Since the Department of Labor's 1998 report, there has been little change in the situation with regard to the use of forced labor in Burma. However, there has been some significant action by the International Labor Organization (ILO) on this matter. Forced labor continues to be used with impunity by authorities throughout the country for infrastructure development projects and to support military operations. Reports also suggest that people continue to work under very poor conditions and suffer from human rights abuses. There is little new information with regard to allegations of forced labor related to the Yadana Pipeline. Available information suggests that forced relocations are becoming a growing problem in Burma, and forced labor often goes hand in hand with the policy of forced relocations. While the circumstances in Burma may not have improved greatly, the international community has taken an additional action against the current regime through the ILO's adoption of an emergency resolution on forced labor in Burma, which resulted in the exclusion of Burma from almost all participation in the ILO.

I. Recent Developments in the ILO

In June 1996, 25 worker delegates to the ILO's International Labour Conference filed a formal complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution alleging Burma's non-observance of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29). A Commission of Inquiry (COI) was established in March 1997 to investigate the complaint - only the tenth COI in the ILO's 80-year history. The COI concluded in its July 1998 report that

There is abundant evidence before the Commission showing the pervasive use of forced labour imposed on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the military for portering, the construction, maintenance and servicing of military camps, other work in support of the military, work on agriculture, logging and other production projects undertaken by the authorities or the military, sometimes for the profit of private individuals, the construction and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other infrastructure work and a range of other tasks, none of which comes under any of the exceptions listed in Article 2(2) of the Convention.⁽¹⁾

As a result, the COI recommended to the GOB:

• To amend, without delay, national laws permitting forced labor, particularly the Towns Act and the Village Act.⁽²⁾
• To take immediately the necessary steps to ensure that the authorities no longer impose forced labor in practice. Actions taken to stop the use of forced labor cannot be in the form of secret directives but have to be made public and made known to all levels of the military and to the whole population.⁽³⁾
• To impose penalties, according to section 374 of the Penal Code, on persons imposing forced labor.⁽⁴⁾

After the completion of the COI Report, the ILO communicated several times with the GOB, requesting information on actions taken by the government to address the findings of the report and its three recommendations. In more than one instance, the GOB assured the ILO that it was reviewing and amending national law in accordance with the first recommendation of the COI Report (see following discussion). However, a May 1999 report by the ILO Director-General to the Governing Body, information from NGOs, and reports from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon concluded that the GOB has not implemented the recommendations of the COI and that forced labor continues to be used with impunity by authorities throughout the country.

A. Government of Burma's response to the COI Report

The COI Report was sent to the Government of Burma (GOB) on July 27, 1998. On November 25, 1998, the Director-General of the ILO wrote to the GOB asking it to communicate, by February 19, 1999, detailed information on any measures it might have taken in regard to the recommendations of the COI Report. This information would be included in an interim report that would be submitted to the ILO Governing Body in March 1999.⁽⁵⁾

The GOB responded in a letter received by the ILO Director-General on February 4, 1999. The letter stated that government authorities had already reviewed the Village Act and the Towns Act several times in order to "bring them in line with present-day conditions in the country as well as to fulfill Myanmar's obligations to the relevant Convention."⁽⁶⁾ The GOB also stated in the letter that it had set up a Ministerial Committee and Working Group that was reviewing and making recommendations about both acts.

The ILO Director-General sent another letter to the GOB on February 11, 1999, noting that the Ministerial Committee and Working Group seemed to be confining its efforts to reviewing the Village Act and the Towns Act. The Director-General requested that the GOB provide information on all measures the government had taken or envisioned taking in regard to all of the recommendations of the COI Report. The Director-General also asked for more detailed information on the amendments to the Village Act and the Towns Act that were being proposed.⁽⁷⁾

On February 18, 1999, the GOB replied to the ILO Director-General. This reply referred back to the GOB's February 4 letter and reiterated that the relevant articles of the Village Act and the Towns Act were being reviewed. The GOB also stated that the new law would be widely publicized when complete and that action would be taken against any infringement of the new law.⁽⁸⁾

B. Findings of the Director-General's 1999 Report

In March 1999, the ILO Governing Body requested that the Director-General submit a report, by May 21, 1999, on the measures taken by the GOB to comply with the recommendations of the COI Report. In a letter dated April 1, 1999, the Director-General asked the GOB to inform him of any measures taken by the Government on each of the recommendations.⁽⁹⁾ The Director-General also sent a notice to international employer and worker organizations having consultative status with the ILO, intergovernmental organizations, and governments of member States of the ILO asking for information pertinent to the Governing Body's request.⁽¹⁰⁾ The GOB sent two letters in response, on May 12 and May 18, 1999. A number of unions, NGOs and governments of member States replied to the Director-General's request as well. Based on these submissions, the Director-General concluded in his May 1999 report to the Governing Body (hereinafter "Director-General's 1999 Report") that there was "no indication" that the three recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry had been implemented.⁽¹¹⁾

In regard to the first recommendation to amend, without delay, national laws permitting forced labor, the GOB informed the Director-General in its May 18, 1999 letter that the Ministry of Home Affairs issued Order No. 1/99 on May 14, 1999, directing authorities not to exercise the powers authorized under the relevant sections of the Towns Act and Village Act.⁽¹²⁾ The GOB further stated that Order No. 1/99 provides for action to be taken against a person failing to abide by it.⁽¹³⁾ However, the Director-General's Report noted that the Order does not bring either the Village Act or the Towns Act in line with the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).⁽¹⁴⁾ The text of the Order states that it is to remain in effect unless "any further directive is issued"⁽¹⁵⁾ and does not actually rescind either the Village Act or the Towns Act. Order No. 1/99 also permits the use of forced labor under specific circumstances that, in the view of both the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (COE) and the COI, are unjustifiable.⁽¹⁶⁾

In regard to the second recommendation to take immediately the necessary steps to ensure that the authorities no longer impose forced labor in practice, governments of member States, international worker organizations, and other NGOs submitted information to the Director-General indicating that no concrete measures to stop the use of forced labor had been taken by mid-May 1999⁽¹⁷⁾ and that forced labor continued to be used by both government and military authorities on a widespread basis after the COI released its 1998 report.⁽¹⁸⁾ The GOB informed the Director-General in a May 12, 1999 letter that "the practical measures envisaged to be taken on the [COI Report's] recommendations have been submitted to the Government of the Union of Myanmar for decision and that they are already in the process of being actively considered by the high authorities."⁽¹⁹⁾ However, the Director-General's Report noted that there was no indication of the nature of these "practical measures."⁽²⁰⁾

The Director-General's Report also detailed numerous incidents in which forced labor was allegedly used for a range of tasks such as domestic work, land cultivation, infrastructure development, and military support operations; the most notorious allegations involved the use of forced labor on infrastructure development and portering for the military. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) drew attention to copies of several hundred written official orders from both civil and military authorities demanding that village heads provide laborers for a variety of tasks.⁽²¹⁾ In addition, reports of forced labor were often accompanied by additional allegations that workers were not compensated for their labor or for any of the food and materials that they may have supplied for a project, and that forced laborers were subject to extortion, fines, beatings, torture, sexual abuse, starvation, and other forms of hardship and human rights abuses.

