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AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.
Yesterday we began consideration of H.J. Res. 114, authorization for use of military force against Iraq. Without objection, the resolution will be considered as read and open for amendment at any point, and the Chair recognizes himself to strike the last word.
[The resolution, H.J. Res. 114, follows:]
82194a.eps
82194a.AAC
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82194a.AAD
82194a.AAE
82194a.AAF
82194a.AAG
82194a.AAH
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82194a.AAI
82194a.AAJ
82194a.AAK
Chairman HYDE. The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons. This is a sobering prospect. But we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Instead, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself.
We need not make a case against Saddam Hussein. He has condemned himself with a clarity far more stark than his most bitter opponent could pronounce.
In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded more than 1 million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops.
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In 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation on that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out.
He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country, and he has slaughtered and tortured any who oppose him.
Given this record, there can be no doubt that once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them. The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we are not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone, and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike.
Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the Administration, I believe the President and his advisers have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Nations. The response, however, has been a disappointing one. Many of our critics apparently refuse to recognize the danger for what it is.
We can see this attitude in the eager reaction to Saddam's latest promise of cooperation which has, at least initially, accomplished its purpose of undermining the fragile beginning of a consensus that at long last something must be done. But we would be fools indeed if we believed that Saddam can be trusted. He has cynically broken all of his previous promises of cooperation, and there is no reason to believe that his latest statement is anything more than an attempt to delay and divide us. He will only use the time the world grants him to further his plans and his preparations.
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This is hardly an unprecedented situation. Is it really necessary to remind ourselves that the world watched as Hitler boldly proclaimed his objectives and openly armed his forces, willfully blinded and seduced by hope, his intended targets only guaranteed the catastrophe they so greatly feared would descend upon them.
This is an undeniable reality, but we are confronted with an even greater danger than that posed by Saddam. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era, one with new and harsher rules. Through repeated usage, the term ''weapons of mass destruction'' has become almost banal, but the unimaginable destructive power these represent requires our constant focus and a determination to do what we must to defend ourselves.
The problem is not merely that a murderous tyrant such as Saddam may be in possession of these weapons. In the aftermath of September 11, we must accept that he has been joined by many others of an even more fanatical purpose. Terrorists willing to commit suicide in order to kill large numbers of innocents cannot be stopped by the familiar conventions of deterrence. Their possession of weapons of mass destruction must be equated with a certainty that these will be used against us.
To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be a last strike. We cannot shield ourselves with hope. We must not guess the world into annihilation.
What then must we do? The President has demonstrated his determination to act to remove this threat and has asked this Congress for an authorizing resolution. But we have yet to reach unanimity on that resolution. It is reasonable to ask for proof that Saddam is planning to attack us. The temptation to deny the boundless dimensions of the menace he poses to us is a strong one, but this must be abandoned in the recognition that he himself has broadcast his intentions. It is a matter of record that his relentless pursuit of weapons of terror and of mass slaughter is decades old.
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But it was only in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 that we were able to directly measure the intensity of that determination. The revelation that he was within 6 months of possessing an operational nuclear device, a fact that our best intelligence had been unable to uncover, was riveting in its implications. He is restrained in his efforts to do us harm only by the limits of his ability to do so, and he is rising to free himself from those limits.
With every day, the onslaught that he is preparing for us approaches ever closer. For those convinced of Saddam's murderous intentions, the debate has centered on whether or not we should focus our efforts on assembling the coalition of friends and allies and seek the enhanced legitimacy that approval by the United Nations might render to our actions.
But I believe that is the wrong debate. We all agree that these things are desirable and that we should do all in our power to secure them. I believe the President and his Administration have done and are doing just that.
But the real question, the one which should occupy us, is one of far greater consequence: On whom does the final responsibility for protecting ourselves rest? Is it ours, or do we share it with others? Are decisions regarding our faith to be made in common with others?
I believe the answer is unavoidable. We have no choice but to act as a sovereign country prepared to defend ourselves, with our friends and allies if possible, but alone if necessary. There can be no safety if we tie our faith to the cooperation of others, only a hope that all will be well, a hope that eventually must fail.
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For more than half a century, whatever safety and security has existed in this world has been there largely because America has been unafraid to act against threats, and to act alone if necessary. The perception that we are resolved to do so has prevented many assaults on that security and continues to do so today.
On many occasions we have been joined in our efforts by friends and allies, and, more rarely, have enjoyed the world's approval. But often we have not, and still we acted.
If we are to have a chance of averting conflict in Iraq, a simple resolve on our part will not be sufficient to the task, for the great danger we face with Saddam is ambiguity. Saddam has often miscalculated in the past. His flawed judgments have resulted in wars that have killed hundreds of thousands of people. For that reason, any ambiguity regarding our course of action and our determination to act alone, if need be, risks yet another miscalculation on his part and a false grant of safety to call our bluff.
Vigorous debate in our deliberations is not only permissible, it is essential. The question before us and our country is too great to demand acquiescence. But the result of that debate cannot be to condition our actions on the approval of others, for we might wait for an approval that may never come.
Far more important is that we cannot even appear to be waiting for others, for to do so would be to fatally convince Saddam we might wait forever. The sight of dissension, of irresolution in the Congress, cannot but contribute to the potential for miscalculation. However desirable the cooperation of our friends and allies may be, the merest hint of any doubt that we will act alone, if necessary, cannot but reinforce Saddam's calculation that we will not act at all.
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To risk giving him even the faintest hope that we can be restrained or delayed by others in our search for consensus may well be a deadly one, for his gamble might bring ruin upon us all.
I speak of the sight of dissension, for we must remember our debate is not for ourselves alone, and our audience is not confined to this room. The world is watching us. Our allies are watching us. Our enemies are watching us. Saddam is watching us. They are looking for signs of indecision in our resolve, searching for the fatal sign of weakness that will come from binding ourselves to act only in concert with others.
The voice of indecision would cut through any wording in which we might attempt to secrete it, however artfully phrased and cleverly contrived we might render it. We do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All of our choices are difficult, but our only real option is to act.
Over a century ago in another conflict Lincoln said,
''We cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this Administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.''
Those same words apply to us here today.
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A century ago, Britain stood majestically at the height of her power. Within 40 years, the knife was at her throat, and she survived only because we were there to rescue her. But there is no one to rescue us. We cannot entrust our faith to others, for others may never come. If we are not prepared to defend ourselves and to defend ourselves alone if need be, if we cannot convince the world that we are unshakeably resolved to do so, then there can be no security for us, no safety to be purchased, no refuge to be found.
In the name of those brave souls, both living and departed, who purchased our freedom, let us now act.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Hyde follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons.
This is a sobering prospect, but we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Instead, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself.
We need not make a case against Saddam Hussein. He has condemned himself with a clarity far more stark than his most bitter opponent could pronounce.
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In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded over one million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons on Iranian troops. In 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation on that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out. He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country, and he has slaughtered any who have opposed him.
Given this record, there can be no doubt that, once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them.
The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we are not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike. Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the Administration, I believe that the President and his advisers have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Nations.
The response, however, has been a disappointing one. Many of our critics apparently refuse to recognize the danger for what it is.
We can see this attitude in the eager reaction to Saddam's latest promise of cooperation which has, at least initially, accomplished its purpose of undermining the fragile beginnings of a consensus that at long last something must be done.
But we would be fools indeed if we believed that Saddam can be trusted.
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He has cynically broken all of his previous promises of cooperation, and there is no reason to believe that his latest statement is anything more than an attempt to delay and divide us. He will only use the time the world grants him to further his plans and preparations.
This is hardly an unprecedented situation. Is it really necessary to remind ourselves that the world watched as Hitler boldly proclaimed his objectives and openly armed his forces? Willfully blinded and seduced by hope, his intended targets only guaranteed the catastrophe they so greatly feared would descend upon them.
This is an undeniable reality, but we are confronted with an even greater danger than that posed by Saddam. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era, one with new and harsher rules.
Through repeated usage, the term, ''Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' has become almost banal, but the unimaginable destructive power these represent requires our constant focus and a determination to do what we must to defend ourselves.
The problem is not merely that a murderous tyrant such as Saddam may be in possession of these weapons. In the aftermath of September 11th, we must accept that he has been joined by many others of an even more fanatical purpose. Terrorists willing to commit suicide in order to kill large numbers of innocents cannot be stopped by the familiar conventions of deterrence. Their possession of weapons of mass destruction must be equated with a certainty that these will be used against us.
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To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be the last strike.
We cannot shield ourselves with hope. We must not guess the world into annihilation.
What then must we do?
The President has demonstrated his determination to act to remove this threat and has asked the Congress for an authorizing resolution. But we have yet to reach unanimity on that resolution.
It is reasonable to ask for proof that Saddam is planning to attack us. The temptation to deny the boundless dimensions of the menace he poses to us is a strong one, but this must be abandoned in the recognition that he himself has broadcast his intentions.
It is a matter of record that his relentless pursuit of weapons of terror and of mass slaughter is decades-old. But it was only in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 that we were able to directly measure the intensity of that determination. The revelation that he was within six months of possessing an operational nuclear device, a fact that our best intelligence had been unable to uncover, was riveting in its implications.
He is restrained in his efforts to do us harm only by the limits of his ability to do so, and he is racing to free himself from those limits. With every day, the onslaught that he is preparing for us approaches ever closer.
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For those convinced of Saddam's murderous intentions, the debate has centered on whether or not we should focus our efforts on assembling a coalition of friends and allies and seek the enhanced legitimacy that approval by the United Nations might render to our actions.
But I believe that is the wrong debate. We all agree that these are desirable things and that we should do all in our power to secure them. I believe the President and his Administration have done and are doing just that.
But the real question, the one which should occupy us, is one of far greater consequence: On whom does the final responsibility for protecting ourselves rest? Is it ours or do we share it with others? Are decisions regarding our fate to be made in common with others?
I believe the answer is unavoidable.
We have no choice but to act as a sovereign country prepared to defend ourselves, with our friends and allies if possible, but alone if necessary. There can be no safety if we tie our fate to the cooperation of others, only a hope that all will be well, a hope that eventually must fail.
For more than half a century, whatever safety and security has existed in this world has been there largely because America has been unafraid to act against threats, and to act alone if necessary. The perception that we are resolved to do so has prevented many assaults on that security and continues to do so today.
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On many occasions we have been joined in our efforts by our friends and allies and, more rarely, have enjoyed the world's approval. But often we have not, and still we acted.
If we are to have a chance of averting conflict in Iraq, a simple resolve on our part will not be sufficient to the task. For the great danger we face with Saddam is ambiguity.
Saddam has often miscalculated in the past. His flawed judgements have resulted in wars that have killed hundreds of thousands of people. For that reason, any ambiguity regarding our course of action and our determination to act alone if need be risks yet another miscalculation on his part and a false grant of safety to call our bluff.
Vigorous debate in our deliberations is not only permissible—it is essential. The question before us and our country is too great to demand acquiescence. But the result of that debate cannot be to condition our actions on the approval of others, for we might wait for an approval that may never come. Far more important is that we cannot even appear to be waiting for others. For to do so would be to fatally convince Saddam that we might wait forever.
The sight of dissension, of irresolution, in the Congress cannot but contribute to the potential for miscalculation.
However desirable the cooperation of our friends and allies may be, the merest hint of any doubt that we will act alone if necessary cannot but reinforce Saddam's calculation that we will not act at all. To risk giving him even the faintest hope that we can be restrained or delayed by others in our search for consensus, may well be a deadly one, for his gamble might bring ruin upon us all.
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I speak of the sight of dissension, for we must remember that our debate is not for ourselves alone, and that our audience is not confined to this room. The world is watching us. Our allies are watching us.
Our enemies are watching us. Saddam is watching us. They are looking for signs of indecision in our resolve, searching for the fatal sign of weakness that will come from binding ourselves to act only in concert with others. The voice of indecision would cut through any wording in which we might attempt to secret it, however artfully phrased and cleverly contrived we might render it.
We do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All of our choices are difficult ones, but our only real option is to act.
Over a century ago, in another conflict, Lincoln said that ''we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.''
Those same words apply to us here today.
A century ago, Britain stood majestically at the height of her power. Within 40 years, the knife was at her throat, and she survived only because we were there to rescue her. But there is no one to rescue us.
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We cannot entrust our fate to others, for others may never come. If we are not prepared to defend ourselves, and to defend ourselves alone if need be, if we cannot convince the world that we are unshakably resolved to do so, then there can be no security for us, no safety to be purchased, no refuge to be found.
In the name of those brave souls, both living and departed, who purchased our freedom, let us now act.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted just to say a word before you recognize my friend from Nebraska?
Chairman HYDE. Surely.
Mr. LANTOS. I want to commend you for a powerful and eloquent statement, and I want to identify myself with your statement. I think you have laid out the case in a statesmanlike fashion and I want to congratulate you. Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. I thank you very much.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I was involved for 5 1/2 hours yesterday afternoon in the Intelligence Committee deliberations. I could not miss those. I heard only perhaps two-thirds of the statements. I stayed until the end. I think that my colleagues gave a thorough explanation of the background of Saddam Hussein, Iraq, and the abuses against his own people, and presented their own points of view on the resolution before us.
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It is the kind of debate that I think we should have in this Committee and in the Congress. It parallels the kind of extraordinary debate we had on the Gulf War resolution.
After what I would say is a little bit of a shaky start, I think the Administration has proceeded on the right track. As a preparatory comment, I am a former counterintelligence officer and serve on the Intelligence Committee, and I absolutely hate security leaks. But I think that what happened with leaks coming from the Administration, particularly the Pentagon, about the controversy regarding the use of force and the method in which it would be employed against Saddam Hussein, provoked a wide national debate about that subject, which was very salutary. It took place in this body, it took place when Members were back in their districts in August, and, despite the fact that earlier a White House counsel had said the President need not come to Congress for a resolution authorizing the use of force, in fact, he on September 4th agreed that seeking a congressional resolution was the proper course.
Within a week, he had gone to the United Nations and made the point to them that if the institution was going to be relevant—something other than a League of Nations, it could not avoid examining the fact that Saddam Hussein had violated repeatedly, continuously in some cases, 12 Security Council resolutions, and the President asked the U.N. if it was going to continue to be relevant, particularly worthy of the name ''Security Council.''
As a result, I think it is much more likely that we will have greater international support for intervention in Iraq and, more important perhaps, for a coalition of forces in the aftermath of a victory in Iraq. That very difficult task remains ahead, and we should not underestimate it.
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Given the background my colleagues have gone into, I think I can cut my remarks a bit and focus on what I think is the case for the justifiable preemptive use of military force. The case has been laid out about Saddam Hussein.
We recall, of course, that without provocation he attacked and occupied Kuwait. Crucially, however, as we consider preemptive force, we must recognize that Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, against Iran and the Kurdish population of his own country. Is there any legitimate doubt he would be willing to use them again?
There also is, I think, no legitimate reason to doubt that he has a significant stock of both chemical and biological weapons. We recovered skewed warheads with traces of both such agents of weapons of mass destruction in 1991, and I can simply say in this forum that Saddam now has further ways to deploy such chemical and biological agents against his enemies.
The evidence is clear, too, obtained from numerous verifiable sources, that Saddam Hussein has attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past. Ongoing attempts to acquire dual-use technology for use in a nuclear development program continues, notwithstanding the controversy about the intended use of one such attempted acquisition that you have all heard about.
Should any of us have any doubt that he attempts to procure plutonium to substantially shorten the time for developing nuclear weapons? These weapons of mass destruction remain a grave threat to a widening circle of his neighbors and our own forces and facilities in the area. However, again, what is crucial is whether we have any doubt that he would provide such weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological—and perhaps nuclear in the future—to terrorist groups who would use them against our citizens and those of our allies. I don't doubt it in the slightest, and it is a risk we cannot accept.
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In saying this, I do understand that the Administration cannot yet provide incontrovertible evidence of a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam. There are, of course, reasons for strong suspicion about such links. But that logically brings us I think to the question of why should we push for military action now?
Now, of course, in a post-9/11 world, we know all too well that mass terrorism against civilians in any country, in our country or abroad, is part of the equation that American Presidents and the Congress must responsibly consider. Do we now have a reasonable basis to conclude that Saddam is not an imminent threat against the United States? Is there a clear justification for attempting to override the conclusion of a Commander in Chief?
The answer is, unfortunately, no. Delaying action is a greater risk to our national interests, the security of our citizens, than are the uncertainties that always attend a war and its aftermath. The authorization of the use of force, or with reasonable adaptations from the executive/congressional negotiations that are ongoing in this legislative process, such as this resolution—or in other words an adaptation of it—I think is an authorization that Congress should approve.
As we take this extraordinarily important step, fully mindful that we put members of our Armed Services in harm's way, and that now no citizen in this country is assuredly safe from related terrorist events either, this Committee and the Congress have important following responsibilities.
We need to take every step to assure that the Executive Branch has given adequate consideration and contingency planning and resources on the following questions beyond the adequacy of our military force and its combat deployment.
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Question one: Has the U.S. taken adequate steps to broaden the international coalition for not only the military operations but especially for the more difficult and long-term task of developing a democratic regime in Iraq that won't threaten the security and stability of the region? We are giving encouragement in this resolution to the President to pursue that kind of international support through the United Nations and the other ways.
Two: Has adequate consideration been given to the fact that the use of weapons of mass destruction could be launched before or during a conflict by Saddam Hussein, directly or indirectly through terrorists, against nations in the area—against Israel, for example—and are we prepared to fully take into consideration and act accordingly for what might be an extraordinary response from Israel?
Three: Has the Administration taken steps to understand and prepare for the institutional and international consequences of such military action against Iraq in the region and elsewhere in the world? Will our actions strengthen the influence of Iran in the region, even in Iraq? Will our military action strengthen the demand for an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, including areas in neighboring countries like Turkey? Will a victory in Iraq unleash a Shiite bloodbath against the Sunni, or a large part of the Iraqi population that was perceived to have supported Saddam Hussein, and are we able to cope and control that kind of bloodshed? Has the Administration adequately considered the resources we will need in the war/peacekeeping scenario with Iraq to successfully pursue the ongoing American war effort against al-Qaeda and terrorism, including our far-from-finished peacekeeping and broad construction requirements in Afghanistan?
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My colleagues, this list of questions is only illustrative. You know it could be much longer. The passage of H.J. Res. 114 today, momentous as it is, as necessary an action as it is, constitutes but the first step in the many important duties of this Committee and the Congress. We must pursue them. We must be ready and fully committed to accomplish them in a constructive, bipartisan effort with the Executive Branch.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bereuter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUG BEREUTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA
The intense national debate that has developed in Congress, by the American public, and internationally since August about whether the United States should use military force, if necessary, against the regime of Saddam Hussein—and to use such force preemptively—has served a very salutary, even necessary, purpose. As a former counter-intelligence officer and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I hate security leaks. The massive leaking of sharp internal disagreements within the Executive Branch, especially the Pentagon, unfortunately preceded the necessary international diplomacy, essential consultation with at least key committees in Congress, and any concerted effort to inform the American public as to why an Iraqi regime-change is needed. It also seems clear that the discussions of U.S. military action for a regime change in Iraq had gotten ahead of the planning and decision-making for such possible action.
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Many of my colleagues and I, in both houses of Congress on a bipartisan basis, with a sufficient number of voices from the American public, helped make it clear to the Bush Administration that a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force was an essential step before any pre-emptive military action against Iraq could be launched. Despite an earlier White House counsel's advisory opinion that a congressional resolution was not required, in a September 4th meeting with elected congressional leaders President Bush advisedly agreed that his Administration would first seek such a resolution. Thus, we are here today embarked on this gravely important duty.
Another very positive result of the leaking and resultantly intense controversy over the issue of military action on Iraq is what likely will be the outcome of the international communities' furor about a potential unilateral and pre-emptive American strike against Iraq. That strenuous opposition is especially the case among our traditional European allies and the Arab states. As was the case in the Gulf War, the Administration sought international support for action on Iraq through the United Nations. As a result of President Bush's exceptional speech to the U.N. General Assembly, the international community has become serious about demanding the re-introduction of United Nations weapon inspectors in Iraq with the unfettered access demanded to search out production and storage sites of chemical, biological, and possible nuclear weapons. The U.S. is right to insist upon an unconditional, time-certain demand for any new inspection regime to begin and to insist upon full compliance with unfettered access for U.N. inspectors. The international community now has this forceful proposition before it: either we have an effective U.N. weapons inspection program resume and continue in Iraq now, or the U.S. has established more forcefully the legitimacy of military action for regime-change—with the reasonable expectation of a supportive international coalition for military action against Iraq and for the perhaps more difficult task of Iraq reformation in its aftermath.
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Because of an intensive public debate on the necessity of military action against Iraq and especially the involvement of Congress, the resolution Congress has before it today has evolved into a far more acceptable one, and the legislative process has not been yet completed. The broad language extending the authorization for the use of military force ''to secure peace and stability in the Middle East'' has been narrowed to ''Iraq.'' The War Powers Act requirements, with reporting requirements to Congress are now included. A limited notification to Congress by the President about the intent to use or the use of the authorization for military force is now included. Also importantly, the requirement is now included to report to Congress under Section 7 of P.L. 105–338 about the U.S. planning and actions taken by America in Iraq after ''the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power''—humanitarian assistance, democracy transition assistance, and methodology for Iraq to repay its debts are all elements explicitly required. Before using military force, the President, now under the procedures specified in this resolution must make available to Congress his determination that ''reliance on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq,'' and (B) that military action is consistent with the U.S. and international war against terrorism. These are among the important changes to a proposed congressional resolution that has evolved to the one before us today. It may well evolve further before the House and Senate vote on it.
What is the case against Saddam Hussein? Especially important, what is it that justifies the pre-emptive use of military force? We recall, of course, that without provocation he attacked and occupied Kuwait with the intent to annex it. Crucially, however, as we consider pre-emptive force, we must recognize that he has used weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical weapons against Iran and against the Kurdish population in his own country. Is there any legitimate doubt that he would be willing to use them again? There also is no legitimate reason to doubt that he has a significant stock of both chemical and biological weapons. We recovered SCUD unused warheads with traces of both such types of chemical and biological agents in 1991, and I can simply say that he now has developed further ways to deploy such chemical and biological agents against his enemies.
