Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States
Key Judgments
(From April 2006 NIE)
United
States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously
damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted
its operations; however, we judge that Al-Qa’ida
will continue to pose the greatest threat to the
Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist
movement—which includes Al-Qa’ida, affiliated and
independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks
and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism
efforts.
-
Although
we cannot measure the extent of the spread with
precision, a large body of all-source reporting
indicates that activists identifying themselves
as jihadists, although a small percentage of
Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic
dispersion.
-
If
this trend continues, threats to US interests
at home and abroad will become more diverse,
leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
- Greater
pluralism and more responsive political systems
in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some
of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time,
such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted
programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the
jihadist movement and continued pressure on Al-Qa’ida,
could erode support for the jihadists.
We assess
that the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming
more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with
anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely
to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and
dispersed actors will make it harder to find and
undermine jihadist groups.
We assess
that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation
of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist
success there would inspire more fighters to continue
the struggle elsewhere.
- The
Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre. for
jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement
in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters
for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists
leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived,
to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be
inspired to carry on the fight.
We assess
that the underlying factors fueling the spread of
the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are
likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe
of this Estimate.
- Four
underlying factors are fueling the spread of the
jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances,
such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and
a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq ”jihad;”
(3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic,
social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority
nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among
most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.
Concomitant
vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin
to slow the spread of the movement. They include
dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related
conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists'
radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices
of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics
employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
-
The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that
their ultimate political solution.—an
ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based
governance spanning the Muslim world.—is
unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims.
Exposing the religious and political straitjacket
that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda
would help to divide them from the audiences
they seek to persuade.
-
Recent condemnations of violence and extremist
religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim
clerics signal a trend that could facilitate
the growth of a constructive alternative to
jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism.
This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic
participation of broader Muslim communities
in rejecting violence, reducing the ability
of radicals to capitalize on passive community
support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream
emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war
on terror.
- Countering
the spread of the jihadist movement will require
coordinated multilateral efforts that go well
beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist
leaders.
If democratic
reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress
over the next five years, political participation
probably would drive a wedge between intransigent
extremists and groups willing to use the political
process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing
transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists
to exploit.
Al-Qa’ida,
now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network,
is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new
recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership
role.
-
The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama
Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi,
in rapid succession, probably would cause the
group to fracture into smaller groups. Although
like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry
on the mission, the loss of these key leaders
would exacerbate strains and disagreements.
We assess that the resulting splinter groups
would, at least for a time, pose a less serious
threat to US interests than does Al-Qa’ida.
-
Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture
and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess
he could broaden his popular appeal and present
a global threat.
- The
increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations
of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign
jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.
Other
affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as
Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North
African groups, unless countered, are likely to
expand their reach and become more capable of multiple
and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional
areas of operation.
We judge
that most jihadist groups—both well-known
and newly formed—will use improvised explosive
devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on
soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare
strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct
sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments.
Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential
source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these
tactics.
- CBRN
capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist
groups.
While
Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most
active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states
will be unable to prevent territory or resources
from being exploited by terrorists.
Anti-US
and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise
and fueling other radical ideologies. This could
prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist
groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests.
The radicalization process is occurring more quickly,
more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet
age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks
by unknown groups whose members and supporters may
be difficult to pinpoint.
-
We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly
use the Internet to communicate, propagandize,
recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial
support.
TOP |