STATEMENT OF
M.E. RHETT FLATER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN HELICOPTER SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL
 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ON THE
THE U.S. ROTORCRAFT INDUSTRIAL BASE

MARCH 12, 2003


Mr. Chairman, my name is Rhett Flater and I am the Executive Director of the American Helicopter Society.  It is a pleasure to appear before you today as you receive testimony on the fiscal year 2004 national defense authorization request and review United States' rotorcraft programs, the supporting industrial base and future technology initiatives.

The American Helicopter Society is the leading professional, technical society in the world dedicated to the advancement and promotion of vertical flight technologies, including the helicopter and tiltrotor.  The Society was founded in 1943 by Igor Sikorsky and other industry pioneers, who recognized the benefits which vertical flight technologies offer mankind.  Today, the Society is international in membership, with more than 6,000 members, most of whom are managers, engineers, scientists and technicians.  Our membership also includes most large members of the U.S. rotorcraft industrial base, including airframe manufacturers Bell Helicopter Textron, Boeing Helicopter Division of Boeing Defense and Space Group, Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Technologies, and Kaman Aerospace, engine manufacturers GE Aircraft Engines, Honeywell, and Rolls-Royce Corporation, and systems integrators BAE Systems, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. 

I appear before you today to discuss the state of the United States rotorcraft industrial base, specifically as it relates to the ability of the industry to respond to future national and homeland security needs. 

General Overview

The major U.S. airframe manufacturers - Bell Helicopter Textron, The Boeing Company (helicopters) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, a division of United Technologies Corp. - each have (2002) annual revenues from rotorcraft ranging from $1.7 billion to $2.8 billion.  Total sales, as a group, have fluctuated between $5 billion and $6.6 billion during the past five years; in 2002 they were $6.6 billion.   Employment, meanwhile, has ranged from 24,000 to 27,200 during the past five years; in 2002 total worldwide employment for the group was 24,182.  (See Appendix 1 for 10-year industry trends.)

Boeing's sales are entirely military-related.  Sikorsky manufactures products for both the military and civil markets, including the S-76 and S-92.  Bell's sales have historically been spread 50/50 between military and civil, but during the past three years Bell's civil/commercial sales have declined slightly.  This is attributable partly to the economic downturn but also to competition from Eurocopter and other non-US manufacturers.

The U.S. rotorcraft industry also incorporates a large sub-systems supply base, spanning such critical fields as propulsion, avionics, communications and armaments.  Recent industry forecasts predict a 10-year rotorcraft market for over 10,000 helicopters worldwide.  Competition from government supported sub-systems suppliers such as BAE Systems, Turbomeca and Thales can be expected to challenge U.S. suppliers to fully exploit this market.

Foreign military sales by the major U.S. airframers comprise approximately one-third of their total worldwide sales.  Propelled by demonstrated successes by U.S. military technology in Desert Storm, foreign sales have been essential throughout the decade of the 1990s in maintaining warm production lines.  Without such sales, Boeing's CH-47 Chinook (heavy lift transport) line and Sikorsky's UH-60 Blackhawk (medium lift transport) line would be stagnant.  Bell's sales of the AH-1W Supercobra (attack helicopter) to Taiwan have enabled it to retain a production capability which now permits Bell to bridge to AH-1Z and UH-1Y production (or remanufacture) for the U.S. Marine Corps.  According to Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), total helicopter exports in 2000 were $763.9 million.  The industry's net contribution to the current account trade balance was $274.6 million.                                   

Key U.S. military programs include the V-22 Osprey, which will replace the Marine Corps' CH-46 (which has been in service since the mid-1960s); the Army's RAH-66 Comanche; the Navy's MH-60R and MH-60S model Seahawk; the Army's CH-47F Chinook, UH-60M Black Hawk and AH-64D Longbow Apache (all remanufacturing programs); and the Marine's AH-1Z/UH-1Y.  The Osprey, built by Bell and Boeing, is in low-rate production.  The RAH-66, built by Boeing and Sikorsky, remains in the engineering and manufacturing development phase.  The AH-1Z/UH-1Y is in flight test prior to full-rate remanufacturing. 

For the U.S. rotorcraft industry, however, there have been no "new starts" within the past 15 years.  The industry has largely survived, and to some extent prospered, based on remanufacturing existing airframes. 

