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Report to the Chair, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 
U.S. Senate: 

June 2004: 

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: 

New Service for Lender Oversight Reflects Some Best Practices, but 
Strategy for Use Lags Behind: 

GAO-04-610: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-610, a report to the Chair, Committee on Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate:  

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Small Business Administration (SBA) has been challenged in the past 
in developing a lender oversight capability and a loan monitoring 
system to facilitate its oversight. While SBA has made progress in its 
lender oversight program, its past efforts to develop a loan monitoring 
system were unsuccessful. In 2003, SBA obtained loan monitoring 
services from Dun & Bradstreet. 

GAO evaluated SBA’s loan monitoring needs, how well those needs are 
met by the new service, and the similarities and differences for the 
purposes of credit risk management between SBA and private sector best 
practices.

What GAO Found: 

Largely because SBA relies on lenders to make the loans it guarantees, 
the agency needs a loan and lender monitoring capability that will 
enable it to efficiently and effectively analyze its overall portfolio 
of loans, its individual lenders, and their portfolios of loans. SBA, 
along with Dun & Bradstreet, essentially identified these same needs as 
they obtained the loan monitoring service. In addition, they identified 
the importance of applying industry standards and best practices for 
loan and lender monitoring and the need to identify high-risk lenders. 
Based on our assessment of best practices, SBA’s credit risk management 
efforts need to include a comprehensive infrastructure, appropriate 
methodologies, and policies. 

The loan monitoring service could enable SBA to conduct the type of 
monitoring and analyses typical of best practices among banks and 
recommended by financial institution regulators, if SBA develops and 
implements appropriate policies. SBA’s newly obtained service provides 
a credit risk management infrastructure and methodology that appear to 
be on par with those of many private sector lenders. For example, the 
database affords analytical capabilities based on common financial 
models that are used by major financial institutions. Although SBA 
obtained a useful service, it does not have comprehensive policies 
needed to implement best practices and address its needs as an agency 
with a public mission, especially regarding its need to use enforcement 
actions to address noncompliance. In addition, SBA does not have a 
contingency plan in the event the Dun & Bradstreet service is 
discontinued. 

SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risk it 
will tolerate, but it must do so within the context of its mission and 
its programs’ structures, which may consequently translate into 
different uses of its Dun & Bradstreet loan monitoring service. Since 
SBA is a public agency with a public mission, its mission obligations 
will drive its credit risk management policies. For example, different 
loan products in the 7(a) program have different levels of guarantees, 
and guarantees on 504 program loans have a different structure from 
7(a) guarantees. These differences influence the mix of loans in SBA’s 
portfolio and, consequently, would impact how SBA manages its credit 
risk. Furthermore, the structure of SBA’s loan guarantee programs may 
also result in different credit risk management policies between SBA 
and major lenders. Private sector lenders manage credit risk at the 
loan level and the portfolio level. Since SBA relies on private lenders 
to originate and service the majority of the loans it guarantees, it 
also needs to manage the credit risk in its portfolio at the lender 
level. 

What GAO Recommends: 

The SBA Administrator should (1) consider the applicability of best 
practices in developing policies for using the loan monitoring service, 
(2) develop enforcement policies to address noncompliance among 
lenders, (3) ensure adequate resources are devoted to developing 
policies, (4) explore using the service elsewhere in the agency, and 
(5) develop contingency plans in the event that the loan monitoring 
service contract is discontinued. 

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from SBA’s Associate 
Deputy Administrator for Capital Access. SBA generally agreed with the 
overall findings and recommendations, but stated that it should receive 
more credit for progress made.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-610.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William Shear at (202) 
512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Loan and Lender Monitoring Capability Is Necessary for SBA to Conduct 
Effective Portfolio and Lender Oversight: 

The Dun & Bradstreet Loan Monitoring Service Appears to Provide 
Appropriate Infrastructure and Methodologies, but SBA's Lack of 
Comprehensive Policies Could Hamper Effective Oversight: 

SBA's Mission and Loan Program Structure Would Affect Its Use of Credit 
Risk Management Tools: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: SBA Data Integrity Processes for the Dun & Bradstreet RAM 
Data Mart: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Small Business Administration: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Elements of a Comprehensive Credit Risk Management Program: 

Table 2: How Well Does the Service Provide SBA with Best-Practice 
Infrastructure and Methodologies?: 

Table 3: How Well Has SBA Implemented Best-Practice Policies?: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Best-Practices Risk Management Framework: 

Abbreviations: 

ACH: automated clearinghouse: 

CDC: Certified Development Companies: 

CFO: chief financial officer: 

FCA: Farm Credit Administration: 

FEDSIM: Federal Systems Integration and Management Center Program: 

FSS: Financial Stress Score: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

OCC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

OLO: Office of Lender Oversight: 

RAM: Risk Assessment Manager: 

SBLC: Small Business Lending Corporation: 

SBPS: Small Business Predictive Score: 

SBA: Small Business Administration: 

Letter June 8, 2004: 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe: 
Chair, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Madam Chair: 

In fiscal year 2003, private lenders reportedly made more than 57,000 
loans totaling almost $12 billion to small businesses through the Small 
Business Administration's (SBA) two major loan guarantee programs. 
These loans are made to businesses for operating capital and other 
purposes under SBA's 7(a) program and for fixed assets under its 504 
program. SBA guarantees varying portions of these loans, depending on 
the loan program and loan product, although the majority (75 percent) 
was approved by banks and other private financial entities under 
authority delegated by SBA. To efficiently and effectively carry out 
its mission of maintaining and strengthening the nation's economy by 
guaranteeing loans in an effort to help small businesses create jobs, 
SBA must monitor its overall portfolio of loans, its individual 
lenders, and their portfolios. At the end of fiscal year 2003, SBA's 
portfolio of business loans totaled $45 billion. Our past work 
documented that SBA has not had a successful lender monitoring program 
or a loan monitoring system. From 1998 to 2001, at a cost of $9.6 
million, SBA attempted to improve its monitoring by independently 
developing its own loan monitoring system. These efforts failed in part 
because the agency did not plan properly. And in 2003, partly based on 
congressional action to cut funding of its loan monitoring system, SBA 
awarded a contract to Dun & Bradstreet to enable the agency to better 
monitor its portfolio, its individual lenders, and their portfolios. In 
this report, we refer to the loan monitoring service provided under the 
contract with Dun & Bradstreet as "Dun & Bradstreet service" or "loan 
monitoring service." 

Due to the importance of acquiring a loan monitoring service and an 
effective set of policies for its use, you asked us to review the 
agency's acquisition and use of the new Dun & Bradstreet service. 
Specifically, you asked us to determine (1) SBA's loan portfolio 
monitoring needs, (2) how well the newly obtained Dun & Bradstreet 
service meets SBA's loan portfolio monitoring needs, and (3) the major 
differences and similarities for the purposes of credit risk management 
between SBA and private sector best practices.

To determine SBA's loan portfolio monitoring needs, we reviewed and 
analyzed agency documents, and discussed related issues with agency and 
industry officials and contractor staff. In addition we analyzed SBA's 
intended purposes for the Dun & Bradstreet service. Furthermore, we 
identified applicable industry best practices and federal guidance to 
banks for loan portfolio monitoring. To determine how well the new Dun 
& Bradstreet service meets SBA's needs, we reviewed and analyzed agency 
documents, and conducted interviews with agency officials and 
contractor staff. We also analyzed the Dun & Bradstreet deliverables 
and the capabilities of the Dun & Bradstreet service, as well as SBA's 
use and planned use of the service. To determine the major similarities 
and differences between SBA and private sector best practices for the 
purposes of credit risk management, we interviewed selected major small 
business lenders and federal banking regulators. We conducted our work 
in Washington, D.C., between August 2003 and May 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 
contains a full description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Results in Brief: 

Largely because SBA relies on lenders to make its guaranteed loans, the 
agency needs a loan and lender monitoring capability that will enable 
it to efficiently and effectively analyze various aspects of its 
overall portfolio of loans, its individual lenders, and their 
portfolios. Even though SBA did not detail specific requirements for 
its loan monitoring, in general, SBA's intended purpose, according to 
SBA officials, is to enable the agency to effectively oversee its 
portfolio and lending partners. During the acquisition of the loan 
monitoring service, SBA and its contractor, Dun & Bradstreet, 
identified more specific requirements, including application of 
monitoring and evaluation services to existing SBA loan data; 
application of industry standards and best practices for loan and 
lender monitoring; and early identification of high-risk lenders. Based 
on our assessment of best practices, for SBA to effectively monitor its 
portfolio and lending partners, it needs a loan and lender monitoring 
capability based on a credit risk[Footnote 1] management program that 
would likely include a comprehensive infrastructure, appropriate 
methodologies, and policies.

Based on our assessment of best practices, our understanding of the Dun 
& Bradstreet service, and SBA's needs, the Dun & Bradstreet service 
could enable SBA to conduct the type of monitoring and analyses typical 
of best practices among major lenders and recommended by financial 
institution regulators, if SBA develops and implements appropriate 
policies. With the Dun & Bradstreet service, SBA currently has obtained 
a credit risk management infrastructure and methodology that appear to 
be on par with those of many private sector lenders. For instance, Dun 
& Bradstreet maintains a database for SBA that provides SBA with 
analytical capabilities based on financial models widely used by major 
lenders. Although SBA obtained a useful service, it does not have 
comprehensive policies needed to implement best practices. In addition, 
as an agency with a public mission, SBA does not have policies 
directing how the service could be used as a basis for taking 
enforcement actions to address noncompliance.

SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risk it 
will tolerate but must do so within the context of its mission and its 
programs' structures, and this difference may consequently translate 
into different uses of its loan monitoring service. Since SBA is a 
public agency, its mission obligations will drive its credit risk 
management policies. For example, different loan products in the 7(a) 
program have different levels of guarantees, and guarantees on 504 
program loans have a different structure from 7(a) guarantees. These 
differences influence the mix of loans in SBA's portfolio and, 
consequently, would impact how SBA manages its credit risk. Moreover, 
the structure of SBA's loan guarantee programs may also account for 
some of the differences in credit risk management policies between SBA 
and major lenders. Private sector lenders manage credit risk at the 
loan level and the portfolio level. Since SBA relies on private lenders 
to originate and service the majority of the loans it guarantees, it 
also needs to manage the credit risk in its portfolio at the lender 
level.

