Layers of Security
By this time, most of you are getting pretty familiar with what TSA does on a daily basis. If you’re a regular reader of this blog, you’ve likely heard us mention layers of security. It’s a term we use a lot but it’s a lot more than just a catch phrase, it really is what we do.Throughout my time at TSA, many analogies, metaphors and comparisons have been used to describe the layers. Some stick, some fall by the wayside. One way of describing it is like the combination to a lock. One correct number won’t get you access, all have to be correct. Today, I thought I’d take you inside the “layered security approach” for a closer look at what we do.
Each time a passenger boards a flight they’re subject to up to 20 of these layers. I know what you’re thinking…we’ve got the checkpoint, metal detector, screening process, etc but what else?
Before you ever step foot on an airplane, TSA intelligence officials have worked with their counterparts throughout the federal government and its international partners to determine any threats to aviation security. Concurrently, TSA collaborates with CBP and the Joint Terrorism Task Force on threats and security issues. TSA also leans heavily on relationships with local law enforcement. Their work around the airport is vital to successful security.
In addition, passengers are checked against no-fly lists and crews vetted. All of this occurs before the passenger ever reaches the airport.
Once at the airport the other layers of security begin to take shape. Each airport with commercial flights is required to have a TSA-approved security program. This program covers everything from the type of fencing required around the perimeter of the airport to how many police officers are needed to make sure vehicles don’t park too close to the curb. In addition to this plan, VIPR teams consisting of federal air marshals, local law enforcement, canine teams and behavior detection officers may be patrolling the area. This can occur before or beyond the checkpoint, anywhere at an airport.
Passengers entering the security checkpoint are subject to noninvasive screening by TSA’s behavior detection officers. BDOs are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions exhibited by those looking to avoid being discovered.
The passenger also hands their boarding pass and ID to a TSA travel document checker. This layer of security is relatively new, beginning in June 2007. Checking the validity of documents and the person holding them provides a significant security upgrade. Individuals with phony or suspicious documents are referred to local law enforcement for additional scrutiny.
TSA canine teams also patrol the airports perimeter and interior. These teams, composed of a local law enforcement officer and TSA provided canine, are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. TSA has trained and certified more than 500 teams in partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies. They’re working in 70 airports and 14 mass transit systems. TSA will certify more than 400 additional canine teams over the next two years, including teams led by TSA canine handlers that will focus on air cargo.
As previously mentioned, the checkpoint is one of 20 layers of security. Great work is done by TSOs there at over 450 airports nationwide, That said, not a whole lot of ink will be spilled here about it, we’ve done a lot of that already.
TSA also screens every piece of luggage that you’ve checked. Modern inline systems streamline the process in many airports (As demonstrated by this post). Stand alone systems are used in other airports.
The planes themselves are screened as well. Transportation Security Inspectors randomly screen planes and are also involved in VIPR teams and employee screening.
That leads us onto our next layer, which is employee screening. Those with access to the airport’s secure areas including gate workers and food service employees are subject to random screening in addition to going through thorough background checks and being checked everyday against terror watch lists.
TSA’s Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) are also working to increase the strength of our security approach. BAOs were trained at one of two specialized schools and have extensive operational experience in the field as members of military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units or accredited law enforcement/public safety bomb squads. They perform advanced alarm resolution at the checkpoint as well as expert training. Their presence in the airport environment helps security while increasing the abilities of those working with them.
Another vital layer of security is the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). FAMs are TSA’s law enforcement arm. They are specifically trained to work within the aircraft but their role is ever expanding. They participate in VIPR missions and are on duty throughout the airport environment.
Through the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, TSA trains and authorizes pilots and other approved flight crew members to carry a firearm aboard the plane. TSA also offers course to train other members of the flight crew to defend themselves inside an aircraft. The program, known as Crew Member Self Defense, adds an additional layer to the security system.
The hardening of cockpit doors occurred after 9/11 and provides yet another layer preventing possible attack. The vigilance of the flying public in-flight and on the ground is an important piece of aviation security. Passengers’ willingness to work with TSA and local law enforcement is crucial to enhancing security.
Check this out for a clearer, more graphically appealing view of TSA’s layers of security.
Jim
TSA EoS Blog Team
posted by Jim at
5:24 PM
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92 Comments:
One thing I don't understand - what exactly does ID checking have to do with security? As long as the person's belongings is contraband free, then what's the big deal with their ID's? The old contracted ID checkers used to check ID's quickly and without much fuss; now the TSA ID checkers take double as long and it holds up the lines.
Can anyone over at TSA Hq clarify on this, please?
March 24, 2008 5:49 PM
@andy: what exactly does ID checking have to do with security?
Checking IDs at the checkpoint ensures that the person whose name is on the ticket is actually the person entering the secure area. As the post stated, parts of TSA's security model is (1) keeping people on the no-fly list from entering the secure area at all, and (2) making sure that people on the selectee list get the additional screening required. If names on the tickets were not matched against a verified ID, I (a trusted TSA employee) could easily get a boarding pass and give that pass to a terrorist blackmailing me.
March 24, 2008 6:29 PM
Regarding the "travel document checker" policy, you realize it's a complete waste right? A friend of mine prints fake boarding passes so he can meet family members at the gate instead of the curb. I would imagine that anyone with more nefarious intents would be able to do the same.
So tell me what the purpose of that layer is?
March 24, 2008 7:07 PM
Also, if you're going to tout the fact that you allow flight crews to carry firearms (after being trained on how to do so), I wouldn't do it on a day when there's a story about one of these trained crew members accidentally discharging the weapon during a flight.
Yikes.
March 24, 2008 7:09 PM
"By this time, most of you are getting pretty familiar with what TSA does on a daily basis."
What we are becoming familiar with is that the TSA refuses to answer any of the very serious and very legitimate questions posed by so many participants on this blog.
Instead, you keep trying to prove your worth to the flying public. This thread is nothing but one more attempt to do so.
March 24, 2008 7:40 PM
Anonymous re ID checking:
Please, give us a break. ID checking is not keeping anyone on the no-fly list from getting into the secure area at the airport. Do you really want us to believe that every ID checker (many of whom don't have a clue as to what they are doing), knows the name and face of everyone on the no-fly list?
If you are a screener, please go get another job because no one in their right mind believes what you wrote. If you're a member of the public, please do some research into the "no-fly" list.
March 24, 2008 7:45 PM
Anonymous said at March 24,2008 6:29PM that TSA checks ID to insure that people on the no-fly list don't enter the secure area....I thought I read on this blog that a person can fly with NO ID at all if he submits to secondary screening. Also, that it's the airlines' responsibility to check names against the no-fly list.So what's the truth today at the airport of your choice...whatever TSO Whoever decides?
March 24, 2008 7:49 PM
Checking IDs at the checkpoint ensures that the person whose name is on the ticket is actually the person entering the secure area. As the post stated, parts of TSA's security model is (1) keeping people on the no-fly list from entering the secure area at all,
Hmm, exactly how is that done by TSA? I mean, the TSA operative examining the license and ticket have no access to any list at all. I guess that the CIA's experiments in ESP finally paid off and TSA is (through ESP) able to verify identity.
and (2) making sure that people on the selectee list get the additional screening required. If names on the tickets were not matched against a verified ID, I (a trusted TSA employee) could easily get a boarding pass and give that pass to a terrorist blackmailing me.
I was screened (on more than one occasion) at the entrance to the concourse, at the gate, and when I got on a connecting flight. Please tell me how that made anyone safer, since I never left the secure concourse except on arrival at my destination.
When dealing with people you've got to use your brains. To often the phrase "I'm just doing my job" rolls off the lips of a TSO, like once you arrive at work you go on autopilot till quitting time. That situation makes for some unpleasantries for travelers (you know the ones you are supposed to protect).
March 24, 2008 8:24 PM
Yes, please do address the pointless process of comparing IDs to boarding passes. How does this help anyone but airline accountants? Consider the following:
1] Get job as waiter
2] Steal credit card number
3] Buy ticket in that name
4] Check in online under false name
5] Modify boarding pass to your own name
6] Use modified boarding pass with valid but 'incriminating' id that looks like you.