European Industry:  A Comparison

By comparison, sales of the major European airframe manufacturers - AgustaWestland Ltd. (formerly Agusta, SpA and Westland, Inc.) and Eurocopter (formerly Aerospatiale, S.A. and MBB Helicopters, GmbH) - have risen to $2.4 billion and $2.5 billion in 2002 respectively, an increase of more than 12% over the past year. 

European manufacturers have recently introduced several new products competitive with U.S. rotorcraft, with Eurocopter alone having introduced 10 new designs over the past decade.  In the military market, these include the AgustaWestland EH-101 medium lift maritime transport, the NH-90 medium lift transport produced by Eurocopter (France and Germany), AgustaWestland (Italy and Great Britain) Fokker (the Netherlands) and CASA (Spain), and the Tiger light attack helicopter - Eurocopter's answer to Boeing's Apache.  In the civil market, they include the Agusta A-109, Eurocopter EC-120, EC-135, EC-145, EC-155, and EC-225 - nearly all of which are targeted at Bell's civil product line.  The military products are racking up sales across Europe and increasingly winning international competitions, e.g., the NH-90 and the EH-101 beat out Sikorsky's S-92 in the "Nordic competition;" the NH-90 has become the medium lift airframe of choice in Germany, France and most western European countries (except for Great Britain and Italy which chose the EH-101).  Several months ago, Eurocopter's Tiger won the Australia attack helicopter competition (22 aircraft) over the Apache (this is the Tiger's first major international win).  

The European manufacturers are growing more aggressive in pursuing
international orders and they now are selected over U.S. manufacturers on a frequent basis. European technology is as advanced - and in some cases more so - than U.S. technology:  witness European advancements in blade design, composites, bearingless main rotors, transmission design, sensors, HUMS, etc.  The European ability to integrate airframes, engines and systems is comparable equal to that of the U.S. primes.   

The military rotorcraft market is global in nature.  To sell products abroad, aerospace companies must offer significant economic offsets to the purchasing government.  Accordingly, European primes are now teaming with major U.S. defense firms to meet future DoD needs.  For example, AgustaWestland has recently teamed with Lockheed Martin to offer an American version of the EH-101 (the US-101).  Similarly, the U.S. primes are teaming with European companies.  An example is Boeing's teaming with GKN Westland (now AgustaWestland) and BAE Systems on the WH-64D Longbow Apache for the British Army.

Compared to the U.S., European host governments consistently, and heavily, subsidize rotorcraft research and development.  For example, rotorcraft research funding in France is supplied by the military (64%) and by the civil (36%) sectors of the government.  Of these funds, 34% support basic research and 66% technology and development programs.  European government test facilities are modern to state-of-the-art compared to those in the U.S.   Examples include the DNW (Netherlands) wind tunnel, CIRA's (Italy's) new crash test facility and its new icing wind tunnel, both located at Padua.  Russia's TsAGI has three large low speed tunnels that are used extensively for studies of helicopter rotors and complete configurations, e.g., the T-101, T104 and T-105.  The European Union supplements its member state basic R&D funds via European Commission "framework programs."  As the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry recently reported, "in contrast to declining NASA and FAA funding, framework funding has increased dramatically since 1987."  EU supplemental funding for aeronautics research jumped to nearly $1 billion annually in the sixth EU framework program (2002-2006).

There are also a number of new centers of rotorcraft excellence emerging beyond Europe, again with the help of government funding.  These include the helicopter industries of India, China, Japan and Korea.  Closer to home, Canada also continues to support home-grown rotorcraft technology development through its TPC funding programs.

Basic Rotorcraft Research In Decline in the U.S.

Attached as Appendix #3 is the Society's best estimate of the state of DoD rotorcraft science and technology and NASA research and technology programs for the period 1994 through 2004, with projections for fiscal years 2005 through 2007.  Please note that during the period from 2001 through 2003, rotorcraft research declined performed by DoD and NASA declined from $113.6 million to $56.3 million, largely because of NASA's failure to fund rotorcraft research.

Long-term cooperative efforts between NASA and the Department of Defense in rotorcraft research, in particular the 1969 Army NASA Joint Agreement, are in serious turmoil.  Facing internal budget pressures, NASA has eliminated all of its rotorcraft R&D activity in fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004.  In the face of a growing European rotorcraft industry, the future competitiveness of U.S. capabilities in both military and commercial rotorcraft technology development is in jeopardy.  If the trend continues, the U.S. Defense Department may eventually become dependent on non-U.S. suppliers for future mobility requirements.  In its Third Interim Report, the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry ("the Commission") issued a recommendation that "the Administration and Congress should direct NASA and the DoD to coordinate R&D efforts in areas of common need and provide the appropriate funding for joint programs.  For example, funding for joint Army/NASA rotorcraft R&D efforts should be restored."  See Commission Recommendation 5.

