FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This primer is a part of the Multihazard Risk Management Series of publications that 
addresses terrorism risk in buildings. The objective of this primer is to introduce the 
building insurance, finance, and regulatory communities to the issue of terrorism risk 
management in buildings and the tools currently available to manage that risk. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Principal Authors: 
Frederick Krimgold, Virginia Tech
David B. Hattis, Building Technology Inc.
William I. Whiddon, Building Technology Inc.


Contributors: 
Michael T. Chipley, UTD Incorporated
Wesley W. Lyon, UTD Incorporated
Michael J. W. Kaminskas, UTD Incorporated
Mark Hester, UTD Incorporated


Project Advisory Panel: 
Bernard M. Brown, Insurance Advisors, Inc. Mary Pat Denney, Freddie Mac Joseph 
Donovan, Carr America Dottie Harris, New York State Department of State 
Lawrence H. Mirel, DC Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation Matt S. 
Munter, EMG Corporation


Technical Review: 
Deborah McKinnon, Mortgage Bankers Association
Don Glitz, GMAC Commercial Mortgage


FEMA Advisory Panel: 
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development
Wade Belcher, General Services Administration
Curt Betts, Army Corps of Engineers
Jim Caulder, U.S. Air Force � Civil Engineer Support Agency
Joseph Coughlin, FEMA
Marcelle Habibion, Department of Veterans Affairs
Joseph Hartman, Army Corps of Engineers
Eve Hinman, Hinman Consulting Engineers
Rick Jones, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center
Kurt Knight, Department of Veterans Affairs
Howard Leikin, FEMA
Eric Letvin, URS Corporation
John Lynch, Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Criteria Office
Terry Pruitt, Department of Homeland Security

Christopher Rojhan, Applied Technology Council
Lloyd Siegel, Department of Veterans Affairs


 Project Officer: 
Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Building Sciences Technology Branch, Mitigation 
Division 
CONTENTS


CHAPTER 1


Introduction 
.................................................................................... 1-1


Intervening in the Building Investment Process  
...........................  1-2


 Primer Organization  
........................................................................  1-4


 Insurance  
...................................................................................  
1-4

 Finance  
...................................................................................
....  1-5

 Regulation  
..................................................................................  
1-5

 Due Diligence for Terrorism Vulnerability Assessment  
.........  1-6

 Guide to Expertise and Tools  
...................................................  1-7

CHAPTER 2


Insurance and Terrorism Risk 
........................................................... 2-1



Role of Insurance  
.............................................................................  2-1


 Terrorism Risk for Insurers  
......................................................  2-1

 Building Insurance Industry  
.....................................................  2-2

 Actuaries  
...................................................................................
..  2-4

 Insurance Industry Infrastructure  
............................................  2-4

 Insurance Product Lines  
...........................................................  2-6

 World Trade Center Insurance Experience  
............................  2-8

 Property and Liability  
...............................................................  2-8

 Business Interruption  
................................................................  2-9

 Workers' Compensation, Health, and Life  
............................  2-10

 Insurance Losses  
......................................................................  2-11


 Current Insurance Situation  
.........................................................  2-11


 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002  
...................................  2-12

 Participation and Reimbursements  
.......................................  2-13

 Limitations  
...............................................................................  2-
13

 Insurance Risk Management Models  
............................................  2-14

 Data Needs for Insurance  
..............................................................  2-15

 Lack of Actuarial Information  
................................................  2-16

 Future Developments  
.....................................................................  2-16

CHAPTER 3

Finance and Terrorism Risk 
.............................................................. 3-1

Terrorism Risk Threat to Lenders  
..................................................  3-1


 Building Finance Community  
..................................................  3-1


 Lenders Concerns  
.....................................................................  3-2

 Terrorism Impact  
.......................................................................  3-2


 Current Finance Situation  
...............................................................  3-4

 Lender Risk Management Models  
..................................................  3-6

 Future Developments  
.......................................................................  3-7

CHAPTER 4


Building Regulation and Terrorism Risk 
........................................... 4-1



Terrorism Risk for Regulators  
.........................................................  4-1


 Regulation of Terrorism Risk  
...................................................  4-1

 Balancing Stakeholder Interests  
..............................................  4-1

 Implications for Building Regulation Enforcement  
..............  4-1


 Current Building Regulation Situation  
..........................................  4-3


 Code Relation to Terrorist Threats  
..........................................  4-3

 Regulatory Activities Related to Terrorism Risk  
.....................  4-4

 Building Regulation Management Models  
....................................  4-5

 Future Developments  
.......................................................................  4-6

CHAPTER 5


Due Diligence: Estimating Vulnerability 
............................................ 5-1


Fundamental Changes  
.....................................................................  5-1

 Due Diligence Assessment of Vulnerability to Terrorist 
Attack  ....  5-1

 Mitigation of Vulnerability  
..............................................................  5-2

 Process Model for Terrorism Risk Reduction Used in
Federal Facilities  
...............................................................................  5-2

 Protection Priority  
............................................................................  5-3


 Threat Assessment  
............................................................................  5-4


 Defining Threats  .......................................................................  
5-5

 Identifying Likely Threat Event Profiles and Tactics  
..............  5-6

 Assigning a Threat Rating 
.................................................... 5-10

 Alternative: Assigning a Level of Protection Against Threat 
...... 5-11

 Vulnerability Assessment  
...............................................................  5-12


 Initial Vulnerability Estimate  
.........................................................  5-13


 Visual Inspection  .....................................................................  
5-13

 Design Documents Review  .....................................................  
5-14

 Organization and Management Procedures Review  
............  5-14

 Assessment of Vulnerability to Expected Methods
and Means of Attack  ................................................................  
5-14

 Vulnerability Estimate Screening  
..................................................  5-15


 �Site� Questions  ........................................................................  
5-16

 �Architectural� Questions  
........................................................  5-17

 �Structural and Building Envelope Systems� Questions  
.......  5-18

 �Utility Systems� Questions  .....................................................  
5-19

 �Mechanical Systems� Questions  
............................................  5-20

 �Plumbing and Gas Systems� Questions  
.................................  5-21

 �Electrical Systems� Questions  
................................................  5-22

 �Fire Alarm Systems� Questions  
..............................................  5-23

 �Communications and Information Technology Systems�
Questions  .................................................................................  
5-24


 Additional Sources of Detailed Facility Information  
..................  5-25

 Vulnerability Reduction Cost Information and Estimates  
..........  5-25

CHAPTER 6


Guide to Expertise and Tools 
............................................................ 6-1


Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002  
.....................................  6-1

 Building Vulnerability Assessment Screening  
.........................  6-1

 General Glossary  
.......................................................................  6-2

 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Glossary  
...................  6-2

 Acronyms  
...................................................................................  6-2

 Associations and Organizations  
...............................................  6-2

 Bibliography  
..............................................................................  6-3

APPENDIX A 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
............................................... A-1

APPENDIX B 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Screening 
.................................... B-1

APPENDIX C 
General Glossary 
.............................................................................. C-1

APPENDIX D 
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Glossary 
.............................. D-1

APPENDIX E 
Acronyms 
........................................................................................... 
E-1

APPENDIX F 
Associations and Organizations 
......................................................... F-1

APPENDIX G 
Bibliography 
..................................................................................... G-1



INTRODUCTION

This primer, FEMA 429, Insurance, Finance, and Regulation Primer for Terrorism Risk 
Management in Buildings, is a part of the Multihazard Risk Management Series of 
publications that addresses terrorism risk in buildings. The objective of this primer is 
to introduce the building insurance, finance, and regulatory communities to the issue 
of terrorism risk management in buildings and the tools currently available to manage 
that risk. Insurance, finance and regulation are considered the 'change levers' of the 
built environment. They are the principal mechanisms for the evaluation and 
management of risk exposure in buildings. These change levers play a critical role in 
introducing and maintaining standards for risk management and public safety. 
CHANGE LEVERS FOR TERRORISM RISK REDUCTION 
Risk management in the built environment is a complex issue that involves a range of 
decision-makers in all phases and at all levels in the building development, design, 
construction, and management process. The traditional market mechanisms for 
estimating, pricing, and distributing risk are the insurance and finance industries. The 
established mechanism for defining society's acceptable risk levels in the physical 
environment is the public 
regulation of development, including zoning and building regulation. 
Risks related to hazards such as fire, earthquake, flood, asbestos, and lead paint have 
been dealt with through these mechanisms. These risks have been identified and 
assessed, and applicable actuarial data has been collected. Physical measures for risk 
reduction have been developed and defined. Residual risks have been quantified and 
mechanisms for risk transfer are in place. 
The process of understanding and managing of terrorism risk is at its very beginning. 
All of the mechanisms of the traditional building risk management process must be 
engaged to address the issue of terrorism risk. They must understand the threat, 
develop the measures for risk reduction, and motivate the implementation of 
appropriate risk reduction measures. The building design and management 
communities must develop the physical and operational solutions. But it is the change 
levers of finance, insurance, and regulation that can motivate and reward the 
implementation of those solutions.


