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Event Notification Report for June 22, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/21/2006 - 06/22/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 42524
Facility: INDIAN POINT Region: 1 State: NY Unit: [2] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: STEPHEN PRUSSMAN HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER	Notification Date: 04/25/2006 Notification Time: 12:31 [ET] Event Date: 04/25/2006 Event Time: 05:00 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP	Person (Organization): RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	N	0	Cold Shutdown	0	Cold Shutdown

Event Text

SERVICE WATER PIPING FLOODING CONCERN IMPACTS RHR

"At 0500 hours on April 25, 2006 with the plant in mode 5 and RCS loops filled, Operations declared the 21 and 22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps inoperable (see IP2-CR-2006-2133). This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as an event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the RHR pumps from removing residual heat. Residual heat removal is still available through the steam generators. The pumps were declared inoperable, but remained in operation, after a degraded horizontal section of Service Water (SW) line 405 was identified. SW line 405 is a non-ASME Section XI, non-Class A, seismically supported 24 inch return line routed through the Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) Tank room in the Plant Auxiliary Building (PAB) about 15 feet above the floor elevation of 51 feet. The ability of the pipe to withstand a seismic event has not currently been demonstrated. The consequence of a failure of this pipe is the flooding of the SGBD Tank room, cascading water down to the pipe case and then to the 15 foot PAB elevation. Water can drain to the transformer yard through a door at that elevation but the bottom of the RHR pump motors is lower than the door sill.

"Compensating actions have been implemented. These include provisions to open the door to the transformer yard with a security guard to monitor the open door, install sand bags at the entrance to the RHR pump room to prevent water entry, and install blocking devices to prevent backflow through the RHR pump room floor drains. A 24 hour watch is being provided for implementation of these compensatory measures. The watch will have a sump pump should it be necessary for leaks. The RHR pumps were declared operable at 1200 hours. Corrective action for SWS pipe 405 is being planned."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATED ON 6/21/06 AT 0920 EDT BY B. ROKES TO J. ROTTON * * *

"Indian Point 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on April 25, 2006, at 1231 hours. (Log No. 42524).

"The notification on April 25, 2006, reported an event or condition that could have prevented the Residual Heat Removal pumps from removing residual heat [10CFR54.72{b}(3)(v)(B)]. On April 25, 2006, at approximately 0500 hours, Operations declared the 21 and 22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps inoperable after a degraded horizontal section of Service Water (SW) line 405 was identified. SW line 405 is a non-ASME Section XI, non-Class A, seismically supported 24 inch return line routed through the Steam Generator Slowdown (SGBD) Tank room in the Plant Auxiliary Building (PAS) about 15 feet above the floor elevation of 51 feet. The ability of the degraded pipe to withstand a seismic event had not been demonstrated. The consequence of a failure of this pipe is the flooding of the SGBD Tank room, cascading water down to the 15 foot PAB elevation where the RHR pumps are located potentially flooding the RHR pump motors. Compensating actions were implemented and the RHR pumps declared operable at 1200 hours. Subsequently, a detailed engineering calculation was performed that included development of a finite element model of the piping using the SAP 2000 software package. The calculational methodology was based on ASME Section XI, Appendix H, Code Case N-513-1 and was augmented with stress intensity factor solutions from API-579. Stresses resulting from pressure, deadweight, and seismic loads were evaluated and found acceptable demonstrating that the overall structural integrity of the piping is maintained for all loading conditions. Based upon the observed pipe leak rate of approximately 15 gallons per hour (gph), an evaluation of the potential flaw size corresponding to this leak for the lower bound internal pressure was performed. It was concluded that the small stress contribution that would result from seismic loading would cause the flaw to have negligible propagation during a seismic event. Since it was determined that the pipe could support stable flaws much larger than the small flaw that corresponded to the observed leak rate, engineering concluded that the through wall flaws that produced the leakage did not threaten the structural integrity of the pipe. The estimated leakage that could have occurred from the pipe during a seismic event is bounded at 26 gph. Because the 26 gph leakage rate is well within the capacity of the two PAB sump pumps (50 gallons per minute each), there was never any threat to flooding the PAB or a challenge to the operability of the RHR pumps."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the New York Public Service Commission.