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The evidence is clear too, obtained from numerous verifiable sources, that Saddam attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past. On-going attempts to acquire dual use technology for use in a nuclear development program continue—notwithstanding the controversy about the intended use of one such attempted acquisition. Should any of us have any doubt that he has and is attempting to procure plutonium to substantially shorten the time for developing nuclear weapons?
These WMD remain a grave threat to a widening circle of his neighbors and our own forces and facilities in the area. However, again what is also crucial and urgent is whether we have any doubt that he would provide such WMD—chemical and biological, and perhaps nuclear in the future—to terrorist groups who would use them against our citizens and those of our allies? I don't doubt it in the slightest, and it is a risk we cannot accept. In saying this, I do understand that the Administration cannot yet present incontrovertible evidence of a link between al Qaeda and Saddam. There are, of course, reasons for strong suspicion about such links.
That logically brings us to the question of why, at this time, we should authorize the future use of military action by the Administration. I believe it is clear that the threat Saddam poses will only intensify. The United States, the western democracies, and Iraq's neighbors should never have permitted Saddam to hamper and then bar the reentry of United Nations weapons inspectors. In the eleven years since the end of the Gulf War and certainly in the four-year absence of such inspections, we are now in more danger because of that collective lack of resolve to enforce WMD disarmament and because of the commercial and foreign policy goals of some of our European allies and Russia.
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Now, of course, in a post 9/11 world, we know all too well that mass terrorism has been waged against civilians—in our country or abroad. It is a terrible part of the equation that the American President and the Congress must responsibly consider. Do we now have a reasonable basis to conclude that Saddam is not an imminent threat against the United States? Is there a clear justification for attempting to override the conclusion of the Commander in Chief? The answers, unfortunately, are ''no.'' Delaying action is a greater risk to our national interests—the security of our citizens—than the uncertainties that always attend a war and its aftermath. The resolution authorizing the use of force (or one with reasonable additional amendments resulting from Executive-congressional negotiations or the legislative process) is an authorization this Congress should approve.
As we take this extraordinarily important step, fully mindful that we put members of our Armed Services in harm's way, and recognizing that no citizen in this country is assuredly safe now from related terrorist events either, this Committee and Congress has additional important responsibilities. We need to take every step to assure that the Executive Branch has given adequate consideration and provided contingency planning and resources on the following questions (beyond the adequacy of our military force and its combat deployment):
1. Has the U.S. taken adequate steps to broaden the international coalition for not only the military operations, but especially for the more difficult and long-term task of developing a democratic regime in Iraq that will not threaten the security and stability of the region?
2. Has the Administration prepared contingency plans to take into account that Saddam may use chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, directly or through anonymous terrorists, against other nations in the region before or during the conflict which may ensue, e.g., used against Israel? Have we prepared for what could be a rather extraordinary Israeli response?
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3. Has the Administration taken the steps to understand and prepare for the international consequences of such military action against Iraq in the region and elsewhere in the world? Will our action strengthen the influence of Iran in the region—even in Iraq? Will our military actions strengthen the demand for an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, including areas in neighboring countries? Will a victory in Iraq unleash a Shi'a Muslim bloodbath against the Sunni Muslim population or a large part of the Iraqi population that supported or are perceived to have supported Saddam? Are we ready to control it? Certainly, the Shi'a have suffered horrendous provocation for such retribution.
4. Has the Administration adequately considered the resources we will need in this Iraq war/peacekeeping scenario in order to successfully pursue the on-going American war effort against al Qaeda and terrorism—including our far-from-finished military, peacekeeping, and broad reconstruction requirements in Afghanistan?
My colleagues, this list of questions is only illustrative; you know it could be much longer. The passage of H.J.Res. 114 today, momentous as it is, as necessary an action as it is, constitutes but the first step in the many important duties this Committee and Congress must pursue. We must be ready and fully committed to accomplishing them in a constructive, bipartisan effort with the Executive Branch.
Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Napolitano.
Ms. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Unfortunately, I had to leave yesterday afternoon before the completion of my colleague's points which have been stressed over and over again in regard to the issue we are facing today.
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Now more than of our national security must be viewed as our primary consideration in our interactions with other nations. Specifically, our decade-long conflict with Iraq over the acts of aggression in Kuwait, the inhumane treatment of Saddam Hussein's own people, as we are hearing, the gassing of the Kurds, and most importantly, the unending efforts to develop various weapons of mass destruction—the chemical, biological, and nuclear.
We also know that all previous efforts to rein in Iraq through various U.N. resolutions, sanctions, and inspections have not produced the results or the United Nations that we had hoped.
Iraq still poses a horrible significant regional and global threat, operating with impunity, and outside of the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the resolutions we supported. To us the fundamental issue before this body is the extent of the threat and how best to respond to it, keeping disarmament as a major focus. However, without the support of the other nations, it is going to be very chancey for me to vote.
I had considerable doubts about the original request. Our President asked us to provide him with any and all authority he deemed necessary to react to the Iraq threat. That authority was too broad and the case for a military action, either unilateral or in concert with our allies, had not been articulated clearly or conclusively. I still believe we need to quantify that threat more thoroughly.
I also believe our primary focus should be first and foremost on a diplomatic solution, working through the United Nations Security Council and with our allies to remove those weapons of mass destruction.
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Our strongest ally, Prime Minister Tony Blair, at a Labor Party convention just a few days ago, agreed to a compromise resolution calling for Britain to obtain U.N. authority before taking military action. The resolution declares that British troops should participate in action against Iraq only after the exhaustion of all political and diplomatic means. This is the approach that is consistent with our national interests and it is one that the American public appears to support over unilateral action.
I must tell you, Mr. Chairman and Members, that I have had—as many of my colleagues had—quite a number of telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and letters from the people that we represent. And, in my particular case, overwhelmingly veterans groups, individuals, residents, immigrants, are saying no war. Do the best you can to find out a diplomatic solution before we have to go and send our children and our grandchildren into war.
That being said, the resolution before us appears to have a more moderate and thoughtful attempt to address our concerns about pursuing military action before we have exhausted all other options. My concern is that we have not allowed for any amendments, and hopefully we will be able to reach that agreement soon.
The resolution does not seek compliance through the U.N. Security Council, and recognizes that we want all relevant Security Council resolutions strictly enforced. It does limit the scope of the Presidential authorization to Iraq. It does require the President to submit to Congress a determination prior to using force, within 48 hours of using force, that we have exhausted all our efforts.
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I have a problem with 48 hours. However, again, hopefully we will reach some kind of an agreement that will allow us to have a better option. It does require our President to comply with the War Powers Act in regular consultation and reporting to Congress.
In the end, if Saddam Hussein continues to thwart efforts to open all sites to U.N. inspectors, as he has so many times before, we may be left with no option other than military force. I hope, I trust, I pray that this is not the case.
Saddam Hussein can act responsibly if he chooses to do so. He has chosen not to. But he can prevent destruction, remove current sanctions, and thereby improve the lives of his people and neighbors and the rest of the world. It is in his hands. But he must not misjudge our resolve to continue to ensure that he does not continue to develop or use weapons of mass destruction. There is not one person amongst us that wants war or would chose war without exhausting all other options.
I am pleased that the resolution before us provides a number of safeguards, rightly puts diplomacy first, and keeps Congress involved with the process. This is critical in all points.
Nonetheless, I continue to have doubts about the immediacy of the threat. Although there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has developed some weapons of mass destruction and continues to further refine them, ultimately whatever action we take must be done deliberately and with broad support of our citizens, should not be viewed as a partisan issue, as we all know the consequences of war, and it is a heavy burden on each and every one of us. I trust God will guide our hands.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you. I believe everyone has had an opportunity to make an opening statement, and so we will move to amendments.
Are there any amendments?
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sherman. The Clerk will report the Sherman amendment.
Ms. RUSH. An amendment in the nature of a substitute.
Mr. SHERMAN. I actually have three amendments at the desk. The longest of those amendments is the one I would like to bring up. I believe that is identified as Sherman 3. If there is any procedural problem with that amendment, then I will introduce Sherman 1 and 2 in order.
Please proceed.
Chairman HYDE. Do we have all three of his amendments?
Ms. RUSH. Yes.
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Chairman HYDE. You want Sherman 3?
Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. That is a complete substitute, yes.
Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady will read that.
[The information referred to follows:]
82194j.AAB
82194j.AAC
82194j.AAD
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82194j.AAE
82194j.AAF
Ms. RUSH. Amendment in the nature of a substitute by Mr. Sherman. Strike the preamble and insert the following.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, further reading of the amendment is dispensed with.
There was no objection.
Chairman HYDE. As they are distributing the amendment, we will recognize Mr. Sherman for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, we need to authorize the President to use effective action to prevent Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear weapons. The question is whether we adopt the resolution that is before us that authorizes the President to select without congressional input either of two approaches.
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The resolution, the Chairman's mark, lets the President decide whether to take the Powell-Blair approach of trying to get effective inspections, and, only if those inspections are thwarted, to use force. Or the President could embrace the rhetoric presented to this Committee by Richard Perle, and adopt the Cheney approach, declare that only an invasion of Iraq will protect American security, and use the authorization in the Chairman's mark to proceed in that direction.
What my amendment would do is select one of those courses and authorize the President to take the Powell-Blair approach.
In the ''whereas'' clauses, what the amendment would do is to strip out those references to U.N. resolutions that call upon Iraq to treat its own people fairly. Now, of course, we want Iraq to abide by modern notions of human rights. But if we have ''whereas'' clauses that say, Whereas Iraq is oppressing its own people, now therefore America is authorized to invade, then we open up a Pandora's box. There are 80 or 90 countries where that same logic could lead to that similar action. So the ''whereas'' clauses in my substitute focus exclusively on weapons of mass destruction.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman desist for just a moment? We have a vote on approval of the journal. It is my intention to continue with the markup, because I don't think that is a significant vote at this time. What we are doing is more important.
And I don't want to urge those of you with perfect records—and I know most of you are that way—but I think it would be helpful if we could just proceed. So I intend to do so. For those of you who want to make this vote, I would ask you to hurry back.
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Mr. WEXLER. You are not going to call any votes here?
Chairman HYDE. I will not call a vote. I would like to proceed.
All right, I am sorry. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Please continue.
Mr. SHERMAN. Having a chance to address my comments to roughly half the Committee——
Chairman HYDE. But the quality half.
Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Mr. Chairman, my substitute authorizes the use of force only if Iraq fails to promptly agree to an effective and robust weapons inspection and disarmament program, or it also authorizes force if Iraq in any way interferes with that program.
The substitute also defines an effective inspection and disarmament program as requiring an immediate, unobstructed, unannounced entry into all facilities, including absolutely everything without exception, and, of course, no exceptions for so-called ''presidential palaces.''
Finally, the amendment directs the President to seek a U.N. resolution in support of these robust inspection and disarmament approaches, but it does not condition the President's authority to use force on that U.N. action. That is because I believe that Saddam's nuclear weapons program poses a national security threat to the United States which we should not ignore, even if we are unable to win support from France or from Russia or from China.
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So this amendment in the nature of a substitute authorizes force as plan B, and authorizes and directs as the first approach a demand, unequivocable, for an inspection program that is complete, thorough, and unimpaired in any way.
Now, I know that the Chairman's mark reflects negotiations at the White House, bipartisan negotiations, but I think that it is here in this Committee that Congress' role as a full partner in determining American foreign policy should take place, and that we ought to adopt a resolution that does not authorize the use of force if the objectives can be obtained without going to war.
Keep in mind that we could adopt this substitute today, and if in a month or two developments warrant, we could go back and adopt the stronger resolution. If, instead, we adopt the Chairman's mark today, then Congress is out of the decision-making process. We are in the report-receiving mode.
I would hope that, instead, we try to avoid war and that Congress decides that highly intrusive inspections are a substitute for the use of force.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know if I have any time remaining, but I would hope I would be able to address this amendment for 1 minute after our colleagues return and before a vote on the amendment.
Chairman HYDE. Yes, I think it is appropriate that you have a chance to address the voting Members, so we will certainly save a minute for you to do that. But meanwhile, we can discuss among ourselves the amendment.
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The Chair recognizes Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As always, my friend from California submits a carefully crafted and thoughtful amendment, and under ordinary circumstances I would offer to work with him on his amendment, because I know that his basic position is parallel, if not identical, to those of us who support the resolution.
As the gentleman knows, as all Members know, the resolution we are considering was carefully crafted and agreed upon by the Republican leadership of this body, the Democratic leadership of this body, and the White House. And at this stage, amendments do not serve a constructive purpose because the complex process of reopening these negotiations is simply not pragmatic, realistic, or feasible.
I also have some substantive reservations about the gentleman's amendment. The resolution before us deals with basically two issues. It deals with weapons of mass destruction, and it deals with the subject of Saddam's support for terrorism.
The gentleman's amendment is silent on the subject of terrorism, which I believe is a severe oversight. My feeling is that the basic approach of the gentleman is parallel to the resolution before us. We all favor a diplomatic solution. We all favor full and unfettered inspections which, if in fact they are allowed to unfold in such a manner, would result in depriving Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.
But since the gentleman's amendment is silent on the subject of international terrorism and it would reopen complex, many-weeks-long negotiations, I am compelled to oppose it.
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Chairman HYDE. Is there anyone who wishes to be heard? Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support the amendment. I think, as Mr. Lantos indicated, it is a well-thought-out amendment. I would suggest that the deletion of the ''whereas'' clauses that refer to terrorism, as Mr. Sherman indicated, are appropriate, given the fact that logic would demand, if pursued to a conclusion, that a precedent would be established whereby some 60 or 70 countries would be appropriate targets in the future for military invasion.
I have a quote here from the most recent report by the Department of State relative to terrorism and state sponsors of terrorism. Let me begin the quote:
''Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001,'' the most active sponsor in state terrorism. ''It continues to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that used terrorism to pursue their goals. Since the outbreak of the Intifada, support has intensified for the Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel. Iran continues to provide Hezbollah, Hamas, PFLP, with funding, safe havens, training and weapons.''
Now, while Iraq allegedly and clearly does support some of the smaller terrorist groups, it has no relationships with the groups that I just enumerated—Hezbollah and Hamas—and as Senator Graham indicated in an op-ed piece that he wrote, the focus on Iraq is actually a distraction from the campaign against terrorism. It lists Syria and Iran as countries that should be at the front of any agency efforts against state sponsors of terrorism.
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He went on to say,
''Iraq should not be the priority, given the President's own criteria: countries that were accomplices in the September 11 attack or provided a sanctuary for terrorist groups.''
Again, now, I am quoting Senator Graham, who, by the way, is the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
''By these two standards, Iraq does not make it very high on the list of a terrorist state. The focus should be on countries that have a significant al-Qaeda presence or terrorist training camps. These are primarily in Syria and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and in Iran.''
I think we should be reminded of the fact that it was Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates that recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, not Iraq.
So, again, I think that this is an amendment that makes sense, for the reasons articulated by the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, and if he wants any of my additional time, I would be happy to yield.
Mr. LANTOS. Would my friend yield to me?
Mr. SHERMAN. He has offered to yield to me and I would like to use a little of our time, and I will yield to our Ranking Member.
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I would point out two things, and that is that while Iran has a nuclear weapons program that is also of concern, if we were to invade countries based on their support for terrorism, Syria would outrank Iraq, and various other countries have at least tolerated ''private'' support for terrorism, including the toleration of the Saudi Arabian regime.
Second, I would point out if we embark on an approach where we are demanding highly intrusive inspections, then either we get those inspections and avoid war while achieving disarmament, or Saddam refuses to allow for real inspections and then when we go to war, we do so with considerably more international support and considerably more domestic support than we would have otherwise. An approach that seems to say we want to invade no matter what Saddam does, I think puts us in a weaker diplomatic position.
Whatever time is left, with Mr. Delahunt's permission, I yield to Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Well, I merely would like to say to my good friend from Massachusetts that, as always, his logic is impeccable, and I largely agree with the points he makes. In the broader context, to argue that there are 60 countries in which there are terrorist cells, while accurate, does not indicate to me that the United States should simultaneously declare war on 60 countries. I trust that is not what my friend is recommending.
We are now dealing with Iraq. Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction. Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Iraq also is supportive of terrorist activities. The resolution that was agreed to by the bipartisan leadership and the White House makes both of these points. Leaving out matters of terrorism weakens our resolution. Iraq has many crimes to its credit, including its historic behavior, its current development of weapons of mass destruction, and its current support of terrorism, as exemplified by the payment of $25,000 to families of suicide bombers. And to leave those aspects out of the resolution makes the resolution incomplete and inaccurate. Which compels me, in addition to the need to renegotiate the whole matter, which is palpably an infeasible undertaking, it makes me firm in my opposition to the amendment of my friend from California.
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Mr. SHERMAN. If I can reclaim Bill's time, which I have partially yielded to Mr. Lantos, if someone is being executed for murder, we identify that that is the reason they are being executed. We do not read a list of their other crimes, because we want to make it clear that the reason that that capital punishment is being imposed is for capital murder. We don't want to indicate that any number of shoplifting convictions or burglaries or even attempts at murder are reasons to lead to capital punishment.
Saddam has committed many crimes, far more vicious than any crime a single individual could commit. These include the support for terrorism. These include his gassing of his own people. But if we identify in this resolution—I would be happy to pass a resolution listing all of Saddam's crimes. I think we passed several of them through this Committee—but if we identify in this resolution a host of crimes of Saddam that are not the reasons for the use of force, then we leave the image that oppressing one's own people or providing money to suicide bombers, in attacking Israel, et cetera, that these are crimes that justify American invasion, and then we pass a resolution that begs the question: Why are we invading Iraq and not Syria?
If we have a simple resolution that draws that distinction, that says yes, Congress has passed many resolutions attacking Saddam's many crimes, but it is the threat to the United States posed by his weapons of mass destruction, those that he possesses and those he is trying to develop. If we make this a simple resolution, then we do not beg questions and create inconsistencies.
I yield to Mr. Delahunt the remainder of his time.
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Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the Chair for his indulgence. I think my time might have expired. I will just take a moment just to even reinforce the points made by my friend, Mr. Sherman. I think it is important for us to remember that the rest of the world will be examining and parsing the language of this resolution.
Now, many of us, I am sure, have perused the ''whereas'' clauses that are abundant. But as the gentleman indicated, there is a certain precedent that is being established by our action here in this Committee, and to lay out the case against Saddam Hussein in the course of the preamble and referencing specific instances of violation of human rights, of crimes against humanity, and specific acts of terrorism, I daresay will cause great concern among the international community, with speculation as to who is next.
If we are concerned about the weapons of mass destruction and the behavior of nations that we find repugnant in terms of their ideology, in terms of their political system, in terms of how they treat their own citizens, and if we are willing to authorize preemptive, unilateral military intervention, what does that say about the United States? When can we expect a similar resolution before us dealing with Iran, dealing with North Korea? Both of those nations are further along in the development of nuclear devices than Iraq, and both of those nations possess weapons of mass destruction now.
Are their intentions any less hostile to the United States? Do they pose less of a threat to our national security than Iraq?
I daresay no. In fact, I would submit that both of those nations, original members of the axis-of-evil club, pose a significantly greater danger to the United States and to our interests in Iraq.
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My friend Mr. Lantos talks about the terrorist acts that Hussein has committed. Yes. But I daresay in terms of regional stability in the Middle East, they are far less in terms of their magnitude than Iran. I don't think there is significant dispute in terms of who is supporting those groups that are creating the tensions and the acts of terrorism in Israel today.
We know that Hamas is responsible for encouragement of suicide bombers. It is clear that Hamas is supported by Iran.
I think that we are making a terrible mistake if we don't adopt the Sherman amendment. I was unaware that the gentleman from California was going to propose this amendment, but I think it is of real significance and will encourage my colleagues to review it and give it careful consideration. I intend to vote in support of it, and compliment the gentleman for the amendment.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually, I would like to follow directly on the gentleman from Massachusetts's comments, because he makes some very interesting points about when it is we are going to use preemptive military force. Despite the fact that Saddam Hussein has violated a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions, I think the only one that is relevant, the only one that justifies preemptive use of military force, is the demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction—not simply that he has them, because unfortunately, as the gentleman points out, North Korea and Iran also seek to have nuclear weapons, and in my judgment, North Korea has nuclear weapons. But we haven't witnessed that demonstrated willingness to use them that Saddam Hussein has provided us with respect to the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi Kurdish population itself.
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Now, I think that the focus, therefore, the only logical, the only reasonable time that we have to consider the preemptive use of military force is when we have an adversary who is willing to use those weapons of mass destruction and has demonstrated it.
The focus of the gentleman's amendments, the gentleman from California is on the inspection process; and I would like to feel comfortable that an unfettered, unconditional weapons inspection program for weapons of mass destruction would be adequate. I don't. First of all, I cannot imagine—and we are seeing demonstrated now—that we will have unlimited, unconditional access for international inspectors in Iraq. Remember, too, that Iraq is a very big country and that Saddam Hussein has had 10-plus years now to conceal the stocks and the production capabilities he has for biological and chemical weapons and to conceal a nuclear development program.
We have important methods for determining where such stocks are; in some respects, if we are allowed to use them, we have capacities beyond what is publicly known.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to find biological weapons stocks. No matter how intrusive the inspection process, no matter the technology we have already developed, that is near unto impossible. Therefore, while I expect that this process is going to be used if we enable him to drag out this process, and we will have back-and-forth situations with Saddam Hussein and demands that palaces and other facilities are off limits; and we will have delays getting inspectors in there, even when they are finally there—if that ever happens, which I doubt—we are not going to be able to find biological weapons.
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That is what it comes down to, and I think that fact should not escape us.
Therefore, I think the gentleman's amendment, while well intended, does not focus on the right issue. It cannot be focused on the weapons inspection process.
I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I think there are two separate issues. One is, under this resolution that I propose, will Saddam be able to play games, defer inspections, prevent inspections, demand conditions on inspections? And the answer is clearly ''no,'' as shown on page 3 and, in particular, section 2 of the resolution. It defines a robust weapons inspection and disarmament program as requiring teams with leadership that the President of the United States accepts.
Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming my time, I recognize those facts; and he can delay until, for example, October 31st. But even if, in fact, at the end of the day, we get their so-called ''unfettered, unconditional access,'' it is not going to be adequate to assure ourselves that biological weapons are not there and not made available to terrorist organizations as well.
That is why I think the gentleman's amendment, or substitute, fails. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. SHERMAN. The second point is, will inspections be adequate? And we did hear from Richard Perle and from the gentleman from Nebraska that inspections would not be adequate, especially with regard to biological weapons.
