February 15, 2000
(Note: These are unedited and uncorrected transcripts)

Introduction

I am Roger Winter, executive director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees you for conducting this hearing on Sudan. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the plight of refugees and displaced people around the world. We have defended the rights of refugees, displaced, and war-affected people for more than 40 years. To do that seriously, we regularly go on site in the midst of war and conflict situations to document conditions, analyze the political environment, and offer informed policy recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my organization, I welcome your leadership as the new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs. In all candor, this Subcommittee needs to become more vigorous on a range of countries and issues in Africa. The people of Africa sorely need our attention, our assistance, and our international leadership. I believe you and your staff share that view. We at U.S. Committee for Refugees are prepared to help in any way we can as you take steps to energize this important Subcommittee. Your decision to focus on Sudan today in one of your first hearings as Chairman is highly appropriate and encouraging.

USCR Involvement in Sudan Issues

As director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), I have been a close observer and often an eyewitness of events in Sudan for 18 years. I first traveled to Sudan in 1981 and have conducted multiple visits to Sudan annually on behalf of USCR since 1988.

As a participant in 11 previous Congressional hearings on Sudan, dating back to 1989, USCR has documented the human toll imposed by civil war, human rights atrocities, harsh Sudanese government policies, blockages of humanitarian relief efforts, huge population displacements, and man-made famines. A review of previous Congressional hearings on Sudan offers a sobering list of hearing titles: "Crisis in Sudan" in July 1998; "Terrorism and Sudan" in May 1997; "Recent Developments in Sudan" in May 1993; "War and Famine, Peace and Relief' in May 1991; "War and Famine in the Sudan" in May 1991; "War and Famine in Sudan" in November 1990; "War and Famine in Sudan" in October 1990; and "War and Famine in Sudan" in early 1990. The theme is sadly consistent.

In addition to Congressional testimony, USCR has published several reports on the Sudan conflict:

* Follow the Women and the Cows: Personal Stories of Sudan's Uprooted People, published by USCR earlier this month, narrates the personal sagas of uprooted Sudanese and their struggles to survive war, famine, slave raids, aerial bombings, disease, displacement, and utter destitution.

* A Working Document II: Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains 1983-1998, published by USCR in December 1998, was a ground-breaking study of the death toll in southern Sudan. It concluded that at least 1.9 million people had died due to war-related causes during the past 15 years, through mid-1998.

* A Working Document I: Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan 1983-1993, published by USCR in October 1993, reviewed the toll on civilians in the first ten years of the current civil war .-The report, researched and written by USCR consultant and former U.S. aid official Millard Burr, concluded that 1.3 million Sudanese had died of war-related causes-far more deaths than previously believed.

* Sudan 1990-1992: Food Aid, Famine, and Failure, published by USCR in May 1993, traced the Sudan government's political manipulation of relief programs.

* War and Famine in Sudan, published by USCR in March 1991, examined the links between starvation and war in Sudan.

* Khartoum' s Displaced Persons: A Decade of Despair, published by USCR in August 1990, reported on the plight of more than 1 million displaced persons in Sudan' s capital area and the Sudan government's antipathy toward them.

USCR staff have conducted five site visits to Sudan in the past year. USCR has hosted a series of briefings on the current Sudan crisis and regularly publishes policy recommendations and analyses of the political and humanitarian situation. Copies can be obtained through our office here in Washington. USCR also provides updated information on Sudan at our website, at .

Scope of Testimony

This testimony consists of five sections:

* Understanding the Magnitude of Sudan's Crisis
* Political and Military Issues in Sudan
* Political Recommendations
* The Humanitarian Emergency in Sudan .Humanitarian Assistance Recommendations

My testimony contains ten policy recommendations that I hope the Subcommittee and the entire U.S. government will consider closely.

Understanding the Magnitude of Sudan's Crisis

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Sudan is extraordinary .Events there certainly qualify as news by any measure, even though they rarely appear on our television screens or in our newspapers. The ongoing emergency in Sudan cries for a stronger and wiser response than the United States and the rest of the world have bothered to provide so far. Consider these facts:

* The people of southern Sudan currently are suffering the longest continual civil war in the world-conflict for nearly 16 consecutive years, and for 32 of the past 43 years.

* The Sudanese people have suffered more war-related deaths during the past 15 years than any single population in the world-an estimated 1.9 million have died.

