Testimony by James R

Testimony by James R. Jones

Co-Chairman and CEO of Manatt Jones Global Strategies

Former Member of Congress and US Ambassador to Mexico

October 25, 2007 Hearing

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the

Western Hemisphere

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept your invitation to testify today about the proposed package of assistance to the Government of Mexico to help them and our own government in the on-going fight against narco-trafficking and organized crime. I hope that the Congress will act with deliberation and dispatch to approve an appropriate package as it is in our own self interest as well as that of Mexico.

You have asked me to comment on the proposal and how it will be received in Mexico and what I think the elements of such a package should be. Following are some of my thoughts based on my experience but before I have seen the Administration’s proposal:

This should not be called "Plan Mexico" as if to equate it with "Plan Colombia." The situations and respective histories of the two nations are different. Approaches to working with both countries should also be different. Unlike Colombia, there should be no U. S. military involved on Mexican soil. Also, we must recognize that the level of real democracy in Mexico is significantly different from that of Colombia.

A more appropriate title should be "United States and Mexico Partnership to Enhance Border Security and Combat Organized Crime." Certainly, that is how we and Mexico should view the proposal.

The problem in Mexico is much broader today than just narco-trafficking. As I predicted in the 1990s when I was Ambassador, the enormous financial profits from trafficking illegal drugs from Mexico to the U. S. will create additional social problems in Mexico itself. Today we see drug usage in Mexico on the rise as well as pervasive organized crime which challenges and corrupts governments just as has happened in the past in Italy and Colombia among others.

Narco trafficking is a relatively new phenomenon in Mexico. When I was in Congress, my colleague, Glenn English, carried on a decade long battle to thwart drug trafficking through the Caribbean to the United States. Mexico was not really a factor during that decade. Finally, in the late 1980s, our country had the resources and capability to seriously disrupt this Gulf of Mexico corridor of drug trafficking. So the drug lords from South America merely changed their routes, using Mexican land routes as the avenue to the drug demand in our country.

At first, these Mexican criminal facilitators merely took a commission. Soon they took product and then established their own trafficking routes into the United States. This created huge profits they could use, in part, to corrupt law enforcement on both sides of our border.

When I was Ambassador, we established efforts to combat narco-trafficking as one of our top three objectives. I called our strategy, "Operation Cucaracha," because I soon concluded that as long as the U. S. market for illegal drugs was as large and prosperous as it was, the drug traffickers will find a way to penetrate that market. So, like cockroaches, we need to acknowledge that it will be virtually impossible to completely and permanently kill these drug gangs. But by harassing and interdicting them and by going after their laundered drug profits, perhaps we can slow them down and force them to find alternative routes.

That seems to be part of what Mexico's new President, Felipe Calderon, is trying to accomplish as he has made it his priority to go after and disrupt these organized crime groups. Apparently, it is having an effect as our government reports that cocaine shipments to the United States are down almost 25 percent and that the price of cocaine in the U.S. has increased about 24 percent.

My point is that an aggressive campaign against drug trafficking can show positive results. But until we make drug usage in the United States as socially and practically unacceptable as smoking tobacco, the drug traffickers will find some way to reach our very profitable market.

It is very important that we assist in any way possible to strengthen democracy within our southern neighbor. Let's remember that Mexico has had real democracy for only about a dozen years. Before that it was democracy in name only as the country was ruled for more than seven decades by one political party which controlled virtually all of the institutions of government. While there were three branches of government, power resided in one branch alone.

Today, Mexico has truly an independent Congress which must be reckoned with when policy is considered. At the Supreme Court, Mexico has an independent and competent group of justices who instill confidence in the rule of law when issues reach that level.

But in many parts of the country, local government, including local law enforcement in some instances, is badly infiltrated by these drug lords.

Let's also be mindful of the tortured history between our two countries. For example, until the early 1990s, Mexican textbooks taught that it was the United States that "stole half of Mexico" in the Mexican American War ceding the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California and Oregon to the U.S. Those textbooks also noted that the United States was the only nation that invaded Mexico, twice sending military excursions into Mexico in the 20th Century.

This is to say that whatever program you devise, you should be sensitive to this history and the suspicions many Mexicans have about our intentions. That is why this program should be a true partnership. It should ensure that no armed private contractors in the image of “Blackwater groups" be allowed to violate Mexican sovereignty and soil. The Mexican government and people should have no reason to harbor any such concerns.