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First, I would point out that no system is perfect. Invasion is not a perfect solution either. First, it involves thousands of Americans and perhaps tens of thousands of Iraqi deaths.
But second, we would expect Saddam to use whatever he has. And third, we would expect him to share all of his secrets and information with the worst scoundrels on the planet, just as the Nazis put into a submarine all of their nuclear secrets and sent that submarine toward Imperial Japan.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes himself to strike the last word.
I urge my colleagues to vote against this well-intended, interesting amendment for several reasons. Most importantly it unravels the agreement reached between the Democratic leadership in the House, the Republican leadership in the House, and the White House. The arguments contained—asserted on behalf of Mr. Sherman's amendment were all considered by those who laboriously and lengthily negotiated the resolution, and for one reason or another they were rejected.
The amendment offered by the gentleman emphasizes weapons of mass destruction and does not talk or admit to the threat of conventional attacks on U.S. forces, on their neighbors in the Gulf region. It undercuts regime change. There are many problems with it.
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However, it is not without merit. It is a thoughtful amendment. It just is inappropriate in the present posture where we are attempting to pass the text that has been agreed upon by so many people.
I would suggest to Mr. Sherman that mention of his resolution and its content will be included in the record—I might add, favorable mention. So it isn't a total loss.
But I would like to move to a vote on this.
I hear three ''Mr. Chairmans''.
Mr. Paul. Mr. Paul, you are recognized.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to speak in favor of the amendment.
It is not the type of amendment that I would have drawn up. It does recognize the authority of the United Nations, and I do not believe our national security interests and our national sovereignty should depend on the United Nations, but nevertheless this amendment is a big improvement over the current resolution. So I will support this amendment.
But I think it is important to note that the process that we are dealing with is very important. As I mentioned yesterday, we should not forget that the overall philosophy of our foreign policy brings us to events like this because our philosophy and our foreign policy for 50 years have been designed not to declare war, but to slip into war, get sanction of war by the United Nations, and also to give our Presidents more power and authority than the Constitution gives them.
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So I want to remind my colleagues of that as well as of the shortcomings of this war. Because it really isn't a war in national defense. We have not been attacked. So I think we should continue to remember that and that we deal with the process, we deal with the philosophy and we deal with the wisdom, or lack of wisdom, for the war.
This resolution moves in the direction of restraint, making use of the United Nations in a reasonable fashion, under today's circumstances, which I think is much better than getting—pressuring the United Nations to rubber-stamp our efforts to go to war in the name of peace.
Because, of course, you don't go to the United Nations to declare war. There is no provision for that. The United Nations can only pursue peace. That is why when you go to war under the United Nations banner, it is not called war. They don't declare war; they call this a ''police action'' or a ''mission for peace.'' I think it is misuse of words and terminology, and we should home in on what we are doing here.
We are talking about war. We are talking about going to war. And I support this resolution because I think it will make us stop and think a little more carefully without a total rejection of the international order that exists, that I would like to someday challenge, and I continue to challenge. But we should continue to watch this.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I want to take the opportunity to respond to the gentleman from Nebraska, in his distinguishing between Saddam Hussein and North Korea and Iran, in terms of propensity to—or in the case of Iraq, having demonstrated the willingness to—use weapons of mass destruction.
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Well, to set the record straight, the Gulf War occurred in 1990. It has been reported in a variety of venues that the message was sent clearly and unequivocally by Secretary Baker, and I believe now, Secretary of State Powell, that if there was the utilization of chemical or biological warfare, there would be a devastating response by the United States.
The reality is, he did not use weapons of mass destruction during the course of the Gulf War. Unless I am incorrect, there have been only two occasions when Saddam Hussein utilized weapons of mass destruction; one was in 1988 against the Kurds in northern Iraq.
Mr. PAUL. May I retrieve my time, because the time is running out.
Later, when I have more time, I would like to admit some evidence to the Committee that really challenges even that assumption about what happened with the Kurds, and it comes from a Pentagon report. So I would like to follow up on that later.
But if you can, you can go ahead and finish.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just conclude by saying that the United States, at that point in time, was fully aware of his use of weapons of mass destruction; and we didn't hear a peep out of the then-Administration in terms of condemning that horrific act.
And the reality is, also, that we were fully aware that during the course of the war against Iran by Iraq that there was the utilization of weapons of mass destruction——
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Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Against the Iranian army.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I intend to support Mr. Sherman's amendment even though I have some concerns of some of the ''whereas'' clauses that he has included. But I heard the President go before the United Nations and say to the United Nations that if you do not want to be irrelevant, then you must act.
In essence what Mr. Sherman is doing is listening to what the President said before the United Nations and giving that body and our allies an opportunity to see whether that organization can function and we do not have to go it alone.
Now, if you go before the United Nations as the head of this country and you say to them that, in fact, you want them to act because if they do not act, the whole organization is irrelevant. You will send the message which is, in essence, what is being sent to the Administration that, guess what, we think you are irrelevant anyhow, and we are not even going to wait or try to engage in a way in which we can seek the broad opportunity to have a coalition through the United Nations to act in the way that Mr. Sherman has in this resolution—which is a very short time period.
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Today is October 3rd, he is saying, by October 31st this has to happen. By the time this actually passes, there will be very little time, so he is talking about an incredibly short time period. But at least we are putting the United Nations and our allies on notice. He is talking about a very robust weapons inspection and disarmament program. That is what we say we want in pursuit of United Nations resolutions that have called for such an effort.
If we don't want to have this long-range attitude and perception in the world, this is probably the best opportunity to seek a multilateral effort in an incredibly truncated period of time with the type of robust activity that we are seeking. In essence what we are saying is, before we even try, we are just going to obviate—that is just a, you know, window dressing at best.
Now, I would be happy when I finish my statement—because others have spoken already—to yield.
When, in fact, I hear consistently that any amendment would disturb that which the Democratic/Republican leadership and the Administration have put together, I would remind my colleagues—that sure don't need to be reminded on this fact—that none of them elected any of us individually to the United States House of Representatives. It is the people from our respective districts that sent us here to pass judgment on many questions that affect their lives, including war and peace and life and death. And in that regard, that is a hollow argument for me to listen to, that this Committee and this Congress are merely a rubber stamp for what a handful of leaders decide would be the course of events for this country and for all of our people. I didn't get elected by any of those individuals. I have great respect for all of them, but they cannot take my vote, nor should the call be made to rubber-stamp a vote on an issue of such national importance and national significance.
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I think that if we cannot adopt Mr. Sherman's amendment that provides for a very short period of time, that provides for robust inspection, that seeks a multilateral effort that we have ostensibly had our President go before and say, we want you to act if you want to be significant; and if you want to be insignificant, don't act, well that implies that we are willing to act with them.
And I think Mr. Sherman's amendment should be adopted. It, in fact, is in pursuit of what the President told the world community when he appeared before them.
I would be happy to yield.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman.
I just would remind our colleagues that section 2(b)(1) and (2) says that determination to be made by the President, communicated to the Congress, is that the U.S. has made all appropriate diplomatic and peaceful means to ensure compliance, including the weapons of mass destruction resolution; and second, that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.
It does not preclude the possibility that we would have, in fact, a weapons inspection regime attempted.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I would say to the gentleman that from the words of this Administration, they have already taken the view that that has been tried and been unsuccessful. So I think that that statement is a rather hollow proposition. That is why we, in fact, have a resolution before us that basically authorizes the President, well before he might take any action, to pursue action. And I think that undercuts.
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This, at least, sends a very clear message that we have a certain time for us to seek the support of the United Nations to be relative in a world order.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, as we meet, our diplomats at the United Nations are doing their utmost to achieve the goals the gentleman from California seeks. We are currently in the process of engaging all members of the United Nations Security Council to join us in demanding unfettered, unlimited inspections throughout Iraq, with no presidential hiding places exempt from any investigation as to whether in fact weapons of mass destruction are hidden there.
This amendment effectively encourages the Administration to do what is in fact current U.S. diplomatic policy and what in fact are current U.S. diplomatic efforts. Our Secretary of State and our Ambassador to the United Nations are doing precisely what the gentleman from California is asking for. Therefore, the amendment I believe is, as I suggested earlier, redundant, incomplete, and unravels a carefully crafted bipartisan compromise.
I would not be as disdainful of that compromise resolution as some of my colleagues are. It was not easy for the Democratic leadership of this body, and I paid high tribute to Leader Mr. Gephardt yesterday and the Republican Speaker of the House and the White House to hammer out an agreement which, at the end of the day, obviously will enjoy strong bipartisan support.
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So it is not a meaningless argument that agreement has been reached. We were all elected by our constituents, but we also understand the nature of what a representative form of government means; and leadership can present to the body a bipartisan resolution, which is precisely what we are debating at this moment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. The question occurs on the amendment.
Mr. SHERMAN. You will remember you promised me a chance to close.
Chairman HYDE. Oh, Mr. Sherman, do you think you have been shortchanged on time?
Mr. SHERMAN. I think I have spoken at length, but I think quite of number of people weren't here to hear most of my comments.
Chairman HYDE. All right. Mr. Sherman, 2 minutes.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Does that mean no one else will be allowed to speak on this?
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Chairman HYDE. No. It means you are going to sit here and listen to Mr. Sherman for 2 minutes, and I want your full attention.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would be delighted.
Mr. SHERMAN. I regret the pain of the next 2 minutes.
This does not unravel a complete agreement. Keep in mind the leadership of the United States Senate has not signed off on this agreement. But far more important, this is a markup by the Committee that is supposed to deal with the foreign policy of the United States. And a markup is not supposed to be using a rubber stamp to mark a document. This is the Committee that is supposed to debate and, perhaps, change the resolution put before us.
Second, inspections are not a bad idea. Half the Administration thinks that is the way to go, perhaps more than half. Right now, as Mr. Menendez points out, we are at the United Nations imploring them to give us a resolution that is probably very close to the text I have drafted. So this resolution is not a departure from American foreign policy. It is a departure from our foreign policy announced by some in Washington, but it is a mirror of what our policy is in New York.
How can we be imploring the U.N. to demand robust, total inspections and then at the same time leave open to the President the possibility that he may get what he is asking for from the United Nations and then say, no, he agrees with Richard Perle, inspections are not enough, we are going to invade even after we have been given what we want. We should not pass a resolution that gives the President a blank check to either do what we are saying we want to do at the U.N. or do what Richard Perle and perhaps Dick Cheney want us to do.
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Let us, instead, pass a resolution that is consistent with the position that we are taking at the U.N., highly intrusive inspections, and if we don't get them——
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired again.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
In a number of ways, I like Mr. Sherman's amendment better than I like the base text, if it was just up to me. But I am going to oppose the amendment, and I want to use this time to address the comments of both Mr. Menendez and Mr. Sherman about our role.
They are both absolutely right. We were not elected by the leadership of either party or by the White House to our positions. We are individual Members of Congress, responsible to our conscience and our constituents and mandated to use our best judgment. We are not rubber stamps.
This Committee has jurisdiction and has every right in the world to try and shape and clean up a resolution, particularly something as important as a resolution which essentially authorizes the use of force and is the way we have chosen to try and exercise our constitutional responsibility.
So now the question comes, how do each of you choose to exercise that function? And here, I guess I would like to make my plea for what I see as the big picture.
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Mr. Bereuter is correct, there are inherent limitations in an inspection program in a country where the dictator has every reason, total evidence of a history of wanting to hide what he is doing, to lie, to connive, to conceal, to play the bait-and-switch game. There are tremendous limitations.
The Administration is now pursuing a course to go to the U.N., as Mr. Lantos said, to get that kind of a robust inspection regime approved. That regime, if it can go into place, can disrupt, discover, impede, and to some extent disarm certain aspects of Iraq's weapons program.
But the real goal here is to create what I think all of us think is better than unilateral action, which is to create a multilateral dynamic, first for inspections and compliance and disarmament, and compliance with Security Council resolutions. Secondly, to build up the base of support for what we might have to do if he impedes, as I think he will, that process.
We adopt this amendment, that unravels the deal, that causes the Republican leadership to change the text on the House Floor. We start losing some of the basis for an ability for a bipartisan majority to stand with the Administration in pursuit of this goal and we hurt what I think many people would like to see, which is our opportunity to maximize the chance that the U.N. Security Council in the first instance, and a broad, multilateral group of nations in the second instance will act both on inspections and on the enforcement of the effort to disarm.
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Because unlike the Chairman, I believe—I want to see regime change in Iraq, but I believe the justification for a regime change in Iraq by the use of force has to be directly tied to disarming his weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, I am pretty close to the conclusion, that may be the only way we get the disarmament of his weapons of mass destruction.
But that is the purpose of the regime change, the two are linked. And so I would argue that if we come to—start looking at this text as lawyers and which one better defines—which amendment better defines our feelings about all this. We are defeating the bigger picture, which is to put together a political consensus in this country that says we stand with the Administration in his effort, in the President's effort to get the United Nations to take this issue seriously, and ultimately, if necessary, to use force. And that that is a bigger reason to vote on each of these amendments, again, than the appeal and the logic of the text of any particular amendment.
So that is why I am going to oppose this and other amendments even, as in the case of this one, where I find that it more perfectly fits my own thinking about how we should be dealing with this issue.
Chairman HYDE. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. PAYNE. The fellow from New Jersey. I don't know if I am a gentleman.
Chairman HYDE. Yes, indeed you are. Mr. Payne.
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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would certainly like to express my support for the Sherman amendment. I am really not very enamored or enthusiastic about any of the amendments. However, I do think that the one that Mr. Sherman has put forth certainly clarifies the issues.
The resolutions of the U.N. 60, 61 and 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, all of these are incorporated in our current resolution. I agree that we say that Saddam Hussein must respect each of these resolutions.
Of course, one of the resolutions is the repressing of its citizen population. Now, our allies, the Philippines—I mean, you can go right down the line, Turkey, some of the New Independent Republics that are siding with us. If we start going down—and I would love for every country not to repress its own citizens. We are even striving for more a perfect union here in the United States of America. But for that to be one of the resolutions that we should use as a reason that would justify, with these other eight or nine U.N. resolutions, I think it clouds the issue.
I think that Mr. Sherman's resolution clarifies some of the issues. I think that it is great that there has been a leadership team at the White House that has worked this out, the big picture, the bipartisan group. I don't know who has been in there expressing my views. I am not sure it is my leadership, because I have not heard the discussions of the things that are coming and resonating in my district about this war and the proposals that we see before us. And so, in true effect, my voice has not been heard there at these negotiations, so I am not unraveling anything that I was a part of.
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So, therefore, I think that the Brad Sherman resolution makes a lot of sense, and I urge its adoption.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman.
Before you commence, Mr. Ackerman, I want to announce there are nine amendments still at the desk. We are going to finish this today. This is a getaway day, and the longer everybody talks and the more people to talk, the tougher it gets toward the end of the day for everybody else who wants to say something.
There is plenty of opportunity to be heard. I am not going to shut anybody off, but I plead with you to be mindful of the strictures on time that we find ourselves in.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just in response to my colleague from New Jersey, I would like to say that my point of view was represented by my leadership. I think most of our points of view were. They weren't necessarily heeded by the other side, but I think that they were represented.
Just because we don't get our way doesn't mean we weren't properly represented. We don't always get our way; we don't always win the votes. In a democracy, we have to live with that.
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With regard to this very reasonable, rational and probably superior amendment than what is before us, I would like to make a few points. And I will oppose this amendment. And it is not because we are a rubber stamp. This is getting a full hearing and a full debate before this Committee, and we can do whatever we choose, and the House can do whatever it chooses. And that is the difference between this government and the government in Iraq and so many others.
With regard to the litany of things that are deleted from this amendment, that is pointed out by the maker of the motion and some previous speakers, a lot of the things are not necessarily reasons to go to war; most of them are not. And as Mr. Sherman pointed out quite properly, in a court of law, when somebody is on trial for capital murder, you don't bring up the fact that he had a parking ticket.
That is true, but we are not talking about somebody accused of not paying their parking tickets or walking through a red light. Before us—if there is an analogy, before us in the court of public opinion stands not a vestal virgin, but someone who has already been found guilty, by almost everybody who has seen the evidence, of committing some of the most heinous crimes in the history of this century. You don't need a trial to come to that conclusion.
What we have before us is somebody who has already been found guilty and is a recidivist and is being sentenced before that court of world opinion. And this whole litany—while each of these things, in and of themselves, as individual items that have been taken out, do not necessarily meet the standard of a capital crime or a reason for declaring war—is nonetheless a reminder, as is permitted in a court of law prior to sentencing, to look at the record of who you have before you, who is a heinous, murderous criminal, somebody who murdered the father of his own grandchildren because they were talking about him, giving away his secrets.
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What we have here is not just somebody who lives next door, who is a gun or knife collector and may have a very huge collection, but somebody who may have only one or three or six weapons but is shooting up the hole darned neighborhood.
That is the real difference when we are looking at this government and some other governments and saying, why don't we attack this one and that one, and who is next on our list. Anyone who meets that profile of both having weapons of mass destruction and acting with them in a murderous way should be on this list.
Right now, we have one person so accused. That is the issue that we are dealing with. We are not dealing with Finland and we are not dealing with North Korea. If the North Koreans were using those weapons of mass destruction against their neighbors, that would be a separate case and justifiably brought before the U.N. and brought before this body.
The people in New York are working very hard. I had the opportunity to be in the United Nations the day the President spoke, together with Mr. Gilman and Mr. Issa, and met with our team assembled there. They are doing a yeoman job trying to convince the United Nations to be focused on this, and I think they are going to be successful. They can't be successful if they have a divided Congress and a divided American people over this.
Certainly we want to be part of the international community, but if we want them to act, they have to know America has some resolve on this issue. If we are going to wait until Saddam Hussein lets the inspectors in—I already saw the movie. If you watch the same movie again and again and again and expect a different ending, then you are squandering the fare of admission. While we are doing that, the situation is only going to get worse.
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And while, in the ideal, this amendment would be something that I would like to vote for, the practicality of the situation in which we find ourselves argues against it.
I yield back the balance.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
The question occurs on the amendment. All those in favor, say aye.
Opposed, nay. In the opinion of the Chair, the noes have it.
Mr. SHERMAN. I request a recorded vote.
Chairman HYDE. A recorded vote is requested. The clerk will call the roll.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Leach.
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Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes no.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
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Mr. King.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes no.
Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
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Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes no.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
Mrs. Davis.
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Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
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Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Faleomavaega votes no.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes yes.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes yes.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes yes.
Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes yes.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler votes no.
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Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes no.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes yes.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes yes.
Ms. Lee.
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Ms. LEE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Lee votes no.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes yes.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes yes.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes yes.
Ms. Berkley.
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Ms. BERKLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes no.
Mrs. Napolitano.
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes yes.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes yes.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Watson votes yes.
Mr. RUSH. Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes no.
Chairman HYDE. The clerk will report.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 15 ayes and 31 noes.
Chairman HYDE. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith of Michigan's amendment. The clerk will report the amendment.
[The information referred to follows:]
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82194i.AAB
Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Smith of Michigan. In the fourth clause of the preamble, strike Iraq, the first place such term appears and insert the current Iraqi regime.
In the 6th clause of the preamble, strike Iraq——
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I would move, Mr. Chairman, the amendment could be considered as read.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, earlier this year in H.J. Res. 75, this Committee, in criticizing Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime, accepted my amendment to change the word Iraq—implying the people of Iraq too much, I thought—and we changed that resolution to substitute the Iraqi regime.
In this resolution, there are 23 paragraphs setting out the conditions or, if you will, 23 ''whereas'' paragraphs. Five of those paragraphs, I think, are in my amendment. I have picked out five of those paragraphs to change Iraq to particularly identify Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi regime.
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And briefly going through the resolution, if you want to bring up the particular paragraphs that I deal with in my amendment, on page 2 the second ''whereas'' on that page is, Whereas Iraq in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, and instead of Iraq insert the current Iraqi regime.
The last ''whereas'' on page 2 is, Whereas Iraq, and that—poses a continuing threat to the national security, and that is changed to the current Iraqi regime.
Just a footnote, I think it is very, very important that we be clear that our contest, our dispute, is not with the people of Iraq. They are our friends. We have helped them in the past; we will continue to help them. A lot of the Iraqi people will support our efforts to overthrow and replace the tyranny.
On page 3, for example, it says Iraq persists in engaging in brutal repression of Iraq. It is much more appropriate, it would seem, to say the current Iraqi regime persists in engaging in this brutal repression.
On page—on page 4, there are no changes.
On page 5, again, it says Iraq's repression of Iraqi's population.
I know that this is on a fast track. I know that leadership says no amendments, but I think as the Committee of jurisdiction in the Congress of the United States, we should consider these amendments for the merit that they might have. I would suggest that it is very important in this kind of a resolution that we make that distinction, to make it very, very clear to the best of our ability that our contest, our fight, our disagreement is not with the Iraqi people.
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Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?
I thank the gentleman. I congratulate him on a very fine amendment. It reflects the reality. I would urge the gentleman, as a courtesy, to withdraw the amendment. We will mention it in the report most favorably.
It is the reality that we certainly make the distinction between Iraq and the people of Iraq and the regime of Iraq, all of those distinctions are very real and substantive. This amendment has been drafted. It is agreed to by the Democrats, that is, the Democratic leadership, Republican leadership, the White House, Senator Lott—we are hoping Senator Daschle will come along.
But we don't want to unravel that agreement, and I think by offering it and debating it, you have made a point that is worth making and will be memorialized in the report.
So would the gentleman consider withdrawing?
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult when such a great Chairman as you requests that I withdraw it. But it seems to me that it is important that we maintain our strength as a Committee. What is the sense of a Committee meeting if we are simply given a resolution and told—no changes, leadership has decided on this.
Each one of us represents an idea. I think this idea has merit. And at least at this point I would not withdraw until we have additional discussion on it.
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Chairman HYDE. If the gentleman would yield, I appreciate what you are saying. The reason for having the Committee meeting and holding out for no amendments is not merely to go through the form of a meeting, but to give everyone an opportunity to weigh in on the important issues involved. And I think it has been very valuable, a very valuable exercise to let that happen.
But I accept the gentleman's wishes.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I think there is not a Member on this Committee who does not differentiate between the Iraqi people and the Saddam Hussein regime. That point is well taken.
