GLOBAL
TRENDS
2015:
A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment
Experts
December
2000
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CONTENTS
Note
on Process
In undertaking
this comprehensive analysis, the NIC worked actively with
a range of nongovernmental institutions and experts. We
began the analysis with two workshops focusing on drivers
and alternative futures, as the appendix describes. Subsequently,
numerous specialists from academia and the private sector
contributed to every aspect of the study, from demographics
to developments in science and technology, from the global
arms market to implications for the United States. Many
of the judgments in this paper derive from our efforts
to distill the diverse views expressed at these conferences
or related workshops. Major conferences cosponsored by
the NIC with other government and private centers in support
of Global Trends 2015 included:
- Foreign
Reactions to the Revolution in Military Affairs
(Georgetown University).
- Evolution
of the Nation-State (University of Maryland).
- Trends
in Democratization (CIA and academic experts).
- American
Economic Power (Industry & Trade Strategies,
San Francisco, CA).
- Transformation
of Defense Industries (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, UK).
- Alternative
Futures in War and Conflict (Defense Intelligence
Agency and Naval War College, Newport, RI, and CIA).
- Out of
the Box and Into the Future: A Dialogue Between Warfighters
and Scientists on Far Future Warfare (Potomac Institute,
Arlington, VA).
- Future
Threat Technologies Symposium (MITRE Corporation,
McLean, VA).
- The Global
Course of the Information Revolution: Technological
Trends (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA).
- The Global
Course of the Information Revolution: Political, Economic,
and Social Consequences (RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, CA).
- The Middle
East: The Media, Information Technology, and the Internet
(The National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington,
DC).
- Global
Migration Trends and Their Implications for the United
States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC).
- Alternative
Global Futures: 2000-2015 (Department of State/Bureau
of Intelligence and Research and CIA's Global Futures
Project).
In October
2000, the draft report was discussed with outside experts,
including Richard Cooper and Joseph Nye (Harvard University),
Richard Haass (Brookings Institution), James Steinberg
(Markle Foundation), and Jessica Mathews (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace). Their comments and suggestions
are incorporated in the report.
CONTENTS
Contents
Overview
Global
Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the
Future With Nongovernment Experts
Over the past
15 months, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), in
close collaboration with US Government specialists and
a wide range of experts outside the government, has worked
to identify major drivers and trends that will shape the
world of 2015.
The key drivers
identified are:
(l) Demographics.
(2) Natural
resources and environment.
(3) Science
and technology.
(4) The global
economy and globalization.
(5) National
and international governance.
(6) Future
conflict.
(7) The role
of the United States.
In examining
these drivers, several points should be kept in mind:
- No single
driver or trend will dominate the global future in 2015.
- Each driver
will have varying impacts in different regions and countries.
- The drivers
are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; in some cases,
they will work at cross-purposes.
Taken together,
these drivers and trends intersect to create an integrated
picture of the world of 2015, about which we can make
projections with varying degrees of confidence and identify
some troubling uncertainties of strategic importance to
the United States.
The Methodology
Global Trends 2015
provides a flexible framework to discuss and debate
the future. The methodology is useful for our purposes,
although admittedly inexact for the social scientist.
Our purpose is to rise above short-term, tactical
considerations and provide a longer-term, strategic
perspective. Judgments about demographic and natural
resource trends are based primarily on informed
extrapolation of existing trends. In contrast, many
judgments about science and technology, economic
growth, globalization, governance, and the nature
of conflict represent a distillation of views of
experts inside and outside the United States Government.
The former are projections about natural phenomena,
about which we can have fairly high confidence;
the latter are more speculative because they are
contingent upon the decisions that societies and
governments will make.
The drivers
we emphasize will have staying power. Some of the trends
will persist; others will be less enduring and may change
course over the time frame we consider. The major contribution
of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), assisted by
experts from the Intelligence Community, has been to harness
US Government and nongovernmental specialists to identify
drivers, to determine which ones matter most, to highlight
key uncertainties, and to integrate analysis of these
trends into a national security context. The result identifies
issues for more rigorous analysis and quantification.
Revisiting
Global Trends 2010: How Our Assessments Have Changed
Over
the past four years, we have tested the judgments
made in the predecessor, Global Trends 2010, published
in 1997. Global Trends 2010 was the centerpiece
of numerous briefings, conferences, and public
addresses. Various audiences were energetic in
challenging, modifying or confirming our judgments.
The lively debate that ensued has expanded our
treatment of drivers, altered some projections
we made in 1997, and matured our thinking overallwhich
was the essential purpose of this exercise.
Global
Trends 2015 amplifies several drivers identified
previously, and links them more closely to the
trends we now project over the next 15 years.
Some of the key changes include:
- Globalization
has emerged as a more powerful driver. GT 2015
sees international economic dynamicsincluding
developments in the World Trade Organizationand
the spread of information technology as having
much greater influence than portrayed in GT
2010.
- GT
2015 assigns more significance to the importance
of governance, notably the ability of states
to deal with nonstate actors, both good and
bad. GT 2015 pays attention both to the opportunities
for cooperation between governments and private
organizations and to the growing reach of international
criminal and terrorist networks.
- GT
2015 includes a more careful examination of
the likely role of science and technology as
a driver of global developments. In addition
to the growing significance of information technology,
biotechnology and other technologies carry much
more weight in the present assessment.
- The
effect of the United States as the preponderant
power is introduced in GT 2015. The US role
as a global driver has emerged more clearly
over the past four years, particularly as many
countries debate the impact of "US hegemony"
on their domestic and foreign policies.
- GT
2015 provides a more complete discussion of
natural resources including food, water, energy,
and the environment. It discusses, for example,
the over three billion individuals who will
be living in water-stressed regions from North
China to Africa and the implications for conflict.
The linkage between energy availability, price,
and distribution is more thoroughly explored.
- GT
2015 emphasizes interactions among the drivers.
For example, we discuss the relationship between
S&T, military developments, and the potential
for conflict.
- In
the regional sections, GT 2015 makes projections
about the impact of the spread of information,
the growing power of China, and the declining
power of Russia.
Events
and trends in key states and regions over the
last four years have led us to revise some projections
substantially in GT 2015.
- GT
2010 did not foresee the global financial crisis
of 1997-98; GT 2015 takes account of obstacles
to economic development in East Asia, though
the overall projections remain fairly optimistic.
- As
described in GT 2010, there is still substantial
uncertainty regarding whether China can cope
with internal political and economic trends.
GT 2015 highlights even greater uncertainty
over the direction of Beijing's regional policies.
- Many
of the global trends continue to remain negative
for the societies and regimes in the Middle
East. GT 2015 projects at best a "cold peace"
between Israel and its adversaries and sees
prospects for potentially destabilizing social
changes due to adverse effects of globalization
and insufficient attention to reform. The spike
in oil revenues reinforces the assessment of
GT 2010 about the rising demand for OPEC oil;
these revenues are not likely to be directed
primarily at core human resources and social
needs.
- Projections
for Sub-Saharan Africa are even more dire than
in GT 2010 because of the spread of AIDS and
the continuing prospects for humanitarian crises,
political instability, and military conflicts.
|
CONTENTS
The
Drivers and Trends
Demographics
World population in 2015 will be 7.2 billion, up
from 6.1 billion in the year 2000, and in most countries,
people will live longer. Ninety-five percent of
the increase will be in developing countries, nearly
all in rapidly expanding urban areas. Where political
systems are brittle, the combination of population
growth and urbanization will foster instability.
Increasing lifespans will have significantly divergent
impacts.
- In the advanced
economiesand a growing number of emerging market
countriesdeclining birthrates and aging will combine
to increase health care and pension costs while reducing
the relative size of the working population, straining
the social contract, and leaving significant shortfalls
in the size and capacity of the work force.
- In some
developing countries, these same trends will combine
to expand the size of the working population and reduce
the youth bulgeincreasing the potential for economic
growth and political stability.
Natural
Resources and Environment
Overall food production will be adequate to feed the world's
growing population, but poor infrastructure and distribution,
political instability, and chronic poverty will lead to
malnourishment in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The potential
for famine will persist in countries with repressive government
policies or internal conflicts. Despite a 50 percent increase
in global energy demand, energy resources will be sufficient
to meet demand; the latest estimates suggest that 80 percent
of the world's available oil and 95 percent of its gas
remain underground.
- Although
the Persian Gulf region will remain the world's largest
single source of oil, the global energy market is likely
to encompass two relatively distinct patterns of regional
distribution: one serving consumers (including the United
States) from Atlantic Basin reserves; and the other
meeting the needs of primarily Asian customers (increasingly
China and India) from Persian Gulf supplies and, to
a lesser extent, the Caspian region and Central Asia.
- In contrast
to food and energy, water scarcities and allocation
will pose significant challenges to governments in the
Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and northern
China. Regional tensions over water will be heightened
by 2015.
Science
and Technology
Fifteen years ago, few predicted the profound impact of
the revolution in information technology. Looking ahead
another 15 years, the world will encounter more quantum
leaps in information technology (IT) and in other areas
of science and technology. The continuing diffusion of
information technology and new applications of biotechnology
will be at the crest of the wave. IT will be the major
building block for international commerce and for empowering
nonstate actors. Most experts agree that the IT revolution
represents the most significant global transformation
since the Industrial Revolution beginning in the mid-eighteenth
century.
- The integrationor
fusionof continuing revolutions in information
technology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology
will generate a dramatic increase in investment in technology,
which will further stimulate innovation within the more
advanced countries.
- Older technologies
will continue lateral "sidewise development" into new
markets and applications through 2015, benefiting US
allies and adversaries around the world who are interested
in acquiring early generation ballistic missile and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies.
- Biotechnology
will drive medical breakthroughs that will enable the
world's wealthiest people to improve their health and
increase their longevity dramatically. At the same time,
genetically modified crops will offer the potential
to improve nutrition among the world's one billion malnourished
people.
- Breakthroughs
in materials technology will generate widely available
products that are multi-functional, environmentally
safe, longer lasting, and easily adapted to particular
consumer requirements.
- Disaffected
states, terrorists, proliferators, narcotraffickers,
and organized criminals will take advantage of the new
high-speed information environment and other advances
in technology to integrate their illegal activities
and compound their threat to stability and security
around the world.
The Global
Economy and Globalization
The networked global economy will be driven by rapid and
largely unrestricted flows of information, ideas, cultural
values, capital, goods and services, and people: that
is, globalization. This globalized economy will be a net
contributor to increased political stability in the world
in 2015, although its reach and benefits will not be universal.
In contrast to the Industrial Revolution, the process
of globalization is more compressed. Its evolution will
be rocky, marked by chronic financial volatility and a
widening economic divide.
- The global
economy, overall, will return to the high levels of
growth reached in the 1960s and early 1970s. Economic
growth will be driven by political pressures for higher
living standards, improved economic policies, rising
foreign trade and investment, the diffusion of information
technologies, and an increasingly dynamic private sector.
Potential brakes on the global economysuch as
a sustained financial crisis or prolonged disruption
of energy suppliescould undo this optimistic projection.
- Regions,
countries, and groups feeling left behind will face
deepening economic stagnation, political instability,
and cultural alienation. They will foster political,
ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism, along
with the violence that often accompanies it. They will
force the United States and other developed countries
to remain focused on "old-world" challenges while concentrating
on the implications of "new-world" technologies at the
same time.
National
and International Governance
States will continue to be the dominant players on the
world stage, but governments will have less and less control
over flows of information, technology, diseases, migrants,
arms, and financial transactions, whether licit or illicit,
across their borders. Nonstate actors ranging from business
firms to nonprofit organizations will play increasingly
larger roles in both national and international affairs.
The quality of governance, both nationally and internationally,
will substantially determine how well states and societies
cope with these global forces.
- States with
competent governance, including the United States, will
adapt government structures to a dramatically changed
global environmentmaking them better able to engage
with a more interconnected world. The responsibilities
of once "semiautonomous" government agencies increasingly
will intersect because of the transnational nature of
national security priorities and because of the clear
requirement for interdisciplinary policy responses.
Shaping the complex, fast-moving world of 2015 will
require reshaping traditional government structures.
- Effective
governance will increasingly be determined by the ability
and agility to form partnerships to exploit increased
information flows, new technologies, migration, and
the influence of nonstate actors. Most but not all countries
that succeed will be representative democracies.
- States with
ineffective and incompetent governance not only will
fail to benefit from globalization, but in some instances
will spawn conflicts at home and abroad, ensuring an
even wider gap between regional winners and losers than
exists today.
Globalization
will increase the transparency of government decision-making,
complicating the ability of authoritarian regimes to maintain
control, but also complicating the traditional deliberative
processes of democracies. Increasing migration will create
influential diasporas, affecting policies, politics and
even national identity in many countries. Globalization
also will create increasing demands for international
cooperation on transnational issues, but the response
of both states and international organizations will fall
short in 2015.
Future Conflict
The United States will maintain a strong technological
edge in IT-driven "battlefield awareness" and in precision-guided
weaponry in 2015. The United States will face three types
of threats:
- Asymmetric
threats in which state and nonstate adversaries avoid
direct engagements with the US military but devise strategies,
tactics, and weaponssome improved by "sidewise"
technologyto minimize US strengths and exploit
perceived weaknesses;
- Strategic
WMD threats, including nuclear missile threats, in which
(barring significant political or economic changes)
Russia, China, most likely North Korea, probably Iran,
and possibly Iraq have the capability to strike the
United States, and the potential for unconventional
delivery of WMD by both states or nonstate actors also
will grow; and
- Regional
military threats in which a few countries maintain large
military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold
War concepts and technologies.
The risk of
war among developed countries will be low. The international
community will continue, however, to face conflicts around
the world, ranging from relatively frequent small-scale
internal upheavals to less frequent regional interstate
wars. The potential for conflict will arise from rivalries
in Asia, ranging from India-Pakistan to China-Taiwan,
as well as among the antagonists in the Middle East. Their
potential lethality will grow, driven by the availability
of WMD, longer-range missile delivery systems and other
technologies.
Internal conflicts
stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political
disputes will remain at current levels or even increase
in number. The United Nations and regional organizations
will be called upon to manage such conflicts because major
statesstressed by domestic concerns, perceived risk
of failure, lack of political will, or tight resourceswill
minimize their direct involvement.
Export control
regimes and sanctions will be less effective because of
the diffusion of technology, porous borders, defense industry
consolidations, and reliance upon foreign markets to maintain
profitability. Arms and weapons technology transfers will
be more difficult to control.
- Prospects
will grow that more sophisticated weaponry, including
weapons of mass destructionindigenously produced
or externally acquiredwill get into the hands
of state and nonstate belligerents, some hostile to
the United States. The likelihood will increase over
this period that WMD will be used either against the
United States or its forces, facilities, and interests
overseas.
Role of
the United States
The United States will continue to be a major force in
the world community. US global economic, technological,
military, and diplomatic influence will be unparalleled
among nations as well as regional and international organizations
in 2015. This power not only will ensure America's preeminence,
but also will cast the United States as a key driver of
the international system.
The United
States will continue to be identified throughout the world
as the leading proponent and beneficiary of globalization.
US economic actions, even when pursued for such domestic
goals as adjusting interest rates, will have a major global
impact because of the tighter integration of global markets
by 2015.
- The United
States will remain in the vanguard of the technological
revolution from information to biotechnology and beyond.
- Both allies
and adversaries will factor continued US military pre-eminence
in their calculations of national security interests
and ambitions.
- Some statesadversaries
and allieswill try at times to check what they
see as American "hegemony." Although this posture will
not translate into strategic, broad-based and enduring
anti-US coalitions, it will lead to tactical alignments
on specific policies and demands for a greater role
in international political and economic institutions.
Diplomacy will
be more complicated. Washington will have greater difficulty
harnessing its power to achieve specific foreign policy
goals: the US Government will exercise a smaller and less
powerful part of the overall economic and cultural influence
of the United States abroad.
- In the absence
of a clear and overriding national security threat,
the United States will have difficulty drawing on its
economic prowess to advance its foreign policy agenda.
The top priority of the American private sector, which
will be central to maintaining the US economic and technological
lead, will be financial profitability, not foreign policy
objectives.
- The United
States also will have greater difficulty building coalitions
to support its policy goals, although the international
community will often turn to Washington, even if reluctantly,
to lead multilateral efforts in real and potential conflicts.
- There will
be increasing numbers of important actors on the world
stage to challenge and checkas well as to reinforceUS
leadership: countries such as China, Russia, India,
Mexico, and Brazil; regional organizations such as the
European Union; and a vast array of increasingly powerful
multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations
with their own interests to defend in the world.
