Docs 164-205
164. Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
[place not declassified], May 30, 1954, 1833Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 13, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
382. From Cadick.
Request identities and available info on four persons discussed with [name not declassified] for early eradication. Confirm early date.
165. Memorandum by Graham L. Page/1/
Guatemala City, June 1, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 1. No classification marking. Transmitted on June 4 via courier from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida. Sent for information to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division.
SUBJECT
K-Program
Notes
1. Your letter, dated 30 May 1954,/2/ prompts me to line up once more my premises and conclusions. If you should detect any inconsistencies put that down to a situation in flux.
/2/Not found.
2. The recruitment of [name not declassified] was effected under PBSUCCESS auspices. He has become reconciled to Calligeris' role, but there are no indications of subservience./3/ Nor has he waived his stipulation that Calligeris be kept uninformed. [name not declassified] realizes that the underlying concept of PBSUCCESS is a workable one and that--at least at the time of his recruitment--there existed no workable alternative.
/3/Less than 1 week later, however, [name not declassified] wrote: "I personally feel that it would be destructive to the concept of Army unity which underlies our planning, were he to be allowed to come in here. Whether you wish to believe it or not, there are some very important officers in the higher ranks who are actively hostile to Calligeris. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the injection of Calligeris would disrupt the kind of effort I have been outlining to you." (Memorandum, June 7; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 1)
3. [name not declassified]'s sole asset is a personal following among ranking Army officers. He is our channel to Colonel [initials not declassified], an officer who--according to [name not declassified]--is fully committed to our cause. He is working on SMILAX. He is turning over in his mind ways and means of defecting Colonel [initials not declassified]. Regarding the latter he has provided us with a frame of reference that makes sense to me.
4. I have increasing doubts whether additional recruitments can be effected under PBSUCCESS auspices. I know for certain that in the cases of SMILAX, Colonel [initials not declassified], and Colonel [initials not declassified], the involvement of Calligeris is likely to stiffen their resolve to protect the regime at all cost. They detest Calligeris and his enterprise to them holds connotations of a "foreign invasion", calling forth a strictly emotional reaction (see SMILAX broadcast).
5. Now this is where the inconsistency comes in: I maintain--so far a priori--that the manifest threat of United States intervention is the sole lever that might conceivably unhinge the allegiance of the "Anti Calligeris faction" to the Arbenz regime. Of course, they wouldn't cotton to the prospect of landing marines any more than to that of invading revolutionaries. But--I maintain--the certain prospect of a unilateral United States move would give them ample food for thought. In an atmosphere of reflection, my message conveying to them an "Easy way out" formula, would be bound to make an impact. In effect they would be offered an opportunity to stave off intervention by the simple expedient of overthrowing the regime and usurping power for themselves. Of course, there would be some weighty political strings attached to our countenancing this shift, but nothing that could possibly be construed as an abridgment of Guatemala's sovereignty.
6. You of course realize that I am not advocating that we scrap PBSUCCESS or modify its objectives. I am discussing defection techniques and approaches. By a process of elimination I believe to have isolated the one motivating factor that may lead to significant defections in the Army High Command. If those defections come off, it may conceivably provide the spark setting off Calligeris' effort, because there will undoubtedly ensue a period of turmoil during which [lots] of things can happen. But the "crucial spark" has to be generated by heat--United States heat.
7. Speaking of "overt thunder", I am most concerned that our initial clarion [call] which scared the dickens out of Arbenz and his gang may turn out to have been little more than amplified Bronx cheers. I trust no one up the line is taking umbrage at my Alsopian outbursts. Without anything factual to go by, I can just feel in my bones what is going on in "foggy bottom". Let me tell you some time--with the radio turned full blast--what I think about good neighbor policy and hemispheric solidarity. But promise to tell only your closest friends.
8. Pinning [name not declassified] down to facts is a slow and arduous process. He is endowed with a meandering and reminiscing mind. His interest in Calligeris' plans is not un[text missing]. He hardly ever asks direct questions.
Graham L Page/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
166. Note for the Files/1/
Washington, June 1, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. No classification marking. The name of the drafting officer is not declassified.
SUBJECT
Disposal List Prepared by C/EW
1. A cursory check of Subject list reveals that the biographic data is not up-to-date and that even the information available at Lincoln is not included; that in some cases, doubt certainly exists as to whether or not the person in question is a Communist; that the list is by no means complete, as it excludes such prominent Communists as Julio Estrada de la Hoz.
2. In short, no real analysis has been made to date to determine who is "to be" or "not to be." It is recommended that before any disposal action is taken, all available personality data be compiled and careful study be made of all "candidates" for said list.
3. Please note that Mr. [name not declassified] has prepared a memorandum recommending five key persons, about whom little doubt exists. (Copy not available at the moment, but Mr. [name not declassified] has one on file.) Also note that there has been some cable traffic regarding this Subject.
167. Draft Memorandum/1/
Washington, June 1, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret.
SUBJECT
Present status and possible future course of PBSUCCESS
1. Mr. [name not declassified] has reported his very tentative view--which is his own estimate of the situation and which lacks the benefit of a report from [name not declassified] (who will return to LINCOLN Monday night),/2/ that in case the originally conceived, carefully-timed paramilitary action should prove difficult of fulfillment, an alternative approach might will be considered. Nothing but tentative conclusions are possible with careful review of all available facts resulting from the SEMANTIC action and from [name not declassified] are studied.
/2/June 7.
2. The main premise for any plan from now on should be the build-up of pressures both internal and external on WSBURNT both because the internal situation is such that anti-government action should result in continued tension and uncertainty and because there should be fairly quick counter action to avoid any inference that the SEMANTIC episode has caused any problem.
3. The basic concept for any successful result is that the WSBURNT army must move against the regime--consequently the major issue is what action is necessary to persuade the appropriate officers to move. It is felt that a carefully integrated large scale action, as originally planned, would clearly produce the result. Due, however, to unforeseen problems in material movement, uncertainties as to the leadership of Calligeris and possible internal losses via the SEMANTIC episode, the capacity for achieving the integrated plan may have to be unduly delayed or actually substantially changed. Therefore, a different stimulus to produce Army reaction should be planned at least as a contingency alternative.
4. The most promising alternative would seem to be the despatching of organizers and RRUS as soon as the effects of the SEMANTIC episode establish the proper method for doing it. Concurrently leaflet drops, specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected. Moreover, material should be moved into WSBURNT and cached in all ways possible. The hope would be that this approach might persuade the WSBURNT Army to take anti-Arbenz action on its own. If not, the results of the organizers' efforts, accentuated by the affirmative steps just mentioned, could be assessed. If resistance potential develops, material could be distributed either from internal caches, if developed, or dropped by night flights and action comparable to the original plan undertaken. If early action proves unwise, then a classical longer range resistance build-up can be adopted with a view to action at the first propitious movement.
5. It is obvious that this alternative in the first instance would mean a different use of existing assets than presently contemplated. On the other hand, the possibility of successful pressure on the Army for independent action, and the alternative of longer range build-up of earlier solutions do not occur.
168. Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
HGG-A-1195
Guatemala City, June 2, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 100, Folder 1. Secret; PBSUCCESS, RYBAT. Drafted by Graham L. Page and delivered by courier. Sent for information to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.
SUBJECT
General--K-Program
Specific--JMBLUG
1. This is to advise you that Page paid JMBLUG a personal call on the evening of 1 June 1954. The meeting took place in JMBLUG's private residence.
2. In view of certain anticipated ramifications of the SWALLOW operation, it was deemed necessary to apprise JMBLUG of what had transpired and what we are trying to accomplish. Page gave JMBLUG a general briefing on the scope and purpose of K-Program and explained that he is operating independently of the Station so as to preclude any conceivable compromise to our diplomatic representation should the Guatemalan authorities uncover his true status.
3. JMBLUG fully approved of our endeavor to enlist the support of SWALLOW in the defection of members of the Army High Command and promised to continue backstopping to the extent of vouching for his bona fides. Page advised JMBLUG that Whiting had decided against formally introducing Page to him to so as to rule out any possibility of embarrassment should there be an unpleasantness.
4. Page disavowed detailed knowledge of the progress of PBSUCCESS and of the nature of Calligeris' operations in Guatemala, stressing the limited and strictly compartmentalized nature of the program in which he is engaged.
5. It should be pointed out that the call on JMBLUG was a move decided upon by Page acting on his own responsibility. The Station introduced Page and crowded the necessary security safeguards. Further meetings, if required, will be held in a secure, neutral place.
Graham L. Page/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
169. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency/1/
HUL-A-1052
[place not declassified], June 2, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Playdon.