However, it is perfectly conceivable that the Saddam Hussein regime may be replaced by an equally odious regime. We are dealing with the country of Iraq as presently constituted; and whether Saddam is assassinated tomorrow or not, the weapons of mass destruction are there, the record is there, and I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this amendment and to support the underlying resolution. I yield back.
Chairman HYDE. We have two votes on the Floor, one is a rule and the other is a previous question. I beg of you to return after the second vote immediately so we can proceed. This is such an important issue, and please come back.
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Chairman HYDE. Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. I would like to speak on the amendment.
Chairman HYDE. Well, okay.
We will stand in recess until after the second vote. Come right back, please.
[Recess.]
Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.
The amendment of the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith, is the pending order of business, and Congressman Ron Paul of Texas was about to address the question. So, Mr. Paul, you are recognized. However, before that, what became of the slip I have here?
We have 11 amendments now. I am told the plane going to Hawaii for Patsy Mink's funeral will leave after the last vote, which is probably the next vote, which means we are getting short on time. I am going to ask unanimous consent that each and every amendment be debated, limited to 20 minutes equally divided between proponent and opponent. Let's see how far we get.
Is there any objection?
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So ordered.
Mr. Paul, you will take your 5 minutes on Mr. Smith's amendment.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to speak in favor of this amendment. I think the gentleman from Michigan makes an excellent point about the difference between Iraq and the Iraqi people versus Saddam Hussein and the current Iraqi regime. There is a difference. There has always been a difference in war, in turmoil, the difference between governments and the people.
For this reason, I think it is making this point very clearly. The concern for civilians and innocents so often is ignored in time of war. Most times when war is pursued, there is diligence given to protecting civilians, but frequently this is abused. Certainly, inadvertently, there are a lot of civilians who get killed and injured, and we do not want people to think they are the enemy, because historically, even on our side, the people who fight the wars never declare the wars. It is always the government. So you never have the people who are required to fight, and really the people who are required to pay the taxes to fight the war—they don't get to vote on this.
Certainly the civilians and the innocent people of Iraq are in between a rock and a hard place. They have this dictator over there that abuses their liberties, and he has policies that actually injure them. At the same time, they are about ready to have a war declared against them, and no matter how hard we try, they will be victimized with this. Hopefully it will come out all right and they will do better, but history is against that happening.
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There is going to be a lot more suffering. At this point, it is not the Iraqi people we are declaring our actions against, but Saddam Hussein and his regime.
The one thing we have to remember is that when a country goes to war, whether we call it a police action or a declaration for peace, or we get behind U.N. resolutions, war is war. And war is difficult and war is very expensive. I read an editorial the other day, very honest and up-front, somebody who advocated the promotion of this war. At the same time he was up-front and said to do so, the American people ought to know that there will be a need to raise taxes. There is a likelihood, a much higher likelihood—and he was already for it—of having the reinstitution of the draft.
If the war goes quickly, maybe this will not be such a burden. But if the war does not go quickly and easily—and we have had experience where it doesn't nearly as well as we think—Korea and Vietnam were not short. Therefore, we should be prepared and let the people know that not only are the civilians in Iraq between the rock and the hard place, those who fight the war and pay for the war in this country are between the rock and a hard place as well.
That is why I think this amendment is so important in making an important distinction from the people, the people who fight the war, but they don't declare the war, and we have to consider them as well.
I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. This may regrettably give my Chairman some pain, and I understand the difficulties of the leadership for Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos, but I do think Mr. Menendez made a relevant point earlier, and that is we are sent here to exercise our judgment by our constituencies.
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I refuse to put my brain on neutral. We have a lot of expertise on this Committee—individually and collectively. We don't always make the right decisions in this Committee or any of its predecessors, but I think we have a responsibility and an opportunity. I daresay we have more knowledge on this Committee, among many Members, than the leadership of the House—that is pushing this resolution. I think we ought to exercise our judgment on what is a good amendment and what is not. I support the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman will yield further, I am curious about one thing, because there is much about what the gentleman from Nebraska says. What if Saddam Hussein bestows upon his son Uday—whatever his name is—Hussein, the numero uno position in Iraq. Is that regime change? Is that a new regime?
Mr. PAUL. If I can reclaim my time, I think you make a very important point and you raise a big question about what is going to happen. So just the idea of preemptive strikes and regime changes raises questions rather than gives answers.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. If the gentleman will yield so the sponsor of the amendment can respond to that?
Mr. BERMAN. The reason I asked that question is to the extent you limit this to the regime, the current regime, is there something about essentially an insignificant change in leadership in terms of the reasons we are talking about this? Does that render null and void the authorization to use force?
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Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. If I may respond, on page 5, the only place where we use ''Saddam Hussein'' is on page 5, the third ''whereas,'' that it says: ''Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge posed by Saddam Hussein and the current Iraqi regime,'' that is the only place where we use the ''Saddam Hussein.''
I just would like to point out to my colleagues that this helps make this resolution consistent. We already use the ''Iraqi regime'' in several of the references and ''whereases,'' namely page 3 and page 5. On page 3 it is the second ''whereas,'' the third ''whereas,'' and I have included the first ''whereas'' also on page 3. Out of the 23, I have changed it in 5 locations. I think the message needs to be emphasized by this Committee that the Iraqi people are friends of ours and that there is no intention that we include them on the bad things that this current regime does.
Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman would yield further for another question——
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I want to say that this is not only a reasonable and thoughtful amendment, it is an exceptionally important amendment, and it is important because words matter.
At the beginning of this year we heard a speech that was largely correct but erred in one regard, and it was one of the most important speeches in modern American history, when we had the notion that three countries might be evil.
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I think it is very important that this body recognize that individuals can be malevolent, possibly evil, and Saddam Hussein fits that definition. But countries and people are not inherently evil.
What this body is concerned with is a tyrant individual and a regime that is rogue. This body is the people's body. We speak to the people of other countries, most particularly Iraq, in this kind of resolution. I think it is very important that we divorce Saddam Hussein from the people of Iraq in reference to our concerns.
Therefore, I would suggest that the gentleman has offered an amendment that is not only consistent with other aspects of the resolution, but is incredibly important for this body to reflect to the world. I would urge its adoption.
Chairman HYDE. The Chair recognizes himself.
If Saddam were ousted and were succeeded by another bloody tyrant, his son or somebody else, some other person, this would be relevant. This would not apply.
Yes, we are a Committee and we are a people of intellect and conscience who were elected by their constituency to use their brain, and they serve on this Committee to debate issues and to vote up or down, depending on their predilection. But we also ought to recognize that being a team player has some benefits, too, and that this Committee was going to be bypassed, or there was talk that they would go directly to the Floor with this because they wanted to avoid 435 secretaries of state writing their own resolutions, which we all could.
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Everybody on this Committee could write a resolution, and maybe a better one than the one we are dealing with. I don't know. But to orchestrate an agreement on such a sensitive, critical, consequential point between the Democratic leadership, the Republican leadership, the White House, Mr. Lott, is no small accomplishment. We can sit here and exercise the privilege and the prerogative we have as a Member by voting to change it for the better. But that unravels the agreement that has been made, and we go back to zero and start again.
I have a duty to my constituency to vote my conscience, but I am doing that. I am voting my conscience and supporting this resolution. I just appeal to everybody to put aside their pride of authorship and their linguistic improvements and support the cause that we are dealing with here today and vindicate my fighting for this Committee to get jurisdiction.
It is not that we are doing an empty thing. We are thinking about the consequences of this language, all of us. We are having input. Some amendments are excellent and deserve to be enshrined in the report, where they will have relevance for this generation and future ones. But I am just asking, not demanding, I am not leaning on anybody, I am not disciplining anybody, I am not refusing to recognize anybody. I am just pleading to support not the President, but the cause that is embodied in this resolution by maintaining its integrity.
So I hope the gentleman's amendment, which is a worthy one, is not accepted so we can proceed.
So the question rises on the amendment.
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All those in favor, say aye.
Opposed, nay.
In the opinion of the Chair, the nays have it.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. I would ask for a rollcall.
Chairman HYDE. The Clerk will call the roll.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes yes.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Burton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
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Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
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Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes yes.
Mr. Paul.
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Mr. PAUL. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes yes.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes no.
Mr. Cantor.
[No response.]
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
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Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Faleomavaega votes no.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes yes.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes yes.
Mr. Brown.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney votes yes.
Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
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Mr. Sherman.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler.
[No response.]
Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes no.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes yes.
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Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes yes.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Lee votes yes.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes no.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes yes.
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Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes yes.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes yes.
Mrs. Napolitano.
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes yes.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes no.
Ms. Watson.
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Ms. WATSON. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Watson votes yes.
Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Have all voted who wish? Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. How am I recorded, Mr. Chairman?
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher has not voted.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Being in great sympathy with the issue, but greater sympathy with the Chairman, I vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce has not voted.
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Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Kerns.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns has not voted.
Mr. KERNS. I vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton has not voted.
Mr. BURTON. I vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes no.
Chairman HYDE. The Clerk will report.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 18 ayes and 26 noes.
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Chairman HYDE. Then the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, Nick Smith. May I have permission to speak out of order for 10 seconds?
Chairman HYDE. Surely.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Chairman, I do feel strongly about this, and I hope that we can have the kind of report language that makes this very clear, that our fight isn't with the Iraqi people.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's remarks will be recorded.
Are there further amendments?
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have three amendments at the desk, but I ask unanimous consent that they be considered en bloc.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. The Clerk will report the three amendments.
[The information referred to follows:]
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82194k.AAB
82194k.AAC
82194k.AAD
82194l.AAB
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Ms. RUSH. An amendment offered by Ms. Lee:
Amendment the title so as to read, joint resolution expressing the importance of the United States working through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions to advance peace and security in the Persian Gulf region.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, further reading of the three resolutions is suspended, dispensed with, and the gentlewoman is recognized for 10 minutes. You can divide up and control the 10 minutes as you wish.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This amendment consists of a resolution which I introduced, H.Con.Res. 473, on September 19, which has the support of approximately 36 cosponsors. It urges the United States to reengage the diplomatic process and stresses our government's commitment to the United Nations inspections process. Containment and inspections have worked in the past and can work in the future.
This amendment outlines the history of Iraq's noncompliance with the United Nations Resolution 687 and other resolutions and also cease-fire agreements, and sets forth the need to renew inspections and to seek out and destroy any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It also points out the potential consequences for the United States of a first strike against Iraq.
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The amendment reads in part: Whereas the short-term and long-term costs of unilateral U.S. military action against Iraq and subsequent occupation may be significant in terms of United States casualties, the cost to the United States Treasury and harm to the United States' diplomatic relations in other countries, now therefore be it resolved that the House of Representatives should work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, inquiry, regional arrangements and other peaceful means.
This resolution, Mr. Chairman, also opposes a unilateral preemptive first strike. This sets a dangerous precedent and undercuts the United States' moral authority in our attempts to keep, for example, China and Taiwan, India, Pakistan, or other countries from using weapons of war. Authorizing a unilateral first strike really does lower the bar, changes the standards inherent in our foreign policy, and to now say that it is okay to start a war, whether or not there is evidence of an imminent, clear, and present danger, is a very dangerous path to put our country on.
This amendment does not foreclose future options for the United States if in fact inspections do not work. It differs from Mr. Sherman's previous amendment in several ways, but primarily while it supports inspections, this amendment does not give the President authority to engage in unilateral military action if inspections fail.
It is my contention that the United States must not take any unilateral action nor any preemptive action but must seek multilateral solutions to our current crisis. This is very important I think, Mr. Chairman, because it definitely goes against the Administration, the consensus resolution, the underlying resolution that we are considering today. It does unravel the basic tenets of that resolution.
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I believe that we should support the inspections process. We know that inspections have worked in the past. We should support the full, unfettered inspection process. And I believe we remember when Secretary Powell came to this Committee, I asked him—and I think some Members were here when I asked him this question—I asked him what would the United States' response be had Iraq not responded in the affirmative to the inspections process. He said that he didn't know whether it would have been any different in terms of our response.
So I believe that we need to allow the inspections process to move forward, and it should be done in an unencumbered way, whereby peace and security and the reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction is our goal rather than the stated goal of regime change.
I yield the balance of my time and thank you for the time. I reserve the balance of my time.
Chairman HYDE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Lantos for managing the other 10 minutes on this amendment.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to commend my colleague from California for bringing before us a thoughtful amendment which I am compelled to oppose strongly.
One aspect of my colleague's argument is, of course, an argument we all agree with. We all favor peaceful and diplomatic resolution to this issue. I know of no one on this Committee or in this House who favors a military solution.
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As a matter of fact, the resolution before us makes it crystal clear that we are in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions being enforced. We are calling on the Security Council to take prompt and decisive action to see to it that Iraq complies with its obligations that it had undertaken 11 years ago and has consistently violated.
As a matter of fact, it is interesting to note that had Saddam's sons-in-law not escaped to Jordan where they spilled the beans and made revelations which subsequently resulted in discovering vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, we would never have known that.
The statement of my colleague that we should allow inspections to work fails to recognize that the problem we are confronting fundamentally is that for 11 years inspections have not worked, and the fact that Saddam Hussein today is at least talking about readmitting inspectors is clearly the result of the sword of Damocles that the President's speech in June placed over his head. Had it not been a powerful and forceful statement indicating that that unless inspections are reinstituted—this time in an unfettered, unlimited fashion—we would not now be talking about resuming inspections. The only reason we are talking about inspections is because Saddam recognized that his continued opposition to inspections will result in military action.
So to evade military action, he has now engaged in his traditional song and dance of debating the modalities of inspection and having lied, cheated, and deceived for 11 years, it takes a great deal of hope to assume that there will be a sudden dramatic change in his attitude toward inspections.
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But our underlying resolution accepts that possibility. If in fact full, unfettered, and unlimited inspections will be implemented, we will achieve our goal of finding and destroying Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
My judgment is that to remove the force that made Saddam agree to even limited and imperfect inspections—namely, the eventual, if necessary, use of force—makes it all the more likely that inspections will not achieve their stated objectives.
I strongly urge my colleagues to reject the amendment.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LANTOS. I am happy to yield.
Mr. BEREUTER. Beyond the cogent arguments the gentleman has made, I think we have made it clear in the debate that preemptive action would be used only if we have a situation where a person has demonstrated the willingness to use weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, while it is always desirable to seek to have a resolution and cooperation and assistance from the United Nations, we should never say it is necessary. We are always needing to reserve the right to act in our national interest. This resolution in the Resolved clause precludes that possibility.
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I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Chairman HYDE. Is there further discussion?
Ms. LEE. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is important to note that three individuals, former four-star American generals, would agree with the lady, one of whom was General Clark, and also General Hall, who in fact was the general in charge of the appropriate command that dealt with the Middle East.
They indicated that attacking Iraq without a United Nations resolution supporting military action would limit support from allies, would energize recruiting for al-Qaeda, and would undermine long-term American diplomatic and economic interests worldwide.
I think it is important to note that.
Additionally, the——
Mr. LANTOS. Will my colleague yield on that point? I am reluctant to make this point. I read the testimony of the three gentleman in question, and, in all candor, I do not think you have reflected their views fully and accurately. Since they are not here to testify for themselves, and their written testimony is not before us, I think for the sake of keeping the record accurate, it is important to indicate that some of us view their testimony not in accordance with the gentlelady's amendment and in many ways diametrically opposed to it. I thank my friend.
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Mr. DELAHUNT. I would hope that the time that was consumed by my colleague would be added to the time given, appropriated, to Ms. Lee.
I clearly respect my Ranking Member and I know what he speaks of, I am sure he is convinced of. However, my understanding, as it was reported in the New York Times, indicates a different tone in terms of their testimony as I enunciated it.
But I think the what most important point is that this amendment speaks to is the whole concept of this preemption doctrine. It clearly has caused grave concern among our allies. There have been reports that EU officials are expressing public alarm.
I think what we should reflect on is that the mixture of containment and establishing an international rule of law and encouraging democratic rule should be noted to have succeeded; that since the Gulf War, there have been no efforts, no initiatives taken by the Iraqi regime against its neighbors. And there are other options. There are other options that are based upon the rule of law.
Later I hope to introduce an amendment that would establish a War Crimes Tribunal as one of those particular options. I would suggest it is more reflective of what we ought to be about as a Nation in terms of our foreign policy and in terms of setting standards for the rest of the world.
When we talk about preemption, what triggers preemption? Are there any boundaries? Are there any parameters that trigger this particular doctrine? What quantum of evidence is necessary? What evidence do we need to trigger preemption?
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That can vary. As we discussed earlier in the amendment offered—I forget who offered the amendment—but there have to be standards, there have to be benchmarks. Otherwise, as the gentlewoman indicates, we will create an international order where states, for whatever reason, either feel threatened or take an aggressive stance, will utilize this so-called doctrine of preemption.
Mr. LANTOS. I yield 2 minutes to my colleague, Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate your yielding me the time. A couple of points. We are not voting on the doctrine of preemption. We are voting on a very specific authorization which could involve the use of preemptory force.
I happen to have real concerns about the broader doctrine as issued by the Administration. I found it bellicose, I found it arrogant, I found it problematic in terms of other questions that need to be answered.
But wait a second, guys, this will not be the first time we have contemplated preemptive action, if preemptive action means striking before the other person strikes you or strikes your allies.
A large group of us on this side of the aisle supported General Wesley Clark when he wanted to start bombing in Kosovo, without Security Council authorization—in a situation where the Security Council was sure to have exercised in the case of Russia its veto power—to start bombing. Yugoslovia didn't attack any of its neighbors. It was just slaughtering its own citizens. And we thought for compelling humanitarian purposes, we wanted to pass a resolution, which, by the way, if I recall, did not pass, allowing the previous Administration to begin bombing to smitherines out of a variety of targets in Yugoslavia to stop that humanitarian tragedy, because there were other strategic interests. We have acted peremptorily in the past, if acting peremptorily means acting before they strike you.
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By the way, if the facts were clear that Saddam had a nuclear weapon and somebody was proposing this, would the same arguments be made? We are not debating the broader doctrine of preemption as put forth by the Administration in this particular resolution. I have grave concerns about that doctrine and its application and what it means in terms of what other countries might do, citing the same doctrine.
But this is a very different issue. And this particular amendment makes many interesting and good and correct points. But it totally fails in its ''whereas'' clauses to point out that those same inspectors who went in and found a lot, also told us they never got any accounting—notwithstanding his promises—from Saddam of his dozens and dozens of biological and chemical warheads that we know he still has and that we have never found. We never got any accounting of the tons of materials which are the basic elements for botulism and smallpox that we know he has. This is not from Richard Perle, this is from U.N. inspection teams that were in Iraq.
I urge that this amendment be defeated.
Mr. LANTOS. I yield 2 minutes to Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you.
I do applaud Ms. Lee's concerns and her fashion, wanting very much that we collectively make this effort to have as many not only countries of the world in support of this effort, but the fact that we ought to pursue it through the means of the Security Council and the United Nations.
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But I wanted to ask my good friend from California, Mr. Lantos, if section 2 and section 3 of the proposed Joint Resolution 114 do not address this very concern that we have? And is the President definitely pursuing every means possible within the confines of pursuing a diplomatic solution to this issue as it makes reference to working closely with the Security Council of the United Nations, as well as other regional organizations? I wanted to ask Mr. Lantos if he could address that issue.
Mr. LANTOS. If my friend will yield, you are absolutely correct. Yesterday in my opening statement, perhaps my main point was that the use of force must be the very last resort, when everything else has failed. This is the policy of our government. It is a policy that underlies the resolution, the bipartisan resolution, and it is a policy that I suspect all of us on this Committee and in this House support.
So you are correct, sir.
Chairman HYDE. The question occurs on the amendments en bloc offered by the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, has my time expired?
Chairman HYDE. You have 43 seconds.
Ms. LEE. Let me yield to the gentleman from New York.
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Mr. MEEKS. Forty-three seconds. I will just say this: From what I hear, we can't have it both ways. In one instance I hear the U.N. is irrelevant and we can't allow the U.N. to do this or that. On the other hand, as I read the joint resolution, and what I have heard many of the Administration officials come before us and say, it says we must consider this because there is a violation of the U.N. resolution.
If there is a violation of the U.N. resolution, we are giving the U.N. credibility because of the resolution they presented, but then we are saying they are irrelevant, irrespective. So we are going to arbitrarily make a determination on how to enforce the U.N. resolution without going back to the U.N.
So if we set this precedent that the U.N. can have a resolution, people don't abide by those resolutions, and then an individual country can come in and say the U.N. has a resolution, they are in violation of it, we will decide how the U.N. resolutions will be enforced without the U.N. I think we are setting a precedent that is going to be widespread. So anybody else that is in violation of a U.N. resolution, somebody else can come in and say you are in violation of a U.N. resolution and we are going to determine unilaterally to take force to take you out, because you are in violation of the U.N.
We should watch the precedents we are setting here. I support the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. LANTOS. I am pleased to yield my 30 seconds to my friend from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
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Mr. GREEN. Very quickly, I will return to the subject of this amendment, inspections. We have to be careful how we use that term. Almost no one out there is arguing that inspections conducted under the terms insisted upon by Saddam Hussein to date have been at all effective. Even the Carnegie Endowment for Peace has not said that these inspection regimes have been effective at all. The best way we enforce and secure the peace is to strengthen the President's hand. That is how we make diplomacy meaningful. That is how we avoid a costly conflict.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman HYDE. The question occurs on the amendments bloc offered by the gentlewoman from California.
All those in favor, say aye.
Those opposed, nay.
In the opinion of the Chair, the nays have it.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, may I have a vote?
Chairman HYDE. The gentlewoman asked for a rollcall. She shall have one. The Clerk will call the roll.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
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Mr. GILMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith.
[No response.]
Mr. Burton.
Ms. Rush. Mr. Gallegly.
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Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
Mr. Issa.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes no.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
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Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Mr. Green votes no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Faleomavaega votes no.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes no.
Mr. Menendez.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes yes.
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Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney votes yes.
Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes no.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes yes.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes yes.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Lee votes yes.
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Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes no.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes no.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes yes.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes no.
Mrs. Napolitano.
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Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes yes.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes no.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Watson votes yes.
Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith.
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Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Have all voted who wish?
If so, the Clerk will announce the roll, the vote.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 11 ayes and 34 noes.
Chairman HYDE. And the amendments are not agreed to.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul, do you have an amendment?
Mr. PAUL. I have an amendment, thank you.
Chairman HYDE. The Clerk will report the amendment of Mr. Paul.
