SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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43–413 CC
1997
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EGYPT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 10, 1997
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
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WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL ''MARK'' SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JERRY MORAN, Kansas
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KEVIN BRADY, Texas
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
WALTER CAPPS, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
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DEBORAH E. BODLANDER, Professional Staff Member
CAROLINE G. COOPER, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
Dr. Robert Satloff, Executive Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Mr. Joe Stark, Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch/Middle East
Dr. Mamoun H. Fandy, Research Professor, Arab Studies, Georgetown University
Mr. Abe Foxman, National Director, Anti-Defamation League
APPENDIX
Opening statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Statement of Representative Gary L. Ackerman
Statement of Dr. Robert Satloff
Statement of Mr. Joe Stark
Statement of Dr. Mamoun H. Fandy
Statement of Mr. Abe Foxman
ADL press statement on Anti-Jewish Rhetoric
''Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian Media'' by the Anti-Defamation League
Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by Chairman Gilman to the Department of State
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Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by Chairman Gilman to the Department of Defense
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EGYPT
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1997
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to take stock of one of our more important bilateral relationships, if not the most important, that between the United States and Egypt, and to assess the current status of American-Egyptian cooperation, where it stands, and where we would like to see it go.
Since the 1970's, our relations with Egypt have been a key element in the American policy in the Middle East. Our two nations have been united in the pursuit of several common goals, including the promotion of regional peace and stability, the opposition to terrorism and extremism, and more recently, our joint efforts to promote Egyptian economic reform.
Our U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship is marked by a significant level of military cooperation, including joint military exercises, a large-scale aid and development program, frequent high-level meetings between our political leaders, and a generally shared perception of the complexities in trying to maintain regional stability. Without question, Egypt has in the past played an indispensable role in shaping the environment for peace. Egypt pointed the way to Arab reconciliation with Israel in the 1979 Camp David accords.
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But instead of looking at our past achievement and cooperation, we must now look toward the future to ensure that the basis of this partnership reflects the realities of the Middle East as we move into the 21st century.
Today's hearing is also occasioned by the regrettable widespread perception that the United States and Egypt appear to be moving further apart on a range of critical issues. The latest example of discord occurred most recently when, under Egyptian leadership, the Arab League recommended that its member States ceased normalizing relations with Israel and to restore the old economic boycott. Egypt's leadership role in that vote puzzles and dismays many of its friends in the United States. Both Egypt and the Arab League appear to have taken an unfortunate step backward with the failed politics of confrontation with Israel.
Of course, old friends like the United States and Egypt will always have legitimate differences of opinion, and we respect those differences, but the Arab League vote is only the latest in a series of other moves by Egypt in recent years, that indicated a pattern in its foreign relations that has been distressing.
For example, Egypt has repeatedly called for easing sanctions against Libya and has refused to support even mild antiterrorism resolutions against Sudan. Egypt has opposed U.S. initiatives to compel Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions and advocated the reintegration of Iraq into the Arab fold. Egypt has also derailed regional arms reduction talks by insisting on discussing Israel's purported nuclear arsenal, a move that has prevented progress on the more urgent issue of conventional arms in the region.
Moreover, as for the peace process, we hear repeatedly from various sources that until 24 hours before the Hebron accord was signed, Egypt had not been helpful during the negotiations. One might add to this list reports that Egypt's human rights record has steadily worsened in recent years. Many of our colleagues are also concerned that Egypt has abdicated its leadership role for peace and is gradually adopting a more hostile posture toward Israel.
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For example, President Mubarak has not spoken out rigorously against terrorism and the use of violence in the current wave of unrest in the Middle East. Leadership requires President Mubarak to signal explicitly that there is an Egyptian red light on the use of violence.
Many of our colleagues will also express their dismay over Egypt's cold peace with Israel. After nearly 16 years as President, Mr. Mubarak has visited Israel on only one occasion, to attend the funeral of late Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. For two countries that are at peace, this standoffish posture puzzles many of Egypt's friends in the Congress. Egypt's friends are also puzzled by the prevalence of a number of anti-Semitic themes in the Egyptian press and in academia.
Before asking my colleagues if they want to make an opening statement, I want to express my regret that the Administration is not present with us this morning. Our Committee invited the State Department, USAID, and the Defense Department to send representatives to this hearing. As I indicated yesterday when we had a similar situation, our Committee takes our responsibility on these important matters very seriously, and I am hoping the State Department will work with us more cooperatively in the future.
But despite the Administration's absence, the Committee will submit to the relevant agencies in writing questions which we would have posed to their witnesses this morning.
Before introducing our witnesses, I would ask if any of my colleagues have an opening statement they would like to make.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first fully identify myself with your comments concerning U.S.-Egyptian relations. We had an excellent relationship with Egypt over a long period of time, and, in an almost inexplicable manner, there has been a growing pattern of anti-U.S. attitudes that one can detect in Egyptian foreign policy. This relates not only to the immediate region, but it also reflects an attitude of undermining U.S. foreign policy purposes and actions and interests in the broader arena.
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Unfortunately, President Mubarak's recent visit with us did not serve to dispel our concerns with respect to the deterioration of U.S.-Egyptian relations. It is incomprehensible to me that after this country, under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, has gone out of its way to provide Egypt with economic, military, political, and other support in a steadfast fashion, the attitude of the Egyptian Government should be increasingly hostile to U.S. foreign policy interests on a broad range of issues.
Instead of functioning as a stabilizing and moderating influence, Egypt has been in the forefront of exacerbating the current crisis in the Middle East. Egypt has attempted in a variety of ways to undermine U.S. foreign policy with respect to Iraq. Egypt has been hostile to our policy with respect to Libya. And I think it is none too soon for the Egyptian Government to understand that the multi-billion-dollar U.S. aid program to Egypt is not an unchangeable entitlement.
The Congress of the United States embarked on a major program of providing aid to Egypt, both economic and technical, many years ago. The American taxpayer has spent billions and billions of dollars year after year to improve the Egyptian economy and the standard of living of the Egyptian people. Instead of an attitude of cooperation and friendship, we have been increasingly subjected to negative attitudes and actions by the Egyptian Government.
Many months ago in a letter to the President of Egypt, I made this position clear in the hope that, hoisting the flag of caution, our Egyptian friends will understand that patience in the Congress is not infinite. Far from an improvement in Egyptian attitudes toward U.S. policy goals, there has been a further deterioration.
I would like to serve public notice that it is my intention, when the issue of aid to Egypt comes before us, I reserve the option of proposing a cut in that aid, since I do not think that the American taxpayer can be expected to continue the level of aid to Egypt that we have undertaken for years in the light of a pattern of policies hostile to U.S. foreign policy interests.
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I hope it is not too late for the Government of Egypt to rethink its attitudes with respect to the United States. But a pattern of undermining U.S. national objectives while receiving large aid from the United States on an almost routine annual basis is an unrealistic expectation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Do any of our other Members seek recognition? If not, we will start with our first witness.
Our first witness this morning is Dr. Robert Satloff, the Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Dr. Satloff is a distinguished expert on Arab and Islamic politics and on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Dr. Satloff has been a member of the Washington Institute since 1985. He has written widely on Palestinian and Jordanian affairs and the political repercussions of Islamic politics on regional stability. He has appeared as a Middle East commentator in such major papers as the New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times. He has appeared on TV and radio, including CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News, among other programs. He is the author and editor of important works too numerous to cite individually, but including ''The Politics of Change in the Middle East,'' and ''From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition.'' He is also a professional lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies and is fluent in Arabic, French, and Hebrew.
You certainly have an impressive background, Dr. Satloff. We welcome you. You may put in your full statement for the record or summarize, as you may deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT SATLOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
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Mr. SATLOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that kind introduction. It is an honor to appear before this Committee. I will be summarizing my statement and submitting the full statement for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be entered into the record.
Mr. SATLOFF. In a previous appearance before this Committee, my attempt at brevity did not succeed, so I think that is probably the wise thing to do.
Mr. Chairman, in recent years, as visible signs of discord between the United States and Egypt over a wide array of issues have appeared, the topic of today's hearing has emerged as one of the most important on the regional agenda. Regretfully, however, it is often overlooked in the rush of events. I commend the Committee greatly for holding this hearing.
I, too, am sorry the U.S. Government officials are not here today. I would have preferred being on the second panel and not the first. I also, Mr. Chairman, associate myself with your opening comments, which I think accurately summarize the existing situation with the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. I would just add a few other words about it.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to make four points in my opening statement: First, about Egypt's importance; second, about what is broken in the U.S.-Egyptian relationship; third, about the absence of a mechanism to deal with the problem in the U.S.-Egyptian relationship; fourth, what is to be done.
Mr. Chairman, the first point, Egypt's importance is self-evident. For two decades, this relationship has been a centerpiece of U.S. policy, a centerpiece of U.S. efforts to bolster peace and security in the Middle East. There are four elements at the core of this relationship: A strategic alliance, a commitment to peace, a pursuit of economic reform, and a recognition of the importance of incrementalism in the pursuit of liberalization and democratization.