SUBJECT
Guatemalan efforts to link U.S. action regarding arms shipment to UFCO claims; recommendations for diplomatic and related actions
1. In several statements during the last few days made by Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello, by other Guatemalan government officials and by the pro-Government Guatemalan press as well as in leftist comment on the arms incident (in broadcasts and articles in other countries), a persistent effort is being made to link the energetic protest of the U.S. State Department against the arms shipment to the claim of UFCO for compensation of its expropriated lands, upheld officially by the State Department a few weeks ago./2/
/2/References are to a Department of State formal claim on behalf of a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company against the Guatemalan Government for its expropriation of the company's land, and announcement of the arms shipment to Guatemalan from Eastern Europe. Texts of press releases of April 20 and May 17 are in Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1954, pp. 678-679, and May 31, 1954, p. 835. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles also discussed the arms shipment at a meeting on May 19 (Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1116-1117 (Document 36)), and the President responded to a question on the shipment during his May 19 press conference. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 489-497) Secretary Dulles made news conference statements on the arms shipment on May 25. (Department of State Bulletin, June 7, 1954, pp. 873-874)
2. From the viewpoint of PBSUCCESS, that State Department intervention on behalf of UFCO was unfortunately timed since (whatever the merits of the case may be) it lent some credence to the Guatemalan communist-government claim that U.S. policy is being conducted in the interest of the "big capitalists." Their latest effort, as noted above, to imply that the U.S. would never take such strong actions because of a paltry arms shipment if it were not to exert pressure in the interest of UFCO's claim for $15 million (or so), is a rather shrewd diversionary maneuver--far superior to the obvious confusion in which the Guatemalan government's first statements concerning the arms shipment were made--well designed to improve Guatemala's case on the arms question in the eyes not only of Guatemalan public opinion, but of a major section of world public opinion as well.
3. We therefore, suggest that steps be considered to spike this Guatemalan propaganda line as quickly and as effectively as possible. Such steps should notably include (but do not have to be limited to) the following:
a. A statement by State, possibly directly addressed to the Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington, strongly protesting in terms of moral indignation the attempt to confuse the U.S. Government's concern about hemispheric security and peace with its routine legal aid to the interests of U.S. citizens abroad, terming this attempt an insult likely to exacerbate relations between the two countries.
b. An offer, to be made either by UFCO or by State, to have UFCO's claim settled either in the World Court or by some other form of international arbitration, in order to remove this claim from the sphere of US-Guatemalan diplomatic relations (if the Guatemalan Government rejects this, as it may be likely to do, the blame will fall on them)./3/
/3/A May 24 memorandum from the Government of Guatemala handed to Ambassador Peurifoy rejected the United Fruit Company's claim for damages and denied that expropriation was a subject for international discussion; see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1127-1128 (Document 45).
c. Publication of a White Paper, enumerating all cases in which Guatemalan diplomats were involved in communist propaganda, assistance to strikes in other countries and other incidents of "undiplomatic activity", listing all complaints by other Central American governments against such activities, etc., as a strong means and discrediting the Guatemalan Government in general and its Foreign Minister and diplomatic missions in particular. (We submit that RQM/OIS could assist State in preparing such a document, thereby obtaining more rapid action.)
4. Fast and impressive action in this direction--whether or not it follows exactly the specific lines suggested in the preceding paragraph--appears urgently necessary not only in the general interest of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Guatemala, but also in the specific interest of PBSUCCESS and of our efforts to frustrate the "anti-imperialist" line of communist political warfare and to protect the U.S. Government against being reproached for attacking Guatemala in the interest of UFCO or of "Wall Street" in general.
5. We therefore request that you take up the above matter with State as quickly as practicable and press for immediate action--which, in this case, appears to be even more in their interest than in ours. Please keep us informed as the action taken and progress achieved.
William D. Playdon/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
170. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, June 3, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret. Drafted by Wisner. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State Holland.
SUBJECT
Points Covered in H/W/2/ Discussions of June 1 and 2
/2/Holland-Wisner.
1. The following is a list of the points which were discussed in the above mentioned conversations, together with an indication of the extent of agreement reached and/or the policy guidance provided to each.
2. Concerning further airborne leaflet drops W advised H we were considering the desirability and timing of additional leaflet drops. He explained we might wish to do this at any time and moreover that there might be occasion to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (who have been recruited on an unwitting basis) for certain of these flights. But that the use of such pilots would be reserved for flights involving the use of particularly significant and important pamphlets and where accuracy of delivery is a special requirement. W further stated that the operating headquarters had been directed to explore fully and carefully the possibility of using indigenously procured planes and indigenous pilots for certain of the leaflet drops viz. those of lesser importance and of shorter length, not requiring such deep penetration. H stated that he saw no objection from a policy standpoint. [H recommended that we give further consideration to the use of leaflet rocket bombs especially for the area of the capital city. These are simple devices the release of which is both easy and capable of accomplishment with little risk.]/3/
/3/Brackets in the source text.
3./4/ The evidence of an additional and very substantial purchase of arms [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was also discussed with H who requested that we do everything we can to procure documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export license. Considered and rejected was the thought of letting the shipment go through and then attempting to waylay it shortly before arrival at destination. This course of action was considered too risky and as involving unnecessary operational difficulties as well as raising more policy problems than the course of action calculated to prevent shipment of arms [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Moreover it was considered that documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export license should make a sufficiently valuable contribution to the Department's "case" against Guatemala. It was understood that the possibilities of obtaining the documents would be explored by KUBARK, and that if it should prove to be necessary to employ Embassy approach to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], H would wish to be advised so that he can clear this with EUR. An important unresolved question in this regard is whether the original documents are required for presentation at the OAS meeting. If the method of obtainment is to be clandestine then it would probably be an embarrassment to present the originals at the meeting, since it would be more difficult to explain how they were come by in original form than would be the case if photostats were used (photostats can be obtained in various ways, but official original documents would have to be obtained officially if it were not to appear clearly that they had been stolen).
/4/This subject covered and disposed of on basis H/W telephone conversation of Saturday morning, June 5, unless after examination of available documents and photostats H would still desire the original or a copy of the application for export license, in which case Embassy Rome could probably obtain special request. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. The problem of shaking loose our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in order to dispatch him promptly to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was brought to the attention of H, and he agreed to provide his full support in the Department and with the Embassy in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if this is necessary.
5. Concerning one very sensitive type of treatment, which was raised directly for the first time by TB in his memo prepared here, H considered this and ruled it out, at least for the immediate future, on the ground that it would probably prove to be counter-productive. This decision was not conclusive and H suggested that he come up with more plans both concerning the individual targets, the timing and the statement of the purpose sought to be achieved with respect to each. This would require a fairly solid showing of the advantage to be gained by this type of activity.
6. The petroleum supply situation was discussed at some length and H reaffirmed his decision against efforts prior to the OAS conference to prevail upon the suppliers by means of direct approach to them to delay, slowdown and interrupt shipments. At the same time he approved of and encouraged us to embark upon a carefully selected series of attempts against certain installations. The hope was expressed that if results can be achieved of the right kind, these results might in themselves cause more general benefit by engendering disinclination on the part of suppliers to ship the goods.
7. It was agreed by H that we might establish direct liaison with Mr. Wieland for the purpose of exchanging ideas and information with him regarding statements and other forms of policy and propaganda output. H was to speak to Wieland and W was to pass the word to Mr. [name not declassified].
171. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency/1/
HUL-A-1039
[place not declassified], June 4, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Playdon on June 2.
SUBJECT
General--KUGOWN
Specific--Further counter-measures to repudiate communist attacks on U.S. "imperialism" in Guatemala (and in Latin America, in general)
REF
HUL-A-1052
1. Apart from the immediate need for "tactical" counter-action, as suggested in reference, we continue to be faced with the basic or "strategic" problem of countering the communist claim that U.S. anti-communism is merely a disguise for the "imperialist" interests of U.S. "capitalistic monopolies." This claim is not only raised in all communist and government media in Guatemala but in communist propaganda everywhere, including virtual daily comments by radio Moscow. The problem is particularly difficult for two major reasons:
a. Said communist claim is obviously believed by a substantial part of the people in Guatemala and throughout Latin America which explains also to a large extent why a mere handful of communists is able to exert predominant influence on government policies and on public opinion in Guatemala (and elsewhere);
b. PBSUCCESS has hardly a positive program with which to counter that claim, the few positive statements by Calligeris and [name not declassified] being very general and not at all forceful enough to undo the rather substantial effects of communist propaganda.
2. It cannot be LINCOLN's task to speculate what ODYOKE policy in general might do to undermine and outflank the above described communist "position of strength." But even for the immediate KUGOWN needs of PBSUCCESS, a more coherent and vigorous counter-effort is obviously needed. Such a counter-effort should be based, we believe, on the following propositions:
a. The only imperialism operating today--i.e. at least since 1939--is that of the Soviet Union. Imperialism is the use of government power for the exploitation of foreign territories and peoples. Only the USSR has annexed foreign countries since 1939 and is exploiting satellite territories for its own political and economic benefit.
b. The economic structure of the Soviet Union, including its foreign trade, is truly monopolistic and completely government-controlled, thereby putting the political and military power of the USSR at the disposal of Russia's economic interests. This puts any country dealing with the Soviet Union (or any other communist state) at a grave disadvantage.
c. No such monopolies and no such close links between economy and government exist either in the U.S. or in Britain, France or any other "capitalist" country. Proof: the Sherman Act and the many anti-trust law suits undertaken by the U.S. Government; the SEC legislation; the duty of high government officials to divest themselves of "incompatible" business properties before accepting high public office, etc.
d. U.S.-owned and operated enterprises in foreign countries treat their personnel much better than similar communist enterprises.
e. Social security and other labor legislation in "capitalist" countries is much more advantageous to the workers than the corresponding institutions in the Soviet orbit.