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[The information referred to follows:]
82194g.AAB
82194m.AAB
82194n.AAB
Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Paul: Strike all after the Resolving clause and insert the following:
Mr. PAUL. I ask unanimous consent that it be considered as read and that the three amendments be considered as one.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
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Mr. PAUL. Five or ten?
Chairman HYDE. I guess 10. I tried to get away with something.
Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this is a substitute amendment and it is a simple, clear-cut, straightforward, front-door declaration of war. No back door to war, it is the front door. I am depending on you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure it doesn't pass.
Chairman HYDE. A very wise move.
Mr. LANTOS. You may count on me, too.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Chairman, I will be voting with you and the Administration on this bill, on this particular substitute. But nevertheless, I consider what I am doing here very important and not frivolous, because this is a declaration of war. As I mentioned before, in the resolution that we have before us, we never mention war. We never mention article I, section 8. We only talk about transferring the power and the authority to the President to wage war when he pleases. I consider that unconstitutional.
Of course, we cite the U.N. 25 times as back-up evidence for what we are doing, so I think it is appropriate for us to think about our oath of office and the Constitution, what America is all about. Because, quite frankly, I think we have suffered tremendously over the last 50 or 60 years, since World War II, since we have rejected this process, because we don't win wars but men die. One hundred thousand men have died in that period of time, and many hundreds of thousands wounded, and many ignored. The Persian Gulf syndrome ignored, yet over 100,000 may be suffering from that.
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I see this as very important that we should be up front with the American people, because, if not, we can well slip into war once again. And that, to me, is not what we are supposed to be doing. We are supposed to be very up-front in doing this as we have been obligated to do.
I would like to read a quote from a former President of a few years back. He had something to do with the Constitution. He speaks for that time. Of course, most people believe today that the Constitution is a living, ever-changing document, that the truth is not everlasting and that the founders are irrelevant. But we still have the law on the book. We haven't changed the law. And this quote emphasizes how they looked at foreign policy and the separation of powers, because at the time of our Revolution they had firsthand experience of what happened in Europe when the King or one leader has the authority and the power to go to war.
So it was strongly emphasized by those who were writing the Constitution of where this war power would reside. It was put into the legislative branch of government, which was closest to the people. That is very important, because our failure to win wars is one of the strongest motivations on my part to address this subject.
Quite frankly, I believe that the Persian Gulf War, one, never ended. We are just dealing with one more segment of a war that is perpetual because it was not declared. We half-heartedly committed, we had the restraints of the United Nations, we did not go for the right reasons, and we didn't win. Therefore, we didn't do the job that should have been done in 1990 if we had declared war.
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The same thing could have been said about Korea and Vietnam. It is time we address the process just as emphatically as we address the pros and cons of whether this country should go to war.
Now, let me quote from James Madison. Madison said in 1798:
''The Constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrate, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature.''
We have now just carelessly over the years, and today once again, easily given this up.
You say, no, this doesn't necessarily mean that, and we have done if before. We have allowed our Presidents to do this. But if the President can go to war, this is the permission that we are giving.
It is interesting to note that in the United Nations Charter, you do not have a provision that says well, when you want to declare war, here you come, and these are the procedures. When the United Nations gets involved, we are always declaring the use of force for peace. But it gets difficult and it gets muddied, and it is murky under today's conditions because there is no war going on in Iraq. Yet we have not exhausted the vehicle of negotiations and other things that could be done.
So, this is why, unfortunately, I have very little faith and confidence this will be the solution to solve the problem in Iraq and the Middle East. As a matter of fact, if that happens, this is a dramatic reversal of 60 years of history. It is not going to happen.
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We have not dealt with the unintended consequences, what we are dealing with today in the sense that the wars continue, but the unintended consequences. And I disagree with the previous speaker who said that this resolution is not dealing with preemptive strikes. That is what the whole thing is about, allowing the President the authority to do a preemptive strike against a nation that has not committed aggression against us. This is the whole issue.
So I would say that this is the time that we ought to not only think about the issue of the pros and cons of war, but the issue of how much of our sovereignty we give away to the United Nations and how many restraints will be placed on us, not only now as we try to satisfy everybody in the United Nations, but later on as well.
It was said we didn't finish the war in 1990 because of the resolution not permitting us to do this, and therefore it wasn't done, but we were following the rules. Of course, that is why you need—if you commit the country and commit the young people and commit the taxpayer to war—you need to call it war.
So those of you who are for war, vote for this. Those who are opposed to it should vote against the war, because we don't believe it is necessary to go to war right now. If you are honest with yourself, this is what you should do. Otherwise you are perpetuating a fraud on the American people, perpetuating a system that has not worked, perpetuating a system that ends too often in chaos.
I just don't think that is good. I really don't. I think we should think about this very carefully and make sure that we follow the process as well as our best judgments on war.
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Some have argued that in this case what you are saying is we would tie the hands of the President. We would tie the hands of the President. Well, that sounds a little strong. But you know what? That is what was intended in the Constitution. That is what Madison is talking about, tying the hands of one person to make the decision to go to war. Therefore, I think—I want and desire so much to think more seriously, because if there a declaration of war, we will fight to win it and it won't drag on and be endless and lead to another one.
We don't know what is going to happen. There may be an attack on Taiwan, and India may move, and who knows what may come of this? It certainly will not solidify our support in an Arab world that is very antagonistic to us and numbers over 1 billion people.
At this time, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Will the gentleman yield?
If the gentleman will yield, much of what you say truly resonates, because I do concur. I do believe this is about a doctrine of preemption. I think we all feel uneasy about it. I am not denying that inherent in a Nation State, if there is a real clear, convincing threat, that that doctrine does not apply. I think it should apply.
But what concerns me is that the standards that are being set by the underlying resolution here are so low that it could very well create a new concept in the international order that, as you described, will give other states, the most obvious examples being India and Pakistan, the right to say to the international community we are going to launch a nuclear strike, when it ought not to be an option.
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I mean, there are many rogue nations, if you will. We have discussed them here today: Iran, North Korea. There is a long litany of nations that possess weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. PAUL. Excuse me, if I might. I would like to reserve a few minutes of my time. Thank you.
Chairman HYDE. You have 3 seconds left, Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. I allow you to finish my time. Mr. Chairman, you were watching closely.
Chairman HYDE. Yes, with great interest. Are you through?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield.
Chairman HYDE. All right. The Chair yields himself the 10 minutes in opposition to this.
It is fascinating to go back in history and see how our Constitution was drafted and what it means. There are things in the Constitution that have been overtaken by events, by time. Declaration of war is one. Letters of mark and reprisal are others. There are things no longer relevant to a modern society.
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The problem with a declaration of war is that is a formal step taken by a nation. And when you do that, you kick in other laws. Enemy aliens—people suddenly become who are of German extraction or Saudi extraction, depending on whom you are declaring war against, suddenly become enemy aliens. Trading with the enemy becomes effective. Therefore, if a country is trading with your enemy, they are your enemy.
Most importantly and psychologically, if you declare war, if we had declared war on Vietnam, China would have had to declare war on us, and then the Soviet Union, not to be outdone fraternally, would have had to declare war on us. And you start a chain of events. That is the last thing you want to do. You want to isolate these conflicts. You don't want them to metastasize.
Declaration of war metastasizes conflict.
Insurance policies are invalidated in time of war. There are so many consequences, criminal statutes. So there are laws affecting military personnel in time of war and in time of peace.
Now, the Congress always has the last word in war and peace because we control the purse strings. We could introduce a bill and rush it through that would say no funds appropriated herein may be used to pay for an expedition to France or to the Caribbean. Congress always has the last word because we control the purse strings. But now this resolution we are dealing with today does not declare war. It does not approach war. War may never happen. If we mean what we say and we say what we mean and we have a reasonably tough posture, we may avoid war.
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Why declare war if you don't have to? We are saying to the President, use your judgment. We know you have tried to have inspections work. We have tried the U.N., they have been made a fool of for 11 years now. The League of Nations was muscular compared to the U.N. That is the situation we are in now.
So to demand that we declare war is to strengthen something to death. You have got a hammerlock on this situation, and it is not called for. Inappropriate, anachronistic, it isn't done anymore because it has the effect of pyramiding when what you want to do is to isolate.
So with great respect for the gentleman's knowledge of political science, I suggest this is inappropriate, and I would hope it would be defeated.
Mr. Green wants to say something.
Mr. GREEN. In many ways, our colleague Dr. Paul is the constitutional conscience of the House, and I appreciate it. But one thing I wanted not to leave unchallenged.
He said in his remarks that Iraq is a country which has committed no acts of aggression against the U.S. There are many people who would disagree with that, not the least of whom would be the pilots in the no-fly zone, who are routinely fired upon. I think we have to be a little bit careful in our remarks.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos.
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Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think you handled, as you always do, the issue perfectly, but I would like to just add a footnote. I have great affection for my friend from Texas, but I detect a touch of frivolity and mischief in his amendment, because I do not believe—I do not believe he is serious about this amendment, not only because of all the reasons you have cited, but because the resolution we are considering is aimed at avoiding war. It is geared to having unfettered, unlimited, foolproof inspections, and not a war.
The possibility of using force is the only mechanism of potentially persuading Saddam Hussein to allow inspections, to have the destruction of weapons of mass destruction be brought about by nonviolent means. So I think, while at one level it is a frivolous proposal, which I strongly urge my colleagues to reject, at a more profound level, it totally misunderstands or deliberately misinterprets the underlying resolution.
It is our hope that we can move to inspections which will achieve the goal of finding and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction without a single shot being fired. That is my earnest hope, that is the earnest hope of, I take it, all of us who support the resolution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
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Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think a formal declaration of war, as opposed to an authorization to use force should Iraq not disarm, is going to have consequences under domestic law, but it is also going to have consequences under international law. And I think for those of us here in Congress we have got to contemplate the fact that it is going to have the effect of transferring power, conferring power to the President and to the Attorney General and to the Pentagon that they cannot otherwise exercise. One of those powers is going to be the power to wiretap, notwithstanding what we do in Congress, once there is a declaration of war, they are automatically going to be able to wiretap.
Another concern would be what we would do to insurance contracts, because once you have a declaration of war, you bring into effect an exclusionary clause in the contracts that are out there. I think also you have to consider the fact that we are moving away from our joint objective here, which is to leverage Iraq to disarm, to have a credible threat against that regime, the threat of use of force. And instead we are abandoning that, if we go with a formal declaration of war, we then take on these international and domestic changes under our Constitution.
And I wanted to ask the author if he contemplated those changes. Should we actually pass this initiative? What do we do about them?
Mr. PAUL. Would the gentleman yield?
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Yes, I certainly did. But that emphasizes and makes my point how serious this is, because you are ignoring how serious war is. And then we know that is what we are talking about here today. No matter what you call it, we are talking about a resolution that permits the President to wage war.
Mr. ROYCE. It permits the President to wage war, and the reason we are going through this exercise is to present a credible threat to the Iraqi regime so that they do disarm.
And you move us off of that strategy on a completely different track, a completely different track with this particular amendment. And that is why I oppose the amendment.
I thank you.
Chairman HYDE. The question occurs on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas. All those in favor, say aye.
Opposed, nay.
In the opinion of the Chair——
Mr. PAUL. I ask for a recorded vote.
Chairman HYDE. If the gentleman wants a recorded vote, he can have one. Call the roll.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith of New Jersey votes no.
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Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes no.
Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Houghton.
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Mr. HOUGHTON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes no.
Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes no.
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Mr. Smith of Michigan.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith of Michigan votes no.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes no.
Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes no.
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Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
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Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Faleomavaega votes no.
Mr. Payne.
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Mr. PAYNE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes no.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes no.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes no.
Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney votes no.
Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes no.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler votes no.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes no.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes no.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes no.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes no.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Lee votes no.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes no.
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Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes no.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes no.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes no.
Mrs. Napolitano.
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes no.
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Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes no.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. WATSON. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Watson votes no.
Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson.
Ms. WATSON. For those who are going on the flight to attend Patsy Mink's funeral, can we state for the record how we would vote on the resolution?
Chairman HYDE. Yes. First of all, let's dispose of this matter.
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The clerk will report the rollcall.
Ms. RUSH. On this vote there are 0 yeas and 41 noes.
Chairman HYDE. The amendment is narrowly defeated.
We now have a vote, which we must attend and hurry back, please. We are going to finish this bill today.
There are three of our Members going on the plane to Hawaii for the Patsy Mink funeral. You certainly may, for the record, state how you would vote on final passage. I don't know what we can do about the amendments, but final passage, you may—why don't you now tell the clerk how you would vote?
Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for accommodating us. When the bill comes up, whether amended or not, I would have voted no.
Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee?
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman when the base bill comes up, the resolution, I intend to vote no on that.
Chairman HYDE. Very well. The record will so show.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would yes in support of the resolution for final passage.
Chairman HYDE. The record will so show.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Davis has an amendment. The clerk will report the amendment and then we will go vote.
[The information referred to follows:]
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82194o.AAG
Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Davis of Florida. Amend the title so as to read——
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Chairman HYDE. Without objection, further reading of the amendment is dispensed with and the gentleman will be recognized for 5 minutes in support of—10 minutes. But we will stand in recess until we come back after——
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Can I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be taken up en bloc as well?
Chairman HYDE. Yes, you certainly may. And without objection, so ordered.
Would you please come back as quickly as you can?
[Recess.]
Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.
The pending business was an amendment offered by Mr. Davis, but before we get to that, one of our Members is—this is his final appearance with the Committee. And he has spent so many years leading us as Chairman and as a Member, and he is not only leaving our Committee, he is leaving the House of Representatives for a very well-deserved retirement—but much too early in my judgment.
But I would like to yield 2 minutes to Ben Gilman, who would like to say a few words.
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Ben Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't realize that you were going to give me this opportunity. And I wish a fond farewell to my colleagues, and I won't take too long.
Mr. Chairman, this may well be the last meeting of our International Relations Committee of the 107th Congress, and while many of my colleagues are going to be returning to our Committee room next year, it is with deep regret—and somewhat painful—that I am involuntarily retiring and will not be with you during the 108th Congress. I say involuntarily. I was a victim of redistricting. I would appreciate your indulgence if you permit me just a couple of observations.
I want to thank in particular you, Mr. Chairman, for the way in which you have conducted the affairs of our Committee during this Congress. You have always been most gracious and considerate not only of me, but indeed of all of our colleagues. I know my colleagues all join in thanking you for your good work.
I first entered, my colleagues, in this room as a Member 30 years ago, sitting down on the lower level. And I have had the privilege of being present for so many memorable hearings and occasions in this wonderful Committee room, along with my colleagues and with many friends in the Administration of both parties and with public-spirited private citizens who have come before us formally here and have given of their advice and counsel to all of us.
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I think we have done so much in this Committee to make not only our Nation more secure, but to make the world a better place for all of us.
So let me thank my many colleagues on both sides of the aisle, both present and those who have left this Committee in past years, for their many kindnesses and cooperation. Especially when I was Chairman and, before that, as Ranking Republican, I always depended upon and uniformly received the cooperation of so many of our Members on both sides; and in that regard I can consider myself most fortunate.
I also thank our Committee's professional and support staff, the staff of our legislative counsel, our leadership staffs, legislative support agencies such as GAO, CRS and CBO, our expert reporters and transcribers, all those who provide for our security and those who keep this building in such great shape and especially our Committee room.
I have long benefited from a loyal and competent personal staff and from the cooperation of the personal staffs of so many of our Members.
So thank you all for allowing me to serve my constituents and to serve my State and Nation in this great institution and to serve our Committee on International Relations. It is very difficult to say good-bye.
One last note. One last advocacy to my colleagues on the International Relations Committee. Please do not be reluctant to travel overseas to fulfill our responsibility to conduct oversight on so many important foreign policy programs and so many billions of dollars that we spend on behalf of our Nation.
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Thank you and God bless.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, on no topic would I dare speak on behalf of all Democrats except on the topic of Ben Gilman. So allow me, on behalf of all of our Democratic colleagues, to say a word to Ben.
Ben's integrity and intelligence have been an inspiration for every single Member of this Committee and of this Congress. I have never met a colleague more diligent, more committed, more serious, more patriotic, more effective than Ben Gilman. For years, he and I Co-Chaired our liaison committee to the European Parliament. And after long, long days of debates and discussions, Ben always wanted the Floor one more time at a time that these topics were not on the front pages, and he wanted to talk about international terrorism. This was years and years and years before that topic became topic one on the international scene.
It was Ben who at every one of these meetings and in countless other venues insisted on talking about drugs and the danger that drugs pose to the United States and to the American people.
And as the founding Chairman of the congressional Human Rights Caucus, let me say there is no more passionate, persistent and powerful advocate for human rights in this body than our friend Ben Gilman.
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So Ben, we know that it is difficult for you to leave the Committee and the Congress. Let me assure you it is more difficult for to us think of the 108th Congress where Ben Gilman's cheerful face and indefatigable performance will not be part of the scene.
So on behalf of every one of my Democratic colleagues, may we say thank you. We wish you well in your new endeavor, which is a very powerful and important international endeavor; and we know you will come back to us because you are part of our family.
Mr. ENGEL. Would the gentleman yield? I thank my friend for yielding.
I would be remiss if I didn't say a very few words about my friend and colleague, Ben Gilman.
I just want to tell my colleagues that since the new districts are different than the ones we have all been running in for the past 10 years—a substantial portion of my new district is part of the district that Ben has so wonderfully represented for the past 30 years. I can tell you that no matter where I go in Rockland County, New York, no matter where the people are, no matter what political persuasion they are, from all walks of life, everybody has nothing but the finest and the best to say about Ben Gilman.
I think that if we are going to judge our standards, all of us here as colleagues, in the way we conduct ourselves as Members of the House of Representatives, I can think of no finer example than the way Ben Gilman has conducted himself for more than 30 years here.
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I just want all my colleagues to know the very, very high esteem that Ben is held in in New York—his are big footsteps to step into. So we had a tribute up in Rockland for Ben, and I have never seen such a tremendous outpouring of every elected official, Republican and Democrat, talking about Ben Gilman.
So I just wanted to add my words to yours, Mr. Lantos. And we will miss Ben, but we know that the Congress's loss is going to be the country's gain.
Mr. LANTOS. May I yield for a moment to Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDE. Surely.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lantos.
Ben, I have spent the last 20 years serving with you on this Committee, and it has always been a pleasure. You have been an inspiration to so many of us. You have been a teacher and a friend, where politics was not the important thing, but policy was.
I remember the many trips we have taken together, you and your wife—actually, you and your wives—I can tell you how much we love Georgia and say how lucky you are to have her and she to have you.
I think Tom said it all, about you discussing the issues, when they were not necessarily in vogue, and talking about things such as international terrorism, things as diverse as human rights throughout the years, when nobody had the thought on their mind or that phrase on their lips; and the fight against drugs for all of these decades that you championed all over the world and made it so important here and made such a policy difference.
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If I might, Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, say a word that usually those of our background have in mind and a few others on this Committee share, that you don't usually hear us talk about in person. But we come from a relatively small people, although admittedly overachievers, generally underrepresented in most bodies for quite a long historical period of time.
And I remember, as a young boy growing up, the name of Ben Gilman was revered in my parents' house as the name of a hero, somebody that we could look up to, someone that we could respect, somebody that we might aspire to be like when we grew up.
And, Ben, you have been very much a part of that dream that so many of us have had. And being able to actually grow up and serve with you and watch and learn from you has been a pleasure for me and so many of us in this body, and we will be forever grateful to you.
Mr. LANTOS. May I be permitted to yield a minute to my dear friend from New Jersey, our distinguished colleague, Mr. Payne?
Chairman HYDE. Yes, of course. I just hope this doesn't move to a near funereal tone here.
Mr. PAYNE. I will be the cleanup here. I will wrap it up.
But I too would like to express to Ben Gilman how much I appreciated working with him. Many instances—you know, my voice is usually that of being contrary. I mentioned earlier that no one was representing me at the negotiations that were going on about Iraq. However, if Ben was there, I knew my voice might be heard.
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Let me say that Ben Gilman has done so many programs—the U.S. Korean program that many people don't even know about. Ben Gilman has had young people from Korea come to the U.S. and American children go to Korea to live in homes of Korean people and to have bonds that last forever. It is just fantastic that Ben would have the vision to know that these people-to-people programs are so important.
The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, when I first came to Congress I was amazed at how two persons, very different, different parties, different backgrounds, could work so closely together. When Charlie Rangel, who Chaired that Committee with Ben Gilman—Charlie from Harlem came up rough and tumble, a Korean War veteran, and Ben Gilman from upstate New York, elitist—that these two men could come together and work so closely together to attempt to work on the elimination of this dread disease.
I think we have lost a lot, Ben, since the elimination of the Select Committees.
I would just like to say, although I am over in New Jersey on the other side of the Hudson, we do get the New York City sludge and garbage, however, you are upstate and you have nothing to do with that.
We certainly will miss you. And continue to use Newark International Airport, because I see you slip in and out of there quite a bit.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman HYDE. I hope the rest of you will put your remarks in writing and mail them to Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank my colleagues for their kind words.
Chairman HYDE. Let me just say, for those of us who have not joined because of time constraints, that we all think of you as a perfect blue white diamond in a sea of zirconia.
Okay, Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to call up—I guess we are at that posture. The amendment that I presume is before everyone, as well as a 1-page explanation and a contrast between the underlying bill and my amendment which is the substitute.
We have had a good debate, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly appreciate that you made a comment earlier that you hope we would maintain the integrity of the underlying bill; and I believe that this substitute amendment does that.
This substitute amendment is the exact text of the proposal that has been developed by Senator Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Lugar, Ranking Member, and it is also strongly supported by Senator Hagel and perhaps others.
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What we are going to vote on later today has been presented to us as a compromise, a reasonably good deal. I think it does represent progress.
But I think our constituents expect us to develop something that doesn't just represent a good compromise. They expect to us come up with our very best efforts. I believe this amendment I am about to describe to you significantly improves upon the underlying bill.
The amendment attempts to directly and—to make directly—let me try again.
The amendment attempts to make perfectly clear and state directly the goals associated with the authorization of force. The substitute amendment is an authorization of force. This amendment says, in the way that it is written, that the goal here is disarmament. I do not believe the case has been made for a preemptive strike. I think that, for the sake of the President, it is very important that we focus on disarmament.