This report contains five recommendations to SBA. We recommend that SBA 
consider the applicability of best practices for risk management 
addressed in this report as it develops policies for using the Dun & 
Bradstreet service. We also recommend that SBA expedite the development 
of the policies, especially as they would relate to enforcement. In 
addition, we recommend that SBA ensure that adequate resources are 
devoted to developing policies for the use of the Dun & Bradstreet 
service. We also recommend that SBA explore the potential for applying 
or expanding the capabilities of the service to SBA business processes 
and responsibilities, such as creating budget projections, in addition 
to lender oversight. Finally, we recommend that SBA develop contingency 
plans that would enable SBA's continued risk management of the 7(a) and 
504 portfolio overall, individual lenders, and their portfolios in the 
event that the Dun & Bradstreet contract is discontinued.

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from SBA's 
Associate Deputy Administrator for Capital Access. These comments are 
discussed near the end of this report, and SBA's letter is reprinted in 
appendix III. In commenting on the draft, the Associate Deputy 
Administrator generally agreed with the overall findings and 
recommendations, especially the need to develop and fully implement 
policies for using the Dun & Bradstreet service. However, the letter 
stated that SBA should receive more credit for the progress it has 
made, especially in developing policies to implement the service. We 
believe that we have given SBA sufficient credit for the progress it 
has made, in particular for obtaining the service that provides SBA 
with best-practice infrastructure and methodologies. However, we think 
that the development of policies for use of such a service is an 
integral part of strategic planning, including planning during the time 
period before such a service is obtained.

Background: 

In pursuing its mission of aiding small businesses, SBA provides small 
businesses with access to credit, primarily by guaranteeing loans 
through its 7(a) and 504 loan programs. SBA has a total credit 
portfolio of $45 billion, the majority of which consists of 7(a) and 
504 loans.[Footnote 2] The 7(a) Loan Program is intended to serve small 
business borrowers who could not otherwise obtain credit under suitable 
terms and conditions from the private sector without an SBA guarantee. 
Under the program, SBA provides guarantees of up to 85 percent[Footnote 
3] on loans made by participating lenders--often called certified or 
preferred lenders,[Footnote 4] which are subject to program oversight 
by SBA.[Footnote 5] Loan proceeds can be used for most business 
purposes, including working capital, equipment, furniture and fixtures, 
land and buildings, leasehold improvements, and debt refinancing. The 
504 loan program provides long-term, fixed-rate financing to small 
businesses for expansion or modernization, primarily of real estate. 
The 504 financing is delivered through Certified Development Companies 
(CDC), about 270 typically preexisting private nonprofit corporations, 
established to contribute to the economic development of their 
communities.[Footnote 6] For a typical 504 loan project, at least 10 
percent of the loan proceeds are provided by the borrower, at least 50 
percent by an unguaranteed third-party lender loan, and the remainder 
by an SBA-guaranteed debenture[Footnote 7] from a CDC. Although SBA's 
7(a) and 504 loan programs serve different needs, both programs rely on 
third parties to originate loan guarantees (participating lenders for 
7(a) and CDCs for 504 loans). Because SBA guarantees up to 85 percent 
of the 7(a) loans and 40 percent of 504 loan projects, there is risk 
to SBA similar to that of a lender if the loans it makes are not 
repaid.

Loan portfolio management (monitoring) is the process by which risks 
that are inherent in the credit process (primarily credit risk) are 
managed and controlled.[Footnote 8] Current best practices emphasize an 
understanding of (1) the risk posed by each loan and (2) how the risks 
of individual loans and portfolios are interrelated. To address 
individual credit risk, best-practice lenders focus on controlling the 
quality of individual loans approved and carefully monitoring loan 
performance over time. These efforts encompass such activities as 
specifying underwriting criteria, analyzing financial data at loan 
origination, maintaining loan documentation, routinely reviewing loan 
performance, and monitoring the financial condition of the borrower. 
Managing a loan portfolio to consider portfolio concentration risks--
which can result from concentration of loans in, for example, a 
particular industry--requires a more holistic view. Here, better 
technology and information systems have opened the door to better 
management methods. Today's loan portfolio managers frequently use 
software tools to identify interrelationships among loans and rank risk 
within a portfolio. The goal is to obtain early indications of 
increasing risk. Together, these two conceptual approaches--an 
individual and an aggregate view of risk--form the foundation of modern 
loan portfolio management.

The Small Business Programs Improvement Act of 1996 required SBA to 
establish a risk management database that would provide timely and 
accurate information to identify loan underwriting, collections, 
recovery, and liquidation problems.[Footnote 9] In its fiscal year 1998 
budget request, SBA presented plans for increased reliance on lenders 
to service and liquidate defaulted small business loans. SBA planned to 
use the new database to manage its loan portfolios, identify and 
effectively mitigate risks incurred through loans guaranteed by SBA, 
implement oversight of internal and external operations, and calculate 
subsidy rates.

We reviewed SBA's plans to develop its loan monitoring system and 
reported[Footnote 10] that SBA had not undertaken the essential 
planning needed to develop the proposed system. Congress subsequently 
enacted provisions in the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 
that directed the agency to complete certain necessary planning 
activities that would serve as the basis for funding the development 
and implementation of its loan monitoring system.[Footnote 11] From 
1998 to 2001, SBA's estimate for implementing the system grew from 
$17.3 million to $44.6 million. By 2001, SBA had spent $9.6 million for 
developmental activities but had never completed the mandated planning 
activities or developed a functioning loan monitoring system. We have 
periodically reported on SBA's progress in planning and developing the 
loan monitoring system since 1997.[Footnote 12] In 2001, Congress 
stopped appropriating funds for the loan monitoring system and instead 
authorized SBA to use reprogrammed funds, provided that SBA notify 
Congress in advance of SBA's use of the reprogrammed funds.[Footnote 
13] Congress also directed SBA to develop a project plan to serve as a 
basis for future funding and oversight of the loan monitoring system. 
As a result, SBA suspended the loan monitoring system development 
effort. Of the $32 million appropriated for the loan monitoring system 
effort, about $14.7 million remained[Footnote 14] and was deposited 
with the General Services Administration's (GSA) Federal Systems 
Integration and Management Center Program (FEDSIM).[Footnote 15] In 
January 2002, SBA contracted for assistance to identify alternatives 
and provide recommendations for further developing a loan monitoring 
system. As a result, SBA chartered a loan monitoring system project 
management board with overall leadership and responsibility for the 
vision, direction, and results of the loan monitoring system effort. 
This board subsequently made the decision to no longer pursue the 
development of a loan monitoring system, and in February 2003, SBA, 
through FEDSIM, prepared a task order request for loan management 
services. A contract was awarded to Dun & Bradstreet in April 2003 to 
obtain loan management services, including loan and lender monitoring 
and evaluation and risk management tools; the contract includes four 
one-year options at an average cost of approximately $2 million a 
year.[Footnote 16]

Prior to contracting for the Dun & Bradstreet loan monitoring service, 
SBA had made progress in developing its lender oversight program for 
7(a) lenders with the establishment of the Office of Lender Oversight 
(OLO)--the office within SBA that is charged with ensuring consistent 
and appropriate supervision of its lending partners, with the 
development of written guidance in the form of "Standard Operating 
Procedures" and "Loan Policy and Program Oversight Guide for Lender 
Reviews," and through conducting reviews. However, our 2002 study of 
SBA's preferred lender review process found that it involved only a 
cursory review of lenders' processes rather than a qualitative 
assessment of their decisions with regard to borrowers' 
creditworthiness and eligibility.[Footnote 17] Preferred lender 
reviews were not designed to evaluate future financial risk.

SBA's preferred lender reviews were set up as strict compliance reviews 
and were not designed to measure the lenders' future financial risk. 
Lender reviews were based on reviewers' findings using a questionnaire 
and a review checklist. Recent changes related to these reviews are 
discussed in this report. As participants in the 7(a) program, SBLCs 
are subject to the same review requirements as other 7(a) lenders, in 
addition to the required safety and soundness reviews. We have made 
recommendations calling on SBA to clarify its supervisory and 
enforcement powers over 7(a) lenders since November 2000.[Footnote 18] 
Further, CDCs are subject to the same lender reviews as those required 
by 7(a) lenders. As with SBLCs, SBA provides the only oversight 
currently required for CDCs; therefore, lender oversight for both SBLCs 
and CDCs is especially important in order for SBA to monitor the risk 
they pose to the agency. In February 2003, SBA's Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) recommended[Footnote 19] that SBA develop separate review 
procedures for the oversight of the 504 loan program and that the 
review process be both a financial and a compliance review. SBA 
responded that a redesigned approach to CDC lender reviews was under 
way.[Footnote 20]

While elements of SBA's oversight program touched on the financial risk 
posed by preferred lenders, including SBLCs, based on historical 
information, weaknesses in the program limited SBA's ability to focus 
on, and respond to, current and future financial risk to the lenders' 
portfolio. In the past, neither the lender review process nor SBA's 
off-site monitoring efforts adequately focused on the financial risk 
posed by preferred lenders to SBA. Previously, SBA used loan 
performance benchmarking and ad hoc portfolio analysis as its primary 
tools for off-site monitoring. SBA officials stated that loan 
performance benchmarks are based on financial risk and serve as a 
measure to address a lender's potential risk to the SBA portfolio.

Loan and Lender Monitoring Capability Is Necessary for SBA to Conduct 
Effective Portfolio and Lender Oversight: 

As SBA's reliance on lenders to originate 7(a) and 504 loans has grown, 
so has SBA's need for an effective method to monitor its portfolio and 
its individual lenders' performances. A credit risk loan and lender 
monitoring system--based on industry best practices for infrastructure, 
methodologies, and policies--would be an effective way to address 
credit risk in the SBA portfolio and to facilitate the oversight of 
SBA's lending partners. Although SBA has not articulated its specific 
information and analytical requirements needed to monitor credit risk, 
it has over several years developed some general requirements for its 
loan monitoring needs. Based on our assessment of best practices and 
our understanding of SBA's oversight and programmatic responsibilities, 
SBA needs a credit risk loan and lender monitoring service that will 
enable the agency to efficiently and effectively analyze various 
aspects of its overall portfolio, its individual lenders, and their 
portfolios. Although specific credit risk management practices may 
differ among banks, depending on the nature and complexity of their 
credit activities, a bank's credit risk management program will likely 
include a comprehensive infrastructure, appropriate methodologies, and 
policies.

