JOHN R. BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANT V. NATIVIDAD CASTILLO, ET AL. No. 85-250 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Brief for the Appellant PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Appellant John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, was named as a defendant in each of four consolidated cases before the district court. The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-81-260, in addition to Natividad Castillo, were Fernando Sosa; Petra Sosa, for herself and as next friend of Roberto Sosa, Saul Sosa, Roy Sosa, Eduardo Sosa, Catalina Castillo, Natividad Castillo, and Graciela Castillo, Minors; Blanca Martinez, for herself and as next friend of Venessa Marie Martinez, Minor; Sara Cortez, for herself and as next friend of Perla Ruby Cortez and Sylvia Cortez, Minors; Elias Ruiz; and Belinda Ruiz, for herself and as next friend of Marciela Ruiz and Cindy Ruiz, Minors. The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Human Resources; and Jose Campos, in his capacity as the Program Director for the Brownsville Food Stamp Office of the Department of Human Resources. The plaintiff in Civil Action No. B-82-7 was Sylvia Nieto, for herself and as next friend of Rolando Nieto, Minor. The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Human Resources; and Cruz Cervantes, in his capacity as the Supervisor for the Raymondville Food Stamp Office of the Department of Human Resources. The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-82-21 were Robert Cody, Jerry Cody, for themselves and as next friend of Gary Cody and Robin Cody. The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Human Resources; and Rene Zamora, in his capacity as the Program Director of the Harlingen Food Stamp Office of the Department of Human Resources. The plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-83-106 were Cecilia Villafranca, for herself and as next friend of Alberto Trevino and Eric Villafranca, Minors; and Gregorio Alvarado; Maria Alvarado, for herself and as next friend of Claudio Alvarado, Gregorio Alvarado, Jr., and Mauricio Alvarado, Minors. The non-federal defendants were Marlin Johnston, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Human Resources; and Jose Campos, in his capacity as the Program Director for the Brownsville Food Stamp Office of the Department of Human Resources. TABLE OF CONTENTS Parties to the proceeding Opinions below Jurisdiction Questions presented Statutory provision involved Statement A. The Food Stamp Program B. The Present Controversy Summary of argument Argument: The Food Stamp Act's definition of "household" does not violate equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause A. The household definition distinguishes between groups composed of family members and groups composed of unrelated persons based on rational considerations that advance legitimate governmental interests B. The household definition is not subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny C. The judgment of Congress on questions of social welfare policy is entitled to deference from the courts Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The memorandum and order of the district court (J.S. App. 1a-8a) is unreported. The supplemental memorandum of the district court (J.S. App. 9a-13a) is also unreported. JURISDICTION The order of the district court was entered on April 23, 1985. A notice of appeal was filed on May 17, 1985 (J.S. App. 14a). On July 8, 1985, Justice White extended the time within which to docket this appeal to and including August 15, 1985. The jurisdictional statement was filed on August 14, 1985 and probable jurisdiction was noted on November 18, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1252. STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), provides in pertinent part: "Household" means (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases foods and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption; except that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member. * * * QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), which provides that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall generally constitute a single "household" for food stamp entitlement purposes, violates equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by discriminating against family members or impermissibly burdening family decisions to live together. STATEMENT The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2011 et seq., establishes a public welfare program, funded by the Department of Agriculture and administered by state agencies, that supplements the food purchasing power of low-income households. This appeal involves four consolidated suits, brought by potential benefit recipients (appellees) against the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary) and state welfare administrators. The suits challenge the constitutionality of Section 3(i) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), which defines the term "household" for food stamp entitlement purposes. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that Section 2012(i) is unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement against appellees. The court reasoned that the statute violates equal protection principles of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by creating a classification that discriminates against family members and that impermissibly burdens family decisions to live together. /1/ A. The Food Stamp Program 1. The Food Stamp program is a federally-funded, state-administered effort that "permit(s) low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power." 7 U.S.C. 2011. Households with aggregate income and financial resources below specified national standards may participate. 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2014. They receive coupons (food stamps) that can be used for food purchases at retail stores. 7 U.S.C. 2013. Although the federal government is responsible for establishing eligibility standards, see 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2014, the states have primary responsibility for distributing food stamps. See 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 2020; Atkins v. Parker, No. 83-1660 (June 4, 1985), slip op. 2. State agencies are authorized to allot food stamps to each eligible household in an amount based on the cost of a "thrifty food plan," reduced by 30% of the household's income. 7 U.S.C. 2017. The "thrifty food plan" is a diet, determined by the Secretary, that adequately feeds an average family of four. 7 U.S.C. 2012(o). /2/ The cost of the diet is used to calculate standard household allotments, based on household size, that "tak(e) into account economies of scale." Ibid.; see 7 C.F.R. 273.10(e)(4). The cost of the thrifty food plan diet is updated annually, through general notices in the Federal Register, to reflect changes in the price of food. See 7 U.S.C. 2012(o); 7 C.F.R. 273.10(e)(4). Under the present plan, a one-member household is entitled to a maximum food stamp allotment of $80 per month, a four-member household is entitled to a maximum of $268 per month, and an eight-member household is entitled to a maximum of $483 per month. See 50 Fed. Reg. 36641, 36642 (1985). As these figures demonstrate, the per capita allotment diminishes with increasing household size to reflect the economies of group food purchase and preparation. Specifically, the maximum benefit for a family of eight is 90.1% of the benefits paid to two families of four, and 75.5% of the benefits paid to eight single-member households. /3/ 2. The Food Stamp program is the Nation's second most costly "needs-based" public assistance program. See S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). Program outlays were over $11 billion in 1983, providing