TO:	M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight
FROM:	W/Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Administrative Investigations, and Assessments
SUBJECT:	Enhancing Compatibility for Long-Duration Space Flight Crews

The ongoing Office of Inspector General evaluation of the United States participation in the Phase I Shuttle-Mir Program and the programs related to the International Space Station (ISS) examined the issue of crew compatibility. Our inquiry included a review of astronaut psychological evaluation and training. ⁽¹⁾ The ISS crews will be multi-national, larger in number, and will remain on station longer than the Phase I Mir crews. This situation poses greater challenges to achieving crew compatibility.

Introduction
In its 1987 report on "A Strategy for Space Biology and Medical Science," the Space Science Board of the National Research Council indicated that:

[I]t seems likely that behavioral and social problems have already occurred during long-term missions and that such problems will be exacerbated as missions becomes (sic) more complex, as mission duration is increased, and as the composition of crews become more heterogeneous. An understanding of the problems and their amelioration is essential if man desires to occupy space for extended periods of time.

The report further indicates that there had been a significant amount of research completed on the screening and selection of individuals for situations resembling space flight that require both high technical competence and the ability to work well in small, interactive groups.

The report concluded that more research is needed to identify other factors that may be important to group performance and to determine the validity of such criteria to long-duration space flight.

Other research has also identified the need to consider the psychological aspects of long-duration flight in selecting crews for future missions. Dr. Nick A. Kanas co-authored a 1971 study for NASA entitled "Behavior, Psychiatric, and Sociological Problems of Long-Duration Space Missions." At the time of the study, Dr. Kanas was with the University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine. This study advocated the importance of selecting compatible crew members to minimize stressors during long-duration missions. ⁽²⁾ Dr. Kanas indicated that there are four types of stressors: physical, physiological, psychological, and social. He concluded that NASA largely concerned itself with the physical and the physiological stressors. However, he believed that the advent of long-duration missions requires that the psychological and social stressors be considered.

Using travel to Mars as an example, Dr. Kanas' report stated that:

[T]he long duration of a Mars mission, the great distance the crew will be from the vicinity of earth, the vastness and hostility of outer space, and man's lack of knowledge about outer space are factors which make it unwise to extrapolate from our current experiences and predict that psychological and social stressors will not seriously affect the probability of mission success.

Among the psychological and social stressors, Dr. Kanas listed low sensory input, lack of motivation, confinement, isolation, monotony, free time, unconscious conflicts, dangers and emergencies, interpersonal relationships, crew size, and crew structure. He concluded that the selection of crew members who are compatible will minimize many stressor effects.

Background
NASA formed an In-House Working Group on Psychiatric and Psychological Selection of Astronauts (Working Group) in 1988 to discuss NASA's psychiatric procedure for selecting astronauts and to recommend psychiatric standards for making future selections. ⁽³⁾ The Working Group published a paper in July 1988, that defined "the 'best' psychological make-up for the job of astronaut; and the 'best' crew psychological mix, particularly for extended-duration space flights." The Working Group defined three attributes--aptitude, motivation, and sensitivity--as being of equal importance in the selection of astronauts. ⁽⁴⁾ These attributes were referred to as the select-in criteria. ⁽⁵⁾ The Working Group asserted, however, that attributes accurately reflecting characteristics that predict astronaut or crew member success on a long-duration mission were unknown. Therefore, validation through ongoing performance and behavioral measures would be essential.

NASA used the attributes developed by the Working Group and continually recorded select-in information on astronaut candidates beginning with the astronaut class of 1991. However, since the Agency disbanded the Working Group in 1990, NASA has not further refined the criteria based on the experiences of long-duration missions on the Mir.

In 1996, NASA selected one of Dr. Kanas' science experiments to fly to Mir on NASA 3 through 7. ⁽⁶⁾ The experiment was designed to study crew member tension, cohesion, and leadership roles both with the Mir on-board crew and the ground support crew.

During the time between Dr. Kanas' initial study in 1971 and the selection of his current experiment, little study has been done of psychological issues as they relate to the U.S. space program and its astronauts. To quote Dr. Santy from her 1994 book, Choosing the Right Stuff: The Psychological Selection of Astronauts and Cosmonauts:

Thirty years of space flight experience in this country have yielded a gold mine of data and knowledge about the human body and its response to the space environment, but no objective data on the human psyche in that same environment has been produced--and many scientists consider psychological issues to be a limiting factor in the human exploration of the universe.