Sudan's war has killed more people than any war since World War II. Twice as many Sudanese have died in the past 15 years than all the war-related deaths suffered by Americans in the more than 200-year history of the United States. Sudan's war has killed, directly or indirectly, an average of more than 60,000 people per year, more than 5,000 people per month, more than 1,200 people per week, more than 180 people per day. ..for the past 15 years. And the dying continues today, unabated.

* Sudan currently is producing more uprooted people than any other country on earth.

More than 4 million Sudanese have fled their homes, including an estimated 4 million displaced within Sudan, and 300,000 Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries. More than 80 percent of southern Sudan's population has been displaced at some time during the war, according to USCR' s estimates.

* The people of southern Sudan are struggling to recover from one of the worst famines seen anywhere in the world in recent years.

Tens of thousands of people died of famine-related causes in 1998, according to the most conservative estimates in the field. Some 2.5 million people faced serious food shortages last year, and 2 million people will continue to require international food aid this year, according to assessments by the World Food Program (WFP).

* Slave raids abduct thousands of children and women into slavery each year in southern Sudan.

Militia armed and supported by the Sudan government regularly destroy isolated southern villages and abduct women and children. Many captives are shipped to northern Sudan and forced into slavery , according to numerous accounts. These accounts of enslavement touch a raw nerve in most Americans because of our own shameful national experience. One unconfirmed survey by local chieftains in southern Sudan suggested that raiders abducted more than 40,000 children during a seven-year period in the 1980s. We are unable to assess the accuracy of this estimate, but we know that the abhorrent practice continues today, despite denials by the Sudan government.

* Sudan is Africa's largest country geographically, equal to the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River .

The southern one-third of Sudan, where the warfare, famine, dying, and population displacement are worst, contains approximately 5 million impoverished people in an area roughly the size of Texas.

* The people of southern Sudan are arguably the poorest, most destitute people on the face of the earth.

Most of southern Sudan is vast, remote, and devoid of basic services. Rates of child mortality, malnutrition, health care, educational opportunities, clean water systems, and other basic human needs are among the worst in the world. Exact statistics are lacking, however, because ongoing warfare makes systematic surveys virtually impossible.

The above summary suggests that the scale of prolonged suffering in southern Sudan is unprecedented in modern times. It is the most under-reported tragedy of our age. The death or displacement of some 6 million people in a single country demands far more world attention than it has received, and requires a committed policy response.

Political and Military Issues in Sudan

This testimony will not attempt to review the long history of Sudan's civil war. The country and its southern people have endured armed conflict since Sudan achieved independence in 1956, except for a brief 11-year hiatus of peace during 1972-83.

The military situation on the ground has come almost full circle during the past ten years. By the end of 1988, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the then- government of Sudan agreed to a peace process to end a war that had produced perhaps a quarter-million civilian deaths that year and rapid SPLA military gains. On June 30, 1989, the National Islamic Front came to power by coup precisely to abort Sudan's peace process, which was based on political and religious compromise. The NIF government showed great willingness to continue the war and to manipulate humanitarian assistance. The NIF continues to rule the country to this day. In 1991, the NIF government backed Saddam Hussein in the Desert Storm war and was subsequently placed on the United States government's list of regimes involved in international terrorism.

In August 1991, the SPLA fragmented and weakened militarily, opening an opportunity for Sudan' s militant government to retake much of the territory in SPLA hands. Since 1994, the SPLA has made some internal reforms and established a civil administration within the territory it controls. It has little in the way of resources, however. Militarily it has regained significant territory. However, the Sudan government retains control of the major towns in the south. An SPLA offensive in late 1998 produced no significant gains. The SPLA' s limited resources makes it a seasonal military .

In my view, it is unlikely that either side can militarily overwhelm the other. However, the Sudan government appears to be on the verge of new oil production in the near future and apparently believes it can achieve a military victory .Thus Sudan' sNIP government believes it has little reason to negotiate a just political solution to the conflict in the south. .

It is important to note that the conflict in Sudan is not confined to the south. The SPLA is collaborating with other opposition elements-such as the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Beja Congress, and others-under the framework of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In addition, it is important to understand that some of the worst-affected conflict areas, such as the Nuba Mountains region of central Sudan, are located outside the traditional south. Thus, all of Sudan is suffering. The south, however, is a whole society in absolute extremis as a result of the war.