INTERVENING IN THE BUILDING INVESTMENT PROCESS 
It is necessary that guidance on the design, construction, and 
rehabilitation of buildings to reduce terrorism risk be made available to 
architects, engineers, and constructors. The other publications of the 
FEMA Multihazard Risk Management Series provide this guidance. 
However, architects, engineers, and constructors implement the 
programs and directives of their clients� building developers and 
owners�who must be aware of the opportunity and the benefits of in-
vesting in terrorism risk reduction measures before they decide to make 
such investments. 
What motivates building owners to make invest
ment decisions about their buildings? Most 
owners view their buildings as revenue generators, 
not as instruments of social policy. Owners invest 
in buildings in order to realize an economic return. How can owners 
be persuaded that investments to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack will 
make business sense? 
Figure 1-1 is a schematic representation of the building process as it addresses the 
issue of terrorism risk reduction. Buildings are the final product of this process. 
Designers and builders are key actors in the implementation of physical mitigation of 
risk, but 
Figure 1-1: Terrorism Risk Reduction Decision-Making

building owners and change levers are the key decision-makers regarding 
management of risk in buildings. In order to introduce physical or operational 
change in buildings (to reduce terrorism risk), it is necessary to intervene at several 
points. 
Builders who actually construct the buildings must be guided by the plans and 
specifications developed by the design professionals (architects and engineers). The 
design professionals are, in turn, guided by the programs and demands of their 
clients, the owners. Building owners have functional, financial, and esthetic objectives 
that may or may not specifically include risk management. It is the change levers that 
are most sensitive to risk management needs and are in a position to effectively 
leverage owner interests that are communicated to designers and builders. 
It is of key importance that owners demand appropriate mitigation measures in 
design, that designers have the specific technical guidance to provide required 
mitigation measures, and that builders have the technical capability to implement 
appropriate designs. However, highest in this causative chain of decision-making are 
the change levers that influence the entire process that ultimately determines the end 
product. 
If investments cannot result directly in added profit in the form of increased rents or 
reduced operating costs, they will not be made, unless owners are induced or forced 
to make them by the change levers. The change levers must create an environment 
that demands and rewards investment in safety. 
Regulators force such changes through laws that mandate terrorist resistant building 
design and construction. Lenders induce such changes by requiring them as 
conditions of the loan to acquire or construct the building, or by adjusting interest 
rates or other terms of the loan. Insurers can motivate such changes by relating 
premiums to risk and rewarding effective mitigation 
In order to introduce these changes, it is necessary for the change levers to 
understand the character of terrorism risk, understand available risk reduction 
measures, and be able to evaluate related costs and benefits. This primer provides 
this information.


PRIMER ORGANIZATION 
Insurance 
Chapter 2 of this primer provides information on terrorism risk management for the 
insurance industry. 
The insurance industry consists of three primary segments, each of which has a 
unique role in the assessment of terrorism risk, and therefore can benefit from 
familiarity with the information in this primer: 
. _ Direct insurers 
. _ Reinsurers 
. _ Agents/brokers 

The industry is supported by a complex infrastructure, each component of which will 
be able to use this information: 
. _ Overseers/regulators 
. _ Technical support 
. _ Think tanks (risk modelers) 

. _ Lobbying groups 
. _ Independent advisors and consultants 

The industry also segments itself by product lines. Some of these lines have a direct 
relationship to building safety features, and others may have an indirect relationship: 
. _ Property, liability, and business interruption 
. _ Workers' compensation 
. _ Health (and health maintenance organizations) 
. _ Life 

Buyers of insurance are represented by various associations such as the Risk and 
Insurance Management Society (RIMS), and the Apartment and Office Building 
Association (AOBA). 
Finance 
Chapter 3 of this primer provides information that will be of use to both commercial 
and multifamily lenders, including: 
. _ Loan originators 
. _ Loan servicers 
. _ Secondary markets 
. _ Bond markets 

Regulation 
Chapter 4 provides information on terrorism risk management for the building 
regulatory community. 
There are four categories of building regulation that have the potential to address 
terrorism risk reduction, and each has its own array of audiences: 
. _ Zoning and planning regulations 
. _ Property maintenance codes 
. _ Building rehabilitation codes 

_	Construction codes (building, mechanical,
plumbing, electrical)

All four categories of building regulation include extensive reference to voluntary 
standards that are developed by a wide array of organizations. 
These regulations are enforced by a variety of local and/or state agencies, each 
represented by trade associations, including: 
. _	Building officials and building departments 
. _	Fire marshals and fire prevention bureaus 
. _	Health departments 
. _	Planning and community development de-
partments and agencies


Due Diligence for Terrorism Vulnerability Assessment 
Chapter 5 provides information on due diligence for terrorism vulnerability 
assessment for individual buildings and facilities. 
Methods for threat assessment and vulnerability assessment are described and a 
framework for a qualitative terrorism risk 'vulnerability estimate' is presented. 
Guide to Expertise and Tools 
Chapter 6 provides reference to resources, including: 
. _	The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
. _	Building Vulnerability Assessment Screening 
. _	A general glossary 
. _	A chemical, biological, and radiological glossary 
. _	A list of acronyms 

. _	A list of associations and organizations related to terrorism risk 
management 
. _	A bibliography 



INSURANCE AND TERRORISM RISK

ROLE OF INSURANCE 
Insurance plays a critical role in society in the management of risk. Insurance provides 
a mechanism for spreading risk, which allows individuals to accept risks that would 
otherwise be unacceptable. Insurance also provides the service of pricing risk. On the 
basis of actuarial data and analysis insurers attempt to quantify risks and to set rates for 
the fi-
nancing of risks. 
Property insurance has worked very well for a range of familiar hazards such as fire 
and windstorm. Not only has insurance served to transfer risks, it has also provided the 
database for identifying and reducing risks. 
Loss data has contributed to general understanding of perils and has led to the 
development of effective mitigation measures. Recognition of the effectiveness of 
those mitigation or risk reduction measures has been reflected in differential 
premiums that provide a direct incentive for mitigation investment. Risk based access 
to insurance and risk based pricing of insurance make it a very effective change lever 
strongly influencing building design and management practices. 
Terrorism Risk for Insurers 
Terrorism risk is new to the United States. The threat is not well defined. There is 
very limited experience or actuarial data. There is even less experience of the 
effectiveness of protective measures in buildings. The insurance industry is now 
struggling to digest this new threat. Traditional means of analysis are so far ineffective 
in providing the basis for pricing the risk. 
Lacking greater experience it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of terrorism risk 
perception on the part of key participants in the real estate industry. Potential buyers 
of terrorism risk coverage must have a reasonable basis for estimating their insurance 
needs. At the same time, those selling insurance must have a defensible basis for 
pricing terrorism risk coverage. In the absence of data or other means of determining 
premiums, and in light of the catastrophic loss potential of the risk, insurers left the 
market. In response to this crisis in the insurance market the federal government has 
taken extraordinary measures to provide temporary support for the insurance market. 
These measures are discussed later in this chapter. 
Insurance pricing and availability are also driven by market capacity and competition. 
Even without actuarially based rates the pricing mechanism of the market will come 
into play. Demand for terrorism risk insurance is driven in part by building owners' 
perception of their risk and in part by the risk perception of their lenders. Both 
owners and lenders rely on the insurance industry to price such risks. 
Evaluation of terrorism vulnerability in planned and existing commercial buildings 
can provide valuable input to the rating of relative risk for specific buildings. Criteria 
for the evaluation of relative terrorism risk in buildings can eventually contribute an 
important component of the ratemaking equation. Recognition by the insurance 
industry of effective risk reduction measures should provide guidance and incentive 
for investment in terrorism risk reduction. 
Some aspects of terrorism risk may be approached through community rating systems, 
such as that used in the National Flood Insurance Program, which reflect the target 
priority and the state of security organization of a community. Because of the relation-
ship of terrorism risk to national security policy it may prove reasonable that the 
federal government role be extended. 
Building Insurance Industry 
The insurance industry consists of three primary segments, each of which has a 
unique role in the assessment of terrorism risk, and therefore can benefit from 
familiarity with the information in this primer: 
. _ Direct insurers 
. _ Reinsurers 
. _ Agents/brokers 

Direct insurers are the front line of the insurance industry. The direct insurer writes 
the policy, collects the premium and pays the claim to the insured. Direct insurers are 
now required by state insurance regulators to offer terrorism risk insurance. It is the 
responsibility of the direct insurer to set premium rates based on an analysis of 
exposure and risk. This rate structure must be reviewed and ultimately approved by 
the various state insurance commissioners in most state jurisdictions. 
Ideally, direct insurers need basic information on the frequency and severity of 
terrorist events and on the vulnerability of particular properties to terrorist attack in 
order to set specific premiums. They must also know the effectiveness of specific miti-
gation measures in order to modify premium rates appropriately. 
Reinsurers provide insurance for direct insurers. That is, direct insurers are able to 
purchase reinsurance to cover some part of their exposure. Reinsurers are not 
regulated by state insurance commissioners and are not required to provide 
reinsurance for terrorism risk. Following the World Trade Center (WTC) attack most 
major reinsurers excluded terrorism risk from new treaties with direct insurers. This 
created a temporary crisis in insurance markets in that direct insurers were required 
to provide terrorism risk insurance but they were no longer able to transfer part of 
that risk to reinsurers. 
Ideally, reinsurers need information on the frequency and severity of expected 
terrorist attacks on a global scale. They also need to be able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the property risk assessment methodologies of their clients, the direct 
insurers. 
Insurance agents and brokers are the key connection between insurance buyers and 
sellers. Agents typically represent the seller and brokers typically represent the buyers. 
Agents and brokers communicate directly with the policyholder or the building 
owner. It is necessary for agents and brokers to understand the specific exposure and 
insurance needs of the client as well and the policy conditions and exclusions of the 
insurer. In the case of terrorism risk this will require understanding of the physical 
and operational aspects of buildings that indicate vulnerability to terrorist attack. 
Actuaries 
Actuaries are the foundation of the insurance business, and they provide services for 
each of the primary segments of the industry. The actuary assesses the available loss 
data to quantify the risk as the basis for pricing risk and setting premiums. Actuarial 
data and analysis is the basis for the pricing of risk and evaluating the solvency of 
insurance companies. The key problem in the assessment of terrorism risk is the lack 
of actuarial data. There are very few examples of terrorist attack losses in the United 
States. It is very difficult to generalize or project expected losses on the basis of this 
documented experience. Terrorism is not a well-defined or stable phenomenon. 
Without actuarial data it is difficult to price the risk and it is difficult to defend 
proposed rates. 
Insurance Industry Infrastructure 
The industry is supported by a complex infrastructure, each component of which will 
be able to use this information: 
. _	Overseers/regulators (historically, insurance is regulated at
state level by insurance commissioners)