March 24, 2008 8:50 PM
Is that a pistol in your pocket, Mr. Pilot, or are you happy to see me?
March 24, 2008 9:09 PM
While on the subject of "travel document checking," what exactly constitutes a valid ID? There were many questions about this in the And Now, a Word from our Lawyers ... thread, but no answers.
March 24, 2008 9:38 PM
How quickly do posts get published?
March 24, 2008 10:42 PM
What level of security would a FFDO firing his weapon accidently be?
March 24, 2008 10:55 PM
"passengers are checked against no-fly lists"
At what point does the TSA perform this task? Certainly not ad the ID check, unless the TSOs have committed the hundreds of thousands of inappropriately identified names on the No-Fly list to memory and can recall them while they are checking the name.
Moreover, it is a pretty ridiculous assumption that someone cannot get an ID with a name on it if they want to. It is just a matter of patience and money.
Finally, who cares if someone on the no-fly list is on the airplane. If the TSOs are doing what should be their primary task - searching for things headed air-side that could cause trouble on an airplane - then it wouldn't matter who went airside, as they wouldn't have any weapons available to them anyways. It doesn't matter if the terrorist is blackmailing you if they do not have a weapon on the plane; they cannot cause sufficient trouble to justify the fiasco that ID checking represents.
Maybe focusing the efforts on layers such as screening cargo or screening employees - two areas that are much more likely to be troublesome since they are on airport grounds more regularly - would be a more legitimate use of limited resources. Of course then you wouldn't be able to brag about all the false papers you find each week - a mission the agency was not tasked with, by the way.
Focus on your real mission, not just the parts that look good to the 80% of the public that never or rarely travels.
March 24, 2008 11:10 PM
"TSA also screens every piece of luggage that you’ve checked. Modern inline systems streamline the process in many airports."
The TSA uses this screening to steal high value items from opened luggage.
Happened to me. Hello, AMTRAK.
March 24, 2008 11:22 PM
What the graphic fails to identify is the passenger who is right smack dab in the middle and suffers all these layers.
March 24, 2008 11:23 PM
Jim wrote:
"passengers are checked against no-fly lists and crews vetted. All of this occurs before the passenger ever reaches the airport."
If a passenger is barred from travel via such list, this amounts to an administrative punishment without any trial and with no chance for appeal.
Over 900,000 names are now on the United States' so-called "terrorist watch list". Presumably, the people named on that list have done nothing wrong, or they would be arrested, tried, convicted, and punished for their crimes -- right? In the United States, are we not considered innocent until proven guilty in the eyes of the law?
"The passenger also hands their boarding pass and ID to a TSA travel document checker."
Note that although Jim's wording carefully avoids stating so, the passenger only hands over an I.D. if he so desires (possibly because he wishes to avoid a thorough screening). There is no requirement that passengers on domestic flights identify themselves to government agents; a boarding pass is sufficient. "Showing I.D." simply allows one to slip through security with an abbreviated screening.
If you doubt that this is the case, please see this 2007 letter from Jeffrey R. Sural of the TSA to Senator John Warner confirming that domestic passengers are not required to show any I.D. at airport security checkpoints (PDF; 88KB) or this TSA "Travel Assistant" page which states, "We encourage each adult traveler to keep his/her airline boarding pass and government-issued photo ID available until exiting the security checkpoint." Note: that's "encourage" not "require".
"Checking the validity of documents and the person holding them provides a significant security upgrade. Individuals with phony or suspicious documents are referred to local law enforcement for additional scrutiny."
People with falsified identification cards (any one of the 50+ types that are acceptable) will only be caught if the TSA agent notices. It's safe to assume that even a moderately-well-funded criminal could acquire a good fake or steal someone else's identity and use the other person's I.D. card.
Even assuming that screeners are able to consistently detect falsified I.D. documents, that their doing so provides any increased security is arguable. In fact, it may actually decrease security, because 1) it contributes to a false sense of security, breeding complacency, and 2) potential criminals can probe the system by sending a group of people on innocent trips, observing which ones are subject to additional screening, then send the ones who weren't flagged for additional screening on a terrorist mission (this is described by MIT researchers as "The Carnival Booth Algorithm").
Most of the instances of passengers being caught with falsified I.D. cards and passports that are described on TSA's "Travel Document Checker (TDC)" Web page (under "Travel Document Checking Success Stories") were arrested on charges of immigrations violations, possession of illegal drugs, or credit card theft. None of them is described as having been found to be carrying anything that, had he brought it onto his flight, would have put other passengers or crew at risk.
Paraphrasing The Identity Project: No matter how sophisticated the security embedded into an I.D., a well-funded criminal will be able to falsify it. Honest people, however, go to Pro-Life rallies. Honest people go to Pro-Choice rallies, too. Honest people attend gun shows. Honest people protest the actions of the President of the United States. Honest people fly to political conventions. What if those with the power to put people on a "no fly" list decided that they didn't like the reason for which you wanted to travel? The honest people wouldn't be going anywhere.
For related information, please see "What's Wrong With Showing ID" at The Identity Project.
March 25, 2008 1:12 AM
You mention the "no-fly" list, and I think that I (and many other people) have some concerns with this concept.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that there have been numerous false-positives (people mistakenly put on the list, people whose names and data are similar or identical to other people on the list) and that there is no easy way to get off the list (nor is there a way to find out why you were put on the list, or any recourse for that matter!). In fact, I remember a story back in 2004 where Senator Edward Kennedy was mistakenly flagged, and it took HIM 3 weeks to get off the list. And he's a Senator. What chance do WE, the general public have?
I believe that he no fly list (and any other lists that you match people against) require more transparency and accountability. If someone is on the list, tell them why, how to get off it, and offer additional screening in the mean time (instead of sending them home), until they can be removed.
March 25, 2008 8:59 AM
I would like to back up what Andy said earlier. The ID check brings us *nothing* in terms of security on the plane. Osama bin Laden himself could get on a plane (and be identified as such) and we would not be one single jot more endangered - provided you guys make sure he doesn't have any weapons or explosives on board.
The whole ID thing just smacks of scope creep. As I mentioned in another post - I have had TSOs try to verify my immigration status. It is woefully clear that they don't have any clue what kind of documentation they should be looking for so why bother looking?
March 25, 2008 9:46 AM
Have you covered hijacking attempts by space aliens as well? Some of the items you 'protect' us from are as remote and as improbable as is a hijacking attempt by space aliens. The middle east isn't the US.
March 25, 2008 10:22 AM
In response to Andy's question, "what exactly does ID checking have to do with security?" someone anonymously wrote:
"If names on the tickets were not matched against a verified ID, I (a trusted TSA employee) could easily get a boarding pass and give that pass to a terrorist blackmailing me."
...and if names were matched in such a manner as a matter of policy, the terrorist need only a) purchase a good fake I.D. with your information and his picture, b) blackmail someone who looks a bit like him and take the victim's I.D. card to the airport along with his boarding pass, or c) simply steal one's identity and get I.D. and boarding pass in his name.
Remember, the men accused of hijacking the planes that were used in the crimes of September 11, 2001, were all in possession of valid, U.S.-government-issued I.D.
March 25, 2008 10:39 AM
Checking IDs at the checkpoint ensures that the person whose name is on the ticket is actually the person entering the secure area.
Funny how that wouldn't prevent another September 11th, considering that all of the terrorist hijackers had IDs matching the names on their boarding passes.
And, considering the relative ease of creating authentic-looking false IDs -- despite the provisions of the relatively ineffective REAL ID Act, or obtaining stolen authentic ID materials, and the fact that I can print a boarding pass at home (opening the possibility of modifying the printed name via photoshop or a text editor), it's a laughable "layer" that adds one more unnecessarily compulsory item to juggle at the security checkpoint.
* Shoes
* Belt
* Sweater/Jacket
* Boarding pass
* ID
* Laptop
* Batteries (hyperbole at its best)
* Liquids (which in and of itself is a joke)
March 25, 2008 10:42 AM
So we know that the maximum number of checks is 20. The more important question I would think is what is the minimum number that everyone goes through? A max of 20 means little if most people only go through 3 or 4 of them.
March 25, 2008 11:45 AM
Okay, so you have discovered that airline security is imperfect. What’s the next step?