assistance to approximately 21 million participants. See Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government FY 1985, at 8-43; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, at 122-123 (105th ed.). The program has grown dramatically since its inception, registering a 20-fold increase in outlays and a three-fold increase in participation since 1970. /4/ The burgeoning growth of the Food Stamp program has produced public concern over administrative inefficiency and recipient abuse. Congress has held numerous hearings to investigate methods for Food Stamp reform. /5/ As a result of these hearings, Congress has enacted various amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 to prevent waste and fraud. Congress has given specific attention to the term "household." The definition of that term is central to the Food Stamp program because food stamps are distributed on the basis of household units. The concept of a "household" unit has proven to be a frequent source of recipient abuse. The 1964 Act defined "household" broadly to include virtually any single individual who prepared his own meals using separate cooking facilities and virtually any group of individuals that functioned as a single economic unit and shared common cooking facilities. See 7 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 2012(e). However, as the Food Stamp program grew, Congress gave the term a more exacting definition. In 1971, Congress amended the definition of "household" to exclude most groups of related persons from participation in the Food Stamp program. See 7 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1972) 2012(e). This Court declared the amendment unconstitutional, concluding that it represented purposeful discrimination against "hippie communes." United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In 1977, Congress again amended the definition, requiring groups of individuals, whether related or unrelated, who customarily purchased and prepared meals together, to be treated as a single household. 7 U.S.C. (Supp. I 1977) 2012(i). The definition provided that individuals, whether living alone or with others, could qualify as distinct households provided that each customarily purchased food and prepared meals separately. Ibid. The amendment was intended to end the focus on cooking facilities and "economic units" in classifying households, concentrating instead on "what the household members do with their food money." H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1977). /6/ In 1981 and 1982, following extensive hearings revealing continuing widespread abuse in the Food Stamp program, /7/ Congress once more addressed the term "household." These changes, enacted together with other program reforms as part of the 1981 and 1982 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Tit. I, 95 Stat. 358 et seq., and Pub. L. No. 97-253, Tit. I, Subtit. E, 96 Stat. 772 et seq., precipitated the present litigation. The 1981 modifications addressed the application of the term "household" to parents and children. Congress provided that parents and children who live together shall comprise a single household for food stamp purposes, regardless of whether they purchase food and prepare meals separately or together, unless one of the parents is at least 60 years old. 7 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981) 2012(i). The Senate Report indicates that this change was "designed to prevent household members from artificially claiming to be separate households although they live and prepare meals together." S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1981). Families frequently attempted to increase their food stamp benefits -- and to qualify for benefits for which they would otherwise be ineligible -- by characterizing their members as separate households sharing a single roof. The amendment was intended to eliminate that abuse. /8/ The Senate Committee on the Budget estimated that the change, together with a change eliminating boarders from participation in the Food Stamp program, would save $195 million in fiscal years 1982-1984. See S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1981). The 1982 modifications further refined the definition of "household" to prevent food stamp abuses. The principal change, presently codified with the 1981 modifications at 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), prohibits siblings, as well as parents and children, from increasing their food stamp benefits by splintering into separate "households." It was enacted with an accompanying provision excepting disabled and elderly family members from the restriction. See ibid.; 7 U.S.C. 2012(r). These changes were adopted, together with other measures, upon the advice of federal and state food stamp administrators. See H.R. Rep. 97-687, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 25 (1982). The House Committee on Agriculture estimated that they would result in savings of $120 million in fiscal years 1983-1985. Id. at 105. /9/ Thus, Congress's 1981 and 1982 modifications to the definition of "household" reflect carefully structured refinements to reduce widespread fraud in the Food Stamp program and to preserve the public's limited welfare resources for the truly needy. The present definition, treating most parents and children, or siblings, who live together as single households for food stamp entitlement purposes, reflects a considered response to the persistent problem of family groups mischaracterizing their food purchasing and preparation habits to obtain undeserved food stamp benefits. B. The Present Controversy In September 1981, Natividad Castillo, his wife Petra Sosa, and their children, moved into the home of Sosa's daughter, Teresa Barrera (J.A. 26). The Castillo family applied for food stamp benefits from the Brownsville, Texas Food Stamp Office. Although the Barrera family already received food stamps, the Castillos claimed that they were entitled to their own food stamp allotment because they did not purchase food in common with the Barreras and the two families were not "living as one economic unit" (id. at 26-27). The Food Stamp Office denied the request, concluding that the Castillo and Barrera families constituted a single household within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. 2012(i). The Office indicated, however, that Barrera's food stamp allotment would be supplemented to reflect an increase in the household's size (J.A. 27). On October 7, 1981, the Castillo family sued state food stamp officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, claiming, inter alia, that the denial of their food stamp request violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Civ. No. B-81-260). Two days later, the district court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the state agencies from denying the Castillos food stamp benefits on grounds other than their family income (J.A. 54-55). The Castillos sought class certification and amended their complaint to join the Secretary of Agriculture as a defendant and to add additional plaintiffs who, like the Castillos, were denied separate household status under the Food Stamp program (J.A. 16-25). /10/ The district court did not act on the motion for class certification; however, it did consolidate the Castillos' suit with three similar actions brought by family groups alleging that the revised definition of the term "household" unconstitutionally denied them separate household status and attendant food stamp benefits. /11/ The court then considered the constitutional challenge to 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) on cross motions for summary judgment. It ruled that Section 2012(i) violates equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by discriminating against family members and impermissibly burdening family decisions