In regard to the third recommendation to impose penalties on persons exacting forced labor, the Director-General's Report stated that, to the knowledge of the ILO, no person had thus far been penalized under section 374 of the Penal Code for imposing forced labor.⁽²²⁾

C. Government of Burma's response to the Director-General's 1999 Report

The GOB responded to the Director-General's Report in a June 7, 1999 memorandum submitted to the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards during the ILO's 87^th International Labour Conference (ILC), held June 1 - 17, 1999. In the memorandum, the GOB asserted that the Director-General's Report was full of "unfounded and biased" charges and "manifestly false" accusations; that allegations of the use of forced labor in Burma "were largely the result of misconceptions and misunderstandings" of the situation; and that the facts of the COI's 1998 Report were inaccurate.⁽²³⁾

The GOB maintained that all of the allegations mentioned in the Director-General's Report took place before Ministry of Home Affairs Order No. 1/99 was issued on May 14, 1999 and that no allegations had been made after that date.⁽²⁴⁾ In addition, the memorandum asserted that Order No. 1/99 was, in accordance with the COI Report's recommendations, made public and distributed immediately to 16 authorities, including the Supreme Court, the Police Major General, and all Township Peace and Development Councils. Further, GOB representatives announced Order No. 1/99 in a public, international forum - the 13^th ASEAN Labor Ministers Meeting in May 1999⁽²⁵⁾ - and proclaimed that officials had pledged to use only military troops as labor on national infrastructure projects.⁽²⁶⁾ The GOB also stated that the Order would be published in the Myanmar Gazette, which publishes all laws.⁽²⁷⁾

Though the GOB claimed that no allegations of forced labor had been made after the Ministry of Home Affairs Order No. 1/99 was issued on May 14, 1999, NGOs, and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon have reported numerous allegations that forced labor was used on government and military projects after the Order was issued.⁽²⁸⁾ In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon observed that as of July 2, 1999, Order No. 1/99 had not been printed in the Myanmar Gazette nor had appeared in Burmese or English language newspapers, apart from brief references from a press conference at the time of the ASEAN Labor Ministers meeting.⁽²⁹⁾

D. Response of the International Labor Conference

Despite the claims of the GOB, reports of the continued use of forced labor by government and military authorities led delegates to the 87^th ILO International Labour Conference to denounce labor conditions in Burma. The Conference Committee on the Application of Standards noted in its June 15, 1999 report that there was "convincing" information available that forced and compulsory labor still occurred on a broad scale in Burma.⁽³⁰⁾ In the view of this Committee, the explanations provided by the GOB did not respond to the detailed findings and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and the Committee of Experts.⁽³¹⁾ As a result, the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards adopted a special paragraph in its report noting "with great concern" Burma's continued failure over several years to eliminate serious discrepancies in the application of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29).⁽³²⁾

Because of the GOB's consistent violations of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and failure to respond to repeated rulings by supervisory bodies to put an end to forced labor, the International Labour Conference submitted, discussed, and adopted an unprecedented emergency resolution on the widespread use of forced labor in Burma on June 17, 1999 (located in Appendix II). The Resolution reaffirmed that all member States have an obligation to apply fully, in law and practice, the ILO Conventions that they have voluntarily ratified⁽³³⁾ and deplored the GOB's failure to comply with the recommendations of the COI Report.⁽³⁴⁾ The Resolution further resolved:

(a) that the attitude and behaviour of the Government of Myanmar are grossly incompatible with the conditions and principles governing membership of the Organization;⁽³⁵⁾

• that the Government of Myanmar should cease to benefit from any technical cooperation or assistance from the ILO, except for the purpose of direct assistance to implement immediately the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, until such time as it has implemented the said recommendations;⁽³⁶⁾
• that the Government of Myanmar should henceforth not receive any invitation to attend meetings, symposia and seminars organized by the ILO, except such meetings that have the sole purpose of securing immediate and full compliance with the said recommendations, until such time as it has implemented the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry.⁽³⁷⁾

This Resolution was originally submitted by the Workers and Employers delegations to the International Labour Conference. The International Labour Conference referred the Resolution to the Selection Committee for examination. The Selection Committee met in closed sessions on June 14 and 15, 1999, discussed proposed amendments to the Resolution, and submitted a report and text of the draft Resolution to the International Labour Conference.

While an overwhelming majority of the delegates to the International Labour Conference supported the emergency Resolution, some Government delegates objected to the inclusion of paragraphs 3(b)⁽³⁸⁾ and 3(c)⁽³⁹⁾ in the text of the draft. The Government delegate of Cuba stated that the Resolution contained two separate notions - one referring to the general situation in Burma and one referring to the power to impose sanctions - and that the International Labour Conference did not have the power to impose sanctions, as proposed by paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c).⁽⁴⁰⁾ The Government delegate of Cuba, supported by the Government of Mexico, requested that the International Labour Conference vote separately on those parts of paragraph 3.⁽⁴¹⁾

The Workers and Employers delegations opposed the motion to put paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c) to a separate vote. The Government delegate of the U.S. joined them in opposing the request, noting that a majority of the delegates to the International Labour Conference would be against it, and that the motion should therefore be withdrawn.⁽⁴²⁾ In the end, the motion to have a separate vote on paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c) was rejected.⁽⁴³⁾

After this vote, the International Labour Conference immediately moved to the emergency Resolution. On June 17, 1999, the "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar" was adopted by the International Labour Conference with an overwhelming majority of delegates voting in favor of adoption.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The Resolution deplored the GOB's failure to comply with the recommendations of the COI Report and withdrew 1) technical cooperation or assistance to Burma, except for direct assistance in implementing the recommendations of the COI Report, and 2) future invitations to attend ILO meetings, symposia, or seminars, except for meetings with the sole purpose of securing compliance with the recommendations of the COI Report. This Resolution is unprecedented in the history of the ILO. It does not simply denounce the situation and activities of a country but significantly restricts all contact between Burma and ILO and excludes Burma from almost all participation in the ILO.

II. Recent Allegations of Forced Labor on Infrastructure Development Projects

The Department's 1998 Report noted that allegations of the use of forced labor on infrastructure development projects was widespread. They included charges that forced labor had been used to construct or repair roads, railway lines, ditches, dams, canals, dikes, airfields, and embankments. Many forced laborers had reported that they worked under very poor conditions with little food, medical care, or rest, and there were repeated reports of gross human rights violations, including beatings, torture and summary execution. The number of people who contributed their labor to infrastructure development projects was so large that the value of their work in rural development projects had been reported in GOB budget figures.

The findings of the Director-General's 1999 Report and other reports from the ILO, information from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, and reports from trade unions and NGOs suggest that forced labor continues to be used on a widespread basis for infrastructure development projects. A large number of the allegations presented in this update relate to the construction and repair of roads. However, there are also numerous allegations that forced labor also continues to be used to build or repair embankments, canals, dykes, and pagodas, and to develop land. Some of the allegations suggest that forced labor continues to be used on infrastructure projects designed to support the tourism industry in Burma. Villagers can avoid forced labor if they pay fees to the authorities, but most individuals do not have enough money to pay on a long-term basis. In addition, many villages appear to have been ordered to supply tools, food, other materials, and transportation for the duration of a given project.