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Along the way, as Egypt moved from war to peace, it paid a steep price for its moderation, suffering political isolation, ostracism, and the loss of great financial assistance from other Arab States. U.S. economic assistance partly offset this loss, and at the core of the rationale for U.S. aid to Egypt is the belief that U.S. interests are served by a strong Egypt, able to meet the needs of its people and to assert itself in the Middle East.
Over the past few years, however, public disputes, disagreements, and divergences between the United States and Egypt have increased. Today, we have sadly reached the point where the foundation of the bilateral relationship has eroded. Divergences are in a wide array of issues, from Egypt's role in the peace process, both bilateral and multilateral tracks, to the lack of warmth in Egypt's own relationship with Israel, to Egypt's relationship with terrorist-supporting States on its borders, to Egypt's criticism of Israeli-Turkish security ties, to support for Iraqi reintegration into the Arab world, and for castigation of U.S. actions against Iraq.
I would note here, President Mubarak was one of the few leaders in the world to term the U.S. missile strike against Iraq in September 1996 as ''a violation of international law.''
While important and fundamental areas of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation remain intact, I fear that they reflect only an episodic convergence of interests, not a pattern of partnership. This complements, I fear, the strategic decision Egypt appears to have made regarding relations with Israel, a decision that marks a deep contrast from Egypt's policies in the 1970s and the 1980s.
At that time, the policy was to broaden the Arab relationship with Israel, to validate Egypt's own peace. In the last half-dozen years, however, Egypt has taken a different path, one that tends to view Israel as a challenge to Egypt's self-perception as a regional power and that views Egypt's national interests as zero sum with Israel's.
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I think there are a number of pieces of evidence that support this contention, Mr. Chairman, and I will just list a few very briefly, and they all come under the rubric of Egypt's relationship with Israel, having turned from what was characterized as cold peace in the 1970s and 1980s to what I think is cold war today.
I was saddened that in a recent issue of Jerusalem Report, President Mubarak in a cover story interview was asked about cold peace and replied, ''Believe me, it will stay cold and it will stay cold for a very long time to come.''
I was also saddened that in September, when Egypt undertook its exercises, military exercises, Badr 96, using the same code name as the exercises that led to, in that worthy October war of 1973, the managing editor of Al-Ahram newspaper described the rationale for terming this the same code name as in 1973 when he said, ''The lessons of Badr 73 and Badr 96 take us back to the starting point, that the end of war does not necessarily mean the achievement of peace,'' and, he said, ''Vice versa, the achievement of peace is not the end of war.''
Perhaps most disturbing, as you said, Mr. Chairman, was the Arab League resolution adopted last week recommending the reimposition of the boycott. In my view, this resolution, which could not have been approved without Egyptian support and urging, is, at the very least, a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, article 3, paragraph 3, by which the parties agree that their relationship will ''Include the termination of economic boycotts,'' and paragraph 2, by which each party commits to ''Refrain from participating in acts or threats of hostility.''
Now, none of this is to suggest that Cairo is planning or even contemplating any breach of the military aspects of its treaty. Maintaining that treaty is clearly in Egypt's national interest, especially at a moment when they are so strongly committed to implementing market reforms. But we would be remiss if we did not recognize the seriousness of the drift now under way toward containment of Israel, not reconciliation with Israel.
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The U.S. relationship is broken, and it needs fixing. Today reflects the realities of the 1970s, not the 1990s. What is lacking, I believe, in the dilemma of this relationship is that the United States feels itself constrained from pursuing an open and honest discussion for fear of sending a message to the Egyptian leadership and its opposition that our support for President Mubarak is somehow wavering.
We haven't found a way to have a true strategic dialog without precluding us from open and honest debate that doesn't send the wrong message to the opposition. We haven't figured out the problem that has nagged us from dealing with the shah, still more than 20 years later.
What is to be done, Mr. Chairman? Let me recommend the following. First and foremost, we need an ongoing, high-level, bilateral consultation that ends the ad hoc form of relations that still bedevils this relationship after 20 years. We have this on economic matters, between Vice President Gore and President Mubarak. We lack it on almost all other aspects of this bilateral relationship. We need it.
Mr. Chairman, we need a common agenda for U.S.-Egyptian security relations. The shape and composition of the $1.3 billion annual military assistance package is not today the product of thorough ongoing consultations that reflect common approaches to regional security. It must be so. In this context, it is imperative that Egypt's leaders cease making public statements or taking action, such as military maneuvers, which characterize Israel as a threat to Egyptian national security.
From a major non-NATO ally, from a signatory for Egypt's peace treaty, from a recipient of major U.S. economic and military assistance, this is unacceptable. It not only poisons the relationship for Egyptian-Israeli relations, but it also erodes the confidence we have in the direction of Egyptian strategic thinking.
On economic matters, Mr. Chairman, I believe the objective must be to change our economic relationship to improve the prospects for economic growth in Egypt. Given the great strides Egypt has taken in structural reform in recent years, now is the time for us to reshape the $815 million economic assistance package, to bolster reform, cut back the aid bureaucracy, and place the economic relationship on a healthier footing. President Mubarak understands this, and he has admitted so in public.
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Reductions in U.S. economic assistance, not in pique, not as punitive measures, but to improve Egypt's prospects for a healthier, sounder economy is a good idea. We should begin immediately. Options include debt restructuring, increased trade.
One idea very popular among Egyptian businessmen is to decrease economic assistance via a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff that matches cuts in aid with increased access to the American market. We should change the mix in our aid package, lowering the overall amount of assistance, perhaps, and channeling it into areas where Egyptians decide more on their own where it should go.
These are just options, but we need to view them immediately, Mr. Chairman, because shoring up the foundation of the relationship needs to be a top priority. I believe it is essential that our dialog with Egypt begin with a clear enunciation of the problem, which I believe our Administration does not yet recognize, and it highlights the need for Egypt to take urgent action to strengthen both U.S.-Egyptian relations and to correct the image that our relationship is only a periodic confluence of interests, not a strategic partnership.
Two key areas are Arab normalization with Israel and the maintenance of international sanctions on Iraq. If Egypt cannot take clear action on these two matters, I fear, Mr. Chairman, that we may be approaching a breach in relations. I know and hope and believe this can be avoided, but I believe also that unless immediate action is taken, it may not.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Dr. Satloff, for your very pertinent testimony.
Our next witness is Joseph Stork, who is the Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, an independent human rights monitoring group based in New York and in Washington. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Mr. Stork was the chief editor of the Middle East Report, a bimonthly magazine in Washington. Mr. Stork's articles on Middle East developments have appeared in many publications and books, including the ''Introductory Essay for Political Islam,'' a book published last year by the University of California Press.
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Mr. Stork has also been a frequent Middle East commentator on radio and other media.
Welcome, Mr. Stork. You may, again, introduce your entire testimony for the record or summarize it, whichever you may deem appropriate.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH STORK, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. STORK. I would like to try to summarize it this morning and also submit it in its entirety for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, your entire testimony will be made part of the record. Please proceed.
Mr. STORK. I would like to thank you for inviting Human Rights Watch to testify this morning. We welcome the attention of the Committee to the U.S. policy regarding Egypt, and we would urge the Congress and this Committee in particular to place respect for human rights among the highest priority concerns of the United States in that relationship. We would also urge that criticism of human rights practices not be reserved for those States that have poor relations with Washington, and in that regard, we would also urge that the Committee schedule hearings addressing U.S. policy to the other countries in the region, close allies of the United States, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and Tunisia, whose human rights records also leave much to be desired.
U.S. policymakers have long viewed Egypt as a key military and political ally. The status, however, in our view, has for too long exempted the Egyptian Government from the kind of human rights scrutiny and criticism warranted by the serious and recurrent nature of human rights abuses there. Although U.S. officials have assured us that human rights concerns are raised privately by embassy officials in Cairo, we see no signs that it is at this level in this fashion producing results.
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One State Department official recently acknowledged to me, for instance, that when President Mubarak visited Washington in 1996, staffers at the Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor were essentially told by the White House not to bother forwarding the briefings they prepared because the subject of human rights would not be raised in his meetings with President Mubarak. As far as we know, the only U.S. rebuke to Egypt's human rights record is the chapter in the annual State Department Country Reports, and that appears to have no policy consequences.
There is no evidence, furthermore, that the Clinton Administration has used the leverage provided by the annual $2.1 billion aid package, to insist, for instance, the Mubarak Government lift the state of emergency under which it has ruled since 1981, or that Egypt take specific steps to approve other aspects of its human rights record. If anything, senior officials this last year have publicly signalled that Egypt's human rights record was off limits. Again, with the sole exception of the Country Reports.
Human Rights Watch has been monitoring the situation in Egypt since 1990. And, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit a chapter from our most recent World Report on Egypt for inclusion in the public record.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. STORK. The violations I would like to bring to your attention today relate to Egypt's obligations under international law, but we believe they are also important because of the impact on Egypt's future political course. And by urging the Government of Egypt to increase the space for nonviolent political association, to end the impunity of the security forces and to implement legislative reforms that would encourage broader participation in the political process, the United States can contribute to a more durable stability in Egypt, one of which pluralism and respect for the law would help to marginalize militant extremism.