Key
Uncertainties: Technology Will
Alter Outcomes
Examining the
interaction of these drivers and trends points to some
major uncertainties that will only be clarified as events
occur and leaders make policy decisions that cannot be
foreseen today. We cite eight transnational and regional
issues for which the future, according to our trends analysis,
is too tough to call with any confidence or precision.
- These
are high-stakes, national security issues that will
require continuous analysis and, in the view of our
conferees, periodic policy review in the years ahead.
Science
and Technology
We know that the possibility is greater than ever that
the revolution in science and technology will improve
the quality of life. What we know about this revolution
is exciting. Advances in science and technology will generate
dramatic breakthroughs in agriculture and health and in
leap-frog applications, such as universal wireless cellular
communications, which already are networking developing
countries that never had land-lines. What we do not know
about the S&T revolution, however, is staggering.
We do not know to what extent technology will benefit,
or further disadvantage, disaffected national populations,
alienated ethnic and religious groups, or the less developed
countries. We do not know to what degree lateral or "side-wise"
technology will increase the threat from low technology
countries and groups. One certainty is that progression
will not be linear. Another is that as future technologies
emerge, people will lack full awareness of their wider
economic, environmental, cultural, legal, and moral impactor
the continuing potential for research and development.
Advances in
science and technology will pose national security challenges
of uncertain character and scale.
- Increasing
reliance on computer networks is making critical US
infrastructures more attractive as targets. Computer
network operations today offer new options for attacking
the United States within its traditional continental
sanctuarypotentially anonymously and with selective
effects. Nevertheless, we do not know how quickly or
effectively such adversaries as terrorists or disaffected
states will develop the tradecraft to use cyber warfare
tools and technology, or, in fact, whether cyber warfare
will ever evolve into a decisive combat arm.
- Rapid advances
and diffusion of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and
the materials sciences, moreover, will add to the capabilities
of our adversaries to engage in biological warfare or
bio-terrorism.
Asymmetric
Warfare
As noted earlier, most adversaries will recognize the
information advantage and military superiority of the
United States in 2015. Rather than acquiesce to any potential
US military domination, they will try to circumvent or
minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses.
IT-driven globalization will significantly increase interaction
among terrorists, narcotraffickers, weapons proliferators,
and organized criminals, who in a networked world will
have greater access to information, to technology, to
finance, to sophisticated deception-and-denial techniques
and to each other. Such asymmetric approacheswhether
undertaken by states or nonstate actorswill become
the dominant characteristic of most threats to the US
homeland. They will be a defining challenge for US strategy,
operations, and force development, and they will require
that strategy to maintain focus on traditional, low-technology
threats as well as the capacity of potential adversaries
to harness elements of proliferating advanced technologies.
At the same time, we do not know the extent to which adversaries,
state and nonstate, might be influenced or deterred by
other geopolitical, economic, technological, or diplomatic
factors in 2015.
The Global
Economy
Although the outlook for the global economy appears strong,
achieving broad and sustained high levels of global growth
will be contingent on avoiding several potential brakes
to growth. These include:
The US economy
suffers a sustained downturn. Given its large trade
deficit and low domestic savings, the US economythe
most important driver of recent global growthis
vulnerable to a loss of international confidence in its
growth prospects that could lead to a sharp downturn,
which, if long lasting, would have deleterious economic
and policy consequences for the rest of the world.
Europe and
Japan fail to manage their demographic challenges.
European and Japanese populations are aging rapidly, requiring
more than 110 million new workers by 2015 to maintain
current dependency ratios between the working population
and retirees. Conflicts over social services or immigration
policies in major European states could dampen economic
growth.
China and/or
India fail to sustain high growth. China's ambitious
goals for reforming its economy will be difficult to achieve:
restructuring state-owned enterprises, cleaning up and
transforming the banking system, and cutting the government's
employment rolls in half. Growth would slow if these reforms
go off-track. Failure by India to implement reforms would
prevent it from achieving sustained growth.
Emerging
market countries fail to reform their financial institutions.
Many emerging market countries have not yet undertaken
the financial reforms needed to help them survive the
next economic crisis. Absent such reform, a series of
future economic crises in emerging market countries probably
will dry up the capital flows crucial for high rates of
economic growth.
Global energy
supplies suffer a major disruption. Turbulence in
global energy supplies would have a devastating effect.
Such a result could be driven by conflict among key energy-producing
states, sustained internal instability in two or more
major energy-producing states, or major terrorist actions.
The Middle
East
Global trends from demography and natural resources to
globalization and governance appear generally negative
for the Middle East. Most regimes are change-resistant.
Many are buoyed by continuing energy revenues and will
not be inclined to make the necessary reforms, including
in basic education, to change this unfavorable picture.
- Linear trend
analysis shows little positive change in the region,
raising the prospects for increased demographic pressures,
social unrest, religious and ideological extremism,
and terrorism directed both at the regimes and at their
Western supporters.
- Nonlinear
developmentssuch as the sudden rise of a Web-connected
opposition, a sharp and sustained economic downturn,
or, conversely, the emergence of enlightened leaders
committed to good governancemight change outcomes
in individual countries. Political changes in Iran in
the late 1990s are an example of such nonlinear development.
China
Estimates of developments in China over the next 15 years
are fraught with unknowables. Working against China's
aspirations to sustain economic growth while preserving
its political system is an array of political, social,
and economic pressures that will increasingly challenge
the regime's legitimacy, and perhaps its survival.
- The sweeping
structural changes required by China's entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the broader demands
of economic globalization and the information revolution
will generate significantly new levels and types of
social and economic disruption that will only add to
an already wide range of domestic and international
problems.
Nevertheless,
China need not be overwhelmed by these problems. China
has proven politically resilient, economically dynamic,
and increasingly assertive in positioning itself for a
leadership role in East Asia. Its long-term military program
in particular suggests that Beijing wants to have the
capability to achieve its territorial objectives, outmatch
its neighbors, and constrain US power in the region.
- We do not
rule out the introduction of enough political reform
by 2015 to allow China to adapt to domestic pressure
for change and to continue to grow economically.
Two conditions,
in the view of many specialists, would lead to a major
security challenge for the United States and its allies
in the region: a weak, disintegrating China, or an assertive
China willing to use its growing economic wealth and military
capabilities to pursue its strategic advantage in the
region. These opposite extremes bound a more commonly
held view among experts that China will continue to see
peace as essential to its economic growth and internal
stability.
Russia
Between now and 2015, Moscow will be challenged even more
than today to adjust its expectations for world leadership
to its dramatically reduced resources. Whether the country
can make the transition in adjusting ends to means remains
an open and critical question, according to most experts,
as does the question of the character and quality of Russian
governance and economic policies. The most likely outcome
is a Russia that remains internally weak and institutionally
linked to the international system primarily through its
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In this view,
whether Russia can adjust to this diminished status in
a manner that preserves rather than upsets regional stability
is also uncertain. The stakes for both Europe and the
United States will be high, although neither will have
the ability to determine the outcome for Russia in 2015.
Russian governance will be the critical factor.
Japan
The first uncertainty about Japan is whether it will carry
out the structural reforms needed to resume robust economic
growth and to slow its decline relative to the rest of
East Asia, particularly China. The second uncertainty
is whether Japan will alter its security policy to allow
Tokyo to maintain a stronger military and more reciprocal
relationship with the United States. Experts agree that
Japanese governance will be the key driver in determining
the outcomes.
India
Global trends conflict significantly in India. The size
of its population1.2 billion by 2015and its
technologically driven economic growth virtually dictate
that India will be a rising regional power. The unevenness
of its internal economic growth, with a growing gap between
rich and poor, and serious questions about the fractious
nature of its politics, all cast doubt on how powerful
India will be by 2015. Whatever its degree of power, India's
rising ambition will further strain its relations with
China, as well as complicate its ties with Russia, Japan,
and the Westand continue its nuclear standoff with
Pakistan.
CONTENTS
Key
Challenges to Governance:
People Will Decide
Global Trends
2015 identifies governance as a major driver for the
future and assumes that all trends we cite will be influenced,
for good or bad, by decisions of people. The inclusion
of the United States as a driverboth the US Government
as well as US for-profit and nonprofit organizationsis
based on the general assumption that the actions of nonstate
actors as well as governments will shape global outcomes
in the years ahead.
An integrated
trend analysis suggests at least four related conclusions:
National
Priorities Will Matter
- To prosper
in the global economy of 2015, governments will have
to invest more in technology, in public education, and
in broader participation in government to include increasingly
influential nonstate actors. The extent to which governments
around the world are doing these things today gives
some indication of where they will be in 2015.
US Responsibilities
Will Cover the World, Old and New
- The United
States and other developed countries will be challenged
in 2015 to lead the fast-paced technological revolution
while, at the same time, maintaining military, diplomatic,
and intelligence capabilities to deal with traditional
problems and threats from low-technology countries and
groups. The United States, as a global power, will have
little choice but to engage leading actors and confront
problems on both sides of the widening economic and
digital divides in the world of 2015, when globalization's
benefits will be far from global.
US Foreign
Priorities Will be More Transnational
- International
or multilateral arrangements increasingly will be called
upon in 2015 to deal with growing transnational problems
from economic and financial volatility; to legal and
illegal migration; to competition for scarce natural
resources such as water; to humanitarian, refugee, and
environmental crises; to terrorism, narcotrafficking,
and weapons proliferation; and to both regional conflicts
and cyber threats. And when international cooperationor
international governancecomes up short, the United
States and other developed countries will have to broker
solutions among a wide array of international playersincluding
governments at all levels, multinational corporations,
and nonprofit organizations.
National
Governments Will be More Transparent
- To deal
with a transnational agenda and an interconnected world
in 2015, governments will have to develop greater communication
and collaboration between national security and domestic
policy agencies. Interagency cooperation will be essential
to understanding transnational threats and to developing
interdisciplinary strategies to counter them. Consequence
management of a biological warfare (BW) attack, for
example, would require close coordination among a host
of US Government agencies, foreign governments, US state
and municipal governments, the military, the medical
community, and the media.
CONTENTS
Discussion
Global
Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment
Experts
The international
system in 2015 will be shaped by seven global drivers
and related trends: population; natural resources and
the environment; science and technology; the global economy
and globalization; national and international governance;
the nature of conflict; and the role of the United States.
These trends will influence the capacities, priorities,
and behavior of states and societies and thus substantially
define the international security environment.
CONTENTS
Population
Trends
The
world in 2015 will be populated by some 7.2 billion people,
up from 6.1 billion in the year 2000. The rate of world
population growth, however, will have diminished from
1.7 percent annually in 1985, to 1.3 percent today, to
approximately 1 percent in 2015.
Increased life
expectancy and falling fertility rates will contribute
to a shift toward an aging population in high-income developed
countries. Beyond that, demographic trends will sharply
diverge. More than 95 percent of the increase in world
population will be found in developing countries, nearly
all in rapidly expanding urban areas.
- India's
population will grow from 900 million to more than 1.2
billion by 2015; Pakistan's probably will swell from
140 million now to about 195 million.
- Some countries
in Africa with high rates of AIDS will experience reduced
population growth or even declining populations despite
relatively high birthrates. In South Africa, for example,
the population is projected to drop from 43.4 million
in 2000 to 38.7 million in 2015.
Russia and
many post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe will have
declining populations. As a result of high mortality and
low birthrates, Russia's population may drop from its
current 146 million to as low as 130 to 135 million in
2015, while the neighboring states of Central Asia will
experience continued population growth. In Japan and West
European countries such as Italy and Spain, populations
also will decline in the absence of dramatic increases
in birthrates or immigration.
- North America,
Australia, and New Zealandthe traditional magnets
for migrantswill continue to have the highest
rates of population growth among the developed countries,
with annual population growth rates between 0.7 percent
and 1.0 percent.
Global
Population: 1950-2015 (27k)
CONTENTS
Divergent
Aging Patterns
In developed countries and many of the more advanced developing
countries, the declining ratio of working people to retirees
will strain social services, pensions, and health systems.
Governments will seek to mitigate the problem through
such measures as delaying retirement, encouraging greater
participation in the work force by women, and relying
on migrant workers. Dealing effectively with declining
dependency ratios is likely to require more extensive
measures than most governments will be prepared to undertake.
The shift towards a greater proportion of older voters
will change the political dynamics in these countries
in ways difficult to foresee.
At the same
time, "youth bulges" will persist in some developing countries,
notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and a few countries in Latin
America and the Middle East. A high proportion of young
people will be destabilizing, particularly when combined
with high unemployment or communal tension.
CONTENTS
Movement
of People
Two major trends in the movement of people will characterize
the next 15 yearsurbanization and cross-border migrationeach
of which poses both opportunities and challenges.
Growth
in Mega-Cities (231k)
(1392k)
The ratio of
urban to rural dwellers is steadily increasing. By 2015
more than half of the world's population will be urban.
The number of people living in mega-citiesthose
containing more than 10 million inhabitantswill
double to more than 400 million.
- Urbanization
will provide many countries the opportunity to tap the
information revolution and other technological advances.
- The explosive
growth of cities in developing countries will test the
capacity of governments to stimulate the investment
required to generate jobs and to provide the services,
infrastructure, and social supports necessary to sustain
livable and stable environments.
Regional
Population: 1950-2015 (27k)
Divergent demographic
trends, the globalization of labor markets, and political
instability and conflict will fuel a dramatic increase
in the global movement of people through 2015. Legal and
illegal migrants now account for more than 15 percent
of the population in more than 50 countries. These numbers
will grow substantially and will increase social and political
tension and perhaps alter national identities even as
they contribute to demographic and economic dynamism.
States will
face increasing difficulty in managing migration pressures
and flows, which will number several million people annually.
Over the next 15 years, migrants will seek to move:
- To North
America primarily from Latin America and East and South
Asia.
- To Europe
primarily from North Africa and the Middle East, South
Asia, and the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe
and Eurasia.
- From the
least to the most developed countries of Asia, Latin
America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regional
Population by Age Group: 2000 and 2015 (28k)
For high-income
receiving countries, migration will relieve labor
shortages and otherwise ensure continuing economic vitality.
EU countries and Japan will need large numbers of new
workers because of aging populations and low birthrates.
Immigration will complicate political and social integration:
some political parties will continue to mobilize popular
sentiment against migrants, protesting the strain on social
services and the difficulties in assimilation. European
countries and Japan will face difficult dilemmas in seeking
to reconcile protection of national borders and cultural
identity with the need to address growing demographic
and labor market imbalances.
For low-income
receiving countries, mass migration resulting from
civil conflict, natural disasters, or economic crises
will strain local infrastructures, upset ethnic balances,
and spark ethnic conflict. Illegal migration will become
a more contentious issue between and among governments.
For low-income
sending countries, mass migration will relieve pressures
from unemployed and underemployed workers and generate
significant remittances. Migrants will function as ethnic
lobbies on behalf of sending-country interests, sometimes
supporting armed conflicts in their home countries, as
in the cases of the Albanian, Kurdish, Tamil, Armenian,
Eritrean, and Ethiopian diasporas. At the same time, emigration
increasingly will deprive low-income sending countries
of their educated elites. An estimated 1.5 million skilled
expatriates from developing countries already are employed
in high-income countries. This brain drain from low-income
to high-income countries is likely to intensify over the
next 15 years.
CONTENTS
Health
Disparities in health status between developed and
developing countriesparticularly the least
developed countrieswill persist and widen.
In developed countries, major inroads against a
variety of maladies will be achieved by 2015 as
a result of generous health spending and major medical
advances. The revolution in biotechnology holds
the promise of even more dramatic improvements in
health status. Noninfectious diseases will pose
greater challenges to health in developed countries
than will infectious
diseases. Progress against infectious diseases,
nevertheless, will encounter some setbacks as a
result of growing microbial resistance to antibiotics
and the accelerating pace of international movement
of people and products that facilitate the spread
of infectious diseases.
Countries
with Youth Bulges in 2000 and 2015 (85k)
Developing
countries, by contrast, are likely to experience a surge
in both infectious and noninfectious diseases and in general
will have inadequate health care capacities and spending.
- Tuberculosis,
malaria, hepatitis, and particularly AIDS will continue
to increase rapidly. AIDS and TB together are likely
to account for the majority of deaths in most developing
countries.
AIDS
Public Awareness Poster (114k)
AIDS will be
a major problem not only in Africa but also in India,
Southeast Asia, several countries formerly part of the
Soviet Union, and possibly China.
- AIDS will
reduce economic growth by up to 1 percent of GDP per
year and consume more than 50 percent of health budgets
in the hardest-hit countries.
- AIDS and
such associated diseases as TB will have a destructive
impact on families and society. In some African countries,
average lifespans will be reduced by as much as 30 to
40 years, generating more than 40 million orphans and
contributing to poverty, crime, and instability.
