65 FR 41439, July 5, 2000 A-821-802 Sunset Review Public Document MEMORANDUM TO: Troy H. Cribb Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration FROM: Jeffrey A. May Director Office of Policy SUBJECT: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Sunset Review of Uranium from Russia; Final Results Summary: We have analyzed the comments and rebuttals of interested parties in the full sunset review of the suspended antidumping duty investigation covering uranium from Russia. We recommend that you approve the positions we have developed in the Discussion of the Issues section of this memorandum. Below is the complete list of the issues in this final results of full sunset review for which we received comments and rebuttals by parties: 1. Scope 2. Domestic industry response 3. Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping A. Weighted-average dumping margin B. Volume of imports C. Other Factors 4. Magnitude of the margin likely to prevail A. Margins from the investigation B. Use of a more recent margin C. Background: On February 28, 2000, the Department of Commerce (“the Department”) published in the Federal Register a notice of preliminary results of the full sunset review of the antidumping duty investigation on uranium from Russia (65 FR 10473) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (“the Act”). In our preliminary results, we found that termination of the agreement suspending the antidumping duty investigation would likely result in continuation or recurrence of dumping at a weighted- average margin of 115.82 percent for all producers/exporters from Russia. On March 15, 2000, we received a request from the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy ("Minatom"), AO Technsnabexport ("Tenex"), and Globe Nuclear Services and Supply GNSS, Limited ("GNSS") (collectively, "respondent interested parties") for an extension of time for filing rebuttal comments to case briefs until April 17, 2000. The Department agreed to extend the deadline to April 17, 2000. (1) On March 29, 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Uranium Producers (the "Ad Hoc Committee"), including Rio Algom Mining Corporation ("Rio Algom") and Uranium Resources Inc. ("URI"), and USEC, Inc., and its subsidiary, United States Enrichment Corporation (together, "USEC"), each requested a hearing in this review. On April 10, 2000, we received a case brief on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee and USEC. We also received a case brief on behalf of the Ad Hoc Utilities Group ("AHUG"), (2) and respondent interested parties. On April 14, 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee formally withdrew its March 29, 2000, request for a hearing in this review. On April 18, 2000, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(d), the Department received rebuttal comments from the Ad Hoc Committee, USEC, AHUG, and respondent interested parties. In its rebuttal, USEC also withdrew its March 29, 2000, request for a hearing. Therefore, the Department canceled the public hearing. We have addressed the comments received below. Discussion of the Issues In accordance with section 751(c)(1) of the Act, the Department conducted this sunset review to determine whether termination of the suspended antidumping duty investigation would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping. Section 752(c)(1) of the Act provides that, in making this determination, the Department shall consider the weighted- average dumping margins determined in the investigation and subsequent reviews and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise for the period before and the period after the issuance of the antidumping duty order or suspension agreement. In addition, section 752(c)(3) of the Act provides that the Department shall provide to the International Trade Commission ("the Commission") the magnitude of the margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order or suspension agreement is revoked. 1. Scope Interested Party Comments The Ad Hoc Committee states in its case brief that the Department properly confirmed that the scope of the Russian suspension agreement includes all forms of uranium, including highly enriched uranium ("HEU") and low enriched uranium ("LEU") derived from HEU (see April 10, 2000, case brief of the Ad Hoc Committee at 2). The Ad Hoc Committee urges the Department to reconfirm that HEU and LEU derived from HEU are within the scope of the agreement and the underlying investigation. Id. In its case brief, AHUG opposes the Department's preliminary determination and reiterates and incorporates by reference its comments filed with the Department on September 1, 1999, and September 13, 1999 (see April 10, 2000, case brief of AHUG at 2). Respondent interested parties argue in their case brief that the Department's implicit inclusion of Russian uranium ore enriched in third countries within the scope of the suspended investigation contradicts the language of the Russian suspension agreement (see April 10, 2000, case brief of respondent interested parties at 3). Respondent interested parties state that, as detailed in Section IV.M.1 of the Russian suspension agreement, and confirmed and ratified by Congress when it passed the USEC Privatization Act, the Russian suspension agreement does not restrict the importation of HEU, or LEU derived from HEU, from dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia. Id. at 2. Moreover, the temporary amendment to Section III of the Russian suspension agreement that provided for a two-year period that Russian uranium ore enriched in another country prior to importation into the United States would be considered uranium from Russia and subject to the suspension agreement has now expired and, therefore, such material cannot be considered Russian for purposes of the scope of the suspended investigation. Id. at 3. The Ad Hoc Committee rebuts Minatom's argument that the Russian suspension agreement excludes HEU, is contrary to the language of Section III of the suspension agreement, and is contradicted by the Department's October 30, 1992, Federal Register notice amending the preliminary determination and suspending the investigation (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal of the Ad Hoc Committee at 4-5). The Ad Hoc Committee reasserts that the scope of the underlying investigation and the suspension agreement on Russian uranium includes all forms of uranium produced in Russia, including HEU and LEU. Id. at 5. In addition, the Ad Hoc Committee states that Section IV.M.1 does not remove HEU from the scope of the suspension agreement, but merely permits Russia to sell HEU and derived LEU consistent with the terms of the HEU Agreement and the USEC Privatization Act. Id. Further, Section IV.M.2 simply prescribes the conditions under which HEU and derived LEU may be imported and sold; it does not exclude HEU from the scope of the suspension agreement. Id. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee states that, contrary to Minatom's argument that HEU is de facto outside the scope of the agreement, the Russian suspension agreement is the sole mechanism that permits Russian HEU- derived products to be imported at all, and it permits such importation only to the extent that it is consistent with the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons ("HEU Agreement"). Id. at 6. In addition, deliveries of HEU-derived products must meet the statutory test of preventing the suppression or undercutting of domestic prices under the USEC Privatization Act. Id. Thus, while Section IV.M.1 of the suspension agreement provides for the importation of HEU, the operation of that agreement does not remove HEU from the scope of the Russian suspension agreement. Id. In its rebuttal brief, USEC states that, because the Department amended its preliminary determination to include HEU within the scope of the suspended investigation in October 1992, HEU and LEU derived from HEU are explicitly covered by the suspension agreement (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal of USEC at 3). In fact, USEC adds, Section IV.M.1 of the suspension agreement specifically includes a reference to LEU derived from HEU, and Section IV.M.2 expressly speaks to the fact that the parties agreed to permit LEU derived from HEU to be imported under the suspension agreement. Id. Therefore, USEC asserts, while LEU derived from