The rotorcraft industry is a significant part of the U.S. aerospace industrial base.  Several findings by the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry regarding the industrial base are especially relevant to the rotorcraft industry.  For example:

  • There is a major workforce crisis in the aerospace industry.  Our nation has lost over 600,000 scientific and technical aerospace jobs in the past 13 years.  These layoffs initially began as a result of reduced defense spending following the end of the Cold War.  But subsequent contraction of the industry through mergers and acquisitions and the events of September 11 have made the situation worse.  
  • Aerospace is a technology-driven industry, heavily dependent on defense defense, research and manufacturing.  Yet aerospace procurement by the military fell nearly 53 percent from 1987 to 2000.  The DoD also reduced its overall investment in research, development, testing and evaluation by nearly 20 percent from 1987 to 1999. 
  • Maintaining a world-class national aerospace RDT&E infrastructure is essential to ensure that this country's research programs can be performed successfully.  Yet much of the U.S. RDT&E infrastructure is 40 to 50 years old and marginally maintained.  Currently, NASA has suspended all operations of the 40x80 windtunnel (the NFAC) located at NASA Ames and has threatened to close it permanently.  This is a significant blow to the rotorcraft industry which depends on full-scale testing and access to NFAC.  In addition, NASA has announced the imminent closure of the nation's only crash-safety flight test facility located at NASA Ames.  Accordingly, crash safety tests planned for the RAH-66 Comanche and the Joint Strike Fighter in 2005 must be performed in a European facility or cancelled altogether.  
  • Industry-funded aerospace research and development fell by 37 percent from $8.1 billion in 1986 to $5.1 billion in 1999 (in inflation adjusted dollars).   Absent government procurements, private firms have little incentive to fund basic research on their own because capital markets and stockholders shy away from risky investments with indeterminate returns.   
  • During the same timeframe, the number of major U.S. aerospace prime contractors shrank from more than 50 to just five.  Meanwhile, aerospace firms continue to consolidate to maximize resources, eliminate excess capacity, and access new market segments.  Parts suppliers have undergone a similar contraction and consolidation. 

Given (1) the loss in U.S. rotorcraft market share brought about by the decline in U.S. investment (NASA, DoD, and Industry) in basic research and (2) the availability of equivalent or better European technology supported by aggressive R&D programs with the stated objective of overtaking the U.S. in rotorcraft sales, it should be clear that the U.S. government must support sustained research, e.g., specifically, the DoD and NASA must provide sustained and predictable investments in basic aeronautics research, including rotorcraft.  If this does not occur, the U.S. rotorcraft capability - until recently regarded as the best in the world - will decline.  

This development will have significant implications for U.S. homeland security as well as national transportation planning.  Rotorcraft fill many needs which non-VTOL aircraft are incapable of addressing.  Not only do they provide battlefield mobility for the U.S. military but also emergency response in times of national and homeland security emergencies.  They save lives in the event of natural and man-made disasters.   And Department of Transportation studies indicate that "runway independent aircraft," such as helicopters and tiltrotors, are capable of increasing aviation system capacity and reducing congestion and delays.   For these reasons, further investment in basic research is essential for national security which requires the U.S. industry to remain competitive in world markets.

AHS International "White Paper"

A "White Paper" issued by the Society emphasizes the importance of basic rotorcraft research to address future national and homeland security needs as well as public transportation needs in the following terms:

Rotorcraft fulfill critical needs as part of the national infrastructure.

Rotorcraft currently perform widespread safe and affordable critical public service and other operations such as emergency medical service, search and rescue, law enforcement, firefighting, resource development, and priority transportation.

Recent research indicates that rotorcraft can make a major impact in alleviating airport congestion and delays by enabling runway-independent VTOL aircraft.  For example, a recent study showed that simultaneous non-interfering operations of runway-independent aircraft for short-haul flights could achieve a two-thirds reduction in ground delays projected for 2017 at Newark airport.

The national rotorcraft technology and production base also supports critical national and homeland security needs for improved mobility.

To meet these needs, there is a compelling need for rotorcraft research.

Research is needed to serve these public needs and to maintain a healthy industry in the face of limitations of current rotorcraft and intensifying international competition. Growing investment in rotorcraft research by foreign entities has eroded and, in some cases, overcome U.S. leadership in rotary wing technologies; as a result European industry now has captured half of the world's civil market. 