- AIDS, other
diseases, and health problems will hurt prospects for
transition to democratic regimes as they undermine civil
society, hamper the evolution of sound political and
economic institutions, and intensify the struggle for
power and resources.
CONTENTS
Natural
Resources and Environment
Food
Driven by advances in agricultural technologies, world
food grain production and stocks in 2015 will be adequate
to meet the needs of a growing world population. Despite
the overall adequacy of food, problems of distribution
and availability will remain.
- The number
of chronically malnourished people in conflict-ridden
Sub-Saharan Africa will increase by more than 20 percent
over the next 15 years.
- The potential
for famine will still exist where the combination of
repressive government or internal conflict and persistent
natural disasters prevents or limits relief efforts,
as in Somalia in the early 1990s and North Korea more
recently.
- Donors will
become more reluctant to provide relief when the effort
might become embroiled in military conflict.
Global
Grain Production: 1971-2015 (6k)
The use of
genetically modified crops has great potential for meeting
the nutrition needs of the poor in developing countries.
Popular and political opposition in the EU countries and,
to a lesser extent, in the United States, however, has
clouded the prospects for applying this technology.
Challenged
Water Supply (136k)
CONTENTS
Water
By 2015 nearly half the world's populationmore than
3 billion peoplewill live in countries that are
"water-stressed"have less than 1,700 cubic meters
of water per capita per yearmostly in Africa, the
Middle East, South Asia, and northern China.
In the developing
world, 80 percent of water usage goes into agriculture,
a proportion that is not sustainable; and in 2015 a number
of developing countries will be unable to maintain their
levels of irrigated agriculture. Overpumping of groundwater
in many of the world's important grain-growing regions
will be an increasing problem; about 1,000 tons of water
are needed to produce a ton of grain.
- The water
table under some of the major grain-producing areas
in northern China is falling at a rate of five feet
per year, and water tables throughout India are falling
an average of 3-10 feet per year.
Developing
Countries Challenged to Provide Infrastructure (115k)
Measures undertaken
to increase water availability and to ease acute water
shortagesusing water more efficiently, expanding
use of desalinization, developing genetically modified
crops that use less water or more saline water, and importing
waterwill not be sufficient to substantially change
the outlook for water shortages in 2015. Many will be
expensive; policies to price water more realistically
are not likely to be broadly implemented within the next
15 years, and subsidizing water is politically sensitive
for the many low-income countries short of water because
their populations expect cheap water.
Water has been
a source of contention historically, but no water dispute
has been a cause of open interstate conflict; indeed,
water shortages often have stimulated cooperative arrangements
for sharing the scarce resource. But as countries press
against the limits of available water between now and
2015, the possibility of conflict will increase.
Nearly one-half
of the world's land surface consists of river basins shared
by more than one country, and more than 30 nations receive
more than one-third of their water from outside their
borders.
- Turkey is
building new dams and irrigation projects on the Tigris
and Euphrates Rivers, which will affect water flows
into Syria and Iraqtwo countries that will experience
considerable population growth.
- Egypt is
proceeding with a major diversion of water from the
Nile, which flows from Ethiopia and Sudan, both of which
will want to draw more water from the Nile for their
own development by 2015. Water-sharing arrangements
are likely to become more contentious.
Water shortages
occurring in combination with other sources of tensionsuch
as in the Middle Eastwill be the most worrisome.
World
Water Availibility (99k)
CONTENTS
Energy
The global economy will continue to become more energy
efficient through 2015. Traditional industries, as well
as transportation, are increasingly efficient in their
energy use. Moreover, the most dynamic growth areas in
the global economy, especially services and the knowledge
fields, are less energy intensive than the economic activities
that they replace. Energy production also is becoming
more efficient. Technological applications, particularly
in deep-water exploration and production, are opening
remote and hostile areas to petroleum production.
Sustained global
economic growth, along with population increases, will
drive a nearly 50 percent increase in the demand for energy
over the next 15 years. Total oil demand will increase
from roughly 75 million barrels per day in 2000 to more
than 100 million barrels in 2015, an increase almost as
large as OPEC's current production. Over the next 15 years,
natural gas usage will increase more rapidly than that
of any other energy sourceby more than 100 percentmainly
stemming from the tripling of gas consumption in Asia.
Asia will drive
the expansion in energy demand, replacing North America
as the leading energy consumption region and accounting
for more than half of the world's total increase in demand.
- China, and
to a lesser extent India, will see especially dramatic
increases in energy consumption.
- By 2015,
only one-tenth of Persian Gulf oil will be directed
to Western markets; three-quarters will go to Asia.
Fossil fuels
will remain the dominant form of energy despite increasing
concerns about global warming. Efficiency of solar cells
will improve, genetic engineering will increase the long-term
prospects for the large-scale use of ethanol, and hydrates
will be used increasingly as fuels. Nuclear energy use
will remain at current levels.
World
Energy Consumption 1970 - 2015 (28k)
Meeting the
increase in demand for energy will pose neither a major
supply challenge nor lead to substantial price increases
in real terms. Estimates of the world's total endowment
of oil have steadily increased as technological progress
in extracting oil from remote sources has enabled new
discoveries and more efficient production. Recent estimates
indicate that 80 percent of the world's available oil
still remains in the ground, as does 95 percent of the
world's natural gas.
- The Persian
Gulf regionabsent a major warwill see large
increases in oil production capacity and will rise in
its overall importance to the world energy market. Other
areas of the worldincluding Russia, coastal West
Africa, and Greenlandwill also increase their
role in global energy markets. Russia and the Middle
East account for three-quarters of known gas reserves.
- Latin Americaprincipally
Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazilhas more than 117
billion barrels of proven oil reserves and potentially
114 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, according to
the US Geological Survey. With foreign participation,
Latin American production could increase from 9 million
barrels per day to more than 14 million.
- Caspian
energy development is likely to be in high gear by 2015.
New transport routes for Caspian oil and gas exports
that do not transit Russia will be operating.
Oil-producing
countries will continue to exert leverage on the market
to increase prices but are unlikely to achieve stable
high prices. Energy prices are likely to become more unstable
in the next 15 years, as periodic price hikes are followed
by price collapses.
By 2015, global
energy markets will have coalesced into two quasi-hemispheric
patterns. Asia's energy needs will be met either through
coal from the region or from oil and gas supplies from
the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Russia. Western Europe
and the Western Hemisphere will draw on the Atlantic Basin
for their energy sources at world prices.
CONTENTS
Environment
Contemporary environmental problems will persist and in
many instances grow over the next 15 years. With increasingly
intensive land use, significant degradation of arable
land will continue as will the loss of tropical forests.
Given the promising global economic outlook, greenhouse
gas emissions will increase substantially. The depletion
of tropical forests and other species-rich habitats, such
as wetlands and coral reefs, will exacerbate the historically
large losses of biological species now occurring.
- Environmental
issues will become mainstream issues in several countries,
particularly in the developed world. The consensus on
the need to deal with environmental issues will strengthen;
however, progress in dealing with them will be uneven.
The outlook
to 2015 is mixed for such localized environmental problems
as high concentrations of ozone and noxious chemicals
in the air and the pollution of rivers and lakes by industrial
and agricultural wastes.
- Developed
countries will continue to manage these local environmental
issues, and such issues are unlikely to constitute a
major constraint on economic growth or on improving
health standards.
- The developing
countries, however, will face intensified environmental
problems as a result of population growth, economic
development, and rapid urbanization. An increasing number
of cities will face the serious air and water quality
problems that already are troubling in such urban centers
as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Lagos, and Beijing.
- Russia and
Ukraine will struggle with problems stemming from decades
of environmental neglect and abuse, including widespread
radioactive pollution from badly managed nuclear facilities.
These problems are unlikely to be adequately addressed.
As these countries pursue economic growth, they will
devote insufficient resources to environmental remediation.
- Central
and Eastern European countries face similar problems
as a result of the legacy of environmental neglect from
the Communist era; nevertheless, driven by their desire
to gain EU membership, several will become more effective
in addressing these problems and will upgrade their
environmental standards.
Some existing
agreements, even when implemented, will not be able by
2015 to reverse the targeted environmental damage they
were designed to address. The Montreal Protocol is on
track to restore the stratospheric ozone layer over the
next 50 years. Nevertheless, the seasonal Antarctic ozone
hole will expand for the next two decadesincreasing
the risk of skin cancer in countries like Australia, Argentina,
and Chilebecause of the long lag time between emission
reductions and atmospheric effects. Important new agreements
will be implemented, including, for example, a global
treaty to control the worldwide spread of such persistent
organic chemicals as DDT and dioxins. Other agreements,
such as the Convention on Biodiversity, will fall short
in meeting their objectives.
Over the next
15 years the pressures on the environment as a result
of economic growth will decrease as a result of less energy-intensive
economic development and technological advances. For example,
increased use of fuel cells and hybrid engines is likely
to reduce the rate of increase in the amount of pollution
produced, particularly in the transportation sector. Also,
increases in the utilization of solar and wind power,
advances in the efficiency of energy use, and a shift
toward less polluting fuels, such as natural gas, will
contribute to this trend.
Global warming
will challenge the international community as indications
of a warming climatesuch as meltbacks of polar ice,
sea level rise, and increasing frequency of major stormsoccur.
The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, which mandates emission-reduction
targets for developed countries, is unlikely to come into
force soon or without substantial modification. Even in
the absence of a formal treaty, however, some incremental
progress will be made in reducing the growth of greenhouse
gas emissions.
- Both India
and China will actively explore less carbon-intensive
development strategies, although they will resist setting
targets or timetables for carbon dioxide emission limits.
- A number
of major firms operating internationally will take steps
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
CONTENTS
Science
and Technology
The
continuing diffusion of information technology and new
applications in the biotechnology field will be of particular
global significance. Two major trends will continue:
- The integration
of existing disciplines to form new ones. The integration
of information technology, biotechnology, materials
sciences, and nanotechnology will generate a dramatic
increase in innovation. The effects will be profound
on business and commerce, public health, and safety.
- The lateral
development of technology. Older established technologies
will continue "sidewise" development into new markets
and applications, for example, developing innovative
applications for "old" computer chips.
The time between
the discovery and the application of scientific advances
will continue to shorten. Developments in the laboratory
will reach commercial production at ever faster rates,
leading to increased investments.
CONTENTS
Information
Technology (IT)
Over the next 15 years, a wide range of developments will
lead to many new IT-enabled devices and services. Rapid
diffusion is likely because equipment costs will decrease
at the same time that demand is increasing. Local-to-global
Internet access holds the prospect of universal wireless
connectivity via hand-held devices and large numbers of
low-cost, low-altitude satellites. Satellite systems and
services will develop in ways that increase performance
and reduce costs.
By 2015, information
technology will make major inroads in rural as well as
urban areas around the globe. Moreover, information technology
need not be widespread to produce important effects. The
first information technology "pioneers" in each society
will be the local economic and political elites, multiplying
the initial impact.
- Some countries
and populations, however, will fail to benefit much
from the information revolution.
- Among developing
countries, India will remain in the forefront in developing
information technology, led by the growing class of
high-tech workers and entrepreneurs.
- China will
lead the developing world in utilizing information technology,
with urban areas leading the countryside. Beijing's
capacity to control or shape the content of information,
however, is likely to be sharply reduced.
- Although
most Russian urban-dwellers will adopt information technologies
well before 2015, the adoption of such technologies
will be slow in the broader population.
- Latin America's
Internet market will grow exponentially. Argentina,
Mexico, and Brazil will accrue the greatest benefits
because of larger telecommunications companies, bigger
markets, and more international investment.
- In Sub-Saharan
Africa, South Africa is best positioned to make relatively
rapid progress in IT.
Societies with
advanced communications generally will worry about threats
to individual privacy. Others will worry about the spread
of "cultural contamination." Governments everywhere will
be simultaneously asked to foster the diffusion of IT
while controlling its "harmful" effects.
CONTENTS
Biotechnology
By 2015, the biotechnology revolution will be in full
swing with major achievements in combating disease, increasing
food production, reducing pollution, and enhancing the
quality of life. Many of these developments, especially
in the medical field, will remain costly through 2015
and will be available mainly in the West and to wealthy
segments of other societies. Some biotechnologies will
continue to be controversial for moral and religious reasons.
Among the most significant developments by 2015 are:
- Genomic
profilingby decoding the genetic basis for
pathologywill enable the medical community to
move beyond the description of diseases to more effective
mechanisms for diagnosis and treatment.
- Biomedical
engineering, exploiting advances in biotechnology
and "smart" materials, will produce new surgical procedures
and systems, including better organic and artificial
replacement parts for human beings, and the use of unspecialized
human cells (stem cells) to augment or replace brain
or body functions and structures. It also will spur
development of sensor and neural prosthetics such as
retinal implants for the eye, cochlear implants for
the ear, or bypasses of spinal and other nerve damage.
- Therapy
and drug developments will cure some enduring diseases
and counter trends in antibiotic resistance. Deeper
understanding of how particular diseases affect people
with specific genetic characteristics will facilitate
the development and prescription of custom drugs.
- Genetic
modificationdespite continuing technological
and cultural barrierswill improve the engineering
of organisms to increase food production and quality,
broaden the scale of bio-manufacturing, and provide
cures for certain genetic diseases. Cloning will be
used for such applications as livestock production.
Despite cultural and political concerns, the use of
genetically modified crops has great potential to dramatically
improve the nutrition and health of many of the world's
poorest people.
- DNA identification
will continue to improve law enforcement capabilities.
CONTENTS
Other
Technologies
Breakthroughs in materials technology will
generate widely available products that are smart, multifunctional,
environmentally compatible, more survivable, and customizable.
These products not only will contribute to the growing
information and biotechnology revolutions but also will
benefit manufacturing, logistics, and personal lifestyles.
Materials with active capabilities will be used to combine
sensing and actuation in response to environmental conditions.
Discoveries
in nanotechnology will lead to unprecedented understanding
and control over the fundamental building blocks of all
physical things. Developments in this emerging field are
likely to change the way almost everythingfrom vaccines
to computers to automobile tires to objects not yet imaginedis
designed and made. Self-assembled nanomaterials, such
as semiconductor "quantum dots," could by 2015 revolutionize
chemical labeling and enable rapid processing for drug
discovery, blood content analysis, genetic analysis, and
other biological applications.
CONTENTS
The
Global Economy
The
global economy is well-positioned to achieve a sustained
period of dynamism through 2015. Global economic growth
will return to the high levels reached in the 1960s and
early 1970s, the final years of the post-World War II
"long boom." Dynamism will be strongest among so-called
"emerging markets"especially in the two Asian giants,
China and Indiabut will be broadly based worldwide,
including in both industrialized and many developing countries.
The rising tide of the global economy will create many
economic winners, but it will not lift all boats. The
information revolution will make the persistence of poverty
more visible, and regional differences will remain large.
CONTENTS
Dynamism
and Growth
Five factors will combine to promote widespread economic
dynamism and growth:
Political
pressures for higher living standards. The growing
global middle classnow 2 billion strongis
creating a cycle of rising aspirations, with increased
information flows and the spread of democracy giving political
clout to formerly disenfranchised citizens.
Improved
macroeconomic policies. The widespread improvement
in recent years in economic policy and management sets
the stage for future dynamism. Inflation rates have been
dramatically lowered across a wide range of economies.
The abandonment of unsustainable fixed exchange rate regimes
in Asia and the creation of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) will contribute to economic growth.
Rising trade
and investment. International trade and investment
flows will grow, spurring rapid increases in world GDP.
Opposition to further trade liberalization from special
interest groups and some governments will not erode the
basic trend toward expansion of trade. International capital
flows, which have risen dramatically in the past decade,
will remain plentiful, especially for emerging market
countries that increase their transparency.
Regional
GDP: 1970-2015 (30k)
Diffusion
of information technology. The pervasive incorporation
of information technologies will continue to produce significant
efficiency gains in the US economy. Similar gains will
be witnessedalbeit in varying degreesin numerous
other countries as the integration of these technologies
proceeds. But the absorption of IT and its benefits will
not be automatic because many countries will fail to meet
the conditions needed for effective IT utilizationhigh
educational levels, adequate infrastructure, and appropriate
regulatory policies.
Increasingly
dynamic private sectors. Rapid expansion of the private
sector in many emerging market countriesalong with
deregulation and privatization in Europe and Japanwill
spur economic growth by generating competitive pressures
to use resources more efficiently. The impact of improved
efficiencies will be multiplied as the information revolution
enhances the ability of firms around the world to learn
"best practices" from the most successful enterprises.
Indeed, the world may be on the verge of a rapid convergence
in market-based financial and business practices.