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I would like to run through very briefly some of the major issues we see with regard to Egypt's human rights record. In February, Egypt's Parliament approved a Presidential decree extending emergency rule until the year 2000. The government has been ruling through a state of emergency since 1981 and, indeed, for much of the last 30 years since 1967. Under the emergency law, the government has the power to restrict freedom of assembly and conduct searches and detain subjects without following the criminal procedure code, to censor publications, and to try accused persons, even those not accused of committing or advocating acts of violence before security courts. The imposition of the state of emergency long predates the pattern of violence by armed Islamic groups that has characterized the past several years, although the government cites this pattern of violence in justifying its continued use of the state of emergency.
Human Rights Watch strongly condemns abuses by armed opposition groups, and we recognize the right of the government to prevent such abuses and to bring the perpetrators to justice. However, the methods used to achieve this purpose must conform to international standards, and abuses by opposition groups can never justify violations of fundamental rights by the government themselves.
In particular, we would like to draw your attention this morning to the use of military courts against civilians. Since 1992, these courts have tried and condemned to death civilians charged with acts of political violence in proceedings that have not complied with international affairs trial standards. The Egyptian Government has told Human Rights Watch the cases referred to military courts involved ''terrorist groups,'' and President Mubarak stated back in 1993 the government would use military courts only, ''In cases that required quick measures.''
The need for speedy trials, however, doesn't permit a government to circumvent internationally guaranteed rights, including the right to a fair trial and the right to appeal a conviction to a higher tribunal, especially when conviction can mean a death sentence.
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Since 1995, in a particularly disturbing move, the government has used military courts to prosecute scores of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization that advocates its political agenda through nonviolent means. Consider the trial of 83 Muslim Brothers before the supreme military court in August 1995, for instance, that ended 4 months later with the conviction of 54 of them. The Interior Minister publicly accused the defendants of ''supporting terrorism,'' but the State's formal charges concerned nonviolent political activities, such as belonging to a proscribed group, recruiting new members and fund-raising.
The prosecution of defendants, many who were well known figures in Egyptian public life, was clearly designed to weaken the Brotherhood in advance of Parliamentary elections in which many Muslim Brothers intended to run as independent candidates.
In April 1996, just a year ago, 13 more Muslim Brothers were arrested, including university professors, former members of Parliament, elected officers of professional associations and university clubs, and candidates for Parliament. The case was transferred to the supreme military court by Presidential decree. No evidence was presented during the trial that the defendants had engaged in or advocated violence.
On August 15 of 1996, the Court sent seven of the defendants to 3 years in prison, including a former member of Parliament and another gentleman, both in their 1970s and in poor health.
Mr. Chairman, again, with your permission, I would like to submit for the record a statement the Human Rights Watch made in August 1996 at the conclusion of that trial.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, it will be part of the record.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. STORK. In the matter of freedom of association, the Egyptian Government restricts that freedom for nongovernmental organizations and political parties, constraining civil society and citizen participation in the political process. Civic groups are denied legal status, and in some cases, have been dissolved by the authorities. A political parties law hampers newly formed political groups from securing legal status. The Party Affairs Committee is a semigovernmental body dominated by the ruling party of President Mubarak and has the sole authority to issue licenses for new parties. It has systematically denied newly formed groups such licenses, forcing them to challenge the rulings through protracted legal proceedings that last as long as 10 years. Since the law was passed in 1977, not a single political party has been allowed to form through the approval of the Committee.
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Regarding political participation, I noted earlier the renewal of the state of emergency was approved by the elective Parliament, but elections to that body themselves are conducted under the state of emergency with its intended restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech and restrictions on freedom of association under the political parties law.
The November and December elections of 1995 were marked by arbitrary arrests of opposition and independent candidates, by massive irregularities at the polls, including loss of life, going to excessive use of force, dispersing citizens, protesting vote-rigging and other fraudulent practices. The vote was an overwhelming victory for President Mubarak's ruling of the National Democratic Party. An Egyptian court has since nullified the results in some 200 constituencies, 200 out of 444, but the Parliament has, until now, simply ignored the court rulings.
Let me come briefly to the question of torture, which human rights has documented in Egypt—Human Rights Watch has documented in Egypt since 1992, particularly torture committed by the Ministry of Interior's internal security force, the State Security Investigation, or the SSI. In 1996, the U.N. Committee Against Torture, following a 3-year investigation, reported that, ''Torture is systematically practiced by security forces in Egypt and particularly by the SSI'' and that reported cases are seen to be habitual, widespread and deliberate in at least a considerable part of the country. The government has permitted the SSI free rein in its torturer's acts with impunity, a lack of transparency characterized as official investigations of suspicious deaths in SSI custody. As a result, SSI torturers have not been held accountable for their acts.
Impunity concerning deaths in custody is extended to cases involving the police as well. For instance, the authorities banned the July 14, 1996, issue of the Middle East Times, the Cairo-based weekly, because it carried a story about five persons who had been ill treated in a police station, one of whom died shortly after detention from a brain hemorrhage.
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Abysmal prison conditions also are a major concern. Defense lawyers have expressed concern about inadequate food and particularly lack of medical care and physical abuse regarding political prisoners and in new facilities, such as Wadi Jedid, Aqrab, and Fayyoum prisons.
One attorney told us in 1995, he had been permitted 2 minutes at Wadi Jedid to see one of his clients, Hassan Gharabawy, a lawyer detained without charge since 1989. ''They brought him to me, crawling.'' The lawyer told us, ''Then they told him to 'visit.' He got up, he collapsed, and he said, 'I don't want anything. I am dying slowly'.''
In August, 1995, Egyptian lawyers provided human rights with the name of 23 prisoners who had reportedly died at Wadi Jedid prison since it opened 7 months earlier in February of that year. One was a 35-year-old defense lawyer from Fayyoum, who had been arrested in December 1992, tried and acquitted by a military court, but never released. Authorities said this man died on June 20, 1995, from a lung ailment, but his family and lawyers have yet to receive a copy of the medical report.
During visits to security prisoners in 1992, Human Rights Watch representatives were told by inmates that men had died in their cells or in prison hospitals because of poor or nonexistent medical care. We have documented various breaches of international standards by prison authorities, including the requirement of medical supervision of prisoners who are sick or complain of illness. This is a very serious problem, Mr. Chairman, that has not been addressed by the Egyptian Government. Prisoners continue to die from inadequate care, even after appeals have been made to save their lives.
I want to turn very quickly to the issue of restrictions on freedom of expression. Over the past several years, Egyptian intellectuals have been the targets of a campaign of intimidation by militant Islamist groups in this regard, and some Muslim activists have used Egyptian civil courts and other State institutions to target Egyptian thinkers and artists. Nothing illustrates this more dramatically than the litigation against a Cairo university professor, Dr. Nasr Abu Zeid for his scholarly writings on Islam, and then the decision with grave implications for its effect on academic freedom and freedom of expression, the Cairo court of appeals declared Abu Zeid an apostate, and on this basis, ordered that he be separated from his Muslim wife, also a university professor.
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Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Stork, if you could try to summarize the remainder of your statement, I want to make sure we all have an opportunity to get into a discourse with all the panelists. Thank you.
Mr. STORK. Quite a reasonable request, sir.
I would finish this point by noting the Mubarak Government has yet to speak out publicly in defense of the rights of Dr. Abu Zeid and also request that you accept for the record intervention made by Human Rights Watch and 22 other American groups, including Arab American and American Muslim groups in August 1966 regarding that particular case.
My testimony also deals with the question of treatment of the Christian minority in Egypt. The Egyptian Constitution proclaims Islam the State religion, but also guarantees freedom of belief and freedom to practice religion. There are various aspects of the law, however, in the actual practice of government policy which have the effect of discriminating against Christians. I would cite, in particular, the decree, still enforced today, from the 19th century that requires the President's personal permission for any church construction or repair.
As one Christian lawyer told Human Rights Watch, if you have a decree that so obviously treats churches so differently from mosques, it gives a green light to those who want to make trouble.
The Egyptian Government has responded to the work of Egyptian human rights organizations, which indeed form one of the more serious and sophisticated communities of independent human rights organizations in the Middle East, and with great hostility has refused to license, for instance, the 10-year-old Egyptian organization for human rights and, in fact, has dismissed human rights, to use the words of President Mubarak, ''as interfering in the internal affairs of the country,'' just defending terrorists and criminals.
In summation, Mr. Chairman, Egypt is not a country that most people think of as one that employs fear and intimidation to maintain political control, yet in some important respects, the tactics of Egypt's security forces are not unlike those used in countries such as Syria. Human Rights Watch has documented the use of such tactics with human rights organizations, with defense lawyers, with families of victims of human rights abuses. It is fear of intimidation and retaliation, for instance, that has prevented such individuals from publicly disclosing and talking to Human Rights Watch and other international organizations about such abuses, and it is this fear that has also inhibited people from coming forward with additional accounts.