3. All the above themes lend themselves to overt as well as to clandestine treatment. Point 2-c above can be best argued by overt U.S. Government and private U.S. sources and media, while Point 2-d might be the point of departure for a well-integrated public relations program to be undertaken (long overdue) by UFCO and the other corporations concerned. We suggest that you address appropriate recommendations to ODACID, QKFLOWAGE and--if possible and advisable--directly to UFCO and other interested corporations as well.
4. In the interest of PBSUCCESS and particularly in view of the present state of mail, press and radio censorship in Guatemala it will be necessary to take action along the lines suggested in para 2 above through KUBARK-controlled and influenced media as well, especially via SHERWOOD and the publication outlets in the LINCOLN area. We therefore request that you furnish us continuously with pertinent material, especially with articles, radio scripts, background material, statistics, pictures on the following subjects:
a. Soviet territorial conquests
b. Atrocities committed by Soviet troops in occupied and annexed areas (Latin American audiences might be more impressed if such stories come from Asia rather than from Europe--not excluding the latter, however)
c. Soviet economic exploitation of occupied and satellite areas, including both direct plunder and forcible "adjustment" of the respective economies to serve Russian interests
d. Experiences of countries and enterprises which did business with the Soviet Union and other communist countries
e. Comparisons between labor conditions, labor legislation and general standards of living in the Soviet orbit, on the one hand, and in democratic countries, on the other hand (using, for obvious reasons, less the U.S. than other Western countries, including free Asian countries, for comparison purposes)
f. Labor conditions and treatment of indigenous workers in Soviet enterprises abroad, e.g. in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria, in Manchuria and North Korea, etc.
5. We further recommend that an official ODACID study be published along the lines of para 2-c above (or, perhaps better, that a well reputed economist or professor of political science from a Latin American country be invited to undertake such a study, perhaps on a grant from one of the major foundations) and that the findings be given maximum publicity.
6. In view of the close interrelationship in public opinion between Guatemala and other Latin American, especially Central American countries, we suggest that similar materials be furnished to KUBARK stations outside the LINCOLN area as well.
7. Much of the material requested in para 4 above is undoubtedly in your files and should reach us within the next few days. Other aspects of the proposals made in the present dispatch may require more time-consuming preparations and may not be completed before PBSUCCESS has reached its climax: this is, however, a task which undoubtedly goes well beyond the limits of PBSUCCESS, in time as well as in geographic applicability, and we urge you therefore to initiate action on a sufficiently broad and effective scale in any case. Please keep us advised on your decisions made and action taken, including coordination with ODACID, QKFLOWAGE and with the business enterprises concerned.
William D. Playdon
172. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, June 7, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 152, Folder 3. Secret.
SUBJECT
Meeting with Mr. Holland--7 June 1954
1. Mr. Holland reported the prepared press conference with the Secretary scheduled for June 8/2/ at which time the Secretary will answer a question on the UFCO which will permit him to say that the Government had endeavored to see that the UFCO-Guatemala financial dispute should be negotiated, but that it was the Guatemalans who did not want the matter to be settled; thus claims that the dispute with Guatemala is based on UFCO matters are false--the dispute in fact is one with communism and nothing else. Mr. Holland stated that a similar line would be taken in the Secretary's Seattle speech June 9./3/
/2/Extracts from Secretary Dulles' June 8 press conference on Guatemala are in Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, pp. 950-951.
/3/The speech was made on June 10; see ibid., pp. 935-939.
2. Mr. Leddy confirmed that he was coordinating the matter of the cables describing documentation on the Genar arms shipment.
3. Ecuador, it was reported, is likely to oppose the OAS meeting. Means for influencing Ecuador's position were discussed.
4. Mr. Holland discussed the probabilities that the Guatemalan government might, at some time in the near future, attempt to present a case to the Security Council. It was concluded that such an action on their part would not necessarily be damaging because (a) our strength at the UN is sufficient so that on this issue the Guatemalans would find themselves isolated with only Soviet and satellite support, and (b) such a move would enable us to point out that this is a by-passing of and an affront to the inter-American system.
5. Mr. Leddy reported that the Department is at this moment working toward action which will result in the separation of Jorge Toriello from his U.S. financial affiliation, particularly Westinghouse.
6. The desirability of Mrs. Roosevelt making a statement on communism in Guatemala was discussed, and it was concluded that a move in this direction should be taken only with the Secretary's foreknowledge and approval.
7. The lack of precise information on the nature of the Alfhem arms shipment was considered in light of the continuance of the Military Mission to Guatemala. Mr. Holland decided that again a telegram should be sent to Ambassador Peurifoy requesting him to report definitively whether the Military Mission can or cannot supply information on the nature of the arms.
8. Possible confusions which it was thought could result from the standing CNO directive on the interception of arms-bearing surface traffic were reviewed, and it was concluded that the intention of the language would be enforced and general efficiency improved if it were arranged with the Navy that the Department, rather than CNO, is to designate which ships are "suspect".
9. Mr. Holland, after reviewing a proposed telegram to Bonn, asked Mr. [name not declassified] whether we would still pick up the check on German flag ships delayed during arms inspection and found to be carrying arms. Mr. [name not declassified] replied in principle yes, and since it was not appropriate to discuss this matter before the group, conferred with Mr. Leddy, who was advised that he preferred to ascertain whether the Director still favors such support from us before the release of the cable. Mr. Leddy replied that he had discussed the matter with DD/P last week and that DD/P had said all right but that he would prefer to discuss it with the Director. Mr. Leddy and Mr. [name not declassified] agreed that the cost is likely to become considerable and far beyond the liability resulting from the single case of the Wulfsbrook. It was concluded that before the Agency should agree to be liable for such claims, an understanding should be formalized between the Agency and the Department.
10. With regard to the effecting of the blockade after the OAS Agreement, Mr. Holland pointed out that if we are to interfere with Guatemalan foreign trade, the stopping of American flag vessels will prove more important than interrupting European traffic, and that we shall use as an excuse a search for Communist agents and courier systems. Mr. Holland asked the group to consider developing a formula for this. Subsequently Mr. [name not declassified] discussed this matter with Mr. Leddy and offered to undertake some research which may produce a factual basis or grounds for laying on such a story.
11. Mr. Holland requested Mr. [name not declassified] to initiate action vis--vis American domestic groups to publicize against the purchase of Guatemalan bananas and coffee. Mr. Holland would use this in connection with his attempts to persuade those countries who are so far reluctant to support the OAS meeting--he would point to a growing pressure for unilateral action and urge the reluctant countries to collaborate with the United States before the domestic pressure should become too heavy. Subsequently Mr. [name not declassified] urged Mr. Leddy to handle this as an overt measure with American civil groups and suggested that Mr. Holland has ample proof of domestic pressure existing today. It was concluded that Mr. Leddy would only call on the Agency in the event the Department could not make the necessary arrangements.
[name not declassified]
173. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 8, 1954, 0845Z
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Routine. Drafted by Page. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
773. Following from Page.
1. K-Program likely remain stalemated until further pattern of PBSUCCESS clearly emerging.
2. Not a ghost of a chance to sway army high command as long as Arbenz regime going through impressive phase of consolidation with oppositional elements fragmentized and subdued./2/ Government firmly convinced U.S. has abandoned all thought of going it alone and effective collective intervention discounted (Toriello to SWALLOW).
/2/At 4 a.m. on June 8, the Guatemalan Government suspended constitutional guarantees and moved against its internal opposition; see Document 174. Earlier the government had raided the home of a key supporter of Castillo Armas and confiscated incriminating papers.
3. Recommend K-Program be brought under Station control soonest and Page be authorized return to ZI. [name not declassified] complex can be handled through Esquire. Contact with Swallow will be maintained by Burnett.
4. If at any future time, high command members should indicate desire talk terms with U.S. representative and if situation of manifest strength then favoring our cause, dispatch of PBSUCCESS representative would pose no problem security or otherwise.
5. Request approval for Page return to HQ not later than 10 June. Esquire leaving for U.S. o/a 9 June on short visit and most appropriate effect turn over at that time.
6. Report on Page/SWALLOW meeting in 8 June pouch./3/
/3/Reference is presumably to a June 7 memorandum from Burnette to Bannister. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 100, Folder 1) In a June 8 memorandum, Bannister reported that Page had mentioned his name to a Guatemalan contact, thereby linking the Embassy to Page's efforts to defect high-ranking members of the Guatemalan military: "I consider this a violation of Station security, since he directly implicated the Station in an operation over which we had no control and with which this Station certainly did not wish to be identified at least to an unauthorized person. " (Memorandum from Bannister to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 8; ibid.)
174. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 8, 1954, 2328Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
780. 1. Govt declared suspension constitutional guarantees at 4 a.m. 8 June.