Stop blaming the people and especially the screeners for TSA policy and procedure. They are just doing what they have been told to do. It’s not some 20 year olds fault that he is taking your 6 oz tube of tooth paste or checking your I.D. Have some understanding and patience. Let the TSA do what they do. I hate standing in line at the airport behind someone who gives the TSA a hard time. Put your time and energy to something else. Take that built up frustration and volunteer at your favorite charity or something. Everyone has criticism but no real solution. Get to the airport 2 hours before your flight like we are suppose to and you will be fine. Our soldiers are dying over in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American economy is in big trouble, our children’s minds are being corrupted by our out of control media, and you want to complain about your I.D. being check at the airport. We have more important issues as a country, don’t you think?
March 25, 2008 1:48 PM
"Okay, so you have discovered that airline security is imperfect. What’s the next step?"
That is a very good question!
After all it is what this blog is about.
I am sure there will be some great answers and suggestions.
March 25, 2008 2:39 PM
Anonymous said at 1:48 p.m.:
"Okay, so you have discovered that airline security is imperfect. What’s the next step?
Stop blaming the people and especially the screeners for TSA policy and procedure. They are just doing what they have been told to do. It’s not some 20 year olds fault that he is taking your 6 oz tube of tooth paste or checking your I.D. Have some understanding and patience. Let the TSA do what they do. I hate standing in line at the airport behind someone who gives the TSA a hard time. Put your time and energy to something else. Take that built up frustration and volunteer at your favorite charity or something. Everyone has criticism but no real solution. Get to the airport 2 hours before your flight like we are suppose to and you will be fine. Our soldiers are dying over in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American economy is in big trouble, our children’s minds are being corrupted by our out of control media, and you want to complain about your I.D. being check at the airport. We have more important issues as a country, don’t you think?"
Yes, anonymous, we do have more important issues as a country. And if we were not wasting billions of dollars on procedures such as ID checks that are meaningless and have been proven meaningless by security experts outside of TSA, the liquid and shoe scams, we could be spending that money on those issues that need to solved: hunger, homelessness, lack of proper medical care, education.
What would have happened if 232 years ago, the revolutionaries would have followed your advice?
I look at each and every person who complains, who practices "civil disobedience" by bucking the rules as a revolutionary. We are indeed headed down a slippery slope if we allow these practices, such as REAL ID, to continue.
Why don't you come back to us when it is required that you have ID on our person when you walk you dog?
The only way we are going to bring about change at the TSA is by constantly complaining, bringing to the attention of "sheeple" like yourself the taxpayer money that is being squandered every day and is not making us one iota safer.
As a prime example, not one person from the TSA has bothered to respond to any of the extremely relevant and important questions asked anywhere on this blog. Why? Because they can't substantiate their claims and proclamations.
Thank heaven that in a few more months both Chertoff and Hawley will be out of jobs and, hopefully, more thoughtful heads will prevail at both DHS and TSA.
March 25, 2008 2:50 PM
Your image is WAY to small to read. Hire a graphics person if you're gonna have a blog.
March 25, 2008 3:16 PM
Why do four or five different people have to look at boarding passes between the entry to the TSA checkpoint and the exit?
I'm sure there's some valid classified reason based on "robust intelligence," but from the passenger's perspective it just looks like the TSA is so disorganized and inept that they can't rely on whoever checks the boarding pass at the checkpoint entry.
Repeated presentation of boarding passes within the checkpoint seems an unnecessary distraction that interferes with the passengers' ability to protect their belongings from theft (something the TSA apparently does not care about). I don't see how it does anything to help the screening process or keep anyone safer.
I would like to know why the multiple checks are necessary. But I know better than to expect a straightforward answer from the TSA.
March 25, 2008 5:07 PM
Sandra, to your snippet:
The only way we are going to bring about change at the TSA is by constantly complaining, bringing to the attention of "sheeple" like yourself the taxpayer money that is being squandered every day and is not making us one iota safer.
Thank you. I could not have said it better myself.
March 25, 2008 5:30 PM
Problem:
TSO's who can't recognize fake id.
Solution: Hire bartenders from college towns.
You know this real travesty going on? I would expect that just about any University Campus will have at least one person capable of making a fake ID card that would be 'approved' by a TSO. One guy on my campus had every US State, Protectorate and Territory, as well as all the Canadian Provinces ready to go, including the correct UV/semi-reflective ink seals for embedding under the laminate. All he needed was a picture and ten minutes per ID. True, they'd fail the database test, but they'd work for 'flash' ID. And realistically, what was the difference between his and the real ones? His lasted longer.
March 25, 2008 8:07 PM
Problem:
TSO's who can't recognize fake id.
Solution: Hire bartenders from college towns.
Never going to happen...the bartenders make more money :O
March 25, 2008 11:19 PM
I was reviewing this again the other day and I re-read Kippie's testimony. It's now clear to me that Kippie included "passengers" as Layer #20 in order to someday be able to blame us for an in-flight security failure.
"Unfortunately, Senator, Layer #20 failed yesterday, which is why the airplane got hijacked. All other 19 layers directly under my control performed perfectly."
I don't know about anyone else, but I don't remember either volunteering for for or being drafted into the TSA.
Brilliant move, Kip.
March 26, 2008 6:35 AM
20 layers of security and not a damn word about the fact that a terrorist is far more likely to be a Middle Eastern male than any other profile.
Oh dear, we wouldn't want to "profile!"
March 26, 2008 7:53 AM
"I don't know about anyone else, but I don't remember either volunteering for for or being drafted into the TSA.
Brilliant move, Kip."
While you may not have made the claim yourself, several critics on this blog have either implied or said expressly that because passengers are likely to react to an incident, other TSA security measures are unnecessary. Do you believe that passengers would not or should not react in the event that an incident does occur? If not, why not? If you believe that they should or will, why would including them in the security layer chart be a cause of concern to you?
Chance - Eos Blog Team.
March 26, 2008 10:37 AM
20 layers of security and not a damn word about the fact that a terrorist is far more likely to be a Middle Eastern male than any other profile.
Oh dear, we wouldn't want to "profile!"
That's because not all terrorists are middle eastern, male, or fit other easy criteria to define. Profiling simply isn't an effective means of distinguishing extremists from non-extremists.
March 26, 2008 10:39 AM
"While you may not have made the claim yourself, several critics on this blog have either implied or said expressly that because passengers are likely to react to an incident, other TSA security measures are unnecessary. Do you believe that passengers would not or should not react in the event that an incident does occur? If not, why not? If you believe that they should or will, why would including them in the security layer chart be a cause of concern to you?
Chance - Eos Blog Team.
March 26, 2008 10:37 AM"
Chance,
Of course passengers will fight back. Cooperation with hijackers as the SOP (to borrow an oft-used screener term) ceased to exist not on Flight 93. It ceased to exist on AA 77 (?) -- Pentagon airplane -- but there wasn't enough time for the passengers to mount a counterattack.
My objection -- actually an insult -- to being included in the "layers of security" chart is that it is patronizing. It's nothing more than a feeble attempt to get us -- the flying public -- to buy into all this TSA stuff.
This is akin to a bunch of buy-in techniques Roosevelt came up with during WWII in order to ensure the public was a stakeholder in the war effort. The most blatant of these was the call for people to donate wrought iron and other metals to the "war effort." People ripped out their wrought iron fences and donated all sorts of other metal objects which were useless to any manufacturing process.
This is nothing more than Kippie's wrought iron fence, and it's pretty darn insulting.
Assuming for the moment that a 9/11 style even occurs again, rest assured every passenger won't be looking for Kippie's endorsement or permission before fighting back.
March 26, 2008 12:03 PM
for those of you who think they can get through a checkpoint with a fake id.
i suggest you do one of 2 things.
either shut up, or get yourself one of those fake id's with a hidden camera and lets see if you dont get picked out of line.
then post it up on youtube, so you can finally proove the system doesnt work.
untill then your just talk.
March 26, 2008 1:22 PM
I'd like to hear more about the behavior detection officers.... I fly 2-6 times per week, and I ALWAYS get nervous and self conscious when I walk by security desks or large groups of TSA agents.... do they recognize ridiculous nervousness as opposed to bad-people nervousness? :)
March 26, 2008 1:59 PM
Great... So much for feeling safe when I fly to Washington in June
March 26, 2008 3:05 PM
Sarah, more information on our Behavior Detection Officers may be found
here.
