Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI
Before
the Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
June 21, 2002
"A New FBI Focus"
Good
morning, Chairman Wolf, Congressman Serrano, and members of
the Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before the Subcommittee today and discuss the recently announced
FBI reorganization plan that was submitted to the Congress.
I am pleased that the second phase of my on-going reorganization
has been cleared by the Attorney General and the Administration
and transmitted to the Congress for review.
A
New FBI Focus
Since becoming Director, I have been able to observe firsthand
the volatile environment in which the FBI is called to operate.
I have become increasingly convinced that success in the post-9/11
environment depends upon the FBI becoming more flexible, agile,
and mobile in its capacity to respond to the array of difficult
and challenging national security and criminal threats facing
the United States. The FBI must become better at shaping its
workforce, collaborating with its partners, applying technology
to support investigations, operations, and analyses protecting
our information, and developing core competencies.
I am equally convinced that success demands the FBI become
more proactive in its approaches to dealing with the threats
and crime problems facing the United States, especially in
the areas of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber-crime/infrastructure
protection. Prevention of terrorist attacks is our top priority.
It will become even more important for the FBI to continue
to develop and maintain close working relationships with international
law enforcement partners if we are to prevent terrorist groups
from gaining footholds and bases of operation for launching
attacks against the United States.
Protecting
America in this new environment requires the FBI undertake
a series of management actions built upon three key inter-related
elements: (1) refocusing FBI mission and priorities; (2) realigning
the FBI workforce to address these priorities; and (3) shifting
FBI management and operational cultures to enhance flexibility,
agility, effectiveness, and accountability. This new focus
and the accompanying organizational changes being proposed
are intended to strengthen and guide the Bureau through these
challenging times and are in direct response to the shortcomings
and issues that have been identified over the last several
months. More importantly, these proposals are in direct response
to the tragic events of 9/11 and the clearly charted new course
for the FBI mandated by the paramount mission of prevention
of terrorist attacks.
1.
Refocusing Mission and Priorities
Even
though our nation faces great challenges from those who seek
to destroy our freedoms, the basic mission of the FBI remains
constant. First, and foremost, the FBI must protect and defend
the United States against terrorism and foreign intelligence
threats. Second, the FBI must uphold and enforce the criminal
laws of the United States. And third, the FBI must provide
and enhance assistance to its federal, state, municipal, and
international partners.
While
the FBI's core missions remain constant, its priorities have
shifted since the previous FBI Strategic Plan was issued in
1998 and the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Under the
new alignment, the FBI's focus is to:
1. Protect
the United States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence
operations and espionage.
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and
high-technology crimes.
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations
and enterprises.
7. Combat major white-collar crime.
8. Combat significant violent crime.
9. Support federal, state, municipal, and international partners.
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.
These
are the FBI's priorities, not only for the Bureau in its role
as a national agency, but also for each local FBI field office.
The first eight priorities reflect the core of the FBI's national
security and criminal investigative responsibilities. The
last two, while not investigative in nature, are equally critical
to enabling the FBI to successfully achieve its goals and
objectives.
In pursuing
these priorities, I expect the FBI and its employees to be
true to, and exemplify, certain core values. These core values
are:
- adherence
to the rule of law and the rights conferred to all under
the United States Constitution;
- integrity
through everyday ethical behavior;
- accountability
by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions
and the consequences of our actions and decisions;
- fairness
in dealing with people; and
- leadership
through example, both at work and in our communities.
These
missions and priorities are consistent with the existing authorities
conferred and jurisdictions established by law and executive
order for the FBI. I believe these missions and priorities
represent the expectations that the American people, the law
enforcement community, the Congress, and the Administration
hold for the FBI.
2.
Realigning the Workforce to Address Priorities
In recognition
of the continuing terrorist threat facing the United States
from the Al-Qaeda network and of the urgent need to continue
building the FBI's capacity to prevent future terrorist acts
through improved analytical and intelligence information sharing
capabilities, I am proposing a permanent shift of 518 field
agents from criminal investigations to augment our counterterrorism
investigations and activities (480 agents), implement critical
security improvements (13 agents), and support the training
of new Special Agents at the FBI Academy (25 agents). The
FBI will need to sustain its present level of commitment to
combating and preventing terrorism for the foreseeable future
and be sufficiently flexible to quickly shift whatever additional
resources are necessary to meet any counterterrorism investigative
demand that materializes. These 518 agents will be taken primarily
from FBI drug investigations (400), although there will be
some shift from white-collar (59) and violent crimes (59 agents).