Continued Efforts within SBA Have Yielded General Requirements for Its 
Loan Monitoring Needs: 

Although SBA recognized the need for a credit risk loan and lender 
monitoring system and tried for years to build a system, SBA did not 
specify the information and analytical requirements to meet its needs. 
In its request for proposals to obtain loan management services, SBA 
officials stated that they did not include a needs assessment because 
they did not want to dictate the solution to be provided but to have 
vendors bring innovative risk management solutions to SBA. However, SBA 
reported in its fiscal year 2003-2008 strategic plan that, in general, 
it planned to allocate resources for a loan monitoring capability to 
provide effective oversight of its portfolio, its lending partners, and 
their portfolios in its 7(a) and 504 loan programs. In April 2003, SBA 
contracted with Dun & Bradstreet, which worked in conjunction with Fair 
Isaac, to obtain such services. In the interim, SBA collaborated with 
Dun & Bradstreet to identify more specific requirements. According to 
the statement of work prepared by FEDSIM, SBA wanted a loan monitoring 
capability that would apply monitoring and evaluation services to 
existing loan data, apply industry standards and best practices for 
loan and lender monitoring, and enable SBA to identify high-risk 
lenders. These requirements applied to both the 7(a) loan program and 
the 504 loan program.

SBA's Loan Monitoring Capability Should Be Based on Industry Best 
Practices for Infrastructure, Methodologies, and Policies: 

Based on our analysis of guidance published by financial 
regulators[Footnote 21] and on interviews with risk management 
professionals, it would be appropriate for SBA's loan monitoring 
capability to be based on best practices for infrastructure, 
methodologies, and policies. Figure 1 illustrates this concept. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal regulator 
of national banks, requires regulated lenders to practice basic loan 
portfolio monitoring/risk management. However, OCC notes that the 
sophistication of an institution's risk management policies and 
processes will depend on the size of the institution, the complexity of 
its portfolio, and the types of credit risks it has assumed. 
Accordingly, no single credit risk rating system is ideal for every 
bank. In practice, a bank's risk rating system should reflect the 
complexity of its lending activities and the overall level of risk 
involved.

Figure 1: Best-Practices Risk Management Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Despite customization of risk management systems, financial regulators 
and practitioners we spoke with are in general agreement about the 
characteristics associated with effective credit risk management. 
Similar to private lenders that focus on individual loans and their 
overall portfolio, SBA must monitor its overall portfolio, its 
individual lenders, and their portfolios. As such, it is important for 
SBA to have an effective monitoring capability based on best-practice 
infrastructure, methodologies, and policies.

Infrastructure: 

The infrastructure comprises the elements within an effective 
monitoring system that makes the methodologies and policies work. 
Financial regulators report that an infrastructure based on best 
practices will consist of skilled personnel who are well-trained and 
properly motivated with the ability to make professional judgments 
based on complex analytical data; strong management information systems 
that provide accurate, timely, complete, consistent, and relevant 
information; and functioning internal controls related to data 
quality.[Footnote 22] SBA has been especially challenged, and did not 
succeed, in creating a loan monitoring management information system on 
its own.

Methodologies: 

Best-practice methodologies refer to the application of analytic models 
to measure credit risk. Financial institution regulators agree that 
internal risk rating systems are becoming increasingly important in 
credit risk management at large banks in the United States and are an 
essential ingredient in effective credit risk management.[Footnote 23] 
They also agree that methodologies based on best practices will consist 
of the following elements: 

* sound statistical and financial modeling assumptions;

* scenario approaches such as (1) back testing to see if the models' 
projected default probabilities or expected loss rates are largely 
confirmed by experience and (2) stress testing to see how loan 
performance is affected by changes in one or more financial, 
structural, or economic variables; and: 

* concentration management techniques.

Policies: 

Policies based on best practices will consist of the establishment of a 
risk management function consistent with the nature, size, and 
complexity of the portfolio. According to financial regulators and 
practitioners, successful risk management functions work under the 
guidance of a clear credit strategy and risk profile (i.e., an 
institution's tolerance for risk) established by senior management. 
Policies and procedures also help staff apply the institution's credit 
strategy in a consistent manner to help ensure that management's risk 
profile objectives are met. Standard management reporting--such as 
various forms of segmentation (i.e., various data analyses based on 
variables such as geography, industry, and loan type), trend, and 
purchase/default rate analyses--is one such element within the policy 
framework, which facilitates compliance with management's objective of 
a clear and transparent credit strategy and risk profile. Risk 
management professionals we talked with meet frequently, often weekly 
or monthly, in order to review these standard management reports and to 
discuss their action plans. Further, policies should be in place to 
ensure risk management information systems are continuously updated in 
an ever-changing business environment and internal controls are 
enforced to ensure that exceptions to policies and procedures are 
reported and handled appropriately in a timely manner.

Together, infrastructure, methodologies, and policies form the 
foundation of a best-practices risk management framework, as 
illustrated in figure 1. The sophistication of the individual framework 
components varies and is correlated with the complexity and risk 
profile of the portfolio. The goal is to understand and manage credit 
risk such that a reasonable risk-adjusted profit is generated, or in 
SBA's case, to ensure compliance with its program goals while staying 
within its congressionally approved budget. Table 1 describes these 
credit risk management best practices in more detail.

Table 1: Key Elements of a Comprehensive Credit Risk Management 
Program: 

Infrastructure: Human capital/quality staff; A well- trained and 
properly motivated staff is central to effective credit risk 
management. Judgment is an important factor in best-practices risk 
management because not all decisions can be derived solely from 
complex analytical approaches.

Infrastructure: Strong management information systems; The 
effectiveness of the bank's risk management efforts heavily depends on 
the quality of its management information systems. Systems supporting 
risk management should provide accurate, timely, complete, consistent, 
and relevant information. Many of the advancements in modern loan 
portfolio management are the direct result of the more robust 
information systems available today.

Infrastructure: Data quality/systems maintenance; Routine quality 
control and reconciliation processes are fundamental to ensuring 
accurate data. Risk management data and information technology tools 
should be maintained. In addition, such tools must be upgraded as 
needed. The best technology can be next to worthless if the data are 
not accurate.

Methodologies: Sound statistical and financial models; Models used to 
identify and measure credit risk need to be appropriate and 
conceptually sound.

Methodologies: Back testing; Models used to identify and measure credit 
risk should be empirically validated. Back testing, or validation 
analysis, shows that projected default probabilities or expected loss 
rates, per the models, are largely confirmed by experience-that the 
models are accurately anticipating outcomes.

Methodologies: Stress testing; Stress testing is the process by which 
a lender alters assumptions about one or more financial, structural, 
or economic variables to determine the potential effect on the 
performance of the loan.

Methodologies: Techniques for managing concentrations of risk; 
Portfolio management tools can set exposure limits or ceilings on 
selected concentrations.

Policies: Establishment of a risk management function; Financial 
institutions must have in place a system for monitoring the overall 
composition and quality of their credit portfolio. This system should 
be consistent with the nature, size, and complexity of the 
institution's portfolio. Independence from the loan origination 
function, commitment from top management, and clear enforcement 
authority are characteristics typically associated with successful risk 
management functions.

Policies: Active senior management; involvement; Senior leadership 
should have responsibility for establishing, implementing, and 
periodically reviewing the credit risk strategy and significant credit 
risk policies of the institution. These efforts will drive a lender's 
credit culture. A lender's credit culture is the sum of its credit 
values, beliefs, and behaviors. The culture, risk profile, and credit 
practices of a bank should be linked. Our interviewing revealed 
frequent reporting to senior management by the risk management 
function and, in selected instances, direct participation from senior 
leadership in the risk management function.

Policies: Clear credit strategy and risk profile; Best-practices risk 
management groups operate under the guidance of clear credit strategies 
and risk profiles. These policies are established by senior management 
and should reflect the institution's tolerance for risk and expected 
financial performance. The risk profile evolves from the credit 
culture, strategic planning, and day-to-day activities of making and 
collecting loans.

Policies: Internal risk rating process; An internal risk rating system 
represents an effort to identify, measure, and rank credit risk. Credit 
scoring is a statistical process frequently used to support an internal 
risk rating system. Per OCC, identifying and rating credit risk is a 
core credit risk management practice.

Policies: Standardized reporting; Best-practices risk management 
functions generate timely and relevant standardized management 
reporting. Specific reporting frequently mentioned by practitioners 
includes: various forms of segmentation analysis, trend analysis, 
purchase/default rate analysis, exception reporting, risk rating 
reviews, and analysis of portfolio similarities and interrelationships.

Policies: Frequent and routine portfolio reviews; Best-practices risk 
management professionals meet frequently and routinely with internal 
stakeholders to analyze and review standardized portfolio reporting 
packages and the significant credit policies of the institution.

Policies: Compliance with internal policies/control functions; 
Institutions must ensure that the credit granting function is being 
properly managed and that credit exposures are within levels consistent 
with prudential standards and internal limits. Institutions should 
establish and enforce internal controls and other practices to ensure 
that exceptions to policies and procedures are reported and handled 
appropriately in a timely manner.

Policies: Completeness; All credit exposure should be rated/considered 
by the risk management function.

Policies: Continuous improvement; This refers to efforts to upgrade 
and enhance risk management information systems, policies, and 
practices as appropriate, to accommodate an ever-changing business 
environment. 

Source: GAO analysis of industry publications and interviews with 
industry officials.

Notes: This is not an exhaustive list of best-practice characteristics 
because there is significant variability among the risk management 
systems of private sector lenders.

Sources included relevant sections of the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency's Comptroller's Handbook on Loan Portfolio Management 
(April 1998) and Rating Credit Risk (April 2001); OCC Director's 
Handbook; Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, Risk Management: 
Comprehensive Chapters on Market, Credit, and Operational Risk, 1st ed. 
(New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2001); Basel Committee, Principles 
for the Management of Credit Risk, and Credit Risk Modeling: Current 
Practices and Applications; William F. Treacy and Mark S. Carey, 
"Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks," Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(November 1998); and interviews with select major lenders' officials 
and federal regulator bank examiners.