. _	Technical support: Insurance Services Office (ISO), National Workers 
Compensation Commission, Association for Cooperative Operations Research and 
Development (ACORD), and others 
. _	Think tanks (risk modelers) and risk control consultants: EQECAT, Risk 
Management Solutions (RMS), Applied Insurance Research (AIR), and others 
. _	Lobbying groups: American Insurance Association (AIA), National 
Association of Insurance Brokers (NAIB), Reinsurance Association of America (RAA), 
Risk and Insurance Management Society (RIMS), and others 

State insurance commissioners have a primary responsibility to ensure the solvency 
of insurance companies and their ability to pay claims when required. This means 
they have a strong interest in the quality of actuarial data and analysis used in rate 
setting and they review both the forms and the pricing. They are also concerned 
with ensuring access to insurance at reasonable rates. For this reason insurance 
regulators need to know how to evaluate rates proposed by insurers for terrorism risk 
cover. They also need to know the value of risk reduction measures (risk modifi-
cation factors) that might be considered to qualify for premium reductions. 
Insurance regulation is concerned with the viability of insurance companies as a 
consumer protection issue. Regulators want to ensure that premiums are sufficient to 
pay insurance losses and that insurers remain in business. Insurers are required to 
project future risk and to show a plausible investment strategy. 
For the most part, insurance regulators do not set rates-compa-nies propose and 
regulators evaluate justification of rates. Insurance rating agencies are exempt from 
anti-trust so that data can be shared. The rating agencies analyze all available data. 
They are mathematicians and statisticians, not modelers. 
Technical support organizations help to translate research into new tools for the 
insurance industry. This includes the development of standard procedures and forms 
and guidance on rate making. Technical support organizations have a very important 
role in providing analysis and technical support for many direct insurers. Such 
technical service organizations provide a valuable channel for the processing of 
information and the development of insurance services. They can provide a valuable 
link in the development of insurance products and practice to deal with terrorism 
risk. 
Worthy of particular note are the services provided by the Insurance Services Office 
(ISO). Every year, ISO gathers information from insurance companies on hundreds of 
millions of policies including the premiums the companies collect and the losses they 
pay. ISO submits summaries of that information to insurance regulators, as required 
by law, to help the regulators evaluate the price of insurance in each state. ISO also 
uses the information in its database to prepare products and services that help insurers 
compete in the marketplace. They provide a wealth of related products and services, 
including standardized policy language, rating and underwriting rules, and site surveys 
of individual properties. 
Think tanks are risk management organizations staffed by scientists and engineers as 
well as insurance specialists who carry out and apply research on perils and 
vulnerability of insured properties. Over the past twenty years much progress has been 
made in developing refined understanding of complex perils including natural and 
environmental hazards. Loss estimation models have been developed that help the 
insurance industry deal with low frequency, high consequence events, like 
earthquakes. These re-search-based think tanks are currently working on the 
modeling of terrorism risk to provide loss estimates for rate setting and mitigation 
actions. 
Lobbying organizations that represent the insurance industry in public policy circles, 
and are also acutely interested in understanding the character of terrorism risk. As a 
highly regulated industry, insurance is very much subject to legislative and regulatory 
decisions. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (discussed later in this chapter) 
is an example of a significant federal response to a crisis affecting the insurance 
industry. Future exposure to and management of terrorism risk is a major issue of 
public/private policy discussion. 
Insurance Product Lines 
The insurance industry segments itself by product lines, some of which have a direct 
relationship to building safety features, and others of which may have an indirect 
relationship: 
. _ Property, liability, and business interruption 
. _ Workers' compensation 
. _ Health (and health maintenance organizations) 
. _ Life 

Table 2-1: 
Relationship of 
Terrorist Threats 
to Particular 
Lines of 
Insurance

Property/ 
Business 
Workers' 


Threat/Hazard 
Liability 
Interruption 
Compensation 
Health 
Life 
Armed attack 
 
_ 
_ 
 

Arson/incendiary 
 
 
_ 
 

Biological agent 
_ 
 
 _ 
 

Chemical agent 
_ 
 
 _ 
 

Conventional 
bomb 
 
 
 _ 
 

Cyber-terrorism 

 



HAZMAT release 
_ 
 
 _ 
_ 

Nuclear device 
 
 
 _ 
 

Radiological 
agent 
_ 
 
  
 

Surveillance 





Unauthorized 
entry 

 




LEGEND:  = Probable relationship 
_ = Potential relationship 
Various terrorist threats may cause losses that are covered by different insurance 
product lines. Some terrorist threats may cause losses that are not covered by any 
insurance. Table 2-1 suggests the relevance of recognized terrorist threats to the 
various lines of insurance. It is important to note that aside from bomb blast and arson 
most of the threats do not necessarily imply physical damage to buildings. 
World Trade Center Insurance Experience 
The strongest image of terrorist attack is the collapsing towers of the World Trade 
Center. Clearly, terrorism risk is a major concern for property and liability insurers. 
However, significant claims have resulted for many other lines of insurance as a result 
of terrorist attacks. September 11, 2001 is the costliest day in insurance history. Total 
losses are estimated to be three times the largest previous insurance loss in Hurricane 
Andrew ($18 billion in 1992). 
Insurance losses resulting from the World Trade Center attack fall into various 
categories: 
. _	Property losses to the WTC and surrounding buildings, in-
curred by building owners.

. _	Business income and rent loss due to the inability to use the destroyed 
facilities, incurred by building owners and tenants. 
. _	Workers compensation, life and health insurance losses re-
sulting from the death and injury of victims, incurred by
tenants.

. _	Liability losses for claims due to inadequate fire prevention
and evacuation procedures, incurred by building owners.

. _	Financial losses associated with the mortgage notes of various lenders 
and investors in mortgage-backed securities. 

Terrorism risk insurance before the WTC attacks was included in "all-risk" policies at 
no added cost. Most policies include a standard "war exclusion" clause. Such exclusion 
clauses often refer to "declared" war by a "nation" or "sovereign state" but not to "ter-
rorist action" or "terrorism." Reference to the attacks as an "act of war" was 
inadvertently threatening to commercial property owners and lenders as it may have 
activated the war exclusion and released insurers from damage claims. 
Property and Liability 
In the case of property and liability insurance coverage for the buildings damaged 
in the attack, the principal claimant is the building owner. The extent of the claim 
is dependent on several factors including the future rebuilding plans and the 
characterization of the incident. First, if the buildings are not rebuilt or repaired 
the insurer applies actual cash value rather than replacement cost. Actual cash value 
is defined as replacement cost minus physical depreciation. For older buildings like 
the WTC towers the loss recovery would be considerably less if they were not 
rebuilt. 
Most property policies are written on an "occurrence" basis. That is, the full limit 
applies for each occurrence with no maximum aggregate. In the case of the WTC 
there were two airplanes that struck two buildings at different times, but they were all 
part of one terrorist attack. The difference between one event and two is about $3.5 
billion for the owner and the insurer. The specific definition of the terrorist event is of 
critical importance in terms of what is covered and what is excluded. Because 
terrorism risk is a new concern in the United States many of these definitions remain 
to be established and interpreted by the courts. 
Business Interruption 
Aside from physical damage or fire insurance there are other insurance questions that 
are closely associated with building performance and are of direct interest to building 
owners and tenants. Business interruption insurance, which covers lost business 
income and rental income, presents special problems for insurers, owners and lenders 
in the case of terrorist attack. Loss of income policies (generally included within a 
standard fire policy) are written by insurers either for a specified time period or on 
the basis of "actual loss sustained," which requires insurers and owners or tenants to 
agree on actual losses. The scale of destruction at the WTC was probably considerably 
greater than anything anticipated by insurers or insured. It is very unlikely that 
reconstruction will be completed within the coverage period of most business 
interruption policies. 
Problems also arise in the case of adjacent buildings. Usually, business loss is insurable 
if the building is first damaged by an in-surable peril. Without such damage there is no 
coverage. In the case of the WTC many adjacent, undamaged buildings were 
evacuated by order of civil authorities. Evacuation in response to civil authority can be 
an excluded peril or covered for a limited time period. Denial of access without 
physical building damage, as in the case of bio-terrorist attack or radiological attack, is 
currently excluded from insurance coverage. 
Workers' Compensation, Health, and Life 
Workers' compensation insurance as well as group and private life and health 
insurance cover injured and deceased workers. Building owners and tenants must 
provide statutorily required workers' compensation cover for employees. Lenders 
must, in accordance with standard loan documents, verify that building owners and 
management companies carry workers' compensation insurance. 
Most lenders and owners set up a single-purpose entity that holds the asset when a 
loan is made on a particular property. These entities typically do not have employees 
per se. Employees are usually legally employed in the owner's management company. 
Failure to carry sufficient workers' compensation coverage could affect all operations 
of the owner including the single purpose borrowing entity. Death and injury due to 
building failure resulting from terrorist attack can be a major financial concern for 
building owners, lenders and insurers, aside from the human cost. 
Life insurance claims have been a significant source of insurance loss due to terrorist 
attack. Group benefits are typically a multiple of salary and most people carry 
individual insurance as well. These losses are directly associated with building failure 
in either structural or mechanical systems. Large group insurers are now careful to 
avoid concentration of exposure by restricting coverage at any one site or building. 
Insurance Losses 
Liability Losses. Based on past litigation it is likely that building owners can be held 
liable for contributing to the loss of life by failure to provide appropriate protective 
measures or direction in the case of evacuation. Facilities management is on the front 
line in managing terrorism risk and response in commercial buildings. Standards of 
acceptable practice are not yet available. 
Financial Losses. Mortgage holders and investors are the subject of losses in the case of 
defaults caused by business failure resulting from terrorist attack. The WTC complex 
was controlled under a 99-year leasehold. A CMBS (commercial mortgage backed 
security) securitization was completed for part of the leasehold consideration paid to 
the owners of the WTC. Default insurance was not in place for the securitization. This 
means that investors in those securities could only indirectly depend on the 
traditional property and liability insurance to be collected by the leaseholder. 
Mortgage holders and investors in mortgage backed securities must be concerned 
with the vulnerability of the underlying asset. This vulnerability now includes terrorism 
risk. Terrorism risk evaluation and management is of particular importance for so-
called �trophy buildings� or buildings in close proximity to likely terrorist targets.