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Mr. Chairman, the human rights problems and abuses detailed above are consistent with the State Department's own reporting, and therefore should be familiar to the Members of this Committee. In the face of this record, though, the U.S. Government has clearly placed security and economic concerns at the head of its list and relegated human rights to a very low order. Key U.S. officials have spoken before this Committee; for instance, last June, former Secretary Pelletreau talked about President Mubarak's Government's commitment to accelerate economic reform and liberalization, but was silent on matters of political reform.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by reading several recommendations we would like to make, first to the Clinton Administration and then to the Members of Congress.
To the Clinton Administration, we would urge, first, that the Government of Egypt lift the state of emergency;
Second, that the government ensure freedom of association by decriminalizing peaceful political activity;
Third, that the government stop using military courts to prosecute civilians;
Fourth, that the government take specific, measurable steps to end the practice of torture and to investigate and prosecute personnel who commit or order such practices;
Fifth, the government should take immediate measures to ensure independent oversight of the treatment of inmates throughout the penal system;
Sixth, urge the Government of Egypt to repeal and reform the Ottoman law by which the construction and repair of Coptic churches is impeded;
Seventh, instruct the embassy staff in Cairo to attend security court trials and trials of civilians and military courts to demonstrate U.S. concerns with proceedings that fall short of fair trial standards; and
Last, make clear in visits to Cairo by the Secretary of State and other high-level officials and in meetings with high-level Egyptian officials in Washington, persistent, recurrent violations of human rights affect negatively the depth and quality of relations with the United States, and compliance with the recommendations above will strengthen and improve those relations.
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Finally, to the Members of Congress, we urge, first, you convey to the Clinton Administration and to the Government of Egypt your endorsement of the above recommendations;
Second, that you request the Administration to report regularly on progress by the Egyptian Government with regard to these recommendations;
Third, that you conduct regular hearings on U.S. policy toward Egypt and other major U.S. allies in the region;
Fourth, please ensure that human rights issues are on the agenda of hearings before this Committee and other appropriate committees in the House and Senate; and
Last, please make clear in your hearings and in your meetings with Egyptian officials in Cairo and in Washington, again, that persistent and recurrent violations of human rights affect the depth and quality of the country's relations with the United States and the compliance with human rights standards which strengthen and improve those standards.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Members of the Committee.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stork. We appreciate your extensive review.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stork appears in the appendix.
Chairman GILMAN. Our next witness is Dr. Mamoun Fandy, research professor of politics at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. Dr. Fandy specializes in the politics of Egypt and the Gulf States. Dr. Fandy's articles on the Middle East have appeared in the Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Christian Science Monitor.
Welcome, Dr. Fandy. You may submit your full statement for the record or summarize your statement, whichever you may deem appropriate.
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STATEMENT OF DR. MAMOUN FANDY, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY ARAB STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. FANDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize and submit the full statement for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Your full statement is accepted for the record without objection.
Mr. FANDY. It is an honor to appear before you as somebody who grew up in a small village in southern Egypt and, later, became an American citizen. It is probably only in the United States of America that one can directly speak to lawmakers, chances that might not be given to anybody elsewhere, so I am grateful for that opportunity.
As an American of Egyptian origin, I have an intense interest in these two very diverse countries with two diverse cultures, backgrounds, understanding each other. As a person who has written very critically about certain domestic policy of Egyptian Government—namely, the earlier mishandling of the Islamic problem and issues of further democratization—I am astonished that most criticism launched from Washington at Egypt is so misplaced.
Currently, all indicators point to a region heading for disaster, and blaming one country for this is not the solution. It is a mistake and even dangerous to hold American-Egyptian relations hostile to the deteriorating Arab-Israeli peace process.
We should not sacrifice Egypt at the offer of a failing peace process. And in spite of apparent differences between the two countries, if one examines Egypt's positions on some of the key issues of mutual concern, such as the peace process, Iraq, Libya, terrorism, one would soon realize, more often than not, Egypt's foreign policy has been in constant alignment with the overall objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Apparent differences between the two countries come from a lack of appreciation of Egypt's style of diplomacy and its attempt to reconcile its complex position as a leader in the Arab world, as an important Muslim country, as an African country, as a Middle Eastern country, while keeping its special relationship with the United States a priority.
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Confusion also comes from the fact that we do not have a coherent policy toward Egypt. What we have is a series of initiatives and dialogs in different areas of common concern. Sometimes, one of the issues dominates the agenda. Further complicating the picture are the conflicting signals that the United States sends. For instance, America's long-standing call for freedom of expression is hardly compatible with certain voices that come from the United States pressuring the government to clamp down on certain newspapers when they express displeasure with the United States and/or Israel. These signals are very contradictory and confusing.
Now turning to specifics, let me begin with Egypt's position on the peace process. It is important to recall Egypt was the first Arab country to initiate and sign a peace treaty with Israel, and that thus has a direct interest in guiding the other Arab States down the same path. We have to acknowledge Egypt paid a heavy price for this. The Arab States' 10-year boycott of Egypt had serious ramifications for the Egyptian economy, for the welfare of the Egyptian people, for the image of Egyptians in the Arab world. The aid we provide to Egypt is not comparable to what Egypt has lost in the Arab arena.
In spite of this price, those who are not in touch with the political realities of the region criticize peace between Egypt and Israel, calling it the cold peace. This cold peace is what paved the way for gradual acceptance of Israel by the larger Arab world. These critics do not realize, had Egypt adopted a more embracing and flamboyant approach to peace, it would have been more isolated and less instrumental to convince Arab States to follow suit. The fact that virtually all Arab States now have opened, or since have opened the dialog with Israel testifies to the inherent soundness of Mubarak's so-called peace. It illustrates, moreover, that the Arab world continues to take its cues from Cairo and the Egyptians; the pulse of the Arab world is more or less on target.
It is very important to realize that President Mubarak is one of the most sympathetic leaders in the region to the concerns of America and those of Israel. From an American point of view, it does not get any better than Mubarak. In fact, Mubarak has faced criticism for being too eager to accommodate American interests. Pressure on Mubarak to comply with everything on the wish list of American foreign policymakers and sometimes things Egypt cannot deliver is counterproductive.
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Instead of blaming the Egyptian leadership, we should judge them by their actions and the risks they have taken. First, President Mubarak has taken observation of the success of the peace process, and, despite that, Egyptian public outrage of remarks by Mr. Netanyahu that were interpreted to mean Egyptians lacked education and civilization. Mubarak has hosted Mr. Netanyahu twice in Cairo. Mr. Netanyahu reciprocated by announcing the closure of PSA offices in Jerusalem and affirming his position of building settlements in Arab Eastern Jerusalem as soon as he returned from Cairo.
If Mr. Netanyahu's intention was to embarrass Mubarak at home, his action and remarks did exactly that. Nonetheless, Mubarak's response has been more or less, I think, measured. Mubarak had the opportunity to embarrass the Israeli Government, mainly on the issue of Egyptian POWs that were executed by the Israeli Army during the 1967 and 1973 wars, and these revelations came from Israeli historians themselves. Yet in spite of public outrage in Cairo and throughout the country, Mubarak refrained from criticism for the sake of peace.
Despite such sacrifices, New York Times editorials still sometimes accuse Egypt of hindering the peace process. In actuality, the kind of deterioration in the peace process has occurred in spite of Egypt's efforts. If we are looking for reasons as to why the peace has faltered, we should focus our attention on changes in the region that have coincided with the current impasse. The real changes that have happened are in Israel, not Egypt.
The current crisis began with the assassination of late Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin by a Jewish fundamentalist, the defeat of the peace camp in Israel, and the resurrection of Likud hard-line politics.
In attempting to dispense with the Oslo Accord, the new Government in Israel has shaken the confidence that took years of concerted American and Egyptian diplomacy to build. What we see in Egypt is an effort to rebuild the shaken confidence and to prevent any further deterioration that could potentially lead to a new interruption of violence in the region. When Egypt advised Arafat to proceed carefully in the negotiations, the ultimate objective was to ensure that Arafat could sell the agreement to the Palestinian people without risking his own demise.
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Egypt has long recognized the alternative to Arafat is violence. There is no other Palestinian leader that can deliver peace with Israel. Hence, in this and other endeavors, the overriding objective for Egypt has been to build a slow but durable peace instead of a hastily conceived formula that would not last.
Since Camp David, Egypt has worked successfully with Israeli Prime Ministers, irrespective of their political or ideological considerations. Had it not been for the hard-line politics of the current Administration, little would have changed in Egypt-Israeli relations. What has happened in Egypt afterwards is a reaction rather than a cause. In addition to its contribution to the peace process, Egypt demonstrated its commitment to strategic objectives of the United States during the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis.
Egypt's leadership role and careful diplomacy were instrumental in building and maintaining the Arab component of the U.S.-led coalition that liberated Kuwait from the Iraq occupation. It is important also to recognize, however, Egypt is mindful of Arab perceptions of devastating effects of sanctions on the Iraqi people.