This amendment is very similar to the underlying bill, but let me highlight some of the differences. One of the serious defects in the underlying bill that is corrected by the amendment is that under this amendment we would be voting to authorize the President to use force to enforce Security Council resolutions that have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction and disarmament.
The way that the underlying bill is written, we are authorizing the use of force to enforce such resolutions that deal with the return of stolen property to Kuwait, prisoners of war, and Saddam Hussein's repression of his own people. Those are terrible things we ought to be concerned about, but I don't believe that is the basis upon which this Congress wants to direct the President to be prepared to use military force, even as a last resort.
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The second significant change made by the Biden-Lugar amendment before you is that it requires the President, in the event the U.N. fails to provide a basis for us to settle disarmament with Saddam Hussein, to make a formal declaration to the United States Congress and to the American people that the threat presented by Saddam Hussein is so grave as to warrant military action by the United States. As you will recall, that is exactly the word the President used in the best speech I think he has made on this issue before the United Nations when he talked about ''a grave and gathering danger.'' Grave danger that is likely to produce great harm or danger.
Under the underlying text, I believe we have made a finding that Saddam Hussein represents a continuing threat and we have essentially said to the President that if the U.N. process fails, the President is free, with our support, to proceed into Iraq. And I don't think that is the standard that we want to set.
I think we want to use the President's word, ''grave.'' I think we want to set a standard that if there is a substantial risk, a likely harm, a great harm to the United States, that we should be prepared to use force as a last resort.
I think these particular changes make the amendment before you a much-improved version of the underlying text. And so I want to urge you, regardless of whether you intend to vote for the resolution or not, to consider this as an improvement to the underlying text and something that adds to the integrity of the bill.
I will reserve the balance of my time.
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Chairman HYDE. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank my friend Mr. Davis for bringing before our Committee a very serious amendment.
If my friend will allow me a personal note, Senator Biden, the principal Democratic sponsor of this amendment, is probably my closest friend in the Congress as a whole. We have been together in many, many contexts and capacities for something like 3 decades, and I have the highest affection and respect and admiration for him.
Senator Lugar represents the finest in American public service. So the amendment comes to us with the most powerful, impressive, and high-level sponsorship.
As a matter of fact, I must say in all candor that if this were an editorial committee meeting, I would be prepared to entertain editorial changes in our underlying resolution or in the Biden-Lugar resolution as submitted by Mr. Davis. But that is not where we are.
The President has stated flat-out he is opposed to Biden-Lugar. Yesterday, the House Democratic leadership, the House Republican leadership, and the Senate Republican leadership were present at the White House at the press conference where the agreement was announced. The Democratic Party on the Senate side was represented by some of the leaders on the Democratic side of the United States Senate.
The issue before us is the underlying resolution. My friend is correct in saying that nuances of one or another may be preferable to some of us or others. This train is now on its way. The Senate has before it the same resolution we are now considering. That resolution, the bipartisan resolution negotiated by the bipartisan leadership, has a very impressive list of cosponsors, ranging from Senator McCain to Senator Lieberman, and we are really not here to argue whether Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman and Senator Warner and Senator Bayh and others carry more weight than Biden and Lugar. They are all fine people. They are all passionate patriots, experts in the field of international relations.
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If we were at the beginning of the process it might be reasonable to negotiate a blending of the two resolutions. That is clearly not the status of the debate.
On a bipartisan basis here in the House, we have an agreement with the President of the United States who has stated his opposition to Biden-Lugar. We will not now unravel an agreement which will be the vehicle early next week for congressional debate in both houses and a vote hopefully before the end of next week.
Therefore, with great respect for my friend Mr. Davis and for the authors of his amendment, Senators Biden and Lugar, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this amendment, because accepting it would reopen a multiweek debate of very complex proportions.
I also think I should mention a substantive criticism I have of Mr. Davis' amendment. It does not deal with the subject of international terrorism. The underlying resolution does. I fully agree with all of my colleagues who claim that the focus of our resolution has to be and is the need to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction. But not to deal with Iraq's support of international terrorism is a very significant gap in the Biden-Lugar amendment.
Now, they may have chosen not to deal with it for good and substantial reasons, but since we are dealing not with a legal case but with a litany of crimes, some of which certainly do not rise to the level of taking military action, while the question of weapons of mass destruction might, I feel that the underlying resolution has not only the advantage of having been approved by both the President and our bipartisan leadership, but it also has a substantive advantage over Biden-Lugar.
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I urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining on my side?
Chairman HYDE. You have 6 minutes and 43 seconds.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. I yield a minute and a half to Mr. Menendez.
Chairman HYDE. You certainly may.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I want to speak on behalf of Mr. Davis' effort. Don't consider his effort a nuance. Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator, and on that there is no difference. But the precedents we set here are very important as is evidenced by the ''whereas'' clauses in this Committee's resolution. It is not a nuance.
Now, I know that some of my colleagues have said this vote is not in fact a vote on the preemption doctrine, but that doctrine and regime change have been the cornerstone of what the Administration's case has been before this Congress and the American people.
Now, proponents of this doctrine have tried to differentiate the application of that doctrine between Iraq and North Korea that has nuclear weapons and Iran that is closer to having nuclear weapons than Iraq, in that Iraq has shown their predisposition to use such weapons of mass destruction. However, the logical underpinning of a preemptive strike is to preempt the possibility of an enemy using their weapons in the first instance. That logic does not dictate that predisposition is the trigger to invoke the preemption doctrine.
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So I think it is incredibly important what we seek to do here today, and in that regard the Biden-Lugar proposal, Mr. Davis' substitute, outlines a clear goal. It makes it perfectly clear that the resolution is about disarmament, and requires the President to make a determination that there is grave risk and cause to seek that type of determination, because if Congress is going to send American men and women into harm's way, the risk must be more than continuing. The United States faces many continuing risks, but they do not warrant the use of military force.
This higher standard, this clear objective, a clear understanding, sets not only the right course, but the right precedent. I certainly am not ready to invoke a broad-based preemptive doctrine that is not clear in its application, that some will seek today to differentiate on the basis that it is in fact eligible against Iraq because in fact they have the predisposition. That is not the basis of a preemptive strike.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Davis?
Anyone over here? Mr. Rohrabacher would like to speak on Mr. Lantos' time. How much time do you give him?
Mr. LANTOS. How much time would my friend like?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Two minutes, if I could.
Mr. LANTOS. I am happy to yield to my friend.
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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, the American people have been sensitized in this last year; 9/11 did that to us. Before that, the American people were unwilling to come to grips with the threats that we face around the world, especially threats like that of Saddam Hussein and bin Laden at the time. Over and over again, some of us tried to raise the emergency flag and say take a look here, we have a problem, and people in this country didn't want to face it.
Since 9/11 our public has been sensitized to this and President Bush is wisely trying to lead us down the path to take care of this problem, of this challenge, of this grave danger to our people in the persona of Saddam Hussein, a man who is a monster, who has murdered his own people. We don't have to go through all of that again.
This is not just about eliminating Saddam Hussein's grasp on nuclear weapons or chemical biological weapons. We did that before. We did that 10 years ago. He was disarmed. Guess what has happened over the last 10 years? Again and again, we have evolved into a situation, the inspectors have been limited. Little by little we see evidence of the fact he is setting up operations to try to put together a storehouse and an arsenal of chemical/biological weapons.
No, this is not about just eliminating those weapons. It is not—and ''regime change'' is just too sanitized a word. We are talking about liberating the people of Iraq from this monster and at the same time freeing the American people from this grave danger that they face.
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This monster Saddam Hussein, who has murdered his own people, has a blood grudge against us. We brought him down 10 years ago, and if we just think that we are going to put in all of these inspectors and then they are going to find all of the weapons, which nobody believes is really possible, and then we are going to be safer, no way.
Saddam Hussein has got to go. We have the opportunity now to rid our people of this grave danger. Shame on us if we are bogged down with different posturing and political maneuvering. I ask for an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. LANTOS. I am happy to yield.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Democracy means we have to work together in times of crisis. I have been at odds with some of my friends on the other side of the aisle on issues. You have heard it time and time again. This is a chance we have to work together and make our country and make the world safer, rather than getting bogged down in process and being nitpicking about process.
The President has offered a chance. He said, go to Congress. Well, he is here. He said, go to the United Nations. He went there. Let's work together now to make sure that this is not derailed and that we rid our country and world of this danger of Saddam Hussein.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. LANTOS. Of course, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman HYDE. We have 1 minute and 12 seconds left. Mr. Davis, who has the right to close, has 4 minutes 53 seconds. So you have a big advantage.
But anyway, very quickly, there are three major reasons why this is not a good idea. First of all, the amendment offered by Mr. Davis relies upon action or inaction of the U.N. Security Council. What it does is relevant to the trigger mechanism to permit action by the United States against Iraq.
There is no sovereign right of defense independent of U.N. Security Council consideration. In other words, this amendment elevates the U.N. to the trigger mechanism, rather than having us masters of our own destiny.
In addition, the amendment offered by Mr. Davis narrowly defines the United States' ability to defend our national security interests only—I repeat—only if it is tied to threats from both weapons of mass destruction and prohibited ballistic missiles. There is a whole range of other deadly things out there, but this is confined only to mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
Lastly, on notification. Under the bill we are supporting here, the President must notify Congress either prior to taking action or within 48 hours after using force against Iraq.
Mr. Davis' amendment requires notice prior to moving against Iraq. I submit to you, militarily that may be impossible. You put shackles on the President by requiring that.
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So that, plus this is a rewrite of the bill in question and upsets so much, it is not going to work. Again, it is excessively deferential to the U.N.
With that, Mr. Lantos yields back the balance of his time?
Mr. LANTOS. I do.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. I yield 1 minute to Representative Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Mr. Davis. I think there are three good reasons to support the Davis amendment. The first is it focuses on eliminating the weapons of mass destruction. I think that is our best legal and moral and political battleground with Saddam Hussein, is to focus on his weapons of mass destruction.
Secondly, it refocuses our work in the United Nations. It requires the President to exhaust his diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. But it reserves the President's right to act unilaterally if the United Nations does not work itself. I think that is appropriate.
Thirdly, it raises the standard for the justification of going to war from continuing to grave danger. The President used a wonderful phrase, the ''grave and gathering danger'' he sees in Iraq. I agree with that. It is a Churchillian phrase. Let us use that standard in our own language. We are not trying to unravel any agreement, we are trying to knit a stronger document. I support the Davis amendment.
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Chairman HYDE. Would Mr. Davis yield for a moment?
Mr. Houghton has to leave and catch a plane. He asked leave to make a short statement, if you don't mind.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I have to leave. This is a very important personal matter. If I were here for the final vote I want to record that I would vote against it. I want to leave that.
Chairman HYDE. That shall be a part of the record. Thank you.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on my side?
Chairman HYDE. Three minutes and fifty-seven seconds.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Mr. Chairman, I will go ahead and close. Let me respond first to the substance of the comments you have made—and Mr. Lantos, whom I have high respect for. I read the memo that I believe you were referring to, and I think it is incorrect in suggesting that this amendment deprives the United States of sovereign defense.
I don't support that view. This doesn't. If you read on page 2, it is perfectly clear that this simply says that the President is required to proceed in good faith with the U.N., as he has already started and as the underlying resolution says. If that does not succeed, once he attempts to do that, if it doesn't succeed, he can choose to exercise force if he finds there is a grave threat. So I think that point is not an issue here.
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You are correct, Mr. Chairman, that there should be a change which could easily be accomplished through a manager's amendment to refer to the national interests of the country being weapons of mass destruction or missiles. I agree with that.
With respect to the notice. Yes, it is correct, before the President decides to use force, he has to pick up the telephone and call the Speaker of the House and Speaker Pro Tempore of the Senate. I think that is a reasonable requirement.
Mr. Lantos said the train is on its way, and we are reopening the debate if we adopt the amendment. That is exactly what I intend to do.
Let me say to my colleagues, this is ultimately not between us and the President, this is about our constituents. This is about them. This is about us making our best effort, not just the best compromise that was developed yesterday, to make sure we do our utmost to protect this country and clearly define the roles that our constituents are going to play within our country, potentially including the ultimate sacrifice. I think we would be remiss if we didn't have a fresh and open debate here. I don't think we should be afraid of slowing this down a little bit. We are not debating the size of a tax cut, the size of a spending proposal, whether a regulation goes too far or not far enough. We are debating among the most fundamental obligations we face.
Let me just close by recapping the differences between what we are going to vote on in final passage and what this amendment says. If we do not adopt this amendment, we are conceding that Iraq represents a continuing threat, and that if the U.N. doesn't work out, the President is free to use force against Iraq.
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That is not what the President said in his speech to the Security Council and the rest of the U.N. He said that Iraq posed a grave and gathering danger. We have taken that word, ''grave danger,'' likely to cause serious harm to this country, and put it in here to say if the U.N. process is not successful in disarming Saddam Hussein. The President then has to make a determination that he shares with the Congress and with the public that Iraq represents a grave danger to our country.
I think that is a bar that should be raised. Does that tie the President's hands? Of course, it ties it a little bit, but that is our job to provide balance and wisdom. It is wisdom and force that should ultimately characterize the actions of the President and Congress.
The second difference we are about to vote on is whether we want to authorize the President to use force to enforce Security Council resolutions that have nothing to do with weapons of mass destruction. The way the resolution is unfortunately written, we are giving the President the ability to use force to deal with the way Saddam Hussein has oppressed his own people and engaged in inappropriate activity with prisoners of war. Of course we are against that and condemn it, but do we really want to use military force on that basis? We don't.
Let's have a very clean, clear, simple declaration to our constituents, to the American people, to people abroad, as to exactly what our intentions are. That is what our constituents are entitled to if we are to wield the mighty military force of this country in disarming Saddam Hussein.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Chairman HYDE. All time for debate has expired. The question occurs on the amendment offered by Mr. Davis.
All those in favor, say aye.
Those opposed, nay.
In my opinion, the noes have it.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. I ask for a rollcall vote.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman is entitled to one. The clerk will call the roll.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Leach.
[No response.]
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Burton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
[No response.]
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Ms. RUSH Mr. Ballenger.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
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Mr. Houghton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh. Votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes no.
Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes yes.
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Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes no.
Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes no.
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Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
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Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes yes.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes yes.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes yes.
Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
Mr. Sherman.
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Mr. SHERMAN. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes yes.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler votes yes.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes no.
Mr. Delahunt.
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Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes yes.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes yes.
Ms. Lee.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes yes.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes yes.
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Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes yes.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes no.
Mrs. Napolitano.
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes yes.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes yes.
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Ms. Watson.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, how am I recorded?
Ms. RUSH. You are not recorded.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce.
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Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Chairman HYDE. The clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 16 ayes and 26 noes.
Chairman HYDE. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman HYDE. The clerk will report the Brown amendment.
[The information referred to follows:]
82194e.AAB
82194e.AAC
Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Brown: Page 8, after line 20, insert the following.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, further reading of the amendment is dispensed with. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment. Ten minutes, I am sorry.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two or three weeks ago, three retired four-star generals testified in front of a Senate Committee, stating that attacking Iraq without a U.N. resolution supporting military action could limit aid from allies, ''super-charge,'' is the words one used, recruiting for al-Qaeda, and undermine our war on terrorism.
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While the President appears fully invested in taking our country to war, many Americans are not convinced. There are too many questions the Administration has yet to answer, especially ones evolving around the war on terrorism.
If we strike Iraq on our own, if we unilaterally go into Iraq, what happens with the campaign against terrorism? Most of our allies in the war on terror oppose U.S. unilateral action against Iraq. Will our coalition against terrorism fracture? And once we win a unilateral war, will we be responsible for unilaterally rebuilding Iraq?
I am not convinced the Administration possesses the political commitment to repair the damage done after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. This may entail sustained military engagement and appropriations of hundreds of millions of dollars a year for years and years to come. Should a new enemy arise while we are paying for the campaign against al-Qaeda and the reconstruction of Iraq, will our resources be so overextended that we will be ill-equipped to address this new threat? These difficult questions need answers.
We should not in this Congress authorize the use of force unless the Administration can detail what it plans to do and how we will deal with the consequences of these actions.
I recommend we set stronger conditions before any military action is permitted. My amendment sets a condition to section 3 that the President present to Congress a report that addresses the domestic and foreign policy implications of military action against Iraq. Such a report should include, but not be limited to, a cost estimate for military action and reconstruction—along with a proposal for how the U.S. will pay for these costs, an analysis of the impact of the U.S. domestic economy, including oil prices, and of the use of resources for military action and reconstruction of Iraq; a comprehensive plan for U.S. financial and political commitment to long-term cultural, economic, and political stabilization in a free Iraq; a comprehensive statement that details the extent of the international support for military operations in Iraq; and what effect a military action against Iraq will mean for the broader war on terrorism; and a comprehensive analysis of the effect on the stability of Iraq and the region of any regime change in Iraq that may occur as a result of U.S. military action.
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These are not unreasonable demands. They don't tie the hands in any way of the Administration. They don't change the thrust of the resolution.
These are questions, however, that must be answered before Congress can responsibly allow the President to send our sons and daughters to war. We are going down a long and very dangerous road. We all know that. We have all acknowledged that. When the lives of so many innocent people are at risk, when the broader war against terrorism and our country's economic stability are at risk, we should at least be making this important decision with our ayes wide open.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in opposition to this amendment. I might point out that although it is well-intended, it seems to have a consistent pattern. Item by item: Item 1, cost; item 2, economic or economy of the United States; item 3, financial commitment; item 4, involvement of others; item 5, back to economic.
There is a pattern here which is that in fact what this seeks to do is take us from principles of should we or should we not change a totalitarian regime to what does it cost.
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This is not an Appropriations Committee. Our responsibility is to consider the merit of the President's action to restore freedom in that area of the world. I believe that this amendment seeks to send—maybe unintentionally—but seeks to send the wrong message.
I would like to take this short period of time to further express my support for the resolution as it is. I do so specifically because the President has gone out of his way, upon request of the Congress and the United Nations, to articulate why today we are talking about Iraq and not Cuba, about Iraq and not Iran, about Iraq and not Libya, about Iraq and not Syria, about Iraq and not North Korea.
The President has gone out of his way to put Saddam Hussein's corrupt and dangerous regime in a unique category even among those nations that we have serious concerns about their regimes.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I again reiterate my opposition to watering down this resolution and my support of the resolution.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ISSA. I gladly yield to the gentleman.
Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman. One of the objections to this amendment is that it compromises intelligence, sensitive intelligence information, and may lead to some very unpleasant disclosures and deny us information from other countries.
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For example, paragraph 4 of the amendment says that the government, our government, shall provide to Congress a comprehensive statement that details the nature and extent of the international support for military action against Iraq.
Now, what if one of the frontline states which has a delicate political situation at home is helping us with intelligence, with information, with personnel, with all sorts of things? We have to disclose that prior to using United States Armed Forces? That is crazy. I mean, that has never been done before. If we were required to do it in this resolution, we would be denying access to a lot of sensitive information.
So I submit that this asks a lot of questions, and those are questions that could be asked at hearings, maybe in executive session, maybe not. But I think this is a poison pill, and I respectfully request a no vote on this. Thank you.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my friend from Florida, Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, as I stated yesterday, I am going to vote for the resolution. I am voting for the resolution because I entirely agree with the President's policy and objective of regime change in Iraq and the disarmament of Iraq. But I would hope that the goal of this Committee and the goal of the Congress when we are done debating and passing a resolution, the goal should be to put the President, our military forces, and our diplomatic officials in the strongest position possible to effectuate the goals and the objectives of the President.
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It seems to me that the Brown amendment does a great deal of good in putting us in that posture.
I don't think anyone on this Committee or in fact anyone in this Congress at this point in time knows with any reasonable degree of certainty what the estimates are of what this thing is going to cost. Who is going to pay for it? Where is it coming from?
The President has not spoken to this Congress about what may be an allocation of hundreds of billions of dollars. Are we freezing tax cuts? Are we running greater deficits? Are we raising taxes? Are we cutting domestic programs?
I think the American people have a right to know so that there is an informed judgment. Ultimately, I believe if there is a nuclear danger in Iraq, we should pay for it—we have to—to disarm it. But we have to make certain that the information is available, and this resolution, on its face, that I am going to vote for, admittedly, will not provide the American people with that information.
Now, there may be not a specific effort to mislead, but people might think it might be the same thing as the last time. Well, it is very different from the last time. The last time in the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid the bulk of the freight. Not this time, because we apparently don't have the international support to do so. So it seems to me the American people, so we could unify behind the President and his policy, ought to know all the facts.
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We ought to know what the ramifications in Turkey are going to be. The IMF has given more than $30 billion to Turkey, of which half comes from American taxpayers. Their economy may be crippled from a war in Iraq. Are we going to be required to spend billions more in Turkey? I would say we probably should. Where is the money coming from? What is the plan, Mr. President?
How about Jordan? We just passed a free trade agreement with Jordan because they are our ally in the Middle East peace process. What is going to be the impact on Jordan? Where is that discussion? Nowhere here. What is going to be the plan? More money to Jordan? I probably think yes. We have to help them more. Where is it coming from?
I think the American people deserve that information to be provided before we make a decision, so it is an informed one. I will vote for it, but I would hope we would know the information.
Thank you.
Mr. ISSA. I would be pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you for yielding. There are no two colleagues I have more respect for than the two gentlemen who have spoken, Mr. Brown and Mr. Wexler. But allow me to raise some questions.
I am all in favor of getting precise budget estimates, but as a professional economist, allow me to raise some different kinds of questions.
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The World Trade Center tragedy, according to the best estimates, cost $100 billion. Now, if Iraq is going to participate in potential military action against our forces, our territory, failure to pass this resolution might cost trillions of dollars. This is not a single act that is perfectly predictable in all of its ramifications.
Although I don't think my analogy is very good, it seems to me that this is somewhat analogous to a prenuptial agreement that you are demanding. You are demanding to know what the visiting rights will be after your children, not yet born, will have the pleasure of a divorce between the two parents.
I mean, when far greater military undertakings were contemplated, like World War II, the list of questions that my good friend Mr. Brown has raised would have totally paralyzed the allied forces because everything, looking ahead 6 years, would have had to have been predicted.
This assumes a degree of omniscience which clearly no one on this planet, not the most competent White House, Republican or Democratic, Defense Department, or State Department, could possibly have. Those are all legitimate questions. And the Brookings Institute and other think-tanks will be dealing with them, both before and after.