March 26, 2008 4:08 PM
Well, WWII was quite a bit before my time, but I've never heard anyone before describe feeling insulted by the various programs intended to include the population in the war effort. Even if I were to accept your comparison as a fair one, I wouldn't be offended, but to each their own. I'm sure there are people who would be offended if passengers weren't on the chart.
Chance EoS Blog Team
March 26, 2008 4:15 PM
Chance said:
"Sarah, more information on our Behavior Detection Officers may be found
here."
And when I clicked on the link I was taken to a TSA page that said, "Sorry, the page you requested was not found." Is the info SSI, Chance?
March 27, 2008 2:49 PM
Chance's link was botched (a line break element was included in the target URI).
TSA Blog: The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior Detection Officer
March 27, 2008 3:36 PM
So what do you all have to say about this poor woman on CNN.com who was forced to remove her nipple piercing.
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/27/nipple.ring.ap/index.html
I hope whomever was responsible gets fired. This was unreasonable and uncalled for.
March 27, 2008 11:08 PM
"Blogger Chance said... Well, WWII was quite a bit before my time, but I've never heard anyone before describe feeling insulted by the various programs intended to include the population in the war effort."
Yeah, Jesus was before your time too, you probably didn't hear about the folks feelings about him either.
Mr. Nelson is spot on with his comments.
I'd be interested to hear the official TSA reaction to the recent 'nipple ring' incident in Lubbock.
At some point, TSA must begin working WITH the public, not against.
March 28, 2008 1:09 AM
The combination lock analogy is a bad one.
You open your 20-layer combination lock to 2,000,000 people per day. 2,000,000 people per day work the combination. Processing volumes like that trains your workforce to let people through, not lock people out.
The problem the terrorist has isn't picking a 20-number combination lock, it is blending in with what 2,000,000 other people do every day.
Also, several of your layers give do-overs: Carrying a prohibited liquid gets a confiscation and a pass. No ID gets you secondary screening. If the terrorist can set foot on an airplane at least once before they try their their mission, they've got the ID, no-fly, CBP, JTTF, and local law enforcement numbers picked.
It might be nice salesmanship to think of it as a 20-layer combination lock, but the layers don't all overlap, (so you don't every have all 20 layers working together) and any combination you have to give out to 2,000,000 people per day can't be very secure.
If someone was dumb enough to try 9/11 over again, would TSA's 20-layer combination lock prevent it?
And Chance: the objection to including things like the passengers in your 20 layers of TSA security is that TSA isn't responsible for them. Like the fences we had around airports long before TSA, or the hardened cockpit doors that also pre-date TSA, those layers work independently of TSA.
March 28, 2008 1:11 AM
Savings us from dangerous body jewelry. Which layer of security did this involve?
[url=http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080328/ap_on_re_us/nipple_rings;_ylt=AqLNkusaW707gxtnWs3VMI6s0NUE] Dangerous piercings[/url]
March 28, 2008 6:55 AM
Even though I have sent a few spears your way I do have a question that I feel would be of interest to all travelers.
On any given day the risk of an attempted highjacking or other such undesired event must be extremely low, much less than 1% chance I would quess. Probably about the same odds of an aircraft accident from any other possible cause.
From a risk analysis viewpoint how much effort spent on clearing passengers is overkill?
We know there is always a chance of an aircraft crash caused by mechanical failure, pilot error, weather or air traffic control failure yet we do not ground the aircraft and stop flying.
TSA employs some 40,000 plus people to stop a 1 in a million event that may never happen. I would expect a crash from any of the other possible causes to happen before another event such as 9/11 ever takes place. I think your cost to benefit ratio needs some outside scrutiny.
Passengers know there is some slight risk of an aircraft going down yet they continue to fly. TSA has a function but has gone well overboard of the real threat risk.
Would TSA care to comment?
March 28, 2008 10:52 AM
TSA employs some 40,000 plus people to stop a 1 in a million event that may never happen. I would expect a crash from any of the other possible causes to happen before another event such as 9/11 ever takes place. I think your cost to benefit ratio needs some outside scrutiny.
If you're going to do a cost-benefit analysis, you'll have to factor in the unfortunate fact that the TSA's efforts to stop an extremely rare (but potentially devastating) threat actually increase passengers' risk for the much more common threat of theft.
TSA procedures require checked bags to be unlocked, and inspectors too often remove even "approved" locks, facilitating theft by rogue TSA inspectors and by subsequent baggage handlers. Procedures at checkpoints require passengers to separate their belongings into several bins, and then separate themselves from those belongings. Passengers are continually distracted while being screened (and repeatedly asked to show boarding passes), and particularly during the chaotic, pressured exit from the checkpoint as they frantically gather their separated belongings and put on their shoes.
All those distractions make easy targets for thieves. But the TSA is so focused on enforcing (and "interpreting") all those rules about shoes and liquids in an effort to spot the 1-in-a-million threat to aviation (and it's probably more like one in a billion) that they're completely oblivious to the risk to passengers that they're creating.
What the TSA seems to forget is that "Security" (their middle name) actually means ensuring that passengers and their belongings safely arrive at their destinations. Terrorism is a "glamorous" but rare threat to passenger security. Theft is a very unglamorous but regrettably common threat to passenger security. A "security" system that focuses exclusively on the "glamorous" but very rare threat of terrorism while increasing the risk of the "unglamorous" but common threat of theft is no "security" at all. That's possibly the largest of the many flaws in the TSA's approach.
No matter how many impressive layers the bureaucracy can cram onto a busy PowerPoint slide, they're worthless if they actually encourage common threats to passenger security. If the TSA is going to brag their fancy Behavior Detection Officers hauling in drug criminals and bearers of fake identification, they should at least expand their lookouts to thieves who actually do threaten passengers.
March 28, 2008 1:39 PM
Yes, it will be very interesting to see the response to the latest PR fiasco on this blog. I'll bet someone is hard at work right now writing a post that will spin the nipple-piercing incident as proof of the TSA's effectiveness! After all, someone who pierces her nipples has to be suspicious and merits thorough investigation.
March 28, 2008 1:43 PM
Please tell us exactly what "layer" is being utilized when a woman is forced to remove her nipple piercings by means of PLIERS before being allowed to board a flight? Here's a link: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080327/ap_on_re_us/nipple_rings
Naturally, you can't comment on this, TSA, because _you're being sued_ for forcing an American citizen to physically remove piercings, but boy oh boy I'd love to hear how this makes America safer from the shoe bombers. Goodness knows that I feel safer every time I throw away a bottle of Dasani water before the checkpoints and then buy THE SAME BRAND for $3.25 immediately after security.
March 28, 2008 2:12 PM
Johnny-on-the-spot, brave TSA operatives have saved America from a nipple-dangles attack. How proud must be the minions of bureaucratic goons that have accounted themselves so well. She should be happy that she didn't have a pacemaker!
Great job!
March 28, 2008 2:33 PM
Isn't it strange how the day after the Nipplegate story broke that all the Blog Operators seem to have taken the day off.
Not a one of them has had the backbone to respond to this.
Figures!!
March 28, 2008 2:50 PM
Sandra,
I have a few comments. You sad said “I look at each and every person who complains, who practices "civil disobedience" by bucking the rules as a revolutionary.” Give me a break, some people just like to be jerks and that’s why they practice civil disobedience.