2. This most drastic step taken in recent times by WSBURNT govt.
3. Morning edition Impacto seized.
4. Declaration curfew possible.
5. Plane reported dropped leaflets over Quetzaltenango night 7 June.
6. Fear panic spreading in government circles and offices. Constant meetings govt high command with Fortuny ranking Commies attending. Fortuny allegedly successfully recommending policy appeasement toward ODYOKE. Bannister comment: Believe govt becoming desperate attempting shore up position. Suspension guarantees and subsequent activities repression may rebound govt detriment rather than benefit. Consider army key situation and believe army situation again becoming fluid. Flight ESODICS caused sensation showed army not whole heartedly supporting govt. Individual army officers griping at constant state alert and believed dissatisfaction could mount to point action if govt makes foolish moves in attempting keep afloat. Sources: ESPARTO, ESCHEL, ESPERANCE, ESCONSON-2.
175. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 8, 1954, 2328Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 5, Folder 7. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
3631. Re: GUAT 773./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 3)
1. Despite compromise PBSUCCESS moving forward apace. Compromise cost only top echelon and plans that events have invalidated anyway. But mass of organization remains intact and in state of near-readiness.
2. RO's, organizers, sab leaders presently being launched. They will contact unburned second, third echelon and proceed as planned.
3. Numerous 5-man harassment teams being readied for launching, with mission attack Commies and Commie property, but not attack army.
4. Capacity to air supply friendly internal forces should exist soon.
5. Shock troops moving to WSHOOFS staging sites. High degrees of readiness, both in proficiency and spirit.
6. More leaflet drops, intensified SHERWOOD programs contemplated.
7. It would therefore be regrettable if, by your departure, you would tend confirm apparent impression of setback to PBSUCCESS. On contrary, your mission now to counteract [name not declassified] depression and destroy whatever smugness/fatalism has arisen among army through Semantic compromise.
8. If SWALLOW your sole channel after ESQUIRE departure, make maximum use to convey "You ain't seen nothing yet" theme to SMILAX, SUMAC-2, etc. This might begin soonest. Events in next week may make you appear as prophet and man worth doing business with.
9. Would be unfortunate you leave on eve of authentication you have been requesting.
10. Request you weigh foregoing in light security and operational factors and advise your considered conclusions for LINC decision.
11. Also request you attempt retain ESQUIRE in place during forthcoming period.
176. Memorandum From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 75, Folder 6. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dunbar.
SUBJECT
Operational
KMHOOK Plans
1. As you have no doubt surmised the recent SEMANTIC flap/2/ has occasioned a great deal of soul-searching and assessment within PBSUCCESS in LINCOLN and the field stations. The conclusions arrived at were inevitable and logical. The compromise of SEMANTIC and portions of his organization is regrettable, especially at this point, but the damage done is not irreparable. We have no alternative but to proceed altering our course of action only enough to by-pass tainted portions of the internal organization.
/2/See Document 175.
2. Every effort is being made to bring all PBSUCCESS paramilitary assets to a point of readiness by 12 June 1954. There are two main contingencies for which we are preparing. One is that all assets will be in position and ready to go at our signal. Two is that through some action, spontaneous and uncontemplated, within WSBURNT the time is right for a revolutionary attempt and PBSUCCESS has no alternative but to capitalize on this spark and use it to our advantage.
3. In preparation for contingency our organizers, sab leaders and radio operators are being dispatched, pre-D-day DZ's have been selected, shock troops are being positioned, arms are moving forward and five man HORNET teams (duties are harassment and general hell-raising) are being launched.
4. Should contingency two occur, meaning that PBSUCCESS does not initiate the revolutionary attempt, we are readying all our assets to the point where we can throw all our effort into the fight within hours. All organizations have selected DZ's to be used on D-day or shortly thereafter and our air section is ready to fly the supplies which are already prepared. Since the organizers and radio operators are departing shortly it is expected that they will be in position prior to any unexpected revolutionary attempt.
5. Rest assured that action will ensue and probably in the very near future. Especially since during the time of this writing the word has gone out to launch the HORNET teams. There is the possibility that the actions of these teams may be enough to bring already strained atmosphere to a breaking point.
6. In order to broaden our perspective somewhat it would be appreciated if you would keep LINCOLN informed as to the atmosphere and sentiment within WSBURNT city during the forthcoming days and, of course, tell us of any restrictions and military police movements within the city and the surrounding area which have a bearing on the tactical situation.
7. When the revolution begins we would like to know when the time has arrived that Calligeris could, with a reasonable degree of safety (50-50 chance) fly into the main airport: in effect, make a triumphal entry which would sway any recalcitrant oppositionists to our point of view. We expect to get reports on the tactical situation through our radio operators but feel that it is necessary to get your viewpoint also.
Jerome C. Dunbar/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
177. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 9, 1954, 2308Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
791. Re: LINC 3631./2/
/2/Document 175.
1. King Program./3/ Following from Page etd Guat City 10 June 1200 hours on PAA flight 444. ETA Miami same day.
/3/K-Program.
2. Ref LINC 3631 (IN 15716). Your message very heartening, but developments make imperative Page proceed LINC at least for consultation. No reason why can not return WSBURNT soonest if operational and security considerations warrant. Recent correspondence re [name not declassified] suggests LINCOLN/King Program gears no longer mesh./4/ Either Page at fault in not clearly conveying substance [name not declassified] plans or LINCOLN unwilling consider any suggestions not strictly in line original PBSUCCESS concept. Due lack specific instructions [name not declassified] operation has deteriorated into academic exercise.
/4/Page reported a June 7 conversation with ESQUIRE as follows: "The consistency of our sponsoring on the one hand Calligeris and on the other hand wooing the High Command via [name not declassified] has not escaped him. I explained to him that the 'consejo' is anxious to have a second string to its bow. Furthermore the hope has not been given up entirely that at some future juncture it may be possible to phase together both efforts. I assured him that the consejo was giving continuous thought to this problem." (Memorandum, June 7; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 1)
3. ESQUIRE ETD 9 June. ETD New Orleans for WSBURNT 15 June. Visiting dying father in Chicago. Suggest ESQUIRE, Nutting and Page have joint discussion o/a 15 June.
178. Record of Decisions/1/
Washington, June 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 71, Folder 6. Secret.
DECISIONS TAKEN AT PBSUCCESS MEETING OF 9 JUNE 1954
1. It is understood that LINCOLN will give prior notice to Headquarters of the proposed departure of any senior members of LINC Station to the field, indicating where they are going and for what purposes. (Action: LINCOLN) (In this connection, LINC is to be advised which countries require the visa applicant to appear in person.) (Action: Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. Preston)
2. Discussion was had of the latest Corcoran attacks against the Agency and his efforts to penetrate PBSUCCESS and bring pressures to bear, using only slightly veiled threats of stirring up trouble for CIA on the Hill. Messrs. Barnes and [name not declassified] were requested to pass the word down the line at LINC to the effect that no one should have any conversation with or pass any word to Corcoran without prior approval of DCI. This is the Agency line as a whole. (Messrs. [name not declassified] and Barnes said that they know of no one at or connected with LINC who had had any contact with or passed any word to Corcoran.) (Action: Messrs. Barnes and [name not declassified])
3. Cable is to be sent to [place not declassified] in an effort to get [name not declassified] (correspondent there) to write the Perez Asturias story. (Action: Mr. [name not declassified])
4. After the 5:00 meeting with Mr. Dulles today, the problem of the additional radio operators, to be procured from General McClellan's shop, is to be re-examined. (Action: Mr. Wisner)
5. A cable is to be sent to [name not declassified] requesting that he cable Hqs at least a preliminary report of the [name not declassified]/Perez Jimenez meeting. Hqs is planning to leak a story re this meeting and it is important that we get the information developed on this meeting. (Action: Mr. Esterline)
6. The FOA plan to be handled with Mr. Weiland of USIA. (Action: Mr. Bissell)
179. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 10, 1954, 0629Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
799. Re: GUAT 791./2/
/2/Document 177.
1. Though clearly understood that this Station has no responsibility for the K-Program and in fact is limited to being a commo channel and backstopper for Page nevertheless information obtained by us and made available to Page plus that obtained by Page from [name not declassified] (see GUAT 785 (IN 15812))/3/ leads us to believe that Page's departure at this time is unfortunate since indications army discontent mounting and may result in conditions favorable to defection efforts either through [name not declassified] or others.
/3/Dated June 9. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3)
2. Since information contained LINC 3631 (IN 15716)/4/ and obtained from [name not declassified] as reported GUAT 790 (IN 16092)/5/ indicates Semantic compromise is an inconvenience rather than disaster, we perturbed by fact no one will be on scene to handle defection possibilities which may shortly arise as friendly pressure and govt tension mount.
/4/Document 175.
/5/Dated June 11. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3)
3. We wish point out we have no contact with any Page people and that K-Program automatically suspended with Page departure.
180. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 12, 1954, 1739Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Bissell on June 12 and approved by Wisner.
04681. Ref: A. SHERWOOD 200;/2/ B. LINCOLN 3711./3/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 12, Folder 3)
/3/Dated June 11. (Ibid., Box 5, Folder 8)
1. KMFLUSH Ambassador has closed deal with ODACID for three F-47. Down payment will be made and title transferred 14 or 15 June.
2. Planes will be "processed" prior delivery which we take to mean bringing maintenance completely up to date. On this basis delivery possible by 22 or 23 June. If completely rehabilitated with engines rebuilt would require considerably longer.