Mr. Chairman, the most effective way to discuss the political and military situation in Sudan at this time-and how the United States and the international community should respond-is to focus on the following key points. These key points-all of them would appear to be self-evident truths beyond debate-should prompt the U.S. government to adopt a more energetic, more committed political strategy to help end the suffering of Sudan' s people.

* Sudan's civil war, and Sudan government policies associated with the war, are the most important causes of massive humanitarian emergencies in southern Sudan year after year .

The people of southern Sudan are resilient people. They generally know how to cope with drought, floods, and annual hunger periods. It is the relentless grind of war, year after year, that has uprooted people from their homes and farms, destroyed crops, ruined livelihoods, blocked relief efforts, and impeded long-term development efforts. Famine in Sudan is man-made, not imposed by Mother Nature.

The world responded generously, albeit late, to alleviate last year's famine in southern Sudan. Relief efforts should continue. But a generous humanitarian policy is no substitute for a strong political policy. Current international aid efforts costing $1 million per day can address the symptoms of Sudan's war, but only strong international diplomatic efforts can end the war that is causing the suffering.

* No side in Sudan's civil war can win a full military victory under current circumstances.

The SPLA rebels were on the verge of military defeat five years ago, yet they survived and have regained much of the territory they lost. They are a guerrilla force that has demonstrated its ability to survive in the bush. The Sudan government's military, meanwhile, has shown an ability to control strategic towns in southern Sudan and sustain the war at a reported cost of $1 million per day. Not once in 16 years of warfare has the SPLA managed to capture the "capital" of southern Sudan, Juba.

The United States and other nations have been unwilling to become more involved in ways that would substantially tip the military balance in Sudan's war. The war drags on with neither side capable of military victory .It is an intractable game of "checkmate" that only produces dead Sudanese civilians.

* Both sides are likely to continue the war in Sudan unless the international community makes stronger, more focused efforts to help produce a just peace.

Neither the government army and its allies, nor the SPLA and its allies, show signs of quitting the war despite the relative stalemate on the ground. Nor have the combatants taken serious steps to accelerate peace negotiations. Antagonisms and mistrust run deep, and 16 years of uninterrupted violence have made warfare the "norm" for many combatants.

* The status quo is morally unacceptable. The world should not tolerate a military and diplomatic stalemate in which an average of more than 60,000 people die each year.

People in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains area of central Sudan continue to die in massive numbers. International humanitarian relief saves tens of thousands of lives, to be sure, but tens of thousands of lives each year cannot be saved despite extraordinary relief efforts. The time has long-since come when the world community can no longer assuage itself that the "glass is half full" (the lives saved by aid programs); it is time to admit that the glass is more than half empty (the lives that have perished and will continue to perish as the war bleeds on).

Sporadic and hollow political rhetoric by the United States--driven by our legitimate concerns about international terrorism, but which allows Sudanese civilians to die in droves-is morally bankrupt.

* The current process of peace negotiations, moderated by neighboring countries, is stalled and weakened, but it remains the most viable venue to achieve a fair, lasting peace.

Regional government members of IGAD {Intergovernmental Authority on Development), led by Kenya, have engaged in peace negotiations since 1993 in an effort to end Sudan's civil war. IGAD negotiations have progressed at an agonizingly slow pace. The war between two of the mediators-Ethiopia and Eritrea-has weakened mediation efforts.

Yet the IGAD peace process remains the most viable hope to negotiate a just peace in Sudan. It is important to understand that the IGAD process is by no means an artificial peace process imposed on Sudan by the international community. On the contrary , it is a regionally created process that includes, directly or indirectly, all important political parties in Sudan as well as governments of neighboring frontline states. All participants in the IGAD negotiations have a direct, vital stake in the future of Sudan and its stability

Despite the slow pace of negotiations, some progress has occurred. Participants in the IGAD negotiations have agreed on an important Declaration of Principles that could eventually provide a formula for real peace. As part of the IGAD negotiations, the Sudan government and its domestic opponents have agreed in principle on the relationship of religion and government in Sudanese society. They have also agreed on the right of self- determination for the people of southern Sudan (see next).

* All sides in Sudan's war-including the government-have already agreed that the principle of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan is indispensable to a just peace.