CURRENT INSURANCE SITUATION 
Following the WTC attack the major burden of the property and liability loss was 
passed on to the major international reinsurers. In response to this unprecedented 
loss the major reinsurers excluded terrorism risk from their renewal treaties. This 
action in turn led direct insurers to file for exclusions for terrorism risk. The 
unavailability of terrorism risk insurance at feasible prices led to an insurance �crisis� 
that particularly affected large-scale real estate and lending investment in what were 
perceived to be target cities. 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
On November 26, 2002 the president signed into law a federal program that requires 
property and liability insurers in the United States to offer coverage for incidents of 
international terrorism, and reinsures a large percentage of that insured risk. 
PUBLIC LAW 107-297, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), produced 
some immediate effects on commercial insurance coverage and will continue as a 
significant feature of the domestic insurance market through 2005. See Appendix A 
for the full text of TRIA. 
The Act addresses only a defined category of terrorism losses. An act of terrorism 
must be certified as such by the Secretary of the Treasury and must have the following 
characteristics: 
. _	It must be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to human life, 
property, or infrastructure. 
. _	It must have resulted in damage within the United States, or on the 
premises of any U.S. Mission abroad. 
. _	It must have been committed by someone acting on behalf of a "foreign 
person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the 
United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the U.S. Government 
by coercion." 
. _	It must produce property and casualty insurance losses in excess of $5 
million. 

It is also important to note that chemical, biological, and radiological perils are 
excluded from terrorism risk cover. 
Acts that might otherwise meet these criteria but that occur in the course of a 
declared war cannot be certified as acts of terrorism under the Act, except with 
respect to workers' compensation claims. 
Participation and Reimbursements 
Participation in the program is mandatory for all insurers covering commercial lines 
property and casualty insurance, including excess insurance, workers' compensation 
and surety. 
Under TRIA, the federal government reimburses insurers for losses caused by 
terrorism, paying 90% of covered terrorism losses exceeding a deductible paid by the 
insurance companies. The deductible is prescribed by statute and phases in over 
several years based on an insurance company's earned premiums in the prior calendar 
year. The Act establishes a cap on annual liability of $100 billion for both the 
government and insurance industry. 
Coverage of claims is triggered when the Secretary of the Treasury, in concurrence 
with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, certifies an event to be an "act of 
terrorism." A key element of terrorism is the involvement of a foreign interest, thus 
excluding acts of domestic terrorism, such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Also 
excluded from the definition of terrorism are acts committed in the course of war and 
losses under $5 million. 
Under TRIA, insurers are required to provide "clear and conspicuous" disclosure to 
policyholders of the premium charged for terrorism insurance. Existing terrorism 
exclusions are voided to the extent they would deny coverage for acts of terrorism as 
defined by the Act, unless the policyholder affirmatively declines terrorism coverage 
within 30 days of receiving the insurer's notice, or the policyholder fails to pay any 
additional premium required by the insurer. 
Limitations 
TRIA is an interim solution to the management of terrorism risk. 
The act establishes a temporary federal program that provides for a transparent 
system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from 
acts of terrorism in order to: 
1. 1. Protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the 
continued widespread availability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk; 
and 
2. 2. Allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume 
pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, while 
preserving state insurance regulation consumer protections. 

This law gives emphasis to the impact of terrorism risk on insurance and finance as 
well as on commercial building owners, and suggests the critical role that insurance, 
finance, and regulation will play in the adjustment to terrorism risk in the U.S. 
The law assumes that the private insurance market for terrorism risk coverage will 
stabilize over the next three years and that property and casualty insurers will develop 
reliable models for pricing such insurance. While there have been signs of market 
pricing mechanisms developing, it is not clear that a period of three years will provide 
adequate time to resolve the issues associated with such a complex phenomenon. So 
far, the anecdotal evidence is that many property owners are not buying terrorism 
insurance post-TRIA.


INSURANCE RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS 
The major loss modeling organizations have been quick to develop probabilistic 
terrorism insurance models. These models have typically begun with the general 
format of the loss estimation models developed for natural hazards such as 
earthquakes and hurricanes. The most significant challenge in terrorism modeling is 
the characterization of the hazard. Unlike the case of earthquakes or hurricanes, we 
do not have clear definitions of the phenomenon and we do not have hundreds of 
years of fre-quency/severity data. 
Currently available terrorism insurance models cover the major recognized risk 
sources, including bomb blast, aircraft impact, and chemical, biological, nuclear, and 
radiological threats. Most models set priorities for targets in all major cities and states 
and then simulate attacks with various types of weapons. The models include 
modeling of impact on adjacent buildings based on comprehensive national building 
inventories. 
These models are intended to enable insurers and reinsurers to price and manage 
accumulated exposures to terrorism losses from multiple perils. The models claim to 
provide industry or portfolio-specific loss probability distributions, expected annual 
loss and scenario losses for workers' compensation and property exposures. 
The models are very good at estimating loss from defined scenario events such as a 
given size blast at a given location. The critical weakness of all models to date has been 
the credibility of the hazard characterization. Typically the modelers have assembled 
teams of experts with backgrounds in national defense and domestic security. The 
ability to properly portray all of the potential terrorist events and their impact is 
central to the efficacy of a terrorism model. So far, this ability has not been convincing 
for the insurance industry or the real estate industry.


DATA NEEDS FOR INSURANCE 
TRIA requires insurers to include terrorism risk cover, and then disclose the cost of 
the added coverage as a percentage of the total premium. So far the reported costs for 
terrorism risk as a percentage of the total premium range from 0% to 80% with many 
averaging 9% to 11%. 
Most insurers charge 0% to 10% in order to avoid returning premiums to insureds at a 
later date when better information is available (and terrorism risk may be 
discounted). Some insurers are reportedly setting the level high, 20% to 50%, 
depending on how much terrorism risk coverage they want to write and the 
characteristics of the property (e.g., location, prominence, significance). 
Lack of Actuarial Information 
Actuaries are the key for insurance rate setting. Actuarial prediction of future losses is 
highly specialized and very influential. In the absence of data temporary solutions 
like TRIA will be necessary. 
Without actuarial data it is not possible to set actuarially sound rates for insurance 
cover. It is equally not possible for insurance regulators to evaluate rates proposed by 
insurers. However, for terrorism risk to be an insurable risk there must be data. 
Models may be helpful in the interim but real data will take time to collect and will 
unfortunately result from more terrorist attacks.


FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Actions such as improved building standards and operational mitigation could result 
in reduced terrorism risk exposure for the public, building owners, and the insurance 
industry. Tools for the evaluation of building vulnerability to known terrorist threats, 
such as those discussed in Chapter 5, will allow for the determination of relative risk 
between buildings and for development of a risk hierarchy based on the physical and 
operational characteristics of individual properties. Development of standards of 
practice will also provide a useful baseline for determination of liability related to 
terrorist attack.