[End of table]

The Dun & Bradstreet Loan Monitoring Service Appears to Provide 
Appropriate Infrastructure and Methodologies, but SBA's Lack of 
Comprehensive Policies Could Hamper Effective Oversight: 

Combined with appropriate SBA policies, the Dun & Bradstreet service 
could enable the agency to conduct the type of monitoring and analyses 
typical among major lenders and recommended by financial regulators. 
SBA now has access to a risk management infrastructure and methodology 
that appear to have characteristics similar to those of many private 
sector lenders, including a functioning Web-accessible "data 
mart"[Footnote 24] that will provide the agency with the information 
necessary to manage its loan portfolio. Furthermore, the Dun & 
Bradstreet service provides SBA with an independent risk management 
team of contractor staff dedicated to managing the service and 
associated portfolio analysis. Although SBA has obtained a useful 
service, it does not yet have comprehensive policies on par with 
industry best practices to support the loan monitoring service. SBA has 
implemented certain key elements, such as an internal risk rating 
system, but it has not yet adopted other critical policy-related best 
practices. The policies, for example, should set explicit risk limits 
and steps to take when the limits are violated.

The Dun & Bradstreet Service Appears to Provide an Infrastructure and 
Methodology on Par with Best Practices: 

The loan monitoring service SBA obtained under contract from Dun & 
Bradstreet includes an infrastructure that appears to be on par with 
best practices, including a strong management information system, 
quality data, and human capital. The comprehensive data mart hosted by 
Dun & Bradstreet, referred to as RAM (Risk Assessment Manager), is a 
password-protected, Web-accessible data mart that SBA staff can query 
at any time. The sources for the RAM data are SBA's 7(a) and 504 
databases, Dun & Bradstreet corporate information, and commercial 
scoring data (e.g., Small Business Predictive Score (SBPS) and 
Financial Stress Score (FSS)).[Footnote 25] Each month, SBA staff 
electronically send Dun & Bradstreet updated loan data files. After Dun 
& Bradstreet staff process the SBA loan data, they add the corporate 
and scoring data, which are updated quarterly.

Ensuring the integrity of data used in the RAM is critical to the value 
of the loan monitoring service and is considered a best practice. 
Routine quality control and reconciliation processes are fundamental to 
ensuring data integrity. We analyzed the processes SBA, Dun & 
Bradstreet, and Fair Isaac have to manage the integrity of data 
associated with the service. We found through our own testing and other 
analyses that SBA's controls to ensure the integrity of both the 7(a) 
and the 504 program data appear reasonable, as a whole, to ensure that 
misstatements or inaccuracies are detected and corrected on a timely 
basis. These controls were adequate to help ensure the quality of the 
underlying SBA data used in the data mart. Although we did not test the 
Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac's processes for data quality, we 
reviewed their established procedures for data integrity and found them 
generally reasonable. Appendix II contains a full discussion of our 
review of data integrity.

There are several contractor staff that manage and assist SBA staff 
with using the loan monitoring service. SBA has a risk management team 
within the Office of Lender Oversight (OLO) dedicated to managing the 
Dun & Bradstreet contract as part of its lender oversight 
responsibilities. Furthermore, SBA can contact Dun & Bradstreet staff 
to fulfill ad hoc analysis requests and for consultation regarding best 
practices. The Dun & Bradstreet staff also provide SBA with monthly 
status reports about the progress of their obligations under the 
contract and current trends in best practices related to the small 
business lending industry.

Similar to the loan monitoring service infrastructure, the associated 
methodology appears to be consistent with private sector best practices 
since it appears to be based on sound financial models. The financial 
models used to score the loans and lenders are based on data managed by 
Dun & Bradstreet and commercial-off-the-shelf risk scoring models 
developed by Fair Isaac. Dun & Bradstreet has over 160 years of data 
management experience, including current relationships with over 90 
percent of the top 1,000 companies worldwide, whereas Fair Isaac has 
over 50 years of experience as the leading provider of financial 
services analytics. Fair Isaac's suite of solutions is used by 22 of 
the top 25 U.S. small business lenders. Fair Isaac conducts statistical 
analysis on its products, including stress testing during its model 
development.

In addition to using the widely used statistical and financial models, 
Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac conduct continuous process improvement 
through back testing to ensure that the models are working correctly 
for SBA. The modeling and SBPS and FSS scores undergo evaluation on a 
regular basis, including analyses to determine whether the models 
predict outcomes in a stable manner as the population of loans changes 
(called population stability) and loan characteristics change (called 
character analysis). These analyses and reports can help determine when 
the models require redevelopment to maintain accurate predictive risk 
information. Since SBA is solely dependent on the Dun & Bradstreet 
service to provide them with infrastructure and methodologies 
consistent with best practices, without the service it is unlikely, at 
this time, that SBA would be able to continue the same level of risk 
management of its overall portfolio, its individual lenders, and their 
portfolios.

SBA Does Not Have Comprehensive Policies for Its New Loan Monitoring 
Capability on Par with Industry Best Practices: 

Unlike best practices, SBA has not fully developed or implemented 
comprehensive loan monitoring-related policies and procedures to 
improve its lender oversight. However, SBA has implemented certain key 
elements of policy-related best practices. For instance, SBA 
established a risk management function when it created the Office of 
Lender Oversight in 1999. In addition, SBA officials have implemented 
an internal risk rating process (i.e., lender rankings) and receive 
standard quarterly reports, or tools, provided by Dun & Bradstreet. 
According to SBA's own broad time line for developing policy related to 
the new loan monitoring capability, while some key oversight standard 
operating procedures are scheduled to be completed by September 2004, 
its policies will remain incomplete until at least April 30, 2005, 
about 1.5 years after Dun & Bradstreet began providing its service to 
SBA in September 2003. Comprehensive policies based on best practices 
would enable the agency to effectively carry out its public mission, 
especially regarding its need to address any findings of noncompliance 
with enforcement actions.

SBA has, through the Dun & Bradstreet service, an internal risk rating 
process that includes lender rankings and associated risk scoring. Dun 
& Bradstreet ranks SBA lenders each quarter based on their risk level. 
To do this, Dun & Bradstreet consolidates each lender's loans and then 
scores, or quantifies, the risk by calculating the projected purchase 
rate (i.e., the price SBA pays a lender for a loan when a borrower 
defaults on the loan and SBA determines the lender has complied with 
the loan program requirements) for each loan portfolio against the 
total SBA dollars at risk.[Footnote 26] Subsequently, Dun & Bradstreet 
staff rank lenders for review based on their score. On September 30, 
2003, Dun & Bradstreet provided OLO with the first round of lender 
rankings.

Dun & Bradstreet staff also provide SBA with standard lender 
performance reports each quarter. These reports are based on profiles 
Dun & Bradstreet staff develop of each loan and lender portfolio. These 
include high-level profiling, such as demographic profiles and 
segmentation profiling and analysis.[Footnote 27] The lender-level 
profiling also includes aggregating each loan portfolio into lender 
portfolios and comparing lenders based on high-level performance 
analysis and reporting. The variables used to do this include dollar 
value of loans, distribution of 90-plus days past due by SBPS, average 
SBPS, and dollars at risk.

However, SBA falls short on other key elements of policy-related best 
practices. Best practices dictate the need for a clear and transparent 
understanding of how a risk management service and the tools it 
provides will be used. Comprehensive policies are fundamental to 
developing and implementing a shared understanding of tools associated 
with the Dun & Bradstreet service. Best practices state that agency 
stakeholders should meet frequently and routinely to review the loan 
portfolios and the resulting analyses, and discussion should occur 
within the context of the comprehensive policies, notably the 
institution's credit strategy and risk profile. According to major-
lender officials, internal stakeholders (companywide) meet at least 
once a month to analyze and review the standard management reporting 
packages to understand the major trends within the portfolio and 
identify possible policies that need to be revised or adopted to ensure 
they are consistent with the credit strategy and risk profile. At SBA, 
according to OLO officials, agencywide stakeholders meet periodically 
to discuss overall portfolio performance trends. These portfolio 
reviews, often occurring monthly, incorporate the quarterly Dun & 
Bradstreet reports, and according to SBA officials, additional internal 
SBA management reporting in their discussions. This process of meeting 
routinely to review standardized reporting is consistent with major-
lender best practices, although SBA's lack of a clear credit strategy 
and risk profile may impact the efficacy of this portfolio review 
process.

Additionally, SBA states in its fiscal year 2005 Performance Plan that 
it will continue to use and enhance its new loan monitoring capability 
to improve financial accountability and management, to improve the 
content of and processes involving the agency's financial statements, 
and the subsidy models used for estimating the cost of SBA's loan 
programs. Although selected offices within the agency currently receive 
monthly portfolio management reporting and analytics, including 
quarterly Dun & Bradstreet reports, stakeholders agencywide do not yet 
routinely use Dun & Bradstreet reports to support their mission 
activities. For example, the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) office, 
which is one of the offices that does not routinely use these reports, 
may benefit from the data and analytic capabilities provided by the Dun 
& Bradstreet service in fulfilling its budget and financial management 
responsibilities. In addition, other offices might use performance 
reports to better inform SBA district office staff about specific 
lender activity in order to enhance their outreach efforts to both 
businesses and lenders and their technical support services to 
businesses. For example, performance reports could be used to monitor 
lending to special groups of eligible small businesses like veterans, 
Native Americans, women, and disadvantaged businesses.

Although SBA recognizes that it needs to revise its lender review 
process, it has yet to fully implement a review process that enables it 
to ensure that its lending partners are complying with agency 
regulations and policies and that it has found any prospective 
financial risks. In 2003, the agency planned to begin conducting new 
strategic on-site operational reviews with those lenders whose risk 
profiles indicate a high level of financial risk to the agency. SBA 
reviewers intend to assess a lender's SBA origination, servicing, and 
liquidation practices. These risk-based reviews should provide the SBA 
with better information to both improve lender loan management 
processes and SBA loan programs, as well as develop useful information 
regarding lender and portfolio risk. In a related effort, the agency 
performance plan has a goal to expand its safety and soundness 
examinations of certain state-chartered nondepository financial 
entities. SBA officials stated that there are only a small number of 
these entities making 7(a) loans and that these entities are currently 
overseen by state regulators. The SBA Administrator testified in 
February 2004 that the new loan monitoring capability, coupled with a 
redesigned lender review process, would result in a risk-based approach 
to oversight, providing the agency with more meaningful information 
about SBA's lenders.[Footnote 28] According to the Administrator's 
testimony, the approach would also be more streamlined and efficient, 
allowing SBA to better deploy resources in areas where the agency has 
the most exposure, while being less intrusive to the lenders. Pilot 
testing of the new review process began in May 2003.