Although in some cases Egyptian policy may appear to conflict with the overall objectives of the United States, a careful look reveals otherwise. Libya and the issue of terrorism are but two examples. Egypt's constructive engagement with Colonel Qadhafi is, in fact, very sensible, given the long border Egypt shares with Libya and the large number of Egyptians who work there. Qadhafi could have been much more troublesome without Egyptian involvement.
On the issue of terrorism, Egypt successfully convened the Sharm al-Sheikh conference in response to an event that took place in Israel to shore up Peres' position and to assure the Israeli people that Egypt does not tolerate random violence against innocent people.
Egypt's behavior in some instances is dictated by local realities. One example was President Mubarak's refusal to come to Washington for an emergency summit in October of last year. Mubarak was aware coming to Washington would not produce any results. The outcome of that meeting vindicated his judgment. Mr. Mubarak has to see that a trip is worthwhile and can be sold to the public in Egypt and in the Arab world at large.
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Egypt's behavior is not at odds with the United States. However, it is at odds with the Israeli Government on some issues. Egypt's concern over the NPT was largely driven by Arab concern over the Israeli nuclear arsenal. And in spite of heavy criticism at home, Egypt signed a treaty mainly to accommodate the American position.
Yet America's interests in the Arab world are not in total agreement with Israel's interests. Totally conflicting Israel's interest with American interests is an ideological position of some interest groups that confuse the broader pursuit of America's interest in an important region. America has interest in the Gulf oil, the bloodline of Western civilization, in a very large Arab market, and in regional security issues that should be separated from the interest of other States.
Seeing the Arab world through the Israeli lens is a disservice to America's broad and complex global interests, and in spite of the Egyptian public disagreement with some specific American policies, there is a tremendous untapped reservoir of goodwill toward Americans based on respect for American ideals and gratitude for America's solid stand in averting aggression against Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956. If it were not for America, that occupation would have lasted longer, and the Egyptians recognize that.
To utilize this reservoir of goodwill, I suggest an expansion, a greater cooperation, of the Gore-Mubarak partnership to include greater economic, social, and cultural cooperation. A stable Egypt is central to a stable Middle East.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fandy appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, very much, Dr. Fandy.
Our final witness today is Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League since 1987. He is a world renowned leader in the fight against bigotry, anti-Semitism, and discrimination. He appears frequently on national news programs, often quoted in America's major newspapers and news magazines. Mr. Foxman is a Holocaust survivor and is a recognized authority on the Holocaust and the Jewish resistance to the Nazis. He has written extensively on the subject, has contributed to the Encyclopedia Judaica as well as to at least four books. He is a member of the President's Holocaust Memorial Council, the Advisory Council to the New York City Holocaust Memorial Commission, and he is the vice president of the American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors.
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Welcome, Mr. Foxman. You may submit your full statement for the record or summarize, whichever you deem appropriate
STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN, NATIONAL DIRECTOR, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
Mr. FOXMAN. I will do both, Mr. Chairman, with your permission.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, we will accept the full statement for the record.
Mr. FOXMAN. Chairman Gilman and distinguished Members of the Committee, the Anti-Defamation League has worked to counter anti-Semitism and bigotry for over 80 years and has been a staunch supporter of the Middle East peace process and efforts to foster mutual respect among Israel and her neighbors.
In this record, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings and for inviting us to address the persistence of anti-Jewish propaganda and stereotyping in the Egyptian media that has been a matter of concern to us for some time.
Twenty years ago, we were fortunate to experience what was once thought of as an unthinkable and revolutionary reconciliation between the State of Israel and her most belligerent enemy, the Arab Republic of Egypt. In November 1977, Anwar Sadat, a decorated war hero, took the most courageous step of his life, his historic visit to Israel. In his address to the Knesset he said—and I quote—''I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life and to establish peace.''
In an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding of their common interest, President Sadat and equally bold Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace agreement which held out the promise of a new life for Egyptians and Israelis. The agreement signified more than just a cessation of war and a return of territory; it laid out a framework for two former enemy nations and people to live side by side in peace and security. Sadat's commitment to that vision encompassed the lifting of the economic boycott and the establishment of full diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. The mutually agreed-upon parameters of good neighborly relations were specified in the treaty, ''To foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will accordingly abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.''
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Eighteen years later, what has been realized? Egypt and Israel are at peace; Israel has remained true—Egypt has remained true to Sadat's pledge to end war; and despite periods of tension—and there have been many throughout the years—there have never been deployments on the Israeli-Egyptian border. Terrorists have not used the Sinai as a launching ground for anti-Israel attacks. Egypt maintains an embassy in Israel, and Israel one in Egypt. Egypt has played, as we heard, a crucial role in encouraging the Arab world to reconcile with Israel and has facilitated negotiations between Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Gulf States.
But what of the promise of a normalized relationship? Regrettably, this never materialized. The Israel-Egypt peace is, as we have heard this morning, commonly referred to as the cold peace. This manifests itself in successive periods of severe tension, diminished levels of trade, and nonexistent cultural changes.
Chairman GILMAN. If I might interrupt, a vote is on. We are going to continue. I am going to ask Mr. Manzullo to come back and chair the meeting so we can continue right through the vote.
Please continue, Mr. Foxman. Sorry for the interruption.
Mr. FOXMAN. President Mubarak has rebuffed the notion of visiting Israel even during periods of relative calm in the region. In the last 16 years, he has repeatedly claimed public opinion would not accept this visit. He claimed in a March 5 interview that visiting Israel at this time would, ''produce disgust among the Egyptian public.''
The most strategic and insidious manifestation of Egypt's failure to implement the spirit and the letter of the Camp David agreement is the fire wall of animosity it has put up between the Egyptian and the Israeli people. Given the treaty commitment to foster normal relations, it was reasonable to expect moves by the Egyptian leadership to take concrete steps to create a positive atmosphere and framework for cooperation on a business, cultural, and people-to-people level.
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Instead, unfortunately, the Arab boycott of Israel has been replaced by an unofficial boycott on the part of the government-supported institutions such as trade associations and universities. In cultural, professional, and academic spheres, Egyptians who reach out or accept invitations from their Israeli counterparts face being ostracized or expelled from professional associations.
And beyond the government's failure to promote implementation of its treaty commitments, it allows the proliferation of the vilest forms of anti-Semitic expressions in the mass media. Egyptian newspapers, news stories, editorials, and political cartoons are rife with anti-Semitic images and accusations. They echo traditional anti-Semitic themes: Jews as a satanic force trying to undermine Islam; an international cabal of Jews seeking domination of the Middle East and the world; Jews controlling the American Government; the equation of Jews with Nazis; conspiracy theories alleging Israeli attempts to poison or corrupt Arab youths, an Egyptian version of the medieval ''blood libel;'' and the graphic display of Jews as demonic and subhuman figures bent on killing innocent Arabs.
The propagators of these images foment hatred between the peoples and exploit popular frustration as a political device to undermine normalization with Israel. The repercussions of these images are obvious, Mr. Chairman. If a Jew is the same as a Nazi, if a Jew seeks only to undermine Islam and Egypt, if a Jew is responsible for introducing AIDS to Egypt, how can the Egyptian people accept the Jewish State? This dehumanizes Jews and delegitimizes their presence as a national entity in the Middle East.
These horrific images have a virtual constant in the Egyptian press since the founding of Israel in 1948, through both periods of tension and peaceful relations. The phenomenon continued up through the 1979 peace treaty, and even after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and Israel's subsequent agreements with the Palestinians.
The attacks crossed party lines, appearing consistently, irrespective of whether Labor or Likud Party is in power.
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Tacit approval of incendiary rhetoric about and images of Jews is a thoroughly unacceptable means of expressing disagreement with Israeli policies. Time and time again, President Mubarak has said to us, this is only a critique of Israel. The persistence of these images throughout every Israeli Administration since Camp David belies the notion that they are an expression of popular reaction to a particular Israeli policy.
Would the U.S. Government, which surely enjoys the most free press in the world, defend the vitriolic, racist accusations as a legitimate means of expressing a grievance against a neighbor?.
While we understand that Egypt enjoys a relatively free press, Mr. Chairman, it is incumbent upon President Mubarak to set a responsible tone and to convey to his people that stereotyping is gratuitously destructive to efforts to implement Camp David and build trust between the two peoples.
The Egyptian political leadership cannot evade this moral responsibility by claiming that the press is a free agent and critical of the Egyptian Government as well. President Mubarak's failure to respond to repeated pleas by Israel, the United States, the world Jewish community, is a conscious choice. Much of the press is government-backed and controlled, including the respected Al-Ahram, Al-Goumhuriyya, and the popular magazine, October. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, editors are often appointed by the President's office and salaries paid by the government.
The opposition press is, of course, less restrained. The Anti-Defamation League has raised this issue numerous times with Egyptian diplomats and political leaders. In November 1995, after the funeral of the late Prime Minister Rabin, when the ADL delegation visited Cairo, we appealed personally to President Mubarak to speak out publicly against incendiary images of the Jews. President Mubarak gracefully declined and instructed me to come out in front of his official residence and to tell the media that the President is opposed to it. And when I asked him to do it in his own voice, in his own person, he said he didn't think it was necessary.