3. KMFLUSH Ambassador here insisting on having planes in "perfect condition". ODACID urging him accept "processed" planes with understanding they will be rehabilitated if any difficulties develop within 90 days.
4. Arrangement presently being worked out between KMFLUSH Ambassador and ODACID calls for delivery by ODUNIT in Miami and KMFLUSH to fly from there with "American pilots under contract." We are not attempting alter this arrangement. Planes originate Puerto Rico and could probably be turned over there if preferable.
5. Realize delivery 23 June later than you desire but believe the machinery cannot be made to turn over any faster.
181. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to All PBSUCCESS Stations/1/
HUL-A-1045
[place not declassified], June 13, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dunbar on June 13. Sent to Guatemala City, [4 places not declassified], and Washington.
SUBJECT
General--KUGOWN
Specific--Policy Guidance for Final Phase of PBSUCCESS
1. We are forwarding herewith copy of our Policy Guidance which is a general outline of the KUGOWN effort desired in support of the final phase of PBSUCCESS which has just started.
2. In view of the continuous changes of the situation and the necessary flexibility of the KUGOWN effort in line with the progress of our KUHOOK action, our policy guidance had to be confined to a fairly general plan the implementation of which we must leave to you.
3. We shall supplement this general guidance by cable or dispatch, as the situation may warrant, but we expect you to take all possible steps for the implementation of this program without delay and without expecting separate directives for every single step from us. We reiterate, however, that all KUGOWN action must be coordinated with, and subordinated to, KUHOOK action on the spot.
JCD
Attachment
POLICY GUIDANCE
1. Our enterprise has now entered its final, decisive phase. We cannot expect any more to change fundamentally the political opinions and attitudes of large groups of the population during this necessarily short period, but Psychological Warfare has nevertheless a very significant role to play during this final stage.
2. The government has been trying frantically during the last two weeks to recover the initiative which it had virtually lost before--as had been indicated by the profound effect of Archbishop Arellano's pastoral letter, the impression made by the opening of a powerful clandestine radio station, the highly successful "32" campaign, the indignation provoked by the arrival of Soviet arms and finally the distribution of oppositional leaflets by an unidentified plane which swooped low over the roof of the National Palace.
3. The government's initiative consisted primarily of mass arrests and house searches, climaxed by the formal suspension of constitutional liberties--which had been practically disregarded already before (arrests without warrants, people held incommunicado, etc.). At the same time, the communists issued publicly orders for the arming of labor and peasants' groups, thus admitting their uncertainty as regards the political attitude of the army. In the diplomatic field, the government tried to seize the initiative by offering Honduras a non-aggression pact (an offer which has been turned down in the meantime), by offering direct talks between Arbenz and Eisenhower (also rejected) and by a world-wide propaganda campaign--supported by communists everywhere, notably by Radio Moscow--which tries to denounce the opposition movement as a "tool of foreign imperialists," while at the same time linking the U.S. State Department's protest against the Soviet arms shipment to the United Fruit Company's financial claims (the old "amalgam" technique which Stalin used already in the beginning of his fratricidal fight against Trotsky and his followers).
4. The government--or rather the leaders of the Communist Party manipulating the figureheads in the government--obviously pursue a triple goal:
a. deprive the opposition movement of its heads through arrests and of its voices through rigorous censorship
b. intimidate and confuse the rank-and-file of the opposition by a show of strength, while at the same time impugning the motives of the opposition
c. defend their position diplomatically by presenting Guatemala as the victim of U.S. imperialist intervention, mainly in the interest of UFCO and other "monopolies," thus preparing for the OAS conference and gaining time for the consolidation of their internal position.
5. Our Psychological Warfare effort in combatting this government-communist policy must be focused on the following objectives:
a. Explaining to the people that the apparent "show of strength" is actually a show of weakness, confusion and hysteria and that the few smart moves of the government (especially in the diplomatic field) have most obviously not originated in Guatemala, but in Moscow and in Moscow-trained minds;
b. Weakening the enemy's potential by showing them the hopelessness of their stand, their increasing isolation, the true motives behind the government's actions and inviting them to change sides--or at least to leave the government's side--while there is still time (but very little time left);
c. Giving as much direct, on-the-spot support to all moves connected with the actual uprising against the government--discouraging premature local actions as well as panic, reducing the need for violence in persuading enemy forces to surrender or to withdraw and mobilizing popular support on the broadest possible scale.
6. Inside the target area, the above objectives will have to be reached under the present circumstances primarily by clandestine means, especially--though by no means exclusively--by the activities of mobile Tactical Psywar Teams (for which special, detailed instructions have already been issued before) which ought to include (but do not have to be confined to)
Issuance of clandestine bulletins and leaflets
Nerve war action against enemy key personnel
Rumor (whispering) campaigns
Wall paintings etc.
7. The enemy relies especially on mass support through communist-led labor and peasants unions and through front organizations of youth, students, women, peace committees, etc. Enemy public mass meetings and parades ought to be attacked by hecklers, spreading of sudden panic rumors (e.g. telling people gathering for an open-air meeting that an air raid is imminent or that store of explosives in a nearby building is about to blow up), use of stink bombs, setting inflammable displays, posters, banners, etc. afire, or the like. Wherever arms are issued to communist-led groups, our friends and sympathizers ought to try to get their share: if this is impossible, we ought to start at least rumors that these weapons are getting largely into the "wrong" hands.
8. Our main psychological efforts should be concentrated on the following groups:
a. Most Important--upon the members of the Armed Forces, influencing them to side with the opposition, or where this proves impossible, at least inducing them to stand aside and not give any support to the government;
b. All other armed groups, police, armed workers and peasant troops, etc. To the extent to which these groups are composed of irredeemable enemies, they should be at least weakened and so far as possible eliminated from the struggle, by intimidating or confusing them, etc.;
c. Workers in key enterprises, railroad, dockers, electrical power plants, printing shops, etc. (to prevent them from carrying out communist orders);
d. Students and other young people who can possibly be mobilized for active participation in the fighting on our side;
e. Housewives and other women who can (i) influence their men, husbands, sons etc. in the armed forces, and so forth (ii) undertake demonstrations before prisons, police stations, government buildings, etc., asking for the release of political prisoners, demonstrate against the use of force, perhaps even physically impede the move of the government forces, by crowding the streets, lying down on railroad tracks, etc.
9. Rumors, combining fact and fiction, which ought to be circulated, may include the following (not every rumor is applicable to every group of people and to every situation; select from the following suggestions whatever is suitable for given moment and audience):
(i) A group of Soviet commissars, officers and political advisers, led by a member of the Moscow Politbureau, have landed (at the airfield, in Puerto Barrios, etc.);
(ii) The government has issued an order devaluating the Quetzal at the rate of 1:10. Use your money immediately to buy food and durable goods;
(iii) The government is about to change. Fortuny will take Arbenz' place, Pellecer Foreign Minister, Gutierrez will be made Minister of Government (Interior), Monzon propaganda minister, etc. Fortuny, Toriello and Fanjul are being flown to Argentina in a two-engined Soviet jet plane.
(iv) In addition to military conscription, the communists will introduce labor conscription. A decree is already being printed. All boys and girls 16 years old will be called for one year of labor duty in special camps, mainly for political indoctrination and to break the influence of family and church on the young people. These labor troops will also be used for special missions in other countries.
(v) Food rationing is about to be introduced and the money which people can no longer spend on food stuffs and other consumer goods is to be made available to the government by means of a compulsory loan.
(vi) Arbenz has already left the country. His announcements from the National Palace are actually made by a double, provided by Soviet intelligence.
(vii) An educational reform is being prepared. There will be no longer any religious instruction at state expense, but on the contrary lessons in atheism, Soviet style.
Add rumors of your own, following the day-by-day changes in the situation.
10. The efforts of our friends inside the target area must be supported to the utmost from outside, by radio, newspapers, leaflets, teams of border crossers, etc. This outside effort must be subordinated to the program outlined above. All outside groups, by listening to our own radio station as well as the other news broadcasts, must adapt their activities on a day-to-day basis to the developments inside the target area.
11. An all-out effort on a 24-hour basis, using all human and material resources within reach, must be started immediately to implement the above program in support of the decisive last steps of our enterprise.
182. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, June 14, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Secret.
SUBJECT
Guatemalan Friendship Societies--Gruson/2/ piece of 14 June 1954, New York Times
/2/New York Times reporter Sidney Gruson.
1. In line with our conversation of this morning about the Gruson piece in today's Times, I believe you have already received by now a copy of the piece that we have worked up and given to Time Magazine, entitled "The Friends of Guatemala."
2. This piece of Gruson reporting is about as harmful as anything he has done. It places the entire emphasis upon the line taken by the (known) Communist-inspired and Communist-organized so-called Guatemalan Friendship Society in Mexico--giving the impression that there is tremendous Mexican sentiment against the US position with respect to Guatemala and implying that the Mexican Government had better watch out if it is thinking about shifting its position in the direction of what the United States wishes.