to live together (J.S. App. 1a-8a). The district court recognized that a social welfare program may generally distinguish among benefit recipients provided that the distinctions do not "'invidiously discriminate * * * on the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal'" (J.S. App. 3a-4a, quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975) ). And the court acknowledged that Section 2012(i), which was enacted to limit claims of separate household status among family members, "conforms to the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in Salfi" (J.S. App. 6a). However, the court stated that "a great amount of inconsistency surrounds Salfi," noting that "such a limitation does not apply to gender-based classifications" (J.S. App. 6a, citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-212 (1977) ). The district court therefore queried "whether family-based classifications are subject to such limitations" (J.S. App. 6a). It turned for guidance to Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and Cleveland Board of Education v. La-Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Relying on those cases, the court concluded that "(i)t is clear that family life-styles have been afforded a stricter standard of review than the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in Salfi" (J.S. App. 7a). The District court attached "even greater importance" (J.S. App. 7a) to this Court's decision in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). That decision held that a provision of the Food Stamp Act, denying benefits to cohabiting, unrelated individuals, was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause because it represented a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group" (413 U.S. at 534). The district court reasoned that "if the Supreme Court is willing to protect unpopular political groups it should even be more willing to protect the traditional family value of living together" (J.S. App. 8a). The district court thus found that "(f)amily type classifications are clearly deserving of the judicial scrutiny that was applied in (Goldfarb)" (J.S. App. 7a). It concluded, without further analysis, that the provisions of Section 2012(i), limiting family member eligibility for separate household status, "are discriminatory and in violation of (appellees') Fifth Amendment rights" (J.S. App. 8a). The court permanently enjoined enforcement of these provisions against appellees (ibid.). /12/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court has declared unconstitutional a carefully considered legislative initiative to correct widespread abuse in the Food Stamp program. The court's decision, by its own admission (J.S. App. 3a), departs from established equal protection jurisprudence. It employs heightened scrutiny to a social welfare classification that does not involve a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, justifying its result through the unsupportable theory that Congress, in amending the definition of "household" contained in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), has discriminated against families and impermissibly burdened their fundamental rights. Congress amended Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household" in response to documented reports of widespread food stamp abuses. Congressional hearings, conducted in 1981 and 1982, revealed that individuals who lived together as a single household frequently claimed separate household status in order to receive increased food stamp benefits. Faced with the practical difficulties of verifying separate household status, Congress chose to refine the definition of "household" to prevent that abuse. Congress specified that when certain closely related persons -- namely, parents and children, or siblings -- live together, they shall be treated as a single household regardless of their claimed meal purchase and preparation habits. To ameliorate any hardship, Congress excepted elderly or disabled parents and siblings from this provision. Section 2012(i)'s refined definition of "household" applies a rational distinction between groups composed of related and unrelated persons to combat a pervasive method of food stamp recipient abuse. Congress reasonably concluded that closely related family members, who are more likely to purchase and prepare meals together than unrelated persons, should be treated as a single household for purposes of the Food Stamp program. This classification advances legitimate government goals -- preserving public confidence in the integrity of the Food Stamp program and assuring optimal allocation of the government's limited public assistance resources -- in a wholly reasonable manner. The definition, carefully tailored to meet specific congressional concerns, plainly withstands the "rational basis" scrutiny applicable to equal protection challenges to social welfare statutes. The district court plainly erred in concluding that Section 2012(i) is subject to "heightened" equal protection scrutiny. Family members, the group subject to special treatment under the statute, do not constitute a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. Furthermore, the statute does not burden any fundamental rights. Section 2012(i)'s distinction between households composed of related and unrelated persons does not have a direct and substantial impact on family living arrangements. Nor does it create an irrebutable evidentiary presumption; instead, it employs legitimate eligibility criteria to achieve a legislative policy objective. The district court's ultimate conclusion -- that the Food Stamp program must apply the same limitations to family groups that it applies to groups of unrelated individuals -- has the practical effect of ascribing constitutional status to a family member's decision to purchase food and prepare meals apart from the parents, children, or siblings with whom he lives. This result cannot be reconciled with equal protection principles or common sense; moreover, it represents a striking lack of deference to "the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a co-equal and representative branch of our Government." Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, No. 84-571 (June 28, 1985), slip op. 13. ARGUMENT THE FOOD STAMP ACT'S DEFINITION OF "HOUSEHOLD" DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE A. The Household Definition Distinguishes Between Groups Composed Of Family Members And Groups Composed Of Unrelated Persons Based On Rational Considerations That Advance Legitimate Governmental Interests Equal protection principles generally require that legislation accord like treatment to similarly situated individuals. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985), slip op. 6; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). But the precept of equal protection does not preclude legislators from making rational distinctions. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. "A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of (government) to remedy every ill." Ibid.; accord Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). In assessing an equal protection challenge, therefore, the judiciary must give broad deference to the lines drawn by Congress, "the appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). "If the goals sought are legitimate, and the classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals, then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971). These principles, applied to the present case, confirm that Congress acted well within its powers in amending the Food Stamp Act's definition of the term "household." The Food Stamp Act is a central component of federal social welfare legislation, providing essential benefits to needy households. However, as noted above, the massive growth in the government's food stamp expenditures has prompted serious public concern over the size, effectiveness, and integrity of the Food Stamp program. Congress, in response, conducted extensive oversight hearings in 1981 and 1982, which revealed a pressing need to combat widespread fraud and recipient abuse. /13/ In particular, Congress received reports from federal, state, and local administrators that the Food Stamp Act's definition of "household," set forth in 7 U.S.C. 2012(i), was frequently subject to manipulation. /14/ Congress found that it had to deal with the practice of individuals who live together but feign separate household status in order to obtain food stamp benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. See H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1981); S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1981). In remedying this abuse, Congress was confronted with a serious practical problem. There is simply no effective means of efficiently determining whether persons who live together are falsely claiming separate household status. /15/ The inherent difficulty of verifying whether persons are preparing meals separately or together renders individual determinations virtually impossible. Any meaningful enforcement scheme would require huge commitments of investigative resources to determine meal purchasing and preparation habits. Indeed, an effective program might require rather elaborate, and perhaps intrusive, surveillance and verification of personal activities. Congress therefore elected to redefine the term "household" to prevent the documented abuses. No doubt, Congress could have prohibited all groups of individuals who live together from claiming separate household status for food stamp purposes. Indeed, it considered that solution. See S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, 87-88 (1982). But Congress, instead, carefully redefined "household" to prevent only certain closely related family members from claiming separate household status. Congress recognized that those persons were most likely to purchase food and prepare meals together and were most conveniently situated to submit fraudulent claims of separate household eligibility. Congress based its revision on an unremarkable observation of human experience -- family members, bound together by close and lasting emotional ties, are more liekly to share resources and responsibilities than unrelated persons whose communality is based on financial convenience. That observation seems particularly true with respect to parents who live with their children and siblings who live with each other. Thus, Congress determined that when those family members live together and receive food stamps, they should be precluded from claiming separate household status because their claims are more likely to be fraudulent. At the same time, Congress was not insensitive to the needs of food stamp recipients. It specifically emphasized that the new provisions would "not disqualify legitimately poor households that apply as a single family unit, but merely require that family units apply as single households, rather than splintering for the purpose of receiving higher benefits." S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32. Moreover, the provisions were carefully tailored to exclude the disabled and the elderly from the single household requirement, assuring that "those parents most likely to reside with their children, but who truly maintain separate household status, will not be barred from participation as separate households." Ibid.; see H.R. Rep. 97-687, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1982). As the extensive legislative history demonstrates, the refined definition of "household" was the product of a conscientious and thorough deliberative process. /16/ Section 2012(i)'s amended definition of "household" is plainly consistent with the equal protection principles of the Due Process Clause. In particular, Section 2012(i) withstands scrutiny under the "rational basis" test applicable to public welfare programs set forth in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). In Salfi, this Court rejected a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (1970 ed. & Supp. III) 416(c)(5) and (e)(2), that imposed a nine-month duration-of-relationship requirement for survivor's benefits. 422 U.S. at 767-785. The Court stated (id. at 777): The question is whether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule. We conclude that the duration-of-relationship test meets this constitutional standard. This "rational basis" test, repeatedly applied by this Court in rejecting equal protection attacks on social welfare legislation, controls the present case. /17/ As in Salfi, Congress was faced with the "administrative difficulties of individual eligibility determinations" (422 U.S. at 784). It responded by establishing a definition of "household" that would "eliminate the potential for this type of program abuse." H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 119; see also S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32. The modifications to the previous "household" definition represent Congress's legitimate policy determination that the Food Stamp program, and its millions of beneficiaries, would benefit from a definition of "household" that prevents fraudulent claims. See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 784. Congress rationally concluded "that generalized rules were appropriate to its purposes and concerns" and "that the difficulties of individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the precise effectuation of congressional concern which they might be expected to produce" (id. at 785). Section 2012(i) imposes a reasonable prophylactic rule that prevents the unjust distribution of food stamp benefits resulting from recipient abuse. As in the case of any statutory provision, there might be room to debate the legislature's ultimate policy perspective. But that does not determine the constitutional question. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487. The different treatment that Section 2012(i) accords to family members advances a legitimate government interest -- preserving the integrity of benefit distributions -- in a way that cannot be described as "patently arbitrary or irrational." Fritz, 449 U.S. at 177 (1980); see also, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. at 84; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). /18/ Thus, Section 2012(i) plainly withstands "rational basis" scrutiny. Steinberg v. United States Department of Agriculture, 613 F. Supp. 432, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, No. 85-6028 (2d Cir. July 16, 1985) (unpublished order), petition for cert. pending, No. 85-5624 (filed Oct. 10, 1985); Levesque v. Block, No. C82-437-L (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 1983), slip op. 7-8, aff'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983). B. The Household Definition Is Not Subject To Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny The district court acknowledged (J.S. App. 6a) that Section 2012(i) "conforms to the 'rational basis' test as it is pronounced in Salfi." The court should have ended its inquiry upon that conclusion. Instead, it discerned a need for heightened scrutiny. The court's analysis plainly strays from firmly-established equal protection principles. A legislative choice is subject to heightened scrutiny only if it "employs a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230. /19/ Section 2012(i)'s treatment of certain family members who live together as a single household fits neither of these categories. Family members plainly do not represent a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. /20/ They fall far short of even the most minimal requirements for that characterization. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985), slip op. 6-13 (declining to recognize the mentally retarded as a "quasi-suspect" class). Family members have not been subject to historic discrimination, they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group, and they are neither a minority nor a politically powerless segment of society. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam). To the contrary, families have traditionally received favored status in American cultural and political processes. /21/ Likewise, members of low-income families -- the sub-group served by the Food Stamp program -- do not meet suspect class requirements. The inclusion of poverty as an additional class characteristic does not change the constitutional calculus. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Furthermore, this case does not involve fundamental rights. Contrary to appellees' contentions (Mot. to Dis. 7-9) Section 2012(i) does not create a classification system that infringes a "fundamental right" of food stamp recipients to make choices concerning family living arrangements. This Court has held that certain family-based decisions do enjoy constitutionally protected status. /22/ When the government seriously intrudes on basic choices concerning the composition of the marriage or family unit, the Court has "examine(d) carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). But such scrutiny has been applied only when the government regulation, at a minimum, "directly and substantially" interferes with family choices. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-387 & n.12 (1978); see id. at 403-404 (Stevens, J., concurring); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977). Unlike the zoning provisions at issue in Moore, which prohibited a grandmother from living together with her grandchild, or the statute in Zablocki, which provided that members of a certain class could not marry, Section 2012(i) does not have a direct and substantial impact upon family living arrangements. Section 2012(i) does not prevent any group of persons, related or unrelated, from living or dining together. Its definition of "household" merely reflects a congressional determination, concededly rational, that closely related persons who live together should receive food stamp benefits based on the economic needs of a single household that purchases food and prepares meals together. Section 2012(i) ensures that the amount of a family's food stamp entitlement reflects the economies of scale that a family can enjoy in jointly purchasing and preparing meals. The statute simply adjusts food stamp benefits in light of the cooperative arrangements that families can generally employ; it does not amount to a constitutionally significant intrusion on family living arrangements. See Steinberg v. United States Department of Agriculture, 613 F. Supp. at 435. Indeed, Section 2012(i)'s impact on family living arrangements is no different from that of a broad variety of other legislative provisions that consider family status in allocating financial burdens and benefits. For example, the Internal Revenue Code determines individual income tax liability on the basis of marital, family, and dependent relationships. See e.g., 26 U.S.C. 1-2. Similarly, an individual's eligibility for federally subsidized educational assistance is frequently determined on the basis of his family's financial resources. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1089. And, of course, other welfare programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid, provide assistance according to family-based criteria. See 42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.; Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48 (1981). As these examples indicate, federal law routinely allocates financial burdens and benefits through general rules that utilize family status as indicia of financial resources and need. There is nothing novel -- much less unconstitutional -- in Section 2012(i)'s use of rational, family-based criteria in determining Food Stamp eligibility and benefit levels. Admittedly, Section 2012(i) may encourage families to take advantage of the savings available in joint meal purchase and preparation; by the same token, it may discourage family members from purchasing food and preparing meals separate and apart from the parents, children, or siblings, with whom they live. But these limitations on the "right" to dine separately hardly amount to the kind of interference with family relationships that this Court has found constitutionally significant. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386-387 ("reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed"); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 58 (Social Security provisions terminating a child's benefits upon marriage do not violate equal protection principles even though they "may have an impact on (the child's) desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others."). In particular, Section 2012(i) does not disrupt family bonds by preventing -- or even discouraging -- closely related individuals from living together. Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household" restricts a family's food stamp entitlement in only one respect: it measures the entitlement in light of the economies of scale derived from joint food purchase and preparation. Thus, Section 2012(i) may provide family members with an increased incentive to reap these economies by buying food and preparing meals together; however, it generally provides no incentive to live apart simply to collect increased food stamp allotments, because the separate living arrangements would impose a corresponding increase in food preparation costs. Even in those limited instances where it could conceivably create such an incentive, the result cannot reasonably be characterized as an intrusion on the family unit. /23/ Likewise, Section 2012(i) does not impair a fundamental liberty simply because it denies increased benefits to family members who claim to maintain separate households under one roof. Congress has no obligation to underwrite the full range of possible family living arrangements. Even where the Due Process Clause has been held to "protect against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980); see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-474 (1977). Family members may sincerely desire to share the same living quarters while purchasing food and preparing meals separately; however, the public is not obligated to subsidize that unconventional choice. Congress certainly can create a financial incentive for family members to purchase food and prepare meals together without disturbing a family member's "range of choices" concerning family living arrangements. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. /24/ The district court and appellees have suggested other insubstantial grounds for heightened scrutiny. The district court maintained (J.S. App. 7a) that heightened scrutiny was required by this Court's decision in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Court applied equal protection principles to invalidate provisions of the Food Stamp Act that excluded benefits to households composed of unrelated persons. Examining the scant legislative history behind that exemption, the Court concluded that the provisions had no purpose other than "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group." 