Tables 2 and 3 compare SBA's credit risk management capability to key 
elements of best practices. SBA relied solely on Dun & Bradstreet to 
provide the infrastructure and methodologies consistent with best 
practices. The service, which is owned and operated by Dun & 
Bradstreet, provides SBA with many key best-practice elements, 
including a strong management information system based on apparent 
sound statistical and financial models. Although the Dun & Bradstreet 
service is consistent with key elements of best practices associated 
with infrastructure and methodologies, without contingency plans SBA 
would not have the capability on its own to duplicate the loan 
monitoring service. SBA officials shared general ideas about what they 
might be able to do without the Dun & Bradstreet service, but they have 
no specific contingency plans. Moreover, while SBA has incorporated 
selected best-practice policies, such as a functioning internal risk 
rating system and more frequent and relevant standardized risk 
management reporting, the agency has yet to develop a clear credit 
strategy and risk profile for its credit portfolio or to define 
enforcement actions against its lenders in cases of noncompliance.

Table 2: How Well Does the Service Provide SBA with Best-Practice 
Infrastructure and Methodologies?[A]: 

Infrastructure: Human capital/quality staff; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Infrastructure: Strong management information systems; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Infrastructure: Data quality/systems maintenance; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Methodologies: Sound statistical and financial models; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Methodologies: Back testing; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Methodologies: Stress testing; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Methodologies: Concentration management techniques[B]; 
Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Yes. 

Source: GAO analysis of industry publications and interviews with 
industry officials.

Note: Sources included relevant sections of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency's Comptroller's Handbook on Loan Portfolio 
Management (April 1998) and Rating Credit Risk (April 2001); OCC 
Director's Handbook; Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, Risk 
Management: Comprehensive Chapters on Market, Credit, and Operational 
Risk, 1st ed. (New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2001); Basel Committee, 
Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, and Credit Risk Modeling: 
Current Practices and Applications; William F. Treacy and Mark S. 
Carey, "Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin (November 1998); and interviews with select major lenders' 
officials and federal regulator bank examiners.

[A] The infrastructure and methodologies are provided by Dun & 
Bradstreet and Fair Isaac. Our designation of significant progress is 
based on a continuation of SBA's contract with Dun & Bradstreet. While 
SBA now has implemented certain key elements of a risk management 
function, significant improvements in selected "significant progress" 
categories may be appropriate.

[B] Techniques for managing concentrations of risk include setting 
exposure limits or ceilings on concentrations.

[End of table]

Table 3: How Well Has SBA Implemented Best-Practice Policies?

Policies: Establishment of a risk management function; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Policies: Active senior management involvement; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Policies: Clear credit strategy and risk profile; 
Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Yes.

Policies: Internal risk rating process; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Policies: Standardized reporting[A]; 
Significant progress: Yes; 
Limited progress: No.

Policies: Frequent and routine portfolio reviews; 
Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Yes.

Policies: Compliance with internal policies/control functions; 
Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Yes.

Policies: Completeness; 
Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Yes.

Policies: Continuous improvement; 
Significant progress: Significant progress: No; 
Limited progress: Limited progress: Yes. 

Source: GAO analysis of industry publications and interviews with 
industry officials.

Note: Sources included relevant sections of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency's Comptroller's Handbook on Loan Portfolio 
Management (April 1998) and Rating Credit Risk (April 2001); OCC 
Director's Handbook; Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, Risk 
Management: Comprehensive Chapters on Market, Credit, and Operational 
Risk, 1st ed. (New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2001); Basel Committee, 
Principles for the Management of Credit Risk, and Credit Risk Modeling: 
Current Practices and Applications; William F. Treacy and Mark S. 
Carey, "Credit Risk Rating at Large U.S. Banks," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin (November 1998); and interviews with select major lenders' 
officials and federal regulator bank examiners.

[A] Standardized reporting is frequent, typically monthly, management 
reporting that is reviewed and discussed companywide, or in SBA's case 
would be discussed by senior office heads. Further, these reports could 
be used to identify portfolio trends and identify possible policy 
revisions. These reports support the credit strategy of the financial 
entity.

[End of table]

SBA's Mission and Loan Program Structure Would Affect Its Use of Credit 
Risk Management Tools: 

SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of risk it 
will tolerate but do so within the context of the public purposes of 
its loan guarantee programs, their budget constraints, and their 
structures. Nevertheless, many private sector risk management best 
practices are relevant to SBA.

SBA's Mission and Loan Guarantee Program Structure Would Affect How SBA 
Uses the New Loan Monitoring Capability: 

Although SBA, similar to private lenders, must determine the level of 
risks it will tolerate in the loans it guarantees, its mission 
obligations will drive its credit risk management policies. For 
example, different loan products in the 7(a) program have different 
levels of guarantees, and guarantees on 504 program loans have a 
different structure from 7(a) guarantees. These differences influence 
the mix of loans in SBA's portfolio and, consequently, would impact how 
SBA manages its credit risk. Accordingly, SBA may require policies and 
management reporting that are different from what lenders require. For 
example, while lenders manage credit risk by determining which loans to 
make and the mix of loans made, SBA, as a federal agency and advocate 
for small business, may not be able to manage its risk in the same 
ways. SBA's exclusion of, or imposition of, concentration limits on 
selected loan sectors based on risk limits could conflict with 
congressional, public, or industry interpretations of its mission 
obligations. Similarly, changing underwriting standards for certain 
classes of loans could be difficult to implement because it would 
compel its lending partners to change their underwriting criteria as 
needed due to economic conditions. Additionally, SBA may permit its 
lenders to offer greater forbearance (e.g., time to repay the loan) 
than private lenders would in the absence of an SBA guarantee. Also, 
SBA could offer assistance, such as counseling and technical help, to 
struggling borrowers through its partnerships with private entities. 
These kinds of broad, mission-related issues may influence the policies 
and business practices governing SBA's use of the Dun & Bradstreet loan 
monitoring service and related tools.

The structures of SBA's loan guarantee programs may also account for 
some of the differences in risk management policies and practices 
between SBA and major lenders. This lender-level emphasis contrasts 
with how major private sector lenders manage credit risk, which is at 
the loan level. Because SBA relies on private lenders to originate and 
service the majority of the loans it guarantees, SBA is primarily 
managing the credit risk in its portfolio at the lender level. As a 
result, much of the agency's risk rating processes and management 
reporting--while conceptually similar to the processes associated with 
loan-level analysis--focuses on lenders, or a lender's portfolio of 
loans. Here, the Dun & Bradstreet loan monitoring service supports 
lender oversight functions, such as SBLC examinations. These lender 
oversight responsibilities, and the associated interest in lender risk, 
contrast with how SBA, compared with private lenders, might use its 
risk management tools.

Conclusions: 

In acquiring the loan monitoring service under contract with outside 
experts, SBA has taken an important step that should help it meet the 
needs it identified for monitoring its lending partners, and their 
portfolios, and in managing the risk inherent in its $45 billion loan 
portfolio. The service provided by Dun & Bradstreet reflects many best 
practices, particularly those related to infrastructure and 
methodology, and can facilitate a new level of sophistication in SBA's 
oversight efforts. It will afford SBA a means to obtain various 
measures of financial risk posed by its lending partners and the 
opportunities to analyze loans and lending patterns efficiently and 
effectively. These functions are important to managing risk and to 
strengthening both SBA's on-site reviews and off-site monitoring of its 
lending partners--functions of the Office of Lender Oversight (OLO). In 
addition, the Dun & Bradstreet service, its related tools, and its 
potential for developing other tools could aid SBA offices with other 
responsibilities. These include certifying preferred lenders, 
identifying lenders against which enforcement actions might be taken, 
ensuring that its lending programs are providing credit to special 
groups of eligible small businesses (veterans, disadvantaged 
businesses, etc.), and estimating the cost of its loan programs. 
However, the potential benefits of the service, for OLO and other 
offices, cannot be realized without comprehensive policies that reflect 
best practices appropriate to SBA's responsibilities to guide the use 
of the loan monitoring service. SBA's time line for developing such 
policies stretches into 2005, more than a year and a half after the 
contractor delivered the capability to SBA. Moreover, SBA officials 
have not yet begun to explore the potential uses of the service for 
purposes other than lender oversight and portfolio monitoring, such as 
creating budget projections for its loan programs. Notably, SBA's 
continued risk management capability is solely contingent on the 
continuation of the Dun & Bradstreet contract. In the event that the 
Dun & Bradstreet contract is discontinued, SBA would not have the 
capability on its own to duplicate the loan monitoring service provided 
by Dun & Bradstreet.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making five recommendations to the SBA Administrator. First, we 
recommend that in developing policies for the use of the Dun & 
Bradstreet loan monitoring service, SBA consider the applicability of 
best practices, including specific policy elements identified in this 
report. Practices that should be considered include plans for 
continuous improvement in the service and its tools, frequent and 
routine portfolio reviews, and active involvement of senior SBA 
managers in reviewing the use of output.

Second, the Administrator should expedite the development of policies 
for taking enforcement actions against all lending partners to address 
noncompliance issues identified through the loan monitoring service and 
to address safety and soundness issues among SBLCs and CDCs, for whom 
SBA is the only regulator. We have made recommendations calling on SBA 
to clarify its supervisory and enforcement powers since November 2000. 
Although SBA has taken some incremental planning steps to address the 
issue, its current time line estimates finalizing enforcement 
regulations in April 2005.

Third, ensure that resources within SBA are devoted to developing 
policies for the use of the loan monitoring service, so that the 
overall time line for completion--April 2005--is met.

Fourth, establish an agencywide task force to explore the potential for 
applying the capabilities of the Dun & Bradstreet service to SBA 
business processes and responsibilities other than lender oversight, 
such as overall portfolio risk management or budget projections. 
Programmatic offices and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
should be included.

Fifth, develop contingency plans that would enable SBA's continued risk 
management of the 7(a) and 504 portfolio overall, individual lenders, 
and their portfolios in the event that the Dun & Bradstreet contract is 
discontinued.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested SBA's comments on a draft of this report. The Associate 
Deputy Administrator for Capital Access provided written comments that 
are presented in appendix III. The Associate Deputy Administrator 
generally agreed with the overall findings and recommendations, 
especially the need to develop and fully implement policies for using 
the Dun & Bradstreet service. However, the letter stated that SBA 
should receive more credit for the progress it has made in developing 
these policies.

