute manpower shortage, there's this cultural implication that's the basis of the -- of -- is a huge contributing factor, there's the training aspect, and the train dispatcher focus. Now, there are a lot of other issues and they go into a lot more detail in the various reports that have come out, specifically the FRA report, but those are the ones that got the attention of the public and the regulated community. Those are the ones that -- where Mr. Davis and the administrator were -- appeared on TV and identified right off things that needed swift and decisive action.

The railroad will deal with its issues, with its employees within its ability, and FRA will do what it can as well. It's the collaborative aspect, those issues that are best addressed in collaboration that I focus on in SACP, and that's really the -- the basis of all the things that come out of SACP.

When I say "culture," however, I don't -- everybody can define it a lot better than I can, I'm sure, and people have their own opinion, and that'll be resolved by other folks. What I'm talking about here is the two things that contribute most to, in my view, to the dynamic that we have a hard time overcoming. One is is that the railroad is 99 percent motivated by collective bargaining. It's just the nature of the animal.

The other is is that the railroad seems to operate or does operate on a "act now, grieve later" approach. In the hands of a enlightened manager and a fair person, that's not a big deal. You always have your day in court. In the hands of a -- of a street thug, for an example, somebody that has the ability and the authority and the power over someone else, that may be a different matter.

But the facts of the matter are is that people in the railroad business are used to acting now, and if they have a problem with it, they grieve later. And those are the two components that I call the culture for the purposes of my discussion here.

The two polarizing areas for me are -- I've heard said by labor folks that there's no such thing as an accident, there are only calculated risks that management is willing to take. Unfortunately, the labor person is closer to the accident. For its part, management has said, at least I've heard, that -- safety concerns seem to disappear with a little money. And the one -- the example that they use most are that everyone talks about the safety of two people in the locomotive cab and yet they always refer to the erosion of the fireman, that somehow that -- all those concerns about a double-manned cab went away when the opportunity for an extra couple of dollars was offered.

I don't -- and I don't want to address the accuracy or the fairness of either of those two comments. I think they indicate how far the parties are in many instances of safety.

So, I use those as the starting points that I have to get over. And if I can rely on my colleague to use one of these slides here -- would you please put up the issue escalation process graph?

(Slide)

MR. PHELAN: These were entered into exhibit yesterday. I believe they're -- I don't know if they are one, two, or three. Certainly, they're in the docket. You've seen them before. I'm just going to use them for the purpose of illustration rather than give you a ton of -- more paper.

But I think that this illustrates the two different priorities that are available. The --

(Pause)

MR. PHELAN: At the very bottom of that graph there's a triangle -- well, it's probably not a triangle. A square standing on its side, and it calls safety-related. And it moves then to the next one, which is the box that says, "Local management and/or union."

My point in just showing that to you is that that's where management deals with its problems that are not local, that don't require collaboration, that don't require FRA to be involved. The goal is for all people at a local level involved is to resolve the problems of safety where they belong, which is the -- by the people right there out in the field.

The next step are those that are systemic. Is the card apartment in Utah causing as much trouble as the card apartment in Omaha, for an example? If they are just the result of two labor management disputes, that's one thing. But if there appears to be a policy that's occurring throughout the system, perhaps it's not just an isolated event. It may be systemic.

In that way, then, it requires some more attention. It goes through the local management, and if they can't resolve it again as it progresses through the evolutionary chain on management, then perhaps it has to get to the oversight committee, which is the top box. Again, those item -- and the -- those items that can be resolved by the people involved deserve to be and they belong to be. The ones that cannot then have to bubble up to where collaborative attention requires it, and that's what the SACP tool is about.

UP has put its own resources in and it wants to take care of its problems. When they can't or don't for some reason, that's when they go to that top process. The reason I wanted to emphasize this is I wanted to point out that the SACP the -- that everybody here has talked about here is not the exclusive mechanism for the FRA to address safety concerns that it has, nor is it the exclusive avenue that UP has. In fact, one of the largest problems that I personally had when I hit the property was to try to see which was being served where. Those things that -- I think that we heard today that although the Alertness Solutions department that -- at the Union Pacific seemed to come into being right around the same time that FRA was making its recommendations. Mr. Holland perhaps interviewed for the job the month before. It's clear somebody was thinking about it before we got there was my point and that those things have to be encouraged.

(Pause)

MR. PHELAN: The SACP -- the basic points of the SACP. I don't think these were emphasized as much as I'd like to. Make sure that we all leave here with that.