413 U.S. at 534. However, the Court clearly employed "rational basis" scrutiny to reach that result. Id. at 532-534. Thus, Moreno offers no support for applying heightened scrutiny to the present case. /25/ Appellees, relying on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), argue (Mot. to Dis. 11) that "(e)ven if the government does not interfere with the (appellees') right to live with closely related individuals, this Court should look at the deprivation of food with heightened scrutiny." This argument -- not made below -- is frivolous. Section 2012(i) set forth a condition on food stamp eligibility and benefits; it does not prevent appellees from pursuing alternatives, other than food stamps, for obtaining food. Appellees do not have an inherent fundamental right to federal food purchasing assistance. Neither Plyler nor any other decision of this Court supports that proposition. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316. Plyler addressed a state statute that completely denied a public education to the children of undocumented aliens. This Court stated that the case raised unique concerns because education, while not a fundamental right, "has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." 457 U.S. at 221. It noted that "'education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.'" Id. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ). The Court further observed that "denial of an education to some isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit." 457 U.S. at 221-222. The Court specifically stated that public education is not "some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Id. at 221. Food stamps have none of the distinctive attributes of public education. Instead, as appellees concede (Mot. to Dis. 12), they are a standard form of social welfare payment, providing the needy with direct funds for the limited purpose of purchasing food items. Like other social welfare programs, the Food Stamp program is subject to recipient fraud and abuse. The revised definition of "household" represents a legitimate classification designed to preserve the integrity of the food stamp system. Classifications of this type, familiar to all social welfare programs, are not subject to heightened scrutiny. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 776-777. Appellees' intimation (Mot. to Dis. 7, 8, 13) that Section 2012(i) creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption is also insubstantial. As this Court has made clear, legislation that satisfies equal protection requirements "'is perforce consistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment.'" Salfi, 422 U.S. at 770 (quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. at 81). In any event, Section 2012(i) does not create an evidentiary presumption; rather, it is a legitimate legislative classification. See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771-772. Section 2012(i) "does not purport to speak in terms of the bona fides" of the family members' household status and "then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible." 422 U.S. at 772. Instead, it provides that "benefits * * * are available upon compliance with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used as the test for eligibility." Ibid. In sum, Section 2012(i) does not establish a legislative classification requiring heightened equal protection scrutiny. Rather, it represents a considered legislative initiative designed to improve the operation of a social welfare program. The question, therefore, is whether Section 2012(i) is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. As the district court acknowledged (J.S. App. 6a), the statute easily meets the "rational basis" test. /26/ C. The Judgment Of Congress On Questions Of Social Welfare Policy Is Entitled To Deference From The Courts When judging the constitutionality of a federal statute, this Court gives significant deference "to the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government." Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, No. 84-571 (June 28, 1985), slip op. 13. In particular, "(t)his Court has granted a 'strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation conferring monetary benefits, Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S., at 185, because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238. Accord Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591 n.32 (1982). Appellees nonetheless urge this Court to declare Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household" unconstitutional largely on public policy grounds. Appellees suggest (Mot. to Dis. 9-11), for example, that families receiving food stamps may be unable to employ the cooperative meal preparation envisioned by Section 2012(i) because of working schedules, health problems and small cooking and dining facilities. They argue (Mot. to Dis. 10-11) that food stamp recipients are likely to suffer from communicable disease or require special diets and, therefore, may be precluded from eating together. They also assert (id. at 12) that Section 2012(i)'s household definition has an especially harsh impact on children of low-income families. Appellees' arguments are debatable. But whatever their merit, they "are addressed to an inappropriate forum" (United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965) ). See, e.g., Hogan, 457 U.S. at 590-592; Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238-239. Congress, rather than the judiciary, is charged with establishing the Food Stamp program's eligibility requirements and benefit levels, and the courts "do not sit to pass on policy or the wisdom of the course Congress has set." Heckler v. Turner, No. 83-1097 (Feb. 27, 1985), slip op. 27. "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely (the Court) may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Section 2012(i)'s refined definition of "household" represents an important congressional initiative to reduce fraud in the Food Stamp program. It responds to documented abuses, "plac(ing) a reasonable control on a situation that State and local administrators have identified as * * * requir(ing) congressional action." S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982). If the district court's invalidation of Section 2012(i) is permitted to stand, millions of dollars in food stamp benefits will ultimately be paid to the undeserving, reducing public confidence in the integrity of welfare distributions and diverting the Nation's limited resources from the truly needy to those who choose to abuse the Food Stamp program. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General KENNETH S. GELLER Deputy Solicitor General JEFFREY P. MINEAR Assistant to the Solicitor General JANUARY 1986 /1/ Several courts have rejected equal protection challenges to Section 2012(i). See Steinberg v. United States Department of Agriculture, 613 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, No. 85-6028 (2d Cir. July 16, 1985) (unpublished order), petition for cert. pending, No. 85-5624 (filed Oct. 10, 1985); Levesque v. Block, No. C82-437-L (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 1983), aff'd in part on other grounds, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983). A number of pending suits present similar equal protection challenges. See Tripp v. Block, No. 85-1203 Civ. T17 (M.D. Fla. filed July 25, 1985); Ma v. Block, Civ. No. 85-64-D-1 (S.D. Iowa filed Mar. 25, 1985); Rogers v. Mansour, Civ. No. K-84-507 (W.D. Mich. removed from state court Nov. 26, 1984); Robinson v. Block, Civ. No. 84-4229 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 12, 1984). /2/ The Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) develops the thrifty food plan on the basis of dietary standards, the nutrient content of foods, and food consumption patterns among low-income households. See 48 Fed. Reg. 34700-34707 (1983). See also Consumer Nutrition Division, Human Nutrition Information Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, The Thrifty Food Plan, 1983 (Aug. 1983). /3/ The economy of scale factors are calculated on the basis of an extensive nationwide survey, conducted by the Department of Agriculture, of food costs for families of different