Don’t use the term “revolutionary” so loosely. To sum up what I was saying is you have to pick your battles. If you cry and scream and stomp your feet over the little things then larger issues will pass you by. You called me a “sheeple.” No name calling please. It takes away from your argument. Good use of the high school vocabulary. You also said that the liquid and shoe thing were “scams.” I don’t think you are correct. Richard Reed was caught flying with explosives in his shoe, after he boarded the plane and it took off he tried to ignite the explosive but some nearby passengers and airline crew caught him and wrestled him to the floor. Otherwise, the flight would have gone down in flames. Also, Last year in Britain several men were caught trying to bring liquid explosives on board a plane. They were stopped. In all, I believe that 16 planes were targeted that day and disaster was adverted. TSA can do a better job, but somewhere along the line we have to stop and remember there a people out there who want to kill Americans and for some reason they are obsessed with the Airline industry. TSA is not the bad guy, un organized, underpaid and under trained is most likely the case. However, please don’t associate the word revolution with the protesting of I.D. checks. The people working for TSA are our friends and Neighbors, fellow Americans, not an opposing force trying to take away our rights and freedoms. Believe it or not, they are on our side. In order to have a revolution you have to be in protest or revolt against someone or something that’s against your way of life. TSA is not the British from times of old. TSA is there to help no matter how much you may not like that idea. If another plane goes down by a terrorist, and it was a shoe bomb or they find out the person was let through because of the lack of an I.D. check, your one of those people who will be out to blame the TSA. It’s attitudes like yours that weaken this nation.
March 28, 2008 3:05 PM
I would be interested in seeing the graph updated with the efficiency of each layer. Efficiency meaning the amount of risk (to the passenger) mitigated by the layer over the cost (to the passenger in taxes, time, property, annoyance) of the layer.
These layers are not equally efficient. Is the time/money/tax/annoyance cost of passenger screening really worth the reduction in risk? How about the liquid ban, shoe removal, ID "checking"?
Perhaps a few of the least efficient layers could be eliminated.
Also, many these layers are only protection against a terrorist attack (a large but unlikely event).
What are the layers in place to protect against theft of passengers belongings?
What are the layers in place to protect against violation of passengers civil rights?
What are the layers in place to protect against an attack on the security checkpoint itself?
I look forward to your open and honest answers to these questions.
March 28, 2008 3:11 PM
Isn't it strange how the day after the Nipplegate story broke that all the Blog Operators seem to have taken the day off.
Not a one of them has had the backbone to respond to this.
Patience. A carefully crafted PR response takes much time and many people to put together, unlike the truth.
March 28, 2008 3:13 PM
What happened on September 11th? Around 3000 innocent people lost their lives and their families were forever affected. What also happened? The U.S. economy nearly collapsed. No one talks about that. What would have happened to the millions of other Americans if our economy failed? The Great depression would have not looked not so great compared to this. The U.S. economy, can not take another September 11th. You cannot imagine all the different industries effected by September 11th. Companies around our country and around the globe shut down, some, never to recover. So, when I walk through an airport the question I have isn’t why they are taking my bottle of water or making me takeoff my shoes, but why isn’t there more security?
March 28, 2008 3:22 PM
Sorry about the broken link, I am not so good with HTML. I prefer the easy linking in a wiki myself.
On any given day the risk of an attempted high jacking or other such undesired event must be extremely low, much less than 1% chance I would quess. Probably about the same odds of an aircraft accident from any other possible cause.
I would have to disagree with 1%. For any one aircraft, probably that's a defensible a statement, but for the aviation sector as a whole, it would have to be far greater. See my comments at the bottom of this response.
From a risk analysis viewpoint how much effort spent on clearing passengers is overkill?
Basically you're asking what the acceptable losses due to extremist action are.
In my opinion, it depends on how you structure your analysis. In pure dollar terms, once the direct and indirect costs of security exceeds the amount of direct and indirect costs from damage terrorists can cause, that would appear to be overkill. However, I don't believe most of the public would agree to that, and even if they did I don’t believe we are at all close to that point, especially since extremist actions can have an outsized effect.
An analogy I use is this: people die almost every year trying to climb Mt. Everest, but people still try despite the relative risk. Suppose now you had some guys taking potshots at climbers as they went up. Even if they were horrible shots, and your relative risk only went up slightly, I guarantee you the number of climbers per year would plummet, pun intended.
We know there is always a chance of an aircraft crash caused by mechanical failure, pilot error, weather or air traffic control failure yet we do not ground the aircraft and stop flying. TSA employs some 40,000 plus people to stop a 1 in a million event that may never happen. I would expect a crash from any of the other possible causes to happen before another event such as 9/11 ever takes place.
We don’t ground aircraft? Yes we do. Aircraft are grounded all the time for safety violations, and billions of dollars are spent on safety systems to avoid the very issues you point out. By you're reasoning, FAA and other civil aviation organizations are wasting your money, because the probability of an accident is so low. This is like saying you should fire your exterminator because you don’t have a bug problem.
I think your cost to benefit ratio needs some outside scrutiny.
Out products and procedures are looked at by the Intelligence Community, other US government agencies, industry representatives, and segments of academia, using standard tools used both inside and outside of government. Could we be wrong? Sure. But we are reviewed by multiple people and agencies on a continuing basis.
Passengers know there is some slight risk of an aircraft going down yet they continue to fly. TSA has a function but has gone well overboard of the real threat risk.
Would TSA care to comment?
I'm not "TSA", so if this is a game of gotcha, I'm taking my ball and going home.
Threat is only part of the risk equation. A simple Google search will show many, many examples of extremists with a clear intent to attack the U.S. or its interests. Further research will show hijackings, attack plots, and suspicious incidents galore since 9/11. Further research exposes numerous concerns about vulnerabilities. Still more search reveals studies about the consequences of successful attacks are quite high. All this is available from open sources. While you can certainly argue that a particular program or policy isn’t effective or costs too much or is too much hassle, I simply don’t believe that at this time the overall threat (and hence risk) is as slight as you believe.
Chance – EoS blog team.
March 28, 2008 3:28 PM
March 24, 2008 7:07 PM curious said... A friend of mine prints fake boarding passes so he can meet family members at the gate instead of the curb. I would imagine that anyone with more nefarious intents would be able to do the same?
The TSA has had a problem in the past with fraudulent paper boarding passes. Working together with Continental Airlines, an electronic paperless boarding pass that uses encrypted bar codes on the screens of mobile devices has been developed. Eventually this scanning technology will be rolled out for all boarding passes.
Here is a story from the Huston Chronicle where a pilot was conducted.
Follow the link and check out the story. I think that will show you where we’re going and what we’re doing to remedy fraudulent boarding passes.
March 28, 2008 3:33 PM
Bob:
While this is a good idea, do you know if TSA plans to track where you go when they scan your boarding pass? Or will they just simply verify the BP to make sure it is genuine?
However, why is this even TSA's responsibility? Your responsibility is to screen us for dangerous items - why not have the airlines do the verifying of BP's? Or contract workers?
March 28, 2008 3:58 PM
bob said:
"The TSA has had a problem in the past with fraudulent paper boarding passes. Working together with Continental Airlines, an electronic paperless boarding pass that uses encrypted bar codes on the screens of mobile devices has been developed. Eventually this scanning technology will be rolled out for all boarding passes.
Here is a story from the Huston Chronicle where a pilot was conducted.
Follow the link and check out the story. I think that will show you where we’re going and what we’re doing to remedy fraudulent boarding passes."
So is the TSA going to require every passenger to have a PDA and an e-mail account before they can fly? I have been part of that pilot and have seen some of the issues.
Here is where the TSA wants to get to in this area:
1. Confirm the boarding pass is real via an embedded digital signature.
2. Confirm the ID is real via credential authentication technology.
3. Confirm the info on the id matches the boarding pass.
Talk about greater intrusion into one's life without any greater security (see the No Fly List as an example).
The pilot is the tip of the iceberg.
March 28, 2008 6:35 PM
Chance said:
"'On any given day the risk of an attempted high jacking or other such undesired event must be extremely low, much less than 1% chance I would quess.'
I would have to disagree with 1%. For any one aircraft, probably that's a defensible a statement, but for the aviation sector as a whole, it would have to be far greater.
Threat is only part of the risk equation. A simple Google search will show many, many examples of extremists with a clear intent to attack the U.S. or its interests. Further research will show hijackings, attack plots, and suspicious incidents galore since 9/11."
Sure it is less than 1%. Otherwise if it was greater, you would have seen an incident thwarted on average every 100 days in the airline sector, and that is not the case. How many terrorists intent on hijacking or blowing up a plane have been stopped in all the years by the TSA at a airport screening checkpoint? I will give you a hint: the number is less than 1. How many terrorists have been convicted in the United States for trying to disrupt the airline sector. At best a handful and their plots weren't credible.