According to Amnesty International, the use of forced labor has decreased in central Burma but is still being reported on a large scale in the seven ethnic minority states surrounding the central Burmese plain.⁽⁴⁵⁾ For instance, three quarters of the Karenni and Shan minority refugees who had been interviewed by Amnesty International in February 1999 stated that they were forced to work on roads and other infrastructure projects such as cultivating crops, transporting logs, digging trenches, and building Buddhist temples.⁽⁴⁶⁾ The GOB asserted that it is attempting to improve the infrastructure of areas which had formerly been affected by fighting between the GOB and armed ethnic minority troops; as a result of this policy, thousands of ethnic minority civilians are forced to work on infrastructure projects on a regular basis.⁽⁴⁷⁾

A. Recent allegations of forced labor on road construction projects

The ILO Director-General's 1999 Report cites numerous allegations that government and/or military authorities continue to use forced labor on road construction and development projects. Specific allegations submitted by the ICFTU to the ILO and contained in interviews conducted and reports published by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) include the following:

• Villagers in Nyaunglebin District were forced to work for up to one month to dig dirt and build new roads (December 1998 - March 1999).⁽⁴⁸⁾
• Members of some 20 villages in Kyauk Kyi township were forced to build a new road from Na Than Gwin to Mone (beginning in January 1999).⁽⁴⁹⁾
• Continued use of forced labor for the construction of the Toungoo - Mawchi road (beginning in October 1998).⁽⁵⁰⁾

The ICFTU also submitted copies of a number of orders commanding that people from the villages be sent with their own tools to clear shrub along roads.⁽⁵¹⁾

In reply to the Director-General's request for information, the government of a member State detailed allegations that forced labor had been used from August 1998 - May 1999 on a number of projects, including the following:

• Villagers from Htantabin township have been forced to work on earthworks and road construction projects every dry season. The workers were responsible for transportation and food costs.⁽⁵²⁾
• Villagers in Mon State and Tennasserim Division were forced to collect road-building materials and/or widen the trunk road south between Kawthoung and Myeik and between Ye and Dawei.⁽⁵³⁾
• Forced labor was used on road projects in Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships in the Shan state.⁽⁵⁴⁾
• Villagers in Arakan (Rakhine) state had to provide labor and collect gravel and other road-building materials, without compensation, for a major road-building project that would link Kyauktaw, Mrauk Oo and Minbya.⁽⁵⁵⁾
• Forced laborers were used on road and bridge-building projects in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. They were paid on occasion.⁽⁵⁶⁾
• Forced labor was used on a new bridge in Myitkyina and support roads.⁽⁵⁷⁾
• Villagers in Paletwa township, southern Chin State, had to provide labor and collect road-building materials for a new trunk road.⁽⁵⁸⁾
• Relocated villagers were forced to work on a road to the Shadaw relocation site (Kayah State). They were paid sporadically with rice.⁽⁵⁹⁾
• Forced labor was used on a new road passing through Thaundaung township (Kayin (Karen) State) into Phasawng township (Kayah State).⁽⁶⁰⁾

The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon also reported allegations that forced labor was being used on road construction and repair projects, including the following:

• Villagers built a road from Yay-Way to Ma-Hlaing, Mon-Dine Village, and Bare-Gone Village. Those who did not work were forced to pay 3000 kyat per person (beginning in 1999).⁽⁶¹⁾
• Villagers were ordered to work on a road between Hle-Seik and Kyun Ngu villages. When some local farmers failed to appear at the appointed time, the local authorities sent a "harsh" letter to the heads of the village wards, warning them to contribute labor on the following day or else pay a fine of 500 kyat (April 29, 1999).⁽⁶²⁾
• Villagers had to build a 20-mile road between Myo Tha Town and Tada-Oo Town. About 1000 people are working on the road daily (beginning June 1999).⁽⁶³⁾
• Villagers were told to work on the Insein-Nyaung Don road or else pay a fine of 300 kyat per family. The local police threatened residents with beatings or detention if they refused and arrested those who could not pay (May 17-30, 1999).⁽⁶⁴⁾
• Civilians were forced to work on completing a section of the Kachanburi-Tavoy highway (October 1998).⁽⁶⁵⁾

Other allegations that forced labor was used on road construction and development projects include the following:

• Villagers were forced to work from dawn until 11:00 pm to build a 50-mile road between Vuangtu village and Thantlang town by May 1999.⁽⁶⁶⁾
• Forced laborers were ordered to dynamite a rocky road and then pick-up the stones while rocks were still falling from above. Soldiers beat and threatened workers who tried to help those who were struck by falling rocks (May 11, 1999).⁽⁶⁷⁾

• A 35-year old Catholic farmer was forced to work on a road from Shadaw to the Pon River for several days without compensation (December 1998).⁽⁶⁸⁾
• Troops arrived at Metta village in the Tavoy area with more than 400 villagers to work on an unfinished section of a highway linking Thailand and Burma. All of the laborers were required to bring their own tools (beginning October 5, 1998).⁽⁶⁹⁾
• People in the Yebyu and Tavoy township were forced to work without compensation to widening the Ye-Tavoy motor road. Villagers had to pay transportation costs to load and bring the stone to places where they had to be laid. Local battalions allegedly received funds from the government to widen the road but elected to use forced, unpaid labor. They also reportedly took the stones crushed by villagers and sold them for their own profit. Villagers were instructed to carry their own food and tools because the military would not provide such items to the workers (beginning mid-November 1998).⁽⁷⁰⁾

B. Recent allegations of forced labor on land development projects

The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon reported several allegations of forced labor being used to develop land. These allegations include several cases in connection with the GOB's project to double the amount of cultivated land by developing 22 million acres of wetlands and virgin lands and the establishment of "labor villages" in order to provide year-round help to entrepreneurs developing the wetlands.⁽⁷¹⁾

The Embassy reported additional allegations of the use of forced labor on land development projects through a July 23, 1999 cable, including the following:

• Each village tract from 8 townships in Sagaing Division was told to provide two villagers to work on 500 acres of land per township for a project reclaiming about 4000 acres of virgin land. In addition, each household was required to give 200 kyat each for the authorities to buy rice, oil, salt, and provisions (December 1998).⁽⁷²⁾
• Villagers in Sagaing Division, Yinmarbin Township were forced to provide uncompensated labor or else pay 1000 kyat per person to reclaim 2000 acres of fallow land for the northwest command. The villagers were told to deny that they were contributing labor if they encountered an army truck and to hide if helicopters flew overhead (the U.S. Embassy noted that such helicopters would probably be military helicopters).⁽⁷³⁾
• Villagers in a Sagaing township were forced to clear 1000 acres of land or pay a fine of 3500 kyat each.⁽⁷⁵⁾
• Residents of Irawaddy Division were ordered to clear over 100 acres of land as part of a wetlands reclamation project. The government obtained machinery to do the work but forced local villagers to pay for the equipment.⁽⁷⁶⁾
• Every household in a series of villages in Pegu Division was ordered to dig 10 pits to clear a dry creek filled with silt (beginning April 30, 1999). In addition, every household in the town of Pegu had to contribute 600 kyat for the construction of a moat (May 15, 1999).⁽⁷⁷⁾
• Recent allegations of forced labor on tourism infrastructure development projects

According to the Department of Labor's 1998 Report, the GOB has allegedly used thousands of people as forced laborers on infrastructure projects designed to support Burma's tourism industry. In 1992, the GOB established a Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, which initially targeted specific areas for tourism development, one of which was the Mandalay area.⁽⁷⁸⁾ The Department's 1998 Report noted several allegations that forced labor was used on various infrastructure development projects in Mandalay; allegations of the use of forced labor on infrastructure projects in that area continue.