The decision to propose reducing the FBI's level of involvement
in drug investigations came after careful consultation with
FBI Special Agents in Charge (SACs), United States Attorneys,
state and municipal law enforcement, Members of Congress,
and others - including DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson who
also sits on the Department of Justice Strategic Management
Council. The FBI will still participate in Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) with other federal,
state, and municipal law enforcement. Our resources for OCDETF
cases are not affected by the realignment of drug resources.
Even after the proposed reduction of 400 agents, the FBI will
still be devoting nearly 1,000 agents to drug-related cases.
What
I am asking our SACs to do is reevaluate the level of FBI
involvement in other drug cases and, where possible and without
jeopardizing current investigations, reduce FBI resources.
Where in the past we might have contributed 10 to 12 agents
for day-to-day involvement in a task force or investigation,
we might contribute 5 to 6. SACs may augment that day-to-day
commitment with additional resources to meet special needs,
such as the execution of search warrants or coordination of
multiple arrests. We will also be more deliberate in opening
cases involving drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations,
making sure our efforts do not overlap or duplicate those
of the DEA. As a result of the realignment of 400 FBI Special
Agents, I believe the FBI and the DEA working together can
ensure that federal resources are appropriately applied, so
that the critically important war on drugs is not impaired
in any way and that support to state and local agencies is
not diminished.
Similarly, in the areas of white-collar crime and violent
crime, I am proposing relatively modest reductions of agent
personnel B roughly 2.5 percent in white-collar and 3 percent
in violent crime. Again, I will expect SACs to evaluate day-to-day
levels of commitment to Safe Streets Task Forces and make
adjustments. In the area of white-collar crime, we may adjust
some of the thresholds used for determining whether to proceed
with an investigation and defer other cases to agency inspector
generals who posses the necessary expertise to handle criminal
investigations. But, I expect the impact on our state and
municipal partners in these two areas to be relatively minor.
Let me assure you of one thing: if a state and municipal law
enforcement agency does not possess a needed expertise, the
FBI will provide the assistance and expertise needed.
This reallocation of field agent staffing should enable each
SAC to satisfy both the near-term investigative requirements
and the national programmatic objectives for the FBI's top
three priorities - counterterrorism, counterintelligence/espionage,
and cyber-crime/infrastructure protection. Our foremost mission
is to protect the United States from terrorist attacks, foreign
intelligence operations, and cyber attacks. These are dynamic
challenges that threaten the very security of the United States
and the safety of the American people. Consequently, I consider
the Agents provided to each field office for these three priorities
to be the minimum level of investigative effort for these
programs for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is my expectation
that in addition to these resources, each SAC will, on an
ongoing basis and in consultation with national Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, and Cyber executive management at FBIHQ,
be prepared to devote whatever additional resources are necessary
to fully address and resolve every emerging threat and every
situation that may arise in these three critical areas.
3. Shifting FBI Management and Operating Culture to Enhance
Flexibility, Agility, and Accountability
Implementing
the revised FBI priorities outlined above and redirecting
the FBI workforce toward these priorities requires a concurrent
shift in how the FBI manages these cases from a national perspective.
These changes will also require changes in how we operate
within our offices and perform our work.
In support
of our top three priorities, I am directing a series of changes
to strengthen the FBI's national management and oversight
of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber-crime
investigations and programs. These cases and investigations
are critical to the very foundation of the FBI's ability to
protect national security. These cases often involve parallel
efforts in multiple locations within the United States and
foreign countries, and require extensive coordination and
collaboration with other Intelligence Community, state, municipal
and international partners. These cases also are complex in
terms of inter-relationships among groups and individuals,
a complexity that requires continuity and specialized expertise
and skills. Most importantly, these cases require an organizational
capacity to quickly respond and deploy personnel and technology
to emerging and developing situations.
These changes are also intended to create a centralized body
of subject matter experts and historical case knowledge that,
in the past, has been largely resident in a few FBI field
offices. While this field-based concentration of such expertise
and knowledge often worked well in terms of contributing to
successful prosecutions of terrorists and spies, such expertise
and knowledge was often not available or easily shared with
other FBI Field Offices and our partners. The FBI's shift
toward terrorism prevention necessitates the building of a
national level expertise and body of knowledge that can be
accessed by and deployed to all field offices and that can
be readily shared with our Intelligence Community and law
enforcement partners.