A. Psychological Testing For Optimal Crew Compatibility Should Be Implemented

NASA has moved from the early days of the space program where missions were comprised of a single astronaut, to short-duration flights of several astronauts, to the current long-duration flights with multi-national crews (with even longer duration flights scheduled for ISS). With this progression, the need to consider the psychological impact of long-duration space travel, particularly its effect on crew compatibility, has increased dramatically. However, while some work has been done on determining the psychological fitness of astronaut candidates, little has been done to use psychological testing as the basis for crew selections beyond the initial evaluations.

There have been numerous studies that indicate as space missions become longer and broader in scope and as crews become more heterogeneous, psychological and interpersonal factors take on increasing importance. The Working Group recognized that embarking on missions to other planets and living and working in the space environment for long periods of time requires a certain set of characteristics. Both the individual astronaut and the crew may need characteristics that are different from those needed when astronauts flew alone or for short periods of time. The Working Group's studies were a promising start in this area but its work stopped in the early 1990's without further validation of its identified selection attributes.

Recently, NASA initiated a study to provide further validation of the selection attributes identified by the Working Group. This study was approved by the astronaut office, funded, and staffed by a working group of outside specialists. The study, however, is undergoing a Headquarters' peer review and may be canceled.

NASA has not placed enough emphasis on identifying necessary and desirable characteristics for success during long-duration space flight. Without developing a composite of those characteristics, there is no standard against which the Agency can evaluate astronauts at initial selection, throughout their training programs, and at the point of crew selection. In contrast, the Russian space program has historically emphasized the assembling of compatible space flight crews. According to Russian space psychologists:

The absence of total compatibility (among crew members) can lead to disruption of interpersonal relations, the development of conflicts, neurotic states, and undesirable psychosomatic symptoms. On the other hand, when the system of group relationships in the crew undergoes progressive development, conducive to the stabilization of interactions, the growth of mutual understanding, cohesiveness, and solidarity ensues. Prolonged joint training of the crewmembers through which they develop the capacity to work together very well is particularly important here. The factor of psychological compatibility has a determining significance in the development of this capacity. ⁽⁷⁾

When forming the space flight crews, the Russian psychologists take into account a wide variety of psychological and social attributes in evaluating prospective crew members. While tests of this nature are not fool-proof, the Russians believe the tests provide some additional predictive capability regarding crew compatibility. In 1996, NASA and the Russian Academy of Sciences published a joint work devoted to Space Biology and Medicine. Volume III (Humans in Spaceflight), Book 2, provides insights into psychological factors for long-duration crew as well as group interactions. ⁽⁸⁾ Chapter 19 indicates:

[S]electing compatible crews should begin from the principles of complementarity and congruence. In other words, the strengths of different crew members either should complement and compensate for each other, or character, personality, psychosocial traits and qualities, values, motivations, knowledge, and experience should correspond or be similar among crew members.

The chapter goes on to state:

[W]e have found that as duration of flight increases, the congruence or similarity of crew members' personality traits is more important than complementarity of these traits. Similarity in personality traits that reflect psychosocial maturity, moral and ethical qualities, and capacity for long-term group interactions and group living in crowded conditions are particularly critical. The credibility of the crew commander, reinforced by age and professional experience, also plays a significant role.

Recently, Shannon Lucid, in a Scientific American article, stated, "For long-duration manned spaceflight, the most important consideration is not the technology of the spacecraft but the composition of the crew." Astronaut Lucid also added, "Even if the space station has the latest in futuristic technology, if the crew members do not enjoy working together, the flight will be a miserable experience." ⁽⁹⁾ In addition, another long-duration astronaut emphasized the need to put more into the process of selecting space station commanders. The astronaut also indicated this was one way of lowering stress levels and improving the operation of the space station.

Recommendation 1: NASA should move forward with the proposed study or propose another study to further validate the select-in criteria for astronauts. The study should be expanded to develop a data base of attributes necessary for use in crew selection for long-duration flights.