I have googled these "threats" and very few are even credible. The August 2006 London "liquid bombers" were not even close to be able to pull off their alleged threat. And how many have been convicted so far. Once again - zero. And a number of those arrested have been released. The liquid bomb intended to be made was quite implausible to do so on an airplane. But we all now suffer by not being able to bring our liquids, gels, etc. through security.
There just haven't been these "incidents galore" that you allude to. If there were, given the propensity of the TSA to publicize for example the catching of false ID's at checkpoints, I would expect even more so if that was the case for catching terrorists.
March 28, 2008 6:56 PM
"So, when I walk through an airport the question I have isn’t why they are taking my bottle of water or making me takeoff my shoes, but why isn’t there more security?"
I think the general question should be, why is it allowed to continue to be done so badly. The security needs to be of a more professional quality. Not more security, just security done well. Check-in luggage secure from theft, passengers treated with respect.
March 28, 2008 7:44 PM
I could probably swallow this whole layer concept, if I could just have some peanut butter, and a knife to spread it with....
March 28, 2008 8:02 PM
Here are some more open resources you may wish to consult. Since you feel you have a better understanding of the threat than we do, I also urge you to apply to TSA-OI. We have several openings, and are glad to hear alternative analysis.
http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp
http://aviation-safety.net/index.php
http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_UK_terrorist_incidents
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Terrorist_incidents_in_the_2000s
http://nyjtimes.com/cover/06-27-06/TerrorConvictionsSince9-11.htm
Chance
March 28, 2008 8:40 PM
"How many terrorists intent on hijacking or blowing up a plane have been stopped in all the years by the TSA at a airport screening checkpoint? I will give you a hint: the number is less than 1."
How many terrorist have been deterred from even trying?
"There just haven't been these "incidents galore" that you allude to."
Seems most of the threats I've googled started overseas where TSA doesn't do screening. Sadly, the shoe bomber actually made it onto a plane before he was thwarted!
March 28, 2008 9:03 PM
Responding to Chance's remarks to my post;
We don’t ground aircraft? Yes we do. Aircraft are grounded all the time for safety violations, and billions of dollars are spent on safety systems to avoid the very issues you point out. By you're reasoning, FAA and other civil aviation organizations are wasting your money, because the probability of an accident is so low. This is like saying you should fire your exterminator because you don’t have a bug problem.
Possibly you misunderstood my point. Let me try again.
With all the total risk factors associated with flying very few people are deterred and do not fly.
My point was if flying is such an extreme danger then all aircraft should be grounded. I was not refering to any one individual event or situation.
Your Mount Everest comment; what part of the total world population do the climbers represent? If the climbers feel that the climb is to dangerous then they will not go, no one will bring in the troops to protect against that threat, likewise, 40,000+ TSA folks is overkill. The real threat against air commerce today is very low. Beef up the FAM program but stop with the liquids, shoe and ID stupidity and thin the TSA ranks.
I know that you won't agree but the TSA execution of airport security is terribly off track, citizens see the problems daily and your agency refuses to make the needed corrections.
March 28, 2008 10:56 PM
Chance said:
"Here are some more open resources you may wish to consult. Since you feel you have a better understanding of the threat than we do, I also urge you to apply to TSA-OI. We have several openings, and are glad to hear alternative analysis.
http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp
http://aviation-safety.net/index.php
http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_UK_terrorist_incidents
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Terrorist_incidents_in_the_2000s
http://nyjtimes.com/cover/06-27-06/TerrorConvictionsSince9-11.htm"
No reason for being condescending. I reviewed the sites (though I couldn't get one to open) and it appears that post-9/11, there has been one incident of a conviction in the US in the airline sector, which of course is Richard Reid. That of course wasn't even a US security issue.
So I believe that my statement about a handful of terrorists being convicted in the US for trying to disrupt the airline sector was actually high.
Your non-response to the other statements in my post leads me to conclude that you don't disagree that (1) the TSA has caught no terrorists at the screening checkpoint that were intent on taking over or destroying an airplane and (2) the London "liquid bomb plot" was implausible in its ability to be carried out.
March 28, 2008 11:11 PM
anonymous said:
"How many terrorist have been deterred from even trying?"
As many as have been deterred by my magic rock. ;-)
Given all the holes in security, can you prove otherwise?
March 28, 2008 11:15 PM
Someone anonymously wrote:
"[Chance's] non-response to the other statements in my post leads me to conclude that [she doesn't] disagree that [...] the London "liquid bomb plot" was implausible in its ability to be carried out."
It was definitely implausible. I have previously cited several related references supporting this in another comment on this blog.
March 29, 2008 12:02 AM
Um..."She"? I'm a guy. I guess the subject never came up before, but in my birth year Chance was the 692nd most popular male baby name. It didn't even make the top 1000 list for females. Just FYI.
Anyway, you say you only found one conviction for an aviation incident, yet you willfully ignore or dismiss the number of incidents, such as hijackings (at least 7 worldwide, including 2 cockpit breaches) which though not terrorism related, speak to vulnerabilities still inherent in the system, the Glasgow airport bombing, where "softer" targets were skipped to attack an aviation target, the Reid shoe bomb attempt, the 04 Russian airline bombings, the numerous Bin Laden tapes which demonstrate continued desire to strike the US. I'm not going to list every incident out, but the point is that if you live in a bad neighborhood, you don't unlock your front door because you haven't been robbed for a few years.
So if you believe TSA's response is disproportionate, fine, reasonable people can disagree, but it isn't condescending to ask you to put your money where your mouth is and apply to the job here to show us the supposed error of our ways. Heck, you can have the cube next to me, I'm not shy.
I get the impression that you guys think we're professional hype masters. In reality, a significant portion of our jobs are actually spinning down reports that have little to no credibility. If a plot or incident isn't an indication of threat, we make that know to the leadership. However, as I've said before, a high vulnerability and consequence can overrule a low threat scenario, making the policy in question necessary anyway. Finally, and sorry if you perceive this as condescending again, but many of the risk policy issues you're bringing up sound to me like they need to be addressed at a policy level (i.e., Congress & POTUS), and can't be resolved on our blog.
Now, if I don't respond to your next responses, it's because it's Saturday again, and I'm off. Ya'll have a great weekend, I'm going to chill out.
Chance - EoS Blog Team.
March 29, 2008 9:31 AM
re....I would have to disagree with 1%. For any one aircraft, probably that's a defensible a statement, but for the aviation sector as a whole, it would have to be far greater. See my comments at the bottom of this response.
TSA Week at a Glance (March 17 - March 23, 2008)
By my count TSA reported 71 incidences for the week.
One source I found indicated about 30,000 commercial passenger flights per day, this does not include private, cargo or military flights.
So you do the math, 210,000 flights per week and 71 TSA incidents (42 of which are checkpoint closures and distruptive passengers) at the cost of 40,000+ employee payroll and related infrastructure.
Is the cost of TSA worth the benefit?
March 29, 2008 10:47 AM
Someone anonymously wrote:
"[Chance's] non-response to the other statements in my post leads me to conclude that [she doesn't] disagree that [...] the London "liquid bomb plot" was implausible in its ability to be carried out."
I followed up:
"It was definitely implausible. I have previously cited several related references supporting this in another comment on this blog."
Chance from the EOS Blog Team responded, but still did not address the implausibility of the so-called London "liquid bomb plot".
Chance, we are still left assuming that you agree that that plot was not plausible.
March 29, 2008 11:27 AM
The layers of security are mostly smokescreen, just about all of the airport security is a sham, designed only to look secure. In reality we'd probably be just as safe with no security procedures at all. I'm out there in it every day, that the general public can't see through the TSA farce is amazing to me.
"Aircraft inspections" are a joke.
Security protocols with regard to the aircraft itself are so asinine that they are completely useless.
FAMs are so rare that they may as well not exist at all.
FFDOs are subject to such a ridiculous application process that most pilots don't bother. Those that do are subject to an even more ridiculous carry policy, that makes even more not bother.
Even the security checkpoints are worthless. They'll take a metal butter knife away, but they'll let you keep a metal fork. You'll lose a 1/2 inch drill bit, but you can keep the 12 inch sharpened steel knitting needles. Bottle of water? Can't have that, but they'll just drop it into a container, which would cause it to explode if it were liquid explosive, thus killing everyone in the area anyway.
