In November 1996, the Information Security Resource Center (ISRC) released Advisory Notice No. 6, "Russian Intelligence Collection," concerning ongoing Russian intelligence collections activities impacting Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE contractor personnel and programs. Shortly afterward, Advisory Notice No. 7 addressed specific intelligence targeting risks associated with travel to Russia by DOE and DOE contractor personnel. This follow-on advisory provides additional background regarding Russian intelligence collection activities, about which security professionals across the DOE Complex need to remain aware. It is largely based upon a recent unclassified report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) entitled "Russian Foreign Intelligence Capabilities."

According to the CRS, the Russian Federation continues to maintain an offensive foreign intelligence capability against the US and its allies. Foreign economic, military, and political developments remain primary targets of the Russian intelligence services. Particular emphasis has been placed upon commercial collection efforts to assist Russia's economic and technological development. Activities pertaining to foreign economic trends and scientific and technological developments are deemed to be legitimate targets for Russian intelligence collection, based upon the January 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence, passed by the Russian Duma (Parliament).

CRS concludes that "Russian use of economic espionage against the United States is expected to increase as the Kremlin attempts to assist the country's economic and technological development," which "could adversely affect US economic interests and potentially cost American business billions of dollars."

The 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence identifies four Russian agencies with external intelligence functions. Three of these agencies are of potential interest from a Departmental security standpoint, and are briefly outlined below. The intelligence functions of the fourth organization, the Federal Border Service, do not appear directly relevant.

Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Established in 1991, and roughly analogous to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the SVR is responsible for collecting "political, economic, military-strategic, science and technology, and ecological information." Between 1991 and 1993, the US and Germany reported a 12% increase in intelligence collection efforts by the SVR and their Russian military intelligence (GRU) counterparts, according to CRS. In addition to the economic, scientific, and technical focus of collections efforts noted above, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection against American intelligence agencies also has been ongoing, as exemplified by the 1996 arrests of a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent (Earl Edwin Pitts) and CIA operations officer (Harold James Nicholson). The SVR also has reportedly concluded formal cooperation agreements with the intelligence services of several former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan and Belarus, which cover gathering and sharing intelligence.

Main Reconnaissance Directorate (GRU). The GRU is Russia's premier military intelligence agency, somewhat analogous to the US Defense Intelligence Agency. It remains largely unchanged from the Soviet era and reportedly has greater resources for collecting foreign intelligence than the SVR, according to CRS. The 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence tasks the GRU with gathering "military, military-politico, military-technical, military-economic, and ecological information." CRS characterizes the GRU today as "a cohesive, highly efficient, and professional military intelligence agency," despite widespread budgetary and organizational difficulties facing the rest of the Russian military. The GRU gathers HUMINT through military attaches and foreign agents. It also maintains significant signals intelligence (SIGINT) and photographic reconnaissance and satellite imagery (IMINT) capabilities.

Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). CRS characterizes FAPSI as Russia's most secretive foreign intelligence collection service. FAPSI reportedly performs functions similar to that of the US National Security Agency (NSA), although unlike NSA it operates both overseas and domestically. Its responsibilities outlined under the 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence is to collect information pertaining to "political, economic, military, science and technology through use of electronic means." In addition to maintaining secure communications lines for the Russian President and security services, FAPSI has both the authority and capability to penetrate all government and private information services in Russia, according to CRS. It also has reportedly been successful in collecting intelligence on foreign business ventures, including confidential bank transactions. Finally, FAPSI has also been authorized to engage in commercial operations, such as leasing radio frequency bands and government communications lines to both domestic and foreign companies.

Interaction between DOE and Russian personnel continues to increase via foreign travel and foreign visits and assignments. These interactions help facilitate important US goals, such as improving nuclear safeguards, security, and safety measures throughout Russia and other former Soviet republics, thereby helping to reduce the risk of nuclear materials diversion and associated proliferation concerns. However, these same interactions provide opportunities for intelligence targeting and exploitation activities, which need to recognized and adequately mitigated against.

Security professionals throughout the Department must work diligently through security education, awareness, operations security, and related programs (such as counterintelligence) to ensure that DOE and DOE contractor personnel remain aware of the sustained foreign intelligence threat posed by Russia and other states. Efforts must continue to identify, monitor, and adequately protect scientific and technical research and development across the complex which involve either mature or developing technologies of a sensitive nature that are of interest to foreign countries. In connection with this, it is important to maintain and constantly update our collective knowledge about those technologies that currently or may in the future fall under either the Militarily Critical Technologies List or the National Critical Technologies List.

DOE security professionals should also continue to remind personnel across the Complex of the following.

• Foreign intelligence activities do not only target persons maintaining or having previously maintained a clearance, since a growing amount of collections now focus on unclassified information.

• That foreign science and technology collections are not exclusively targeted against military or defense information, as commercially-viable science and technology to support national economic objectives (e.g., competition with the US) now receive significant attention from foreign intelligence services.

• That there is substantial overlap between the Department's Information Assurance effort and other information security issues.

• Russian or other foreign intelligence service operations can take place in third-country venues (e.g., outside the US or the territory of the foreign intelligence service in question).

• Foreign intelligence service operations may not only involve professional intelligence officers, but also may include coopted scientists, businessmen, students, or others.
  

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Last Updated October 2001