sizes. See Consumer and Food Economics Institute, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, The Effect of Household Size on the Cost of Diets That Are Nutritionally Equivalent (Sept. 1975). /4/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, at 123 (105th ed.). In 1965, approximately 633,000 persons participated in the Food Stamp program, representing a federal outlay of $33 million (ibid.). By 1970, participation had grown to nearly 6.5 million persons, representing a federal outlay of $550 million (ibid.). In 1975, nearly 20 million persons participated, representing a federal outlay of over $4.3 billion (ibid.). /5/ See, e.g., Oversight of the Food Stamp Program: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Subcomm. on Nutrition of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (hereinafter cited as 1984 Senate Hearings); Food Stamp Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) (hereinafter cited as 1982 House Hearings); Proposed Reauthorization of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 (Food Stamps): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Hearings); Fraud in Food Stamp Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearing); Options for Reforming the Food Stamp Program: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Nutrition and Human Needs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); General Farm Program and Food Stamp Program (Food Stamps): Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2 (1969); see also, e.g., Staff of the Subcomm. on Departmental Operations of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Field Investigation of the Operation of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 (Comm. Print 1970). /6/ The House Committee expressly observed that "some persons who constitute (a single) eating unit may currently be certified as separate households because they are separate economic units. The Committee believes that their eating unit status, not their economic unit status, is what is relevant to the food stamp program." H.R. Rep. 95-464, supra, at 143. /7/ See 1982 House Hearings; 1981 Senate Hearings; 1981 House Hearing. The Chairman of the Senate Committee cited estimates by the Administration and congressional investigators that from 11% to 20% of food stamp benefits were issued in error. 1981 Senate Hearings 3 (statement of Chairman Helms). A Department of Agriculture spokesman suggested in the House hearing that losses through fraud might range as high as $1 billion. 1981 House Hearings 10 (statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Bode). See also 1982 House Hearings 4 (statement of Rep. Coleman, citing estimates that $1 billion in food stamps are issued in error each year). /8/ The Senate Committee on the Budget explained the need for revision as follows (S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1981) ): Because small households are provided more food stamps per person and because the same standard deduction is applied to income regardless of household size, a residential unit that splits into several smaller households can, under present law, receive larger total benefits than would be the case if the individuals applied as a single, larger household. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry noted (S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 31): Current law results in some individuals claiming separate household status for purposes of obtaining food stamp benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. This results when the individual claims separate household status and indicates he has zero gross income. The individual could be certified as a separate household although, in fact, he is being supported by his parents. That Committee added (id. at 32): By allowing an exception for parents 60 years of age and older, those parents most likely to reside with their children, but who truly maintain separate household status, will not be barred from participation as separate households. See also H.R. Rep. 97-106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 118-119 (1981). /9/ The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry recommended that all related persons be treated as a single household unless one of the related persons is elderly or disabled. See S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, 87-88 (1982). However, the House proposal, limited to parents, children, and siblings, was adopted in conference. See H.R. Cong. Rep. 97-759, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1982). /10/ Appellees Blanca Martinez and her child, added as plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-81-260, live with Martinez's parents (J.A. 31). According to Martinez's October 27, 1982 affidavit, the combined family group received food stamps as a single household (id. at 32). Appellees Sara Cortez and her children, also added as plaintiffs in Civil Action B-81-260, live with Cortez's parents (id. at 33). According to Cortez's October 28, 1982, affidavit, the family group received food stamps as a single household (id. at 34). Appellees Elias Ruiz and his family, likewise added as plaintiffs in Civil Action B-81-260, live with Ruiz's mother (J.A. 35). Ruiz's February 27, 1984 affidavit does not indicate whether the family group received food stamps as a single household (see id. at 35-36). /11/ In Civil Action No. B-82-7, appellees Sylvia Nieto and her child live with Sylvia Nieto's parents (J.A. 37). Nieto's January 11, 1982 affidavit does not indicate whether the combined family group received food stamps as a single household (see id. at 37-38). In Civil Action No. B-82-21, appellees Robert Cody and his family live with Robert Cody's mother (J.A. 39, 41). According to Cody's January 22, 1982 affidavit, the combined family group received food stamps as a single household (id. at 40). In Civil Action No. B-83-106, appellees Cecilia Villafranca and her children live with Cecilia Villafranca's brother (J.A. 50). Their combined household income exceeds the food stamp eligibility requirements (J.S. App. 3a). Appellee Gregorio Alvarado and his family, also plaintiffs in Civil Action No. B-83-106, live with Alvarado's sister (J.A. 52). Alvarado's May 19, 1983 affidavit does not indicate whether the combined family group received food stamps as a single household (see id. at 52-53). /12/ The district court granted relief based on appellees' affidavits, prepared as early as 1981, describing transient living situations and indicating an immediate need for food stamps (J.A. 26-42, 50-53). Thus, it is possible that appellees are no longer in need of the relief provided by the district court. However, appellees' counsel informs us that at least some of the appellees continue to live with parents, children, or siblings and continue to qualify for relief under the injunction. In all events, this dispute would not be mooted if appellees simply ceased receiving food stamp benefits. The injunction has not been vacated; furthermore, the Secretary may seek repayment of overissuances in the event that the court's decision is overturned (7 U.S.C. 2022). See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, No. 82-206 (June 12, 1984), slip op. 5-9. /13/ See generally 1982 House Hearings; 1981 Senate Hearings; 1981 House Hearing. /14/ See, e.g., S. Rep. 97-504, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982) ("tightening of the household definition was the leading recommendation for change made in response to a recent survey by the (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry)"); id. at 26 ("(h)ousehold size has consistently been determined to be the second most likely source of recipient fraud resulting in overissuances; income is first"); H.R. Rep. 97-687, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982) (revision of the household definition was among "the suggestions made by State program administrations, officials from the General Accounting Office, and the Department (of Agriculture)'s Inspector General"); S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 32 ("(t)hese current practices of artificially splitting households is (sic) an abuse which has been reported frequently to the (Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry) in correspondence from local and State administrators"); 1982 House Hearings 45 ("(t)he vast majority of overissuances and underissuances for this $10.6 billion program stem from errors in determining correct income, assets, and household size") (statement of Henry Eschwege, Director, Community and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office); 1981 Senate Hearings 31-32, 42, 305-306, 308, 310-311 (testimony and prepared statements of S.L. Puett, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Human Services). /15/ As a spokesman for the General Accounting Office observed, "(i)t is very difficult to verify separate household status for people living together." 