In contrast to SBA's Associate Deputy Administrator, we think that we 
have given SBA sufficient credit for its progress. In particular, we 
give credit for obtaining the service, and we documented the 
significant progress made in how the service provides SBA with best-
practice infrastructure and methodologies. However, SBA has not 
detailed how it has devoted resources to the development of needed 
policies. In addition, based on our analysis, it appears that SBA has 
not taken actions that are important to successfully develop needed 
policies. The Associate Deputy Administrator stated, "The development 
of policies is progressing logically following the acquisition of the 
loan and lender monitoring services." In contrast, we think that the 
development of policies for using such a service is an integral part of 
strategic planning, including planning during the time period before 
such a service is obtained. In our view, SBA could have developed more 
specific policies for using the service before it was obtained. For 
example, we have not seen evidence that SBA has developed policies 
addressing the level of risk it will tolerate within the context of its 
mission and its programs' structures.

In response to our recommendation on considering the applicability of 
best practices for risk management as it develops policies for using 
the Dun & Bradstreet service, SBA's Associate Deputy Administrator 
stated that it is committed to fully implementing the service based on 
best practices consistent with those that were identified in the 
report.

In comments regarding our recommendation to expedite the development of 
policies, especially as they relate to enforcement, SBA's Associate 
Deputy Administrator stated that the agency has made progress in 
developing its enforcement-related policies. SBA submitted legislative 
proposals for specific enforcement authorities, but in the absence of 
specific legislation, SBA intends to go forward with proposed 
enforcement regulations under its general oversight authority. However, 
the final rule for enforcement actions will not be completed until 
April 2005. We support SBA's intent to go forward with proposed 
enforcement regulations under SBA's general oversight authority, 
consistent with our earlier recommendations.

Concerning our recommendation that SBA should ensure that resources 
already within the agency are devoted to developing policies for the 
use of the Dun & Bradstreet service, SBA's Associate Deputy 
Administrator stated that the agency is committed to fully implementing 
the service, including the associated policies and procedures, and will 
make every effort to meet the established time line of April 2005 for 
the policies' completion. However, the Associate Deputy Administrator 
did not specifically detail what resources would be devoted to the 
development of the policies.

The Associate Deputy Administrator agreed with our recommendation that 
SBA establish an agencywide task force to explore the potential for 
applying capabilities of the Dun & Bradstreet service to various 
offices within SBA and stated that the agency should leverage this 
resource to the maximum extent possible. He acknowledged that while 
some information provided by the Dun & Bradstreet service has far-
ranging uses that could benefit other program areas within SBA, the 
agency must recognize that the service provides confidential business 
information. Therefore, uses of the service by other offices remain 
unresolved.

In response to our recommendation that SBA develop contingency plans 
that would enable SBA's continued risk management of the 7(a) and 504 
portfolio overall, individual lenders, and their portfolios in the 
event that the Dun & Bradstreet contract is discontinued, SBA's 
Associate Deputy Administrator noted that the agency has begun to 
consider various options to continue its approach to loan and lender 
monitoring, should the contract be discontinued. SBA has identified 
several nationally recognized vendors that offer possible replacement 
services, but the Associate Deputy Administrator stated, and we agree, 
that it is impractical to run concurrent contracts as a contingency 
plan. However, SBA does not have a formal contingency plan in place.

The Associate Deputy Administrator stated in his comment letter that he 
identified a number of inaccuracies in our draft report. However, these 
were mostly technical corrections, which we incorporated, as 
appropriate, in this report. SBA's letter is reprinted in appendix III.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 
distribution until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, 
we will send copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of 
the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, the 
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Small 
Business, other appropriate congressional committees, and the 
Administrator of the Small Business Administration. We also will make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov].

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-8678 or [Hyperlink, shearw@gao.gov]; or Katie Harris, Assistant 
Director, at (202) 512-8415 or [Hyperlink, harrism@gao.gov]. Key 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

William B. Shear, 
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To evaluate the Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan portfolio 
monitoring needs, we first identified SBA's loan portfolio monitoring 
strategy and the intended purpose of the Dun & Bradstreet service. 
Then, we identified best practices from federal guidance to banks and 
generally accepted industry practices and explored how these practices 
might apply to SBA. To identify SBA's loan portfolio monitoring 
strategy, we analyzed agency and contractor files. In addition, we 
interviewed SBA Office of Lender Oversight (OLO) officials and Dun & 
Bradstreet contractors who were providing the loan monitoring service 
during our review. We also interviewed Farm Credit Administration (FCA) 
officials responsible for conducting the Small Business Lending 
Corporation (SBLC) reviews during the last few years and reviewed their 
summary report for fiscal year 2002. To identify industry best 
practices for loan portfolio monitoring, we analyzed guidance published 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Basel Committee, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve and 
consolidated all like practices. We also consulted relevant literature 
related to financial markets and risk management. Lastly, we 
interviewed officials at several large private banks that make 7(a) and 
504 loans as well as other loans to small businesses and selected 
SBLCs.

To determine how well the new Dun & Bradstreet service and associated 
tools meet SBA's needs, we reviewed and analyzed agency and contractor 
documents and conducted interviews. We analyzed the Dun & Bradstreet 
contract files to identify the contract deliverables and the service's 
capabilities. We also verified the contractor's implemented and planned 
actions and interviewed relevant contractor staff. In addition, we 
obtained and analyzed SBA planning documents, including its 2003-2008 
Strategic Plan, and its 2004 and 2005 Annual Performance Plans, and we 
interviewed agency officials to determine SBA's use and planned use of 
the loan monitoring service. Moreover, we compared SBA's current and 
planned use of the service to industry best practices we identified in 
analyzing SBA's loan portfolio monitoring needs.

To determine the major differences and similarities for the purposes of 
credit risk management between SBA and private sector best practices, 
we analyzed industry documents and interviewed risk management 
professionals employed at several of SBA's largest and most active 
small business lending partners. We analyzed banking regulator 
publications related to risk management, primarily credit risk, as well 
as position papers from the Basel Committee, and considered various 
academic studies, and selected books and papers recommended by the 
Global Association of Risk Management Professionals. Furthermore, we 
interviewed bank examiners and relevant employees of the Office of the 
Comptroller Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company.

To determine what steps SBA took to ensure the integrity of the data 
used in the Dun & Bradstreet RAM (Risk Assessment Manager) data mart, 
we analyzed agency and contractor documents and interviewed SBA and 
contractor officials. To document SBA controls over its 7(a) program 
data, we relied on the findings of our recent audit of SBA's 7(a) 
program subsidy model, in which we assessed the integrity of the data 
in SBA's database. To determine the data integrity processes for the 
504 program, we analyzed agency documents and 504 LAMP (the SBA-
developed customized Access database tool) data samples, and 
interviewed SBA officials. However, we did not conduct independent 
tests of the 504 program data integrity process. To determine the data 
integrity processes of the Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac data, we 
interviewed company officials. Although we did not test the Dun & 
Bradstreet and Fair Isaac processes for ensuring data quality, we 
reviewed their established procedures for quality and found them 
generally reasonable. A summary of our related findings is contained in 
appendix II.

We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., between August 2003 and May 
2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: SBA Data Integrity Processes for the Dun & Bradstreet RAM 
Data Mart: 

Controls to help ensure the integrity of the data entered in the Dun & 
Bradstreet RAM data mart appear reasonable, as a whole, to ensure that 
misstatements or inaccuracies are detected and corrected on a timely 
basis, and the level of data errors in the system would not 
significantly affect the loan monitoring service's risk profiling 
capabilities. The RAM database includes information related to SBA's 
entire loan portfolio, roughly 5,000-plus lenders and 230,000 
outstanding loans,[Footnote 29] combining SBA data with commercial 
data, consumer data, and credit scores to produce risk metrics to 
facilitate lender oversight. The RAM receives data from four different 
sources--SBA's 7(a) and 504 databases, and Dun & Bradstreet and Fair 
Isaac. We found that SBA's controls over its 7(a) program data, which 
represent approximately 70 percent of the data entered into the RAM, 
were adequate to help ensure the quality of the underlying data. Our 
review of 504 program database data integrity procedures showed 
generally adequate controls, as well. Although we did not test the Dun 
& Bradstreet and Fair Isaac's processes for data quality, we reviewed 
their established procedures for data integrity and found them 
generally reasonable.

SBA Has Adequate Controls over 7(a) Program Data Integrity: 

In our report on SBA's 7(a) program subsidy model,[Footnote 30] we 
found that SBA's monthly 7(a) reconciliation process, combined with 
lender incentives and loan sales, helped ensure the quality of the 
underlying data. Although some errors existed in SBA's database at the 
time of the review, the nature and magnitude of these errors were 
unlikely to significantly affect the usefulness of the database. The 
7(a) program data represent 70 percent of the data entered into the 
RAM. Therefore, reasonableness of data integrity over the 7(a) program 
data helps to provide assurance that the quality of the data used is 
sufficiently reliable to monitor the performance of SBA's lenders and 
the risk exposure of SBA.

The primary method SBA used to identify and correct data errors in its 
7(a) program is its Form 1502 reconciliation process.[Footnote 31] 
Reconciliations are an important internal control established to ensure 
that all data inputs are received and are valid and that all outputs 
from a particular system are correct. This process, in which an SBA 
contractor every month matches borrower data submitted by 7(a) program 
lenders on SBA's Form 1502 to information in the agency's portfolio 
management system, helps ensure the completeness and accuracy of the 
agency's data. SBA district office staff work with lenders to correct 
errors identified by this match process. We did not independently test 
the data match conducted by SBA's contractors or the field office 
staff. However, we reviewed summary reports of the errors for each 
district office over a 4-month period during fiscal year 2003 and found 
that most of the errors reported were resolved during the month the 
errors were identified.

In addition to the monthly loan data reconciliation process, lender 
incentives also helped ensure the integrity of the underlying data. In 
accordance with current SBA policy, the agency can reduce or completely 
deny a lender's claim for payment of the SBA guarantee if the defaulted 
loan data are not correct. According to SBA officials, this policy 
gives the 7(a) program lenders an incentive to correct data errors 
because it helps ensure they will be paid the full guarantee amount if 
the borrower subsequently defaults on the loan. Further, an ancillary 
benefit of SBA's loan sales program was to help ensure data integrity. 
Prior to a sale, SBA district office staff, as well as contractors, 
reviewed loan files as part of the "due diligence" reviews to provide 
accurate information about the loans available for sale, so that 
potential investors could make informed bids. According to SBA 
officials, discrepancies between the lender's data and SBA data had to 
be resolved prior to selling a loan.