This important point is often overlooked. During IGAD peace negotiations in 1997, the Sudan government agreed to the principle of self -determination for the people of southern Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the main opposition political groups in northern Sudan have also endorsed the principle. IGAD negotiations last year began to focus on defining the precise geographic boundaries of southern Sudan within which a referendum of self-determination would eventually occur.

This means that all sides in the Sudan civil war have already agreed in principle what the ultimate solution should be. We are left with a macabre Alice In Wonderland reality: the war in Sudan rages on, people continue to die in staggering numbers, and a massive international relief effort must be sustained even though the combatants have agreed on the solution to end the carnage.

Political Recommendations

Mr. Chairman, the six truths discussed above should guide U.S. and UN political strategy on Sudan toward the following recommendations:

1. The U.S. government should adopt a "solution-oriented approach" by placing a higher priority on bringing the war in southern Sudan to a just end.

U.S. political policy toward Sudan has failed to bring an end to the war and the staggering death toll suffered by southern Sudanese. U.S. political policy toward Sudan has been largely driven by America's international terrorism concerns, not the needs of the Sudanese people for a just end to their conflict. The harsh U.S. rhetoric directed at the Sudan government is justified, but given the Administration's unwillingness to tip the military balance in Sudan's civil war, U.S. rhetoric alone has been ineffective in resolving the conflict.

Top U.S. officials should devote greater diplomatic resources to help end the war. U.S. policy-makers' interest in Sudan waxes and wanes. Currently the Ethiopia-Eritrea war eclipses the Administration's attention to the Sudan conflict. Sudan must become a consistent priority. Building on the IGAD peace process, U.S. officials should become more seriously engaged in helping find a solution in Sudan. The U.S. government should be prepared to bolster the capacity of the NDA/SPLA if necessary to gain Khartoum's cooperation on a political solution.

2. The UN Security Council, with U .S. leadership, should formally declare that a valid, binding referendum to determine the political future of southern Sudan must and will take place in southern Sudan within three years, by the year 2001.

Since neither the Sudan government nor the SPLA rebels can win a clear military victory under existing circumstances, the war will likely continue indefinitely, costing additional hundreds of thousands of Sudanese lives. This is unacceptable. The solution must be derived through diplomacy.

All sides in the war have stated that southern Sudanese should be able to vote on their political future to remain in a unified Sudan or become an independent nation. Sudanese President Bashir stated in February that the secession of southern Sudan might be preferable to the current war.

Since all sides, disingenuously or not, have agreed that self-determination via a referendum is acceptable, a referendum should be held at the earliest opportunity. The UN Security Council should formally set a date for such a referendum by the year 2001, and should begin preparations to facilitate the voting.

If the Sudan government takes steps to cooperate with a serious peace process, several options for greater U .S. engagement exist: possible re-opening of the American embassy in Khartoum; greater funding and training for the IGAD mediation effort; possible support to strengthen the resources and mandate of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy on Sudan; possible easing of UN sanctions against the Sudan government, etc. USCR does not encourage re-opening the embassy or easing of sanctions, however, without clear movement toward a referendum.

3. Extend the current cease.fire to include all conflict areas and all combatants.

The current cease-fire is a helpful step for humanitarian purposes, but it is no substitute for peace. Currently the mutual cease-fire applies only to Bahr el-Ghazal Province. The SPLA has declared that its cease-fire also includes parts of Upper Nile Province. Neither side has extended the cease-fire to conflict areas in Equatoria Province, nor to the Nuba Mountains region of central Sudan. The Sudan government has failed to include government-backed militia in the cease-fire. As a result, the cease-fire has more loopholes than substance.

All sides should extend the cease-fire to include all areas of southern Sudan and the Nuba region. All combatants, particularly militia, should formally adhere to the cease-fire.

4. Formally and publicly condemn bombings of civilian targets by the Sudan military immediately after each incident.

In areas monitored by UN officials, the Sudan government bombed civilian targets more than 40 times last year and approximately 100 times during the past two-and-a-half years. Bombings of civilian targets in zones inaccessible to UN officials, such as the Nuba Mountains, often go unreported and uncounted.

Three weeks ago, a government war plane dropped 34 bombs in an attack on a hospital in the southern border town of Yei. A government plane bombed a hospital operated by Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) in January. Last November, a government plane bombed the civilian hospital in Yei hours after my colleagues and I completed a visit there; we saw with our own eyes that the hospital was a completely civilian site, filled with sick women and children. That particular attack killed two people, injured 18, and seriously damaged the hospital.