The National League for Democracy (NLD) accused the GOB of evicting villagers from their land and using them as forced labor to build an airport road in Mandalay.⁽⁷⁹⁾ A July 23, 1999 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon supported this allegation, stating that villages have allegedly been relocated and other villages forced to build the temporary entrance to the new Mandalay International Airport.⁽⁸⁰⁾ These villagers were reportedly forced to build a mud road and unload stones from trucks; they also had to repair the road when seasonal rains damaged it.⁽⁸¹⁾ Villagers in Mandalay Division were also allegedly forced to provide labor and collect road-building materials to improve a trunk road in Thabeikkyin township.⁽⁸²⁾

D. Recent allegations of forced labor on other infrastructure development projects

The Director-General's 1999 Report also listed allegations of the use of forced labor on embankment projects. These allegations, mostly based on reports from the NLD and submitted through the ICFTU, include the following:

• Workers were forced to dig a total of 10,000 pits for the embankment of Sae-ma creek, close to Kayan township. Failure to send a worker resulted in a payment of 1,200-1,500 kyat (December 27-31, 1998).⁽⁸³⁾
• Eleven village tracts were forced to give one member of every household to reconstruct a deteriorated embankment on the eastern margin of Kayan township. Failure to send a worker resulted in a penalty of 300 kyat (August - September 1998).⁽⁸⁴⁾
• People were called up to work on constructing an embankment to capture water from the creeks and streams running out of the Chin state to irrigate the land (early 1999).⁽⁸⁵⁾
• 3000-4000 people (men, women, minors, and the elderly) were forced to work without compensation to rebuild an embankment along the Ye-Tavoy railway road. Almost all of the villagers in Yebyu, Longlon, Thayet Chaung, and Tavoy townships had to work at the construction sites about 10-15 days every month from June 1998 until the end of the year.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon also reported allegations that forced labor was being used on embankment projects. According to the Embassy, villagers were forced to build an embankment in Nga-Thaing-Chuang Township or pay 500 kyat per person; a woman who argued that the government had formally announced that there was no forced labor in Burma was allegedly detained for 17 days.⁽⁸⁷⁾ The Embassy also stated that residents of Taung-Dwin-Gyi township were allegedly told to dig a pit to build an embankment or else pay 300 kyat (April 9, 1999).⁽⁸⁸⁾ The Ministry for Agriculture and Irrigation set aside fees of 160 kyat per pit as labor fees, but the local authorities were reportedly collecting amounts ranging from 300-2000 kyat per family to pay for the project.⁽⁸⁹⁾

The NLD, through the ICFTU, submitted allegations to the ILO regarding the use of forced labor for digging canals and building dykes. Other NGOs and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon also reported allegations of the use of forced labor in canal construction projects. Specific allegations include the following:

• Villagers were forced to build a canal in the industrial zone of Monywa Township. Families who could not work were forced to pay 800-1000 kyat (beginning June 18, 1999).⁽⁹⁰⁾
• One person per household was conscripted from 16 villages in the Myaung Township for a canal construction project. In addition to the forced service, authorities collected approximately 5 million kyat (beginning August 1998).⁽⁹¹⁾
•  Local government authorities began forcing villagers in Pakokku township to clear all their crops without compensation and work on a large canal project. One villager who protested was subsequently detained (January 1999).⁽⁹²⁾
•  Households in Taungdwingi township were forced to provide labor to smaller canal projects or make cash contributions of varying amounts (beginning sometime August 1998 - May 1999).⁽⁹³⁾
•  Villagers were required to contribute labor to water projects associated with the Zawgyi dam in south-western Shan State. Some were forced to dig canals which will divert water away from their own fields towards government-run agriculture projects (beginning sometime August 1998 - May 1999).⁽⁹⁴⁾
•  Households in Waw township, including female-headed households, were being ordered to help rebuild dykes after last year's monsoon season. Those unwilling or unable to contribute any labor were required to hire others to take their place (beginning sometime August 1998 - May 1999).⁽⁹⁵⁾
• Government of Burma's response to allegations of forced labor on infrastructure development projects

The GOB stated in a June 7, 1999 memorandum to the ILO that it had undertaken a "substantial effort to improve the infrastructure of the country's economy by building roads, bridges, dams and reservoirs."⁽⁹⁶⁾ According to the GOB, the people of Burma recognize the benefits of these infrastructure projects and have traditionally "contributed" labor so that they may be completed more quickly.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Nevertheless, in response to international condemnation of the practice of forced labor, the GOB pledged to use only military troops as labor on national infrastructure projects.⁽⁹⁸⁾ However, there is no evidence that this pledge has been enforced.⁽⁹⁹⁾

IV. Recent Allegations of Forced Labor to Support Military Operations

The Department's 1998 Report noted numerous allegations and reports charging the Burmese military with using forced labor for a variety of tasks. Allegations included the use of forced laborers as porters for troops, support workers in military camps, and laborers for commercial ventures designed to support the military; the most notorious of these allegations involved forced portering.

Reports from the ILO, Amnesty International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), NGOs, and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon indicate that military authorities continue to use forced labor to support military operations. A large number of the allegations presented in this update relate to the use of forced laborers as porters and sentries for the army, workers in military camps, and workers in commercial ventures designed to profit the military. Reports of human rights abuses, including beatings, torture, summary executions, and starvation often accompany these allegations.

In response to the Director-General's request for information, the ICFTU submitted to the ILO copies of several hundred official, written orders from military authorities demanding that village heads provide laborers to act as porters, repair persons at military camps, or messengers for the military, among other tasks. According to the ICFTU, all of the orders are nearly identical in shape, style, and contents to the forced labor orders examined by the COI and found to be authentic during its investigation.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Several dozen orders dated August 1998 - February 1999 ordered villages to send a number of "servants," "rotation servants," or "volunteer workers" "without fail" to serve the military.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ In some cases, the number of days of service was indicated but in most cases, the length of the assignment was not specified. The orders sometimes specified that the workers would have to supply their own materials, equipment, food, and money.⁽¹⁰²⁾

In early 1999, Amnesty International interviewed over 100 ethnic minority civilians who had fled to Thailand, every one of whom reported that he or she had been compelled by military authorities to clear forests, build roads and military barracks, and cultivate crops to feed the military.⁽¹⁰³⁾ Three quarters of the dozens of Karenni refugees interviewed by Amnesty International in February 1999 were forced to work by the military as unpaid laborers on military bases, building roads, and clearing land.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

About 40 documents submitted by the ICFTU to the ILO contained information gathered in interviews conducted and reports published by the Federation of Trade Unions - Burma (FTUB) and a number of NGOs. They give details of hundreds of cases in which forced labor was exacted from August 1998 - May 1999 for portering, military camp work, sentry duty, and other support work for the military throughout Kayin (Karen) State, Kayah State, Pegu Division, Arakan State, Shan State, Chin State, and Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) Division. The details often included the designation of the military units and/or camps and names of military officers involved, as well as those of villages and of individual victims. In a number of cases, forced labor was reported to have been imposed in circumstances of extreme brutality, involving the destruction of villages, torture, rape, maiming and killing of exhausted, sick or wounded porters, the killing of a non-cooperative village head, and the use of civilians, including women and children, as mine sweepers and human shields.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

A. Recent allegations of forced labor in the employment of porters and sentries

Forced portering is a particularly harsh form of forced labor that occurs in areas where military troops need people to carry ammunition, food, and other supplies for them. Porters are usually held for at least several days at a time and treated severely - facing beatings, starvation, and even execution - if they complain, cannot carry sufficient supplies, or cannot keep up with the pace of the troops. According to Amnesty International, civilians forced to act as porters are often members of ethnic minority groups since the military is active in areas where armed ethnic minority groups are also active; many women, as well as men, serve as porters.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