March 29, 2008 5:03 PM
Chance said:
"Anyway, you say you only found one conviction for an aviation incident, yet you willfully ignore or dismiss the number of incidents, such as hijackings (at least 7 worldwide, including 2 cockpit breaches) which though not terrorism related, speak to vulnerabilities still inherent in the system, the Glasgow airport bombing, where "softer" targets were skipped to attack an aviation target, the Reid shoe bomb attempt, the 04 Russian airline bombings, the numerous Bin Laden tapes which demonstrate continued desire to strike the US.
So if you believe TSA's response is disproportionate, fine, reasonable people can disagree, but it isn't condescending to ask you to put your money where your mouth is and apply to the job here to show us the supposed error of our ways. Heck, you can have the cube next to me, I'm not shy.
I get the impression that you guys think we're professional hype masters. In reality, a significant portion of our jobs are actually spinning down reports that have little to no credibility. If a plot or incident isn't an indication of threat, we make that know to the leadership. However, as I've said before, a high vulnerability and consequence can overrule a low threat scenario, making the policy in question necessary anyway."
Chance, I realize that many of us share the same "Anonymous" name, but it wasn't I that tried to change your gender. ;-)
I am not willfully ignoring anything, but you did ignore that I gave credit to the Richard Reid incident (which was not US-based). Your response supports the statement I made that post-9/11, there has been only one incident of a conviction in the US in the airline sector. All of your other examples do not qualify; those are grasping at straws.
Throughout our history, we have always had enemies and we will continue to do so. The question is the measure of the response.
Spinning down reports? I would hate to see how bad those reports were beforehand.
The problem with intel is that too many times an observation is turned into a credible terrorist plot. Case in point is the "liquid bomb" scare that we are still being required to suffer through.
How about the incident in December 2004 where the TSA promoted as the big catch a gentleman in Honolulu who had a box cutter glued inside the sole of his shoe. If the TSA had waited a short time before releasing that info with their spin, then it could have been determined that a cobbler had accidentally left the box cutter in the shoe when repairing it. It would have saved angst in the general public and embarrassment for the TSA when the truth came out. What was even more embarrassing was the fact that the gentlemen had already had that same shoe screened at another airport and the box cutter was not found.
And do you remember the "Transportation Intelligence Gazette" last year that reported on four dry runs involving SAN, MIL, IAH and BWI; a prime example of taking observations and turning them into terrorist dry runs. All were not and easily explained. As reported on Mother Jones:
"Finally, TSA officials conceded that none of the incidents in the memo were quite as ominous as they sounded; that none of the investigations were, in fact, ongoing, as the original report claimed; and that none of the airports had closed down any terminals, though the memo claimed that "some" had. Less than three days after the initial NBC report, the entire story had been debunked."
The facts since the TSA has been in existence much more support my version of terrorist activity in the US airline sector than the version you are appearing to promote. And I'm not even getting paid by the TSA. ;-)
March 29, 2008 7:50 PM
My experience has been inconsistency, selective process at the discretion of the TSA individual and not based upon alarms going off, document checkers acting as if they would rather have been anywhere else in the world that where they were and doing what they were doing, with most of them you would question whether they knew what a document was. I think the system is totally broken, inpet, costly, and at the present, an infringment upon our civil rights at travelling citizens. Yes, I think to have the xray and the sensors, but come on, only 3 oz of liquid. No make up, hair spray, or any other necessary preparations for a longer visit is in these forms unless they are costly to the American Citizen. Plus, do random searches not continum and announce everything to the terrorist world. The terrorist are accomplishing exactly what they to achieve, and that is to draw attention away from what they are really doing and have America focus on the minors when we should be focusing on the major events. The terrorist mind is control and that is what they have achieve, the control of the rights of our citizens.
March 30, 2008 10:52 AM
I fly infrequently, I live in Massachusetts and my son lives in Tucson Arizon. Plus, my wife and I recently took a cruise out of NYC into the Bahamas which required passing through Immigration and Customs, plus, passing the Transportation Security Administration (similar to air travel).
I set the metal detector off every time. I have a Titanium constructed left knee. (Total knee replacement surgery two years ago this October).
Transportation Security has an area that I must pass before I can continue my boarding procedures. They use a hand-held metal detector and scan my entire body. Sometimes they put me in a telephone boothlike apparatus that sprays air all over me to detect the odor of high explosives. Very high tech detection. I know it takes 5 or 10 minutes longer for them to pat me down -- however, I am glad that they proceed in this safe manner. The extra time it takes me to continue my travel is well worth the few minutes spent to guarantee the safety of hundreds of other travelers. The Transportation Security Administration does a commendable job. A job that sometimes seems like an inconvenience is really for our safety!
I applaud their efforts. They treat me with respect and yet they do not allow me to continue until they are positive that I am not a threat. Great work from great people!
March 30, 2008 11:30 AM
I travel through O'Hare to England periodically. Two trips ago I was using a suitcase where BA had "compromised" the locks, so I epoxied a belt across the lock with the buckle to back up the quiestionable lock. I turned the bag over to TSA and left. When I retrieved it in London, I found that the "screener" had not bothered to open the buckle, but had used some sort of tool to rip the belt off the case. It must be a real roar to watch that screener take his trousers off.
Last trip I found that TSA no longer worked in the lobby area where you could watch them do their mischief, but were hidden somewhere behind the walls. The baggage arrived ok that trip, but I'm skeptical about TSA screeners taking their frustrations out on poor defensless bags, particularly when they are out of sight and not being screened themselves.
March 30, 2008 4:47 PM
"The terrorist mind is control and that is what they have achieve, the control of the rights of our citizens."
Weird. When I don't fly, TSA has very little to do in my regular life. And when I do fly, I see them at most for 30 seconds. (And I'm being nice, as I don't think they control how big the lines get as they don't control when I show up to fly.) I find your comments at most alarmist, full of sound and fury, signafying nothing.
March 30, 2008 10:09 PM
Why isn't the ID checked simultaneous to scanning the boarding pass at the security checkpoint? Seems like it's pretty easy for someone who's up to no good to mess around with names and high-quality fake ID's...
March 31, 2008 11:38 PM
You could have 2000 layers of security and a terrorist could think of 2001 ways of bypassing that security. When you are passive like TSA, you are always doing a catch up to what the terrorists did last year.
April 1, 2008 12:35 AM
To the anonymous person who was confused why TSOs were screening based on "selectiveness" rather than "alarms going off":
That is because TSOs can chose any passenger, at random, for additional screening if they feel there is need for it. That is not to say that they should be doing that constantly, but there are certain TSOs on a lane who may request that an individual be screened further. The Behavior Detection Offcier (BDO) position has lessened the need for other TSOs to be selecting people for further screening, although it is still done if the TSO feels it necessary.
April 3, 2008 8:21 PM
Daniel said:
That is because TSOs can chose any passenger, at random, for additional screening if they feel there is need for it. That is not to say that they should be doing that constantly, but there are certain TSOs on a lane who may request that an individual be screened further. The Behavior Detection Offcier (BDO) position has lessened the need for other TSOs to be selecting people for further screening, although it is still done if the TSO feels it necessary.
It is not random secondary screening if the TSO "feel(s) there is a need for it." Random would be if the criteria to select is, at a minimum, not based on the characteristics of that person or his luggage.
I have been told on more than one occasion when selected by the TSO for additional screening (for which neither myself or my bags alarmed), that it was because continuous random screening was required by the SOP.
Funny thing was in these instances I didn't see anyone ahead of me being subjected to random screening and on those occasions I waited a minimum of five minutes after I have finished screening. Not surprisingly, all who were being secondaried after that were not random, but were due to alarms.
My secondaries were not random; they were retaliatory.
April 4, 2008 2:48 PM
Daniel Said......
That is because TSOs can chose any passenger, at random, for additional screening if they feel there is need for it. ......
____________________________
Build a system ripe for abuse and someone will abuse it.
The reason for extra screening should be well documented to guard against abuse by some TSO on a power trip.
This type of thing is one of the many problems with TSA. No clear cut guidelines, just confused screeners screwing with people!