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Just last month when Mr. Mubarak visited Washington, the Anti-Defamation League released a document on anti-Semitism, urging him to stop this anti-Semitic hate in Egypt, and we are including the ad and the report for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mubarak and his Foreign Minister made excuses and rebuffed the pleas of several Members of Congress, including leading Members of this Committee, as well as the Administration. We heard such arguments as, that Egyptians are Semites, how can they be anti-Semitic? And this is only another version of criticism of Israel. And only last week, Egyptian cartoonists took to the streets to defend their hateful anti-Semitic cartoons as legitimate criticism of the State of Israel.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Foxman, again, I am going to interrupt. We have a few minutes remaining. I must go to the floor. Mr. Manzullo is on his way back in. We will continue as he returns.
The Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. MANZULLO [presiding]. While the other Members are returning from voting, Mr. Foxman, you, I understand, have not had the opportunity to finish?
Mr. FOXMAN. I am ready to wind up.
Mr. MANZULLO. Because of our crazy schedule here, some of us will not be able to hear your entire statement. I would like you to conclude within 3 or 4 minutes. I want to conclude this hearing by 11:55.
Mr. FOXMAN. Fine. With your permission.
Mr. MANZULLO. I am going to give you the 5-minute light here.
Mr. FOXMAN. Fine. I don't think we will have a problem with that.
Sadly, the generation that has come of age in post-Camp David Egypt has been fed the same slanderous information about Jews and Israelis as their parents. Even before they can read, Egyptian youth are subject to them as demons and murderers to be feared and avoided, certainly not as partners in a search for the future without war and hatred.
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We know all too well, while political trends may change, the peace process ebbs and flows, the bitter determination and desire of all people to live normal lives is unrelenting.
But if this is to be a model for how future agreements are implemented, we are shortchanging the generations to come who will live with the consequences of how normalization in the region has been defined.
Finally, as the Arab world's political and cultural arbiter, Egypt's regrettable tolerance of Jew hatred resonates throughout the region. Having led the Arab world in reconciling with Israel, it is expected to lead its own population of people of the Arab world out of the area of vitriol and war.
Today, as the intellectual hub of the Arab world, Egypt exports newspapers, magazines, and books throughout the Middle East. Portrayal of Jews in Israel helps shape popular opinion throughout the region. Egypt and Israel have enjoyed significant benefits through their 18-year peace. Yet 20 years after Anwar Sadat's courageous visit to Jerusalem, Egyptian society, on the most basic level, remains hostile to Judaism, Jews, and Israel. And until the anti-Semitic portrayals are repudiated and until Egypt's political leaders recognize the crucial role they must play, Israel and Egypt must be unable to move beyond their cold peace, toward a normal relationship, accepted and encouraged by Egyptian society.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is more with a sense of sorrow and regret than anger that I would respectfully recommend that this Committee and Congress consider two remedial actions. There must be consequences for such continued disregard, dismissal, and, if you will, total indifference and frequent ridiculing of our pleas; that the President of Egypt and his leadership utilize their bully pulpits to speak out against anti-Semitism as not only vile and destructive but is un-Egyptian, anti-Islam, immoral and unacceptable. Silence on their part is tantamount to tolerating it or legitimizing it and even supporting it.
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It is not unique, Mr. Chairman, nor disrespectful, for citizens or for individuals to petition and request that the leader of a country speak out. It is not unique nor disrespectful when we ask the President of the United States to raise his voice against bigotry and prejudice and anti-Semitism or the President of France or the President of Poland or Germany or Italy, so why can we not ask our friend and ally in Egypt?
And if no voice of outrage and leadership is heard, then, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that Congress consider symbolically taking $100 million of the United States of America and putting it in escrow, keeping it there to see and to witness whether or not the leadership of Egypt, starting with the President, are ready to speak out, to combat this evil, this hate, and this bigotry, and, in fact, begin to implement not only the spirit but the legislative intent of normalization and also to help change the public opinion, which the President of Egypt so frequently turns to as an excuse as to why he cannot move in the direction that he would like.
I would like to support Dr. Satloff's recommendation that we may want to examine transferring some of the military aid into an economic package, and maybe if the funds used will help employment, will help the standard of living, then maybe there will be less of a need or a fear to speak out against bigotry, prejudice, and anti-Semitism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share these views with you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Foxman appears in the appendix.]
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Foxman.
I have a couple questions here, first with Dr. Satloff.
I spent most of my time in Congress working on international trade issues, and, in fact, the past month I met with the American Chamber of Commerce of Egypt, as I met with the American Chambers from all over the world, and one of your recommendations, Dr. Satloff, has been to increase the intensity of trade—would that be correct?—with Egypt.
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Mr. SATLOFF. That is correct. When the American Chamber comes to Washington, they often don't talk about the effect or the impact of their recommendations on U.S. economic assistance, so they may or may not have raised this because of those implications, but privately, almost every major Egyptian businessman I speak with in Cairo and Washington would much prefer having lower economic assistance, government to government, and much greater access for Egyptian goods in the U.S. market.
Textiles, for example: It would encourage Egyptian free enterprise, it would be a much more useful gesture of our good will, that we would be able to send to promote Egyptian free market reform. It would take care of a lot of the bureaucracy and waste that goes with the U.S. economic package, and, in the end, both Egypt and the United States would be better off.
This is not something we can do with every dollar in the assistance package, but I think it is something one can do with a significant portion of the package.
Mr. MANZULLO. What present barriers does the United States have toward Egyptian imports?
Mr. SATLOFF. I should preface this by saying that trade policy is not my area of specialization. I know a lot less about U.S. trade policy than I do Egyptian politics, et cetera. But the main barrier has to do with textiles, what can and can't come into limits and what can come in it. It is a fairly restrictive system.
The Egyptians, as I am sure you know, have a huge textile industry; it goes back centuries. They were once one of the main suppliers of cotton to the United States, but now there are significant restrictions on the import into the United States of Egyptian textile products.
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you.
Mr. Rothman, do you have any questions?
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Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Fandy, I appreciated reading your remarks, and I have some questions about what you said, but I am wondering if you have any comment about what Mr. Foxman said.
Mr. FANDY. I certainly do.
One thing that I can tell you, Congressman, that I personally, myself, took a trip from my village in Luxford, that is about 40 miles, with my mother, to go to visit the city of Harciera, a known Jewish site in the Manhorn, and my mother, who is illiterate, went there to pray and asked God to help her recover from arthritis, to a Jewish saint.
Mr. ROTHMAN. Did you say Jewish site or saint?
Mr. FANDY. Saint. You know, shrine, that's well known. At the level of popular culture, there is tremendous respect for all of that.
Now I think I can tell you that with the tradition of modernity, where history has been partitioned, where Jewish history became isolated, Christian history isolated, and Islamic history isolated, somehow there are these factors that exist, that exist at levels of those who are educated with the idea of modernity, that this history is somehow together.
The rest of Egyptian society that did not go through the modernity education know exactly that Egypt is layers of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian, and at that popular level there is no, what I can characterize as anti-Semitism or anti-Jewish, or total hate.
I think it would be a tremendous injustice to the Egyptian society at large, that I grew up in for 21 years of my life, to really say, because of certain attitudes by cartoonists or otherwise, that sometimes would be driven by, let's say, the remarks coming from Israel or responses among those who are involved in issues of war and peace. But to really cast a blank statement on the whole Egyptian society that somehow there is a streak of anti-Semitism, I think evidence at the popular culture and level in the society does not support that.
Mr. ROTHMAN. If, in fact, you believe that the education of the Egyptian people is something that is good, and that should be encouraged.
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Mr. FANDY. Absolutely.
Mr. ROTHMAN. Then should we then be losing hope in the goodwill that the majority of the Egyptian people not a part of this modern education will now lose when they receive a modern education? That is one point. So perhaps we need to really fix the modern education—our goal is to bring the majority of Egyptian people into this modern education system.
And the second point I would like you to comment on is, do you feel that disagreements with regards to policy in the Palestinian-Israeli disputes, if you will, are just a provocation for anti-Semitism as opposed to anti-Israeli cartoons?
Mr. FANDY. Well, Mr. Congressman, let me just state my fear of confusing some of the issues that take place in the region, first of all, that Arabs and Israelis have been at war for a long time and it would be really naive to assume that these things could just disappear overnight. Certain discourse could be there, not completely healed, and I think it would be wise to know that in the historical memory of people—we haven't passed a generation.
I remember the Arab-Israeli wars, these generations, and I am just sitting here, let's say, being humbled hearing the Chairman introducing someone who is a Holocaust survivor, something I read about in books, or to visit the museum or something of that sort. These things, when they become real to people, people are influenced, and they change their attitudes.