In response to the ILO Director-General's request for information for his May 1999 report to the Governing Body, the government of a member State detailed several allegations that military authorities had demanded porters to carry equipment and goods between August 1998 - May 1999, including the following:

• Households in Myawaddy township were forced to provide porters for military operations against Karen insurgents.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾
• Civilians found traveling outside restricted zones in Kayah state were rounded up to serve as porters.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾
• Households in Paletwa township were forced to provide porters to support army movements.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾
• Villagers in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Minya townships were forced to serve as porters.⁽¹¹⁰⁾
• Displaced Karen villagers continue to be used for the porterage of military supplies.⁽¹¹¹⁾

Reports from Amnesty International also detail specific allegations of forced portering for the military. In February 1999, Amnesty International interviewed dozens of Karen, Karenni, and Shan refugees who had fled Burma for Thailand. They cited several reasons for leaving their homes, including the constant demands for forced labor as porters for troops.⁽¹¹²⁾ Villagers also stated that they were frequently required to pay various forms of arbitrary taxes, including fees to avoid forced portering.⁽¹¹³⁾ Three quarters of the Shan refugees interviewed by Amnesty International had been forced to act as porters for troops.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Specific allegations included the following:

• A 28-year old Baptist farmer from Disakha village tract was seized from Phe Khone township and forced to carry shells, ammunition, food, rice, and office materials. He was beaten when he became too exhausted to walk (October 1998).⁽¹¹⁵⁾
• A 30-year old farmer from Hpa'an District was taken as a porter and never returned. Friends who had been seized with the farmer stated that he had been shot dead and left behind because he could not carry his heavy load (December 1998). The farmer's wife stated that she was forced to act as a porter three times after her husband's death.⁽¹¹⁶⁾
• A 42-year old Christian farmer from Hpa'an District was taken regularly, approximately once a month, as a porter. He and his family fled after the last time he was taken in January 1999.⁽¹¹⁷⁾
• A 40-year old Christian farmer from Hpa'an District was forced to act as a porter for five days even though he suffered from an undiagnosed skin disease. He had been forced to porter every month carrying rice and ammunition (December 1998). He died on December 27, 1998.⁽¹¹⁸⁾
• A 33-year old Shan man from Loikaw township was taken by military authorities while he was harvesting crops. He walked with a pronounced limp but was forced to collect food and act as a messenger (October 1998).⁽¹¹⁹⁾
• A 38-year old farmer in Mon State was asked to act as a porter for the military. He refused and was beaten unconscious with sticks. Troops then stabbed him to death (September 1998).⁽¹²⁰⁾
• A 23-year old woman from Murngnai township was forced to carry oil and condensed milk. When she tired and slowed down, she was pushed and kicked. She was not paid and troops took money from her (January 1999).⁽¹²¹⁾
• A 45-year old Catholic farmer was forced to work as a porter carrying from Shadaw to the Pon River (November 1998).⁽¹²²⁾
• A 42-year old Shan farmer had been taken as a porter for 10 days and forced to carry ammunition. He was given so little food that he became weak and unable to walk. A soldier slapped him across the face several times and caught a finger in the farmer's left eye, resulting in the permanent loss of sight in that eye (October 1998).⁽¹²³⁾
• A 40-year old Roman Catholic widower was assigned by the village headman to porter for the military and carried shells and ammunition (October 1998).⁽¹²⁴⁾
• Recent allegations of forced labor in the employment of military camp workers

In reply to the ILO Director-General's request for information for his 1999 report to the Governing Body, the government of a member State reported several allegations that the military demanded labor to perform construction and maintenance work from August 1998 - May 1999, including the following:

• People from several towns in the Shan State were required to contribute labor to prepare for a visit by a senior general. Tasks ranged from menial activities aimed at beautifying the area to providing transport free of charge to the general's convoy.⁽¹²⁵⁾
• Villagers were forced to cut bamboo to supply army camps in Mon State.⁽¹²⁶⁾
• Households in Myawaddy township were routinely forced to provide labor for army camps, including carrying water over long distances.⁽¹²⁷⁾
• Villagers were required to provide support services to army camps in all six townships in Kayah State.⁽¹²⁸⁾
• Villagers in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Minbya townships were forced to work in construction and camp maintenance.⁽¹²⁹⁾

The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Burma also noted that it is common practice for the military to force villagers to work on military bases.⁽¹³⁰⁾

C. Recent allegations of forced labor on commercial ventures

Documentation submitted by the ICFTU for the Director-General's 1999 Report contains information alleging the use of forced labor on commercial ventures undertaken by the military for profit, including work cultivating rubber plantations operated by the army, digging irrigation ditches to grow rice, producing bricks, and growing beans or other vegetables for the army.⁽¹³¹⁾ Specific allegations that forced labor was used on such projects between August 1998 - May 1999 include the following:

• The army and police forced villagers from Mawlamyainggyun township to contribute labor to a range of income-generating projects, including agriculture, livestock breeding, and brick production. The army reportedly demanded that local truck owners transport finished bricks without payment.⁽¹³²⁾
• Villagers in Maungdaw township were forced to provide labor for government-owned peanut fields while villagers in Eastern Arakan (Rakhine) State had to work on rice and sugarcane fields.⁽¹³³⁾
• Villagers were forced to work on land reclamation projects in Kalay, Monywa and Gangaw townships. At least 10 workers have reportedly died from malaria.⁽¹³⁴⁾
• Forced labor was used on new agricultural projects near Hopong and Taunggyi that are run by private entrepreneurs closely connected with the Government. In Hopong, farmers were reported to be forced to grow soya beans under contract for the army.⁽¹³⁵⁾

In addition, forced laborers are allegedly used in military ventures involving the raising and harvesting of seafood such as fish and prawns (shrimp). The Director-General's Report noted allegations submitted by the ILO that forced laborers were being used to raise fish.⁽¹³⁶⁾ The army and police reportedly forced villagers from Mawlamyainggyun township to contribute labor to a range of income-generating projects, including fish farming.⁽¹³⁷⁾ An NGO - Images Asia - interviewed a refugee from Burma who stated that almost everyday, particularly during the rainy season, the Na Sa Ka⁽¹³⁸⁾ have been collecting workers, both men and children, and forcing them to work on tiger prawn farms.⁽¹³⁹⁾

The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon also reported allegations that forced labor was used in support for agricultural and other production projects for the military. In a July 23, 1999 cable, the Embassy stated that farmers from 10 villages were reportedly forced to work land which the military had confiscated to grow crops; those who did not contribute labor were forced to pay 500 kyat.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ The Embassy also reported that villagers were allegedly forced to clear land for the military on a 100-acre plot managed by the army in Htan-Ta-Bin township.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

Other allegations that forced labor was used on agricultural and other production projects for the military include the following:

• A military camp commander ordered the leaders of nine village tracts to bring 1500 cane sticks from each village tract to the army camp in order to be sold for the army's profit. The forest where the cane plants grew was far away from one village, so the villagers had to sell their domesticated animals and rice to pay the army in lieu of their share of the cane sticks (January 1999).⁽¹⁴³⁾
• A 45-year old farmer from Murngnai township was forced to carry teak logs and grow soya beans for the military (January 1999).⁽¹⁴⁴⁾
• The military used 200-300 forced, uncompensated workers on a daily basis to construct a range of dykes on the coast in Yebyu township. The laborers were conscripted from the more than ten Mon villages of Kywethonnyima village tract. Each village was required to provide 30 to 50 laborers to work on the dyke construction for 15 days per month during the low-tide period (beginning October 1998).⁽¹⁴⁵⁾
• Villagers in Shan state were forced to plant yellow beans for the army, tend the plots, and "do weeding and fencing" for troops at local bases (September 1998).⁽¹⁴⁶⁾
• Army battalions forced villagers to work for periods of up to two weeks splitting rocks near the Salween River crossing of Ta Sarng in Shan state. The rocks were conveyed by the army to large cities where they were sold for 12,000 - 15,000 kyat per truckload (throughout 1998).⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

V. Recent Developments Regarding Allegations of Forced Labor in Construction of the Yadana Pipeline

The Department's 1998 Report looked into repeated allegations that the GOB had used forced labor on the pipeline, that forced labor was used to build support facilities for the pipeline, and that forced labor was used to support the operations of military troops providing security for the pipeline. In addition, there were numerous allegations that the Ye-Tavoy railway, on which the GOB is widely acknowledged to have used forced labor, was being constructed in order to facilitate army operations near and in support of the pipeline.