CONTENTS
Unequal
Growth Prospects and Distribution
The countries and regions most at risk of falling behind
economically are those with endemic internal and/or regional
conflicts and those that fail to diversify their economies.
The economies of most states in Sub-Saharan Africa and
the Middle East and some in Latin America will continue
to suffer. A large segment of the Eurasian landmass extending
from Central Asia through the Caucasus to parts of southeastern
Europe faces dim economic prospects. Within countries,
the gap in the standard of living also will increase.
Even in rapidly growing countries, large regions will
be left behind.
World
Trade as a Percentage of World GDP: 1990-2015 (27k)
Emerging
Asia will be the fastest growing region, led
by breakout candidates China and India, whose economies
already comprise roughly one-sixth of global GDP.
To the degree that China implements reforms mandated
by its entry into the World
Trade Organization, its economy will become
more efficient, enabling rapid growth to continue.
China's economic development, however, will be mainly
in the dynamic coastal provinces. Agricultural provinces
in northern and western China will lag behind, causing
social tensions that Beijing will be challenged
to manage. India's relatively strong educational
system, democracy, and English-language skills position
it well to take advantage of gains related to information
technology. India nevertheless faces enormous challenges
in spreading the benefits of growth to hundreds
of millions of impoverished, often illiterate citizens,
particularly in the northern states.
GDP
by Countries and the EU: 2000 and 2015 (25k)
In Europe
and Japan, the picture is mixed. Western Europe
is likely to narrow what has been a growing economic performance
gap with the United States, and Eastern European
countries, eager for EU membership, generally will adopt
reform policies and grow apace. South-Eastern Europe
will improve economic prospects only gradually as it improves
regional security. Although Japan's economic performance
in the next 15 years will be stronger than that of the
1990s, its relative importance in the global economy will
decrease. Economic prospects for Russia and Eurasia
are not promising.
Latin America
will manage fairly rapid aggregate growth, but it will
be spread unevenly across the region. The market-oriented
democracies in Mexico and the southern cone will lead
the way. A new generation of entrepreneurs will be inclined
to favor additional market openings, but the benefits
may further distort income distribution, already the most
inequitable in the world. Elsewhere, the Andean region
will struggle with a poorly educated labor force, unstable
governance, and dependence upon commodities such as oil,
copper, and narcotics.
The Middle
East and North Africa will be marked by increasing
internal differentiation as some countries respond
more effectively to the challenges of globalization
or to the uncertainties of closer integration with
the EU while others lag. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
persistent conflicts and instability, autocratic
and corrupt governments, overdependence on commodities
with declining real prices, low levels of education,
and widespread infectious
diseases will combine to prevent most countries
from experiencing rapid economic growth.
The
Role of Education
Education
will be determinative of success in 2015 at both
the individual and country levels. The globalizing
economy and technological change inevitably place
an increasing premium on a more highly skilled
labor force. Adult literacy and school enrollments
will increase in almost all countries. The educational
gender gap will narrow and probably will disappear
in East and Southeast Asia and Latin America.
- Progress
will vary among regions, countries, and social
groups, triggering increased income inequalities
within as well as among countries.
- School
enrollments will decline in the most highly
impoverished countries, in those affected
by serious internal conflicts, and in
those with high rates of infectious
diseases.
|
CONTENTS
Economic Crises and Resilience
The global economy will be prone to periodic financial
crises, but its capacity to correct itself will remain
strong. The rapid rebound from the global financial crisis
of 1997-98, the limited impact of the recent tripling
of oil prices on global economic growth, and the successful
management of the "Y2K" problem are the most recent manifestations
of resilience. Nonetheless, economic liberalization and
globalization entail risks and inevitably will create
bumps in the road, some of them potentially highly disruptive.
- Economic
crises will recur. The trends toward free markets
and deregulation will allow financial markets to overshoot,
increase the possibility for sudden reversal in sentiment,
and expose individual countries to broad swings in the
global market. Any of these could trigger a financial
crisis.
- Turbulence
in one economy will affect others. Increased trade
links and the integration of global financial markets
will quickly transmit turmoil in one economy regionally
and internationally, as Russia's financial turmoil in
1998 affected Brazil.
- Disputes
over international economic rules. The Asian financial
crisis revealed differences among countries regarding
global financial architecture. As emerging market countries
continue to grow, they will seek a stronger voice in
setting the terms of international economic governance.
A lack of consensus could at times make financial markets
skittish and undermine growth.
Alternative
Trajectories
Although
the outlook for the global economy appears quite
strong, achieving sustained high levels of global
growth will be contingent on avoiding several
potential brakes to growth. Five are described
below.
The
US economy suffers a sustained downturn. Given
the large trade deficit and low domestic savings,
the US economythe most important driver
of recent global growthis vulnerable to
loss of international confidence in its growth
prospects that could lead to a sharp downturn,
which, if long-lasting, would have deleterious
economic and policy consequences for the rest
of the world. Key trading partners would suffer
as the world's largest market contracted, and
international financial markets might face profound
instability.
Europe
and Japan fail to manage their demographic challenges.
European and Japanese populations are aging rapidly,
requiring more than 110 million new workers by
2015 to maintain current dependency ratios between
the working population and retirees. For these
countries, immigration is a controversial means
of meeting these labor force requirements. Conflicts
over the social contract or immigration policies
in major European states could dampen economic
growth. Japan faces an even more serious labor
force shortage and its strategies for respondingenticing
overseas Japanese to return, broadening the opportunities
for women, and increasing investments elsewhere
in Asiamay prove inadequate. If growth in
Europe and Japan falters, the economic burden
on the US economy would increase, weakening the
overall global outlook.
China
and/or India fail to sustain high growth.
China's ambitious goals for reforming its economy
will be difficult to realize: restructuring state-owned
enterprises, cleaning up and transforming the
banking system, cutting the government's employment
rolls in half, and opening up the economy to greater
foreign competition. Growth would slow if these
reforms go awry, which, in turn, would exacerbate
bureaucratic wrangling and increase opposition
to the reform agenda. India's reform driveessential
to sustained economic growthcould be sidetracked
by social divisions and by the bureaucratic culture
of the public service.
Emerging
market countries fail to reform their financial
institutions. Although most emerging market
countries bounced back from the 1997-98 financial
crisis more quickly than expected, many have not
yet undertaken the financial reforms needed to
help them survive the next economic crisis. Absent
such reform, a series of future economic crises
in emerging market countries could dry up the
capital flows crucial for high rates of economic
growth.
Global
energy supplies are disrupted in a major way.
Although the world economy is less vulnerable
to energy price swings than in the 1970s, a major
disruption in global energy supplies still would
have a devastating effect. Conflict among key
energy-producing states, sustained internal instability
in two or more major energy-producing states,
or major terrorist actions could lead to such
a disruption. |
CONTENTS
National
and International Governance
The
state will remain the single most important organizing
unit of political, economic, and security affairs through
2015 but will confront fundamental tests of effective
governance. The first will be to benefit from, while coping
with, several facets of globalization. The second will
be to deal with increasingly vocal and organized publics.
- The elements
of globalizationgreater and freer flow of information,
capital, goods, services, people, and the diffusion
of power to nonstate actors of all kindswill challenge
the authority of virtually all governments. At the same
time, globalization will create demands for increased
international cooperation on transnational issues.
- All states
will confront popular demands for greater participation
in politics and attention to civil rightspressures
that will encourage greater democratization and transparency.
Twenty-five years ago less than a third of states were
defined as democracies by Freedom House; today more
than half of states are considered democracies, albeit
with varying combinations of electoral and civil or
political rights. The majority of states are likely
to remain democracies in some sense over the next 15
years, but the number of new democracies that are likely
to develop is uncertain.
Successful
states will interact with nonstate actors to manage authority
and share responsibility. Between now and 2015, three
important challenges for states will be:
- Managing
relations with nonstate actors;
- Combating
criminal networks; and
- Responding
to emerging and dynamic religious and ethnic groups.
CONTENTS
Nonstate
Actors
States continually will be dealing with private-sector
organizationsboth for-profit and nonprofit. These
nonstate actors increasingly will gain resources and power
over the next 15 years as a result of the ongoing liberalization
of global finance and trade, as well as the opportunities
afforded by information technology.
The For-profit
Sector. The for-profit business sector will grow rapidly
over the next 15 years, spearheading legal and judicial
reform and challenging governments to become more transparent
and predictable. At the same time, governments will be
challenged to monitor and regulate business firms through
measures consistent with local standards of social welfare.
Multinational
corporationsnow numbering more than 50,000 with
nearly one-half million affiliateshave multiplied
in recent years as governments have deregulated their
economies, privatized state-owned enterprises, and liberalized
financial markets and trade. This trend will continue.
Medium-sized,
mostly local firms will multiply in many countries, driven
by the shift away from Communism and other socialist models
and the broadening of financial services and banking systems.
Micro-enterprises also will multiply, not only because
of deregulation and liberalization, but also because many
states will have a declining capacity to stymie small-scale
commercial activities. As medium-sized and small businesses
become more numerous, they will encourage, and then link
into, various global networks.
The Nonprofit
Sector. Nonprofit networks with affiliates in more
than one country will grow through 2015, having expanded
more than 20-fold between 1964 and 1998. Within individual
countries, the nonprofit sector also will expand rapidly.
The
Role of the Nonprofit Sector
Nonprofit
organizations deliver critical services to individuals
and private groups, with 67 percent of nonprofit
activities in health, education, and social services
alone. They provide information and expertise,
advocate policies on behalf of their interests,
and work through international organizations,
both as implementing partners and as advocates.
In many development projects and humanitarian
emergencies, nonprofits will continue to deliver
most of the aid from governments and international
organizations. |
Over the next 15 years international and national nonprofits
will not only expand but change in significant ways.
- Nonprofit
organizations will have more resources to expand their
activities and will become more confident of their power
and more confrontational. Nonprofits will move beyond
delivering services to the design and implementation
of policies, whether as partners or competitors with
corporations and governments.
- Western
preponderance will persist but at a declining level
as economic growth in Asia and Latin America produces
additional resources for support of civil society. In
addition, autocratic governments and Islamic states
or groups will increasingly support nonprofit groups
sympathetic to their interests.
- Nonprofit
organizations will be expected to meet codes of conduct.
Governments and corporationswhich are increasingly
held to standards of transparency and accountabilitywill,
in turn, expect nonprofits to meet similar standards.
CONTENTS
Criminal
Organizations and Networks
Over the next 15 years, transnational criminal organizations
will become increasingly adept at exploiting the global
diffusion of sophisticated information, financial, and
transportation networks.
Criminal organizations
and networks based in North America, Western Europe, China,
Colombia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia will
expand the scale and scope of their activities. They will
form loose alliances with one another, with smaller criminal
entrepreneurs, and with insurgent movements for specific
operations. They will corrupt leaders of unstable, economically
fragile or failing states, insinuate themselves into troubled
banks and businesses, and cooperate with insurgent political
movements to control substantial geographic areas. Their
income will come from narcotics trafficking; alien smuggling;
trafficking in women and children; smuggling toxic materials,
hazardous wastes, illicit arms, military technologies,
and other contraband; financial fraud; and racketeering.
- The risk
will increase that organized criminal groups will traffic
in nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The degree
of risk depends on whether governments with WMD capabilities
can or will control such weapons and materials.
Crime
and Corruption Pay
Available
data suggest that current annual revenues from
illicit criminal activities include: $100-300
billion from narcotics trafficking; $10-12 billion
from toxic and other hazardous waste dumping;
$9 billion from automobile theft in the United
States and Europe; $7 billion from alien smuggling;
and as much as $1 billion from theft of intellectual
property through pirating of videos, software,
and other commodities.
Available
estimates suggest that corruption costs about
$500 billionor about 1 percent of global
GNP in slower growth, reduced foreign investment,
and lower profits. For example, the average cost
of bribery to firms doing business in Russia is
between 4 and 8 percent of annual revenue, according
to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. |
CONTENTS
Changing Communal Identities and
Networks
Traditional communal groupswhether religious or
ethnic-linguistic groupswill pose a range of challenges
for governance. Using opportunities afforded by globalization
and the opening of civil society, communal groups will
be better positioned to mobilize coreligionists or ethnic
kin to assert their interests or defend against perceived
economic or political discrimination. Ethnic diasporas
and coreligionists abroad also will be more able and willing
to provide fraternal groups with political, financial,
and other support.
- By 2015,
Christianity and Islam, the two largest religious groupings,
will have grown significantly. Both are widely dispersed
in several continents, already use information technologies
to "spread the faith," and draw on adherents to fund
numerous nonprofit groups and political causes. Activist
components of these and other religious groupings will
emerge to contest such issues as genetic manipulation,
women's rights, and the income gap between rich and
poor. A wider religious or spiritual movement also may
emerge, possibly linked to environmental values.
Criminal
Networks and New Technologies (131k)
Estimates of
the number of distinct ethnic-linguistic groups at the
beginning of the twenty-first century run from 2,000 to
5,000, ranging from small bands living in isolated areas
to larger groups living in ancestral homelands or in diasporas.
Most of the world's 191 states are ethnically heterogeneous,
and many contain ethnic populations with co-ethnics in
neighboring states. By 2015, ethnic heterogeneity will
increase in almost all states, as a result of international
migration and divergent birthrates of migrant and native
populations.
Current
World Illicit Trafficking (235k)
(1366k)
Worldwide
Adherents of Selected Major World Religions, Mid-1998
(50k)
Communal tensions,
sometimes culminating in conflict, probably will increase
through 2015. In addition to some ongoing communal frictions
that will persist, triggers of new tensions will include:
- Repression
by the state. States with slow economic growth,
and/or where executive power is concentrated in an exclusionary
political elite and the rule of law and civil or minority
rights are weak, will be inclined to discriminate against
communal minorities. Such conditions will foment ethnic
tensions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia,
and parts of the Middle East, often in rapidly growing
urban areas. Certain powerful statessuch as Russia,
China, Brazil, and Indiaalso are likely to repress
politicized communal minorities.
- Religious,
often fused with ethnic, grievances. Few Muslim
states will grant full political and cultural rights
to religious minorities. At the same time, they will
not remain indifferent to the treatment of Muslim minorities
elsewhere: in Russia, Indonesia, India/Kashmir, China,
and the Balkans. Other religious denominations also
will support beleaguered coreligionists.
- Resistance
to migration. Some relatively homogenous countries
or sub-regions in Asia and Europe will resist ethnically
diverse migrants, creating tensions.
- Indigenous
protest movements. Such movements will increase,
facilitated by transnational networks of indigenous
rights activists and supported by well-funded international
human rights and environmental groups. Tensions will
intensify in the area from Mexico through the Amazon
region; northeastern India; and the Malaysian-Indonesian
archipelago.
CONTENTS
Overall
Impact on States
The developed democracies will be best positioned for
good governance because they will tend to empower legitimate
nonstate actors in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors;
will favor institutions and processes that accommodate
divergent communal groups; will press for transparency
in government and the efficient delivery of public services;
and will maintain institutions to regulate legitimate
for-profit and nonprofit organizations and control illegitimate
criminal groups. Countries in Western Europe, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have the requisite agility
and institutions to meet the challenges. Countries in
Eastern Europe as well as Turkey, South Korea, India,
Chile, and Brazil, among other developing countries, are
moving in these directions, despite some continuing obstacles.
Some newly
democratic states and modernizing authoritarian states
will have leaders amenable to technological change and
access to substantial human and financial resources. They
will encourage business firms, nonprofits, and communal
groups supportive of the government and discourage or
suppress those that are independent-minded or critical
of government policies. They will have some success in
coping with the energy, ideas, and resources of nonstate
actors. Several Asian countries, such as Singapore, Taiwan,
and perhaps China, as well as some states in the Middle
East and Latin America are likely to take this approach.
Other states
in varying degrees will lack the resources and leadership
to achieve effective governance. Most autocratic states
in the Middle East and Africa will not have the institutions
or cultural orientation to exploit the opportunities provided
by nonstate actorsapart from certain forms of humanitarian
assistance. In many of these countries, nonstate actors
will become more important than governments in providing
services, such as health clinics and schools. In the weakest
of these countries, communal, criminal, or terrorist groups
will seek control of government institutions and/or territory.
Overall, the
number of stateswhich has more than tripled since
1945 and has grown 20 percent since 1990is likely
to increase at a slower rate through 2015. This growth
will result from remaining cases of decolonization and
to communal tensions leading to state secession, most
likely in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Indonesia.
In some cases, new states will inspire other secessionist
movements, destabilizing countries where minorities were
not initially seeking secession.
At the same
time, the very concept of "belonging" to a particular
state probably will erode among a growing number of people
with continuing transnational ties to more than one country
through citizenship, residence or other associations.