The Sudan government's bombings of humanitarian targets are among the most egregious violations of international law in the world today. The U .S. government should condemn these acts each time they happen. Moreover, the United States should take this issue directly to the UN Security Council. The UN itself should issue a formal censure of the Sudan government for each bombing immediately after each incident.

5. Support grass roots ethnic reconciliation efforts in southern Sudan.

Tensions between southern Sudan ' s large populations of ethnic Dinka and ethnic Nuer have exacerbated the war. A major Dinka-Nuer reconciliation conference this month in Bahr el-Ghazal Province has reportedly produced a significant accord among hundreds of local chiefs that might reduce local conflicts in some areas. USAID deserves credit for supporting the latest reconciliation conference. The U.S. government should provide financial, diplomatic, and logistical support to similar gatherings planned in other parts of southern Sudan later this year. The United States also should support a full range of civil administration initiatives that can contribute to improved stability and defuse local tensions.

The Humanitarian Emergency in Sudan

Humanitarian conditions in southern Sudan are harsh at all times. Even during years without full-blown famine, southern Sudan remains an inhospitable place with food shortages, hunger periods, untreated diseases, impassable roads, remote villages cut off from the outside world, and massive population displacement. The people of southern Sudan are vibrant, proud, fond of jokes and smiling, and are hauntingly beautiful in their singing. But during 16 years of war they have known more suffering, terror, and death than any other population on earth.

Southern Sudan has suffered two famines in the past ten years. An estimated 250,000 people died in 1988 when the world virtually ignored widespread starvation there The world responded more generously to the famine of 1998, yet the loss of life was again enormous. Tens of thousands died in last year's famine. Some estimates put the death toll at 50,000; one unofficial estimate from the field placed the toll at 100,000 lost lives.

The famine last year centered on Bahr el-Ghazal Province. Raids by government militia in 1997 and drought conditions had left residents of Bahr el- Ghazal already weakened as 1998 began. An SPLA military offensive in early 1998, and the scorched-earth tactics practiced by government forces and their allies, uprooted tens of thousands of people from their homes in the first months of the year. Some 100,000 ethnic Dinka fled from the government-controlled town of Wau in early 1998 to escape a government pogrom that left hundreds, if not thousands, dead. They sought food and shelter in surrounding rural areas where local residents already faced a serious food shortage. Sudanese authorities imposed a two-month ban on most humanitarian aid flights to Bahr el-Ghazal Province at the precise moment when aid was most essential to avert starvation.

The result was famine. The people of Bahr el-Ghazal were caught in a "starvation trap" contrived by the Sudan government. Families' farms and cattle were destroyed by government-supported raiders, access to outside food aid was denied by government edict, and uprooted families found that equally decimated friends and neighbors were unable to feed them.

UN officials charged with coordinating humanitarian relief efforts, known as Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), responded slowly to the famine in the first four months of 1998. Some OLS officials, in fact, virtually denied that a famine existed. Despite extraordinary efforts by OLS and international donors to combat the famine in the second half of 1998, OLS officials' failure to respond more aggressively to the disaster in its initial stages points to the need for serious reforms in OLS management.

During the final half of 1998, OLS managed to mount a massive airlift of food to the estimated 2.6 million Sudanese facing food shortages. OLS cargo planes delivered more than 100,000 tons of relief food; a handful of relief agencies operating independently of OLS also delivered tens of thousands of tons of food and supplies. UN officials characterized it as the largest air drop of food in history , at an estimated cost of $1 million per day. Relief workers were able to deliver only small amounts of food by truck due to poor roads. The U.S. government, to its credit, was a major donor of funds and food to the relief effort.

Some areas of southern Sudan remained inaccessible to aid workers during 1998, however, because of security concerns and Sudan government restrictions. Factional violence forced aid workers to evacuate parts of Upper Nile Province during the second half of the year. Sudanese authorities reneged on their pledge to grant UN workers access to the Nuba Mountains area of central Sudan to assess serious humanitarian needs there.

As of March 1999, the current humanitarian situation in southern Sudan is extremely precarious. The famine conditions have eased thanks to food aid deliveries, but pockets of malnutrition persist and much of the population remains weakened after last year's ordeal. Circumstances could easily propel southern Sudan into another famine. Sustained assistance and careful monitoring will be essential.