Processes for SBA 504 Data Integrity Appear Adequate: 

Unlike the 7(a) loan program, SBA does not currently have a formal 
reconciliation process in place for 504 program data, but testing we 
conducted found no major errors in the data. The informal process that 
SBA uses to ensure the integrity of its 504 data is based on a series 
of checks and balances, notably: (1) processing all payments through 
the federal government's automated clearinghouse (ACH); (2) 
electronically uploading data; and (3) evaluating and certifying 
approved 504 lenders based on accounting reports by a third party--
Colson Services Corporation, a unit of JP Morgan Chase. In addition, 
Certified Development Companies (CDC) have an incentive to review the 
monthly reports and notify SBA of any discrepancies.

The aggregated 504 data come from three sources, but only one source's 
data are inputted into the RAM database. The three sources for 
aggregated data are current loan status and payment history, which is 
provided by Colson--the same contractor that performs similar loan 
payment and accounting for SBA's 7(a) program; semiannual dividend 
disbursements to investors, which is provided by the Bank of New York; 
and loan approval and default loan information that resides in SBA's 
mainframe. Colson and the Bank of New York transmit data monthly to 
SBA. SBA developed a customized Access database tool, referred to as 
the 504 LAMP, which aggregates the data following a set of procedures. 
Dun & Bradstreet's RAM database will input only the Colson data for 
lender oversight purposes since it is concerned only with the current 
loan data.

The processes used to collect and input the Colson data into the 504 
LAMP appear to minimize errors. Initially, Colson collects the majority 
of loan payments electronically via ACH and credits the payments within 
one business day of receipt. For payments not made, Colson is 
immediately notified by ACH and contacts the CDCs to collect the 
payments. For those late payments, checks or money orders are sent to 
Colson, and it enters the payments into its database. Colson 
electronically sends the payment information each month to SBA. 
Finally, SBA electronically inputs the Colson data into the 504 LAMP 
database.

Another informal check on the integrity of the 504 LAMP data is the 
CDCs' incentives to ensure that the current status of loans is 
accurate. CDCs' continued participation in making 504 loans is 
contingent upon adequate financial performance and accountability. 
Therefore, CDCs have strong incentives to contact SBA to have any data 
errors corrected, or risk losing further participation in the program. 
Selected CDC performance data are uploaded monthly onto SBA's password 
protected Web site. CDC directors in the field can log in and receive a 
monthly report on their loan performance. SBA officials stated that CDC 
staff are diligent about finding errors and contacting SBA to remedy 
them.

Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac Data Integrity Processes Appear 
Adequate: 

The quality control processes of Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac appear 
to be reasonable to help ensure the validity of the data used to 
produce risk management information for SBA, based on our review of 
their documentation and interviews with company officials. Due to the 
proprietary nature of the processes, we were unable to independently 
test the Dun & Bradstreet and Fair Isaac processes. However, Dun & 
Bradstreet officials explained their proprietary quality control 
process, referred to as DUNSRight, to validate the commercial data they 
provide to SBA. Additionally, Fair Isaac officials discussed the 
sources of their consumer data and how they ensure data quality.

The commercial and consumer data that Dun & Bradstreet staff input into 
the RAM is used to analyze SBA loan data. More specifically, Dun & 
Bradstreet staff use the data to create predictive models and decision 
tree methodologies, and to group accounts with specific behaviors and 
risk profiles. The predictive models include a suite of five different 
models using Dun & Bradstreet and principal owner data, built using 
Fair Isaac proven analytic methodologies. According to Dun & Bradstreet 
officials, the models and decision trees are reviewed periodically to 
test and fine-tune strategies, based on changing market conditions. Dun 
& Bradstreet officials also stated they have a continual improvement 
process whereby the models used to analyze SBA loan and lender data are 
validated.

The commercial data that Dun & Bradstreet collects go through a five-
step quality assurance process. First, Dun & Bradstreet collects data 
from more than 80 million businesses and continuously updates its 
databases more than 1 million times daily based on real-time business 
transactions. Second, it matches SBA records with its records and 
achieves at least 95 percent match of the data on seven critical pieces 
of information used to identify the borrower. Third, Dun & Bradstreet 
assigns a unique identifier to each company. Fourth, Dun & Bradstreet 
identifies the corporate linkage of a business's branches/subsidiaries 
with their parent entity to help the SBA understand their complete 
corporate exposure between borrowers and their parent entities. 
Finally, Dun & Bradstreet generates predictive indicators of a 
business's potential inability to repay a loan. Dun & Bradstreet 
officials refer to this process as the DUNSRight process.

Fair Isaac uses the commercial data from Dun & Bradstreet and consumer 
data from a credit bureau to develop its credit scores. The consumer 
data that Fair Isaac gathers from Trans Union Credit Bureau go through 
a less detailed cleansing process, but the process still appears to be 
reasonable. Initially, Fair Isaac provides the credit bureau with 
identifier information (i.e., name and address) from SBA, so it can 
match the entity with its associated credit report. Credit bureaus then 
send a report to Fair Isaac if there is a match (or a "hit"). Fair 
Isaac officials told us that the match rate is 95 percent. After Fair 
Isaac receives the credit reports, it electronically files the multiple 
credit reports for each business and transforms them into predictable 
variables. Finally, Fair Isaac creates predictive characteristics from 
the blended Trans Union consumer and Dun & Bradstreet commercial data, 
resulting in a Small Business Predictive Score (SBPS) intended to 
predict the likelihood of severe loan delinquency. Fair Isaac sends the 
SBPS score to Dun & Bradstreet, so it can load it into the RAM. Dun & 
Bradstreet officials stated that controls are in place to verify that 
all data merges in the RAM are successful.

According to Fair Isaac officials, its SBPS model will likely remain 
the same because it is stable. The process Fair Isaac staff use to 
determine the stability of its model starts with the development of a 
population stability report. If the report states that the models are 
unstable, Fair Isaac then creates a characteristics analysis report. 
This report determines if the characteristics (or variables) have 
changed and by how much over time. In addition, each year the models 
are revalidated. Third parties do not routinely ensure the reliability 
or integrity of the models, but Fair Isaac's clients, such as SBA, 
inform the company if the models are not reasonably predicting borrower 
behavior.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Small Business Administration: 

U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20416:

William B. Shear:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment:
General Accounting Office: 
Washington D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Shear:

This letter provides the U.S. Small Business Administration's response 
to the draft report prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
titled "New Service for Lender Oversight Reflects Some Best Practices 
but Strategy for Use Lags Behind," GAO-04-610. We appreciate the 
opportunity to comment on this report.

As GAO acknowledges in its report, the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) has obtained loan and lender monitoring services 
that provides a best practices system comparable to systems utilized by 
major commercial banks in managing their small business loan 
portfolios.

We believe this innovative approach is the first such system 
implemented within the Federal government for credit management 
purposes. After many years and millions of dollars spent unsuccessfully 
attempting to develop a system internally, this Administration 
reoriented, refocused and reprioritized the loan monitoring effort to 
ensure that the Agency has the necessary tools to conduct effective 
lender oversight. This work was achieved much faster, at a lower cost 
and with significantly fewer staff resources that had been involved in 
the prior effort. In the past year, SBA has acquired and put in place 
an impressive loan monitoring system (LMS). To accomplish this goal, 
the effort required the devotion of significant resources along with 
direct SBA staff and management attention to ensure its success. We are 
very proud of the work done in implementing the LMS. In fact, we 
believe a more appropriate title for the report would be "New Service 
for Lender Oversight Reflects Best Practices and Strategy for Use Is 
Underway."

The work of the past year has been devoted largely to the acquisition 
of the services, the intense, detailed work of mapping SBA data to the 
Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data mart, the design and development of 
analytics and reports and the related work associated with the data 
base enhancements recently implemented by D&B. A tremendous amount has 
been achieved in 12 short months.

We are well aware of the need for policies to implement the loan 
monitoring system. Policy development could not proceed meaningfully 
until the system was in place and SBA was able to ascertain how the 
various components would be utilized in its oversight efforts. This 
system is a major strategic initiative for SBA. The development of 
policies is progressing logically following the acquisition of the loan 
and lender monitoring services. The loan monitoring system is part of 
the President's Management Agenda and the SBA's own performance 
scorecard, and the development of policies and procedures to fully 
implement LMS is one of the Office of Lender Oversight's strategic 
goals this year. We are committed to this effort and expect to meet 
our established timelines which we believe are aggressive.

SBA is providing the following response to the five recommendations 
contained in GAO's draft report. Attached to this letter are a number 
of factual and/or technical corrections SBA believes are appropriate.

1. Recommendation One: SBA should consider the applicability of 
industry best practices in implementing LMS, including specific policy 
elements identified in this report. These practices include continuous 
improvement in the service and its tools, frequent and routine 
portfolio reviews, and active involvement of senior SBA managers in 
reviewing the use of output.

SBA is committed to fully implementing a loan monitoring system that 
includes best practices consistent with GAO's recommendations. As GAO 
noted in its report, the application of private sector best practices 
to a Federal agency with public policy and mission priorities may not 
be directly correlated. SBA is making that assessment as it develops 
policy options. Nevertheless, many of GAO's recommendations are already 
being used by SBA in its oversight efforts. These activities will be 
formally _incorporated into the Agency's policies for lender oversight. 
Final policies are scheduled to be developed and in place by September 
30, 2004. The only exception is the publication of a final rule for 
enforcement actions, which is planned for April 2005 due to the 
timeline involved in the regulatory process.

2. Recommendation Two: The administrator should expedite the 
development of policies for taking enforcement actions. We have made 
recommendations calling on SBA to clarify its supervisory and 
enforcement powers since November 2000.

The Small Business Act gives SBA general authority for oversight of its 
lenders. In connection with both the Fiscal Year 2004 and Fiscal Year 
2005 budgets, the Administration has submitted legislative proposals 
that give SBA specific enforcement authorities for its lenders, 
including Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs). SBA had expected 
that some action would be taken on the legislative proposals and that 
the Agency would subsequently develop regulations. There may still be 
Congressional action on this issue; however, in the absence of specific 
legislation, SBA intends to go forward with proposed enforcement 
regulations under SBA's general oversight authority. The timeline for 
developing any proposed and final regulation simply does not allow for 
shortening the timing for regulations beyond the current timeline. 
Agency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) governing supervision and 
enforcement of SBA's lenders under current authorities are scheduled to 
be in place by September 30, 2004.