CONTENTS
International
Cooperation
Globalization and technological change are raising widespread
expectations that increased international cooperation
will help manage many transnational problems that states
can no longer manage on their own. Efforts to realize
such expectations will increase, but concerns about national
interests as well as the costs and risks involved in some
types of international activism will limit success.
Mechanisms
of international cooperationintended to facilitate
bargaining, elucidate common interests and resolve differences
among stateshave increased rapidly in recent decades.
- International
treaties registered with the United Nations more than
tripled between 1970 and 1997. In addition, there are
growing numbers of agreements on standards and practices
initiated by self-selected private networks.
- The number
of international institutions increased by two-thirds
from 1985 until 1999, while at the same time becoming
more complex, more interrelated with often overlapping
areas of responsibility, and more closely linked to
transnational networks and private groups.
International
cooperation will continue to increase through 2015, particularly
when large economic stakes have mobilized the for-profit
sector, and/or when there is intense interest from nonprofit
groups and networks.
Most high-income
democratic states will participate in multiple international
institutions and seek cooperation on a wide range of issues
to protect their interests and to promote their influence.
Members of the European Union will tackle the most ambitious
agenda, including significant political and security cooperation.
Strongly nationalistic
and/or autocratic states will play selective roles
in inter-governmental organizations: working within
them to protect and project their interests, while
working against initiatives that they view as threatening
to their domestic power structures and national
sovereignty. They will also work against those international
institutions viewed as creatures of the established
great powers and thus rigged against themsuch
as the IMF and the WTOas
well as those that cede a major role to nonstate
actors.
Low-income
developing countries will participate actively in international
organizations and arrangements to assert their sovereignty,
garner resources for social and economic development,
and gain support for the incumbent government. The most
unstable of these states will participate in international
organizations and arrangements primarily to maintain international
recognition for the regime.
Agenda
for International Cooperation
Cooperation
is likely to be effective in such areas as:
- Monitoring
international financial flows and financial
safehavens.
- Law
enforcement against corruption, and against
trafficking in narcotics and women and children.
- Monitoring
meteorological data and warning of extreme weather
events.
- Selected
environmental issues, such as reducing substances
that deplete the ozone layer or conserving high-seas
fisheries.
- Developing
vaccines or medicines against major infectious
diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or malaria
and surveillance of infectious disease
outbreaks.
- Humanitarian
assistance for refugees and for victims of famines,
natural disasters, and internal conflicts where
relief organizations can gain access.
- Counterterrorism.
- Efforts
by international and regional organizations
to resolve some internal and interstate conflicts,
particularly in Africa.
Cooperation
is likely to be contentious and with mixed results
in such areas as:
- Conditions
under which Intellectual Property Rights are
protected.
- Reform
and strengthening of international financial
institutions, particularly the Bretton Woods
institutions.
- Expansion
of the UN Security Council.
- Adherence
by major states to an International Criminal
Court with universal, comprehensive jurisdiction.
- Control
of greenhouse gas emissions to reduce global
warming, carrying out the purposes of the 1997
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.
- Acceptance
of genetically-modified organisms to improve
nutrition and health in poor regions.
- Establishing
peacekeeping forces and standby military forces
under the authority of the UN Security Council
or most regional organizations, with the possible
exception of the EU.
- Military
action by forces authorized by the United Nations
to correct abuses of human rights within states,
pursuant to an asserted principle of humanitarian
intervention or an expanded right of secession.
Although "coalitions of the willing" will undertake
such operations from time to time, a significant
number of states will continue to view such
interventions as illegitimate interference in
the internal affairs of sovereign states.
- Proposed
new rights to enjoy or appropriate elements
of the "global commons," such as a right to
"open borders" for people from lower-income
countries.
|
CONTENTS
Through
2015, internal conflicts will pose the most frequent threat
to stability around the world. Interstate wars, though
less frequent, will grow in lethality due to the availability
of more destructive technologies. The international community
will have to deal with the military, political, and economic
dimensions of the rise of China and India and the continued
decline of Russia.
CONTENTS
Internal
Conflicts
Many internal conflicts, particularly those arising from
communal disputes, will continue to be vicious, long-lasting
and difficult to terminateleaving bitter legacies
in their wake.
- They frequently
will spawn internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian
emergencies, and other regionally destabilizing dislocations.
- If left
to fester, internal conflicts will trigger spillover
into inter-state conflicts as neighboring states move
to exploit opportunities for gain or to limit the possibilities
of damage to their national interests.
- Weak states
will spawn recurrent internal conflicts, threatening
the stability of a globalizing international system.
Internal conflicts
stemming from state repression, religious and ethnic grievances,
increasing migration pressures, and/or indigenous protest
movements will occur most frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and parts of south and
southeast Asia, Central America and the Andean region.
The United
Nations and several regional organizations will continue
to be called upon to manage some internal conflicts because
major statesstressed by domestic concerns, perceived
risk of failure, lack of political will, or tight resourceswill
wish to minimize their direct involvement. When, however,
some Western governments, international and regional organizations,
and civil-society groups press for outside military intervention
in certain internal conflicts, they will be opposed by
such states as China, India, Russia and many developing
countries that will tend to view interventions as dangerous
precedents challenging state sovereignty.
CONTENTS
Transnational
Terrorism
States with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious
tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime
breeding grounds for terrorism. In such states, domestic
groups will challenge the entrenched government, and transnational
networks seeking safehavens.
Bombed
US Embassy in Nairobi (127k)
At the same
time, the trend away from state-supported political terrorism
and toward more diverse, free-wheeling, transnational
networksenabled by information technologywill
continue. Some of the states that actively sponsor terrorism
or terrorist groups today may decrease or even cease their
support by 2015 as a result of regime changes, rapprochement
with neighbors, or the conclusion that terrorism has become
counterproductive. But weak states also could drift toward
cooperation with terrorists, creating defacto new state
supporters.
- Between
now and 2015 terrorist tactics will become increasingly
sophisticated and designed to achieve mass casualties.
We expect the trend toward greater lethality in terrorist
attacks to continue.
CONTENTS
Interstate
Conflicts
Over the next 15 years, the international system will
have to adjust to changing power relationships in key
regions:
- China's
potential. Estimates of China beyond five years
are fraught with unknowables. Some projections indicate
that Chinese power will rise because of the growth of
its economic and military capabilities. Other projections
indicate that the array of political, social, and economic
pressures will increasingly challenge the stability
and legitimacy of the regime. Most assessments today
argue that China will seek to avoid conflict in the
region to promote stable economic growth and to ensure
internal stability. A strong China, others assert, would
seek to adjust regional power arrangements to its advantage,
risking conflict with neighbors and some powers external
to the region. A weak China would increase prospects
for criminality, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration,
WMD proliferation, and widespread social instability.
- Russia's
decline. By 2015, Russia will be challenged even
more than today to adjust its expectations for world
leadership to the dramatically reduced resources it
will have to play that role. The quality of Russian
governance is an open question as is whether the country
will be able to make the transition in a manner that
preserves rather than upsets regional stability.
- Japan's
uncertainty. In the view of many experts, Japan
will have difficulty maintaining its current position
as the world's third largest economy by 2015. Tokyo
has so far not shown a willingness to carry through
the painful economic reforms necessary to slow the erosion
of its leadership role in Asia. In the absence of an
external shock, Japan is similarly unlikely to accelerate
changes in security policy.
- India's
prospects. India will strengthen its role as a regional
power, but many uncertainties about the effects of global
trends on its society cast doubt on how far India will
go. India faces growing extremes between wealth and
poverty, a mixed picture on natural resources, and problems
with internal governance.
Current
Ethnic Diversity States (203k)
(1,370k)
The changing
dynamics of state power will combine with other factors
to affect the risk of conflict in various regions. Changing
military capabilities will be prominent among the factors
that determine the risk of war. In South Asia, for example,
that risk will remain fairly high over the next 15 years.
India and Pakistan are both prone to miscalculation. Both
will continue to build up their nuclear and missile forces.
India
most likely will expand the size of its nuclear-capable
force. Pakistan's nuclear and missile forces also
will continue to increase. Islamabad has publicly claimed
that the number of nuclear weapons and missiles it deploys
will be based on "minimum" deterrence and will be independent
of the size of India's arsenal. A noticeable increase
in the size of India's arsenal, however, would prompt
Pakistan to further increase the size of its own arsenal.
Russia
will be unable to maintain conventional forces that are
both sizable and modern or to project significant military
power with conventional means. The Russian military will
increasingly rely on its shrinking strategic and theater
nuclear arsenals to deter or, if deterrence fails, to
counter large-scale conventional assaults on Russian territory.
- Moscow will
maintain as many strategic missiles and associated nuclear
warheads as it believes it can afford but well short
of START I or II limitations. The total Russian force
by 2015, including air launched cruise missiles, probably
will be below 2,500 warheads.
As Russia struggles
with the constraints on its ambitions, it will invest
scarce resources in selected and secretive military technology
programs, especially WMD, hoping to counter Western conventional
and strategic superiority in areas such as ballistic missile
defense.
China's
People's Liberation Army (PLA) will remain the world's
largest military, but the majority of the force will not
be fully modernized by 2015. China could close the technological
gap with the West in one or more major weapons systems.
China's capability for regional military operations is
likely to improve significantly by 2015.
- China will
be exploiting advanced weapons and production technologies
acquired from abroadRussia, Israel, Europe, Japan,
and the United Statesthat will enable it to integrate
naval and air capabilities against Taiwan and potential
adversaries in the South China Sea.
- In the event
of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, some of
China's military objectivessuch as protecting
the sea lanes for Persian Gulf oilcould become
more congruent with those of the United States. Nevertheless,
as an emerging regional power, China would continue
to expand its influence without regard to US interests.
- China by
2015 will have deployed tens to several tens of missiles
with nuclear warheads targeted against the United States,
mostly more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles.
It also will have hundreds of shorter-range ballistic
and cruise missiles for use in regional conflicts. Some
of these shorter-range missiles will have nuclear warheads;
most will be armed with conventional warheads.
China:
How to Think About Its Growing
Wealth and Power
China
has been riding the crest of a significant wave
of economic growth for two decades. Many experts
assess that China can maintain a growth rate of
7 percent or more for many years. Such impressive
rates provide a foundation for military potential,
and some predict that China's rapid economic growth
will lead to a significant increase in military
capabilities. But the degree to which an even
more powerful economy would translate into greater
military power is uncertain.
The
relationship between economic growth and China's
overall power will derive from the priorities
of leaders in Beijingprovided the regime
remains stable. China's leaders have assessed
for some years that comprehensive national power
derives both from economic strength and from the
military and diplomatic resources that a healthy,
large economy makes possible. They apparently
agree that, for the foreseeable future, such priorities
as agricultural and national infrastructure modernization
must take precedence over military development.
In the absence of a strong national security challenge,
this view is unlikely to change even as new leaders
emerge in Beijing. In a stable environment, two
leadership transitions will occur in China between
now and 2015. The evidence strongly suggests that
the new leaders will be even more firmly committed
to developing the economy as the foundation of
national power and that resources for military
capabilities will take a secondary role. Existing
priorities and projected defense allocations could
enable the PLA to emerge as the most powerful
regional military force.
- Beyond
resource issues, China faces daunting challenges
in producing defense systems. Beijing has yet
to demonstrate an assured capacity to translate
increasingly sophisticated science and technology
advances into first-rate military production.
To achieve this, China must effect reforms in
its State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), develop
a capacity for advanced systems integration
skills, and recruit and retain technologically
sophisticated officers and enlisted personnel.
A decision
to alter priorities to emphasize military development
would require substantial change in the leadership.
Internal instability or a rise in nationalism
could produce such change but also probably would
result in economic decline. |
Japan
has a small but modern military force, more able than
any other in Asia to integrate large quantities of new
weaponry. Japan's future military strength will reflect
the state of its economy and the health of its security
relationship with the United States. Tokyo will increasingly
pursue greater autonomy in security matters and develop
security enhancements, such as defense improvements and
more active diplomacy, to supplement the US alliance.
A unified
Korea with a significant US military presence may
become a regional military power. For the next 10 to 15
years, however, knowledgeable observers suggest that the
process of unification will consume South Korea'senergies
and resources.
Absent unification,
North Korea's WMD capabilities will continue to
cloud regional stability. P'yongyang probably has one,
possibly two, nuclear weapons. It has developed medium-range
missiles for years and has tested a three-stage space
launch vehicle.
P'yonyang may
improve the accuracy, range, and payload capabilities
of its Taepo Dong-2 ICBM, deploy variants, or develop
more capable systems. North Korea could have a few to
several Taepo Dong-2 type missiles deployed by 2005.
In the Middle
East, the confluence of domestic economic pressures
and regional rivalries is likely to further the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them. By contrast, spending on conventional arms probably
will remain stable or decline in most countries. Some
governments may maintain large armed forces to absorb
otherwise unemployable youths, but such armies will be
less well trained and equipped. Rather than conventional
war, the region is likely to experience more terrorism,
insurgencies, and humanitarian emergencies arising from
internal disparities or disputes over ethnic or religious
identity.
- Iran
sees its short- and medium-range missiles as deterrents,
as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with
conventional warheads, and as options for delivering
biological, chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons.
Iran could test an IRBM or land-attack cruise missile
by 2004 and perhaps even an ICBM or space launch vehicle
as early as 2001.
- Iraq's
ability to obtain WMD will be influenced, in part, by
the degree to which the UN Security Council can impede
development or procurement over the next 15 years. Under
some scenarios, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of delivering
nuclear-sized payloads to the United States before 2015;
foreign assistance would affect the capabilities of
the missile and the time it became available. Iraq could
also develop a nuclear weapon during this period.
CONTENTS
Reacting
to US Military Superiority
Experts agree that the United States, with its decisive
edge in both information and weapons technology, will
remain the dominant military power during the next 15
years. Further bolstering the strong position of the United
States are its unparalleled economic power, its university
system, and its investment in research and developmenthalf
of the total spent annually by the advanced industrial
world. Many potential adversaries, as reflected in doctrinal
writings and statements, see US military concepts, together
with technology, as giving the United States the ability
to expand its lead in conventional warfighting capabilities.
This perception
among present and potential adversaries will continue
to generate the pursuit of asymmetric capabilities against
US forces and interests abroad as well as the territory
of the United States. US opponentsstate and such
nonstate actors as drug lords, terrorists, and foreign
insurgentswill not want to engage the US military
on its terms. They will choose instead political and military
strategies designed to dissuade the United States from
using force, or, if the United States does use force,
to exhaust American will, circumvent or minimize US strengths,
and exploit perceived US weaknesses. Asymmetric challenges
can arise across the spectrum of conflict that will confront
US forces in a theater of operations or on US soil.
Central
Asia: Regional Hot Spot?
The
interests of Russia, China, and Indiaas
well as of Iran and Turkeywill intersect
in Central Asia; the states of that region will
attempt to balance those powers as well as keep
the United States and the West engaged to prevent
their domination by an outside power. The greatest
danger to the region, however, will not be a conflict
between states, which is unlikely, but the corrosive
impact of communal conflicts and politicial insurgencies,
possibly abetted by outside actors and financed
at least in part by narcotraffickers. |
It is also generally recognized that the United States
and other developed countries will continue to possess
the political, economic, military, and technological advantagesincluding
through National Missile and Theater Missile Defense systemsto
reduce the gains of adversaries from lateral or "side-wise"
technological improvements to their capabilities.
Threats
to Critical Infrastructure. Some potential adversaries
will seek ways to threaten the US homeland. The US national
infrastructurecommunications, transportation, financial
transactions, energy networksis vulnerable to disruption
by physical and electronic attack because of its interdependent
nature and by cyber attacks because of their dependence
on computer networks. Foreign governments and groups will
seek to exploit such vulnerabilities using conventional
munitions, information operations, and even WMD. Over
time, such attacks increasingly are likely to be delivered
by computer networks rather than by conventional munitions,
as the affinity for cyber attacks and the skill of US
adversaries in employing them evolve. Cyber attacks will
provide both state and nonstate adversaries new options
for action against the United States beyond mere words
but short of physical attackstrategic options that
include selection of either nonlethal or lethal damage
and the prospect of anonymity.
Information
Operations. In addition to threatening the US national
infrastructure, adversaries will seek to attack US military
capabilities through electronic warfare, psychological
operations, denial and deception, and the use of new technologies
such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic pulse
weapons. The primary purpose would be to deny US forces
information superiority, to prevent US weapons from working,
and to undermine US domestic support for US actions. Adversaries
also are likely to use cyber attacks to complicate US
power projection in an era of decreasing permanent US
military presence abroad by seeking to disrupt military
networks during deployment operationswhen they are
most stressed. Many countries have programs to develop
such technologies; few have the foresight or capability
to fully integrate these various tools into a comprehensive
attack. But they could develop such capabilities over
the next decade and beyond.