But to expect precision along items when vast, vast areas are not even mentioned—let us assume we would have prepared better for the terrorist act that occurred at New York City in September 2001. It would have been very reasonable to ask would it be worth it to spend $50 billion to prevent terrorism because the cost will be $100 billion?
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I think Mr. Brown has made a very useful contribution to our dialogue. Mr. Wexler has made a very useful contribution to our dialogue. But to anticipate with a straight face as of today that all of these questions can be answered, when questions of far greater order have not even been asked, with all due respect, I believe is unrealistic.
For instance, I can't tell you, nobody can tell you, how much of the collapse of the stock market was related to September 11. Well, the stock market lost $4.5 trillion; $4,500 billion. I hope nobody will ask me how much of that loss was attributable to the terrorist act. Some of it clearly was. Was it $1 trillion, $2 trillion, half a trillion? There is no person on Earth who can answer that.
So we have to put these costs in the context of other costs. The best estimates we have gotten from our Budget Office is that initially the cost of a military undertaking, which we all hope to avoid, is about $9 billion a month.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. ISSA. I yield the gentleman another 2 minutes.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. I merely would like to reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that the two gentlemen who spoke so passionately on this subject are raising extremely valuable questions. I think these will be the issues we will be debating now and in the future. But to expect precise answers at this moment in history to these questions, and no answers to what will happen if we choose to do nothing—what is the cost of doing nothing, what is the cost of allowing Iraq to continue developing weapons of mass destruction—I think is somewhat of an incomplete approach to the dilemma.
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I am merely suggesting that if we are asking for a degree of excruciating precision should military action be undertaken, we need to ask with equal fervor and with equal excruciating detail the cost of inaction. I dare anyone who can give me precise answers to that set of questions, which are equally legitimate.
Chairman HYDE. Excuse me, I think everybody is out of time. So the question is on the Brown amendment——
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I am not even close to being out of time. I took about 4 minutes. I yielded 2 to Mr. Wexler. I have 4 or 5 more speakers that will take a minute or 2 each, according to my math.
Chairman HYDE. Let me check again with the clerk.
Chairman HYDE. She says Mr. Issa has 3 minutes left and all of Mr. Brown's speakers spoke overtime.
Mr. BROWN. No, that is not fair, Mr. Chairman. I only had one speaker. I yielded Mr. Wexler 2 minutes. If he spoke 12, it is only 2 off my time.
Chairman HYDE. You yielded to Mr. Lantos.
Mr. BROWN. I didn't yield to Mr. Lantos. I listened carefully. I don't think Mr. Lantos was on my side on this. I am not positive, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. LANTOS. I am on your side, but not on this issue.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. BROWN. I do object, Mr. Chairman. I have more than 3 minutes.
Chairman HYDE. All right, 4 minutes.
Mr. BROWN. Five, six? I yield one minute to Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
I think Mr. Brown raises some very good questions that we need to grapple with. There may not be completely precise information available, but now is the time to ask these questions.
I would say regarding paragraph 4, the so-called intelligence threat, I don't think that is true. The Brown language talks about the President transmitting to Congress a report in classified or unclassified form as necessary. If it is difficult information, it can be classified in its report to us.
Paragraph 3 is the key here. It talks about a comprehensive plan for the United States' financial and political commitment to long-term stabilization of a free Iraq. We need to talk about that now. We need to know whether we need to embark on a modern day Marshall Plan. If it is for one country alone, for Iraq. This is the time to discuss those issues. This is the time to make the commitment, not later. These questions are beneficial and should be answered and should be addressed now.
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I yield back.
Mr. BROWN. I yield 15 seconds to Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I think that it is important that we talk about the financial commitment. We made a commitment to Afghanistan. That commitment has not even been—it is almost off the table. We need to take a look at our financial commitments.
The other thing that I just want to say at this time is that I think we are doing a disservice when we connect Saddam Hussein and going into Iraq and taking these weapons as a direct correlation to al-Qaeda and the fact that Americans are going to be safer from terrorism. I think that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is leading people down the wrong path to say that to do Saddam Hussein in will end the al-Qaeda cells. It is wrong and we should stop putting that on American people. We will be in as much jeopardy after that as we are at this time.
Mr. BROWN. I yield 1 minute to Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you. Two very brief points. I hesitate ever to disagree with the Committee leadership, but first of all, it seems to me the analogy with World War II, which keeps coming up time and time again, this would not pertain. We were attacked on World War II. Congress acted in a flash. We were able to move forward. Nobody expects when we are under direct attack that we would go through this.
This speaks to the situation where we have a 30-year history of bungling and missteps in the Middle East, and we have a chance to think a little bit about what we do before we go into it now. I think these are the sorts of things precisely that Congress should be thinking about.
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I appreciate the notion that we don't want to target our point, but I think Mr. Brown's resolution language that says that it should be submitted in classified or unclassified language speaks to that and allows us to be able to make sure the information is here. We can delegate it to our Intelligence Committee and to our legislative leadership, but we should at least ask that the information be available. I think it is reasonable.
Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, who has the right to close on this?
Chairman HYDE. The offerer of the amendment.
Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I have but one more speaker. I would like to make Mr. Brown aware of it.
Mr. BROWN. How much time do we have, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HYDE. I have 1 minute and 8 seconds for you, Mr. Brown. Mr. Issa, I don't have the time.
Mr. ISSA. I have 3, but I intend on 1 minute being resumed. I could do that now.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman has the right to close. Why don't you proceed?
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Mr. ISSA. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to be aware, for those who are calling for this amendment or other amendments to be passed, I voted against an amendment earlier today on the Chairman's request, because he made it very clear that if we start unraveling the agreement that the President and the Congress has reached, it is going to unravel this whole thing.
So as much as my colleagues who are expressing this strong moral sentiment about what we really support, what this is all about, but we are demanding this and this, that is really opposing this whole proposition that we confront Saddam Hussein. This undermines the entire effort.
Yes, I am sure an audit of Iraq and all of their weapons and a doctoral dissertation or two would be very helpful. If we could get ready and get out studying these economic things for semester after semester, and come back and have a full look at it, I am sure that would help us.
But if we vote for one of these proposals today, what we are saying is we are not going to confront Saddam Hussein and this whole agreement we have is going to unravel. Do you know what? We will be more at risk. This will make sure that every gangster, every terrorist in the world, understands what America is all about. We are so democratic that we can't get ourselves to act in our own defense when we have a monster like Saddam Hussein who is out there arming himself with nuclear weapons and chemical/biological weapons. Instead we start talking about audits. Give me a break.
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Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Brown is recognized to close.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you. We are doing much more, Mr. Chairman, than talking about audits. We are also doing much more than the straw-man argument erected by leaders of both parties in this Committee that the cost of doing nothing versus the cost that they don't want to talk about of doing something—none of us is saying we should do nothing.
There are two big issues here. One is that the American people talk to every one of us every day about—in our district. There is no evidence the Administration has considered or talked to the American people about what this means in the war on terrorism. What is this going to mean with our relationship with Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, or our relationship with France and Germany if we take unilateral action?
The other is the issue Mr. Hoeffel brought up, and that is what are we going to do after we win? There is no discussion from the President, there is no talking to the American people from the Administration or, frankly, from congressional leaders about what kind of commitment we have to the country of Iraq, to the people of Iraq, after we win this war. How long will our commitment be? How much money will our commitment be to Iraq? It is just not a question of cost, it is a question of commitment to make sure that the next government after Saddam Hussein's government is any better; that democracy really can flourish there. It could be a model for democracy in the Middle East.
There is no indication of the kind of commitment our government will have, how much it will cost, how willing we are to pay, how willing we are to keep that political commitment, that commitment to the people of Iraq and the Middle East, and peace and democracy in that region. That is why this amendment is important, so that we know this information as much as possible before this resolution gets through this Congress.
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Chairman HYDE. The question occurs on the amendment. I know the gentleman will want a rollcall, so let's cut right to the rollcall. The clerk will call the roll.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton.
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[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
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Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes no.
Mr. King.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Houghton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes no.
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Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes no.
Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes no.
Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes no.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes no.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes no.
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Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes no.
Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes no.
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Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes no.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes yes.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes yes.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes yes.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler votes yes.
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Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Mr. Engel.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes yes.
Mr. Meeks.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Lee.
[No response.]
Mr. Crowley.
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Mr. CROWLEY. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley votes yes.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes yes.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes yes.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes no.
Mrs. Napolitano.
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Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes yes.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes no.
Ms. Watson.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Gilman?
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman is not recorded.
Mr. GILMAN. I vote no.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton is not recorded.
Mr. BURTON. I vote no.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo is not recorded.
Mr. TANCREDO. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes no.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chris Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes no.
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Chairman HYDE. Mr. Kerns.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns voted no.
Chairman HYDE. Have all voted who wish?
The clerk will report.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. How am I recorded?
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel did not vote.
Mr. ENGEL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes no.
Chairman HYDE. The clerk will report.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 12 ayes and 28 noes.
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Chairman HYDE. The amendment is not agreed to.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I would offer an amendment.
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman is recognized for that purpose and the clerk will read the amendment.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. BLUMENAUER. I would ask that we suspend the reading.
Chairman HYDE. Certainly. Let her designate it first. Just read the heading.
Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Blumenauer, page 7, strike line 24——
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Chairman HYDE. Without objection, further reading of the amendment is dispensed with. Mr. Blumenauer is recognized for 10 whole minutes.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I assure you I will not use that time. I get the sense of the spirit in which you would like to move it forward.
Chairman HYDE. Bless you, Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. It is not my intention to seek a recorded vote. I have been largely quiet throughout this hearing. I have two observations that I would wish to offer up. One speaks to the process which we have been going through, Mr. Chairman, which I think is very, very important. I feel more optimistic about what is going on and don't feel the need for us to be channeled very narrowly.
We have watched for the last 2 months as we have seen a sort of flailing about from the Administration, a number of inconsistent statements. But I think we are moving it to a better path. Maybe part of the reason that things are moving along a little better was some of this early inconsistency and flailing about. But we are back to the United Nations. We are working with potential partners.
I appreciate what the Committee leadership and the House leadership did working with the Administration to improve upon the resolution that was originally brought forward. I think we are moving in the right direction.
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I do think, however, that the Committee has an important role to play in allowing this process to move forward. I always am stunned and impressed by the presentation from my Democratic colleagues. The Committee leadership has honed in and advanced this discussion. I have been touched, frankly, by some of the remarks from some of the people on the other side of the aisle, from Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Leach, Mr. Smith, Mr. Tancredo. There have been important things that have been put on the record.
But this is a more important process for us to play rather than trying to seek some sort of elusive consensus here on Capitol Hill. I think that is building the base of understanding and support with the American public, and we are not there yet by a long shot.
And I think our working through some of these concepts here and, God forbid, even accepting a few amendments that intellectually make sense, that strengthen this proposal, that means that the Committee is doing its job.
The leadership, in its wisdom—it has done it; we have seen that this congressional system can strip it away, change it in the Rules Committee if they want, but I think we have an obligation to put forth the best possible product. We continue to do so.
The substance of the amendment that I would offer up is to seek support for the concept of coercive, muscular sanctions that were articulated before this Committee by Jessica Mathews and General Charles Boyd, working with the people from the Carnegie Endowment for 6 months. It would help us avoid the trap of a simple attack or relying on the failed inspections scheme of the past. Adopting this approach would entail little or no risk. If it were rejected, it would, in fact, put us in a stronger position to build potential partnerships, to continue to put pressure on the United Nations.
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Mr. Speaker—excuse me, Mr. Chairman—I think the last 2 months of turmoil have left us all better off. The Administration is not where it was. It is more focused and it is moving, I think, in the right direction. Congress is working with the Administration to produce a resolution which, although not ideal by any stretch of the imagination, is better. I think we can make it better still.
Now, there are clear indications that the resolution is not going to be changed here in this Committee. But this Committee is not going to be the last word in this hearing. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, with your leadership, and Mr. Lantos', with the goodwill of the Members of this Committee, that we can find ways to carry forward these important principles and concepts.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield? I want to congratulate the gentleman on an excellent amendment. It is a good idea. It is so good that it is what the government is already doing—attempting to fashion, an armed multinational force by the United Nations to effectuate the inspection regime.
I would appreciate it if the gentleman would withdraw this amendment on my assurances that it will be very favorably mentioned in the report as an idea that is already being implemented, but is very helpful.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I will withdraw the amendment.
I want to say that I hope that our Committee can continue to find ways to hone in on the important discussions that we have had here to give voice to the concerns of the Committee Members and move this forward over the course of the next few months. We are coming back before the next Congress is installed, and I hope there may be ways to build upon it.
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I appreciate your kind comments and I withdraw my amendment.
Chairman HYDE. There is an old adage in practicing law: When you have won the case, you get out of the courtroom before the judge changes his mind. But Mr. Lantos wants to talk.
Mr. LANTOS. I just want to commend my friend for an excellent statement.
Chairman HYDE. I associate myself, as always, with Mr. Lantos' remarks. The amendment is withdrawn.
Are there other amendments? Mr. Delahunt has an amendment. The clerk will report the amendment.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ms. RUSH. Amendment offered by Mr. Delahunt. At the end the following——
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Mr. DELAHUNT. I move that the amendment be considered as read.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. The gentleman is recognized for 10 minutes in support of his amendment, and the opposition time will be assigned to Mr. Royce.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Before I begin speaking to the amendment, Mr. Chairman, let me just echo the sentiments that were expressed by Mr. Blumenauer in terms of your leadership, and by extension, that goes also to the Ranking Member in terms of insisting that regular order take place with this issue that is of such concern to so many in this country. You are to be commended for encouraging debate, and I think it has been time productively well spent.
And I think it is true, too, that we all agree on one objective, and that is unanimous, that we permanently end the threat to peace and regional stability posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; and the question is, how can we best accomplish this.
I would put forth that this amendment would promote another option for bringing about Iraqi compliance and, again, as has been expressed over and over by individual Members avoid war. I would also add that it does not threaten the integrity of the underlying resolution. It is an add-on, if you will, a sense of Congress. But it recommends the immediate adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution establishing an ad hoc tribunal to investigate and prosecute Saddam Hussein and his accomplices for acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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Up to this point, the amendment merely reaffirms legislation calling for an international tribunal to prosecute Saddam and his accomplices. I would note that in 1997 the House voted overwhelmingly, the vote was 396 to 2, to urge establishment of such an Iraqi tribunal, and the following year the Senate followed suit by a unanimous vote of 97 to nothing. And these votes were reaffirmed by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
And it also should be noted that the State Department has set aside $8 million expressly for this purpose. But this amendment would add a trigger in an attempt to motivate compliance.
It allows the tribunal to issue indictments only if the Security Council finds that Saddam Hussein has failed to comply with inspections. The first time he violates a Security Council resolution, he is subject to immediate indictment and arrest or whatever appropriate international action is available—a one-strike-and-you're-out concept, I would suggest.
In short, the amendment is—and I think I heard Mr. Lantos use this term before—a sword of Damocles which uses the threat of prosecution to induce compliance. He can avoid indictment only as long as he allows inspectors to have unfettered, unimpeded access to his facilities and to dismantle whatever weapons of mass destruction they find.
Furthermore, a duly constituted tribunal for Iraq, firmly grounded in the rule of law according to existing principles of international law, isolates Saddam and engenders international respect and approval, and is reflective of a core democratic value that we constantly espouse as Americans, the rule of law. It would also make clear that the problem is not a country, it is not a people, but a man, an individual, a villain. We wouldn't be at war with Arabs. We would not be at war with Islam or the people of Iraq. It wouldn't be about a political system. It wouldn't be a clash of civilizations. It would be about, as I said, an evil individual. And like the Hague proceedings that are now ongoing against Milosevic, an Iraq tribunal could help pave the way for regime change without forcing us into war.
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Let me submit that $8 million is a bargain when compared to the countless billions that a full-scale war would require, and coupled with an ironclad, airtight inspection regime, could hopefully, and possibly, save thousands of lives.
I urge support for the amendment and reserve the balance of my time.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have great respect for Mr. Delahunt's concerns for human rights. He has long been a strong voice against genocide and war crimes, and I think the goal of this amendment here is laudable. And indeed many in Congress have expressed their support for an international war crimes tribunal.
However, I think the gentleman in his remarks has acknowledged that Congress has passed, has enacted a Senate Concurrent Resolution on this, a House Concurrent Resolution, that resulted in Public Law 102–138 which has aims similar to this amendment. The funds have been provided by the State Department for the direct purpose of directing world attention to the crimes of the Iraqi regime and moving toward Saddam's indictment. That has been done.
However, requiring the Administration to make this matter its highest priority by pressing for an immediate adoption of a United Nations Security Council resolution on this would not help the Administration's current priority.
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And what is that priority? It is, to quote from this resolution—to quote from the Hastert-Gephardt resolution,
''to obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions.''
That is the current priority. That is what we are passing out today. And so I have to oppose the gentleman's resolution.
Chairman HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROYCE. I will yield.
Chairman HYDE. I want to congratulate Mr. Delahunt on a very good amendment. I think we need to maintain a sense of priorities, however, and I really would hope that he would withdraw the amendment so we could continue to work together very seriously to help make this war crimes tribunal, as it applies to Saddam Hussein, a reality.
I will pledge, Mr. Delahunt, to seriously work with you and ask my staff to work with you to make this a reality, but I just don't want to—for reasons that have been often expressed—want to unravel this resolution.
But this is a good idea, and if the gentleman would withdraw it, it would save us a lot of time, be a great act of courtesy. I guarantee you, we will seriously work to make your concept a reality.
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Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. I would like to add my congratulations to my friend, Mr. Delahunt, for bringing forward a singularly valuable idea. And I would pledge to him that I would be delighted to cosponsor an appropriate resolution, without delay, and work for its adoption.
Mr. LEACH. Would the gentleman yield? I think what the Chairman is saying makes some sense, but the gentleman's point is very profound. I would only add one thing to it because we are dealing with report language as well that might be considered in the report.
And one other aspect is that just as Saddam can avoid perhaps a war criminal trial if the inspections go forward, I think we as a Congress might want to say that he can avoid war itself if he seeks asylum. I think it is important for us register that as a body, because if we register it, among other things, it makes it clear that our concern is with the regime and Saddam and not with the Iraqi people, and that he can save his country from terrifyingly great difficulty.
And add on to it an aspect of something that Mr. Lantos raised earlier, ''he'' would have to be Saddam and his regime, not simply the individual. I think if this was reflected in report language, it would be very helpful; and I would just simply ask the Chairman to seriously consider that.
Chairman HYDE. I certainly will. I think that is a helpful addition.
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The gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, I think that the observation by Mr. Leach really warrants very serious reflection and consideration, because while oftentimes I think we are unaware of the fact, but it is the truth—many are watching us here today. And given the statement by the Chairman, by the Ranking Member, and Mr. Leach's observation, as well as a reality that I wasn't going to win anyhow, I will be happy to withdraw that amendment.
Chairman HYDE. The amendment is withdrawn and the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo, is recognized.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote for this resolution this evening, but I am going to do so with more reluctance than I think I have ever felt when facing any issue since I have been here.
There are many reasons for it; almost all of them have been thoroughly discussed by Members on both sides. But there is something else that is happening that I have to at least try to bring to the attention of my colleagues. I was going to try to do it as the result of an amendment that I would propose; the amendment has been determined to be nongermane, and I will not therefore propose it.
But what we are about to pass is a resolution that will place us on the path to an even bigger war than the one we have heretofore engaged. God only knows the ramifications of this action, but we can assume some to be imminent. One we can reasonably—or one that we can reasonably expect the possibility of terrorist activity around the world will increase dramatically, perhaps exponentially.
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Some of the highest-ranking members of the military have been quoted as saying that if we do not get the U.N. to support this activity, then it will supercharge—I think the quote was ''supercharge al-Qaeda recruiting.'' The danger to Americans will grow proportionately.
As a result, there are steps that any prudent nation would take to protect its citizens. Any prudent nation would do everything possible to make its borders secure to the point that breaching them would be made at least difficult.
We, however, may be preparing for many things to fight this war, but securing our borders is not one of them. It is true that in order to accomplish this task, we may need to at least temporarily employ the military to augment the Border Patrol. We are not going to do it, however, because as Tom Ridge has told us, there are political and cultural obstacles to doing that.
Mr. Chairman, to continue this war and to escalate the war without creating the most secure borders possible is, at least, a terrible flaw in our defense strategy; and to do so because there are political and cultural obstacles is morally reprehensible. I cannot offer the amendment, but I can beg the Administration to show as much courage in confronting the open border's lobby as it has been willing to confront—as it has in being willing to confront the vicious dictator in Iraq. Both of them are deadly dangerous to the United States of America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Chairman HYDE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too was prepared to offer an amendment and then withdraw that amendment after having explained it. Instead, I will not offer that amendment, but will amend my statement for the record on an amendment that I believe would have perfected even more so the resolution that we have before us.
Mr. Chairman, I will withdraw that and not offer that amendment at this time.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think I am going to follow suit.
I had intended offering an amendment basically talking about clarifying the language. Because I think, as I had indicated previously, where the resolution talks about the U.N. and Iraq being in violation of several U.N. resolutions, yet we are saying the U.N. is not relevant and we should unilaterally go ahead to enforce U.N. resolutions—I wanted to add some language that would straighten that out. But I think that conversation has been had, so therefore I withdraw my amendment.
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Chairman HYDE. I certainly thank the gentleman.
I tell the clerk that I have an amendment at the desk which without objection shall be considered as read.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Chairman HYDE. This amendment contains a series of technical conforming and clarifying amendments which are recommended by legislative counsel. It is nonsubstantive in nature, and the proposed amendment has been agreed to by all of the parties that negotiated the underlying text of H.J. Res. 114, that is, the White House and the bipartisan House leadership.
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I am also pleased to have the support of Mr. Lantos on this amendment. This is a very important joint resolution, and we want to make sure we do it right.
So the question occurs on the amendment. All those in favor, say aye.
Opposed, nay.
The ayes have it. The amendment is agreed to.
The question occurs on the motion to report the resolution H.J. Res. 114 favorably. All in favor, say aye.
Opposed, nay.
The ayes have it.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, may we have a recorded vote.
Chairman HYDE. Very well. The clerk will call the roll. This is final passage.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Aye.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gilman votes yes.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Leach votes no.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Bereuter votes yes.
Mr. Smith.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Gallegly.
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[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes yes.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ballenger votes yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Rohrabacher votes yes.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Royce votes yes.
