Type: VVER-1000
Units: Three
Total megawatts (net): 2,850 (950 per unit)
Location: Yuzhnoukrainsk, Ukraine
Dates of initial operation:
For an overview of the principal strengths and deficiencies of Soviet-designed plants, see Soviet Nuclear Power Plant Designs.
In 1991, South Ukraine had the highest number of unplanned shutdowns among Ukraine's plants, with 3.33 per unit.
A September 1992 event at the plant was classified as Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. The event was the result of defective core instrumentation and led to the failure of a steam isolation valve.
After safety systems were shut off in November 1992 to boost power production, officials of GANU--the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety--wrote to the government calling for the removal of South Ukraine's plant manager, Vladimir Fuks. The committee pointed out that safety violations had increased significantly throughout 1992 and generally cited "unsatisfactory" safety conditions.
Ukratomenergoprom, Ukraine's utility organization, responded, noting that incidents were up because of stricter domestic standards and that the reactors were being operated according to international standards. Ukratomenergoprom officials said there was no reason to change management at the plant.
In the spring of 1993, there were reports that the plant's cooling pipes were furred up because local authorities had forbidden the plant to replace the water in the cooling system and the plant had no suitable filters. The plant was also said to be facing critical shortages of boric acid, chemical resins and chemicals needed for the water system. Repair materials were also reportedly in short supply.
In May 1993, Unit 3 at the plant was shut down following the detection of a hydrogen leak in the plant's turbine cooling system. Earlier in the month, a similar leak at Unit 5 of the Zaporozhye plant in Ukraine had resulted in an explosion and fire in which one worker was killed.
In April 1994, a defect in a steam generator's reactor protection system level controller was discovered on Unit 1 during a routine walkdown. The defect was corrected, but not within the time period stipulated by the technical specifications. This event was classified as Level 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. A month later, routine examination of the primary circuit's main gate valve components on Unit 1 revealed corrosion-induced deterioration of the gate valve main joint studs. The deterioration was caused by primary circuit leaks through the gland gasket of the main joint of the gate valves. This event was classified as Level 1 on the INES.
In December 1995, radioactive liquid leaked from a pipe onto the ground at the plant, contaminating a 30-square-meter area. The leak was apparently not discovered until early January. This event was classified as Level 1 on the INES.
Fuel Purchases, Plant Staffing. The South Ukraine plant reportedly received a Ukrainian bank loan of 300 billion karbovanets in March 1995 to buy nuclear fuel from Russia. According to plant manager Vladimir Fuks, the plant is owed nearly 6 trillion karbovanets by electricity consumers.
Fuks said in August 1995 that the plant had no fuel for 1996. He also noted that more than one-third of the plant's equipment had reached the end of its service life. Fuks also said that in 1994 the plant lost a number of staff, including four engineers, six production managers and numerous other skilled workers. He explained that in Russia, salaries were one and a half to two times higher than in Ukraine, but added that the plant had a reserve of personnel.
According to plant manager Fuks, the South Ukraine plant spent about $5 million on maintenance and backfits in 1994. Up to the beginning of 1995, the plant had spent about $10 million on equipment from abroad, of which $7 million was spent for reactor protection system controls from the Czech firm Skoda.
EU Projects. With funding from the European Union, Spain's Tecnatom has supplied a remote primary pipework inspection system, and by the end of 1996, the company will have provided training, design and specification for reactor pressure vessel and primary circuit inspection.
WANO Exchange Visits. The World Association of Nuclear Operators has sponsored several exchange visits involving the South Ukraine plant. The plant has hosted personnel from the following plants:
In addition, personnel from South Ukraine have visited the following plants:
2 Plant Twinning. The South Ukraine plant is twinned with Germany's Grohnde plant.
ASSET Training Seminar. An International Atomic Energy Agency training seminar was held at the South Ukraine plant March 21-25, 1994. The purpose of the seminar was to train operators and regulators in the use of the ASSET--Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team--methodology to identify safety issues, assess their consequences and eliminate the root causes of likely future incidents and accidents. An IAEA training seminar is scheduled to be held at the South Ukraine plant April 10-12, 1996 to demonstrate the practical use of the ASSET analysis procedures for self-assessment of operational events.
ASSET Mission. An ASSET mission visited the South Ukraine plant Jan. 16-27, 1995. The purpose of the mission was to determine the effectiveness of the plant's incident prevention policy. It reviewed all operational events reported by the plant between January 1989 and December 1994. Of 178 events, 98 were found to have safety relevance. Of these 98, six were classified as Level 1, and the remainder as Level 0 on the INES.
The team found that the prevention of safety relevant events varied from unit to unit. While Unit 1 had worsened during the review period, Unit 3 had improved. The team suggested that plant management consider the reasons for the divergent performance of the units, and attempt to bring all units to the performance level of Unit 2.
The team also found considerable variability among the three units with respect to the percentage of events discovered by surveillance. It recommended that plant management consider investigating the reasons for the variability of surveillance performance with a view to bringing surveillance effectiveness to a consistent, high level.
The team also recommended that plant management prepare a report summarizing the problems encountered with emergency power supply cables. The team noted that plants with similar equipment and layout arrangements had not encountered as many problems, and that it would be worthwhile exchanging operating experience. In view of the recurrent cable problems, the team suggested that the plant consider establishing a pro-active policy to detect incipient failures in safety systems.
The team also suggested that plant management consider reviewing the job functions of the personnel in shift operations with a view to enhancing their effectiveness in handling transients through team training and interpersonal communications. In addition, it suggested that plant management consider the advantages that might be gained by adopting symptom-based emergency operation procedures.
The team commended the extensive program of improvements planned by the plant, but it noted that the timely implementation of these improvements might be jeopardized by funding constraints. It strongly urged that funding be made available to the plant. The team also noted the adverse effect of the loss of trained personnel on the plant's safety performance, and strongly urged plant management to continue its efforts to combat the loss of experienced staff.
Planned ASSET Mission. An ASSET peer review mission to South Ukraine is scheduled for March 3-7, 1997. The mission will review the plant's analysis of events reflecting safety culture issues based on ASSET procedures.
December 1995