HEU may be entered and sold in the United States under certain conditions laid out in the Russian suspension agreement without regard to the quantitative limits in the suspension agreement, this does not mean that the merchandise is "beyond the reach" of the suspension agreement or suspended investigation. Id. Department's Position In response to the arguments of interested parties, we find it useful to summarize the history of the scope of the Russian suspension agreement. According to the June 3, 1992, preliminary determination, the suspended investigation encompassed one class or kind of merchandise. (3) The merchandise included natural uranium in the form of uranium ores and concentrates; natural uranium metal and natural uranium compounds; alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products, and mixtures containing natural uranium or natural uranium compound; uranium enriched in U235 and its compounds; alloys dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U235 or compounds or uranium enriched in U235; and any other forms of uranium within the same class or kind. The uranium subject to these investigations was provided for under subheadings 2612.10.00.00, 2844.10.10.00, 2844.10.20.10, 2844.10.20.25, 2844.10.20.50, 2844.10.20.55, 2844.10.50, 2844.20.00.10, 2844.20.00.20, 2844.20.00.30, and 2844.20.00.50 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"). (4) In addition, the Department preliminarily determined that highly-enriched uranium ("HEU") is not within the scope of the investigation. On October 30, 1992, the Department issued a suspension of the antidumping duty investigation of uranium from Russia and an amendment of the preliminary determination. (5) The notice amended the scope of the investigation to include HEU. (6) The merchandise covered by the agreement suspending the antidumping investigation on uranium from the Russian Federation included natural uranium in the form of uranium ores and concentrates; natural uranium metal and natural uranium compounds; alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products, and mixtures containing natural uranium or natural uranium compound; uranium enriched in U235 and its compounds; alloys dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtures containing uranium enriched in U235 or compounds or uranium enriched in U235; and any other forms of uranium within the same class or kind. In addition, Section III of the suspension agreement provides that uranium ore from Russia that is milled into U3O8 and/or converted into UF6 in another country prior to direct and/or indirect importation into the United States is considered uranium from Russia and is subject to the terms of the Russian agreement, regardless of any subsequent modification or blending. (7) Uranium enriched in U235 in another country prior to direct and/or indirect importation into the United States is not considered uranium from the Russian Federation and is not subject to the terms of the Russian agreement. Under the terms of suspension agreement HEU is within the scope of this investigation, and HEU is covered by this Russian suspension agreement. (HEU means uranium enriched to 20 percent or greater in the isotope uranium-235.) Imports of uranium ores and concentrates, natural uranium compounds, and all other forms of enriched uranium were classifiable under HTSUS subheadings 2612.10.00, 2844.10.20, 2844.20.00, respectively. Imports of natural uranium metal and forms of natural uranium other than compounds were classifiable under HTSUS subheadings 2844.10.10 and 2844.10.50. Id. In addition, Section M.1 of the Russian suspension agreement in no way prevents the Russian Federation from selling directly or indirectly any or all of the HEU in existence at the time of the signing of the agreement and/or LEU produced in Russia from HEU to the Department of Energy ("DOE"), its governmental successor, its contractors, assigns, or U.S. private parties acting in association with DOE or the USEC and in a manner not inconsistent with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation concerning the disposition of HEU resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia. There were three amendments to the agreement suspending the antidumping duty investigation on Russian uranium. In particular, the second amendment to the Russian suspension agreement, on November 4, 1996, permitted, among other things, the sale in the United States of Russian low-enriched uranium ("LEU") derived from HEU and included within the scope of the suspension agreement Russian uranium which has been enriched in a third country prior to importation into the United States. (8) According to the amendment, these modifications would remain in effect until October 3, 1998. (9) On August 6, 1999, USEC, Inc. and its subsidiary, United States Enrichment Corporation (collectively, "USEC") requested that the Department issue a scope ruling to clarify that enriched uranium located in Kazakstan at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is within the scope of the Russian suspension agreement. Respondent interested parties filed an opposition to the scope request on August 27, 1999. That scope request is pending before the Department at this time. We determine that the scope remains as described above. We find that it is not appropriate to evaluate scope issues or revise the scope language in the course of this sunset proceeding. Rather, issues of scope are appropriately raised as scope inquiries, which interested parties may request at any time. 2. Domestic Industry Support Interested Party Comments The Ad Hoc Committee agrees with the Department's preliminary determination that a complete substantive response from a single domestic interested party constitutes adequate domestic industry participation in this sunset review under 19 CFR 351.218(e)(1)(i) to warrant continuation of the review (see April 10, 2000, case brief of the Ad Hoc Committee at 2). The Ad Hoc Committee notes that its present members include Rio Algom, URI, Cotter Corporation ("Cotter"), Everest Exploration, Inc. ("Everest"), and ConverDyn, all of which are domestic interested parties under 19 USC 1677(9)(c) and 19 CFR 351.102(b). Id. USEC concurs with the Department's preliminary determination that the response of the domestic uranium industry demonstrates more than adequate support for the continuation of the Russian suspension agreement (see April 10, 2000, case brief of USEC at 2). Respondent interested parties assert that only two entities, each with questionable interested-party status, entered an appearance in this proceeding on behalf of the domestic industry; therefore, the Department should revisit its preliminary determination. Respondent interested parties assert that, although the Department claims that it had sufficient participation from the domestic industry to find its participation adequate, the Department has not specified the basis upon which it proceeded with the review and, further, has not responded to respondent interested parties' challenges to the status of each of the domestic parties (see April 10, 2000, case brief of respondent interested parties at 4). Respondent interested parties note that USEC was not a party to this case at the time of initiation or at the time the investigation was suspended and, further, USEC publically states that its primary business is supplying uranium enrichment services to electric utility companies and that substantially all of its revenue is derived from the sale of such services. Id. at 4-5. Respondent interested parties state that customers supply natural uranium to be enriched, and USEC provides enrichment services utilizing that feedstock; under the Department's regulations, such activity is not considered domestic production. Id. at 5. In addition, respondent interested parties state that USEC in its role of "Executive Agent" under the HEU Agreement, imports substantial quantities of enriched uranium from Russia which is recovered from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Id. Thus, even if USEC were a U.S. producer, as a major importer of Russian uranium, USEC's substantive response to the Department in this review should have been disregarded. Id. USEC's conduct in pursuing this action against imports of Russian uranium while substantially benefitting from imports of Russian uranium under the HEU Agreement obviates any legitimate right