Counterterrorism
Division.
A significant restructuring and expansion of the Counterterrorism
Division at FBI Headquarters is being proposed for three basic
reasons. First, the more direct role envisioned for the Counterterrorism
Division in managing investigations, providing operational
support to field offices, and collaborating with law enforcement
and Intelligence Community partners requires additional staff
at Headquarters. Second, implementing a more proactive approach
to preventing terrorist acts and denying terrorist groups
the ability to operate and raise funds requires a centralized
and robust analytical capacity that does not exist in the
present Counterterrorism Division. Third, processing and exploiting
the information gathered domestically and from abroad during
the course of the PENTTBOM and related investigations requires
an enhanced analytical and data mining capacity that is not
presently available.
Among the significant features and capabilities of the enhanced
Counterterrorism Division will be:
- establishment
of a new multi-agency National Joint Terrorism Task Force
at FBI Headquarters to complement task forces established
in local FBI field offices and to improve collaboration
and information sharing with other agencies;
- establishment
of "flying squads" at Headquarters and specialized
regional assets to augment local field investigative capabilities
with specialized personnel, support deployments of FBI Rapid
Deployment Teams, and provide a surge capacity for quickly
responding to fast-breaking situations and developments
in locations where there is not an FBI presence;
- augmentation
of FBI capabilities to perform financial, communications,
and strategic analyses of terrorist groups and networks;
and
- support
for the Department of Justice's Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force and terrorism prevention outreach efforts.
Many
of you had the opportunity to visit the FBI Strategic Information
Operations Center, better known as SIOC, after the terrorist
acts of September 11. SIOC's operations were a true inter-agency,
collaborative environment where information flowed quickly
between agencies. Others of you saw a similar environment
created at the field office level in Salt Lake City to coordinate
security and intelligence for the Winter Olympic Games.
What we must do in our new Counterterrorism Division is create
a similar collaborative and information sharing environment.
Preventing future terrorist acts necessitates that the Counterterrorism
Division operate at a near-SIOC like capacity for the foreseeable
future. Any less of an effort is not acceptable. Maintaining
such an operating capacity, however, is extremely labor intensive
and well beyond the pre-9/11 resource levels, capacity and
structure of the Counterterrorism Division. The proposed Counterterrorism
Division reorganization is my commitment to establishing the
necessary organizational environment and framework where such
a level of commitment can be sustained and where necessary
cultural and behavioral changes can become institutionalized
over time.
Equally
important to the success of the Counterterrorism Division
reorganization is changing the underlying operations of the
division to emphasize the importance and necessity of sharing
information on a timely basis, creating an intelligence awareness
among employees -- FBI employees and those of other agencies.
We must change how we look at information so that we not only
consider its case-related value, but also its relevance to
the larger, strategic view of a group or organization. We
must also develop and sustain national-level knowledge and
expertise that can be made available at a moments notice to
any FBI Field Office and our partners.
Finally,
with respect to Counterterrorism, I cannot overstate the importance
of building and maintaining effective international partnerships
to combating terrorism. Our investigation of the September
11, 2001 attacks underscores the global nature of terrorism
and the ability of terrorists to plan, finance, and conduct
operations in a variety of countries around the world. Our
Legal Attaches played an extremely valuable role in the PENTTBOM
investigation and continue to be critical to our ongoing efforts
to deny Al-Qaeda the ability to mount future attacks. These
partnerships will only grow more important in the future.
Consequently, I believe it may be necessary for the FBI to
consider additional Legal Attache offices in key locations,
especially in Africa.
Counterintelligence
Division.
Within our Counterintelligence Division, the FBI is proposing
a new espionage section that will focus on the so-called "811"
referrals and investigations of espionage. This will allow
our operational counterintelligence sections to concentrate
solely on detecting and countering foreign intelligence operations,
focus on emerging strategic threats, and protecting United
States secrets from compromise. Additionally, the management
of our Counterintelligence Division is reorienting the focus
of the FBI counterintelligence program to work more closely
with other government agencies, sensitive facilities, and
the private sector to identify and protect United States secrets
from being compromised by foreign agents and spies.