FINANCE AND TERRORISM RISK

TERRORISM RISK THREAT TO LENDERS 
The building finance community 
distinguishes between two major areas of 
lending activity: single-family residential and 
commercial/multifam-ily. The residential 
sector is less affected by terrorism risk 
considerations. However, since the WTC 
attack federal officials have issued specific 
warnings for elevated terrorism risk in 
shopping malls, banks, and multifamily 
housing. 
Building Finance Community 
While many owners are unwilling to make the extra 
expenditure now required for terrorism risk insurance, 
lenders prefer to require adequate cover for all relevant 
perils. To date, apartment lenders have taken the most 
relaxed view because it is most difficult for apartment 
owners to pass through the added insurance costs to 
tenants. Exposed owners might perceive risk, but most 
owners do not voluntarily want to pay for the insurance. 
Commercial building owners and lenders take a stricter 
view. They issue temporary waivers, but require insurance 
when loan balances are over a certain threshold (e.g., $10 
million) and for trophy properties or properties that are 
identified as having higher risk due to location, building 
tenant, or historic/national recognition. 
Each sector consists of its own array of financial interests: 
. _ Loan originators 
. _ Loan servicers 
. _ Secondary markets 
. _ Bond markets 

The commercial/multifamily sector includes: loan 
originators, loan servicers, life insurance companies, 
pension funds, the multifamily secondary market (Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac), Wall Street, and financial 
institutions as direct lenders. 
Lenders Concerns 
Building lenders and loan servicers are concerned about the adequacy of property 
insurance to cover potential loss of the asset and the potential default of the borrower. 
Lenders are also concerned with other types of insurance�workers� compensation, 
liability, and business interruption�as they relate to the solvency of the borrower. 
Both assets and borrower solvency are threatened by terrorism risk. The terrorist acts 
of September 11, 2001 resulted in pervasive uncertainty in the insurance markets 
regarding insurance associated with future terrorist attacks. The commercial/multi-
family real estate industry is very concerned about the availability of terrorism risk 
coverage as it relates to the asset value and financial health of borrowers. The 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ensures the current availability of basic 
terrorism insurance, but significant questions remain as to the comprehensiveness of 
the coverage and whether a viable terrorism insurance market will develop in the 
future. 
Terrorism Impact 
The potential impact of terrorism risk for the real estate finance industry lies in six 
key areas: 
Loss of asset (collateral). The traditional approach to asset risk on the part of lenders 
is to require the borrower to purchase adequate insurance cover for all relevant 
perils. The terrorism risk exclusions following the WTC attack presented a major 
problem for lenders. Their profit is based on extending more loans but without 
insurance cover new loans also expand their credit risk. 
Default of borrower. The primary concern of the lender is the ability of the borrower 
to meet the conditions of the loan. Protection of the underlying asset is of key 
importance to maintaining the business operation of the borrower in addition to 
providing collateral for the loan. Terrorism risk includes modes of attack that will 
directly damage the building such as bomb blast and arson as well as those that may 
not physically damage the building such as biological, chemical, or radiological attack. 
Such �non-building� threats can destroy the borrowers ability to pay and can deny 
access to the asset for extended periods of time. Even without physical damage, asset 
value can be destroyed. 
Rating of securities. In the case of mortgage backed securities for both residential and 
commercial real estate the value of the security is influenced by the evaluation of 
rating agencies. These ratings take into account a range of risks, which will necessarily 
include terrorism risk. The exposure of the underlying assets to terrorist attack and 
the extent of related insurance coverage will influence securities ratings. Perception of 
portfolio risk affects rating of securities: securities based on a single asset in a "high 
risk" location will receive a lower rating. Securities based on multiple or dispersed 
assets are generally less negatively affected by terrorism risk. Aside from New York City 
and Washington DC, the cities of greatest concern for terrorism are Los Angeles, Se-
attle, Chicago, Houston, and Atlanta. 
Retained risk. In the aftermath of the WTC attack and the terrorism risk exclusions, 
many lenders chose to temporarily waive insurance requirements. This action was 
deemed necessary to continue real estate financing and to foster new construction in 
the economy. However, waiving the terrorism insurance requirement left the lenders 
exposed to an as yet undefined risk. Lenders have traditionally relied on the insurance 
industry to price and provide coverage for such risks. In this case the lack of consensus 
on terrorism risk pricing and the withdrawal of the reinsurance industry have left 
lenders in an awkward position. Even with TRIA, lenders remain concerned with risks 
related to domestic terrorism, attacks involving chemical, biological, or radiological 
materials and the designation of terrorism events by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Cost of capital. One approach to dealing with increased risk has been to "cover" the 
risk with increased interest rates. This increase in the cost of capital is not desirable 
because it impacts the volume of lending and who receives a loan if terrorism is not 
covered or the cost is prohibitive. 
Regulation. Financial institutions and lending institutions are subject to regulation 
regarding standards for lending and management of risk, including terrorism risk. 
Banks and financial institutions must meet the regulatory standards of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency and the Securities and Exchange Commission.


CURRENT FINANCE SITUATION 
Following the WTC attack and the withdrawal of the insurance industry from provision 
of terrorism risk cover, real estate finance institutions faced a serious dilemma. In the 
absence of available or reasonably priced reinsurance, investments and lending in 
major projects (those over $30 � $50 million) were delayed in what were believed to be 
the primary target cities of New York and Washington. Difficulty in acquiring 
insurance for recognized trophy buildings also impacted refinancing in some cases. 
The key concern for lenders is borrower insurance coverage, so they also have a keen 
interest in the TRIA. The continued health of the real estate sector of the economy 
requires adequate and affordable property and liability insurance coverage against ter-
rorism risk. The enactment of TRIA is an important milestone for the real estate 
finance industry because it ensures the availability of basic insurance coverage. 
However, the real estate finance industry has several serious concerns with the federal 
program created under the statute: 
. _	Acts of domestic terrorism are not covered. 
. _	It is not clear whether or how carriers will cover terrorist acts with 
aggregate losses below $5 million that are not reinsured under TRIA. 
. _	Carriers are not required to notify lenders if a borrower rejects coverage 
under TRIA, either by affirmative statement or by failing to pay any premium for such 
coverage imposed by the carrier. 

_	Carriers are not required to offer terrorism coverage for nuclear, chemical or 
biological attacks if they do not typically offer property and liability insurance for 
nuclear, chemical and biological perils. 
Following TRIA, lenders have many borrowers out of compliance with loan insurance 
requirements. Lender and servicer procedures vary. Some large servicers have 
instituted a requirement for mandatory terrorism risk coverage. 
Following TRIA there have been limited reports of substantial premium increases, 
particularly in Manhattan and Washington DC. For the most part post-TRIA rate 
increases for required terrorism risk coverage have been in the 0% � 10% range, but 
some have been much higher. 
The terrorist threat is a dynamic phenomenon. Government and commercial 
response to the threat is also dynamic in ways independent of the underlying 
phenomenon. For these reasons change is inevitable. More experience is needed to 
understand the nature of the threat and more time is needed to understand the 
implications of market and policy responses to the threat. 
Key real estate finance industry associations suggest that several factors must be 
monitored over time: 
. _	The Department of the Treasury rule-making process for TRIA relating 
to the acceptance and rejection of terrorism risk insurance by owners, and the 
availability of insurance for acts of terrorism not covered by TRIA. 
. _	The declining financial strength ratings for some insurers
that have produced difficulties for borrowers in obtaining
coverage that complies with underlying loan documents.

. _	The development of a useable insurance certificate that provides an 
accurate and comprehensive summary for lenders and servicers of the coverage 
afforded by the underlying insurance policy. 

What happens after TRIA? It is important to see if the insurance market for terrorism 
risk cover does in fact stabilize over the three year period stipulated in the Act. If the 
market does not find an acceptable means to price terrorism risk there may need to 
be a longer term federal role in this area.


LENDER RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS 
As mentioned above the traditional practice of lenders has been to rely on required 
insurance purchase by borrowers of adequate cover for relevant perils. The 
breakdowns in terrorism insurance availability and risk pricing by insurers have 
necessitated the temporary intervention of the federal government pending the 
stabilization of the insurance market. Lenders are dependent on the insurance 
industry to transfer terrorism risk. In lieu of an insurance solution the real estate 
finance industry will have to consider alternative approaches to terrorism risk 
management. These may include addressing questions of risk identification and risk 
reduction directly. Tools for the assessment of terrorism vulnerability of specific 
buildings may be developed and introduced into the standard process of due 
diligence and property condition assessment, as discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Each sector of the real estate finance industry (originators, servicers, secondary 
markets, and bond markets) may assess its exposure to terrorism risk in a particular 
way. Useful analogies may be found in considering how these sectors address other 
building risks, such as natural disasters and environmental hazards. 
Each sector of the real estate finance industry should also consider terrorism risk in 
relation to the risks traditionally covered by the various lines of insurance. 
As standards for building siting, construction, and property management are 
developed to address terrorism risk reduction, it will become possible for both 
insurers and lenders to rate buildings in terms or their exposure to terrorism.


FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The real estate finance industry needs tools for the evaluation of building vulnerability 
and for the evaluation of physical and operational measures for risk reduction. These 
include: 
. _	Rapid screening methods for the evaluation of portfolios of properties 
. _	Detailed guidelines for due diligence on individual buildings 
. _	Legally accepted standards for risk reduction measures and 
management practices related to terrorism risk 