An estimated 2 million people will require at least partial food relief during the year, according to OLS assessments. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that southern Sudan will require up to 170,000 tons of food aid this year. Much of that food aid appears to be in the pipeline. OLS agencies have appealed to donors for $198 million to fund operations during the year .Although general food distributions continue on the ground, aid workers are gradually closing many of the intensive feeding centers for the worst malnourished children as health conditions improve slightly and families return to their homes to prepare for the planting season in April-May. Relief groups currently are distributing seeds to farmers in anticipation of upcoming rains that will signal the beginning of the growing season. It is essential that the people of Bahr el-Ghazal Province be able to plant and harvest their own crops if they are eventually going to escape this famine and regain food self -sufficiency.

Despite these efforts, the famine could easily recur. Circumstances could rapidly push the people of southern Sudan over the edge again. Crop yields from last November's harvest were better than expected but were still below normal in half the areas surveyed by the international Food and Agricultural Organization. Crop yields were only one-third to one-half normal levels in some of the worst areas. Many aid agencies expect to re-open intensive feeding centers in several months when malnutrition rises, as it always does during the annual "hunger gap" period of June to September. Some locations already are reporting nearly 40 percent malnutrition among children.

Violence continues to disrupt relief efforts. Humanitarian access to Upper Nile Province remains limited due to security concerns; thousands of people have fled from that area in recent months in search of assistance. Government-backed militia have increased their destructive raids in parts of Bahr el-Ghazal Province since mid-January , posing a greater danger to local residents and relief workers alike. A militia raid on January 29 killed ten people, including a local aid worker, according to reports. A series of raids in early February burned 12 villages, aid workers have reported. A militia attack on February 4 killed 14 people and hundreds of children and women were abducted, sources state.

The flawed cease-fire in Bahr el-Ghazal Province fails to cover these militia attacks. As a result, government-supported militia are free to repeat their strategy of last year: force residents to flee their farms, bum crops and food storage sites to ensure starvation, steal cattle and destroy the livelihood of local communities, abduct children to break the will of the population, and impede international relief efforts. In January alone, relief workers temporarily evacuated their posts 27 times due to security concerns, primarily in Bahr el- Ghazal Province, according to OLS. Aid agencies have reduced their staff at project sites as a precautionary security measure. Bombings of relief sites by Sudan government planes (discussed earlier in this testimony) continue unabated and pose another danger to relief efforts.

Even when aid workers are willing and able to overcome these dangers, the government of Sudan is capable, with the stroke of a pen, of halting international aid deliveries. Mr. Chairman, it was exactly one year ago, during February and March 1998, that the government in Khartoum enforced a ban on most OLS aid flights to Bahr el-Ghazal Province. The action effectively condemned to death the people in that famine~stricken area.

It is important to understand that last year's flight ban was not an aberration. Sudanese officials regard humanitarian aid as a weapon and have imposed similar flight bans virtually every year since OLS was established in 1989:

* In 1989, the Sudan government halted all OLS food flights after the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) protested the government's bombing of a humanitarian site;

* In September 1995, the Sudan government halted virtually all flights by large OLS cargo planes for the rest of the year;

* In January-July 1996, the Sudan government continued to halt all flights by large OLS cargo planes and denied OLS access to many areas that had previously been agreed to;

* In 1996, the Sudan government denied flight clearance "to locations severely affected by the spread of cholera and diarrhea disease," a UN agency reported;

* In mid-1996 to mid-1997, the Sudan government prohibited aid flights to an average of 17 locations each month;

* In March 1997, the Sudan government repeatedly blocked aid flights to Equatoria Province and denied flight clearance to 33 locations in Bahr el-Ghazal Province;

* In April-May 1997, the Sudan government barred all aid flights by WFP and UNICEF for a three-week period.

This is the factual record. Given this brazen history, U.S. and UN policy-makers should be prepared when Sudanese authorities impose new flight bans at crucial moments in the future, as they inevitably will if this war continues. International officials are only fooling themselves if they expect that the Sudan government's current cooperation with OLS relief efforts will continue.

In addition to flight bans, the Sudan government often blocks basic assessments of humanitarian needs on the ground. In 1997, the government blocked UN relief workers from conducting assessments of humanitarian needs at 11 of 25 locations for six months, despite earlier agreements to allow such assessments. Currently, the Sudan government continues to prohibit a UN humanitarian assessment in rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, where the humanitarian situation is believed to be grim due to systematic attacks by the government military and the area's extreme isolation.