Notified R1DO (M. Sykes).

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 42533
Facility: KEWAUNEE Region: 3 State: WI Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-2-LP NRC Notified By: JOEL STODOLA HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE	Notification Date: 04/28/2006 Notification Time: 03:20 [ET] Event Date: 04/27/2006 Event Time: 22:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	N	0	Intermediate Shutdown	0	Intermediate Shutdown

Event Text

BOTH SAFETY INJECTION TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE

At 22:30 on 04/27/2006 the Kewaunee Power Station declared both trains of Safety Injection (SI) inoperable. SI Pumps A & B were declared out of service per Surveillance Procedure SP 87-125 (Shift Instrument Channel Checks-Operating) due to SI Accumulator B level change of greater than or equal to 3%. SI Accumulator B level indicator (LI-935) indicated 30%. Previous indication recorded for SI Accumulator B was 33%. Per SP-87-125 'If the SI pumps are not vented prior to a level decrease of greater than or equal to 3%, the SI pumps become INOPERABLE.' TS 3.0.c (Standard Shutdown Sequence) was entered. At 0130 on 4/28/2006, venting of both SI Pumps was completed. SI Pump A was returned to service and SI Pump B remains out of service due to SW Train B inoperability.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 6/21/06 AT 0922 EDT FROM JERRY RISTE TO GERRY WAIG * * *

"On 4/28/06, with Train B of SI already inoperable for other reasons, EN#42533 was made under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for both trains of Safety Injection (SI) being inoperable due to excessive level drop in an SI Accumulator which had the potential to gas-bind both trains.

"Subsequent evaluation has determined that, under the existing plant conditions, an SI train should only be declared inoperable if it is found that gas is actually present in the SI pump. Since venting after the event revealed no gas present, neither SI train was rendered inoperable by the Accumulator level drop, and thus both trains were never inoperable. Therefore, EN#42533 is being retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (K. O'Brien)

General Information or Other	Event Number: 42648
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: QC LAB INC Region: 4 City: BROOKSHIRE State: TX County: License #: L04750-003 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 06/16/2006 Notification Time: 11:19 [ET] Event Date: 06/16/2006 Event Time: 09:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): ANTHONY GODY (R4) TIM HARRIS (NMSS) MEXICO (VIA E-MAIL) () ILTAB (VIA EMAIL) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"Radiation Control received a call at 9:15 am from [name deleted] the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for QC Testing Laboratories, Inc., 10810 Northwest Freeway, Houston, TX, 77092, License # L04750-003, reporting that a technician was at a jobsite in the Houston suburb of Brookshire, when the technician noticed that the chain and lock bracing a moisture density gauge was cut, and the gauge and its case were subsequently stolen around 9:00 am, 6/16/06.

"The Gauge Information is as follows: Manufacturer - Troxler; Model 3430; Serial # 367007.
Source information: Cs-137, 8 millicuries, Serial # 751-796; Am-241Be, 40 millicuries, Serial # 78-1538.
The last leak test was performed April 26, 2006.

"Local police were immediately notified, who in turn have contacted local FBI. The licensee will fax a copy of the police report to Radiation Control as soon as available. Radiation Control was contacted at 10:00 am by the Chief of Police, Brookshire, to confirm the licensee had contacted the agency and to received additional information on the stolen equipment. An email with the device information and a copy of this report was sent to the police chief [email address deleted].