it has to complain. Id. Finally, respondent interested parties contend that USEC holds a significant amount of uranium inventory in the United States which it acquired as part of its privatization; there is no domestic production component involved in this inventory. Id. at 5-6. Therefore, respondent interested parties assert, USEC's inventory alone cannot provide it with a basis for domestic interested-party status and its responses to the Department do not provide a legal basis upon which to proceed with the sunset review in this case. Id. Respondent interested parties also note that the only other party other than USEC that came forward in this proceeding was the Ad Hoc Committee - thirteen U.S. mining interests at the time the uranium cases were initiated - only two of which joined the sunset review. Id. at 6. Respondent interested parties note that URI is a small U.S. operation with 54 employees, and which has stated publicly that it had shut down its production operations, was attempting to sell its assets, and that it was unlikely to be able to continue as a going concern. Id. In addition, respondent interested parties state that the only other member of the Ad Hoc Committee, Rio Algom, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Canadian mining company, which produced less than 25 percent of U.S. uranium in 1998, and only five percent in 1997. Id. at 7. Respondent interested parties argue that this one uranium producer should not be allowed to pursue this action in the face of active opposition from numerous other domestic interested parties, including AHUG. Id. Thus, such failure of the domestic industry to come forward constitutes a negative response to continuation of the proceeding. Id Finally, respondent interested parties assert that, although the Department will normally conclude that domestic interested parties have provided adequate response to a notice of initiation where it receives a complete substantive response from at least one domestic interested party, the instant proceeding is far from a "normal case." Id. Because significant changes have occurred in the domestic industry since the initiation of the original investigation, there was never a finding of domestic industry support in the case against Russia, and this case was suspended prior to the changes in the law, this sunset review requires a measurable show of support by the domestic industry for the case to proceed. Id. at 7-8. Moreover, a determination of domestic industry support would be inconsistent with the WTO Antidumping Agreement. Id. at 8. Without interest from the other elements of the U.S. industry, including U.S. converters and fabricators, respondent interested parties assert that the Department should not proceed to its final results unless it receives an affirmative showing of adequate support from the domestic industry as a whole. Id. In its rebuttal, the Ad Hoc Committee reasserts that, under the Department's regulations, the Department must conduct a full review because has received responses from more than one domestic interested party (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal of the Ad Hoc Committee at 7). The Ad Hoc Committee argues that there is no legal basis for disqualifying U.S. producers such as URI because they are small and struggling or, as with Rio Algom, has foreign parents (the Ad Hoc Committee notes that Rio Algom is only a U.S. uranium producer with a parent company that has no uranium mining interests in Canada). Id at 8. Furthermore, according to the Ad Hoc Committee, USEC is a domestic producer in this review as defined in 19 USC 1677(9)(C), because it is a U.S. manufacturer of enriched uranium, a domestic like product. Id. at 9. The Ad Hoc Committee asserts that, because consumers are not within the definition of domestic interested parties, as defined in section 1677(9), AHUG's opposition to the sunset review is irrelevant to the Department's decision to conduct the review. Id. Further, the Ad Hoc Committee argues that the statutory and regulatory provisions established in the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement ("URAA") for the purpose of determining if a petition has been filed by or on behalf of the domestic industry specifically apply only to initial investigations; they do not apply to the Department's adequacy determination in sunset reviews. Id. In fact, the statute itself provides that the industry support requirements of 1673a(c)(4) are not to be revisited after initiation, making clear their inapplicability to sunset determinations. Id. at 10. Moreover, the Department has held that subsequent changes in the law due to the URAA do not retroactively invalidate a proceeding lawfully conducted under the antidumping statute before the URAA was enacted. Id. The Ad Hoc Committee also contends that, with respect to Minatom's reading of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, because Russia is not a member of the WTO, its rights under the agreement are somehow diminished. Id. In addition, it is U.S. law, not the WTO, that controls the Department's conduct of this review. Id. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee concludes, a sunset review is not an opportunity to reopen questions of standing; information beyond the threshold question of whether the members of the Ad Hoc Committee and USEC are domestic producers willing to submit information and participate in the sunset review is immaterial to the Department's likelihood analysis. Id. Therefore, the Ad Hoc Committee argues, the Department should reject Minatom's arguments and affirm its determination in its Preliminary Results. In its rebuttal, USEC argues that it qualifies as a "producer" of enriched uranium and is clearly part of the domestic industry, and the fact that it imports uranium under the Russian HEU Agreement does not mean that its views as a domestic producer should be disregarded. USEC asserts that, because it is a domestic producer of enriched uranium, a domestic like product, USEC is by definition a domestic interested party and, as such, is entitled to participate in this sunset review (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal of USEC at 5). USEC contends that as an indisputable producer of enriched uranium in the United States it qualifies in this proceeding as a domestic interested party. Id. at 6. In fact, USEC claims that it is the only commercial producer of enriched uranium in the United States. Id. In addition, USEC notes that the Commission dismissed as spurious past attempts to portray USEC as a mere "service" provider rather than a producer as in the preliminary determination in Uranium from the U.S.S.R. Further, the Department itself has recognized that uranium enrichers are producers, as USEC (and its predecessor, the DOE) has participated in this proceeding and in the Russian suspension agreement as a domestic party for over seven years. Id. Finally, USEC refutes Minatom's suggestion that USEC be disqualified because of its status as an importer. USEC contends that it is an importer of Russian LEU derived from HEU because it has been assigned that responsibility as the U.S. Executive Agent under the HEU Agreement, pursuant to which, for national security reasons, USEC purchases the enrichment component of Russian enriched uranium for resale under existing USEC customer contracts. Id. at 7. More significantly, USEC adds, a test to determine domestic industry support for a petition is not relevant in the sunset review; rather, the Department has the discretion under the statutory provision cited by Minatom to disregard the view of domestic producers who are also importers of the subject merchandise. Id. In this case, USEC supports the continuation of the suspension agreement and, accordingly, there is no basis for applying that provision here. Id. Department's Position We agree with the domestic interested parties that the industry support requirements are inapplicable to sunset reviews beyond the adequacy determination. As we stated in our preliminary results, the Department normally will not analyze and evaluate standing and industry support in the course of a sunset review. The Department's mandate in a sunset review is to determine whether termination of the suspended investigation is likely to result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping, and it is clear in the statute that a complete substantive response from one domestic interested party would be considered adequate for purposes of continuing the review. Therefore, given that we received a complete substantive response from at least one member of the domestic industry, in accordance with section 351.218(e)(1)(i) of the regulations, we determine that we have adequate domestic industry participation. 3. Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping: Interested Party Comments: In its case brief, the Ad Hoc Committee states that the Department properly found that the continuation or recurrence of dumping is a likely result of revoking the Russian suspension agreement and underlying investigation (see April 10, 2000, case brief of the Ad Hoc Committee at 3). Specifically, the Ad Hoc Committee states that the Department correctly held that market conditions are such that removal of restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement will likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping in light of the (1) fungible, commodity nature of uranium and the fact that it is sold primarily based on price, so the removal of the Russian agreement's restrictions would result in an increase in Russian imports and a decrease in subject import prices; (2) restricted access of Russian uranium to European and Asian markets; (3) existence of significant Russian uranium production capacity; (4) devaluation of the Russian ruble; and (5) continued underselling of "restricted" western origin uranium by "unrestricted" Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS") origin uranium since the Russian agreement went into effect. Id. In its case brief, USEC concurs with the Department's findings in its preliminary determination. Specifically, USEC states that (1) the sunset review process is not the appropriate forum for reconsideration of the respondent's non-market economy status; (2) the removal of the suspension agreement would likely increase the availability and supply of Russian uranium in the U.S. market; (3) third country markets in Asia and the EU are not completely open to Russian uranium products, increasing the probability that Russian products will be exported to the United States; and (4) the continued distinction between the prices for restricted and unrestricted uranium products contradicts respondent's argument that it would not sell at below-market prices (see April 10, 2000, case brief of USEC at 2-3). Respondent interested parties argue, in their case brief, that the Department does not make clear in its preliminary results its methodology for determining good cause to consider "other factors" in assessing the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping (see April 10, 2000, case brief of respondent interested parties at 8). Respondent interested parties contend that the Department has used the factors submitted for the purpose of showing good cause and in completing the parties' initial substantive findings as "other factors," but has failed to give the parties a full opportunity to complete the record with respect to such factors. Id. at 9. In addition, respondent interested parties contend that the Department does not appear to have structured its decision based upon what the SAA states as good cause to consider "other factors" (market share of foreign producers subject to the antidumping proceeding, changes in exchange rates, inventory levels, production capacity, and capacity utilization, any history of sales below cost of production, changes in manufacturing technology in the industry; and prevailing prices in relevant markets). Id. Rather, the Department states only that it considered the arguments presented by the interested parties with respect to a variety of market and economic factors. Id. Further, respondent interested parties assert that, if the Department did not intend to collect additional information but to limit information on "other factors" to what was already included with the initial submissions, it should have given the parties specific guidance as to how it planned to assess the likelihood of dumping prior to the filing of the initial submissions rather than keep its conduct of the case as speculative. Id. Respondent interested parties also contend that, contrary to the Department's statement in its preliminary results, the sunset proceeding is precisely the forum within which to examine the market-economy status of Russia; it involves a distinctly different country that no longer operates under the same government or economic system as the Soviet Union and involves radical changes directly affecting issues of pricing and fair value comparisons under the antidumping duty law, all of which prohibit the Department from treating the Russian uranium sector as nonmarket in this sunset proceeding. Id. at 10. Respondent interested parties argue that the Department ignores the unique and significant change of circumstances of this case that would lead the Department to conclude a likelihood of dumping in the absence of the suspension agreement. Id. at 12. Namely, the Department ignores the effects of stagnation in demand and the rapid increase in the available supply of uranium in the U.S. and world markets, which have resulted in declining prices; an emphasis on cost cutting measures; a general integration and contraction of users and producers; active participation in the market by a host of different entities; and, the fact that the supply of uranium in the United States and on the world market is largely controlled either by USEC, under the USEC Privatization Act, or by the United States Government through agreements with Russia. Id. at 11. Further, respondent interested parties contend that the Department ignores the progress of the Russian economy as a whole, including the movement of the Russian uranium industry towards a market status, the changes in the U.S. domestic market producing uranium (including the privatization of USEC), and the extensive foreign policy effort of the United States to encourage the purchase and commercial use of weapons- grade uranium from Russian stockpiles. Id. Because the dumping margin found in the preliminary determination in the investigation was based solely upon allegations of activity that took place under the former Soviet Union, and because the Department never conducted an independent investigation of Russia after Russia established itself as an independent republic, no record evidence exists to support a finding that dumping of Russian uranium would continue or recur. Id. at 12. Citing Techsnabexport v. United States, respondent interested parties assert that the fact that the U.S. Court of International Trade (the "CIT") permitted the Department to continue the U.S.S.R. uranium case against the successor republics of the Soviet Union is not evidence of an endorsement of the Department's decision to do so. Id. Rather, in going forward the CIT indicated that the agency was under an obligation to make the process fair, stating that presumably the republics have been given the opportunity to provide republic-specific data which was statutorily sufficient. Id. Further, the CIT made clear that it was not approving the Department's conduct of the proceeding, and indicated that the question of whether the Department adjusted its procedures properly in light of the changes resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union was not at issue in the case before it, and that it did not even have the jurisdiction to make such a determination at that time. Id. at 13. Respondent interested parties assert that, contrary to the arguments of the domestic interested parties, Russia will not market aggressively if there are no restrictions on its imports. Instead, termination of the suspended investigation would only put Russia on equal footing with the uranium producers worldwide, and enable Russia to compete with all other players in the market. However, the key facts of worldwide overcapacity and static consumption would not change, and unrestricted Russian exports would not materially affect overall market conditions. Respondent interested parties reassert that Russia has a strong intent to obtain market prices for uranium it already holds in this country, and contends that it is disingenuous for the Department to claim in its preliminary results that, while it fully acknowledges that restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement may have