B. Need for Periodic and Post Flight Psychological Evaluations

While NASA conducts psychological evaluations as part of its astronaut selection process, there are no further evaluations done. Periodic evaluations would be beneficial in ascertaining continued psychological health and as a basis for determining long-duration crew composition. Every astronaut candidate is interviewed by a psychiatrist. The selection criteria for a NASA astronaut states that anyone with a diagnosed personality disorder is automatically disqualified from consideration. ⁽¹⁰⁾ However, once a candidate is selected, astronauts are required to have annual physical examinations, but not annual psychological evaluations. Furthermore, when an astronaut is selected to fly a long-duration mission, there is no required preflight or post-flight psychological evaluation. As a result, NASA may be unaware that a long-duration astronaut has developed a disqualifying personality disorder either prior to or following the flight. Also, by failing to provide preflight evaluations, NASA fails to identify those areas where the astronaut may need to strengthen the coping skills dictated by a long-duration flight. Post-flight evaluations could reassure the well-being and normalcy of a returning astronaut. Post-flight evaluations can also provide valuable information to share with other astronauts about what to expect as they embark on their own missions and to study the psychological impacts of long-duration space flight. ⁽¹¹⁾

The NASA Task Force on Countermeasures suggested that NASA study Russian data in the area of behavior and performance. The Task Force specifically recommended areas such as pre-flight selection processes, preflight psychological evaluation, in-flight evaluations, and post-flight monitoring and interventions. ⁽¹²⁾ Other organizations such as the Air Force provide periodic psychological evaluations of their pilots. NASA can gain knowledge from these other experiences on how best to implement a periodic psychological evaluation program for its astronauts.

Recommendation 2: NASA management should develop and implement a psychological evaluation process as an integral part of an astronaut's annual physical examination. In developing the process, NASA should study mission data in the area of performance and behavior. A preflight and post-flight evaluation should be conducted each time an astronaut flies a long-duration mission.

C. Need for Improved Crew and Ground Training in Recognizing and Coping With Psychological Stressors Preflight and During Flight

In conjunction with the gathering of valuable information from the psychological evaluations of astronauts, NASA needs to improve the way it approaches the training of flight and ground crews in recognizing and coping with psychological stressors. A myriad of stressors may affect astronauts. Weightlessness, radiation, and atmospheric contaminants can lower an astronaut's tolerance to psychological and sociological stressors. Vibration, lighting, temperature, noise, food, waste removal, and lack of sleep are other stressors affecting performance, behavior, and mental alertness. ⁽¹³⁾ For example, an exhausted Alexander Lazutkin, a Russian crew member on Mir 23, mistakenly pulled a vital cable that shut down the Mir's main computer, causing the station to lose power. ⁽¹⁴⁾ As previously reported in our August 29, 1997, letter to the Chairman, House Committee on Science, an American engineer familiar with events aboard the Mir believes fatigue to be the probable cause of the crew's inadvertently closing a valve that interrupted coolant flow to the Elektron thereby causing it to overheat.

Astronaut John Blaha, in a Washington Post article, stated, "Personally, I would not want to repeat a long-duration space flight--and I didn't have emergenciesLong-duration orbital duty is much more taxing than the intense, but brief, and heady bursts of five (sic) to 14 days orbiting in the U.S. Space Shuttle. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Cosmonaut Valery Polyakov and astronaut Michael Foale, who have flown long-duration space missions, have experience with the various stessors associated with these flights. For example, as indicated in an article in Florida Today Space Online, Michael Foale, "..knew his productivity was slipping by the end of his 4 ½ month Mir mission in early October. Part of that was 'get-home-itis.' And part was accumulated stress from a cargo ship collision and frequent computer breakdowns and power outages." ⁽¹⁶⁾

In the same article, Valery Polyakov indicated, "That's a real effort to be away from everything. I mean, you are really isolated. They talk about the French Foreign Legion. Man, this is really you're in the Sahara Desert and there's just no way around it." ⁽¹⁷⁾

Dr. Ronald Merrell, Chairman of the Department of Surgery at Yale University and member of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, traveled to Moscow in September 1997, to participate in joint meetings with Academician Utkin's Expert Advisory Council. Their purpose was to discuss the Mir environment, the health of the astronauts, and human performance. In a letter to General Stafford dated September 23, 1997, Dr. Merrell reported on the results of the meeting. His report included a discussion of the importance and variability of human interaction in the confines of space. He and his Russian colleagues noted that the:

[M]ajority of the untoward events of the last year have followed non-mechanical or human events rather than purely mechanical failure. However, the age of the station with as much as 50% crew time spent on maintenance has resulted in fatigue, stress and the curtailment of countermeasures.

