# EXTERNAL The WILDCARD OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Pandemic Influenza – Is the deck stacked against us?

Nichole Ovens, MPH May 3, 2006



### Defining Flu

- Seasonal (or common) Flu: Respiratory illness transmitted person to person
  - Most people have some immunity
  - Vaccine available
- Avian (or bird) Flu: Caused by influenza viruses that occur naturally among wild birds

H5N1 variant is deadly for poultry
No human immunity
No vaccine available yet

### Defining Pandemic Flu

- Pandemic Flu: Virulent human flu that causes a global outbreak of serious illness
- Little natural immunity
- Disease can spread easily from person-toperson

"GET INFORMED. BE PREPARED."

CURRENTLY THERE IS NO PANDEMIC FLU



## Can we predict the next pandemic?


- Most scientists believe only a matter of time until next influenza pandemic
- Cannot predict timing and severity of next pandemic
  - Over 30 different influenza pandemics in recorded history
- Influenza pandemics occurred three times last century

1918-19: Spanish Flu (H1N1)

1957-58: Asian Flu (H2N2)

1968-69: Hong Kong Flu (H3N2)


### Why do pandemics occur?



#### **ANTIGENIC DRIFT**



### Why do pandemics occur?



#### **ANTIGENIC SHIFT**



# Will H5N1 cause the next pandemic?

H5N1 raises concern about potential human pandemic because:


- History
- Very virulent
- Spread by migratory birds

1957 1977 1999 2003 1918 1968 1997 2002 2004

NIAID: Timeline of Human Flu Pandemics

- Transmitted from birds to mammals
  - Limited circumstances to humans
- Continues to evolve





### Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO\*

Country	2003		2004		2005		2006		Total	
	cases	deaths								
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5	8	5
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	4	4	2	2	6	6
China	0	0	0	0	8	5	10	7	18	12
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4	12	4
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	17	11	13	12	32	24
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
Thailand	0	0	17	12	5	2	0	0	22	14
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4	12	4
Viet Nam	3	3	29	20	61	19	0	0	93	42
Total	3	3	46	32	95	41	48	33	205	113

<sup>\*</sup>As of April 27, 2006

Total number of cases includes number of deaths. WHO reports only laboratory-confirmed cases.

Vaccine is the best defense against influenza – it is also the most difficult defense to achieve

HHS Secretary Leavitt



NIAID: Flu vaccine grown in eggs, slow but dependable



CDC: Examining the 1918 Pandemic Flu virus



CDC: Extracting the flu vaccine



- High priority, White House/HHS:
  - Develop vaccines
  - Improve vaccine production capacity
- Vaccine development: Greatest portion of all pandemic funding
  - HHS 2006 appropriations = \$3.3B
  - Vaccine development accounts for \$1.78B
  - Planned StrategicStockpiling =8M doses





- 2004: H5N1 reference virus developed by St. Jude Children's Hospital, Memphis, TN
  - Pre-pandemic vaccines made from inactivated H5N1 for clinical trials
  - NIAID awarded two contracts for production and clinical testing of investigational vaccines
- 2006: Pre-pandemic vaccine doses delivered

sanofi pasteur delivered >8,000 doses

Chiron: 10,000 doses coming



- Flu Pandemic Onset: HHS to acquire a vaccine for specific pandemic strain
  - -4-6 months
- Distribution by vaccine distributors or direct from the manufacturer
  - Your plans determine this process
  - Initial Onset:
     Stockpiled
     pre-pandemic
     vaccines may
     be distributed





### How will antivirals be used?

- Antivirals have two roles:
  - Prophylaxis: decrease likelihood of developing flu
  - Treatment: lessen impact of flu (if taken immediately after onset of symptoms)
- Two main choices for battling H5N1
  - Oseltamivir "Tamiflu" (Roche)
  - Zanamivir "Relenza" (GlaxoSmithKline)
- Both can now be used for treatment or prevention





### How will antivirals be used?

- Right now: Used to treat patients and prevent infection in close contacts:
  - Health care workers
  - Family Members
- Flu begins spreading: Can be given to a community where clusters of cases occur to delay spread
- Start of pandemic: They will be the only medical intervention available to reduce morbidity and mortality



### Should we stockpile antivirals?

- \$731M in the budget for stockpiling
  - \$200M for research and development of new antivirals
- HHS Antiviral Purchasing/Stockpiling Goal: Purchase enough to treat 25% of U.S. population (75M)
- HHS will purchase 50M courses and subsidize states for 31M