Humanitarian Assistance Recommendations

1. Be prepared to declare that southern Sudan is a "humanitarian autonomous zone" for purposes of delivering humanitarian relief whenever and wherever such relief is required.

Although the Sudan government is currently cooperating with OLS aid efforts, the past ten years have amply demonstrated the Sudan government's readiness to block aid to southern Sudan for its own political and military reasons (see above). In the first two months of 1999, Sudanese officials blocked OLS aid flights to 14 locations, and continues to deny aid flights to numerous locations in March.

The UN, with U.S. leadership, should be prepared to declare that southern Sudan is a "humanitarian autonomous zone" for purposes of delivering humanitarian relief wherever such relief is required. Declaration of a "humanitarian autonomous zone" would provide a legal umbrella for humanitarian aid deliveries regardless of the Sudan government's permission or non-permission. Establishment of a "humanitarian autonomous zone" signifies that the death toll in southern Sudan is so catastrophic and humanitarian conditions there are so deplorable that the international community is prepared to take extraordinary steps to ensure absolute humanitarian access.

2. Redouble efforts to gain humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains region.

Much of the Nuba Mountains area of central Sudan remains cut off from the outside world. Food shortages, fighting, and harsh resettlement policies imposed by the Sudan government continue to afflict the Nuba region. The government for years has prohibited all outside humanitarian aid to rebel-held areas of Nuba. An estimated quarter-million ethnic Nubans live in rebel-controlled areas and warrant international humanitarian assistance.

Sudanese authorities have reneged on their earlier agreement to allow OLS to conduct a humanitarian assessment in rebel-held areas of Nuba. The U.S. and the UN should intensify efforts to reach Nuba with aid.

3. Maintain strong support for Sudan emergency relief programs operated by OLS as well as by non-OLS agencies.

The international community , led by the United States, responded belatedly but generously to last year's famine. Aid should continue during 1999. OLS has appealed to donors for $198 million in funding and food. Aid agencies working in southern Sudan independently of OLS should also receive strong international support.

In addition to food aid, funders should continue to fund road building to facilitate relief efforts and local economic growth. Programs to improve local food production and distribution should receive greater support.

4. Reform OLS in order to increase its effectiveness.

In its ten-year existence, OLS has broken new ground in international relief amid conflict. Nearly 40 UN and NGO agencies coordinate their activities under the OLS umbrella. Yet OLS has notable weaknesses.

OLS exists solely to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan. Yet last year's deadly famine occurred despite the presence of OLS. Officials of the Sudan government and, to a lesser extent, the SPLA rebels manipulate OLS for their own political and military purposes. OLS officials often fail to display the creativity and vocal leadership necessary to respond most effectively to the humanitarian challenges of southern Sudan.

U.S. officials should exert leadership in pressing for reforms to strengthen the OLS mandate, insulate it from manipulation by Sudanese government and SPLA authorities, and improve its internal management. For example, recommendations last year by a Joint Task Force of OLS agencies and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to improve the targeting of aid deliveries should be implemented. Recent expansion of OLS operations in the past year and upcoming personnel changes within OLS make this an opportune time for reform.

5. Undertake development programs in addition to emergency relief.

After 15 consecutive years of warfare and decades of neglect, southern Sudan is arguably the largest least developed place on earth. Most southern Sudanese live in utter isolation, with a striking lack of roads, schools, medical services, or technical skills.

Southern Sudan needs development assistance in addition to emergency relief aid. Relief programs must begin to incorporate a development component in order to succeed. Congress should continue to push USAID to expand its efforts in southern Sudan in projects such as road building, agriculture, animal husbandry , well-digging, education, and skills training. An entire generation of children is growing up without formal education. Given the extreme degradation in southern Sudan, development projects such as these are not diversions from emergency response-indeed, such development is sorely needed to facilitate emergency response.

* * *

In conclusion, Sudan's war cannot be resolved without the United States. The United States is already deeply involved in Sudan because of our interests. It is time to take the interests of the people of Sudan properly into account.

Before the Clinton Administration expires in 22 months, the United States should be a leader for effective peace in Sudan. That would be a legacy of which Americans, and the Clinton Administration, could be proud. Failure to do this will likely mean hundreds of thousand more dead Sudanese.