Oil companies involved with the pipeline vigorously denied allegations of human rights abuses and particularly the association of forced labor with actual pipeline construction.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ U.S. oil company Unocal Corporation, one of the investors in the Yadana pipeline, has issued a discussion paper titled Human Rights and Unocal stating that it has "taken a leadership role in assuring that no human rights abuses have occurred in the project's activities. ...From the onset of the project, Unocal has carefully monitored the labor practices followed by the project operator, Total, a French energy company. We have sent our own fact-finding teams to the pipeline area."⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ The same discussion paper also states that "Unocal would not tolerate the use of forced labor or other human rights abuses on any of our projects."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

There is little new information with regard to the construction of the Yadana Pipeline. Statements reportedly made by the Chair of a French Parliamentary Mission examining the role of oil companies suggest that forced labor may have been used for work on facilities supporting pipeline construction. However, questions regarding the alleged use of forced labor on the pipeline project have yet to be completely resolved, and officials from Unocal Corporation have continued to dispute allegations that forced labor was used on the pipeline and to communicate their concern over the methodology used by the Department of Labor in researching the 1998 Report as well as this update.

In March 1999, a French Parliamentary Mission traveled to Burma and visited the Yadana pipeline project. The Parliamentary Mission, made up of members of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, was formed to evaluate the role of oil companies in international politics as well as their social and environmental impacts worldwide. In addition to field visits to Chad, Cameroon, Burma, Thailand and the United States, the Mission also conducted about 40 hearings in France in the fall of 1998. Persons testifying at the hearings included government officials, representatives of various NGOs, academics, journalists, and representatives of several oil companies.⁽¹⁵¹⁾

In an interview published in May 1999, the Chair of the Parliamentary Mission stated that "the Burmese army resorted to forced labour for various preliminary works on the building site of the gas pipeline, built thereafter by Total. Some clearings of undergrowth and portering was accomplished with forced labour before the Total personnel began the construction of the gas pipeline. Total representatives revealed that when they were informed of these facts, they told the Burmese army that it should cease and so it would have ceased."⁽¹⁵²⁾ The Chair of the Parliamentary Mission also reportedly stated that allegations that Total and Unocal have financially supported the Burmese army to ensure the safety of the pipeline were not credible.⁽¹⁵³⁾ However, the Mission has thus far not released any report.

VI. Recent Allegations of Forced Relocations

The Department's 1998 Report noted that, according to the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, tens of thousands of villagers in Burma have been displaced. The Department observed that forced relocations in Burma generally take two forms that affect both urban and rural populations: 1) as part of urban redevelopment programs, or 2) in the context of counter-insurgency campaigns. While the practice of forcibly relocating villages in Burma started before 1988, the report observed that it seemed to escalate significantly after that year. The area to which villagers were forced to locate were commonly ill-prepared, if at all. People had to buy or build new accommodations on arrival, and there was often no water, sewage, or health care facilities. The Department also noted reports that forcibly relocated villagers had been subjected to forced labor.

Reports from the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, other NGOs, and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon indicate that forced relocations are still a serious problem in Burma. Many villagers, particularly in ethnic minority regions, are apparently still subject to forcible relocations, often to relocation sites with very poor living conditions. It also seems as if the practice of forced labor often goes hand in hand with the policy of forced relocations. Specific allegations of forced relocations include the following:

• Villagers from Sai Khao, Kaeng Kham and Kaeng Lom have been forcibly relocated over the last two to three years to the outskirts of Kunhing.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾
• Villages have been relocated to build the temporary entrance to the new Mandalay International Airport.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾
• A 35-year old Christian widow from Hlaingbwe township stated that all of the residents of her village were ordered to leave after fighting broke out between the armies of two different ethnic minority opposition groups. Villagers were told that they would be shot if they did not leave within five days (January 14, 1999).⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

A. Forced relocations and ethnic tensions

The practice of forcibly relocating entire villages and populations of people in Burma is apparently one component of the military's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy, which severs alleged links of intelligence, food, money, and recruits between armed opposition groups and civilians.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ In addition to being subject to searches, destruction and burning of houses, and confiscation of property and food, entire communities living in or near combat zones are forced to move to relocation sites subject to strict military control with little or no warning.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ As a consequence, the ethnic origin or perceived political beliefs of village(s) often play a determining role in whether or not they are forced to relocate.

Human Rights Watch believes that the GOB has stepped up its practice of targeting villagers suspected of supporting ethnic insurgents for relocation. According to this organization, forced relocations were especially prevalent in the central southern Shan state, Kayah (Karenni) state, Karen state, and Tenasserim division, all areas where peace talks or cease fires had broken down in the previous three years.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ The January 22, 1999 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma (hereinafter "Report of the Special Rapporteur") also noted that the scale of forced relocations had increased significantly after 1996.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

Reports from Amnesty International support this assessment, noting that hundreds of thousands of ethnic minority civilians in the Karen, Karenni, and Shan states have been forcibly relocated by the military since 1996.⁽¹⁶¹⁾ In February 1999, Amnesty International interviewed dozens of Karen refugees in Thailand who had fled Burma in late 1998 and early 1999. They cited several reasons for leaving their homes, including forced relocation by the Burmese military, and many of the Karen civilians from Papun District and other areas interviewed by Amnesty International had been forced off their land by the military.⁽¹⁶²⁾ In the Kayah state, Amnesty International found that forced relocations appear to be carried out solely on account of the ethnic origin or perceived political beliefs of the affected Karenni civilians.⁽¹⁶³⁾

B. Living conditions at relocation sites

Forced relocations place people into life-threatening conditions in relocation centers. According to the 1999 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur, no particular arrangements are made by the authorities to accommodate forcibly relocated populations.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Relocation centers often have inadequate or entirely lack housing, proper sanitation, safe drinking water, food, and medical care. For example, the Shadaw relocation site, established in mid-1996, is located in a deep valley with very little arable land in the area and a limited water supply.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ There is often little or no medical care, hypodermic needles are re-used without being cleaned, and many die of diarrhea and malaria.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

The residents of relocation centers do not possess freedom of movement. According to the report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur, villagers cannot leave the relocation site without a pass, which they have to purchase.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Residents of relocation sites are reportedly subject to being shot if found outside of a certain radius of the camp.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ In one case, an individual who had been forcibly relocated to Kunhing town was given permission by the local authorities to return to his village to collect his cattle; he was caught and shot dead by troops after departing for his village.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