As with
Counterterrorism, success in the counterintelligence area
will depend upon the ability of the FBI in acquiring agents,
analysts, translators, and others with specialized skills
and backgrounds and training existing counterintelligence
personnel. The FBI is also establishing a career path for
counterintelligence agents to encourage retention of personnel
in this highly specialized field. In the end, we will have
a new structure operating pursuant to a new, differently focused
strategy that recognizes the critically important CI-21 approach.
Office of Intelligence. The December 2001 reorganization
created a new Office of Intelligence to support our counterterrorism
and counterintelligence programs. Building a strategic and
tactical intelligence analytical capacity is critical if the
FBI is to be successful at pulling together bits and pieces
of information that often come from separate sources and providing
analytic products to policy makers and investigators that
will allow us to prevent terrorist acts.
This
Congress is all too familiar with the FBI's analytical shortcomings.
These shortcomings have been documented by the FBI and others,
discussed in prior hearings and briefings and need not be
restated again. Fixing these shortcomings is going to require
investments in additional personnel, basic and advanced training,
technology, and, perhaps most importantly, time. Building
subject area expertise or developing an awareness of the potential
value of an isolated piece of information does not occur overnight;
it is developed over time. That is why I am grateful to Director
of Central Intelligence George Tenet for his willingness to
detail experienced CIA analysts to the FBI to work at both
the field and Headquarters level, and to set up and manage
our Office of Intelligence. These personnel, expected to arrive
over the next several weeks, are needed to provide the FBI
with a critical near-term analytical capacity while we recruit,
hire, train, and build our analytic cadre.
Cyber Division. Last December, the Administration and
Congress approved the establishment of a Cyber Division at
FBI Headquarters. The Cyber Division will coordinate, oversee,
and facilitate FBI investigations in which the Internet, on-line
services, and computer systems and networks are the principal
instruments or targets of foreign intelligence or terrorists
and for criminal violations where the use of such systems
is essential to the illegal activity. The FBI will consolidate
under a single national program manager headquarters and field
resources associated with the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), the Internet Fraud Complaint Center, and cyber-related
criminal investigations delegated to the FBI for investigation,
such as intellectual property rights-related investigations
involving theft of trade secrets and signals; copyright infringement
investigations involving computer software; and Innocent Images
National Initiative investigations and training. The new division
will continue a direct connection between NIPC and the Counterterrorism
and Counterintelligence Divisions regarding national security
cases. Additionally, the division will work closely with the
proposed Investigative Technologies Division regarding support
for the Computer Analysis Response Team program and deployment
of Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories.
Dealing
with the problem of cyber-crime requires skills and understanding
of technology that the FBI does not possess in great numbers.
Consequently, the FBI will develop new and expand existing
alliances with other federal, state, and municipal agencies,
academia, and the private sector.
At the field level, the approach the Cyber Division is considering
is inter-agency Cyber Task Forces. In large FBI Field Offices,
I envision the FBI maintaining existing stand-alone National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) squads to handle computer
intrusions, critical infrastructure protection issues, and
the INFRAGARD program. Complementary Cyber Crime Squads will
be established to consolidate management and investigation
of cyber-related violations currently handled under the White-Collar
and Violent Crime programs, as well as investigate non-terrorist
and non-intelligence computer hacking and intrusion cases.
In small or medium FBI Field Offices, the FBI will either
use the above model or create hybrid cyber squads that consolidate
NIPC and criminal resources into a single squad. Regardless
of the size of office, the FBI will reach out to invite participation
from other federal, state, and municipal agencies on Cyber
Crime Squads to reduce duplication of effort and maximize
resources. FBI Cyber Crime Squads and task forces will be
allied with Department of Justice Computer Hacking and Intellectual
Property (CHiP) units in those 13 United States cities where
CHiP units are being established. The FBI will continue its
partnership with the National White-Collar Crime Center to
operate the Internet Fraud Complaint Center.
Investigative
Technologies Division.
I am proposing to split the current Laboratory Division into
two divisions: Laboratory and Investigative Technologies.
Recent growth in the mission, staffing, and funding of the
programs encompassed by the Laboratory Division presents potential
problems in the areas of management span of control and effective
project management. The technical nature of many of the multi-year
projects being carried out by division project leaders requires
a degree of management oversight and involvement that can
be best achieved by splitting the current division.