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Mr. King.
Mr. KING. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. King votes yes.
Mr. Chabot.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Houghton.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cooksey.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo.
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Mr. TANCREDO. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Tancredo votes yes.
Mr. Paul.
Mr. PAUL. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Paul votes no.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes yes.
Mr. Pitts.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Issa votes yes.
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Mr. Cantor.
Mr. CANTOR. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Cantor votes yes.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Flake votes yes.
Mr. Kerns.
Mr. KERNS. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Kerns votes yes.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Davis votes yes.
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Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Green votes yes.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Lantos votes yes.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Berman votes yes.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Ackerman votes yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
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[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Payne votes no.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. No is offered.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Menendez votes no.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Brown votes no.
Ms. McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. I don't think there is any doubt.
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A very strong no.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. McKinney votes no.
Mr. Hilliard.
Mr. HILLIARD. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hilliard votes no.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Sherman votes yes.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Wexler votes yes.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS OF FLORIDA. Yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Davis votes yes.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Engel votes yes.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Delahunt votes no.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Meeks votes no.
Ms. Lee.
[No response.]
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Crowley.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hoeffel votes yes.
Mr. Blumenauer.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. No.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Blumenauer votes no.
Ms. Berkley.
Ms. BERKLEY. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Ms. Berkley votes yes.
Mrs. Napolitano.
Mrs. NAPOLITANO. No.
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Ms. RUSH. Mrs. Napolitano votes no.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Schiff votes a yes.
Ms. Watson.
[No response.]
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde.
Chairman HYDE. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Hyde votes yes.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton is not recorded.
Mr. BURTON. I will vote yes.
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Ms. RUSH. Mr. Burton votes yes.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chabot votes yes.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chris Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Smith votes yes.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. McHugh.
Mr. MCHUGH. No—yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. McHugh votes yes.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Pitts.
Mr. PITTS. Yes.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Pitts votes yes.
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Chairman HYDE. Have all voted who wish?
The clerk will report.
Ms. RUSH. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 31 ayes and 11 noes.
Chairman HYDE. And the motion is agreed to. My congratulations to the Committee.
The gentlelady from Georgia.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that Members have the opportunity to file dissenting and additional views, as well as extraneous material to be included in the report accompanying the resolution.
Chairman HYDE. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlelady will, of course, be granted that privilege. However, in order for the House to have the benefit of the Committee's report and the gentlelady's views prior to the Floor consideration, I would ask the gentlelady's cooperation in submitting her views for inclusion in the report by the close of business tomorrow. This will enable the report to be assembled, filed and printed in a timely manner.
Would the gentlelady agree with that?
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Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, is there any way possible it could be by the close of business on Monday?
Chairman HYDE. Monday morning?
Ms. MCKINNEY. Okay, Monday morning.
What time, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HYDE. Ten.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Ten Monday morning; it is agreed.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Brown.
Mr. BROWN. Just an inquiry. Ms. Lee and Ms. Watson, who expressed their votes, those were not actually—expressed their desired position, those were not actually counted in the votes; is that correct?
Chairman HYDE. No. The votes cannot be counted unless you are here.
Mr. BROWN. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that something as important as this, the media at least should understand that there were at least two more votes in this Committee of people—or three more, counting Mr. Houghton—at least three more when they look at the vote down here——
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Chairman HYDE. Well, Mr. Faleomavaega would have voted the other way.
Mr. BROWN [continuing]. With those other ones announced.
That is fine.
Chairman HYDE. Without objection, the preamble and resolving clauses shall each be reported as single amendments incorporating any—well, there were no amendments adopted by the Committee—except my amendment; that is right.
Without objection, the Chairman is authorized to move to go to conference pursuant to House Rule XXII. Without objection, staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Material Submitted for the Record
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we are considering a resolution that, without a doubt, weighs heavy on everyone's heart.
To cast a vote on whether or not to authorize our President to use military force against an enemy is one the most important responsibilities we have as Members of Congress.
This is not an easy decision. It is a very complex state of affairs that will have foreign policy and national security implications for many years—beyond the service of many Members here today.
So, we must not simply think about today, but we must also think about what the future holds.
With this said, we must look at the big picture.
It is a complex picture, but there are several things we do know for sure.
1) For many years, Saddam Hussein has brutally oppressed his people. He has committed mass murder, mass starvation, and gross violations of human rights.
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2) Saddam Hussein has developed chemical and biological weapons with the capability to attack neighboring countries, like Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—our allies.
3) Saddam has already used chemical and biological weapons against his own people and his enemies—we know he is not afraid to use them.
4) Saddam has vowed to use these weapons against anyone or any country that stands in his way, including the U.S., our allies, and even the Shia population in his own country.
5) Saddam is seeking nuclear weapons and is not far from obtaining this capability, and
6) For over a decade, Saddam has routinely disregarded the will of the U.N. and obstructed its weapons inspectors.
I could go on, but the point is clear. Saddam is a tyrant and a madman that poses a direct threat to the United States, our allies, and his own people. His reign of terror must end.
That is why we are here today. And that is why we must pass this resolution today without amendment.
The timing is right. We must give the President the full authority to use force when he deems it is the right time. If now is not the time, then when? When Saddam's launches an attack against the U.S. or one of our allies, or when he provides terrorists with the capability to attack us?
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Some have said that the use of military force against Saddam will destabilize the region. But, Saddam has already destabilized the region. Other nations and the vast majority of Arab people in the region do not like Saddam, they fear him. They know what he can do and that he his willing to do it.
They know that Saddam is bent on an imperialist vision that will establish him in history as a ''great'' man—a conqueror, prophet, and king.
Further, some will say that this authorization will lead to unilateral action. It is my hope that we do not have to act unilaterally, and I believe that when the time is right, we will not have to.
However, let's not forget that we have been acting multilaterally for over the past decade. Yet, today, Saddam has regained his dominance and his power, and the international community has been silent—the U.N. has not enforced its own resolutions. At what point does the security of the American people trump the desire for multilateral action.
Mr. Chairman, this resolution before us in the right action for Congress at the right time. The resolution has been carefully crafted with broad bipartisan support.
We should give the President the authority to use the military to protect our national security. We should not wait until we are attacked. We should not wait to see if the President uses military force before we authorize him to do so.
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We should be unified behind the strong leadership of the President. We should show Saddam that his days are numbered.
I urge my colleagues to vote for this resolution without amendments and give the President the authority he needs to protect our national security and end the terror of Saddam's regime.
I yield back the balance of my time.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Today, as a Committee, a Congress, and a country, we face one of the most difficult dilemmas in the human experience. We are considering the question of war. The debate has returned us to the fundamental questions all leaders need to face: when is it time to fight? Is it ever time to fight? And if we fight, how should we do it? Mr. Chairman, these questions need to be addressed, and I appreciate the opportunity we have today to debate this issue.
There are strategic reasons to remove Saddam Hussein. Many critics of the President's position have asked if we have any ''proof'' of an ''imminent threat'' from Saddam. Mr. Chairman, we have over 20 years of proof. Since the early 1980's, Saddam has aggressively attempted to develop weapons of mass destruction, from nerve gas, to weaponized anthrax, to nuclear weapons. He has used some of these weapons many times already, against Iranian civilians and soldiers in his decade-long bloodbath with Iran, and against Kurdish villages in 1988. Many Kurds believe he attacked them out of retribution, but also as an experiment for a much larger attack against his true enemy, the United States.
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The United Nations weapons inspectors did their best to track down Saddam's ''special weapons,'' as he calls them, but they were unable to locate the most dangerous material. According to Gary Milhollin, the Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, inspectors could not find an estimated four tons of VX nerve gas; 600 tons of ingredients for VX; 3,000 tons of other chemical agents; and at least 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas. Inspectors were also not able to dismantle Saddam's nuclear weapons, which were being aggressively developed throughout the seven years of inspections.
When these weapons are combined with Saddam's support for terrorism, the result will be disaster, for us and for our allies. We know that Saddam is at least harboring members of al-Qaeda in his country, if not supporting them altogether. He may not have participated in the planning for the September 11 attacks, but he has gone out of his way to prop up anti-American terrorist regimes that will, if left alone, strike us again.
Saddam may not be planning to use weapons of mass destruction against us next week, but there is no doubt that he intends to attack us and our allies until we either acquiesce to his aggression, or defeat him.
Mr. Chairman, there are also moral reasons for removing Saddam. Since he seized power in 1979 Saddam has built up one of the most brutal, merciless dictatorships in the history of the world. He has embarked on a massive ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurds, who he thought were not loyal enough to him in his war against Iran. Aside from his chemical weapons attacks in 1988, Saddam has also attacked Kurds by forcing them into concentration camps and literally starving them to death. He has recently engaged in cultural genocide against the Kurds. Saddam's secret police have been forcing Iraqi Kurds to ''correct'' their identity documents by claiming that their birth records are false, and that they have always been Arab. If they refuse, they are forced off their property to make room for Arab families. Saddam is trying to erase the Kurdish past, to ''cleanse'' Iraq of this ethnic group he hates so bitterly. A prominent Iraqi expert, Peter Galbraith, describes Saddam's persecution of the Kurds as ''a policy of genocide, a crime of intent, destroying a group whole or in part.'' Mr. Chairman, this regime is an Orwellian nightmare. It cannot and will not be tolerated in a civilized world.
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The rap sheet on Saddam is long and detailed. If the international community applied a three strikes law to the world's tyrants, Saddam Hussein would have struck out long ago. The simple fact is, there are plenty of reasons to go to war with Iraq, and very few reasons not to. The going will be tough, particularly after Saddam is gone. But the difficulty of the situation does not necessitate a head-in-the-sand approach to this problem. Saddam will continue to defy any sort of inspections program as long as he is in power. We have a vested interest in seeing the Iraqi people live prosperous lives in a fair and just democracy. It is time to make that happen. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution today and I yield back the balance of my time.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFF FLAKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA
Saddam Hussein poses an immediate and grave threat to the security of American interests and to American lives. We know that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction in the form of biological and chemical weapons, and he has made clear his intent to develop nuclear weapons, if he has not already done so.
Saddam Hussein has used such weapons on people in his own country and on his neighbors. He has also defied the United Nations by expelling inspectors who had identified and destroyed some of his arsenal. Saddam's actions have demonstrated a determination to carry on with his program of weapons of mass destruction—and to what end? To carry out attacks against the United States and his other enemies.
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Our government has a responsibility and duty to take the essential steps to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam against the United States.
As previously mentioned, United Nations and the United States have tried diplomatically to eliminate this threat through weapons inspections. Rather than complying and cooperating with weapons inspectors, Saddam lied to them, limited their access, and eventually, forced them out of Iraq. Diplomacy has failed in the past, and President Bush has clearly outlined the failures in his recent address to the United Nations. The President has urged the United Nations to make another determined, decisive, and effective resolution. If the United Nations, however, cannot eliminate the threat to Americans, then the United States must.
This resolution will authorize President Bush to use military force, if he deems it necessary, to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam. As dangerous as it is to commit military troops to forcefully remove the threat posed by Saddam, the risk of doing nothing is far greater.
Many countries recognize that it is not merely in the United States' interest to remove the threat posed by Saddam, but it is in the world's interest. Saddam is a brutal dictator who has no respect for democracy or human rights. He creates instability and volatility to a region of the world that needs stability and certainty.
Other countries have expressed their concerns with United States action in Iraq. As much as I respect the advice and opinions of those countries, the job of the United States government is to act in the interests of the people of the United States.
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It is very much in the interest of the American people to eliminate the threat posed to them by Saddam Hussein. This resolution is absolutely necessary to ensure the future of American democracy, American ideals, and the American way.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
The decision to declare war is one of the most important responsibilities our Constitution has charged to us as Members of Congress. As a parent, there is no responsibility that weighs on me more heavily than the decision to send our sons and daughters off to war.
The 650,000 citizens in the Bronx and Queens whom I represent have only just recently started rebuilding their lives from last September eleventh's attack on the World Trade Center, an attack which shattered families, devastated New York's economy, and caused profound changes in the communal and social lives of New York City's many communities.
I have thought long and hard about what this vote means not only for me as a Member of Congress and as a representative of my constituency, but also for what it means to me as a New Yorker.
September 11th changed New York as a City and the United States as a nation. The events of last September altered our nation's priorities. Protecting Social Security and Medicare and extending prescription drug coverage to our nation's senior citizens and bringing jobs to local neighborhoods are still critical issues. But the need to protect our country, our families, and our children is growing in importance. If our country is not secure, then our future cannot be secure.
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I have sought out as much information as possible on the threats and risks posed by launching a military confrontation with Iraq, as well as the risks of not acting. I have heard intelligence briefings on Saddam's military capabilities, including his chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. I have heard Administration officials and experts on Iraq make both sides of the argument in testimony to Congress. I have thought about the hundreds of thousands of young men and women who will be sent to fight this war, as well as their parents.
And I have thought of their families. During the Vietnam war, my own neighborhood of Woodside, Queens, and its surrounding ZIP code lost the highest number of people per capita in the nation. Countless constituents have called me and written to me to express their concerns about the impact that a war against Iraq will have on the nation, on the economy, and on their communities.
This is not the best time to consider military action against Iraq. We have worked carefully over the past year to compile a broad-based international coalition to help us in the fight against global terrorism, which is and should remain our top national priority. Yet by calling for the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad, we are weakening the international support and good will that we have worked so hard to achieve. I am concerned that military action against Iraq will distract us from the more important work that we and our allies are doing to root out and eliminate the threat posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist entities.
That said, the Administration has decided that now is the time to address the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and it has fallen to this Congress to decide whether to authorize the use of force against Iraq or not. After carefully considering the evidence, the allegations, and the arguments, I have concluded that Saddam is, in fact, continuing to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and that he maintains the ability to deploy and use small numbers of chemical and biological weapons. As a result, Saddam does, in fact, pose a severe threat not only to the Middle East, to our allies in Israel, to the United States, but to the entire world.
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I do believe that Saddam is close to acquiring nuclear weapons or to once again using his chemical or biological weapons. I do believe that it is only a matter of time before these weapons, unless eliminated, are used against the United States or our allies.
Many of my colleagues, and many in the international community, have called for weapons inspections to be given one last try. But years of UN weapons inspections and international monitoring have demonstrated that inspections cannot work as long as the Iraqi regime is determined to thwart them. And it is clear that Saddam remains as determined to block such inspections as he was before. We cannot wait any longer to address the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; the longer we wait, the more likely the United States and the international community will face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons.
It is also clear that Saddam has no plans to end his support for international terrorism. While the Administration has not, in my mind, proven that Saddam has provided support to al-Qaeda, Saddam is integrally linked to Palestinian terror attacks against innocent civilians in Israel, paying a sliding scale of benefits to the families of Palestinians who are killed or injured in such attacks. The families of Palestinians who blow themselves up in suicide bombings receive $25,000 in cash; the families of those killed in other attacks against Israelis receive $10,000; Palestinians seriously injured in attacks on Israelis receive $1,000; and Palestinians lightly injured in attacks on Israelis receive $500. Saddam has volunteered to be the workers compensation plan for Palestinian terrorists, whose homicidal intentions are no different from the nineteen murders who flew airplanes filled with innocent people into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. Only when Iraq ceases to be a threat and takes its place as a responsible member of the international community will Israel's future be secure.
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Because of Saddam's continued support for terrorism and the serious threat posed by Saddam's continued efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, I want to express my support for this resolution.
I commend President Bush, as well as the Democratic Leadership of the Senate and House and the Chairman and Ranking Member of this Committee, for their work to address some of my concerns regarding war against Iraq and a preemptive strike. In fact, many of the concerns expressed by my fellow Democrats have been included in the resolution under consideration.
I have been extremely concerned about the risks of unilateral military action. None of our European allies save Great Britain have indicated support for pre-emptive military action, and none of the allied countries neighboring Iraq—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar—have indicated support for military action unless it is authorized by the UN Security Council. If we want to bring an end to religious extremism and terrorism in the Middle East, we must work with, not against, leaders in the region and in the international community.
The resolution being considered today, however, now includes a provision supporting the president's efforts to seek Iraqi compliance through the UN Security Council. I wish that the resolution made multilateral support and UN Security Council authorization absolute preconditions for the use of force, but I am pleased that it calls on the president to work through the Security Council to secure Iraq's compliance with existing UN resolutions. It is imperative that the United States act in concert with allies and partners with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. U.S. national interests are not served by unilateral military action.
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While I am convinced, as I have said, that weapons inspections will not contribute to Saddam's disarmament, I am concerned that the rest of the world will judge us harshly because we appear too willing to use force to address the Iraqi threat. It is therefore extremely important that the resolution prevents the president from using force against Iraq unless and until he declares to Congress and to the American people that he has exhausted all possible diplomatic efforts and attests that further diplomatic means will not protect U.S. national security or lead to enforcement of UN resolutions. This means that the use of force will truly be a last resort.
The resolution also requires the president to submit to Congress a determination, prior to using force, that taking military action against Iraq is consistent with continuing efforts by the United States and other nations to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations. This ensures that the war against terrorism, which must remain our top national priority, will not be pushed aside by efforts in Iraq.
Finally, the resolution requires the president to report every 60 days on military operations and on the planning for post-conflict activities such as reconstruction and peacekeeping. This provision is critical, as I do not believe that the Administration has yet developed a strategy for rebuilding Iraq.
The post-Saddam effort to transform Iraq into a democratic, multi-ethnic, free society will require a tremendous financial contribution from the United States amounting to tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars. Such an endeavor will require international support and participation. Without a long, committed international reconstruction effort, Iraq is destined to fall back into chaos and fall victim to a new despotic regime, and the sacrifices of U.S. military personnel will have been in vain.
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As with Afghanistan, if we start the process of political change in Iraq by overthrowing the current regime, we must remain there to see the process through. We will have to rebuild Iraq—reconstruct critical infrastructure, bolster the educational system, invest in the oil industry, and deploy U.S. and coalition soldiers there for years while basic law and order is established—in order to bring long-term peace and stability to this region. We will need to do this not just because the Iraqi people need such assistance after decades of living under Saddam's despotic regime; we will need to do this because ensuring that Iraq is democratic, prosperous, and stable furthers U.S. national interests.
Mr. Chairman, despite my misgivings, and though I wish the Administration had decided to wait to pursue its anti-Saddam crusade until we and our allies had made more substantial inroads against terrorist groups around the world, I will support this resolution.
Noting, however, that this resolution does not provide the Administration with a blank check, I encourage you and our colleagues on the Committee to ensure that the Administration proceeds wisely:
That it consults with allies and partners on the steps ahead;
That it seeks authorization from the United Nations Security Council; and
That it works with allies, partners, the United Nations, and other multinational institutions to develop a concrete, thorough plan for Iraq's reconstruction, and that it commits the necessary resources—both financial and human—to finish what it seeks to start.
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Thank you.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Since becoming a member of Congress, I've been struck by how often there is a gap between the needs and the concerns of the public and the ability of Congress to hear and give voice to those needs and those concerns.
Nowhere is that gap between the people and their government wider than what is happening over a possible war with Iraq.
I've talked to dozens of members of Congress from different states, from both parties, with highly varied districts, and without exception, we all hear the same reactions.
The people are asking very hard questions about the wisdom of our past actions.
There is, to be charitable, little enthusiasm for unilateral American action.
People suspect that part of the instability in the Middle East is the result of our past missteps and miscalculations, giving aid and comfort to Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, not thinking it through fully at the front end, and then walking away when our attention is diverted or we become fatigued.
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People want to know, ''What's the rush? What's changed?'' and they are skeptical about what appears to be political timing.
The responses from constituents who bother to formally contact our offices are overwhelmingly opposed to war with Iraq, often by ratios of 100:1, even 500:1
I think the American public has it right.
We're not finished with the war on terrorism; and this is highly distinct from our ongoing conflict with Iraq.
We're not finished yet in Afghanistan. President Karzai is barely the mayor of Kabul, and owes his life to his American Delta Force bodyguards. It is not clear that we or the countries who supported us in Afghanistan are ready to do what it takes to finish that job.
Indeed, we're not even finished yet in the Balkans.
It has been an open secret on Capitol Hill that, contrary to some of the administration's formal pronouncements, there's been much greater caution and skepticism from the leaders in the Pentagon. Former generals have openly declared their concerns before Congress.
Some of the voices that have expressed concern, and in some instances opposition, have been those of distinguished political leaders in both parties, names familiar to the public: Armey, Gore, Lugar, Hagel, Kennedy.
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There are many more concerned leaders whose voices are not as well known. These are the voices of our colleagues who don't need focus groups or more famous politicians to validate their own deeply held convictions.
My bottom line is that no president deserves a blank check when it comes to waging war. And despite some additional verbiage in this resolution, the authorization delegates the decision to the President's unfettered judgment.
Some claim the strong words of the President got the United Nations engaged. This is probably true; that is his job and his prerogative. Now Congress needs to do its job.
I am not opposed to the use of force. I have supported it in the past, and could do so in the future. However, this is a situation where neither has the case been made, nor the foundation established.
It is terrorism that is the greatest threat to America. Inappropriate action against Iraq could actually expose Americans to greater risk.
I urge the leadership and the diverse membership of this committee to be part of a diplomatic solution internationally, and to engage honestly with the American public here at home.
Congress and the American people have a right to know the costs and consequences before following this path.
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We should reject the notion of a pre-emptive, unilateral, go-it-alone attack on anyone we deem a threat.
A unilateral preemptive strike, without direct provocation, is both wrong and dangerous, especially when undertaken by the most powerful nation the world has ever seen.
If we can't live up to our principles, how can we expect other countries to obey the rule of law?
To respect the integrity of the reasonable strategic diplomatic and moral position of the United States is not to imply any sympathy for Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime.
There is a bipartisan consensus in Congress:
to work with our allies—not tell them what to do beforehand;
to use the United Nations to lay the foundation for a muscular aggressive regime of effective inspections and enforcement of United Nations resolutions.
Such an approach will be the most likely to produce the results the administration claims it wants. It is entirely consistent with where the American public is, based on the most accurate measurement: what we actually hear from people when we take the time to listen to them.
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The situation in the Middle East is the most volatile it has been in our lifetime. Iraq is but one troubling part of the equation.
Yet this can be the beginning of a new chapter of diplomacy and thoughtful action on the part of the United States.
I hope the Congress will be equal to this challenge as we work our way through this process.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership and commitment to your committee doing its job.