"Radiation Control is continuing to investigate & will transmit any updated information as soon as it is received. Texas Incident # I -8347."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

General Information or Other	Event Number: 42649
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: KLEINFELDER, INC Region: 4 City: BELLEVUE State: WA County: License #: WN-I0475-1 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT	Notification Date: 06/16/2006 Notification Time: 12:44 [ET] Event Date: 06/15/2006 Event Time: [PDT] Last Update Date: 06/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): ANTHONY GODY (R4) TIM HARRIS (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"A Troxler 3440 portable gauge serial number 37319 (8 millicuries Cs-137, 40 millicuries Am-241:Be) was damaged when a large earth moving piece of equipment backed over it. The operator was taking density readings about 20 feet behind the equipment when the equipment backed up. The operator ran to safety as the gauge was struck. The operator roped off a 50 foot radius around the gauge and called the RSO. When the RSO arrived at the site, the RSO and the operator took the buried gauge out of the soil and inspected it. The fire department was called and took readings in the area with a Geiger count-rate meter. Radiation levels were determined to be in the normal range. The top outer portion of the gauge was damaged and the source rod bent slightly, but the source areas were intact. The source rod was put back into the gauge by pounding the handle up with a mallet. The gauge was transported back to the licensed storage location and will be sent back to the manufacture for repair or disposal."

Location of Event: SeaTac Airport, Port of Seattle, City of SeaTac.

Washington State report number: WA-06-044

General Information or Other	Event Number: 42653
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: FORT JAMES OPERATING COMPANY Region: 4 City: CAMAS State: WA County: License #: WN-I0228-1 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 06/19/2006 Notification Time: 15:18 [ET] Event Date: 05/05/2006 Event Time: [PDT] Last Update Date: 06/19/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): DAVID GRAVES (R4) ELMO COLLINS (NMSS) CANADA (CNSC)- Email () ILTAB ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM SIGNS

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The Radiation Safety Office of Fort James Operating Company notified the department on 23 May 2006 that one Generally licensed tritium exit sign was missing. The exit sign was noted missing on 5 May 2006 during a corporate inventory of all radioactive material possessed at the site. The sign's bracket was also missing. There was no evidence the sign was damaged while being removed. The Radiation Safety Officer interviewed numerous workers to try and locate the sign but was unable to determine what happened.

"Isotope and Activity involved: 11.5 Ci (425.5 MBq) H-3.

"Tritium Exit Sign, S/N M5099."

WA State Report No.WA-06-021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

Other Nuclear Material	Event Number: 42654
Rep Org: QUAKER SALES CORPORATION Licensee: QUAKER SALES CORPORATION Region: 1 City: JOHNSTOWN State: PA County: License #: 37-23351-02 Agreement: N Docket: NRC Notified By: CALVIN OVERDORFF HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA	Notification Date: 06/20/2006 Notification Time: 15:05 [ET] Event Date: 06/20/2006 Event Time: 14:30 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: INFORMATION ONLY	Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R1) GREG MORELL (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Licensee was performing work on pavement at State Route 22, Indiana County, PA when a Moisture Density Gauge was damaged by compacting equipment. The damage to the gauge was restricted to the casing and the licensee has confirmed that the sources are in their retracted safe positions. The damaged gauge was moved off the pavement and a perimeter was established around it. Contact readings were recorded as 60 millirem/hr. The licensee has contacted Northeast Technical who is the service provider. The gauge will be temporarily transferred to office storage and will be subsequently transported to the service provider for repairs. The density gauge is a Troxler model 3450, serial number 00397 containing 8 millicuries Cs-137, 40 millicuries Am-241/Be (source numbers 750-6096 and 47-28081 respectively).

* * * UPDATE ON 6/21/06 AT 1100 EDT FROM CALVIN OVERDORFF TO GERRY WAIG * * *

The licensee called to correct the radiation contact reading reported above. The contact reading originally reported as 60 millirem/hr should read 6 millirem/hr to 11 millirem/hr. Notified R1DO (M. Sykes) and NMSS (G. Morell).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 42657
Facility: HATCH Region: 2 State: GA Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON	Notification Date: 06/21/2006 Notification Time: 02:36 [ET] Event Date: 06/21/2006 Event Time: 00:15 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION	Person (Organization): SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
2	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE EXCESSVIE AUX OIL PUMP MOTOR CURRENT

"During routine weekly operation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP), 2E41C002-3, the pump displayed indications of excessive motor current after the pump had been inservice for approximately 45 minutes. The pump was secured and, following review of electrical diagrams and consultation with Electrical Maintenance, the operating current of the AOP was checked and determined to be excessive. The AOP was declared inoperable, with the AOP inoperable, the HPCI system cannot be considered operable. The HPCI System is a single train ECCS system. Investigation into the cause of the high motor current is ongoing."