Collaborative approach and accountability. And I've jotted a note because I've heard different versions of what collaborative process means or what accountability means. The object of the accountability as far as SACP is that it will place the tools to make decisions with the people that have to live with the results of those decisions. And for me that's a very important characteristic here. You hear fatigue talked about, you hear manpower talked about, so the very folks then that have to live with the results of how many people are employed by the Union Pacific Railroad have no voice in the hiring. It's not an unusual thing and as long as there was never any complaints about that that was a fine arrangement. But the account -- accountability then is to try to get the right people together for all of that stuff.

The second part of it is the collaborative aspect of it. I talked a little bit about the various obligations that people have to begin with, whether it's the shareholders, whether it's the constituents, whether it's their oath of office that the FRA people feel that they have. Once those are overcome, then the SACP process can begin.

People -- as I said, they have to know the obligations of their folks, they have to make sure that they respect them, and then they have to start identifying those areas of common cause where they can begin to work on some of their problems. Some things do not lend themselves to the SACP process, and the parties have to be astute enough to know when they've run up against a brick wall.

For our purposes, it has -- absolutely has to be inclusive. It's critical that all employee groups, and that means -- by employee groups I mean everybody that draws a check from the Union Pacific Railroad -- has to be represented. I -- my personal bias, as you've heard me say earlier I suppose, is that I'm a trade unionist. I happen to think that the labor relation, labor union approach is the most effective way for employee representation. I believe that employee representatives then have to be involved in this process as well.

It has to be fact-based. It has to be safety-focused. It cannot stray into those areas of collective bargaining, the little -- the luxuries associated, perhaps, with -- with the work environment. It has to be consensus-governed, and most importantly, it has to be self-directed. I can't say that enough.

The -- one of the things that I can't get around -- this is, I think, the 12th anniversary of the Chase, Maryland accident. For 130-odd years the parties have tried unsuccessively -- unsuccessfully to deal with alcohol and drug use among employees and it wasn't until employees and management sat at the table and took care of their own business. It took a little prompting, God knows, from both -- from all regulatory parties, and I believe that it was necessary and hopefully it'll be a model for some of the actions here.

My point is is that until Operation Red Block came on the property I don't think that that problem was addressed effectively. So, I personally use that as a model for the types of collaborative projects that have great success. That's why I say it has to be self-directed. The people that resolve the problem have to feel that it's theirs. And that again is the -- the basis of the SACP.

A few more points at that -- about that. Once people sit at the table, once they've overcome those preliminary bars of recognizing what opportunity is there for them, they have to have some knowledge of the process. They have to have some commitment. There has to be a buy-in on that.

From my standpoint as a facilitator in the process, I'm constantly looking to see if there's a buy-in. Now, I'm not an expert in management dynamics so I'm certainly no psychiatrist, but I think that I can sit at the table and look at a room full of people, and as they start to talk you can -- find out the extend of their buy-in, their -- the extent of their commitment. I'll give you a few of those evaluations at the end of this of where I feel that that seems to shake down.

The biggest part of this project then is to have people overcome their personal agendas, overcome their provincialism. That is putting the foundation of the SACP process in place. That's what it takes. It takes an inordinate length of time. I think that -- again, to steal some of the phrases from Dr. Rosekind, he was saying that you have to have the education and training first. That's what goes on in SACP. Unfortunately, the railroad doesn't stop running in the meantime that the spotlights on us don't at all diminish. People are still trying to resolve and come to answers to fix those problems that brought us together in the first place.

Do you have another chart back there on the working -- SACP working groups?

(Slide)

MR. PHELAN: Again, you've seen this, hopefully, yesterday and probably many of you have seen it in the handouts, but this is what the groups on the -- the UP SACP have come to. And again, if I could just point out some of that stuff for you.

What they've done is divide all their issues and concerns on the Union Pacific Railroad into those six boxes. Every single one of their concerns was placed someplace just appropriately, and that was just their tool for trying to keep some kind of order to this process. Each one of those has spawned a few more working groups of its own, and a few lesser -- more teams to address different issues just to make sure that they run through them.

One that has a dark side in there is the training work group. That one has not been activated because all of the training skills that were coming out were being addressed at each of the individual work groups. The people that were closest to the problem felt that they somehow had more information to deal with them rather than making a -- a full-blown working group.

The chart begins to show the level of detail associated with this. I'm not going to add to the more -- more paper that you have, but it's certainly available. Mr. Kutch, who was up here the other day, I think he put it most succinctly when he said that his role is to document, document, and document again.

When you have a process like this that is so open to criticism, so open to scrutiny, we that are involved feel that it's incumbent upon us to document every single thing. We know that we're introducing a new tool that people are not used to that they haven't necessarily seen before, so we go out of our way to make sure it's done, so that a good two-thirds of the paper that was sent over to the NTSB in the -- in anticipation of this hearing, for example, was associated with the SACP. The people are getting used to the idea that their obligation is to document it.