Cost is a major inhibitor to expanded rotorcraft operations.  Current rotorcraft cost at least three times as much to operate as equivalent turboprops, limiting rotorcraft applications and potential ridership.  This relationship is determined largely by cruise efficiency, empty weight, speed, complexity, and development and certification cost and time - all of which are being attacked by vigorous technology efforts.

These same attributes, and especially range and cruise efficiency are also vital to the military.  Next-generation VTOL military transports will have to operate at much greater ranges than the current generation¾up to 600 miles¾yet be able to land in and take off from confined areas or ships almost anywhere in the world with minimum logistic support. 

Safe all-weather 24/7 operations are critical to the efficient exploitation of the advantages of vertical flight.  The very nature of the unique capabilities of rotorcraft lead us to use them in both military and civil applications where no other alternative exists.  The public perception that rotorcraft flight is inherently risky derives from the fact that rotorcraft are often called upon to operate in bad weather at very low altitudes and in close proximity to ground-based obstacles such as towers and wires.

External noise is a critical factor in achieving public acceptance of rotorcraft operations.  Quiet environmentally-friendly aircraft will be needed to operate from hub airports, general aviation airfields, and dispersed heliports, thereby maximizing time savings for travelers.  In the case of military applications, external noise impacts the ability of the military to operate from bases in close proximity to populated areas, not to mention the obvious loss of stealth.

Other barriers to enhanced and expanded civil operations include ride comfort and reliable near all-weather operations.  Overcoming these barriers is needed to attract passengers and provide public service, such as emergency medical service.

What is NASA's role?

NASA's role has always been to conduct high-value research that will enable the introduction of new aeronautical technologies or products.  The risks and long time horizons for financial returns from such research fail to meet industry criteria for private investment.  For example, NASA research played a key role in the development of tiltrotor technology beginning in 1971, including joint sponsorship of the XV-15 technology demonstrator, that is only now beginning to provide returns to the industry and the public.

NASA funding for rotorcraft research is highly leveraged.  Recognizing that many technologies are applicable to both military and civil rotorcraft, under a NASA/Army Joint Agreement the two agencies share 50/50 in supporting rotorcraft research.  The Army and NASA funding for the National Rotorcraft Technology Center is further matched by Industry, providing four-to-one leverage for NASA investment in that program, which has been cited as a model for government-industry-academia partnership.  Equally important, these programs provide very effective mechanisms for technology transfer among the participants.

Examples of possible NASA/DoD contributions include:

·    Concepts for innovative new configurations can radically improve rotorcraft speed, affordability, and mission effectiveness, while retaining superior VTOL and low-speed characteristics.

·    Applications of information and computing technologies will result in safer, more affordable, environmentally-friendly rotorcraft and far more effective and survivable military systems.  These technologies can enable safe near all-weather operation in confined urban areas, particularly important for scheduled transport and public service operations. 

·    Active and adaptive controls have demonstrated the potential to improve performance, and reduce external noise, internal noise, vibration, and weight and mechanical complexity. 

·    Noise reducing design and operational methods have demonstrated noise reductions totaling 20 dB (i.e., 75% reduction), but continued research is needed to achieve this for future rotorcraft configurations.

·    Design tools can reduce development cycle time by 50%, speeding up the application of technology improvements.  These include physics-based models, such as advanced structural analysis and computational fluid dynamics, that lead to improved performance, noise, and vibration characteristics.  These methods are needed to optimize designs and to "get it right the first time," avoiding costly redesign and retest, particularly for innovative aircraft configurations. 

·    Deice and anti-ice concepts and certification methods are needed for affordable and reliable all-weather operation.  Operation of rotorcraft in icing conditions currently requires complex (hence costly and sometimes unreliable) systems and is difficult, costly, and time consuming to certify for civil operation. 

Future research addressing these barrier technologies will bring about radical improvements that will achieve the characteristics needed to contribute to national security as well as the air transportation system of the future.

Conclusion

Companies such as Bell, Boeing and Sikorsky and their supporting suppliers are innovative.  They also have responsive, can-do senior managers and proven and experienced management teams which partner well with their customer.  When called upon, they are capable of responding with alacrity to national security and civil market needs. 

In conclusion, I would make three recommendations. 

