IV. Mexican Institutional Reorganization and Anti-Corruption Efforts
The GOM faces a daunting challenge in eliminating deep-seated corruption from its law enforcement institutions. The exposure and arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, former head of the INCD, as an associate of the Amado Carrillo Fuentes drug trafficking organization sent shock waves through the Mexican and U.S. Governments, but it also provided the impetus for a profound cleansing and reorganization of Mexico's counternarcotics and law enforcement institutions.
Responding to the corruption challenge, Mexican Attorney General Madrazo announced on April 30, 1997 the dissolution of the INCD and, to fight impunity and corruption, the creation of new, vetted units within the PGR. The new organizations, the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS) and the Organized Crime Unit (OCU), are designed to be more reliable, more professionally competent, and more focused than their predecessors. They will be staffed with personnel who have passed through a vetting procedure which examines them for drug usage, checks their personal finances and lifestyle, and subjects them to polygraph screening.
The entire PGR is also undergoing a general reorganization that began in 1996 when former Attorney General Lozano fired more than 1,200 PGR employees for corruption or unsuitability, and continues under the plan announced by Attorney General Madrazo on April 30, 1997. Nearly all of the individuals dismissed last year appealed their dismissals, citing procedural flaws in the terminations. According to the U.S. Embassy and the GOM, the appeals have resulted in the PGR being ordered by Mexican courts to reinstate 234 individuals with back pay as of August 1997. Attorney General Madrazo stated on September 10 that an additional 270 PGR employees were fired between December 1996 and August 1997, and that 192 of them face prosecution.
The Mexican Defense Secretariat also is engaged in a far-reaching effort to investigate and eliminate drug corruption within the ranks of the armed forces. The GOM has applied the provisions of the new Organized Crime Law in its investigation and prosecution of General Gutierrez Rebollo and, as recent press reporting has indicated, 34 senior officers have been identified for disciplinary action because of their alleged ties to narcotics trafficking.
The Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health
The new Mexican federal agency responsible for counterdrug law enforcement is the FEADS, headed by Mariano Herran Salvatti. Although FEADS was established as the successor to the discredited INCD, its capacity remains limited by the small number of personnel who have been fully vetted. According to Herran Salvatti, as of August 25, only 282 prospective employees had passed the polygraph phase of the vetting process; the organization’s projected strength is 2,000 agents. Nonetheless, FEADS has begun to cooperate effectively with DEA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies. A major early product of this cooperation was the seizure of 2.7 tons of cocaine in early August (referred to in Section II under maritime interdiction). FEADS has also established cooperative relationships with other foreign law enforcement authorities and INTERPOL.
The dissolution of the INCD and the reorganization of the principal Mexican drug law enforcement agency, although necessary steps, have had the effect of temporarily slowing progress on counternarcotics in some areas. FEADS still lacks infrastructure support; agents have typically not been issued credentials, badges, or weapons, and they only have limited resources with which to work. Additionally, while officials who do not successfully complete the vetting process are being fired, many former INCD officers remain in place pending completion of vetting. Until a sufficient number of personnel are fully vetted and the non-vetted INCD personnel are removed, the effectiveness of FEADS will be limited.
Law Enforcement Screening Process (Vetting)
The GOM has initiated procedures to conduct thorough vetting for individuals considered for selection as members of the special units. This vetting process, combined with enhanced training, a minimum time commitment (U.S. agencies have suggested a three-year minimum assignment), premium pay to reflect the additional training, and ongoing integrity checks would increase U.S. law enforcement confidence in the BTFs and OCU. These measures would indicate that BTF and OCU personnel are substantially free of corruption and are likely to develop the competence to combat the highly sophisticated and violent drug trafficking cartels.
PGR Reorganization
The special vetted units described above will form the core of a reorganized and fully vetted PGR. What distinguishes these organizations from prior efforts to reform the PGR is the comprehensive and serious vetting process which all prospective members of each unit must undergo. In addition to being more thorough than ever before, vetting is more widespread, with the GOM planning to screen all employees of the PGR. The PGR has examined more than 1,300 officers in its vetting process and plans to aggressively continue this procedure.
The GOM is also considering a significantly enhanced package of pay and benefits for the members of the vetted units. These units and their continued expansion are part of a comprehensive GOM strategy to reform the PGR overall. The PGR has improved its recruitment and selection procedures, and has expanded its training course for judicial police from nine months to two years.
The PGR is also making efforts to fight impunity throughout its organization. Attorney General Madrazo has ordered widespread drug testing for PGR officials, and officials detected using drugs are being prosecuted. The PGR is also prosecuting officers involved in the theft of cocaine seized by the Mexican military and stored with the PGR in San Luis Rio Colorado (Sonora). On September 1, 1997, the PGR arrested 18 personnel from its own aviation division for allegedly smuggling illicit drugs in a PGR aircraft.
The major reorganization of Mexican counternarcotics and law enforcement institutions has meant that Mexican institutions and personnel must begin at a basic level to rebuild confidence, trust, and cooperation with the U.S. This has led the U.S. and Mexico to develop avenues for working level cooperation and information sharing as the new Mexican institutions develop.
U.S. - Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation Contents
Last Updated: March 4, 2002