resulted in the price distinction and, knowing that Russian uranium prices are controlled by the suspension agreement in a way that requires that they be lower than the restricted market in the United States, uncontested pricing information submitted by domestic interested parties demonstrates the difference between restricted and unrestricted prices since the conclusion of the suspension agreement. Id. Instead, Russian-origin uranium unencumbered by Department restrictions would sell in the United States at full market prices. Id. Respondent interested parties also argue that there is no evidentiary support - other than unsupported assertions by domestic interested parties with respect to the Asian market - for the Department's suggestion that Russia is likely to dump uranium into the United States if restrictions are lifted because other markets are closed to its exports. Id. at 14. They contend that, while the European Union has limited restrictions on uranium from CIS countries, generally, there is still a substantial European market available to Russian uranium imports. Id. The fact that there may be additional Russian capacity available for sales to the United States absent the restrictions imposted by the suspension agreement is no measure of likelihood of future dumping; that supply is already available on the world market and any additional supply Russia might be able to export to the U.S. market is easily matched by any of a number of other market participants who are currently selling in the United States without restriction, and by USEC's own stockpiles. Id. As it is, Russia is not selling uranium to the United States today at levels permitted under the existing suspension agreement; thus, it cannot be assumed that lifting the agreement is going to suddenly change its level of exports. Id. at 15. Finally, respondent interested parties conclude that purchasing decisions are based almost exclusively on price, and dismiss the utilities' statements that factors other than price influence their purchasing decisions. Id. at 15. Respondent interested parties contend that the United States has no right to restrict imports of uranium simply to protect price levels in the United States; restricting supply to protect the U.S. uranium industry is not the purpose of the antidumping law or the sunset procedure. Id. Rather, if increased imports are the Department’s concern, a more appropriate remedy is for the parties to seek relief under Section 201 et. seq. of the Trade Act of 1974, not the dumping laws. Id. In its rebuttal, the Ad Hoc Committee states that the statute indicates that the Department must find only likelihood of resumed or continued dumping; accordingly, because dumping is a likely outcome following termination of the suspension agreement, the Department correctly determined that the suspension agreement may not be terminated (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal brief of the Ad Hoc Committee at 11). The Ad Hoc Committee argues that the Department clearly articulated its test for determining when good cause exists to warrant consideration of additional information placed on the record in this sunset review. The Ad Hoc Committee asserts that, contrary to Minatom's allegations, the Department specifically considered other factors such as the fact that uranium is a fungible commodity product sold principally on the basis of price, the price distinction between "restricted" western-origin uranium and "unrestricted" CIS-origin uranium, the limited access of Russian and other CIS-origin uranium to European and Asian markets, the size of Russian uranium production capacity and the devaluation of the Russian ruble. Id. at 12-13. Thus, the Ad Hoc Committee contends, the basis of the Department's determination to consider this information was both clear and lawful. Id. at 13. With respect to Minatom's statement that the Department made no effort to collect new information to support its preliminary results, the Ad Hoc Committee asserts that the Department's regulations unambiguously state that information or evidence that a party wishes the Department to consider in a sunset review must be submitted in the party's substantive response to the notice of initiation. Id. Thus, the Ad Hoc Committee argues that, to place new information on the record is untimely and should be rejected, because the onus is on the parties, not the Department, to obtain and put forth the relevant information Id. With respect to Minatom's assertion that the Department did not offer the parties specific guidance on assessing likelihood of dumping prior to the filing of the initial submissions, the Ad Hoc Committee asserts that the Department's regulations and precedent are very clear as to the manner in which it will assess the likelihood of the continuation or recurrence of dumping. Id. at 14. Indeed, the Department considered the information that interested parties placed on the record, including information regarding a variety of market and economic factors. With respect to the Department's rejection of Minatom's arguments for reconsideration of Russian's non-market economy, the Ad Hoc Committee asserts that the Department should again reject Minatom's arguments for reason discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee's September 13, 1999, rebuttal response. Id. First, Article XIII of the Russian suspension agreement specifically permits Russia's market-economy status to be considered within the context of the suspension agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee asserts that Minatom could have raised this issue at any time since 1992, but has not done so; thus, Minatom cannot now reasonably plead unfairness after it has failed to avail itself of the procedures for considering this issue. Id. at 15. Second, the Ad Hoc Committee contends that Russia's economic status is not, in any event, relevant to the Department's likelihood determination of the continuation or recurrence of dumping. Id. This would require recalculating a margin using the methodologies appropriate for market economies, which would nonetheless be irrelevant to the Department's likelihood analysis because it would reflect the effects of the suspension agreement without indicating whether dumping is likely without the suspension agreement in place. Id. The Ad Hoc Committee states that the Department properly considered all information submitted on the record; the fact that there may be more than one likely outcome following the termination of a suspension agreement does not mandate a termination. Id. Further, there is no record evidence to support Minatom's assertion that, because the Department allegedly did not conduct an independent investigation, there is no record evidence to support a finding of likelihood. The Ad Hoc Committee notes that the Department publicly announced that it would continue its investigation of uranium from the U.S.S.R. with respect to the Russia and the CIT held that the Department adequately notified the Russia and the other former Soviet republics of the investigation. Thus, uranium from Russia was investigated by the Department and the procedural history of the underlying investigation does not preclude the Department from determining that dumping is a likely outcome of the termination of the suspended investigation. Id. 16-17. Moreover, the Ad Hoc Committee asserts, this sunset review is not the appropriate forum from Minatom's complaints about alleged procedural defects in the underlying investigation. Minatom had the opportunity to request continuation of the investigation under 19 U.S.C. 1673(g) and seek a final determination, and it also had a full opportunity to participate and submit information in the investigation but failed to do so despite extensive efforts by the Department to obtain such information. Id. at 17. Thus, Minatom cannot argue that procedural deficiencies during the investigation invalidate the preliminary LTFV rate for Russia. Id. The Ad Hoc Committee asserts that Minatom fails to show why such information on the various conditions and trends related to the U.S. and worldwide uranium markets - including changes in the politico-economic status of Russia, the end of the Cold War, the development of uranium resources in Canada and Australia, the deregulation of U.S. utilities, the Asian economic crisis, the effects of changes in supply and demand on uranium prices, the