Terrorism.
Much of the terrorism noted earlier will be directed at
the United States and its overseas interests. Most anti-US
terrorism will be based on perceived ethnic, religious
or cultural grievances. Terrorist groups will continue
to find ways to attack US military and diplomatic facilities
abroad. Such attacks are likely to expand increasingly
to include US companies and American citizens. Middle
East and Southwest Asian-based terrorists are the most
likely to threaten the United States.
Weapons
of Mass Destruction. WMD programs reflect the motivations
and intentions of the governments that produce them and,
therefore, can be altered by the change of a regime or
by a regime's change of view. Linear projections of WMD
are intended to assess what the picture will look like
if changes in motivations and intentions do not occur.
Short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly if armed
with WMD, already pose a significant threat overseas to
US interests, military forces, and allies. By 2015, the
United States, barring major political changes in these
countries, will face ICBM threats from North Korea, probably
from Iran, and possibly from Iraq, in addition to long-standing
threats from Russia and China.
- Weapons
development programs, in many cases fueled by foreign
assistance, have led to new capabilitiesas illustrated
by Iran's Shahab-3 launches in 1998 and 2000 and North
Korea's Taepo Dong-1 space launch attempt in August
1998. In addition, some countries that have been traditional
recipients of missile technologies have become exporters.
- Sales of
ICBMs or space launch vehicles, which have inherent
ICBM capabilities, could further increase the number
of countries that will be able to threaten the United
States with a missile strike.
The probability
that a missile armed with WMD would be used against
US forces or interests is higher today than during most
of the Cold War and will continue to grow. The emerging
missile threats will be mounted by countries possessing
considerably fewer missiles with far less accuracy, yield,
survivability, reliability, and range-payload capability
than the strategic forces of the Soviet Union. North Korea's
space launch attempt in 1998 demonstrated that P'yongyang
is seeking a long-range missile capability that could
be used against US forces and interests abroad and against
US territory itself. Moreover, many of the countries developing
longer-range missiles assess that the mere threat
of their use would complicate US crisis decisionmaking
and potentially would deter Washington from pursuing certain
objectives.
Other means
to deliver WMD against the United States will emerge,
some cheaper and more reliable and accurate than early-generation
ICBMs. The likelihood of an attack by these means is greater
than that of a WMD attack with an ICBM. The goal of the
adversary would be to move the weapon within striking
distance by using short- and medium-range missiles deployed
on surface ships or covert missions using military special
operations forces or state intelligence services. Non-missile
delivery means, however, do not provide the same prestige,
deterrence, and coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMs.
WMD
Proliferation and the Potential for Unconventional
Warfare and Escalation
The
risks of escalation inherent in direct armed conflict
will be magnified by the availability of WMD;
consequently, proliferation will tend to spur
a reversion to prolonged, lower-level conflict
by other means: intimidation, subversion, terrorism,
proxies, and guerrilla operations. This trend
already is evident between Israel and some of
its neighbors and between India and Pakistan.
In the event of war, urban fighting will be typical
and consequently, civilian casualties will be
high relative to those among combatants. Technology
will count for less, and large, youthful, and
motivated populations for more. Exploitation of
communal divisions within an adversary's civil
populations will be seen as a key to winning such
conflictsincreasing their bitterness and
thereby prolonging them. |
Chemical and biological threats to the United States will
become more widespread; such capabilities are easier to
develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons. Some terrorists
or insurgents will attempt to use such weapons against
US interestsagainst the United States itself, its
forces or facilities overseas, or its allies. Moreover,
the United States would be affected by the use of such
weapons anywhere in the world because Washington would
be called on to help contain the damage and to provide
scientific expertise and economic assistance to deal with
the effects. Such weapons could be delivered through a
variety of means, including missiles, unmanned aerial
vehicles, or covertly via land, air, and sea.
Trends
in Global Defense Spending
and Armaments
Defense-related
technologies will advance rapidly over the next
15 yearsparticularly precision weapons,
information systems and communications. The development
and integrated application of these technologies
will occur mostly in the advanced countries, particularly
the United States. Given the high costs and complexity
of technical and operational integration, few
nations will assign high priority to the indigenous
development of such military technology.
- Non-US
global defense spending has dropped some 50
percent since the late 1980s. "Military modernization
accounts," particularly procurement, have been
hit hard.
- The
global arms market has decreased by more than
50 percent during the same period.
- Indications
are that global defense spending may be recovering
from mid-1990s lows; part of East Asia, for
example, could experience rises in defense spending
over the next decade, but, overall, long-term
spending patterns are uncertain.
Over
the past decade, a slow but persistent transformation
has occurred in the arms procurement strategies
of states. Many states are attempting to diversify
sources of arms for reasons that vary from fears
of arms embargoes, to declining defense budgets,
or to a desire to acquire limited numbers of cutting-edge
technologies. Their efforts include developing
a mix of indigenous production; codeveloping,
coproducing, or licensing production; purchasing
entire weapon systems; or leasing capabilities.
At the same time, many arms-producing states,
confronted with declining domestic arms needs
but determined to maintain defense industries,
are commercializing defense production and aggressively
expanding arms exports.
Together,
the above factors suggest:
Technology
diffusion to those few states with a motivation
to arm and the economic resources to do so will
accelerate as weapons and militarily relevant
technologies are moved rapidly and routinely across
national borders in response to increasingly commercial
rather than security calculations. For such militarily
related technologies as the Global Positioning
System, satellite imagery, and communications,
technological superiority will be difficult
to maintain for very long. In an environment
of broad technological diffusion, nonmaterial
elements of military powerstrategy, doctrine,
and trainingwill increase in importance
over the next 15 years in deciding combat outcomes.
Export
regimes and sanctions will be difficult to manage
and less effective in controlling arms and weapons
technology transfers. The resultant proliferation
of WMD and long-range delivery systems would be
destabilizing and increase the risk of miscalculation
and conflict that produces high casualties.
Advantages
will go to states that have a strong commercial
technology sector and develop effective ways to
link these capabilities to their national defense
industrial base. States able to optimize private
and public sector linkages could achieve significant
advancements in weapons systems.
The
twin developments outlined aboveconstrained
defense spending worldwide combined with increasing
military technological potentialpreclude
accurate forecasts of which technologies, in what
quantity and form, will be incorporated in the
military systems of future adversaries. In many
cases, the question will not be which technologies
provide the greatest military potential but which
will receive the political backing and resources
to reach the procurement and fielding stage. Moreover,
civilian technology development already is driving
military technology development in many countries. |
Theater-range
ballistic and cruise missile proliferation will continue.
Most proliferation will involve systems a generation or
two behind state of the art, but they will be substantially
new capabilities for the states that acquire them. Such
missiles will be capable of delivering WMD or conventional
payloads inter-regionally against fixed targets. Major
air and sea ports, logistics bases and facilities, troop
concentrations, and fixed communications nodes increasingly
will be at risk.
- Land-attack
cruise missiles probably will be more accurate than
ballistic missiles.
Access to
Space. US competitors and adversaries realize the
degree to which access to space is critical to
US military power, and by 2015 they will have made strides
in countering US space dominance. International commercialization
of space will give states and nonstate adversaries access
rivaling today's major space powers in such areas as high-resolution
reconnaissance and weather prediction, global encrypted
communications, and precise navigation. When combined,
such services will provide adversaries who are aware of
US and allied force deployments the capability for precise
targeting and global coordination of operations. Moreover,
many adversaries will have developed capabilities to degrade
US space assetsin particular, with attacks against
ground facilities, electronic warfare, and denial and
deception. By 2015, several countries will have such counterspace
technologies as improved space-object tracking, signal
jamming, and directed-energy weapons such as low-power
lasers.
Arms
Control: An Uncertain Agenda
The
last three decades witnessed significant negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union
(and Russia), but the future probably will not
replicate those efforts in form or magnitude.
- The
INF, CFE, and START I treaties and, to a large
extent, the CWC were concluded in an effort
to reduce tensions during the Cold War. Verification
and monitoring in each of these treaties were
viewed as essential to their implementation.
Prospects
for bilateral arms control between the major powers
probably will be dim over the next 15 years; progress
in multilateral regimeswith less intrusive
and lower-certainty monitoringprobably will
grow sporadically. Beyond this generalization:
- Efforts
will be incremental, focusing mainly on extensions,
modifications or adaptations of existing treaties,
such as START III between the United States
and Russia or a protocol enhancing verification
of the Biological Weapons Convention.
- Efforts
will assume a more regional focus as countries
of concern continue developing their own WMD
arsenals.
- Safeguarding
and controlling transfer of materials and technology
for nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems
will take on greater importance.
- Formal
agreements probably will contain limited monitoring
or verification provisions.
- Agreements
are more likely to be asymmetrical in terms
of the goals and outcomes. For example, a form
of barter may become the norm. Sides will negotiate
dissimilar commitments in reaching agreement.
An example would be North Korea's willingness
to give up nuclear weapons and missiles in return
for electric power and space launch services.
|
CONTENTS
The
following snapshots of individual regions result from
our assessment of trends and from estimates by regional
experts as to where specific nations will be in 15 years.
To make these judgments, we have distilled the views expressed
by many outside experts in our conferences and workshops.
The results are intended to stimulate debate, not to endorse
one view over another.
Political
Rights in East and Southeast Asia (65k)
CONTENTS
East
and Southeast Asia
Regional Trends. East Asia over the next 15 years
will be characterized by uneven economic dynamismboth
between and within statespolitical and national
assertiveness rather than ideology, and potential for
strategic tension if not outright conflict.
The states
of the region will be led by generally nationalistic governments
eschewing ideology and focusing on nation-building and
development. These states will broadly accommodate international
norms on the free flow of information to modernize their
economies, open markets, and fight international crime
and disease. They also will encounter pressure for greater
political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human
rights. Failure to meet popular expectations probably
will result in leaders being voted out of office in democratic
states or in widespread demonstrations and violence leading
to regime collapse in authoritarian states.
Political
and Security Trends. The major power realignments
and the more fluid post-Cold War security environment
in the region will raise serious questions about how regional
leaders will handle nascent great-power rivalries (the
US-China, China-Japan, China-India), related regional
"hot spots" (Taiwan, Korea, South China Sea), the future
of challenged political regimes (Indonesia, North Korea
absent unification, China), and communal tensions and
minority issues (in China, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Malaysia). On balance, the number and range of rivalries
and potential flashpoints suggest a better-than-even chance
that episodes of military confrontation and conflict will
erupt over the next 15 years.
The implications
of the rise
of China as an economic and increasingly capable
regional military powereven as the influence
of Communism and authoritarianism weakenspose
the greatest uncertainty in the area. Adding to
uncertainty are the prospects forand implications
ofKorean unification over the next 15 years,
and the evolution of Japan's regional leadership
aspirations and capabilities.
Instability
in Russia and Central Asia, and the nuclear standoff between
India and Pakistan will be peripheral but still important
in East Asian security calculations. The Middle East will
become increasingly important as a primary source of energy.
Economic
Dynamism. While governments in the region generally
will accept the need to accommodate international norms
on ownership, markets, trade, and investment, they will
seek to block or slow the perceived adverse economic,
political, and social consequences of globalization.
The most likely
economic outlook will be that rich societiesJapan,
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and pockets in China
and elsewherewill get richer, with Japan likely
to continue to be a leader in S&T development and
applications for commercial use. In contrast, the poor
societiesVietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and rural areas
in western China and elsewherewill fall further
behind. Greater economic links are likely to have been
forged between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South China as a
result of the development of investment and infrastructure.
China will be increasingly integrated into the world economy
through foreign direct investiment, trade, and international
capital markets. Energy markets will have drawn the region
more closely together despite lingering issues of ownership
of resources and territorial disputes.
Key uncertainties
will persist on economic performance and political stability,
including the rising costs of pensions and services for
Japan's aging population; the adequacy of energy and water
for China, political leadership in Indonesia and China,
and the impact of AIDS in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Regional
Interaction. Given the weakness of regional political-security
arrangements, the US political, economic, and security
presence will remain pronounced. At the same time, many
countries in the region will remain uncertain about US
objectives, apprehensive of both US withdrawal and US
unilateralism. Key states, most significantly China and
Japan, will continue "hedging," by using diplomacy, military
preparations and other means to ensure that their particular
interests will be safeguarded, especially in case the
regional situation deteriorates.
Japan and others
will seek to maintain a US presence, in part to counter
China's influence. Economic and other ties will bind Japan
and China, but historical, territorial, and strategic
differences will underline continuing wariness between
the two. China will want good economic ties to the United
States but also will nurture links to Russia and others
to counter the possibility of US pressure against it and
to weaken US support for Taiwan and the US security posture
in East Asia. US-China confrontations over Taiwan or over
broader competing security interests are possible.
Although preserving
the US alliance, Japanese leaders also will be less certain
they can rely on the United States to deal with some security
contingencies. More confident of their ability to handle
security issues independently, they will pursue initiatives
internally and overseas that are designed to safeguard
Japanese interests without direct reference to the US
alliance.
CONTENTS
South
Asia
Regional Trends. The widening strategic and economic
gaps between the two principal powers, India and Pakistanand
the dynamic interplay between their mutual hostility and
the instability in Central Asiawill define the South
Asia region in 2015.
- India will
be the unrivaled regional power with a large militaryincluding
naval and nuclear capabilitiesand a dynamic and
growing economy. The widening India-Pakistan gapdestabilizing
in its own rightwill be accompanied by deep political,
economic, and social disparities within both states.
- Pakistan
will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on international
financial assistance.
- Other South
Asian statesBangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepalwill
be drawn closer to and more dependent on India and its
economy. Afghanistan will likely remain weak and a destabilizing
force in the region and the world.
Wary of China,
India will look increasingly to the West, but its need
for oil and desire to balance Arab ties to Pakistan will
lead to strengthened ties to Persian Gulf states as well.
Demographic
Challenges. Although population growth rates in South
Asia will decline, population still will grow by nearly
30 percent by 2015. India's population alone will grow
to more than 1.2 billion. Pakistan's projected growth
from 140 million to about 195 million in 2015 will put
a major strain on an economy already unable to meet the
basic needs of the current population. The percentage
of urban dwellers will climb steadily from the current
25-30 percent of the population to between 40-50 percent,
leading to continued deterioration in the overall quality
of urban life. Differential population growth patterns
will exacerbate inequalities in wealth. Ties between provincial
and central governments throughout the region will be
strained.
Jammu
and Kashmir: Ethnic Mix of a Disputed State (195k)
Resource
and Environmental Challenges. Water will remain South
Asia's most vital and most contested natural resource.
Continued population and economic growth and expansion
of irrigated agriculture over the next 15 years will increasingly
stress water resources, and pollution of surface and groundwater
will be a serious challenge. In India, per capita water
availability is likely to drop by 50-75 percent. Because
many of the region's waterways are interstate, water could
become a source of renewed friction. Deforestation in
India and Nepal will exacerbate pollution, flooding, and
land degradation in Bangladesh.
India in
2015. Indian democracy will remain strong, albeit
more factionalized by the secular-Hindu nationalist debate,
growing differentials among regions and the increase in
competitive party politics. India's economy, long repressed
by the heavy hand of regulation, is likely to achieve
sustained growth to the degree reforms are implemented.
High-technology companies will be the most dynamic agents
and will lead the thriving service sector in four key
urban centersMumbai, New Delhi, Bangalore, and Chennai.
Computer software services and customized applications
will continue to expand as India strengthens economic
ties to key international markets. Industries such as
pharmaceuticals and agro-processing also will compete
globally. Numerous factors provide India a competitive
advantage in the global economy. It has the largest English-speaking
population in the developing world; its education system
produces millions of scientific and technical personnel.
India has a growing business-minded middle class eager
to strengthen ties to the outside world, and the large
Indian expatriate population provides strong links to
key markets around the world.
Despite rapid
economic growth, more than half a billion Indians will
remain in dire poverty. Harnessing technology to improve
agriculture will be India's main challenge in alleviating
poverty in 2015. The widening gulf between "have" and
"have-not" regions and disagreements over the pace and
nature of reforms will be a source of domestic strife.
Rapidly growing, poorer northern states will continue
to drain resources in subsidies and social welfare benefits.
Pakistan
in 2015. Pakistan, our conferees concluded, will not
recover easily from decades of political and economic
mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption
and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce
little change in the face of opposition from an entrenched
political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic
decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who
may significantly increase their role in national politics
and alter the makeup and cohesion of the militaryonce
Pakistan's most capable institution. In a climate of continuing
domestic turmoil, the central government's control probably
will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic
hub of Karachi.