1982 House Hearings 47 (statement of Henry Eschwege, Director, Community and Economic Development Division). Individual determinations are impractical because, as a Texas food stamp fraud investigator explained, "(t)he complexity of the program works to the advantage of those determined to abuse it." 1981 Senate Hearings 52 (statement of E. Richards, Investigator General, Texas Department of Human Resources). The very size of the program prevents individual investigations. Id. at 51 (noting an investigation backlog of 10,000 cases in Texas alone). /16/ See H.R. Conf. Rep. 97-759, supra, at 62-63; S. Rep. 97-504, supra, at 24-27, 87-88, 111, 119; H.R. Rep. 97-687, supra, at 25, 75-76, 83-84, 105; S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 52-53; S. Rep. 97-128, supra, at 31-32; H.R. Rep. 97-106, supra, at 118-119. /17/ See e.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 588-593 (1982) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal limitations that result in higher Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) than to persons who are self-supporting); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230-239 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on SSI eligibility that provides benefits only to residents in public institutions who receive Medicaid funds for their care); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174-178 (1978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal limitations on payment of SSI benefits to persons who reside outside the United States for a period greater than 30 days); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to the divorced wives of retirees); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-516 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to surviving illegitimate children who are unable to establish dependency on the putative parent). /18/ Congress quite reasonably chose "to avoid the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976). Nonetheless, it attempted to tailor its definition of "household," to the extent possible, to minimize hardships on particular family arrangements. For example, Congress provided specific exceptions from the houshold definition for the elderly and the disabled. Even these exceptions may, of course, "leave some comparatively needy person outside the favored circle" (Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238). But that result is inevitable in the course of legislative line-drawing: "Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark." Id. at 239 n.23 (quoting Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ). See also, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 549; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487. /19/ See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216-217; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 312 (1976) (per curiam); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). /20/ The district court suggested (J.S. App. 6a), without clear explanation, that this Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), recognizing gender as a "quasi-suspect" classification, justified heightened scrutiny in the present case. Appellees, however, have not contended that family members are subject to invidious class discrimination. See Mot. to Dis. 7-13. /21/ See generally Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy -- Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1983). /22/ For example, the right to marry and have children receives special constitutional protection. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (invalidating oppressively restrictive maternity leave regulations); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state statute banning interracial marriage). /23/ We perceive only one situation in which Section 2012(i)'s "household" definition might theoretically encourage family members to live apart. In some circumstances, a family that is ineligible for food stamp benefits based on its combined household income might become eligible if the individual members lived apart and applied for benefits separately. It appears doubtful that family members would choose to live separately simply to qualify for food stamps; the increased cost of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the value of the food stamp benefits. Nonetheless, family members intent upon receiving food stamps might conceivably adjust their living arrangements to satisfy the eligibility criteria. The availability of that option, however, does not constitute government impairment of any fundamental family right. The government does not intrude upon family relationships simply because family members with combined income in excess of public welfare eligibility requirements may choose to adjust their lifestyles to qualify for welfare benefits. /24/ By the same token, Section 2012(i) does not infringe the constitutional rights of family members, presently living apart and receiving food stamp benefits, who wish to live together and preserve the same benefit level. At bottom, these family members are simply demanding "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail (themselves) of the full range of protected choices." McRae, 448 U.S. at 316. /25/ The district court also misconstrued Moreno in concluding that the decision would preclude food stamp benefit limitations even in the absence of "a congressional pronouncement of a desire to harm" (J.S. App. 8a). Moreno clearly turned on a finding that Congress's sole reason for enacting the challenged legislation was its desire to disadvantage a "politically unpopular group," rather than to serve a legitimate government interest. 413 U.S. at 534. Thus, contrary to the district court's statement, Congress's motivation was critical to the Court's conclusion. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 87 (1976); Levesque v. Block, slip op. 5-7. /26/ Although the Court need not reach the issue, we believe Section 2012(i) would withstand the "intermediate" level of scrutiny that the district court mistakenly required. The sheer magnitude of food stamp fraud and the impossibility of policing it on a case-by-case basis provide "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for redefining the term "household" to prevent widespread systematic abuses. Cf. Heckler v. Mathews, No. 82-1050 (Mar. 5, 1984), slip op. 19. Likewise, the judicious deliberation and weighing of competing interests that accompanied the redefinition indicates that the changes were "plainly adopted 'through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.'" Mathews, slip op. 20 (quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) ). Thus, Section 2012(i)'s definition of "household" is substantially related to important government objectives.