And you're talking about folks that might not normally deal with a lot of offices or administrative stuff. I mean you have a lot of union guys, a lot of folks that just come from other crafts that are just making a good effort at trying to document where they've come so that people reading over their shoulder know the evolution of those ideas.

The other three pieces of paper -- if you could put up the first list of accomplishments.

(Slide)

MR. PHELAN: My personal goal for being here just these couple of days is I don't think that any man or woman that has come through that door is entitled to leave this room without recognizing these three pieces of paper. And I know that that sounds as heavy-handed; well, it probably is as heavy-handed as it sounds.

But there's probably not a chance that you can read this eye chart, and I apologize.

What this is is three pieces of paper. There'll be a couple of more on that that are attached to the handout that we handed in yesterday part of the record, and it goes through all the successes of every one of the SACP groups on the Union Pacific. These are not pithy little statements of encouragement saying that we had a meeting or we thought that people should work safely or perhaps work more -- work smarter. These are real dollars-and-cents, tangible successes that have been accomplished.

Unless this is going to be an eye test, I don't think there's any need to put any more of those up. Thanks. Just knock that off.

They're part of the record, and I think everybody should outfit themselves with it before they start making an evaluation of whether SACP has been effective, and that's just on this property. There are certainly others if you want to explore how it's been on other properties.

My point in putting those up and making sure that everybody gets them is that in five months on that property there's been more money that's gone into that effort than I've ever been able to secure through a Section 6 notice in all my days as a union representative, and I pride myself on being very successful. I don't think that the Union Pacific railroad for all its conservative and probably somewhat aggressive labor relations policies has ever had the opportunity to avail itself of the buy-in of its employees as it has now, and I say that without much experience on the Union Pacific Railroad, unfortunately.

For FRA, there's never been more opportunity to address so many significant problems in one fell swoop with so much help. There's over 300 people that have been involved with the SACP effort right now, and there has been a tremendous amount of energy that's been put into it. I consider that very, very successful, very significant.

Having said all of that, there certainly are not -- there are certainly problems associated with it. Those are the growing pains and those'll happen. For an example, we've heard today from other witnesses about their knowledge and perception of how effective the SACP process is or how widespread it is, what the follow-through is. It boggles the mind that people -- that the amount of money and the number of people that have been involved in this that not everyone would know about it.

And I see that as a problem for everybody. I think that there's enough responsibility in this process to implicate everyone. If the Union Pacific Railroad was having a proxy vote tomorrow on its board of directors or if they were going to have a vote to increase their -- their -- their benefits or return on their investment, I daresay that they could probably contact every single person that they needed to within 10 days. I suspect that if there was going to be a job action by any labor union on that property in the next five days that they would find a way to tell every single one of their members. And as we know, if FRA's going to go out there we can put people out there within a week.

And yet, for some reason there's still people that don't know about SACP, don't know the extent of their -- their principal's commitment, and they don't know really what's come out of it. And I find that a problem, and I think that it's one where the -- everybody involved has to look at it for themselves and see what they bring to the party.

I think that the -- the need to take collective bargaining issues out of the SACP is going to overshadow it forever. I think that's the constant tension. When you live in a collective bargaining environment it's very difficult to go down that road.

One of the first successes that we had on the SACP, there was some animated discussion about the effective date because no sooner did we make a change to the discipline policy that the railroad had when the talk came up about what are we going to do with the folks that are still out there? How about some retroactive treatment? I consider that a very important concern, certainly, more important perhaps for a labor representative than for me but was it safety-related? And I'm not sure that it was, I'm not sure that it wasn't. But my point is that there's things like that that certainly affect the process.

That's just about everything that I think that needs to be said, at least from my point of view, on the SACP. There's plenty of opportunity for all of us and plenty of responsibility. You don't need me to tell you that.

If there's anything that I can say or do or didn't say or do, I'd be glad to do that now.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you, Mr. Phelan. There is one thing that you're going to -- that I would like you to do.

(Pause)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: I assume that you have all the schedules for the SACP?

MR. PHELAN: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: I would like you to make sure that my office knows exactly when and where every meeting is held.

MR. PHELAN: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the Technical Panel. Any questions?

MR. JAMES S. DUNN: Technical Panel has no questions of either witness.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: To the parties. UTU?

MR. LARRY DAVIS: I just would -- want to ask one question, Mr. Phelan.

Do you share with me the concern that we have over the very narrow window of opportunity that exists now that the NTSB is saying in effect -- taking a hard look at that. Do you share with me there's a very narrow window? And are -- is the FRA committed to participate with that in mind?

MR. PHELAN: Absolutely. There is an -- an incredible sense of urgency. I believe that the FRA has that official policy of urgency, and I personally have it a lot.