Other Regional
States. Prospects for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and
Sri Lanka in 2015 appear bleak. Decades of foreign domination
and civil war have devastated Afghanistan's society and
economy, and the country is likely to remain internationally
isolated, a major narcotics exporter, and a haven for
Islamic radicals and terrorist groups. Bangladesh will
not abandon democracy but will be characterized by coalitions
or weak one-party governments, fragile institutions of
governance, deep-seated leadership squabbles, and no notion
of a loyal opposition.
Security
and Political Concerns Predominate. The threat of
major conflict between India and Pakistan will overshadow
all other regional issues during the next 15 years. Continued
turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan will spill over into
Kashmir and other areas of the subcontinent, prompting
Indian leaders to take more aggressive preemptive and
retaliatory actions. India's conventional military advantage
over Pakistan will widen as a result of New Delhi's superior
economic position. India will also continue to build up
its ocean-going navy to dominate the Indian Ocean transit
routes used for delivery of Persian Gulf oil to Asia.
The decisive shift in conventional military power in India's
favor over the coming years potentially will make the
region more volatile and unstable. Both India and Pakistan
will see weapons of mass destruction as a strategic imperative
and will continue to amass nuclear warheads and build
a variety of missile delivery systems.
Projected
Demographic Trends in Eurasia (70k)
CONTENTS
Russia
and Eurasia
Regional Trends. Uncertainties abound about the
future internal configuration, geopolitical dynamics,
and degree of turbulence within and among former Soviet
states. Russia and the other states of Eurasia are likely
to fall short in resolving critical impediments to economic
and political reform in their struggle to manage the negative
legacies of the Soviet period. Changing demographics,
chronic economic difficulties, and continued questions
about governance will constrain Russia's ability to project
its power beyond the former Soviet republics to the south,
complicate Ukraine's efforts to draw closer to the West,
and retard the development of stable, open political structures
throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. Those states
that could make progress on the basis of potential energy
revenues are likely to fail because of corruption and
the absence of structural economic reform. The rapid pace
of scientific and technological innovation, as well as
globalization, will leave these states further behind
the West as well as behind the major emerging markets.
The economic
challenges to these countries will remain daunting: insufficient
structural reform, poor productivity in agriculture as
compared with Western standards, decaying infrastructure
and environmental degradation. Corruption and organized
crime, sustained by drug trafficking, money laundering,
and other illegal enterprises and, in several instances,
protected by corrupt political allies, will persist.
Demographic
pressures also will affect the economic performance and
political cohesiveness of these states. Because of low
birthrates and falling life expectancy among males, the
populations of the Slavic core and much of the Caucasus
will continue to decline; Russian experts predict that
the country's population could fall from 146 million at
present to 130-135 million by 2015. At the other end of
the spectrum, the Central Asian countries will face a
growing youth cohort that will peak around 2010 before
resuming a more gradual pattern of population growth.
The centrality
of Russia will continue to diminish, and by 2015 "Eurasia"
will be a geographic term lacking a unifying political,
economic, and cultural reality. Russia and the western
Eurasian States will continue to orient themselves toward
Europe but will remain essentially outside of it. Because
of geographic proximity and cultural affinities, the Caucasus
will be closer politically to their neighbors to the south
and west, with Central Asia drawing closer to South Asia
and China. Nonetheless, important interdependencies will
remain, primarily in the energy sphere.
Russia will
remain the most important actor in the former Soviet Union.
Its power relative to others in the region and neighboring
areas will have declined, however, and it will continue
to lack the resources to impose its will.
The Soviet
economic inheritance will continue to plague Russia.
Besides a crumbling
physical infrastructure, years of environmental
neglect are taking a toll on the population, a toll
made worse by such societal costs of transition
as alcoholism, cardiac diseases, drugs, and a worsening
health delivery system. Russia's population is not
only getting smaller, but it is becoming less and
less healthy and thus less able to serve as an engine
of economic recovery. In macro economic terms Russia's
GDP probably has bottomed out. Russia, nevertheless,
is still likely to fall short in its efforts to
become fully integrated into the global financial
and trading system by 2015. Even under a best case
scenario of five percent annual economic growth,
Russia would attain an economy less than one-fifth
the size of that of the United States.
Many Russian
futures are possible, ranging from political resurgence
to dissolution. The general drift, however, is toward
authoritarianism, although not to the extreme extent of
the Soviet period. The factors favoring this course are
President Putin's own bent toward hierarchical rule from
Moscow; the population's general support of this course
as an antidote to the messiness and societal disruption
of the post-Soviet transition; the ability of the ruling
elite to hold on to power because of the lack of effective
national opposition, thus making that elite accountable
only to itself; and the ongoing shift of tax resources
from the regions to the center. This centralizing tendency
will contribute to dysfunctional governance. Effective
governance is nearly impossible under such centralization
for a country as large and diverse as Russia and lacking
well-ordered, disciplined national bureaucracies. Recentralization,
however, will be constrained by the interconnectedness
brought about by the global information revolution, and
by the gradual, although uneven, growth of civil society.
Russia will
focus its foreign policy goals on reestablishing lost
influence in the former Soviet republics to the south,
fostering ties to Europe and Asia, and presenting itself
as a significant player vis-a-vis the United States. Its
energy resources will be an important lever for these
endeavors. However, its domestic ills will frustrate its
efforts to reclaim its great power status. Russia will
maintain the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world
as the last vestige of its old status. The net outcome
of these trends will be a Russia that remains internally
weak and institutionally linked to the international system
primarily through its permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.
Ukraine's
path to the West will be constrained by widespread
corruption, the power of criminal organizations,
and lingering questions over its commitment to the
rule of law. Kiev will remain vulnerable to Russian
pressures, primarily because of its continued energy
dependence, but Ukrainians of all political stripes
and likely to opt for independence rather than reintegration
into Russia's sphere of influence.
In 2015,
the South
Caucasus will remain in flux because of
unresolved local conflicts, weak economic fundamentals,
and continued Russian meddling. Georgia probably
will have achieved a measure of political and economic
stability, fueled in part by energy transit revenues,
but it will remain the focus of Russian attention
in the region. Armenia will remain largely
isolated and is likely to remain a Russianor
possibly Iranianclient and, therefore, a regional
wild card. Azerbaijan's success in developing
its energy sector is unlikely to bring widespread
prosperity: Baku will be a one-sector economy with
pervasive corruption at all levels of society.
In Central
Asia, social, environmental, religious,
and possibly ethnic strains will grow. Wasteful
water-intensive practices and pollution of ground
water and arable land will lead to continued shortages
for agricultural and energy generation. The high
birthrates of the 1980s and early 1990s will lead
to strains on education, healthcare, and social
services. The region also is likely to be the scene
of increased competition among surrounding powersRussia,
China, India, Iran, and possibly Turkeyfor
control, influence, and access to energy resources.
Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan will threaten
regional stability.
Growth
in Population From 2000 to 2015 (75k)
CONTENTS
The
Middle East and North Africa
Regimes in the regionfrom Morocco to Iranwill
have to cope with demographic, economic and societal pressures
from within and globalization from without. No single
ideology or philosophy will unite any one state or group
of states in response to these challenges, although popular
resentment of globalization as a Western intrusion will
be widespread. Political Islam in various forms will be
an attractive alternative for millions of Muslims throughout
the region, and some radical variants will continue to
be divisive social and political forces.
By 2015, Israel
will have attained a cold peace with its neighbors, with
only limited social, economic, and cultural ties. There
will be a Palestinian state, but Israeli-Palestinian tensions
will persist and occasionally erupt into crises. Old rivalries
among core statesEgypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iranwill
reemerge. International attention will shift anew to the
Persian Gulf, an increasingly important source of energy
resources to fuel the global economy, and oil revenues
anticipated for Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in particular
will provide strategicand potentially destabilizingoptions
for those states. New relationships between geographic
regions could emerge between North Africa and Europe (on
trade); India, China and the Persian Gulf (on energy);
and Israel, Turkey, and India (on economic, technical,
and in the case of Turkey, security considerations).
A key driver
for the Middle East over the next 15 years will be demographic
pressures, specifically how to provide jobs, housing,
public services, and subsidies for rapidly growing and
increasingly urban populations. By 2015, in much of the
Middle East populations will be significantly larger,
poorer, more urban, and more disillusioned. In nearly
all Middle Eastern countries, more than half the population
is now under 20 years of age. These populations will continue
to have very large youth cohorts through 2015, with the
labor force growing at an average rate of 3.1 percent
per year. The problem of job placement is compounded by
weak educational systems producing a generation lacking
the technical and problem-solving skills required for
economic growth.
Globalization.
With the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern states will
view globalization more as a challenge than an opportunity.
Although the Internet will remain confined to a small
elite due to relatively high cost, undeveloped infrastructures,
and cultural obstacles, the information revolution and
other technological advances probably will have a net
destabilizing effect on the Middle East by raising expectations,
increasing income disparities, and eroding the power of
regimes to control information or mold popular opinion.
Attracting foreign direct investment will also be difficult:
except for the energy sector, investors will tend to shy
away from these countries, discouraged by overbearing
state sectors; heavy, opaque, and arbitrary government
regulation; underdeveloped financial sectors; inadequate
physical infrastructure; and the threat of political instability.
Political
Change. Most Middle Eastern governments recognize
the need for economic restructuring and even a modicum
of greater political participation, but they will proceed
cautiously, fearful of undermining their rule. As some
governments or sectors embrace the new economy and civil
society while others cling to more traditional paradigms,
inequities between and within states will grow. Islamists
could come to power in states that are beginning to become
pluralist and in which entrenched secular elites have
lost their appeal.
CONTENTS
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Regional Trends. The interplay of demographics
and diseaseas well as poor governancewill
be the major determinants of Africa's increasing international
marginalization in 2015. Most African states will miss
out on the economic growth engendered elsewhere by globalization
and by scientific and technological advances. Only a few
countries will do better, while a handful of states will
have hardly any relevance to the lives of their citizens.
As Sub-Saharan Africa's multiple and interconnected problems
are compounded, ethnic and communal tensions will intensify,
periodically escalating into open conflict, often spreading
across borders and sometimes spawning secessionist states.
Current
HIV Prevalence Rates (90k)
In the absence
of a major medical breakthrough, the relentless progression
of AIDS and other diseases will decimate the economically
productive adult population, sharply accentuate the continent's
youth bulge, and generate a huge cohort of orphaned children.
This condition will strain the ability of the extended
family system to cope and will contribute to higher levels
of dissatisfaction, crime, and political volatility.
Poverty and
poor governance will further deplete natural resources
and drive rapid urbanization. As impoverished people flee
unproductive rural areas, many cities will double in population
by 2015, but resources will be inadequate to provide the
needed expansion of water systems, sewers, and health
facilities. Cities will be sources of crime and instability
as ethnic and religious differences exacerbate the competition
for ever scarcer jobs and resources. The number of malnourished
people will increase by more than 20 percent and the potential
for famine will persist where the combination of internal
conflict and recurring natural disasters prevents or limits
relief efforts.
Economic
Prospects. Conditions for economic development in
Sub-Saharan Africa are limited by the persistence of conflicts,
poor political leadership and endemic corruption, and
uncertain weather conditions. Africa's most talented individuals
will shun the public sector or be lured abroad by greater
income and security. Effective and conscientious leaders
are unlikely to emerge from undemocratic and corrupt societies.
- Most technological
advances in the next 15 yearswith the possible
exception of genetically modified cropswill not
have substantial positive impact on the African economies.
- Although
West Africa will play an increasing role in global energy
markets, providing 25 percent of North American oil
imports in 2015, the pattern of oil wealth fostering
corruption rather than economic development will continue.
There will
be exceptions to this bleak overall outlook. The quality
of governance, rather than resource endowments, will be
the key determinant of development and differentiation
among African states.
South Africa
and Nigeria, the continent's largest economies, will remain
the dominant powers in the region through 2015. But their
ability to function as economic locomotives and stabilizers
in their regions will be constrained by large unmet domestic
demands for resources to stimulate employment, growth,
and social services, including dealing with AIDS. Even
a robust South Africa will not exert a strong pull on
its partners in the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). The success of the South African economy will
be more closely tied to its relationship with the larger
global economy than with Sub-Saharan Africa.
Ethnic,
political, and religious conflicts (105k)
Role of
Nonstate Actors. The atrophy of special relationships
between European powers and their former colonies in Africa
will be virtually complete by 2015. Filling the void will
be international organizations and nonstate actors of
all types: transnational religious institutions; international
nonprofit organizations, international crime syndicates
and drug traffickers; foreign mercenaries; and international
terrorists seeking safehavens.
- Fundamentalist
movements, especially proselytizing Islamic groups,
will plow fertile ground as Africans seek alternative
ways to meet their basic needs.
- Internal
conflicts will attractand leaders will in some
cases welcome foreign criminal organizations or
mercenaries to assist in the plundering of national
assets, while faltering regimes will willingly trade
their sovereignty for cash.
International
organizations will be heavily engaged in Sub-Saharan Africa
over the next 15 years, given its growing needs and slow
growth relative to other regions. Africa will continue
to receive more development assistance per capita than
other regions of the world.
- The international
financial institutions will be a continuing presence
in Africa, as many donor countries funnel development
assistance through them.
- The perpetuation
of poor governance and communal conflicts in a region
awash with guns will generate frequent natural and man-made
humanitarian crises, precipitating international humanitarian
relief efforts.
- The Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the SADC
will be the primary economic and political instruments
through which the continental powers, Nigeria and South
Africa, exert their leadership.
European
Union Members and Aspirants (70k)
CONTENTS
Europe
Regional Trends. Most of Europe in 2015 will be
relatively peaceful and wealthy. Its residents will do
extensive business with the rest of the world but politically
will be more inward-looking than the citizens of Europe
in 2000. Looking out to 2015, Europe's agenda will be
to put in place the final components of EU integration;
to take advantage of globalization; to sustain a strong
IT and S&T base to tackle changing demographics; and
to wean the Balkans away from virulent nationalism.
EU enlargement,
institutional reform, and a common foreign, security and
defense policy will play out over the next 15 years, so
that by 2015 the final contours of the "European project"
are likely to be firmly set. Having absorbed at least
10 new members, the European Union will have achieved
its geographic and institutional limits.
- As a consequence
of long delays in gaining EU entry (and the after-effects
of actual membership), leaders in some Central/Eastern
Europe countries will be susceptible to pressures from
authoritarian, nationalist forces on both the left and
right. These forces will capitalize on public resentment
about the effects of EU policy and globalization, including
unemployment, foreign ownership, and cultural penetration.
- The EU will
not include Russia. The Europeans, nevertheless, will
seek to engage Moscowencouraging stability and
maintaining dialogue. Although Russia will continue
to recede in importance to the European governments,
they will use US handling of Russia as a barometer of
how well or poorly Washington is exerting leadership
and defending European interests.
Economic
Reform & Globalization. EU governments will continue
to seek a "third way" between state control and unbridled
capitalism: piecemeal and often unavowed economic reform
driven in part by an ever denser network of overseas business
relationships and changes in corporate governance. Lingering
labor market rigidity and state regulation will hamper
restructuring, retooling, and reinvestment strategies.
Europe will trail the United States in entrepreneurship
and innovation as governments seek ways to balance encouragement
of these factors against social effects. Thus, Europe
will not achieve fully the dreams of parity with the United
States as a shaper of the global economic system.
In Prague,
Vienna, and other European capitals, protestors have questioned
the merits of globalization. By 2015, Europe will have
globalized more extensively than some of its political
rhetoric will suggest. It also will have less difficulty
than other regions coping with rapid change because of
high education and technological levels. States will continue
to push private sector competitiveness in the international
market. Three of the top five information technology centers
in the world will be in Europe: London, Munich, and Paris.
Many Europeans
will see the role of foreign policy as protecting their
social and cultural identities from the "excesses" of
globalizationand from its "superpatron," the United
States. One of the ways in which leaders will respond
will be to clamor for greater political control over international
financial and trade institutions.
The aging of
the population and low birthrates will be major challenges
to European prosperity and cohesion. Greater percentages
of state budgets will have to be allocated to the aging,
while, at the same time, there will be significant, chronic
shortages both of highly skilled workers in IT and other
professions and unskilled workers in basic services. Legal
and illegal immigration will mitigate labor shortages
to a limited extent but at a cost in terms of social friction
and crime. As EU governments grapple with immigration
policy and European and national identity, anti-immigrant
sentiment will figure more prominently in the political
arena throughout Western Europe.