general integration and contraction of uranium users and producers, and the role of USEC in the U.S. market - is relevant to the Department's determination in this sunset review. Id. Although the future likely impact of Russian imports on the U.S. industry and domestic prices may be relevant to the International Trade Commission's analysis in this sunset review, these factors are not relevant to the question of whether, in the absence of this suspension agreement, such Russian imports likely to be unfairly traded. Id. The Ad Hoc Committee also argues that, if Minatom were able to compete in the U.S. market without dumping, Minatom could have sought to amend the agreement to a non-quantitative agreement under section 734(b) that eliminates dumping. Id. at 18. However, because Minatom took no steps to amend or terminate the agreement, it is not unreasonable for the Department to apply the only calculated margin in this proceeding. Id. The Ad Hoc Committee states that, although Minatom argues that the suspension agreement depressed the price for Russian uranium, the under- pricing of CIS uranium was observed in the fourth quarter of 1992, immediately after the institution of the suspension agreements, and before the uranium market learned how the Department would administer the agreements. Id. The ability of U.S. prices to rise above the lower prices for Russian and other CIS-origin uranium, an increase that created the price differential, was a result of the quantity of limits of the agreements - limits that existed before the matched sales provisions were adopted in 1994. Id. Further, even if Russian uranium prices were to rise, there is no indication that these prices would be above normal value and would, therefore, be fairly traded. Id. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee argues that, with respect to Minatom's criticism of the Department's recognition that Russian uranium imports are restricted from entering the European markets and that uranium is a fungible commodity product that is primarily solely based on price, it is Minatom, not the Department, which lacks any evidentiary support for its position. Id. at 19. The Commission recently reached these very conclusions in the investigation of Uranium from Kazakhstan. Id. Minatom has not pointed to any information indicating that there is no likelihood of dumping after termination of the suspension agreement and most of the information relied by Minatom are without merit and irrelevant to the Department's analysis. Id. In its rebuttal, USEC refutes Minatom's complaint that the Department in its preliminary results (1) did not make clear what test it has used for determining when "good cause" exists for it to consider "other factors" in assessing the likelihood of dumping in this proceeding; (2) made no effort to collect new information beyond what was presented by the parties or was already in the record; (3) should have used the sunset review to revisit Russia's non-market economy status; and (4) articulated no rational basis for "disregarding" the other factors cited by Minatom (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal brief of USEC at 8). Further, USEC cites the SAA, which states that a determination is inherently predictive and speculative, and so long as there is a reasonable basis for the conclusion that a possible likely outcome is the continuation or recurrence of dumping, the order or suspended investigation will be continued. Id. at 9. USEC asserts that, in this case, U.S. sales prices and import volumes are not necessarily indicative of the likelihood of future dumping and, therefore, the Department made a "good cause" finding to consider the "other factors" raised by interested parties. Id. at 10. Clearly, the Department considered all other factors that Minatom brought to its attention. Id. In addition, USEC contends that, contrary to Minatom's assertions, the Department in its preliminary results clearly addressed the information and arguments advanced by all of the interested parties and explained the bases for its conclusion that removal of the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement will likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping. Id. USEC notes the factors that the Department identified as supporting its conclusion, such as: uranium as a fungible commodity; price purchasing decisions; possible increase in the supply of Russian uranium imports in the US market; the closure of EU and Asian markets; Russia's significant unused capacity; the fact that Minatom does not need to sell below market to obtain U.S. market share, and changes that have taken place in the worldwide uranium market in the 1990s. Id. Further, USEC argues that the Department's regulations and procedures provided all parties with notice and a full opportunity to identify and provide factual support for any "other factors" that a party believed the Department should consider in making its likelihood determination. Further, the Department's regulations make clear that a party's substantive response is the appropriate vehicle to submit any information that it wants the Department to consider. Accordingly, the Department based its preliminary determination on information already in the record, and there was no reason or basis for the Department to have had to undertake an independent effort to collect new information to support its preliminary results. Id. at 13. It is impossible for the Department to provide more specific guidance as to how it plans to assess the likelihood of dumping in any particular case. Id. With respect to the Department's decision not to use the uranium sunset review as a forum for revisiting Russia's non-market economy status, USEC highlights the major points of discussion in its rebuttal of September 13, 1999, as points of agreement, as found in the preliminary results. Id. at 14-15. USEC contends that Minatom's brief does not address these rebuttal points, but merely reiterates its position that such reconsideration should have been undertaken in this sunset review. Id. at 15. Regarding Minatom's discussion of market conditions and trends, USEC asserts that the Department clearly considers the alleged changes. In addition, USEC notes that, in its September 13, 1999, rebuttal, it pointed out the effect of the termination of the suspension agreement on the U.S. market is an issue for the Commission to resolve. Further, Minatom's response is irrelevant to the issue of likelihood and, indeed, Minatom did not even attempt to suggest such a linkage. Id. at 17. In fact, much of Minatom's discussion of this topic in its April 10, brief suffers from the same defect of confusing the Department's determination of likelihood of dumping and the Commission's focus on market impact. Id. Finally, regarding Minatom's attempt to reiterate its view that no conclusions about Russia's future pricing behavior can be drawn from the price distinctions between unrestricted and restricted uranium in the U.S. market, USEC states that the most relevant information presented in this proceeding is Russia's significant underutilized enrichment capacity and its willingness to utilize that capacity to re-enrich depleted tails at prices well below the economic benefit of new commercial enrichment business at current market prices. Id. at 18. USEC contends that these facts are undisputed by the Russian parties and, on this information alone, the Department's preliminary results are justified. Department's Position We agree with the interested parties that, in the instant sunset review, the observed patterns regarding U.S. sales prices and import volumes pursuant to the suspension agreement are not necessarily indicative of the likelihood of future dumping. Although we have not conducted an administrative review of the suspension agreement, the Department has monitored imports of Russian uranium to ensure consistent compliance with the terms of the agreement and, accordingly, we considered the volume of imports for the period before and after the suspended investigation. Specifically, we examined statistics that the respondent interested parties provided on uranium exports from the Russian Federation for 1990 and 1994-1998, excluding HEU material which they claimed is not covered by the suspended investigation. This information demonstrates that import volumes have fluctuated over the life of the agreement. Therefore, in