Unemployment is also a major problem at relocation sites. Because they no longer own land, residents are forced to find work as daily workers. Some are able to find jobs working 12 hours a day for about $2 per week.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ However, most are not so fortunate, and income-generating activities are curtailed by the forced, uncompensated labor they have to perform regularly for the military.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

C. Recent allegations of forced labor at relocation sites

The practice of forced labor often seems to go hand in hand with the policy of forced relocations. The report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur noted that the people most seriously affected by demands for forced labor are those who have been forcibly relocated since they have been forced to leave their land and become wage laborers instead of farmers.⁽¹⁷²⁾ According to Amnesty International, Shan villagers who were relocated from their villages into larger sites near towns or army bases became sitting targets for forced labor duties by the military, and they were used as a pool of laborers to perform forced labor without pay.⁽¹⁷³⁾ In one case, Shan villagers forcibly relocated to Kunhing town were forced to work on a large Buddhist temple in the northern part of Kunhing.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

VII. Conclusion

There has been no evident improvement in the situation with respect to forced labor and forced relocations in Burma since the release of the Department of Labor's 1998 Report. Forced labor continues to be used throughout Burma for infrastructure development projects and to support military operations, and allegations of human rights abuses still accompany charges of forced labor on a frequent basis. Forced relocations continue to affect a great number of people, and the incidence of it may even be growing.

The use of forced labor continues to be legal in Burma. The national laws of Burma have not yet been changed to prohibit the practice. Numerous reports received by the ILO Director-General, information from NGOs, and reports from the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon indicated that the Order No. 1/99 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs does not bring either the Village Act or the Towns Act in line with the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and to the knowledge of the ILO, no person has thus far been penalized under section 374 of the Penal Code for imposing forced labor.

In addition, the GOB has never given any indication of the nature of the practical measures it has taken with regard to the ILO Commission of Inquiry's recommendations. The Director-General received many reports from member States of the ILO, international worker organizations, and NGOs detailing numerous incidents in which forced labor was allegedly used for a range of tasks on infrastructure development projects and military support operations.

Other reports and information from the United Nations, NGOs, and the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon also refer to specific projects which allegedly used forced labor. A large number of the allegations with respect to the use of forced labor on infrastructure development projects relate to the construction and repair of roads, but there are also a number of allegations that forced labor continues to be used to build or repair embankments, canals, dykes, and pagodas, and to develop land. Some of the allegations include the continued use of forced labor on infrastructure projects in those areas of the country originally targeted by the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism for tourism development. In addition, reports indicate that the military continues to use forced labor to support military operations. A large number of these allegations relate to the use of forced laborers as porters and sentries for the army, workers in military camps, and workers in commercial ventures by the military.

Forced laborers continue to work under very poor conditions. Villagers are apparently forced to supply their own food, tools, and transportation. There are also repeated reports of human rights abuses, including beatings, torture, starvation, and summary executions.

There is little new information with regard to allegations of forced labor related to the Yadana Pipeline. In March 1999, a French Parliamentary mission traveled to Burma and visited the site of the Yadana pipeline project. In an interview published in May 1999, the Chair of the Parliamentary Mission reportedly stated that the Burmese army had used forced labor for infrastructure work related to the pipeline, but before Total personnel began construction of the pipeline itself. The Chair also reportedly stated that allegations that Total and Unocal have financially supported the Burmese army to ensure the safety of the pipeline were not credible. However, the Mission's report has not yet been released. In addition, officials from Unocal Corporation have continued to dispute allegations that forced labor was used on the pipeline and to communicate their objections to actions and findings by the Department of Labor with regard to the 1998 Report as well as this update.

Forced relocations remain a serious problem in Burma, and the number of people affected by forced relocations may be increasing. Forced relocations place people into life-threatening conditions in relocation centers. The sites often have inadequate or entirely lack housing, proper sanitation, safe drinking water, food, and medical care. Residents of relocation centers do not have freedom of movement. Unemployment is a major problem, and the practice of forced labor often seems to go hand in hand with the policy of forced relocations; villagers forced to relocate near military camps are particularly vulnerable to demands for forced labor by military authorities.

Forced relocations are one component of the military's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy. As a consequence, the ethnic origin or perceived political beliefs of populations often play a determining role in whether or not they are forced to relocate, and ethnic minorities are particularly vulnerable to forced relocations. The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur also noted that the scale of forced relocations had increased significantly over the past three years.

Because of the GOB's consistent violations of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930

(No. 29) and failure to respond to repeated rulings by supervisory bodies to put an end to forced labor, the ILO's 87^th International Labor Conference submitted, discussed, and adopted an unprecedented emergency resolution on the widespread use of forced labor in Burma on

June 17, 1999. The Resolution deplored the GOB's failure to comply with the recommendations of the COI Report and withdrew 1) technical cooperation or assistance to Burma, except for direct assistance in implementing the recommendations of the COI Report, and 2) future invitations to attend ILO meetings, symposia, or seminars, except for meetings with the sole purpose of securing compliance with the recommendations of the COI Report. This Resolution is unprecedented in the history of the ILO. It does not simply denounce the situation and activities of a member State but excludes Burma from almost all activities of the ILO.

1. International Labour Organization, Commission of Inquiry, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2 July 1998) paragraph 528.

2. ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 539(a).

3. ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 539(b).

4. ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, paragraph 539(c).

5. Michel Hansenne, "To Mr. U. Tun Shwe, Director-General, Department of Labor," (25 November 1998). Letter reprinted in International Labour Organization, "Measures taken by the Government of Myanmar to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry established to examine the complaint concerning its observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)," (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 24 March 1999) Appendix I.

6. Sein Myint, "To the Director-General," (4 February 1999). Letter reprinted in ILO, "Measures taken by the Government of Myanmar," Appendix II.

7. Michel Hansenne, "To Mr. Sein Myint, Director-General, Department of Labour," (11 February 1999). Letter reprinted in Letter reprinted in ILO, "Measures taken by the Government of Myanmar," Appendix III.

8. Sein Myint, "To The Director-General," (18 February 1999). Letter reprinted in ILO, "Measures taken by the Government of Myanmar,"Appendix IV.

9. International Labour Organization, International Labour Office, Report of the Director-General to the members of the Governing Body on Measures taken by the Government of Myanmar following the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry established to examine its observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 21 May 1999) paragraph 2.

10. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 3.

11. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 61.

12. Soe Nyunt, "To the Director-General," (18 May 1999). Letter reprinted in ILO, Report of the Director-General, Appendix II.

13. Soe Nyunt, "To the Director-General," (18 May 1999). Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Home Affairs, "Order No. 1/99: Order Directing Not to Exercise Powers Under Certain Provisions of the Towns Act, 1907 and the Village Act, 1907," paragraph 6. Reprinted in ILO, Report of the Director-General, Appendix III.

14. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraphs 49-54.

15. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 48.

16. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 52.

17. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 46.

18. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 16.

19. Sein Myint, "To The Director-General," (12 May 1999). Letter reprinted in ILO, Report of the Director-General, Appendix I.

20. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 9.

21. ²² ICFTU, "To Mr. Juan Somavia, Director-General," (3 May 1999). Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraphs 17-20. Cited in Janek Kuczkiewicz, "Fresh evidence of forced labour in Burma," Trade Union World No. 6, June 1999: N. pag.

22. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 57.