April 4, 2008 2:50 PM
Ah to be able to get thruogh an airport without arriving 3hrs early...I feel targeted everytime I go through an airport because i always get "special checkpoint" because i purchase single tickets or a certain way I pay. I am a young attractive female who travels quite a bit and feel I get hassled by security and tsa when obviously they could check my flying record and realize IVE NEVER BEEN OF HARM...Not so much to say about the other ones who use fake ids to travel and get away with way to much for their to be SO MUCH EXTra additional screening!!!
April 4, 2008 5:36 PM
I fly relatively frequently and go through the airport in Sacramento about once a month. It seems to me each time I go through the security checkpoint, i am required to do something different. One time I will be required to show my boarding pass only at the lectern, and the next time I must carry it through the scanner as well.
What I object to is the rudeness of the arrogant and officious little snot nosed TSOs and their disrespectful tone. When I asked to speak to a supervisor I was told by the supervisor "We do our best." If that is your best, it is nothing short of pathetic.
April 7, 2008 8:38 PM
orwell was right. he just had the year wrong.
April 8, 2008 1:29 AM
I'm not going to sit here and tell the bunch who responded to my post that they're wrong, because they aren't. What I stated is what TSOs are SUPPOSED to do, and what the guidelines give as reasons for the additional screening. What individual TSOs determine as the "reasons" to select you for further screening are is an entirely different issue, and I will not even dive into that one because its aggravating and out of my control.
Some forms of additional screening are intended to be random, but yet are implemented by certain TSOs in a negative way, and sometimes even with retailiaton in mind, as one person put it. I wish TSOs wouldn't use what authority they do have against the public, for whatever reason. Part of the job is to be able to deal with high levels of stress and a fast-paced and often chaotic workplace, and it's frustrating to hear that passengers are being singled out for what they feel are personal-type issues.
As a TSO, I have never made one decision based on a mindset of retailiation. It's shameful to know that there are TSOs out there who are abusing the basic duties of the job. There is new training being implemented which should put a dent into the number of TSOs acting this way. At least that's the intended goal...
April 10, 2008 8:50 PM
I'd like to hear TSA comment on why it is permissable for airline & airport employees to cut in front of the PAYING passengers at the security checkpoint. I questioned a flight attendent about this as she was arrogantly cutting in front of me and she made the comment that she was there for work and didn't I want the flights to leave on time. This comment implies that people who have to wait in line will not make their flight in time. Also, since I'm usually traveling for work, may I cut to the front of the line? I'm anxious to hear your answer.
April 12, 2008 12:13 PM
I do not understand the complaints about crew, TSO's, and vendors cutting the line. Those folks have to get to work to service you the flying public. This means that they might have to go through security of one type or another, and you want them to wait with the passengers possibly delaying flights and disrupting many more passengers throughout the day. I know the cutting the line seems rude, and I'm sorry for that appearance. But crewmembers not only have to get on the planes they have to get ready to fly them. The vendors shouldn't have to get to work 2 hours early so that they can make it through security in time to sell you water and coffee on the other side of screening. TSO's are necessary to get the screening process moving along, and they maybe having a shift change or helping out when the checkpoint line gets long. Give them a break and forgive the appearance of rudeness please.
April 13, 2008 4:20 PM
Checking ID's is crucial to ensuring that the person is who they say they are and is on the ticket. It should go without saying that a basic goal of the tsa's security program is to keep those on the no-fly list out of the secure areas. Again, I think that should go without saying. Anything could happen.
September 10, 2008 10:28 AM
Wrong. ID's are easy to forge. Boarding passes are easy to forge. Even if they weren't, a criminal could use someone else's identity to get an ID in the other person's name.
Following are some very relevant questions and answers from Gilmore v. Ashcroft -- FAA ID challenge FAQ:
Q. Isn't an ID check needed to stop known terrorists from flying?
If we knew who the terrorists were, we could just arrest them all, rather than stopping them when they try to fly. So what do you mean by "a known terrorist"? A previously convicted hijacker? A card-carrying member of Al-Queda? A Green Party member, who seeks to change our established form of government? Someone on probation, convicted of non-violent civil disobedience for protesting the Star Wars program at Vandenberg Air Force Base? A member of Earth First!?
There is good reason to believe that any list of "known terrorists" contains "suspected" terrorists, not actual terrorists, and is full of errors besides. Particularly when the list is secret and neither the press nor the public can examine it for errors or political biases.
"Johnnie Thomas" was on the watch list because a 28-year-old "FBI Most Wanted" man, Christian Michael Longo, used that name as an alias. But Longo was arrested two days after joining the "Most Wanted" list for murdering his family. After he had been in custody for months, 70-year-old black grandma "Johnnie Thomas" gets stopped every time she tries to fly. Her story is in the May 2002 issue of New Yorker magazine. It's not clear why an ordinary criminal like Longo was on the list in the first place -- nor why he wasn't removed from the list when he was captured two days later. What is clear is that this secret watch-list is poorly controlled and ripe for abuse. And, of course, there is no guarantee that an actual terrorist would be carrying their real ID.
There are many ways to deter terrorism, but checking IDs against a watch list is not one of them. It is an exercise in futility that provides a false sense of security.
Q. So then how should we figure out who is a terrorist?
It's a good question, that goes to the heart of the post-9/11 civil liberties issues.
Who is a terrorist? Any IRA member from the last twenty years? A member of the Irgun (led by former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin)? Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for sabotage for 27 years by the South African government? A WTO protester? The US Government killed more Afghani civilians in the last year than the number of US people killed on 9/11; does that make US soldiers terrorists? Israel and Palestine both claim that the other is terrorist. So do India and Pakistan. So do leftists and rightists in Colombia.
Ultimately the line between "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" is a political one. Our freedom to travel should not depend on a politician's decision about whether they agree with our aims or not. Every "anti-terrorist" measure restricts people based on their politics, not just based on whether they use violence. Violence was already illegal.
In other words, any list of "terrorists" will inevitably contain many individuals that have never committed a terrorist act, and not contain many individuals that have actually committed a terrorist act.
Q. Won't elimating ID checks make air travel more dangerous?
No. First, air travel is far less dangerous than driving a car or riding a bicycle. This includes the danger from terrorist incidents as well as the much more common mechanical problems and human errors.
A car is dangerous because it's a heavy mass of metal moving at high speeds compared to what is nearby. The energy in that motion can easily crush humans (either inside or outside the car), or other objects like trees, buildings, or cars. Safely using a car requires the application of good human judgment every second. Whenever that judgment is missing (unconscious driver) or poor (intoxicated, enraged, or suicidal), then a car is a danger to those in and around it.
An airplane is dangerous because it's a "car" with much more mass, much higher speeds, the ability to move in three dimensions instead of two, and carrying a much greater load of high-energy material (gasoline). Commercial air travel has been safer than car travel only because of rigorous professionalism, having co-pilots always ready to take over, and safety precautions far exceeding those of amateur-operated cars.
The 9/11 hijackings made it clear that those safety precautions did not keep the pilots in control of the plane. What makes air travel particularly dangerous is that all law-abiding passengers and crew have been disarmed. It's clear that when passengers realize the deadly goals of hijackers, they have the courage to attack the hijackers, with their bare hands if necessary. But we would all be safer if the honest passengers had weapons as good or better than the weapons smuggled aboard by hijackers. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that even with today's security screening, many honest people accidentally bring weapons onto airplanes, and are not detected. If honest people can do it, so can hijackers -- and unlike the honest people, they'll use their weapon to seize the plane.
My philosophy is to "educate and then trust the general public". This philosophy is in line with the basic values of democracies. The government's approach to homeland security is "keep everything secret and trust nobody". This is in line with the basic values of authoritarian governments.
Paraphrasing words of The Identity Project: No matter how sophisticated the security embedded into an I.D., a well-funded criminal will be able to falsify it. Honest people, however, go to Pro-Life rallies. Honest people go to Pro-Choice rallies, too. Honest people attend gun shows. Honest people protest the actions of the President of the United States. Honest people fly to political conventions. What if those with the power to put people on a 'no fly' list decided that they didn't like the reason for which you wanted to travel? The honest people wouldn't be going anywhere.
September 10, 2008 11:44 AM
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