MR. LARRY DAVIS: Thank you. That's all.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers?

MR. WALPERT: Yes. I just wanted to say both to Mr. Itzkoff and -- and Mr. Phelan that -- that we listened intently to your remarks and wanted to ensure you that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is committed to the SACP process, and we'll do whatever we can. In regard to informing our membership, I can assure you that we will take measures to ensure that that is done also. We see this as a breath of fresh air. It's -- it's a new way of doing business, and we can see the light at the end of the tunnel by using such a process as this. And we will be committed to that process and do whatever we can to ensure its success.

I really have no questions other than that. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Thank you.

Union Pacific?

MR. JERRY R. DAVIS: No questions, Mr. Chairman, although a comment.

Mr. Phelan, on behalf of all of us at Union Pacific we would like to thank you for your -- your efforts, your professionalism in -- in guiding us through this process. A big thank you to you.

MR. PHELAN: Thank you very much, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Federal Railroad Administration?

MR. GAVALLA: Yes, sir. Mr. Phelan, I missed one of your opening remarks. Could you please repeat your opening statement?

(Laughter)

MR. GAVALLA: Never mind. Strike that. No -- no comments at this time.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: He probably could verbatim.

There are no questions from the head table.

I don't believe there are any clarification questions since there wasn't any, so Mr. Itzkoff and Mr. Phelan, thank you very much.

MR. PHELAN: Thank you, sir.

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: You are released.

(Whereupon, the witnesses were excused.)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Okay. At this point in the hearing let's -- we're coming to a close, and I have a closing statement to read.

But before I get to my closing statement I have -- I would like to thank our sound man. I -- I've been to an awful lot of these type of hearings, and I don't know if you've noticed but over the last three days we have had not one feedback in the microphone. Not one. So thank you.

(Applause)

CHAIRMAN GOGLIA: Since there are no other witnesses to be called to testify at this time, this portion of the Safety Board's investigation is concluded.

However, I want to emphasize that in accordance with our procedures this investigation will remain open for the submission of new and pertinent information by any interested person. If the Safety Board finds that such evidence is relevant and probative it will be made of the part docket, and where appropriate the parties will give -- be given the opportunity to comment.

As parties to this hearing you will have the opportunity to submit proposed findings of facts, conclusions, and recommendations. Please forward any such submission to the National Transportation Safety Board. Also, any parties making such a submission should also send copies of their proposals to the other parties. Any and all such proposals will be made part of the public docket and will receive careful consideration during the Safety Board's analysis of the evidence and during the preparation of the Safety Board's final reports of this special investigation.

The intent of this hearing was and will continue to be to develop the facts rate -- related to the operations and functions of the parties presence -- present as related to the accidents and events on the Union Pacific Railroad.

The statement made by FRA Administrator Jolene Molitoris offered promise of improving safety through the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program. The testimony of Mr. Jerry Davis recognized the promise of the SACP process and also outlined plans specific to the Union Pacific to improve safety. Furthermore, the parties at this hearing have voiced a need for improvements and cooperative efforts among all the parties that would drive towards improved safety.

As hearing chairman, I believe the SACP process may provide the necessary cooperative solution. I also believe this process could benefit not only the railroad industry but also other modes of transportation.

Therefore, as chairman of this hearing and thus by the authority available to me under Section 845.20 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations I have chosen not to close but to recess this hearing and return for additional investigation in approximately six months. The -- it is the intent of this Board of Inquiry to allow the parties represented at this hearing to successfully advance the improvements -- the improvement plans cited. This Board will reconvene to determine the process of those improvements.

The Safety Board in providing this recess strongly suggests that all parties consider the effects of not learning from the facts gathered during this hearing. The Safety Board will be extremely interested in the changes in operations and functions of the parties' stewards' improved safety.

All of the parties at this hearing, including the NTSB, have one thing in common: we have the responsibility of providing a safe working environment to our employees and a safe transportation system for the citizens of our country. Don't let your employees down; don't let your co-workers down or the families of those who have lost lives in this tragedy we've discussed here. Don't let them down.

On behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board I want to thank the parties for this proceedings for their cooperation not only during the proceeding but also throughout the investigations of all the accidents.

Also, on behalf of the Board of Inquiry and the Technical Panel I want to express sincere appreciation to all of those groups, persons, companies and associations, and agencies who have lent their talent so willingly throughout this hearing.

Last and certainly not least, I want to thank all the witnesses who gave testimony during this hearing. I know that the -- what I'm told is an unprecedented action in -- in -- in recessing these hearings. We'll have some procedural questions, and we will discuss those questions with the parties later.

This hearing is recessed.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the proceedings were adjourned.)

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