3. I don't know whether you plan to have any further conversations with your friend on the Times, but it has occurred to me that if you do plan any further conversation--or if he should contact you again--you might call his attention to this Gruson piece and tell him how much we know about the Communist origin of this whole friendship society charade. You could then make the obvious conclusion that Gruson, by his writing, is putting a lot of heavy water on the wheels of this Communist operation and that he must be pretty naive if he is not aware of the significance of his action./3/ I don't think you should provide the actual text of the piece entitled "The Friends of Guatemala" to your friend on the Times--since we have already given this to Time Magazine in this precise form and since this would make it all too apparent from where Time got its poop.
/3/Because of Agency complaints about Gruson's reporting, DCI Dulles went to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who soon had Gruson reassigned elsewhere. (Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS History, pp. 71-72)
Frank G. Wisner/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
183. Telegram From [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
[place not declassified], June 14, 1954, 2233Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 13, Folder 6. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
583. 1. SECANT and all others adamant that 1 bomb, placed on presidential palace would be convincer to army on-the-fencers and cause mass hiding of key opposition.
2. Pilots convinced palace can be hit on 1 shot. SECANT convinced people would understand 1 bomb only not meant for them and would be convinced we holding back on bombing to prevent harming them. Field convinced.
3. Request SOMERSET be advised in accord with LINCOLN decision. If used, should be timed hours after clandestine broadcast announces go.
184. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, June 15, 1954, 1951Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; Routine. Drafted by [name not declassified] on June 14 and cleared by [name not declassified].
04884. To: [name not declassified]. For [name not declassified] CS-40544. Guatemala, Guatemala City, 11 June 1954. Former Guatemalan army officer with many contacts among leading gov't officials.
1. During 3 hour talk with leading civilian gov't officials on 11 June, President Arbenz stated army trying persuade him get rid of Communists and change gov't policy, but said present policy his and unchangeable with or without Communists, added would, if necessary, arm workers and peasants who would "fight to last man" against any attempt overthrow gov't.
(Washington comment: Anti-Communist sentiment of army has until now been balanced by personal loyalty of officers to Arbenz as fellow officer. However, officer's reaction to Communist arms shipments together with growing concern that Arbenz firmly committed to pres-ent pro-Communist policies indicates possibility major split in army on whether to continue support to Arbenz. Army reaction to any Arbenz attempt to arm peasants as counterforce to wavering army is expected to be indication their intentions to initiate or support any anti-government movement.)
2. Arbenz also stated he was trying to send Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello to Salvador to talk with President Osorio but has been informed by Salvadorans that "our minds made up and we not interested becoming friends of Communist gov't".
(Washington comment: Stiffening attitude of Salvador toward Guatemala may be result of Guat receipt Communist arms and recent Communist-inspired strikes northern Honduras.)
185. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], June 14, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Chief of the CIA Station in Guatemala.
3829. 1. After thorough review of all aspects of K Program LINC has reached following conclusions:
A. Opposition to regime had and should have two strings to its bow, one Calligeris and plan now approved and being followed by his assets; the other [name not declassified] working independently through high army officers. Both efforts should be tried since they do not become mutually exclusive until possibly after deposition present regime and even then conflict not unavoidable or even necessary.
B. As already approved the Calligeris effort will proceed without abatement.
C. [name not declassified] possibility had developed to point where it is believed he will not make affirmative move provided some internal WSBURNT turmoil develops and provided he can be given reasonably certain assurance that if he in fact overthrows Arbenz and is the first to establish a de facto government in the capital he will be officially recognized by PBPRIME.
D. Calligeris movement should provide needed internal turmoil. Assume then that [name not declassified] can provide capability to establish himself as de facto regime in capital, can he be given assurance of PBPRIME recognition realizing that at same moment Calligeris may be pursuing successful campaign in numerous areas outside capital? Assuming Calligeris defeat or assuming [name not declassified] failure there is no problem.
2. LINC recommends that PBPRIME should take advantage all possible movements capable achieving major target namely overthrow present regime and elimination Communists. Consequently should urge [name not declassified] take action. If authority given, LINC can through Page ESQUIRE get word to [name not declassified] which believe he will accept regarding recognition provided on his own he gets control govt in capital first. Such assurance however should not be given unless recognition in fact given immediately provided conditions met.
3. What might occur thereafter between [name not declassified] and Calligeris is an internal WSBURNT affair.
4. This is matter in LINC. Opinion of utmost importance so appreciate advise soonest. Request your concurrence.
186. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 15, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
3838. 1. Entirely possible situation rapidly developing which could very well become critical turning point in PBSUCCESS. Imperative we seek and apply maximum measures at this moment and force the issue.
2. [name not declassified] from your cables appears to be assuming leadership within army. Accordingly you should endeavor to impress upon him through ESQUIRE (per below) the following points which should be clarified and/or reiterated:
A. He is covertly assured of fullest ODYOKE backing.
B. SCOMBER/2/ assures him of fullest support within its capabilities including all its assets.
/2/Joint Council of "The Group" and Castillo Armas' political organization that was used to signal joint decisions.
C. SCOMBER practically certain its control over SYNCARP to almost guarantee its fullest support
D. The moral issue of avoiding bloodshed at this moment--practically zero hour--is so overwhelming that he must impress upon his followers within the army action must be taken at once to avoid the most terrible bloodshed in WSBURNT history. Anti-Communist forces are now well organized and rapidly gaining in power--both externally and internally--and are completely dedicated to gaining control and will not be dissuaded regardless of the price in blood or treasure until success is obtained.
3. The forces of anti-communism are tremendous and are now planning every conceivable measure in stages which may be necessary to eliminate the Communist beachhead from this area. Remind him again that Calligeris is but a symbol because he is the leading anti-Communist exilee. Aircraft, armaments, technical equipment, economic pressures, and every possible weapon is being marshalled behind the Calligeris symbol to insure success and on behalf of the anti-Communists of WSBURNT.
4. ODYOKE presently desirous to make above maximum effort to preserve integrity and pride of WSBURNT to overthrow Soviet yoke by their own means. There is absolutely no question regarding the ultimate outcome. Communism will not be tolerated: if present methods of aiding WSBURNT to resolve their own problems prove inadequate then unquestionable ODYOKE and other Latin American powers will intervene by force. The expulsion of Soviet control of WSBURNT is now underway and will not stop until freedom is restored.
5. The foregoing guidance should be adequate and enable Guat to seize initiative and exploit every opportunity. In event circumstances are as described above inform OPIM any problem or propositions in connection with foregoing guidance, as time is also a vital factor.
6. ESQUIRE due WSBURNT about 0600 15 June and scheduled see [name not declassified] during day.
7. Page scheduled arrive WSBURNT noon 16 June via Mexico City. Arrange contact and brief him before he contacts ESQUIRE.
8. Request you contact ESQUIRE soonest briefing him on your info re [name not declassified] alleged activities asking him to confirm same. Based upon results this verification proceed to guide ESQUIRE on basis above guidance consistent with your best judgment: attempting to ascertain in what way SCOMBER may be of greatest assistance to him if in fact this is a critical moment. If unconfirmed and [name not declassified] not in fact assuming leadership of opposition officer corps and no urgency present then await return of Page on 16 June to resume handling of K-Program.
187. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 15, 1954, 2039Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
04904. 1. Referring in general to the developments of the past 48 hours including subject matter Playdon/Ascham telephone conversation last night, will you please provide to us your very best estimate, as of today, of the date by which you expect to achieve readiness (which we assume to be equivalent to your kickoff date).
2. For your information Hqs going full out to provide or stimulate various forms additional pressure on regime, many of which actions responsive to or in line with recommendations of LINC and field. Yesterday and today following steps have been taken here:
A. Ascham personally arranged leak to ap last night of story which was on morning broadcasts although too late for most morning papers. UP following up with questions and claims to have independent rumor to same effect although we not sure whether ultimate source is same.
B. At least two of major oil companies have been requested take some form of action or make some statement which will be open to interpretation they considering slowdown or temporary stoppage oil shipments. First reaction favorable and one or more may comply./2/
/2/No additional information has been found.
C. Statements have been prepared for both President and Sec/State generally along lines your recommendations, and Sec/State orally briefed this morning before his press conference./3/ President's press conference/4/ comes tomorrow and we hope for best.
/3/Secretary of State Dulles told the press that the Department did not have any information from a "clearly dependable source." He continued: "No doubt there is going on somewhat of a reign of terror in Guatemala. There is no doubt in my opinion but what the great majority of the Guatemalan people have both the desire and the capability of cleaning their own house. But, of course, those things are difficult to do in face of the Communist type of terrorism which is manifesting itself in Guatemala and which is perhaps most dramatically expressed by the statement of one Communist member of the Guatemalan Congress that if there was a disturbance, that would mark the beginning of a beheading of all anti-Communist elements in Guatemala." (Press Release 323, June 15; printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, p. 981)
/4/For information on the press conference, including the draft press statement and an excerpt from Press Secretary James Hagerty's diary, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1168-1169 (Document 62).
D. Other news media provided with bits and pieces which they have accepted avidly.
E. Guidances to non-PBSUCCESS Stations with which you familiar.
3. We assume both LINC and field will continue forwarding recommendations and suggestions for action here.
188. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 16, 1954, 0617Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 5, Folder 9. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
3895. RE: GUAT 848./2/
/2/Dated June 16. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)
1. Appreciate fully your apprehensions behalf Page however he is fully briefed by LINC on how to proceed upon his arrival.