Turkey.
The future direction of Turkey, both internally and geopolitically,
will have a major impact on the region, and on US and
Western interests. Shifting political dynamics; debates
over identity, ethnicity and the role of religion in the
state; and the further development of civil society will
figure prominently in Turkey's domestic agenda. The road
to Turkish membership in the EU will be long and difficult,
and EU member states will evaluate Turkey's candidacy
not only on the basis of economic performance, but on
how well it tackles this comprehensive agenda. Part of
Turkey's success will hinge on the effectiveness of a
growing private sector in advancing Turkey's reform efforts
and its goal of full integration in the West. NATO's involvement
in the Ballkans and expected enlargement in southern Europe
will increase ties between Turkey and the West.
By dint of
its history, location, and interests, Turkey will continue
to pay attention to its neighbors to the northin
the Caucasus and Central Asiaand to the south and
eastSyria, Iraq and Iran. With few exceptions, these
states will continue to struggle with questions of governance.
As Turkey crafts policies toward the countries in these
regions, no single issue will dominate its national security
agenda. Rather, Ankara will find itself having to cope
with regional rivalriesincluding what policies to
adopt toward internal and interstate conflictsproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the politics and economics
of energy transport, and water rights.
Europe and
the World. Europe's agenda will require it to demonstrate
influence in world affairs commensurate with its size
in population and economic strength. The EU's global reach
will be based primarily on economics: robust trade and
investment links to the United States and growing ties
to East and Southeast Asia and Latin America.
In dealing
with matters outside the region, European leaders will
construe their global responsibilities as building legal
mechanisms, encouraging diplomatic contact, andto
a lesser extentproviding nonmilitary aid. They will
respond sporadically to foreign criseseither through
the UN or in ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" with Washington
or othersbut they will not make strong and consistent
overseas commitments, particularly in regard to sending
troops.
Transatlantic
Links. Economic issues will have overtaken security
issues in importance by 2015, and the United States will
see its relations with Europe defined increasingly through
the EU, not only on the basis of trade but in the context
of using economic toolssuch as aid and preferential
trading regimesto underwrite peace initiatives.
By 2015, NATO
will have accepted many, but not all, Central/Eastern
European countries. European Security and Defense Policy
will be set in terms of partnership with, rather than
replacement of, NATO.
CONTENTS
Canada
Trends. Canada will be a full participant in the
globalization process in 2015 and a leading player in
the Americas after the United States, along with Mexico
and Brazil. Ottawa will still be grappling with the political,
demographic, and cultural impact of heavy Asian immigration
in the West as well as residual nationalist sentiment
in French-speaking Quebec. The vast and diverse country,
however, will remain stable amidst constant, dynamic change.
Ottawa will
continue to emphasize the importance of education, and
especially science and technology, for the new economy.
Canada also will promote policies designed to stem the
flow of skilled workers south and will seek to attract
skilled immigrantsespecially professionals from
East and South Asiato ensure that Canada will be
able to take full advantage of global opportunities. The
question of Quebec's place in the country will continue
to stir national debate.
Canada's status
as the pre-eminent US economic partner will be even more
pronounced in 2015. National sensitivity to encroaching
US culture will remain, even as the two economies become
more integrated. Ottawa will retain its interests in the
stability and prosperity of East Asia because of growing
Canadian economic, cultural, and demographic links to
the Pacific region. As additional trade links with Latin
America are developed through the North American Free
Trade Agreement and a likely Free Trade Area of the Americas,
Canada increasingly will take advantage of developments
in the Western hemisphere. Although Canadians will focus
more on Latin America and less on Europe, they will still
look to NATO as the cornerstone of Western security. Like
Europeans, Canadians will judge US global leadership in
terms of the relationship with Russia, especially regarding
strategic arms and National Missile Defense (NMD).
Despite the
relatively small size of Canada's armed forces, Ottawa
still will seek to participate in global and regional
discussions on the future of international peacekeeping.
Canada will continue to build on its traditional support
for international organizations by working to ensure a
more effective UN and greater respect for international
treaties, norms, and regimes. Canadians will be sympathetic
to calls for greater political "management" of globalization
to help mitigate adverse impacts on the environment and
ensure that globalization's benefits reach less advantaged
regions and states.
Latin
America: Average Annual Population Growth: 1998-2015
(63k)
CONTENTS
Latin
America
Regional Trends. By 2015, many Latin American countries
will enjoy greater prosperity as a result of expanding
hemispheric and global economic links, the information
revolution, and lowered birthrates. Progress in building
democratic institutions will reinforce reform and promote
prosperity by enhancing investor confidence. Brazil and
Mexico will be increasingly confident and capable actors
that will seek a greater voice in hemispheric affairs.
But the region will remain vulnerable to financial crises
because of its dependence on external finance and the
continuing role of single commodities in most economies.
The weakest countries in the region, especially in the
Andean region, will fall further behind. Reversals of
democracy in some countries will be spurred by a failure
to deal effectively with popular demands, crime, corruption,
drug trafficking, and insurgencies.
Latin Americaespecially
Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazilwill become an increasingly
important oil producer by 2015 and an important component
of the emerging Atlantic Basin energy system. Its proven
oil reserves are second only to those located in the Middle
East.
Globalization
Gains and Limits. Continued trade and investment liberalization
and the expansion of free trade agreements within and
outside of Latin America will be a significant catalyst
of growth. Regional trade integration through organizations
such as MERCOSUR and the likely conclusion of a Free Trade
Area of the Americas will both boost employment and provide
the political context for governments to sustain economic
reforms even against opposing entrenched interest groups.
Latin America's
Internet market is poised to grow exponentially, stimulating
commerce, foreign investment, new jobs, and corporate
efficiency. Although Internet business opportunities will
promote the growth of firms throughout the region, Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries.
Shifting
Demographics. Latin America's demographics will shift
markedlyto the distinct advantage of some countrieshelping
to ease social strains and underpin higher economic growth.
During the next 15 years, most countries will experience
a substantial slowdown in the number of new jobseekers,
which will help reduce unemployment and boost wages. But
not all countries will enjoy these shifts; Bolivia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay will still
face rapidly increasing populations in need of work.
Democratization
Progress and Setbacks. By 2015, key countries will
have made some headway in building sturdier and more capable
democratic institutions. Democratic institutions in Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil appear poised for continued
incremental consolidation. In other countries, crime,
public corruption, the spread of poverty, and the failure
of governments to redress worsening income inequality
will provide fertile ground for populist and authoritarian
politicians. Soaring crime rates will contribute to vigilantism
and extrajudicial killings by the police. Burgeoning criminal
activityincluding money laundering, alien smuggling,
and narcotraffickingcould overwhelm some Caribbean
countries. Democratization in Cuba will depend upon how
and when Fidel Castro passes from the scene.
Growing
Regional Gaps. By 2015, the gap between the more prosperous
and democratic states of Latin America and the others
will widen. Countries that are unable or unwilling to
undertake reforms will experience slow growth at best.
Several will struggle intermittently with serious domestic
political and economic problems such as crime, corruption,
and dependence on single commodities such as oil. Countries
with high crime and widespread corruption will lack the
political consensus to advance economic reforms and will
face lower growth prospects. Although poverty and inequality
will remain endemic throughout the region, high-fertility
countries will face higher rates of poverty and unemployment.
The Andean
countriesColombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peruare
headed for greater challenges of differing nature and
origin. Competition for scarce resources, demographic
pressures, and a lack of employment opportunities probably
will cause workers' anger to mount and fuel more aggressive
tactics in the future. Fatigue with economic hardship
and deep popular cynicism about political institutions,
particularly traditional parties, could lead to instability
in Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador. Resolution of the long-running
guerrilla war is key to Colombia's future prospects. The
Cuban economy under a Castro Government will fall further
behind most of the Latin American countries that embrace
globalization and adopt free market practices.
Rising Migration.
Pressures for legal and illegal migration to the United
States and regionally will rise during the next 15 years.
Demographic factors, political instability, personal insecurity,
poverty, wage differentials, the growth of alien-smuggling
networks, and wider family ties will propel more Latin
American workers to enter the United States. El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua will become even greater
sources of illegal migrants. In Mexico, declining population
growth and strong economic prospects will gradually diminish
pressures to seek work in the United States, but disparities
in living standards, US demand for labor, and family ties
will remain strong pull factors. Significant political
instability during a transition process in Cuba could
lead to mass migration.
- The growth
of Central American and Mexican alien-smuggling networks
will exacerbate problems along the US border.
Illegal migration
within the region will become a more contentious issue
between Latin American governments. Argentina and Venezuela
already have millions of undocumented workers from neighboring
countries, and resentment of illegal workers could increase.
Although most Haitian migrants will head for the United
States, Haiti's Caribbean neighbors will also experience
further strains.
Significant
Discontinuities
The
trends outlined in this study are based on the
combinations of drivers that are most likely over
the next 15 years. Nevertheless, the drivers could
produce trends quite different from the ones described.
Below are possibilities different from those presented
in the body of the study:
- Serious
deterioration of living standards for the bulk
of the population in several major Middle Eastern
countries and the failure of Israel and the
Palestinians to conclude even a "cold peace,"
lead to serious, violent political upheavals
in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
- The
trend toward more diverse, free-wheeling transnational
terrorist networks leads to the formation of
an international terrorist coalition with diverse
anti-Western objectives and access to WMD.
- Another
global epidemic on the scale of HIV/AIDS, or
rapidly changing weather patterns attributable
to global warming, with grave damage and enormous
costs for several developed countriessparking
an enduring global consensus on the need for
concerted action on health issues and the environment.
- A
state of major concern to US strategic interestssuch
as Iran, Nigeria, Israel, or Saudi Arabiafails
to manage serious internal religious or ethnic
divisions and crisis ensues.
- A
growing antiglobalization movement becomes a
powerful sustainable global political and cultural
forcethreatening Western governmental
and corporate interests.
- China,
India, and Russia form a defacto geo-strategic
alliance in an attempt to counterbalance US
and Western influence.
- The
US-European alliance collapses, owing in part
to intensifying trade disputes and competition
for leadership in handling security questions.
- Major
Asian countries establish an Asian Monetary
Fund or less likely an Asian Trade Organization,
undermining the IMF and WTO and the ability
of the US to exercise global economic leadership.
|
CONTENTS
Appendix
Four
Alternative Global Futures
In September-October
1999, the NIC initiated work on Global Trends 2015
by cosponsoring with Department of State/INR and CIA's
Global Futures Project two unclassified workshops on Alternative
Global Futures: 2000-2015. The workshops brought together
several dozen government and nongovernment specialists
in a wide range of fields.
The first workshop
identified major factors and events that would drive global
change through 2015. It focused on demography, natural
resources, science and technology, the global economy,
governance, social/cultural identities, and conflict and
identified main trends and regional variations. These
analyses became the basis for subsequent elaboration in
Global Trends 2015.
The second
workshop developed four alternative global futures in
which these drivers would interact in different ways through
2015. Each scenario was intended to construct a plausible,
policy-relevant story of how this future might evolve:
highlighting key uncertainties, discontinuities, and unlikely
or "wild card" events, and identifying important policy
and intelligence challenges.
Scenario
One: Inclusive Globalization:
A virtuous circle develops among technology, economic
growth, demographic factors, and effective governance,
which enables a majority of the world's people to benefit
from globalization. Technological development and
diffusionin some cases triggered by severe environmental
or health crisesare utilized to grapple effectively
with some problems of the developing world. Robust global
economic growthspurred by a strong policy
consensus on economic liberalizationdiffuses wealth
widely and mitigates many demographic and resource problems.
Governance is effective at both the national and
international levels. In many countries, the state's role
shrinks, as its functions are privatized or performed
by public-private partnerships, while global cooperation
intensifies on many issues through a variety of international
arrangements. Conflict is minimal within and among
states benefiting from globalization. A minority of the
world's peoplein Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle
East, Central and South Asia, and the Andean regiondo
not benefit from these positive changes, and internal
conflicts persist in and around those countries left behind.
Scenario
Two: Pernicious Globalization
Global elites thrive, but the majority of the world's
population fails to benefit from globalization. Population
growth and resource scarcities place heavy burdens
on many developing countries, and migration becomes a
major source of interstate tension. Technologies
not only fail to address the problems of developing countries
but also are exploited by negative and illicit networks
and incorporated into destabilizing weapons. The global
economy splits into three: growth continues in
developed countries; many developing countries experience
low or negative per capita growth, resulting in a growing
gap with the developed world; and the illicit economy
grows dramatically. Governance and political leadership
are weak at both the national and international levels.
Internal conflicts increase, fueled by frustrated
expectations, inequities, and heightened communal tensions;
WMD proliferate and are used in at least one internal
conflict.
Scenario
Three: Regional Competition
Regional identities sharpen in Europe, Asia, and the Americas,
driven by growing political resistance in Europe and East
Asia to US global preponderance and US-driven globalization
and each region's increasing preoccupation with its own
economic and political priorities. There is an uneven
diffusion of technologies, reflecting differing
regional concepts of intellectual property and attitudes
towards biotechnology. Regional economic integration
in trade and finance increases, resulting in both fairly
high levels of economic growth and rising regional competition.
Both the state and institutions of regional governance
thrive in major developed and emerging market countries,
as governments recognize the need to resolve pressing
regional problems and shift responsibilities from global
to regional institutions. Given the preoccupation of the
three major regions with their own concerns, countries
outside these regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle
East, and Central and South Asia have few places to turn
for resources or political support. Military conflict
among and within the three major regions does not materialize,
but internal conflicts increase in and around other countries
left behind.
Scenario
Four: Post-Polar World
US domestic preoccupation increases as the US economy
slows, then stagnates. Economic and political tensions
with Europe grow, the US-European alliance deteriorates
as the United States withdraws its troops, and Europe
turns inward, relying on its own regional institutions.
At the same time, national governance crises create
instability in Latin America, particularly in Colombia,
Cuba, Mexico, and Panama, forcing the United States to
concentrate on the region. Indonesia also faces internal
crisis and risks disintegration, prompting China to provide
the bulk of an ad hoc peacekeeping force. Otherwise, Asia
is generally prosperous and stable, permitting the United
States to focus elsewhere. Korea's normalization and de
facto unification proceed, China and Japan provide the
bulk of external financial support for Korean unification,
and the United States begins withdrawing its troops from
Korea and Japan. Over time, these geostrategic shifts
ignite longstanding national rivalries among the Asian
powers, triggering increased military preparations and
hitherto dormant or covert WMD programs. Regional and
global institutions prove irrelevant to the evolving conflict
situation in Asia, as China issues an ultimatum to Japan
to dismantle its nuclear program and Japaninvoking
its bilateral treaty with the UScalls for US reengagement
in Asia under adverse circumstances at the brink of a
major war. Given the priorities of Asia, the Americas,
and Europe, countries outside these regions are marginalized,
with virtually no sources of political or financial support.
Generalizations
Across the Scenarios
The four scenarios can be grouped in two pairs: the first
pair contrasting the "positive" and "negative" effects
of globalization; the second pair contrasting intensely
competitive but not conflictual regionalism and the descent
into regional military conflict.
- In all but
the first scenario, globalization does not create widespread
global cooperation. Rather, in the second scenario,
globalization's negative effects promote extensive dislocation
and conflict, while in the third and fourth, they spur
regionalism.
- In all four
scenarios, countries negatively affected by population
growth, resource scarcities and bad governance, fail
to benefit from globalization, are prone to internal
conflicts, and risk state failure.
- In all four
scenarios, the effectiveness of national, regional,
and international governance and at least moderate but
steady economic growth are crucial.
- In all four
scenarios, US global influence wanes.
Matrix:
Drivers in the Global Futures Scenarios: 2000-2015
(351k)
(9k)
Print Version (15k)
CONTENTS
The National Intelligence Council
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process,
incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the Director
of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole.
Chairman (concurrently Assistant Director of
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production) |
|
John Gannon |
Vice Chairman |
|
Ellen Laipson |
Director, Senior Review, Production, and Analysis |
|
Stuart A. Cohen |
National Intelligence Officers |
Africa |
|
Robert Houdek |
At-Large |
|
Stuart A. Cohen |
Conventional Military Issues |
|
John Landry |
East Asia |
|
Robert Sutter |
Economics & Global Issues |
|
David Gordon |
Europe |
|
Barry F. Lowenkron |
Latin America |
|
Fulton T. Armstrong |
Near East and South Asia |
|
Paul Pillar |
Russia and Eurasia |
|
George Kolt |
Science & Technology |
|
Lawrence Gershwin |
Strategic & Nuclear Programs |
|
Robert D Walpole |
Warning |
|
Robert Vickers |
TOP |