The one thing we have to be very mindful of is the idea that somehow these attitudes will change overnight. These attitudes require dialog, and dialog is not one-sided, the dialog ought to be on both sides, and I think Israeli intellectuals and Egyptian intellectuals should engage this issue. The issue should not be tied to Egyptian-Israeli relations, I think the issue should be raised to a level of international discourse over bigotry. That includes, let's say, the representation of people of my ilk.
Let's say, in the American media, for example, every morning I woke up completely offended by representations of what is Arab, what is Islamic, and so on. But these things require larger debate rather than really becoming very specific, and the moment they become exclusive, they lose their purpose.
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Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, I am not sure you answered my question. I certainly understood what you just said, which was a very important point, and I gathered that from your written comments as well as your earlier statement.
But you didn't address my question, which is whether there is a just provocation, given this memory of warfare and loss of loved ones, et cetera, which is quite deep, the feelings running quite deep, with regards to the State of Israel versus the anti-Semitism. Are they inextricably intertwined, connected, in the minds of those Egyptians who have this memory of these years of war?
Mr. FANDY. I think, in my mind, from my experience, growing up there, I would not equate anti-Semitism in the West with, let's say, what we see as a representation of Jews in the Egyptian media. I think there is something that is here ideological and ingrained on this side. On the other side came about where certain political events took place, the creation of Israel, the wars and other things.
But there is no serious anti-Semitism that is ideological and ingrained in Germany or Hitler or things of that sort, that does not exist in Egypt, and society has experienced it.
Mr. ROTHMAN. Can I ask one last question? I really do appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Foxman, would you comment on Dr. Fandy's report?
Mr. FOXMAN. Thank you.
There are several ironies. It is true, Dr. Fandy, there is little, or there was little tradition in the Arab world, Islamic world, of anti-Semitism. In fact, for hundreds of years it was just the reverse. It was, wherever Islam went, it was a shining example of tolerance for the Jewish community, whether it was in Turkey, whether it was in the Arab world.
The irony is how quickly that has changed, and how quickly for all kinds of reasons, political and otherwise, there has been an act of acceptance, an absorption, and even an improvement on some of the classical western concepts and projections of anti-Semitism.
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And yes, Dr. Fandy, there was more. There was pain, there was anguish, but there was a recognition at Camp David that there is no more war and, therefore, we can begin to educate each other for tolerance, for acceptance. And the sad, sad record is that zero, zero has been done positively, and a great deal has been done negatively.
And the final irony is, in most countries of the world, it is reverse. It is the people, as we say—your mother, your grandmother, my mother, my grandmother, the unsophisticated—who, because of their ignorance or lack of exposure or education or contact, their stereotypes, there are these hatreds, et cetera.
And it is the intellectuals, the writers, the professionals, that lead the way in every society in the world to say no; no to hate, no to bigotry; they break all the chains, and that in order to then impact on your mother and my mother and my grandmother and grandfather.
The irony is in Egypt and in Jordan and the Arab world, Egypt, because it is this major, major leader, not only in size and in culture and in art and in everything else—the sad irony, the sad tragedy, is it is the thinkers, the writers, the intellectuals, the creative minds that are so way ahead or behind, if you will, with hatred. They are spreading it rather than controlling it, ameliorating it.
Now, if that continues, then we will never have the opportunity to raise a generation which will respect each other, tolerate each other, and make sacrifices for peace. That is our plea. Our plea is that the leadership will recognize, we are at a stage where the President of Egypt says there is no anti-Semitism in Egypt, Oh, my God, there is anti-Semitism in Washington. Egypt is not that unique. There needs to be first a recognition that there is, and then move to the step of speaking out against, and I apologize for overstepping.
Mr. MANZULLO. You don't have to apologize for your answers.
Welcome, Congresswoman Lowey, to our Committee.
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Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much, and I thank the Chairman and I thank our witnesses for appearing here today on this very important issue. I am privileged to be on the Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee, and I thank you for allowing me to join you today for this very important hearing.
As many of you know, I recently returned with the Appropriations Committee from a trip to the Middle East. It was a very productive trip, and when we came back, we felt very positive about what was happening in that region of the world.
Since then, there have been tremendous difficulties, and most of us are hopeful that we can get the peace process back on track. And I want to make it very clear, having met with President Mubarak during this trip and other trips, we are very grateful for President Mubarak's role in working with the parties to move the peace process forward. And this is why I myself, in my discussions with President Mubarak, express my great concern about the kind of anti-Semitic, anti-Israel cartoon statements of the President, and I mentioned this because President Mubarak has an opportunity to continue to be a great leader, to bring the parties together, to educate the population of Egypt, as difficult as it may be, and I was aware at the time, from our many meetings, that women—for example, only 30 percent of the women are educated (——), and economic development, continued growth are the challenges we want to face with President Mubarak together and be of assistance. So when I expressed my concern about the statements in the press, I did so because, in my judgment, these kinds of cartoons, statements, such as the Jews are injecting the Palestinians with AIDS viruses are all counterproductive; that is not helping us move the peace process forward. There were many comments as to why, President Mubarak said, it is the opposition press; however, we have seen it in Al-Ahram, which is the government press.
Dr. Fandy, perhaps you could respond to us, and explain to us what kinds of actions have been taken since that meeting we had in the region. President Mubarak came here and we had lunch and we also talked about this. I met with Amre Moussa, the Foreign Minister, and I also expressed my concerns about that weekend. Amre Moussa said something that was quite constructive.
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Can you tell us what kinds of actions President Mubarak is taking or plans to take, to move the press forward in a constructive way so that they can contribute to the peace process? And I thank you for being here.
Mr. FANDY. Thank you. One thing I would like to state very openly, that I happen to have an Egyptian background, and probably I can tell you I have not seen the President of Egypt except on television or something like that, like here. Therefore, my comments are about my readings and my involvement with Egypt. I don't know any Egyptian officials, so I cannot really say how they think. I can read their statements and try to analyze it.
Two things I would like to say here. One is that sometimes the big problem probably with Egypt-American relations, in particular, is that we speak different languages, and we come from different culture backgrounds, and things do not translate in the same way. So when you raise the issue of anti-Semitism, let me be very candid with you here.
When you raise this issue in this particular atmosphere of, let's say, intense Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic maneuvering and things of that sort, the issue is, we do a disservice to the issue itself because it becomes part of the political campaign to put Egypt on the defensive. I think these issues ought to be raised at the very normal conditions, not to be totally politicized, and engage civil society in institutions, talk to journalists, talk to all institutions and Egypt and raise the issue.
And the more economic and cultural exchange that exists, let's say, between America—if we have minorities in America coming through, coming here in a Fulbright program, so if these programs exist where they bring people in and out and exchange ideas, these are very helpful. But to really raise these issues at specific junctures, it does the issue a total disservice.
Anti-Semitism is a horrible crime, and anti-Semitism, as anti-Jewish and what happened to the Jewish experience, I think this is something the whole world should be reminded of constantly. The issue, I think, in my mind, is we do the issue disservice when we raise it as part of political context on a mundane level that does not have to do with the moral issue.
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Mrs. LOWEY. If I may pursue this, Dr. Fandy—and I may respectfully disagree—I think for countries to make peace, people have to make peace. And in order for people to understand each other, there has to be respect for one another. And I think, as leaders, we have to speak out when there are injustices and there are wrongs.
And I know certainly in my community, I am very involved in black-Jewish relations, I am involved in many coalitions in my school districts. There are 68 languages being spoken in parts of Queens, so the districts are very diverse, and I respect the differences. And when there are statements that are made that are ugly and mean, I think it is important for people from every tradition to speak out.
So I do think that, in fact, if there is to be peace in that region, then leaders in that region have to work to quell the kind of ugly statements and ugly actions that are there, and perhaps someone else could comment on their perception of the government's influence on the press, and whether they think the government can have a constructive role in stopping some of these statements.
You know, the swastika is a symbol of pain and suffering, not just for the Jewish people, but it is a blot on this entire world; and when there are statements made and pictures drawn—I don't have to take it any further because we have seen this in the reports—it is very hateful. So I think, as leaders, we have to bring our people along.
Before I can go further, I don't know if someone else wants to comment on the impact, Mr. Foxman, the impact that the government could have on influencing the press.
Mr. FOXMAN. Dr. Fandy is right to some extent. One should first try not to have this out in the public arenas we are having. Unfortunately, we have tried. We have tried for the last, if you will, if not 20 years, certainly the last 10 years. I think in every meeting or visit, here or there, privately, we have raised the issue with the President, we have raised the issue with the Foreign Minister, Ambassador, every delegation, Congressmen; and the issue was there. There has been no response, and I guess that is one of the reasons that we are here.
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And there is, if you will, a disingenuousness to say we don't have any impact on the press. Only recently, the Arab League called to isolate Israel and to reinstate the boycott. It was the governments who called on the press to carry this message forward, to make sure that they editorialize, so when it fits, they can impact or tell the press what they would like it to do; but when it doesn't fit, then we hear ''free press'' cannot criticize, it doesn't exist. And that is why we are here.
We are here to finally say, the time has come, respectfully, to the President, to Egyptian leadership, we would like you to stand up and speak out; and we expect freedom of speech and freedom of the press, as you do, but this is unacceptable.