2. With exception change in residence status all points were recognized and anticipated in above briefing. Page despite healthy desire to be cautious is fully prepared for expulsion, denial of entry and at worst apprehension by local authorities. Important point is to permit him opportunity to materialize K Program in manner originally contemplated. FYI LINC 3838 (IN 17978)/3/ was prepared with his assistance and Hqs general concurrence in principle. Moreover LINC convinced that more than "issuing marching orders" left to do.
/3/Document 186.
3. Accordingly however tenuous Page's position may be he should attempt finalization his program with fullest support your Station: In event situation denies him opportunity then Station should be prepared to pick up and follow through with [name not declassified].
4. Therefore arrange to meet and brief Page on developments since his departure setting up usual emergency and alternate procedures in event of his forced withdrawal from operation. Resolve his residence situation soonest. Inform him of DIR 04858 (OUT 53908)./4/
/4/Dated June 15. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1)
5. Imperative your Station provide LINC fullest details these developments by OPIM cable as many other factors hinge upon your progress. Page has been requested to do same.
189. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles/1/
Washington, June 16, 1954, 11:20 a.m.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dulles Telephone Calls, Box 2, A67-28. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis Bernau, Secretary of State Dulles' secretary.
TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ALLEN DULLES
The Sec. asked if there is any news from his front, and AWD said no. Things are moving along. Neither had heard what the President said about Guatemala this a.m.
The Sec. said he is seeing him this p.m. and will mention the question of tankers on the other side of the world. The Sec. asked if AWD had any particular views. AWD said he is not at all sure that he would do it. It is not confirmed yet, and he doesn't think we have picked up vessels. Will try to get word to the Sec. by 2:30. They agreed it does not affect policy. The Sec. said he thought the information from AWD was pretty explicit. There was communication with Geneva. AWD said it would be helpful to get guidance. If it doesn't happen now, it will. It is a very ticklish point.
AWD said he is seeing this morning men from Standard of NJ and they will lay before him their position with regard to the small country down south. AWD besides finding out their position will possibly slow things up without formalized action.
The Sec. asked AWD if he thought Hickenlooper might introduce some kind of a sanctions bill in the Senate. AWD said it is a good idea, but will have to be phrased very carefully. The Sec. said we have a draft drawn up, but he was not satisfied with it. AWD said it would help their phase, though it would create problems here.
190. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 16, 1954, 2050Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 12. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
05142. Refs: A. LINC 3908; B. LINC 3909./2/
1. Guidance provided ref A makes excellent sense to us even though/3/ it appears from here you may be overly optimistic specifying 18 June as date completion pre-D-day air supply and activation minimum commo capability.
/2/Neither printed. (Both ibid., Box 6, Folder 1)
/3/The words "even though" were inserted by hand and Wisner's handwritten initials appear next to the line in the margin.
2. We agree generally with your analysis of situation as set forth ref B and have no policy objection to scheduled timing. Agree specifically that crux whole issue continues to be position WSBURNT armed forces concerning which we must have clearer favorable indications before kick-off./4/ This supersedes all other reasons for additional delay although achievement some degree operational readiness would appear essential prerequisite for action.
/4/Influencing the army leadership was considered so critical that field officers were instructed in radio broadcasts to "Emphasize in above broadcast in every program that army our friend, on side of people and Christianity, against communism. Even if a few officers or men, temporarily obeying orders from their commie superiors, should turn against liberation movement, do not consider entire army our enemy, appeal to soldiers honor, common sense, love of fatherland, Christian faith." (Telegram from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Broadcasting Unit, June 16; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 92, Folder 2)
3. If evidence concerning position of military indicates it solidly behind regime there is no doubt in our mind that Calligeris' forces in exterior and if possible in interior must be restrained from mounting attack since attack under these circumstances would result in certain defeat accompanied by most harmful consequences affecting all aspects WSBURNT problem. This is one thing we must avoid and all efforts must be devoted to this end including imposition of specially devised restraints upon Calligeris, etc. For use in arguments to convince Calligeris and associates it should be brought home to him that his own inability to produce reception parties, etc. reveal great weakness and possibly non-existence his claimed internal organization and he should be told that all support will be withdrawn if he persists. At same time the alternative course envisioned in Lynade's paper/5/ should be forcibly advanced as the only conceivable course of action under the circumstances. Calligeris should be assured of continuing support on this basis and no other.
/5/The paper was not found.
4. Meaning of paras 4 and 5 ref B not clear to us, and in present form seem somewhat inconsistent with para 3. Para 5 could be read as meaning that failures of adequate readiness preparations and other foul-ups are justification for committing all resources to action. Please clarify.
191. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 16, 1954, 2118Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
05145. Ref: A. GUAT 848;/2/ B. LINC 3895./3/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 188.
/3/Document 188.
1. As indicated Whiting/Playdon telephone conversation, we believe LINC made correct decision in return of Page to WSBURNT./4/ Whereas we recognize validity and serious import of certain points in reference A message, this appears time for calculated risk taken with eyes open in order obtain maximum results from Page knowledge, ability and relationship with [name not declassified]. The overriding importance of what could be produced as a result success this line of effort is clear to everyone here, especially in light of developing difficulties and increasing uncertainties Calligeris effort.
/4/See Document 186.
2. Our only suggestion is that you may wish instruct Station to prepare plan for Embassy action in event Page arrest or disappearance. Do not believe Page should remain WSBURNT more than minimum time enable him establish contact and deliver final exhortation.
192. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, June 16, 1954, 2118Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
05144. Ref: GUAT 857./2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)
We question strongly proposal para 1 reference that Campesinos be enjoined kill Guardia Civil, etc. This amounts to incitement civil war and large-scale blood letting thus fouling Calligeris pitch and discrediting his movement as terrorist and irresponsible outfit willing sacrifice innocent lives. An acceptable line would be enjoin Campesinos and others defend and protect themselves and other anti-Communists who are being hunted down in frantic Communist effort save tottering regime.
193. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 17, 1954, 0131Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 75, Folder 2. No classification marking; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
566. Ref: LINC 3838./2/
/2/Document 186.
In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister made cold approach [name not declassified] on morning 15 June. [name not declassified] convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of [name not declassified]. Knows Bannister only by true first name.
2. [name not declassified] firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence.
3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC-2 fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL-1 eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army.
4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC-2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P-38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well.
5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove.
6. [name not declassified] said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed.
7. After meeting he departed to meet SUMAC-2 and then proceed line up regimental commanders in capital.
8. Next meeting morning 17 June at 0900.
9. In view change from negotiations to action you will appreciate impossibility reinserting Page in contact chain.
194. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], June 17, 1954, 0942Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Station in Guatemala.
3953. Ref: [telegram indicator not declassified] 265./2/ For Page.
/2/Not found.
1. Regret PAA stoppage and problems your return WSBURNT.
2. Speed with which events moving plus increased vigilance, tensions and general unrest now such that your return inadvisable.
3. Appreciate your disappointment which we share in losing opportunity close in for kill but unavoidable bad break.
4. If you can get documented for DTFROGS, proceed there soonest to stay through 19 June when SWALLOW expected. Try arrange Wellbank solidly placed as local consejo rep. With high DTFROGS rep possibly Jurant. Wellbank met SWALLOW 14 June but believe you can help consolidate his position.
5. Advise if can make arrangements and ETA. LINC will notify [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If you unable go DTFROGS return LINC.
195. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) and Secretary of State Dulles/1/
Washington, June 17, 1954, 5:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, J.F. Dulles Telephone Conversations, Box 2, A 67-28. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis Bernau.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. HOLLAND
He said Sec. Anderson just told him that he has a military telegram from Honduras that Armas(?) "is moving". The Sec. said he didn't know what that means, but he supposes it means something. H. said A. is a revolutionary individual lurking in the forest.
196. Editorial Note
On June 17, 1954, at its 202nd meeting, the National Security Council discussed a proposed anti-trust suit against the United Fruit Company, and whether or not to proceed with the suit at the present time. The Justice Department proposed a settlement but United Fruit continued to insist that the company had done nothing wrong and refused to consider a settlement "unless the Government revealed in advance" its evidence of violations.
Both Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower saw no reason not to proceed. Dulles added: "on balance it might be positively advantageous to U.S. policy in Latin America if the suit were instituted. Many of the Central American countries were convinced that the sole objective of United States foreign policy was to protect the fruit company. It might be a good idea to go ahead and show them that this was not the case, by instituting the suit." The Secretary was, however, concerned that the suit might interfere "with certain activities of the Central Intelligence Agency."
Allen Dulles responded that "given a little more time, the Central American states would do Justice's job for it." He also advised a delay of one month "by which time the situation in Guatemala would have been clarified." (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
197. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], June 17, 1954, 1907Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 10. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
3965. 1. Evidence available convinces us of following:
A. Internal Calligeris org has been demoralized, frightened into inactivity or badly disorganized by Commie police efforts and arrests.
B. Consequently opposition left with Calligeris external assets plus possibility [name not declassified] move.
C. External assets now in position where will probably move regardless what we do. Only action available to us is either withdraw support or attempt delay move without certainty effective for very brief period, possibly day or two at most.