BUILDING REGULATION AND TERRORISM RISK

TERRORISM RISK FOR REGULATORS 
Following the attack of September 11, 2001 
the definition of building hazards in the 
United States has changed to include 
intentional attack. Protection of civilian 
population from acts of terrorism has 
become a major national priority. 
Though historically focused on fire safety, the building regulatory system does address 
natural disaster mitigation (floods, earthquakes, windstorms, snow storms), some man-
made risks (e.g., HAZMAT storage), and specific societal goals (energy conservation, 
accessibility). The regulation of all these areas is supported by well-established and 
accepted reference standards, regulations, inspection and assessment techniques, plan 
review methods, and quality control. 
Regulation of Terrorism Risk 
For a similar regulation of building-related terrorism 
risks, it will have to be shown that the development and 
implementation of such tools will be cost-effective. Some 
jurisdictions require rigorous cost/benefit analyses to 
support regulatory change. These determinations will 
require an understanding by the regulatory authorities of 
the potential occurrences and damages related to 
terrorism risk. 
Balancing Stakeholder Interests 
The codes and standards development process, involves 
thorough review and balloting by all interested 
stakeholder groups. This consensus process provides for 
the balance of diverse commercial and social priorities. It 
has the advantage that once a regulation or standard is 
promulgated it is likely to be widely accepted and used. It 
is thus an effective change lever. However, the consensus 
process is time consuming. 
Implications for Building Regulation Enforcement 
Zoning and planning regulation define land use, building 
density, transportation systems, and utility systems. They 
are usually adopted by local governments, but state 
planners may provide guidance. For existing vulnerable 
properties, these regulations can address specific access-
control measures. This will require a prioritization of 
hazards and buildings. For future developments, these 
regulations can, at the extreme, result in commercial 
development resembling military installations. How 
should such a decision be made when zoning and 
planning at the local level is the most political of the 
building regulatory processes? 
Property maintenance codes govern the use and maintenance of existing buildings. 
Housing codes and fire codes are two examples. They are developed by model code 
and consensus standards organizations and adopted as regulations by local gov-
ernment agencies. These can be effective at addressing all building vulnerabilities. 
They will require extensive inspections, and enforcement will be burdensome unless 
targeted to highly prioritized vulnerabilities, and accompanied by financial incen-
tives. 
Building rehabilitation codes address health, safety, and welfare in existing buildings 
that are undergoing voluntary improvements. These are a relatively new development. 
They have been enacted by some state or local government agencies. These can be 
effective at addressing vulnerabilities in existing buildings in which rehabilitation 
investments are otherwise being made. They should be carefully calibrated, since 
these codes all have the objective of "encouraging the reuse of existing buildings" 
rather than risk reduction. 
Construction codes (building, mechanical, plumbing, electrical) address health, 
safety, and welfare in new buildings. They are developed by model code organizations 
(ICC, NFPA) and adopted as regulations by state or local government agencies. Rarely 
does the federal government regulate construction requirements. Two recent 
examples of federal regulation are the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
enforced by the Dept. of Justice and the Fair Housing Act enforced by the Dept. of 
Housing and Urban Development. Construction codes can be effective at addressing 
the problem of vulnerability at its margin, that is, new buildings to be built. Unlike the 
preceding three categories of regulation, these may be the easiest to accomplish 
("words on paper are cheap compared to bricks and mortar in place"). However, many 
jurisdictions may require cost/benefit analysis to justify even these regulations.


CURRENT BUILDING REGULATION SITUATION 
Current codes are effective at mitigating the effects of fire and, as discussed above, 
natural disasters. They also regulate aspects of indoor air quality and the installation of 
mechanical, plumbing, electrical, and communication systems. 
Code Relation to Terrorist Threats 
Bomb blast is not addressed in the codes, but some of the earthquake and windstorm 
provisions in the building codes may have a beneficial effect on mitigation of this 
hazard. Code-regulated earthquake design requires the building's structural system to 
have toughness, ductility, and redundancy, all of which may also contribute to the 
mitigation of blast effects. Code-regulated hurricane design requires the fenestration 
to resist the effects of impact of windborne debris, which may also mitigate the 
hazards of glass in explosions. 
Progressive collapse, which is one of the effects of blast (but not the only one), is 
discussed in The American Society of Civil Engineers standard, ASCE 7 (the structural 
loads standard referenced in building codes). Some qualitative guidance is provided, 
but no design criteria are specified. ASCE 7 and the American Concrete Institute 
standard, ACI 318 (the reinforced concrete design standard reference in building 
codes) have references to structural integrity but not as a set of criteria for resisting 
progressive collapse. 
Chemical, biological, and radiological agents are not addressed in the codes, but 
certain details of the design of building heating, ventillating, and air conditioning 
(HVAC) systems, as regulated by mechanical codes, may mitigate the effects of these 
agents. 
Armed attack may be addressed to a limited extent insofar as the codes regulate the 
design and construction of correctional facilities, but the phenomena of incarceration 
and of terrorist attack are quite different in many respects. 
Regulatory Activities Related to Terrorism Risk 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has published The World Trade 
Center Building Performance Study "to examine the damage caused by these events, 
collect data� and identify studies that should be performed." 
The New York City Department of Buildings, soon after the WTC attack, initiated an 
effort to analyze the code as it relates to terrorist threat. In February 2003, the task 
force issued a report of findings and 21 specific recommendations for code, code 
administration, and code enforcement changes. 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) established a Homeland Security 
Standards Panel (HSSP) in February 2003, in response to The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. The proposed mission of the HSSP is to catalog, promote, 
accelerate and coordinate the timely development of consensus standards within the 
national and international voluntary standards system intended to meet identified 
Homeland Security needs, and communicate the existence of such standards 
appropriately to governmental units and the private sector. 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a standards organization active in 
the field of fire safety, established a committee on Premises Security before 9/11. It 
plans to produce two standards by 2005: NFPA 730, Guide to Premises Security; and NFPA 
731, Security System Installation Standard. 
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), a standards organization 
active in the field of materials, specifications, and test methods, many of which are 
referenced in building codes, is considering the creation of a Homeland Security 
Committee, or Subcommittee. 
The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-condi-tioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE), a standards organization active in the field of mechanical systems and 
indoor air quality in buildings, may initiate activities addressing chemical and 
biological agents in buildings. 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a standards organization 
active in the field of boilers & pressure vessels, elevators, and other building 
equipment, has developed a program of seminars for engineers entitled "Strategic 
Responses to Terrorism," which cover a range of topics including biological and 
chemical terrorist attacks. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is conducting an extensive 
review and analysis of the WTC collapse. It is anticipated that it will lead to code 
changes related to structural safety and fire safety in high-rise buildings. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) published PBS-PQ100.1, Facilities Standards 
for the Public Buildings Service, June 14,1996. Chapter 8, Security Design, contains 
building design criteria for blast resistance, progressive collapse, and chemical, 
biological and radiological attack. These criteria cover the design and construction of 
all GSA buildings, and will be applied to all government-leased buildings as well. 
The Department of Defense (DoD), has a similar standard to GSA's entitled Unified 
Facilities Criteria, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, UFC 4-010-01, 31 
July, 2002.


BUILDING REGULATION MANAGEMENT MODELS 
The four categories of building regulations, zoning, property maintenance, building 
rehabilitation, and building construction, have the potential, between them, to 
address all the physical aspects of terrorism risk, including common terrorist tactics 
and delivery systems as well as terrorist attack devices. Development of a specific 
typology that allocates specific risks to the specific regulation requires additional 
analysis. Table 4-1 is a matrix that can be used to begin this analysis. 
In order to implement changes in the building regulatory system to address terrorism 
risk, it is important to recognize that there are four ways that regulatory change can 
take place: 
. _ Federal preemption 
. _ State mandate or preemption 
. _ Local prerogative 
. _ Model code and voluntary standards 

Initiation of changes in each of the four categories of building regulations must be 
carefully analyzed for political acceptability and the availability of resources.


FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
Development of codes and standards to deal with terrorism risk in both new and 
existing buildings will require broad acceptance of the character of the risk and the 
effectiveness of the mitigation measures as well as some form of societal cost/benefit 
assessment. 
Table 4-1: Building 
Regulation 
Applicability to 
Terrorist Tactics and 
Threats/Hazards
s c it caT nommoC 
gninoZ 
y t 
reporP 
ecnane 
tni aM 
baheR 
no it 
cur t 
snoC 
YREVILED KCATTA 




snopae w c it s i ll aB 




y r tne t rev oC 
 
 
 
 
l i aM 


 
 
e l c ihev gni voM 
 



snopaew f f o -dnatS 
 

 
 
e lc ihev yrano i tatS 
 
 
 
 
se il ppuS 

 
 
 
SCINAHCEM 
KCATTA 




enrobr iA 

 
 
 
s t ce f f e t salB 

 
 
 
enr obre taW 

 
 
 
SDRAZAH/STAERH
T 




kcat ta demrA 

_ 
 
 
yrai dnecni /no s rA 

 
 
 
tnega l ac i g o l o iB 

 
 
 
tnega l a c imehC 

 
 
 
bmob l ano i tnevn oC 
 
 
 
 
ms iror re t -rebyC 


_ 
_ 
esae l er TAMZ AH 
_ 
 
 
 
ec i ved rae lcuN 



_ 
tnega l ac i g o l o 
idaR 

_ 
_ 
_ 
ecnal li evruS 




y r tne dez irohtuan U 





LEGEND:  = Applicability to designated type of regulation. _ = Possible applicability.



DUE DILIGENCE: ESTIMATING VULNERABILITY

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES 
Vulnerability assessment methodologies developed by DoD and other federal agencies 
are currently the best available resources for terrorism risk assessment. In order for 
these resources to be feasible and relevant in commercial buildings, they must be 
significantly simplified and civilianized. 
Bringing government experience and expertise regarding terrorism risk and 
building security to the commercial sector will involve two fundamental changes in 
the way buildings are designed, managed, and operated, and in the way that due 
diligence is used to evaluate existing buildings for acquisition or refinancing. 
First, businesses will need to carefully evaluate functional aspects of their operations 
in order to prioritize security requirements. Second, tradeoffs will be required in the 
level of security provided to ensure continued viability of business operations. 
Reducing vulnerability to terrorist threat will involve both physical measures to 
modify a facility and operational changes. Mitigation will consist mainly of measures 
to thwart tactics that terrorists might use in attacking organizations and facilities.


DUE DILIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY TO TERRORIST ATTACK 
Due diligence procedures are employed to assess valuations for property acquisition or 
financing and to identify risks related to the deal. Such procedures may also be used 
as part of insurance underwriting. Due diligence often includes both detailed property 
inspection and rigorous audits of available financial and construction documentation. 
At the same time, due diligence is a highly specialized field requiring both expertise 
and extensive prior experience to render sound judgments and recommendations to 
decision makers. 
A Property Condition Assessment (PCA) is used (at levels of detail and rigor 
appropriate to the investment being considered) as part of due diligence to help make 
prudent investment decisions. The assessment consists of analysis and assessment of 
physical conditions of a property by an on-site inspection and review of available 
construction and operations documentation. Investigators use professional judgment 
to identify items needing further expert investigation and those that can be readily 
evaluated by inspection. 
Vulnerability to terrorist attack should become a distinct element of due diligence 
condition assessments in the future. Professionals conducting property condition 
assessments of vulnerability to terrorist attack must have competency in building 
systems, operations, and security disciplines. 
For terrorism risk and security concerns, a due diligence assessment should also 
include a property condition assessment investigation of operational procedures and 
the vulnerability of those procedures to terrorist attack.