23. Union of Myanmar, "Memorandum of the Government of Myanmar on the Report of the Director-General to the members of the Governing Body dated 21 May 1999," (7 June 1999) N. pag. Also reprinted in International Labour Organization, Committee on the Application of Standards, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards: Observations and Information Concerning Particular Countries (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 15 June 1999) N. pag.

24. Union of Myanmar, "Memorandum of the Government of Myanmar," N. pag.

25. Soe Nyunt, "To the Director-General," (18 May 1999).

26. Soe Nyunt, "To the Director-General," (18 May 1999). United States, Department of State, Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936 (23 July 1999) paragraph 3. Amnesty International, Myanmar. The Kayin (Karen) State: Militarization and Human Rights, Amnesty International Report ASA 16/12/99 (N.p.: Amnesty International, June 1999) N. pag.

27. Union of Myanmar, "Memorandum of the Government of Myanmar," N. pag.

28. See parts III and IV of this section for recent allegations.

29. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 3.

30. International Labour Organization, Committee on the Application of Standards, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards: General Report (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 15 June 1999) paragraph 195.

31. ILO, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards: General Report, paragraph 195.

32. ILO, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards: General Report, paragraph 198.

33. ILO, "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar,"

34. ILO, "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar," paragraph 1.

35. ILO, "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar," paragraph 3(a).

36. ILO, "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar," paragraph 3(b).

37. ILO, "Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar," paragraph 3(c).

38. Paragraph 3(b) of the Resolution states, "that the Government of Myanmar should cease to benefit from any technical cooperation or assistance from the ILO, except for the purpose of direct assistance to implement immediately the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, until such time as it has implemented the said recommendations."

39. Paragraph 3(c) of the Resolution states, "that the Government of Myanmar should henceforth not receive any invitation to attend meetings, symposia and seminars organized by the ILO, except such meetings that have the sole purpose of securing immediate and full compliance with the said recommendations, until such time as it has implemented the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry."

40. ILO, Provisional Record of the 21^st Sitting, 27/12.

41. ILO, Provisional Record of the 21^st Sitting, 27/11-12.

42. ILO, Provisional Record of the 21^st Sitting, 27/12.

43. The motion was rejected with 91 in favor, 290 against, and 28 abstentions. ILO, Provisional Record of the 21^st Sitting, 27/13.

44. The emergency Resolution was adopted by the International Labour Conference with 333 votes in favor, 27 against, and 47 abstentions. ILO, Provisional Record of the 21^st Sitting, 27/13.

45. Amnesty International, Myanmar. Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, Amnesty International Report ASA 16/14/99 (N.p.: Amnesty International, June 1999) N. pag.

46. Amnesty International, Myanmar: Update on the Shan State, Amnesty International Report ASA 16/13/99 (N.p.: Amnesty International, June 1999) N. pag. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

47. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

48. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 36.

49. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 36.

50. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 36.

51. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 36.

52. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

53. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

54. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

55. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

56. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

57. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

58. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraphs 39 and 44.

59. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

60. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

61. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 15.

62. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 10.

63. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 18.

64. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 13.

65. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 19.

66. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), Rhododendron New Bulletin Vol. II No. 5 (July 1999): N. pag.

67. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), "Slave labour in Thantlang, Chin State," (31 May 1999). CHRO, Rhododendron New Bulletin Vol. II No. 5: N. pag.

68. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

69. All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), "Rangoon forces 'hundreds' to work on Burma-Thai highway," (19 October 1998).

70. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 35.

71. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 4.

72. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 5.

73. ⁽⁷⁴⁾

74. U.S. Department of State Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, July 23, 1999, para. 5.

75. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 9.

76. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 7.

77. National League for Democracy (NLD), "NLD: Statement 69 - Forced Labour in Pegu," (2 June 1999).

78. United States, Department of Labor, Report on Labor Practices in Burma, (Washington: Department of Labor, September 1998) page 35.

79. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), ICFTU-APRO Labour Flash No. 805 (9 July 1999).

80. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 8.

81. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 8.

82. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 39.

83. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 40.

84. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 40.

85. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 40.

86. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 34.

87. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 11.

88. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 14.

89. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 14.

90. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 17.

91. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 40.

92. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraphs 40 and 44.

93. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 44.

94. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 44.

95. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 44.

96. Union of Myanmar, "Memorandum of the Government of Myanmar," N. pag.

97. Union of Myanmar, "Memorandum of the Government of Myanmar," N. pag.

98. General Khin Nyunt, Address to the ASEAN Labor Ministers' Meeting (14 May 1999). Cited in Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

99. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 3.

100. ICFTU, "To Mr. Juan Somavia, Director-General." Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 19.

101. ICFTU, "To Mr. Juan Somavia, Director-General." Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 26.

102. ICFTU, "To Mr. Juan Somavia, Director-General." Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 26.

103. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 24.

104. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

105. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 27.

106. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

107. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

108. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

109. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

110. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

111. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

112. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

113. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

114. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag.

115. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

116. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

117. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

118. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

119. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

120. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

121. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag.

122. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

123. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag. Cited in ILO, Director-General's Report, paragraph 28.

124. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

125. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

126. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

127. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

128. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

129. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 30.

130. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/63 (Geneva: United Nations, 22 January 1999) paragraph 43.

131. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 31.

132. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 33.

133. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 33.

134. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 33.

135. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 33.

136. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 31.

137. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 33.

138. The combined forces of the army, border police, and immigration officials posted along the Bangladesh border.

139. Images Asia, Additional Submission from Images Asia, Thailand: Labor Practices in Arakan State, Burma (6 September 1999) Part I, Interview No. 2.

140. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 11.

141. ⁽¹⁴²⁾

142. U.S. Department of State Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, July 23, 1999, para. 5.

143. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), Rhododendron News Bulletin Vol. II No. 6 (August 1999).

144. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag.

145. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraphs 41and 42.

146. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 32.

147. ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 32.

148. See Appendix III for an exchange of correspondence between Unocal and Department of Labor officials regarding the 1998 Report and the preparation of the 1999 Report.

149. Unocal Corporation, Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper, Section titled "Human Rights and Economic Engagement," at http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/humanrights/hr4.htm.

150. Unocal Corporation, Human Rights and Unocal: A Discussion Paper, Section titled "Human Rights and Economic Engagement."

151. Unites States, Department of State, Unclassified Cable from Embassy Paris, No. 012719 (22 July 1999) paragraph 1.

152. Marie-Helene Aubert, interview, "Oil Companies Role in International Politics," Info Birmaine (19 May 1999).

153. Marie-Helene Aubert, interview.

154. Cited in ILO, Report of the Director-General, paragraph 38.

155. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Rangoon, No. 001936, paragraph 8.

156. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

157. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

158. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraphs 37 and 38.

159. Human Rights Watch, "Burma: Human Rights Developments," World Report 1999 (N.p.: Human Rights Watch, 1999) N. pag.

160. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraph 36.

161. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

162. Amnesty International, The Kayin (Karen) State, N. pag.

163. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

164. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraph 66.

165. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

166. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

167. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraph 65.

168. Amnesty International, Aftermath: Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

169. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag.

170. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraph 65.

171. Amnesty International, Three Years of Dislocation in the Kayah State, N. pag.

172. U.N., Report of the Special Rapporteur, paragraph 42.

173. Amnesty International, Update on the Shan State, N. pag.

174. Shan Human Rights Foundation, "7-8 year old children forced to work in Kun-Hing," (17 May 1999). Cited in Amnesty International, Myanmar: Update on the Shan State, N. pag.