order to examine the likelihood of future dumping we determined to consider the additional information submitted by interested parties. Further, we agree with the Ad Hoc Committee that the statute indicates that the Department must in a sunset review only find likelihood of recurrence or continued dumping. We determined, in this case, that without the discipline of the suspension agreement in place, there is a likelihood of recurrence or continued dumping. Our determination was not made solely on the basis of observed patterns regarding U.S. sales prices and import volumes pursuant to the suspension agreement. Instead, the Department structured its decision based upon the SAA language which clearly provide, upon a showing of good cause, for consideration of "other factors" as stated above insofar as they affect the likelihood of future dumping. For instance, in considering the bases for purchasing decisions and pricing information the Department has taken into account the fungibility of uranium, the post-suspension agreement distinction between the unrestricted/restricted uranium markets, including access to the EU and Asian markets, the existence of significant Russian capacity, and the devaluation of the Russian ruble. As stated in our preliminary results, we considered the arguments presented by the interested parties with respect to a variety of market and economic factors. We agree with the Ad Hoc Committee that uranium is a highly fungible commodity and that, therefore, purchasing decisions are based almost exclusively on price in addition to supply diversification and reliability, flexibility in quantities of supply, and payment and delivery terms. Further, all of the interested parties acknowledge the post-suspension agreement distinction between the unrestricted/restricted uranium markets. While AHUG and respondent interested parties argued that removal of the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement would cause the price of Russian uranium to rise, the Ad Hoc Committee and USEC argued that removal of the restrictions would create an oversupply thereby causing prices to fall. While we agree that the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement may have resulted in the price distinction, we do not agree that removal of the restrictions will necessarily cause the price of Russian uranium to rise. As noted in our preliminary results, the basic laws of supply and demand suggest that an increase in supply, all else being equal, will result in a decrease in the price. We find that this model of supply and demand is adequate for the purpose of predicting future likelihood: with the removal of the restrictions, a likely outcome would be the increase in availability and supply of Russian uranium in the U.S. market. With respect to the restrictions on access to the EU and Asian markets, while we agree that the information presented by the parties indicates that the EU and Asian markets are not closed to Russian uranium, we also agree that these markets are not completely open to Russian uranium. Additionally, the respondent interested parties did not dispute the existence of significant Russian capacity but, rather, AHUG argues that Russian inventories are not as large as domestic interested parties would have us believe. In response to arguments that the devaluation of the Russian ruble has created a strong inducement for Russia to earn hard currency by increasing exports at below-market prices, the respondent interested parties argue that this hypothesis makes no business, economic, or common sense, and they assert that Russia does not need to sell below market because it can obtain market prices for its uranium. This assertion is contradicted, however, by uncontested pricing information submitted by domestic interested parties demonstrating the difference between the restricted and unrestricted prices since the conclusion of the suspension agreement. We agree with the domestic interested parties that, as noted in the SAA at 883, the determination called for in these types of reviews is inherently predictive and speculative and that there may be more than one likely outcome following termination. Although we acknowledge the changes that have taken place in the worldwide uranium market during the 1990s, we do not agree with the arguments submitted by respondent interested parties or the AHUG that conditions have changed to such an extent that termination of the suspension agreement and underlying investigation is not likely to result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping. The arguments outlined above indicated that the market conditions are such that the removal of the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement will likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping. Although we agree that there have been many factors that have affected the worldwide uranium market, including the politic-economic status of Russia, the end if the Cold War, the development of uranium resources in Canada and Australia, the deregulation of U.S. utilities, market access to the European and Asian markets, pricing information and trends, the general integration and contraction of uranium users and producers, and the role of USEC in the U.S. market. However, while these factors may influence the worldwide uranium market, we do not agree with respondent interested parties that they do not provide sufficient evidence to the Department with respect to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping or, specifically, that they will affect the ability of U.S. prices to rise above the lower prices for Russian uranium. Further, as the Ad Hoc Committee correctly notes, even if Russian uranium prices were to rise, there is no indication that these prices would be above normal value and would be fairly traded. Finally, we agree with the Ad Hoc Committee that the sunset review is not the appropriate forum for respondent interested parties' arguments for reconsideration of Russia's non-market economy status. Rather, as the Ad Hoc Committee properly observes, Article XIII of the Russian suspension agreement specifically permits Russia's market economy status to be considered within the context of the suspension agreement. Because respondent interested parties have not requested a reexamination of Russia's market economy status within the correct context of resuming the investigation, or in the course of an administrative review, they cannot now claim that the Department has failed to consider Russia's changing economy. Moreover, the CIT held that the Department adequately notified Russia and the other former Soviet republics of the investigation. In addition, although the Department may in the course of a sunset review request or collect new information to support a likelihood determination, we disagree with respondent interested parties' suggestion that the Department should have made more effort to collect new information. As stated in our preliminary results, an interested party that wishes the Department to consider new information or evidence may submit such information in its substantive response to the notice of initiation. As stated above, the Department is required in the context of a sunset review to determine the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. To reexamine Russia's economic status would not necessarily be indicative of the likelihood of future dumping. Because the determination called for in these types of reviews is inherently predictive and speculative, there may be more than one likely outcome following termination of the suspension agreement. We acknowledge the changes that have taken place in the worldwide uranium market during the 1990s, but we do not agree with the arguments submitted by respondent interested parties or AHUG that conditions have changed to such an extent that termination of the suspension agreement and underlying investigation is not likely to result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping. Therefore, we find that the market conditions are such that the removal of the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement will likely result in the continuation or recurrence of dumping. 