D. Delay of such brief period would gain nothing as too short for reorganization and would just give additional time for Commies brutalize opposition and pick up few remaining assets such as sab leaders, organizers, ROS and teams from KMPAJAMA.
E. [name not declassified] move will either occur momentarily or in our opinion he will be arrested or otherwise eliminated.
F. Shock troops sufficiently large to create considerable impact particularly when supported by air drops. Fighters over capital also will have substantial effect. Tros with shock troops now been received will provide some information as to progress.
2. Have decided therefore that should move as planned night of 18 June on theory that resulting activities will force [name not declassified] and army hand if has not already acted. Also Calligeris units may overcome one or two garrisons on initial impact which reported (without confirmation) as weak from morale point of view. This could provide beachhead for rallying opposition.
3. If above fails we are still better off than pulling out and having Calligeris move on his own or assuming most unlikely that he too pulls out. In any case long term effort will become essential and in no case will present assets be any value over long haul. It is thus calculated risk but consciously undertaken as providing only present hope of success while if unsuccessful losing nothing of future value.
4. Moreover the move will provide evidence of active opposition regime and its inability to maintain its position merely through unopposed police methods.
198. Telegram From Operation PBUSCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 17, 1954, 2231Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
3977. 1. All planning heretofore predicated upon basic premise that armed Communist workmen would be denied ability merge on Adam. Blockading forces were designed serve this purpose.
2. Govt action in organizing mass public demonstration 1700 June 18 now believed to be their counter-measure to ensure maximum strength inside city before D-day.
3. Imperative you transmit following soonest to [name not declassified] after explaining above.
A. Army must be made known to recognize that this move constitutes Communist threat to launch Bogotazo and overwhelm army.
B. Practically impossible forestall liberation movement from attacking 2020 June 18. Therefore army must be urged to take immediate measures allegedly against subversive forces, erecting street blockades throughout center of city and searching all civilians for firearms. Armed patrols must be in readiness to prevent disorders. Army must be prepared to fire on rioters and take strong measures without equivocation.
C. Imperative [name not declassified] be impressed with fact that our intelligence indicates this is a Communist maneuver to sack the city and seize control over army which it distrusts. If preventive measures are not taken soonest army will pass to Communist control on this date.
D. Do everything in your power to cancel meeting. Disperse crowds. Deny assembly of all groups. These measures must be taken at once.
4. FYI: Above predicated on deduction only from available info, however, important you realize this capability exists and exercise every means to counteract it. If successful in convincing army of foregoing any action which it would take would be against Communists and therefore a step in direction of supporting anti-Communists. This then could be [name not declassified] first test.
199. Editorial Note
Simultaneous action on the part of the Guatemalan army was key to every Castillo Armas scenario that U.S. planners developed. In the early days of the operation, it was believed that Castillo Armas had a strong organization inside the Guatemalan military, but that belief gradually eroded and faith was placed in the K-Program's ability to persuade the officers themselves to take action against communism. On the eve of operational D-day, June 17, 1954, however, the CIA Station in Guatemala informed PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida:
"[name not declassified] says he must wait for emergency. He pled for bomb drop on racetrack etc. Begged for show of force. Vigorously urged tear gas drop and breaking up of 18 June demonstration which govt. busily trying stage on mammoth scale. Says army and government do not believe anything can or will happen. All pure talk. Nothing but psychological stunt.
"[name not declassified] assured him bomb would be dropped, that planes would fly over, that tracers would be fired, that spectacle force would be provided. [name not declassified] pleaded that this be done soonest, that planes zoom city, [name not declassified] home, [name not declassified] home, Guardia Civil etc.
"He categorically stated that bomb drop and impressive show of strength would swing army over. He insisted with obvious sincerity that show of strength will give him and friends opportunity which they will seize. He convinced they can gain control. He reiterates that time for showing strength is here."
The operatives in Guatemala agreed: "We urgently request that bomb be dropped, show strength be made, that all available planes be sent over, that army and capital be shown that time for decision is here." (Telegram 864 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 4) Telegram 866 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 17, reiterated this message. (Ibid.)
200. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], June 17, 1954, 0720Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
3946. Ref: GUAT 866./2/
/2/See Document 199.
1. Keep pressure on as per ref. You have tremendous opportunity solving whole situation if you succeed with [name not declassified].
2. Emphasize speed essential as Calligeris move imminent and avoidance bloody showdown only possible if [name not declassified] successful immediately.
3. FYI Will not drop bomb 18 June but will do all possible have three fighters buzz capital. At least one fighter will be there 18 June and three noon 19 June.
4. Tell [name not declassified] Consejo too conscientiously in favor bloodless take over to risk misplaced bomb now. Strength if necessary will not be withheld. Point out that fighters plus evidence which he must have heard of day and night drops covering all parts country should be sufficient to convince him without taking chance unnecessary deaths and damage at this time.
5. Also PBPRIME Pres in 16 June press statement has evidenced his concern WSBURNT backing SecState (DIR 04858 (OUT 53908)/3/ so PBPRIME conviction can hardly be in doubt.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 188.
6. Essential you keep us informed as fully and currently possible as move may occur momentarily and picture your end vital our decision.
7. Bear down and good luck.
201. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], June 17, 1954, 1941Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence, SHERWOOD, and to Stations in [place not declassified], Guatemala City, and [place not declassified].
3966. Command msg for Cadick:
1. You hereby assigned full field command all KUBARK controlled PBSUCCESS assets less GUAT Station.
2. Your mission is to create maximum impact on enemy govt with forces at your disposal. With objective of persuading army to join friendly cause.
3. You will be guided by existing directives and/or policies.
4. You will be directly responsible to LINCOLN for requesting further guidance. LINCOLN will provide command directives as required which must be strictly adhered to in every instance.
5. You will hereafter direct all air operational support activities through Somerset less fire. Fighter aircraft will be armed for defense only. Air fire support authority must be obtained from LINCOLN regardless of urgency existing.
6. You will utilize and employ Sherwood broadcast and KUGOWN teams as required.
7. You will direct tactical intelligence activities keeping LINC informed at all times.
8. You will submit operational situation report by OPIM cable every 12 hours until further notice.
202. Editorial Note
Castillo Armas launched his attack on June 18, 1954, at 8:20 p.m. after the "National Liberation Committee" had consulted with the "Assembly of the People" the previous evening, according to text prepared by the CIA for broadcast. In the radio broadcast the people of Guatemala were told: "At this moment, armed groups of our liberation movement are advancing everywhere throughout the country. . . . The hour of decision has struck." The message stressed the indigenous nature of the "uprising": "This is not a foreign intervention, but an uprising of the honest, Christian, freedom-loving people of Guat (sic) to liberate our homeland from the foreign intervention which has already taken place, from control by the Soviet Union which has made Guat an advanced outpost of international commie aggression, from rule by Soviet puppets." (Telegram from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Broadcasting Unit, June 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)
The attack, however, did not surprise the Guatemalan Government. At a meeting of military and political officials on June 15 Minister of Government Augusto Charnaud MacDonald "announced that government informed by 'most reliable source' that Col. Carlos Castillo Armas plans uprising to overthrow Guatemalan government between 18-19 June." (Telegram from the CIA to the Station Chief in [place not declassified], June 18; ibid., Box 9, Folder 2)
203. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 18, 1954, 1414Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. Secret; Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
885. Ref: GUAT 874;/2/ LINC 3970;/3/ LINC 3966 para 5./4/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 1)
/4/Document 201.
1. As stated, success largely depends on letting [name not declassified] and army take action.
2. If ref A fully complied with, [name not declassified] will have opportunity to carry out his agreement and fulfill ref B request.
3. We consider imperative fighter planes drop bombs, fire tracers, buzz city, break up demonstration through tear gas or other drops.
204. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Guatemala City, June 18, 1954, 1504Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 91, Folder 6. No classification marking; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
887. Re LINC 3966 para 5./2/
/2/Document 201.
1. Assume from ref all air potentially at Calligeris disposal.
2. Trust you realize this completely incompatible with role you contemplated for [name not declassified]. Appears you intending give [name not declassified] (the hope for swinging army) only Station "persuasion", while Calligeris gets all the muscle.
3. As repeatedly stated, [name not declassified] needs all available air 18 June to create emergency on which he can capitalize.
4. [name not declassified] also must be able call on air 19 June to follow up his coup if successful.
5. Evident Calligeris shock troops do not need air protection where no air opposition exists. Shock troops also bring own gear, so have not priority need for resupply.
6. Please confirm that air available to [name not declassified] as requested.
205. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], June 19, 1954, 0414Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
4046. 1. If [name not declassified] reaches any good result which we most fervently hope believe an almost immediate cautious statement by ODACID would do wonders to bring possible chaos to a halt.
2. By cautious we mean that regardless of [name not declassified] (or one of his army allies) possible success in capital ODACID statement should not be too flatly in favor [name not declassified]. Assuming that [name not declassified] or his boy gets in, it must not be overlooked that spark which touched it off belonged to Calligeris--also on a national wide hoop-up--PBPRIME must therefore recognize demise of regime but avoid too hasty position on successor.
3. You have probably been thinking of all this and maybe it won't even happen. Our belief in its importance however prompted this message and effort to anticipate.
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