### Should we stockpile antivirals?

- Some organizations have purchased large quantities of Tamiflu for their employees
- Antivirals require prescriptions
- Stockpiling requires
  - Medical oversight
  - Legal oversight
  - Purchasing agreements
  - Planning
  - Logistics

**CDC:** Strategic National Stockpile





### How will a pandemic affect our lives and business operations?

- Average Seasonal Flu:
  - 5% to 20% of the population gets the flu
  - >200,000 people are hospitalized from complications
  - Approximately 36,000 people die
  - Employee absence average in U.S. = 1.5 days
  - Cost of absence for business = \$600/employee



## How will a pandemic affect our lives and business operations?

- Moderate Pandemic Flu:
  - 25% of the population gets the flu
    - 20 47 million additional illnesses
    - 18 42 million outpatient visits
  - 314,000 734,000 people are hospitalized from complications
  - Between 89,000 207,000 deaths
  - Significant employee absenteeism
  - Cost to U.S. economy:
    - \$71.3 \$166.5 billion
    - This does not include disruptions to commerce and society





### How will a pandemic affect our lives and business operations?

Characteristic	Moderate (1958)	<b>Severe (1918)</b>
Illness	90 million (30%)	90 million (30%)
Outpatient medical care	45 million (50%)	45 million (50%)
Hospitalization	865,000	9,900,000
ICU care	128,750	1,485,000
Mechanical ventilation	64,875	745,500
Deaths	209,000	1,903,000

Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Scenarios\*



<sup>\*</sup> Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the U.S. These estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during previous pandemics. www.pandemicflu.gov

#### **WHO Global Pandemic Preparedness Plan**

Phase	Strategic Action
Pre-pandemic	<ol> <li>Reduce opportunity for human infection</li> <li>Strengthen early warning system</li> </ol>
Emergence of pandemic virus	3. Contain and/or delay the spread at source
Pandemic declared	4. Reduce morbidity, mortality and social disruption 5. Conduct research to guide response measures





**U.S. National Strategy** 

Pillar	Goals
Preparedness & Communication	<ol> <li>Work with all levels of government and industry</li> <li>Provide guidance</li> <li>Clearly communicate expectations/responsibilities</li> </ol>
Surveillance & Detection	4. Ensure rapid reporting 5. Close monitoring
Response & Containment	6. Contain outbreaks 7. Increase surge capacity 8. Sustain critical infrastructure 9. Ensure effective risk communication






### The U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides planning with the intent of:

1. Stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the U.S.

2. Limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic and

mitigating disease, suffering and death

3. Sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society





The DOE Pandemic Planning Approach is to support 4 major topics called out in the National Strategy:

- 1. Protect the Health of Employees
- 2. Continue Performance of Mission Essential Functions
- 3. Support the Federal Response
- 4. Communicate with Stakeholders

Office of Environment, Safety and Health

Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health Subcommittee for Infectious Diseases



#### The Biological Event Monitoring Team (BEMT):

- Standing Members
  - Chair
  - DOE Counter-Terrorism
  - DOE Medical Officer
  - NNSA Bioterrorism
  - Admin/Health and Safety Officer
  - Security
  - Continuity Programs
  - Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
  - Chief Information Officer

- Ad Hoc Members
  - SMEs and Advisors
  - Site medical representatives
  - Occupational Medical Director



- Activate Continuity Plan based on MEDCON levels and disease spread
- Minimize exposure and transmission
  - Most employees remain at home/Telework encouraged
  - Employees remain in close contact with managers
- "Mission essential" employees report to work

Some Essential Functions may be transferred to other locations



- Social Distancing
  - Limited use of mass transit
  - Meetings and gatherings restricted
  - Conference calls encouraged
  - Extensive use of technology
  - Shift work encouraged
- Health Protection Measures
  - Frequent Hand Washing
  - Protective Equipment
  - Prophylaxis
  - Periodic Medical Exams





- Confined Teams A reverse isolation strategy
  - A team of employees can remain at work for an extended period
     Could be an approach for secure facilities (NNSA, OI, OC)
- Other Considerations
  - Security Restrictions
  - Limited Facility Entrances
  - Limited Access and Exclusion Areas
  - Personnel Accountability
  - Replacement of personnel performing essential functions



### What concerns do you have?

## Open discussion on planning issues



### What are you doing now?

# Open discussion on strategies



## Pandemic Influenza – Is the deck stacked against us?

### QUESTIONS???