However, the lack of supervisory and enforcement regulations does not 
prevent SBA from taking action against SBA lenders when the 
circumstances warrant. SBA has specific regulatory and procedural 
requirements for its lenders, including SBLCs. When these requirements 
are not met, SBA can, and has, taken appropriate action.

The LMS delivers information tools which will allow SBA to become aware 
and respond to potential problems more quickly. It also allows SBA's 
Office of Lender Oversight to plan and adjust its review schedule to 
respond to problems identified.

3. Recommendation Three: The administrator should ensure that resources 
already within SBA are devoted to developing the policies for the use 
of the loan monitoring service so that the overall timeline for 
completion -April 2005-is met.

As noted above, SBA is committed to fully implementing a loan 
monitoring system. Critical to that effort is the development, 
implementation and communication of lender oversight policies and 
procedures. The majority of these policies are scheduled to be in place 
by September 30, 2004. The exception is the publication of a final rule 
for enforcement actions which is planned for April 2005 due to the 
timeline involved in the regulatory process. We will make every effort 
to meet the timeline established by SBA for completion (April 2005).

4. Recommendation Four: Establish an agency wide task force to explore 
the potential for applying the capabilities of the D&B service to SBA 
business processes and responsibilities other than lender oversight, 
such as overall portfolio risk management or budget projections. 
Programmatic offices and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
should be included.

SBA has made a major investment in the loan and lender monitoring 
services provided by D&B and agrees with GAO's recommendation that SBA 
leverage this resource to the maximum extent possible. Over the past 
year, while our Office of Lender Oversight has appropriately been the 
lead office in acquiring and implementing the system, other offices 
have been involved in the process from the beginning. These offices 
include, but are not limited to, the Office of the Chief Financial 
Officer, the Office of Financial Assistance and the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer. One of the main reasons for including 
representatives from these other offices on the LMS team was to ensure 
that they were aware of the features of the system in order to 
ascertain how they might best utilize its features for their program 
activities. SBA will continue the involvement of these offices in LMS 
activities.

While some information provided to SBA by D&B has far-ranging uses that 
could benefit other program areas of SBA, the Agency must be cognizant 
of the fact that the system contains confidential business information 
regarding small businesses and credit information on the principals in 
the businesses. As the D&B system is a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
package, it does not contain features that allow SBA to limit views of 
information to particular audiences. SBA has to identify the data that 
would be of use to other offices and ascertain the best vehicle for its 
dissemination.

5. Recommendation Five: Develop contingency plans that would enable 
SBA's continued risk management of the 7(a) and 504 portfolio overall, 
individual lenders, and their portfolios in the event that the D. & B. 
contract is discontinued.

SBA has been considering various options to continue its approach to 
loan and lender monitoring should the D&B contract be discontinued. It 
is impractical to run concurrent contracts as a contingency plan. 
However, while SBA could not replicate the credit scoring components, 
SBA could acquire small business scores from Fair Isaac directly. With 
that information, combined with the analytical framework created by 
D&B, SBA would be able to continue its loan and lender monitoring 
activities until another vendor with an acceptable solution was 
engaged. SBA has identified several nationally recognized vendors that 
offer possible replacement systems. SBA receives monthly downloads of 
the data mart from D&B which are used for portfolio analysis and can be 
utilized to support an interim solution until a subsequent vendor is 
obtained.

Again, SBA appreciates the opportunity to review GAO's draft report. 
Please contact Anthony Bedell, Assistant Administrator for 
Congressional and Legislative Affairs, at (202) 205-6700 should you 
wish to discuss this response in more detail.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Ronald E. Bew:

Associate Deputy Administrator for Capital Access: 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

William B. Shear, (202) 512-8678 M. Katie Harris, (202) 512-8415: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individuals above, Triana Bash, Dan Blair, Jamey 
Collins, Jordan Corey, Dave Gill, Fred Jimenez, Mitch Rachlis, Carl 
Ramirez, and Rhonda Rose made key contributions to this report.

(250158): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] Credit risk is the risk of financial loss due to borrower default.

[2] Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. 
Section 636, as amended. Authority for section 504 loans is codified at 
15 U.S.C. Section 696, as amended.

[3] Under one of SBA's 7(a) programs, the Export Working Capital 
Program, which provides short-term working capital to exporters, the 
agency can guarantee up to 90 percent of the loan.

[4] Certified and preferred lenders consist of both private banks, 
credit unions, and Small Business Lending Companies (SBLC). SBLCs are 
nonbank lenders licensed and regulated--both for program compliance and 
for safety and soundness--by SBA. Unlike private banks, which have 
federal banking regulators, only SBA regulates SBLCs. 

[5] SBA can guarantee up to 85 percent of loans of $150,000 or less and 
up to 75 percent of loans above $150,000. 15 U.S.C. Section 636 (a) (2) 
(A) (2002).

[6] Under standard operating procedures, SBA evaluates CDCs every three 
years. SOP 5010 Subpart H Chapter 24 Paragraph 26. Regulations require 
CDCs to submit annual reports to SBA district offices, and SBA uses 
these reports for evaluation and monitoring performance. 13 C.F.R. 
Section 120.830 (2004).

[7] A debenture is an unsecured debt backed only by the credit 
worthiness of the borrower. Debentures have no collateral, and the 
agreement is documented by an indenture. The yields may vary from high 
to low, depending on who backs the debenture.

[8] Loan portfolio management is an important element of an internal 
control framework.

[9] Public Law No. 104-208, Div. D, 110 Stat. 3009-724, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 633, as amended.

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: 
Better Planning and Controls Needed for Information Systems, GAO/AIMD-
97-94 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 1997).

[11] Public Law No. 105-135 Section 233, 15 U.S.C. Section 633 note.

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: 
Mandated Planning for Loan Monitoring System Is Not Complete, GAO/AIMD-
98-214R (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1998); Small Business 
Administration: Planning for Loan Monitoring System Has Many Positive 
Features but Still Carries Implementation Challenges, GAO/T-AIMD-98-
233 (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1998); SBA Loan Monitoring System: 
Substantial Progress Yet Key Risks and Challenges Remain, GAO/AIMD-00-
124 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2000); Loan Monitoring System: SBA 
Needs to Evaluate the Use of Software, GAO-02-188 (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 30, 2001).

[13] See Public Law No. 107-77, v. 115 Stat. 796 (2001); H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 107-278 at 164 (2001).

[14] For the $17.3 million that had been used, $9.6 million was used 
for system-related activities and about $7.7 million had been spent for 
nonsystem activities related to SBA's modernization effort.

[15] FEDSIM is part of the GSA's Office of Information Technology 
Integration and provides client services on a fee-for-service basis. It 
is a federal government source for technical expertise to manage 
information technology needs. 

[16] The value of the contract is $1.8 million for the first year, and 
$1.8 million, $1.9 million, $2.1 million, and $2.2 million for the four 
subsequent optional years. Annual renewal is the option of SBA.

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: 
Progress Made but Improvements Needed in Lender Oversight, GAO-03-90 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 2002).

[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: 
Actions Needed to Strengthen Small Business Lending Company Oversight, 
GAO-01-192 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2000).

[19] SBA Office of Inspector General, Audit of 504 Loan Program 
Oversight, Audit Report No. 3-10 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2003).

[20] SBA's Office of Inspector General Fiscal Year 2003 Performance 
Accountability Report does not report any updated information on this 
recommendation. 

[21] Financial regulators include the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). In addition, the Basel Committee of the Bank for 
International Settlements, which was established by the central-bank 
Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1974 to provide a forum for 
regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters, comprises members 
from these agencies and is responsible for formulating broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines and recommending statements of 
best practice for risk management. We will use "financial regulators" 
throughout this report to refer to the above-mentioned financial 
regulators. 

[22] This information was derived from the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency's Comptroller's Handbook on Loan Portfolio Management 
(April 1998) and Rating Credit Risk (April 2001); OCC Director's 
Handbook; and Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, Risk 
Management: Comprehensive Chapters on Market, Credit, and Operational 
Risk, 1st ed. (New York, New York: McGraw Hill, 2001), 106.

[23] William F. Treacy and Mark S. Carey, "Credit Risk Rating at Large 
U.S. Banks," Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1998).

[24] A data mart is a subset of a larger database that is focused on a 
specific business process. For example, according to SBA officials, 
there are six databases: "7(a) lender," with 5,300 lenders; "7(a) 
loan," with over 600,000 loans; "7(a) trend," with 300,000 loans; "504 
lender," with 270 lenders; "504 loan," with 70,000 loans; and "504 
trend," with 40,000 loans. The data mart includes only the current 
quarter 7(a) and 504 data. A separate database houses the previous 
quarters' data for historical analysis and other purposes.

[25] SBA will use the SBPS to predict the likelihood of severe 
delinquency and the FSS to predict the likelihood of a business ceasing 
operations. 

[26] The projected purchase rate is based on a calculation. This 
calculation includes determining the probability of purchase for the 
SBA portfolio by statistically mapping the SBPS score through a 
retroscore analysis. The retroscore analysis validates that the SBPS 
score effectively ranks orders purchase risk within the SBA portfolio 
and determines the precise probability of SBA purchase associated with 
each score. Once the probability of purchase is determined, it is 
multiplied by each loan's SBA dollars to determine the projected 
purchase dollars for each loan. The next step in the calculation is to 
aggregate the projected purchase dollars for all loans within a 
lender's portfolio. The last step in determining the projected purchase 
rate is to divide the total projected purchase dollar by the total SBA 
dollars within each lender's portfolio. 

[27] Demographic profiling includes analysis of the portfolio data 
based on certain variables, including geography and industry code. 
Segmentation profiling and analysis involves segmenting each loan or 
lender into a group with specific profiles. Potential segmentation 
variables include SBPS score, loan type, loan status, and gross amount 
approved.

[28] Statement of Hector V. Barreto, Administrator of the SBA, to the 
Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (Feb. 12, 
2004).

[29] The portfolio includes a broad national sample of loan sizes, loan 
types, geographic locations, and legal structures.

[30] U.S. General Accounting Office, Small Business Administration: 
Model for 7(a) Program Subsidy Had Reasonable Equations, but Inadequate 
Documentation Hampered External Reviews, GAO-04-09 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 31, 2004).

[31] The information on Form 1502 includes a wide variety of data for 
individual loans, such as loan identification number, loan status 
(e.g., current, past due, or in liquidation), loan interest rate, 
portion of the loan guaranteed by SBA, and ending balance of the loan's 
guaranteed portion.

GAO's Mission: 

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
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