  • First, the DoD and NASA should be directed to make further investments in basic 6.1 and 6.2 rotorcraft research - particularly efforts to refine and simplify the rotor system and control systems and the drive train - a high priority. 
  • Second, given the importance of transforming the U.S. military to become more mobile and more agile - a requirement in fighting future 21st century wars - the DoD should fund private industry to design, develop and fly a series of innovative VTOL prototype aircraft. 
  • Third, this Committee should pay particular heed to implementing the recommendations of the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry contained in the Commission's Final Report issued November 17, 2002 highlighted in Appendix 2 to this testimony.

Rapid passage of the recently reintroduced "Aeronautics Revitalization Act of 2004" would go far in addressing these national concerns. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 

Appendix 1

 

 

Rotorcraft Industry Trends
For the Period 1993 - 2002

 

 

                     Year                Total Employees    Total Revenues (Billions US)

                     1993                           28,293                        $5.086

                     1994                           27,606                        $5.121

                     1995                           26,190                        $5.445

                     1996                           25,821                        $4.632

                     1997                           27,526                        $4.505

                     1998                           27,214                        $5.048

                     1999                           25,534                        $5.072

                     2000                           24,899                        $5.482

                     2001                           25,324                        $5.865

                     2002                           24,182                        $6.616

* Includes total revenues and employees for the years ending December 31, 1993 through December 31, 2002 for Bell Helicopter Textron, The Boeing Company (rotorcraft revenues only), McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (1993-1996), and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.

Appendix 2

 

Stakeholder's Coalition
"Final Report of the Commission on the
Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry"

 

Summary Findings
Research and Development Committee

The Stakeholder's Coalition R&D Committee has identified several key recommendations relating to the need for national R&D goals contained within the Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, consolidated, reworded and modified as follows:

  1. The White House and Congress must increase and sustain funding in long-term research and associated RDT&E infrastructure to develop and demonstrate new breakthrough aerospace capabilities.  (Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-8 and 9-12; see also Rec. #111; Com. Rep. at 4-6)

(a)   NASA should reenergize its aeronautics research efforts and, within the next five years, double its investment in aeronautics.  (Rec. #9; Com. Rep. at 9-3, 9-11, 9-13; Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-8 and 9-12)

(b)   The Federal government must assume responsibility for providing, sustaining, and modernizing critical aerospace RDT&E infrastructure to ensure that this country's research programs can be performed successfully.  (Rec. #116; see Com. Rep. at 4-12 and 4-14; Rec. #123; Com. Rep. at 9-7 and 9-12.)

(c)   DoD's annual science and technology (6.1-6.3) funding must be sufficient (not less than 3 percent DoD obligation authority) and stable to create and demonstrate the innovative technologies needed to address future national security threats.  (Rec. #113; see Com. Rep. at 4-7.)

(d)   The Administration and Congress should direct NASA and the DoD to coordinate R&D efforts in areas of common need and provide the appropriate funding for joint programs.  (Rec. #24; Com. Rep. at B-39.)

  1. Industry and government should accelerate research transition reducing the time from concept definition to operational capability by 75 percent through coordinated national goals; aggressive use of information technologies; incentives for real government, industry, labor, and academia partnerships; and an acquisition process that integrates science and technology as part of the product development process.  (Recs. # 103, 104, and #8; Com. Rep. at 9-10/12).
  1. To focus U.S. aerospace research investments on developing breakthrough capabilities, the Administration should adopt - as a national  priority - the achievement of the following aerospace technology demonstration goals by 2010

§   Demonstrate an automated and integrated air transportation capability that would triple air system capacity by 2025;

§   Reduce aviation noise and emissions by 90 percent;

§    Reduce aviation fatal accident rate by 90 percent;

§   Reduce transit time between any two points on earth by 50 percent.

§   Reduce cost and time to access space by 50 percent;

§   Reduce transit time between two points in space by 50 percent;

§   Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and surveil the earth, its atmosphere and space for a wide range of military, intelligence, civil and commercial applications;

(Rec. 8; Com. Rep. at 9-8)

Other Committee Items of Interest:

As the Commission found, "there is a workforce crisis in the aerospace industry" which must have access to a scientifically and technically trained workforce.   The recommendations of the Commission relating to "Workforce" contained at Chapter 8 of the Final Report are of considerable importance to the future health of U.S. R&D, particularly recommendations #22, #23, #118, #119, and #122.

 

Kathryn Holmes, ASME
M.E. Rhett Flater, AHS Int'l
Co-chairs, R&D Committee


House Armed Services Committee
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
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