MITIGATION OF VULNERABILITY 
Strategies for reducing exposure to terrorism risk may be in the form of operational 
actions or construction projects (either new or existing building renovation). They 
could include reorganization of land uses, reorientation of roadways, security 
improvements to site entries, and improvements to the facility, including the existing 
structure and surrounding site area. For some strategies, the process may include the 
identification of multiple scenarios, or alternatives, for achieving the desired goal.


PROCESS MODEL FOR TERRORISM RISK REDUCTION USED IN 
FEDERAL FACILITIES 
United States military services and government agencies have long been involved in 
assessing vulnerabilities and protecting facilities, especially for off-shore installations. 
Terrorism and terrorist attack have been a part of the assessment of threat and 
vulnerability of government facilities for several decades. 
While each government agency has used its own procedures, the general approach has 
been elaborated and presented in FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. 
Figure 5-1: The Terrorism Risk Reduction Process Model 
The terrorism risk reduction process starts with establishment of protection priorities 
and proceeds to assessment of threats, both providing information to a vulnerability 
assessment. The vulnerability assessment in turn leads to identification of mitigation 
options and risk management decisions based on a comparative evaluation of risk, 
liabilities, and mitigation costs and benefits.


PROTECTION PRIORITY 
The first step of the process to assess risk to terrorist attack is to identify the relative 
importance of the people, business activities, goods, and facilities involved in order to 
prioritize security actions. This applies to both new and existing facilities. Three 
actions are recommended in accordance with FEMA 426: 
_	Define and understand the core functions and processes of
the business or institutional entity.

 ._	Identify critical business infrastructure: 
. _	Critical components (people, functions, and facilities) 
. _	Critical information systems and data 
. _	Life safety systems and safe haven areas 
. _	Security systems 
 ._	Assign a relative protection priority, as simple as high, medium, or low, to the 
occupants, business functions, or physical components of the facility (note that FEMA 
426 describes a 9-step scale of values for describing asset values; the 3-step variation 
presented here is a simplified process): 
. _	High Priority. Loss or damage of the facility would have grave 
consequences, such as loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, or major loss 
of core processes and functions for an extended period of time. 
. _	Medium Priority. Loss or damage of the facility would have moderate to 
serious consequences, such as injuries, or impairment of core functions and processes. 
. _	Low Priority. Loss or damage of the facility would have minor 
consequences or impact, such as a slight impact on core functions and processes for a 
short period of time. 


THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Military experience indicates that the terrorist threat is from people with the intent to do harm, who are known to exist, have the 
capability for hostile action, and have expressed the intent to take hostile action. 
Threat assessment is a continual process of compiling and examining information concerning potential threats. Information 
should be gathered from all reliable sources. The assessment process consists of: 
_	Defining threats 
_	Identifying likely threat event profiles and tactics 
Defining Threats 
Defining threats involves analysis of information regarding terrorist existence, capability, history, intention, and targeting: 
. _	Existence is the assessment of who is hostile to the organization, or community of concern. 
. _	Capability is the assessment of what weapons have been used in carrying out past attacks. 
. _	History is the assessment of what the potential terrorist has done in the past and how many times. 
. _	Intention is the assessment of what the potential terrorist
hopes to achieve.

. _	Targeting is the assessment of the likelihood a terrorist (the specific one may not be known) is performing 
surveillance on the particular facility, nearby facilities, or facilities that have much in common with the particular organization. 

The Homeland Security Advisory System is a color-coded hierarchy of threat conditions. The threat level for a specific business 
facility could be similarly developed in coordination with local law enforcement, intelligence, and civil authorities. 
Table 5-1: 
Homeland 
Security 
Advisory 
System 
Related to 
Threat 
Analysis 
Factors sn o i 
t i dn o C ta e 
rhT 

s rot caF s is y lanAta e rh T 


ecn e t s 
i x E 
y t i l 
ibapaC 
y r o t s 
iH 
no itn e 
tn I 
gni t 
egraT 
e r ev e S 
)deR( 
 
 
 
 
 
hgiH 
)egnarO( 
 
 
 
 
_ 
d e tave l E 
)wolleY( 
 
 
 
_ 

d ed rauG 
)eulB( 
 
 
_ 


wo L )neerG( 
 
_ 





LEGEND:  = Factor must be present.    
_
= Factor may or may not be present. 
Adapted from the Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of Homeland Security. 
Identifying Likely Threat Event Profiles and Tactics 
Identifying the likelihood of specific threats and tactics involves evaluation of attack intentions, hazard 
event profiles, and the expected effects of an attack on the facility and organization. Table 5-2, based 
on FEMA 426, presents general event profiles for a range of possible forms of terrorism attack. The 
profiles describe the mode, duration, and extent of the effects of an attack, as well as mitigating and 
exacerbating conditions that may exist. These and more specific descriptions can be used to identify 
threats of concern to individual organizations. (Potential threats are listed in alphabetical order in the 
table.) 
Table 5-2: Event 
Profiles For 
Terrorism and 
Technological 
Hazards ta erh T/d 
raza H 
edo M n oitacilppA 
n o itaru D d raza H 
;stceff E f o tnetx E 
cima ny D/citat S 
dna gnitag itiM s n 
oit idn oC gnitabr 
ecax E 
m sirorr et irgA 
tr ev oc ylla r eneg 
,tc eriD d o of f o n 
oita nimatnoc 
. s htn om ot sya D 
f o epyt yb s e iraV 
.tn edic nd o o F i 
nac ytiruc es etauq 
edan I f o noita r 
etluda etatilicaf 

n oitcudo rtniro 
seilppu s e sae s id 
r o/dna st sep f o d 
na sporc ot stn ega 
. kc ots evil 

stn ev e n oitan 
imat n oc ot 
detimileb ya m , 
setis noitubirt s id 
ete rc s id d na sts 
ep sa er e h w da e 
rp s yam s e sae s 
id on y ll.ya r en 
eG lediw tliub n o 
stceff e 
fo n oitcudo rtnid 
na d oof stn ega e 
sa esid dna st s ep . 
kcots evild na 
sporc ot 



.tn e mnorivn e 

kcattA d emrA 
r o tluas sa lacitcaT 
ot setunim ylla 
rene G 
eht n opu de sab ,s 
e iraV 
nac ytiruc es etauq 
edan I 
)smra llams (scit s 
illaB -
et om e r m o rf 
gnipin s 
. syad 
' srotart ep r ep dna 
tn etni 
ot s secca y sa e 
wolla 
s n opa ew ff o -dnat 
S -
. n oitac ol 

.s e itilibapac 
t n emla ecn oc y 
sa e ,t egrat 
d ellep o rp t ekc o r ( 



dna ,sn opae w fo 
)s rat r o m ,s eda n 
erg 



f o n oitaitinidetc 
et edn u 




.kcatta na 

taerhT/drazaH 
edoM noita 
cilppA 
noitaruD draza H 
;stceff E fo 
tnetxE ciman y D 
/c itatS 
dna gnitagitiM 
snoitidnoC 
gnitabrecaxE 
kca ttA yraidnecn I 
/nosr A 
ro erif fo n o 
itaitinI raen ro no 
nois o lpxe tcatn 
o c tcerid aiv 
tegrat aiv 
yletomer ro 
.elitcejorp 
o t setunim y 
llareneG .sru oh 
siegamad f o tne 
txE dna epy t yb 
denimreted ecived 
fo ytitnauq 
slaireta m dna 
tnarelecca / raen 
ro ta tneserp 
yll.tegrat areneg 
stceff E naht reht 
o citats 
,secneuqesnoc 
gnidacsac larut 
cur ts latnemercni 
.cte ,eruliaf 
edulcnisrotcaf 
noitagitiM n oitceted 
erif ni-tliub smetsys n 
o it cetorp dna 
evitsiser-erif dna . 
seuqinhcet noitcurt 
snoc nac ytiruces 
etauqedan I ot ssecca y 
sae wolla tnemlaecnoc 
ysae ,tegrat ecived 
yraidnecnina fo noita 
itinidet cetednu dna 




.er-no N if a fo 




dna erif ht iw e cnailp 
moc sa llew sa sedoc 
gnidliub niatniam ot 
eruliaf 




noitcetorp erif 
gnitsixe yllaitnatsbus 
nac smetsys 
ssenevitceffe eht 
esaercni 




.nopaew erif a fo 
s tnegA lacigoloiB 
dilos ro diuqiL 
yam stnega 
lacigoloiB 
tnega eht no 
gnidnepeD 
ev oba esaeler f o edu 
titlA 
xarhtn A -
eb nac s 
tnanimatn o c 
rof staerht 
elbaiv e sop 
eht dna desu 
tce ffa nac dnu org 
msilutoB -
gnisu desrepsid 
,sraey ot sru oh 
hcih w htiw 
ssenevitceffe 
sithgilnus ;noisrepsid 
sisollecurB -
losorea/sreyarps 
tnega eht no 
gnidneped 
,deyolped siti 
ynam ot evitcurtsed 
eugalP-
tniop yb ro sro 
tareneg 
nisnoitidn oc 
eht dna 
eb nac noitanima 
tn oc 
;se suriv dna airetcab 
xopllamS -
sa hcus secruos 
enilro 
.s tsixe tih cihw 
dna dniw aiv 
daerps 
sdniw etared o m ot 
thgil 
aimeraluT -
trevoc ,snoitinum 