Dr. Merrell further indicated that the fire (which took place on February 24, 1997) was "associated with profound crew stress." In his letter to General Stafford, Dr. Merrell made several recommendations for the future. One relating to the reduction of stress indicates:

Human factors are the major focus for risk mitigation. Better communication, better group and individual selection, training in group dynamics, programs for stress reduction and fatigue control. In-flight exercise, consistent schedules and active psychodynamic intervention were . . . discussed for the formulation of future plans in the space medicine program to improve the lives and performance of individuals in long duration flight.

Appendix A is a chronological list of mishaps experienced by the Mir crews from February 1997 to February 1998. These types of unpredictable mishaps can cause, or be caused by, emotional stress that could impact an astronaut's ability to perform effectively.

John Blaha, Flight Engineer on Mir 22, indicated that during the organization and conduct of training, it is necessary to take into account the psychological preparation of the American astronaut for long-duration flight. Among the methods he suggested were consultations with psychologists and experts, psychological support during flight, and a sharing of psychological aspects of long-duration flight between those who have completed a Mir flight and those who are preparing to go. ⁽¹⁸⁾

In its May 1997 final report, the NASA Task Force on Countermeasures made several recommendations regarding psychological and behavioral training. Among the recommendations were that NASA:

• use professional psychologists to observe, record, feed back, and lead discussions on group interactions (crew, crew and ground, crew and family, and family and ground);
• strengthen relationships between the mission crew and the ground crew through training, including sections on conflict resolution, communication skills, etc.;
• employ psychologists to help individuals define and maximize performance for personal/professional mental and physical health goals; and
• employ psychologists with special training or experience in cross-cultural work to help mission planners and teams define and maximize performance.

The Task Force indicated that research needs to be conducted regarding the best methods for training individuals and whole crews prior to flights. Topics should include conflict management and resolution, communication skill enhancement, cross-cultural training, team maintenance, and stress management. Research announcements were recently issued in several of these areas, including the relationships between mission crew and ground crew.

Long-duration astronauts have indicated that during their Mir missions they experienced extreme difficulty with getting communications through to their families, a significant time demand for ground communications that impacted other assignments, interruptions in sleep patterns due to the timing of space walks, personality changes in flight, and cultural differences among the crew. These factors and others of that nature should be considered as part of the training for long-duration flights.

Dr. Santy, in her article on "Behavior and Performance in the Space Environment," ⁽¹⁹⁾ points out that psychological training has been used successfully in the German space program. She indicates that:

The biomedical training of science astronauts in the German space program included a psychological training program. The goals of that program were: "(1) improving the individual social-competence of astronauts, (2) evoking and supporting a team-building process within the astronauts' team, and (3) increasing the general efficiency of astronauts by developing general performance skills."

Dr. Santy stated that four elements were emphasized in the training program: communication and cooperation, stress management, coping with operational demands, and group problem-solving.

NASA has an intense training program to prepare astronauts for the physical and operational demands of long-duration flight. We believe that more attention to the psychological demands, not only of the individual, but also of the flight and ground crews, would better prepare all participants for the rigors of long-duration travel and contribute to overall mission success. NASA should make maximum use of data collected during psychological evaluations of crew compatibility and post-flight astronauts as a basis for its psychological training program.

Recommendation 3: As part of its formal training program, NASA should include training on the stressors that individuals and crews will experience on long-duration flights. NASA should factor into this training the results of the research recommended by the Task Force on Countermeasures.

Summary of NASA Management's Response

NASA management partially concurred to the three recommendations made in this report. In his response, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight indicated that the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is developing an integrated program to manage flight crew psychological interactions. The Associate Administrator also provided comments from JSC that specifically addressed each of the recommendations. Overall, the JSC response indicated that the OIG recommendations were helpful and synergistic. JSC management indicated that the Mir Phase I Program did anticipate the psychological demands of long-duration crew members prior to the first Shuttle-Mir mission. The response indicates that NASA created the Psychological Service Group to provide support for long-duration mission astronauts. JSC management stated that it is currently reviewing the implementation of a Behavioral Health and Performance Program, which will be an expansion of the Psychological Services Group. This new program would provide an integrated effort to reach many of the Inspector General's identified goals in this area.

The JSC management response indicated that they will move forward with a study to validate psychological tests and techniques that will be used as aids during the astronaut selection process. In 1996, the Psychological Services Group formally began a Selection Upgrade Project, which resulted in an expansion of the attributes thought to be predictive for use in crew selection.