What are the needs and what should be in the package? In my opinion, Mexico's greatest need in this fight is communications technology. Information technology that accumulates and dispenses intelligence in real time is critical to disrupt criminal organizations. Modern means of communicating among different government agencies is imperative. We learned this lesson as a result of our own 911 terrorist tragedy when we found that different law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies did not or could not share critical information in real time. In addition, there must be equipment that allows both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement, intelligence and military organizations to share information securely.

When I was Ambassador, many in U. S. law enforcement distrusted and were reluctant to share information with Mexican counterparts because of perceived corruption there. Today, that distrust is fading due in large part to the commitment of the Calderon government to clean up and professionalize crime fighting in Mexico. Strengthening that trust among enforcement and intelligence agencies and providing a basis for growing that trust is essential.

Interceptor equipment is also needed including helicopters and swift boats to patrol and interdict these narcotics organizations both inland and on the coasts of Mexico.

This time, please send equipment that works. When I was Ambassador, we requested this kind of equipment when the Zedillo government was making a similar attack on drug lords. Unfortunately, our government sent helicopters, most of which couldn't fly and had to be dismantled to use as spare parts. So the credibility of our commitment was severely undermined.

Training is greatly needed. My observation a decade ago was that even if you assumed the honesty of law enforcement and judicial institutions, the competency simply wasn't there. They didn't know how to collect, preserve and present evidence and as a result, confidence in these legal institutions didn't exist. There has been improvement, but training of law enforcement officers and judges is still needed. In answer to a question of where this training should occur, my suggestion is that it take place in the United States at institutions such as the FBI Academy or within the Administrative Office of the Courts, for example. Other opportunities and for a in which U. S. officers and judges can interact with those from other countries that share our high level of commitment to fighting these problems should be encouraged.

I would also suggest that some funds be dedicated to developing alternative, legitimate crop production to replace some of the lost income of poor farmers who are currently engaged in production of coca or other illicit drugs. The Mexican military has made some strides in destroying this drug cultivation. But we should recall some of our mistakes exemplified in Bolivia earlier in this decade where we had a government that aggressively attacked such illegal production but did not have the funds to help these farmers replace their lost income. Our government did not respond adequately. The Bolivian governments that we supported were deposed and now we have a government not friendly to our policies.

Finally, let me suggest some do's and don’ts. First, please do not saddle this program with another "certification" process as we had when I was Ambassador. For the United States to be judging and certifying Mexico on its willingness to tackle drug trafficking is like the State of New York passing judgment on the quality of public servants' intentions in my home state of Oklahoma during my youth there. It creates significant political problems for the public officials being judged and actually impedes what they are trying to accomplish.

Second, please build into this package a commitment in both countries that any funds will fully respect human rights and not be used to suppress social movements.

Third, include the military of Mexico in the planning process,. Even with some of the compromises that have occurred since the military was thrust into this anti-narco organization battle, it is still probably the most respected law enforcement institution in Mexico. My sense is that the Mexican military leadership has not yet been fully engaged in how to design and effectively implement this program.

Perhaps as important as anything is to engage the Mexican Congress. As I understand, this package will not need to be approved by the Mexican Congress as it does not rise to the level of a Treaty that must be ratified. However, the Mexican Congress has become an institution in that country as important and independent as the U. S. Congress is here. President Calderon's party is a minority in the Congress commanding only around 40 percent of the votes. Obviously, politics plays a large part in that Congress as it does here. Among the opposition parties, there are many suspicions and a reluctance to turn over the program entirely to the President.

When I worked for President Lyndon Johnson, he often quoted Senator Robert Taft who led the Republican minority in the Senate who said, "if you want us on the potential crash landing, you had better have us on the take-off." It is important that the Mexican Congress be on the take-off of this program.

Let me recommend one way to do that. On an informal basis, schedule a meeting soon between the two Foreign Relations committees of the U. S. Congress with the two committees of the Mexican Congress. Discuss what intentions of each side are and how the program can be supported for the benefit of both American and Mexican citizens. A small group of your colleagues started this outreach a few weeks ago and I believe that both sides found these meetings useful as well as building trust among parliamentarians on both sides of the border.

I hope these observations from my own experiences are helpful to the Committee and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you.