4. Magnitude of the Margin Likely to Prevail Interested Party Comments The Ad Hoc Committee asserts, in its case brief, that the Department's decision to select the original margin is in accordance with the Sunset Policy Bulletin, which provides that, if the Department did not issue a final determination because an investigation was suspended, it may provide to the Commission the margin that was determined in the preliminary determination in the original investigation (see April 10, 2000, case brief of the Ad Hoc Committee at 4). Moreover, the original margin is the only margin available to the Department and calculating a new margin would involved undue speculation, which would be inaccurate in this case because the margin would inevitably reflect the effect of the restrictions under the Russian suspension agreement. Id. In its case brief, USEC agrees with the Department that the dumping margin in the preliminary phase of the underlying investigation is the only appropriate margin for the Department to use in this sunset review, and recalculating a dumping margin would require undue speculation by the Department (see April 10, 2000, case brief of USEC at 3). In their case brief, respondent interested parties assert that, since they have provided the Department with support for concluding that, if the suspended investigation were terminated, there is no significant likelihood of dumping by Russian uranium producers, the Department should find that there would be a zero dumping margin if the suspended investigation is terminated (see April 10, 2000, case brief of respondent interested parties at 15) . They contend that the preliminary finding of dumping was based on best information available ("BIA") in a procedure that was fundamentally flawed and, because circumstances have radically changed from those existing at the time the uranium case against the Soviet Union was conducted, the preliminary finding is valid for determining a dumping margin if the suspended investigation is terminated. Id. Respondent interested parties argue that reliance on this margin is unreasonable in this case because the original rate does not reflect the behavior of the Russian exporter, but of the former government and centrally-planned economy of the Soviet Union. Id. at 16. In it its rebuttal, the Ad Hoc Committee contends that the Department should reject Minatom's arguments and reassert that the Department's methodology for selecting a margin is very clear, and entirely consistent with the statute and the SAA (see April 18, 2000, rebuttal of the Ad Hoc Committee at 21). It is the only margin on the record of this proceeding and the only margin that reflects the behavior of exporters and importers of Russian uranium without the discipline of the suspension agreement. Further, the fact that the margin was based on BIA in the underlying investigation does not bar the Department from utilizing it as an indicator of the magnitude of dumping likely to continue or recur upon termination. Id. Finally, the Department provided the Russian respondent more than ample opportunity to provide country-specific data which was statutorily sufficient, and Minatom could have continued the investigation and appealed the results to the CIT, or terminated the suspension agreement and asked the Department to continue the investigation. Id. at 22. In its rebuttal comments, USEC argues that Minatom's arguments ignore Department policy and practice which make clear that the Department will provide the Commission with the margin that was calculated in the preliminary determination in the investigation, even if that margin was based on BIA (see April 19, 2000, rebuttal comments of USEC at 19). USEC closes by stating that there is no other information on the record in this proceeding that would justify any other margin. Id. Department's Position We agree with the domestic interested parties. The margin from the preliminary determination is the only margin on the record of this proceeding and the only margin that reflects the behavior of producers/exporters without the discipline of the suspension agreement. As stated in our preliminary results, the original rate from the preliminary determination in the original investigation is not inappropriate because it is based on BIA. Rather, the submission of new information in this case might be appropriate in the context of a resumed investigation, or a changed circumstances review. As domestic interested parties correctly point out, the fact that the margin was based on BIA in the underlying investigation does not bar the Department from utilizing it as an indicator of the magnitude of dumping likely to prevail upon termination of the suspension agreement. Moreover, the fact that circumstances have radically changed from those existing at the time the uranium investigation against the Soviet Union was conducted does not invalidate the preliminary finding for determining a dumping margin if the suspended investigation is terminated. We have no information on the record to conclude with certainty that this would be the case and would, hence, need to resort to speculation. Thus, we will not, in the course of this sunset review, calculate a new margin of dumping likely to prevail if the suspended investigation were terminated. The SAA makes clear that the calculation of future dumping margins would involve undue speculation regarding future selling prices, costs of production, selling expenses, exchange rates, and sales and production volumes. Further, given the restrictions imposed by the suspension agreement with respect to imports of uranium, any such calculation would reflect the behavior of producers and exporters with the restrictions of the suspension agreement in place. Finally, as stated in our preliminary results, the weighted-average dumping margin in the preliminary determination of the investigation is the only margin available to the Department. Therefore, we determine that the margin calculated in the original of the behavior of Russian producers/exporters of the subject merchandise were the suspended investigation terminated. As such, the Department will report to the Commission the rate from the original investigation as the magnitude of the margin likely to prevail if the suspended investigation were terminated, as contained in the Final Results of Review section of the accompanying Federal Register notice. Recommendation: Based on our analysis of the comments received, we recommend adopting all of the above positions. If these recommendations are accepted, we will publish the final results of review in the Federal Register. AGREE____ DISAGREE____ ___________________________________________________________________________ footnotes: 1. See Letter from Jeffrey A. May, Director, Office of Policy, to Mark D. Herlach, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, granting an extension for time for filing rebuttal comments to the case briefs. 2. AHUG consists of industrial users Ameren UE, Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., Carolina Power and Light Co., Commonwealth Edison Co., Consumers Energy, Duke Power Co., Entergy Services, Ins., FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., Florida Power and Light Co., Northern States Power Co., PECO Energy Co., Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Texas Utilities Electric Co., and Virginia Power. 3. The Department based its analysis of the comments on class or kind submitted during the proceeding and determined that the product under investigation constitutes a single class or kind of merchandise. The Department based its analysis on the "Diversified" criteria (see Diversified Products Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT 1555 (1983)) and case precedent) (57 FR 23380, 23382, June 3, 1992). 4. See Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Uranium from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; and Preliminary Determination of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Uranium from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelarus, Georgia, Moldova and Turkmenistan, 57 FR 23380, 23381 (June 3, 1992). 5. See Antidumping; Uranium from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyszstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; Suspension of Investigations and Amendment of Preliminary Determinations, 57 FR 49220 (October 30, 1992). 6. Id. at 49235. 7. Id. at 49235. 8. See Amendments to the Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Ivnvestigation on Uranium from the Russian Federation, 61 FR 56665 (November 4, 1996). 9. Id. 61 FR at 56667.