Regarding our second recommendation that NASA should develop and implement a psychological evaluation process, JSC management indicated that they are reviewing the implementation of regular preflight and postflight meetings with the NASA psychiatrist. These meetings would culminate not only in flight certification, but also in an individual adaptation and potential treatment plan for each crew member. JSC management also stated that they are considering the collection of crew members' in-flight data to advise them of their health and well being. In addition, JSC management is considering the implementation of a behavioral medicine examination that would be conducted during the annual astronaut physical examination, as well as a method to support the health of the mission ground support team.

In its response to our third recommendation that NASA include training on the stressors that individuals and crews will experience on long-duration flights, JSC management concurred that psychological training, preparation, and support should be provided to the entire mission team. JSC management indicated that they already provide information and training on coping and adaptive strategies that have been used effectively by previous long-duration astronauts. They agreed, however, that additional preflight training is needed. JSC management indicated that they are reviewing, as part of the Behavioral Health and Performance Program, the interface between the crew member and the environment, including habitability, work schedules, and retraining issues during long-duration flight.

NASA management's response is included in its entirety as Appendix B.

Evaluation of Management Response

NASA management's comments are responsive to the intent of the recommendations. We will monitor and periodically evaluate NASA's progress in developing an integrated program to manage flight crew psychological interactions, in validating the initial selection criteria for astronauts, in developing and implementing a psychological evaluation process, and in adapting its training program to include training on stressors unique to long-duration flight.

Both the Associate Administrator and JSC management indicated that psychological testing and crew compatibility are not the only factors in the crew selection process. We have never taken the position that psychological factors are the only consideration. However, we do believe that psychological factors have not been adequately addressed and that they are vitally important in ensuring the overall success of long-duration missions. This is particularly true as NASA moves toward putting together crews for the International Space Station. With these crews, which will be truly international in character, the issue of crew compatibility as well as adequate training becomes significantly important. When successfully implemented, NASA's planned actions should help in these areas.

Conclusion

Crew compatibility and emotional stability are vital factors in space flight. As NASA moves toward missions of longer duration conducted by larger, multi-national crews, the selection of compatible crews and their proper training becomes even more crucial. Therefore, we believe NASA should develop a data base of attributes to use in crew selection for long-duration flights. For optimum safety and mission success of long-duration flights, the Agency should increase its efforts to: (1) identify those astronauts best suited for long-duration travel, (2) select crews based on compatibility factors, (3) implement a psychological evaluation process as an integral part of the astronauts' annual physical exams, and (4) provide psychological training and subsequent support to the entire mission team.

Original Signed/Dated 6/19/98

David M. Cushing

Enclosure

cc:
Distribution

Distribution

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Officials-In-Charge
A/Administrator
AD/Acting Deputy Administrator
AT/Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical)
F/Associate Administrator for Human Resources and Education
I/Associate Administrator for External Relations
L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs
P/Associate Administrator for Public Affairs
Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance
U/Associate Administrator for Life & Microgravity Sciences & Applications

NASA Advisory Officials
Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Chairman, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station
Chairman, Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and ISS Operational Readiness Task Force
Chairman, Life & Microgravity Sciences and Applications Advisory Committee

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of Each of the Following Congressional Committees and Subcommittees:
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space
Senate Committee on Government Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice
House Committee on Science
House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

February 26, 1998
Increased presence of carbon monoxide following an emission of smoke into the cabin.

January 2, 1998
Main computer failed. Solar panels stopped tracking the sun and the station lost power.

December 17, 1997
Inspektr satellite malfunctioned and was abandoned.

October 6, 1997
Progress M-35 supply ship did not undock properly due to a clamp left in place.

September 22, 1997
Main computer failed.

September 16, 1997
Near miss with American science satellite. Crew retreated to the Soyuz.

September 8, 1997
Main computer failed. All systems except life-support equipment were turned off.

August 25, 1997
Primary and backup oxygen generators failed.

August 18, 1997
Main computer failed. Central systems were shut down.

August 18, 1997
Progress redocking failed due to computerized automatic pilot system failure. Crew used manual controls to redock Progress.

August 5, 1997
Two oxygen generators broke down. Crew used special oxygen canisters.

July 17, 1997
Crew member accidentally disconnected a computer cable. MIR lost power and went into free drift.