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Foxman, thank you very much.
Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One point of information for Dr. Fandy.
I assume that Egypt has a public school system under the control of its Ministry of Education and publishes textbooks, et cetera; is that correct?
Mr. FANDY. Yes, correct.
Mr. SHERMAN. My concern is that Israel is making concessions for peace to the fathers while the sons, in most Arab countries, are being educated for war. We are told that the bigotry set forth in this exhibit by ADL is not the government's responsibility, but if you educate for war and for discrimination and bigotry, that is what you will reap, and while I haven't looked specifically at education in Egypt, I have looked at it in Syria and some other countries.
Egyptian children 20 years ago were never told it was the policy of their government at that time to invade, conquer and push Israel into the sea, and that inevitably, or without pictures, meant the extermination of hundreds of thousands, millions of people. Without that historical context, Egyptian children might grow up disagreeing with the actions of the State of Israel, hostile to the country.
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When you look at what Israel has done, turn back an act of aggression with the announced intention of the annihilation of all of its citizens and then give back the sign-on. If Egyptian children had been taught that and they weren't—and that is government action—then perhaps when they grew up, they wouldn't be writing for the press these kinds of editorials.
We have to hold the Egyptian Government responsible for the generation it has raised, and we also have to hold the Egyptian Government responsible for its failure to condemn, in fact, its promotion in some cases, of an anti-Israel line in the press. And I would certainly like to see American aid, or at least a portion of it, conditioned upon truth in education in Egypt.
We get angry when the Japanese do not tell their children what happened to Korean women, what happened to Chinese cities, because we know if you don't teach the past, you are going to be condemned to misevaluate the present and conduct bad actions, at least in the future.
I would also like to point out—and this may be a little far afield—that a natural reaction is American taxpayers pay when there needs to be something done in international affairs. I should point out that Japan contributed virtually nothing to Desert Storm, that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Kuwait itself are contributing less to the support of moderate or pro-American, or at least suitably pro-American or pro-peace or pro-stability Arab regimes, than we are. So we are caught trying to fashion a U.S. foreign policy and pay for a U.S. foreign policy where Japan benefits from those markets, and that oil that Dr. Fandy talked about, but pays almost nothing.
The Gulf States benefit even more directly: The very existence of the ruling class, as opposed to their liquidation, a direct result of the Gulf War and our success in it, pay as little as possible; and then the taxpayers in all of our districts, I think, pay more. I think that our actions ought not to be ''America pays first,'' but the first thing ought to be, we push others with the ability to pay to match our generosity.
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I have a question for Dr. Satloff, and that is, given that Egypt has Scud missiles, is carrying out Badr 96 and other aggressive actions, would a 20- to 30-percent reduction in aid to Egypt get their attention and would it prevent the Egyptian military from being able to carry out its legitimate defense of functions?
Mr. SATLOFF. Thank you for your question, Congressman. I appreciate the premise of the question; I don't ascribe to that as the solution.
We have a very serious strategic problem in our relationship with the Egyptians. In the class of world countries, Egypt is a partner. We have a problem in the partnership.
Before we go through the punitive measure phase of responding to this problem, the first thing is, I would like to see our President and our Vice President and our Secretary have a serious conversation with their counterparts on these problems. These issues rarely, if ever, make it onto the agenda of our senior leaders.
When President Mubarak was in Washington recently, it was during the Har Homa controversy. Sadly, an opportunity to have this sort of discussion was missed, and instead, the lion's share of that conversation between Presidents was over Har Homa. This was a missed opportunity.
We have had dozens of these sorts of missed opportunities. We are not there yet, Congressman, it is not that yet broken.
Mr. SHERMAN. The one comment I would make is, only in Washington is it considered a punitive measure to give somebody $1 billion on the theory last year you gave them a 1.3 billion.
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mrs. Lowey, I will give you 5 more minutes, and then you may conclude the hearing; and I would like you to watch the red light.
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Mrs. LOWEY. OK. Thank you.
As a followup with Dr. Satloff—but, of course, anyone may comment because I missed some of your earlier comments. When we were in Egypt, I really feel, based on so many of my discussions, that peace will come to that region through economic development, through people's understanding each other and through the rise of living standards for all. And, in fact, when peace was on track, there was tremendous movement in Egypt of global investment. And as I understand it, as a result of the views of people that the peace process is in difficulty, global investment is at a standstill.
So it is in the interest of all in that region, for the region to become the Fertile Crescent for all the people to thrive. And people don't have to love each other, but they can learn to live with each other. I have been a strong advocate of exchange programs, as you mentioned, Dr. Fandy, through learning and many other organizations, because that is the way you build the peace from the bottom up.
However, we know that Egypt has been at peace—some say it may be a ''lukewarm peace,'' some say a ''cold peace''—with Israel, much longer than Jordan has been at peace with Israel. President Mubarak talked about some of the very important business development that has been occurring—I believe there was a shirt factory or a jean factory, where Israel and Egypt were working together.
However, I have gotten information, which is very disturbing, that the intelligentsia in Egypt have been very, very, shall we say, negative, about joint business relationships between Israel and Egypt; and I think that is rather unfortunate, because these are the kinds of investments that are in the interests of both nations and should be encouraged.
Perhaps Dr. Satloff, or anyone else on the panel, could comment on that.
Mr. SATLOFF. Well, Congressman, I agree very much with the objective. I think that is necessary for the foundation of peace. If there is any one piece of evidence that suggests that the Egyptian Government is putting an impediment in the way, in the route of this sort of cooperation, it is last week's Arab League resolution. There can't be any clearer piece of evidence that the Egyptian Government views the promotion of bilateral, multilateral, regional economic cooperation as against its interests than by permitting and supporting, advocating a resolution, calling for the resumption of the Arab boycott, calling for the suspension of all multilateral activities, calling for the end of any normalization of Israel.
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What other message could it be sending to its citizens and other citizens throughout the region?
Mrs. LOWEY. Would anyone else care to comment?
Yes, Dr. Fandy.
Mr. FANDY. I would like to bring the issue into American-Egyptian relations, and I think it is very important to realize—for those who care, I think this juncture in the history of the Middle East is very important; and I think, engaging in discussions on details, it is very important to realize Egyptian leadership in a sense is boxed between certain local realities and its willingness to accommodate Israel, to accommodate the interests of the United States; and appreciating these difficulties is very, very important.
And I think in certain issues—for example, the Arab League, the Arab League, in my mind—it happened to be in Cairo; I don't know if it was the Cairo initiative. Even when the initiative came out to deal with the boycott, Egypt and Jordan were exempted from that resolution and that resolution was not binding.
The fact the Arab League in Cairo does not hold Cairo responsible for Arab League action; it is a regional organization that is different, let's say, from the decision taken by the Egyptian Government. So to confuse the two really does disservice to people who are trying to maneuver their way to build the peace process one more time. Because it has, in many senses, faltered, and it needs very careful attention, rather than engaging in shouting matches that I don't see as very helpful, to blame the Israelis or Egyptians; but rather, come back to that process and think about it very carefully.
Because I think if it falters this time, that is the end of it.
Mrs. LOWEY. I think that my time is at an end, unless someone else has a quick comment.
Mr. FOXMAN. I have a quick comment.
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Dr. Fandy, these are not details. It is the Arab League, and again, when it fits Egypt, it disowns the Arab League; when it doesn't fit Egypt, it controls the Arab League. If anybody has leadership of that body, not only when it is centered in Cairo, it is Egypt.
A resolution, a boycott, would not have been passed if the President and Foreign Minister exercised leadership, if they felt it was counterproductive. Unfortunately, they didn't think it was counterproductive. They were part of it, and they embraced it.
So it is not a detail; it is the essence of where we are. We are at a crossroads, and unfortunately, the signals are not for tolerance, not for amelioration, not for a reconciliation. And that is what it is we are coming to say here: a great country, a great power, courageous leadership; please, please exercise it in the interests of peace and reconciliation.
Mrs. LOWEY. And I would just like to say in closing, because I see the red light, that I appreciate the indulgence of our Chairman; that this is a difficult time, and making peace requires courage and creating confidence on all parts. And I would hope that President Mubarak and the great Government of Egypt that have played such an important role in the process will continue to take a leadership role.
We understand all the various difficulties that President Mubarak faces, but we hope all the parties can continue to work together to build confidence and trust so we can see peace and economic prosperity in that region of the world. I know that is a goal we all share, and I thank you very much.
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you very much.
Before we conclude, Dr. Satloff, if you have any additional written materials that substantiate your thesis, with which I agree, that increased trade creates transparency of political economies and leads more toward people acting civilly on both sides of the equation, if you could get that to me, I would appreciate it. I know you are not an expert in trade, but I agree with your philosophy on it, and any background material, we would appreciate.
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Mr. SATLOFF. I would be happy to provide it.
Mr. MANZULLO. We would like to thank you gentlemen for being with us this morning and this afternoon. All your statements, in full, will be part of the record.
This Committee meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]