All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are fully operable including Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC).

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Power Reactor	Event Number: 42658
Facility: CALLAWAY Region: 4 State: MO Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: DENNIS GRIFFITH HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON	Notification Date: 06/21/2006 Notification Time: 10:02 [ET] Event Date: 06/19/2006 Event Time: 16:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH	Person (Organization): DAVID GRAVES (R4) OMID TABATABAI (NRR)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION - PRIME MEASUREMENT PRODUCTS, MODELS 763 AND 763A GAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND MODEL 764 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

"This report is made per 10CFR21.21 Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation.

"Callaway Plant received a notification dated May 18, 2006, from PRIME Measurement Products (formerly ITT Barton) stating Barton Model 763 and 763A Gage Pressure Transmitters and Model 764 Differential Pressure Transmitters may have defective external lead-wire connectors, which could affect their performance during an accident. The notification provided by PRIME stated the affected transmitters were manufactured after May 1982 and shipped from the factory prior to April 1, 2006.

"The potential defect is characterized as follows: The transmitters' external lead wires enter the electronics enclosure through a hermetic seal called a connector assembly. The external lead wires are soldered to the glass sealed pins of the hermetic seal. Epoxy potting is used to structurally support the soldered wire connections and establish a seal to protect the solder connections from shorting, which could be caused by an electrically conductive accident environment. The defect is that the insulated portions of the wires in the connectors, manufactured after May 1982, may not be embedded deeply enough into the epoxy potting to provide an electrical connection that would not be affected in an accident environment.

"The notification also states that actual transmitter installation may preclude shorting of exposed conductors due to the existence of conduit, conduit seals, and special wire connectors which could protect the exposed wires at a defective connector from conductive moisture.

"Callaway Plant identified thirty applicable Barton transmitters and connector assemblies in warehouse stock. Inspections of these operational spare parts identified three connectors, which had exposed conductors external to their seal. One connector had this defect on one lead wire and two connectors had this defect on both lead wires.

"Callaway has also identified that thirty-nine potentially affected transmitters are installed in the plant. An inspection plan has been developed to perform the required inspections, based on safety significance, ALARA considerations, and potential accident environmental conditions. Additional reporting requirements associated with the installed components will be evaluated under 10CFR50.72 as required.

"On 06/19/06, Callaway Plant personnel completed evaluations and determined the defective connections constitute a defect per 10CFR21 require initial NRC notification within two days.

"The NRC resident inspectors have been notified of this issue."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 42659
Facility: SALEM Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: PAUL ABBOTT HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 06/21/2006 Notification Time: 20:50 [ET] Event Date: 06/21/2006 Event Time: 17:10 [EDT] Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION	Person (Organization): MARVIN SYKES (R1)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

CHEMICAL SPILL TO THE DELAWARE RIVER

"A notification was made to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection of a discharge of approximately 6-10 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite with a 15% chlorine concentration. The discharge occurred while returning the chlorination system to service following maintenance. The solution was discharged into the intake bay of an out-of-service circulating water pump that communicates with the Delaware River. A portable screen wash pump, that takes a suction on that bay, transported the chlorine to the intake pump traveling water screens and discharged to the Delaware River via the screen debris trough. Neither of these locations are New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection permitted outfalls.

"There was no out-of-service safety related equipment that contributed to this event. No one was injured as a result of this event."

This event was caused when a floor drain plug was knocked loose during maintenance. This plug is being replaced. 8-10 fish were killed in the trough.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.