July 14, 1997
Russian Commander Vasily Tsibliyev has irregular heart beat and was declared unfit for EVA.

July 5, 1997
Cosmonauts report a substance leaking from Spektr. Substance later identified as urine from the Progress vehicle.

July 3, 1997
Stabilizing gyroscopes shut down.

June 27, 1997
Computer disconnected from control system.

June 25, 1997
Progress collided with Mir and damaged a solar panel and the Spektr.

April 11, 1997
Cooling system leaked ethylene glycol fumes.

April 4, 1997
Cooling system leak forced crew to shut down primary carbon dioxide removal system.

March 7, 1997
Oxygen generator failed.

March 6, 1997
Progress failed a manual redock and almost hit Mir.

February 24, 1997
Oxygen generating canister erupted in flames causing the crew to wear oxygen masks. Crew fought the fire until it burned out.

1. ¹ Related to the issue of psychological evaluation and training is the ability of the astronauts to deal with the stress of long-duration space flight. Our August 29, 1997, letter to the Chairman, House Committee on Science, highlights several factors contributing to fatigue and stress, and provides several examples of problems that may have occurred because of stress.

2. ²Kanas' study defined stress as being any change in an organism produced by a stressor and a stressor being some condition(s) affecting an organism.

3. ³Dr. Patricia A. Santy chaired the Working Group, a diverse group which included astronauts, professors, consultants, university department heads, National Space Development Agency of Japan employees, and others. Dr. Santy worked at the Johnson Space Center from 1984 to 1991 as a flight surgeon to the astronauts. She was the first full-time civil service psychiatrist to fill this position.

4. ⁴Aptitude evaluates an astronaut's ability to function effectively in an extended-duration mission environment. Motivation defines the degree of interest and enthusiasm for the job with a high degree of mission-oriented motivation. Sensitivity to self and others is believed to demonstrate emotional maturity.

5. ⁵ Dr. Santy defined select-in as a process frequently used in personnel selection that does not have specific medical or psychiatric implications. The goal of this process is to identify the best person for the job.

Dr. Santy defined selecting-out as primarily a medical/psychiatric decision. The candidate cannot previously have had or currently have any of the specified psychiatric conditions listed in the standards, or he or she will be disqualified.

6. ⁶Kanas' experiment began with NASA 3, John Blaha's flight to Mir in September 1996, and will conclude with the completion of Andrew Thomas' flight, NASA 7, in May 1998.

7. ⁷ G.T. Beregovoy, V.N.Grigorenko, and R. B. Bogdashevskiy. In: Pochkayev: Kosmicheskaya Akademiya [Space Academy]. Mashinostroyeniye, Moscow. Pp. 1-7, 1987.

8. ⁸ Space Biology and Medicine, Joint U.S./Russian Publication in Five Volumes, Volume III, Humans in Spaceflight, Book 2, Chapter 19, "Psychological States and Group Interactions of Crew Members in Flight."

9. ⁹"Six Months on Mir," Scientific American, May 1998.

10. ¹⁰Some personality disorders that would eliminate a candidate from consideration include bi-polar tendencies and major depressions.

11. ¹¹ One long-duration astronaut recommended that astronauts who had already completed flights on the Mir be involved in the training of those preparing to go to Mir. The astronaut also stressed the importance of the briefing between the astronaut completing a space flight and the newly arrived astronaut. One of the topics to be covered was psychological support of the newly arrived astronaut as it relates to a long-duration mission.

12. ¹² "Final Report of NASA Task Force on Countermeasures," May 1997.

13. ¹³ Dr. Kanas, "Behavior, Psychiatric, and Sociological Problems of Long-Duration Space Missions," 1971.

14. ¹⁴ MSNBC, "Interview with Alexander Lazutkin, Mir 23 Flight Engineer."

15. ¹⁵ The Washington Post, July 20, 1997, p.A25.

16. ¹⁶ Florida Today, Space Online, December 7, 1997.

17. ¹⁷ Ibid.

18. ¹⁸ "Operational Report of Flight Engineer-2, NASA Astronaut John Blaha on the Preparations for and Completion of a Space Flight Aboard the MIR Orbital Scientific Research Complex."

19. ¹⁹ Patricia A. Santy, "Behavior and Performance in the Space Environment," Fundamentals of Space Life Sciences, Vol. 2.