The Laboratory Division will continue to focus upon the collection,
processing and analysis of evidence, training, and forensic
research and development. The proposed Investigative Technologies
Division will concentrate on providing technical and tactical
services in support of investigators and the Intelligence
Community, such as electronic surveillance, physical surveillance,
cyber technology, and wireless and radio communications, as
well as the development of new investigative technologies
and techniques and the training of technical agents and personnel.
Criminal
Investigations.
The American people look to the FBI for leadership in investigating
the most serious national and international crimes and criminal
enterprises and for cooperating and assisting other federal,
state, municipal and foreign law enforcement authorities.
As a national law enforcement agency, FBI Field Offices should
draw upon national criminal investigative priorities to develop
local crime-fighting strategies. The national priorities I
have identified will serve the FBI as a critical common denominator
that links criminal investigative activities across field
offices.
In developing local criminal priorities and resource allocation
plans, each SAC should also take into account the ability
of state, municipal, and other federal law enforcement to
handle the full range of criminal violations which may vary
widely among jurisdictions and agencies. This requires the
FBI to be more flexible and collaborative in its approaches
to its criminal investigative mission. At the same time, SACs
should, in consultation with the United States Attorney and
appropriate state and municipal authorities, develop and implement
appropriate strategies and resource allocations for addressing
the FBI's other criminal investigative priorities. These five
areas are: public corruption, civil rights, transnational
and national criminal organizations, major white-collar crime,
and significant violent crime.
Given
the near-term requirement to ensure the resource needs of
our top three priorities are satisfied, SACs must be more
focused and deliberate in his/her management of resources
allocated to criminal priorities. Consequently, it is imperative
that SACs avoid duplicating the efforts of other agencies
or direct resources against crime problems that can be more
appropriately handled by other agencies. We must be prepared,
for the time being, to defer criminal cases to others, even
in significant cases, if other agencies possess the expertise
to handle the matter adequately. In situations where other
federal, state, and municipal capabilities are not sufficient
to handle a case or situation, SACs should be prepared to
step in and provide FBI resources as needed. However, once
the immediate situation is under control or resolved I expect
SACs to reevaluate the level of FBI commitment and make necessary
adjustments.
Within the conduct of our criminal investigative mission and
in our day-to-day interactions with state and municipal law
enforcement partners, all FBI personnel must remain alert
for indications of criminal or suspicious activities that
might be precursors of possible terrorist operational and
logistical activities. The PENTTBOM investigation has demonstrated
how a group of terrorists were able to infiltrate our country
and carry out extensive planning, operational, and logistical
activities without apprehension by law enforcement. Other
terrorist investigations have revealed patterns of low-level
criminal activity by terrorists. It is the duty of every FBI
employee to remain vigilant for suspicious activity or informant
information that could be a tip-off to a future terrorist
attack.
Closing
Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Serrano, and members of the Subcommittee, the unpredictable
and unconventional threats to our national security and the
serious crime problems that often reach beyond our borders
necessitate changes in the FBI, changes in our priorities,
changes in our workforce, and changes in our approach to performing
our mission. Critics often characterize the FBI as being resistant
to change, citing an "insular" culture. I have had
the opportunity to work closely with the fine men and women
of the FBI under the extreme circumstances of the last nine
months. I am confident of their recognition of the importance
of this critical moment in our history and I am confident
that change is being embraced. I will not pretend it will
be easy but I also do not doubt that a different FBI is emerging
post-9/11.
What I am proposing is an evolving road map for moving the
FBI forward through this time of uncertainty and unpredictability.
As an evolving strategy, it will be adjusted to meet changes
in the world in which we must operate. Our adversaries, whether
they are terrorists, foreign intelligence agents, or criminals,
are not static or complacent -- we must not be either. The
challenges facing the FBI requires a workforce that possess
specialized skills and backgrounds, that is equipped with
the proper investigative, technical, and analytical tools,
and possesses the managerial and administrative competencies
necessary to deal with a complex and volatile environment.
Beyond the changes and proposals I have outlined today are
the challenges of changing and revitalizing internal processes
to eliminate "stove-pipes" and barriers that prevent
us from being more collaborative among ourselves and with
our external partners.
I welcome
your comments and suggestions relative to the management and
organizational changes that I have submitted to the Congress.
I appreciate the support that this Committee has given to
what we are trying to accomplish and I particularly appreciate
the recognition of the urgency with which I believe these
issues must be addressed.
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