.reta w eb nac 
noitcefn I 
tub stnega e 
srepsidlliw 
cigahrro meh lariV-
gnivom dna ,st 
isoped 

r o namuh aiv 
daerps 
kaerb nac sdniw 
rehgih 
srevef 
. sreyarps 

.srotcev lam ina 
eht ;sdu o lclosorea pu 
snixoT -



lacigoloroetem-orcim 
,munilu toB( 



dna sgnidliub fo 
stceffe 
lacc o colyhpatS 
,niciR 



ecneulfni nac niarret 
2-T ,B nixotore tnE 



levart dna 
noitazilosorea 
)snixotocyM 



.stnega fo 

taerhT/drazaH 
edoM noitacilppA 
noitaruD dra zaH 
;stce ffE f o tnetx 
E cimanyD /citat S 
dna gnitagitiM 
snoitidnoC 
gnitabrecaxE 
s tneg A lacimehC 
retsi lB -doo lB -yran 
om lup 
/gnul/gnikohC -
gnitaticapa cnI -e 
vreN -sag raet 
/lortnoc toiR -
gnitimoV -
l osorea/diuqiL eb 
nac stnan imatnoc 
sreyarps gnisu 
desrepsid losorea 
rehto ro sdiuq il 
;srotareneg /se 
lddup mor f gni 
ziropav .snoit 
inum ro 
;sreniatnoc 
yam stnega 
slacimehC r of 
staerht elbaiv esop 
,s keew o t sruoh 
tnega eh t no 
gnidneped ni 
snoitidnoc eht dna 
.s ts ixe ti h cihw 
eb nac 
noitanimatnoC 
laitini eh t f o tu o 
de irrac ,snosrep 
yb aera tegrat dna 
,retaw ,selcihev 
.dni w eb yam 
slacimehC e 
siwrehto ro 
evisorroc fi emit 
rev o gn iga mad 
.detaidemer ton 
nac erutarepmet ri 
A fo noi taropave 
tceffa .slo sorea 
dnu orG stceffa 
erutarepmet 
.sdiuqil f o 
noitaropave 
egralne nac 
ytidimuH 
,selcitrap losorea 
noitalahni 
gnicuder .drazah 
nac noitatipicerP 
esrepsid dna etulid 
daerps nac tub 
,stnega .noi 
tanimatnoc nac 
dniW 




os la tub , sropav 
esrepsid eb o t era 
tegrat esuac 
.cimanyd -orcim 
ehT fo stceffe la 
cig oloroetem na c 
niarret dna 
sgnidliub n oitarud 
dna levart re tla 




.stnega fo n i 
gnidle ih S ni 
gniretlehs fo mr of 
eht elpoep tce torp 
nac ecalp mor f y 
treporp dna .st 
ceffe lufmrah 
bmoB lanoitnevnoC 
e lcihev yrano ita t S 
-elcihev gnivoM -
liaM -ylppu S -
nworhT -decalP -
lennosreP -
evisolpxe fo 
noitanote D ;tegrat 
raen ro no ecived 
ro ,elcihev ,nosrep 
ai v .elitcejorp 
lano itidda 
;suoenatnatsnI 
yam secived yradn 
oces eht 
gninehtgnel ,desu 
eb eht fo noitarud 
emit k catta eht 
litnu drazah eb ot 
denimreted si etis 
.rael c 
si egamad fo tne 
txE dna epyt yb 
deni mreted .eviso 
lpxe fo yti tnauq 
cita ts yllareneg 
stceffE gnidacsac 
naht reht o , 
secneuqesnoc 
larutcurts 
latnemercn i .c te 
,eruliaf 
sesaerced ygrenE a 
sa yllacimht iragol 
morf ecnatsid fo 
noitcnuf . tsalb fo 
taes ,niarreT , 
serutcurts 
,noitatserof edi 
vorp nac ,.cte 
gnibrosba yb 
gnidleihs ygrene 
gni tce lfed r o/dna 
.sirbed dna 
gnitabrecax E esae 
edulcn i snoi 
tidnoc 




kcal ;tegra t ot s 
secca fo 
;gnidleihs/sre 
irrab fo 















dna ;noitcurtsnoc r 
oop 




fo tnemlaecnoc fo 
e sae 




.eci ved 
msirorretrebyC 
gnisu kcatta cin 
ortcelE 
.syad ot setuniM 
tcerid on yllarene 
G 
na c y tiruces 
etauqedan I 

metsys retup mo c 
eno .rehtona tsn 
iaga 

tliub no s tceffe 
.tnemnorivne 
laci tirc ot ssecca 
eta tilicaf ,s 
metsys retupmoc 




eb o t meht 
gniwolla 




.s kcatta tcudnoc o 
t desu 

taerhT/draza H 
edoM noitacilpp A 
noitaru D drazaH 
;stceffE fo tnetxE 
cimanyD /citatS 
dna gnitagitiM 
snoitidnoC 
gnitabrecaxE 
lairetaM suodra zaH r 
o ytilicaf de xif( esae 
leR )noitatropsnart -
lairtsudn I cixoT dna 
slacimehC cinagrO( 
slairetaM 
;enaxeholcyc 
:sropav ,snegonayc 
:sesag dicA negord 
yh ,enirolhc :sesag e 
saB ;edif lus laicep S 
;ain omma 
,enegsohp :sesac )ed 
yhedla mrof 
ro /dna ,d 
iuqil,diloS 
stnanimatnoc 
suoesag morf 
desaeler eb yam 
elibom ro de xif 
.sreniatnoc 
.syad o t sruoH 
eb yam s lacimehC 
esiwrehto ro evis 
orroc .emit revo 
gnigamad erif ro 
/dna noiso lpx E 
.tneuqesbus eb 
yam eb yam 
noitanimatnoC 
eht fo tuo deirrac 
,sn osrep yb aera 
tnedicni dna ,retaw 
,selcihev .dniw 
lacimehc htiw s A 
rehtaew ,snopaew 
yltceridlliw sn 
oitidnoc dra zah 
eht woh t ceffa 
.spoleved -orcim 
ehT f o s tceffe lac 
igoloroetem nac 
niarret dna sgnid 
liub noitarud dna 
levart retla nign 
idlei.stnega fo hS 
nigniretlehs fo 
mrof eht elpoep 
tcet orp nac ecalp 
morf ytreporp dna 
. stceffe -noN luf 
mrah dna erif h tiw 
ecnailpmoc sa llew 
sa sedoc gnidliub 
niatniam ot eruliaf 




noitce torp erif 
gnits ixe 















tnemniatn oc dna 




yllaitnatsbus nac 
serutaef 




egamad eht esaer 
cni 















suodrazah a m orf 




.e saeler slairetam 
eciveD raelcuN 
raelcun fo 
noitanote D ta 
,dnuorgrednu 
ecived ro ria eht 
ni,ecafrus eh t 
.edutitla hgih ta 
dna hsa lf 
taeh/thgiL rof 
tsale vaw kcohs 
/tsalb raelcun 
;sdnoces tuo llaf 
dna noitaidar r of 
tsisrep na c 
sdrazah .sraey 
eslup c 
itengamortcelE 
edutitla-hgih a 
morf rof 
stsalnoitanoted 
ylno stceffa dna 
sdn oces cinort 
cele detcetorpnu 
.smetsys 
dna taeh ,thgil la 
itinI a f o st ceffe 
tsalb ria ro dnuorg 
,eca frusbus era 
dna citats era tsrub 
eht yb denimreted 
scitsiret carahc s 
'ecived tu ollaf 
;tnemyolpme dna 
evitcaoidar fo eb 
yam s 
tnanimatnoc no 
gnidneped 
,cimanyd 
lacigoloroetem 
.snoitidnoc 
fo stceffe luf mraH 
decuder eb na c n 
oitaidar emit eht 
gniziminim yb , 
taeh 
,thgi.erusopxe fo 
L ygrene tsalb dna 
yllacimhtirag 
olesaerced ecnatsid 
fo noit cnu f a sa 
.tsalb f o taes m 
orf ,noitatserof 
,niarreT nac ,.cte 
,serutcurts yb 
gnidleihs edivorp 
ro/dna gnibrosba 
dna n oitaidar gnit 
celfed 
.stnanimatnoc 
evitcaoidar 
stneg A lacigoloidaR 
ahplA-a teB -a m 
maG -
s tnanimatnoc 
evitcaoidaR gnisu 
desrepsid eb nac 
losorea/ sre yarps 
tniop yb ro 
,srotareneg sa hcus 
secruos enilr o 
trevoc ,snoitinum 
gnivo m dna ,stis 
oped .sre yarps 
ya m stnanima 
tnoC r of 
suodrazah niamer 
,sraey ot sdn oces 
lairetam no 
gnidneped .de su 
eb lliw stceffe la 
itinI fo etis o t de 
zilacol no 
gnidneped ;kcatta 
lacigoloroetem 
tneuqe sbus 
,snoitidnoc 
evitcaoidar fo r 
oivaheb eb yam s 
tnanimatnoc 
.cimanyd 
,erusopxe fo no 
itaru D f o ecruos 
morf ecnatsid eht 
dna ,n oitaidar 
gnidleihs f o tnuo 
ma dna ecruo s 
neewteb enimreted 
tegrat .noita idar 
ot erusopxe 

taerhT/draza H 
edoM noitacilpp A 
noitaru D drazaH 
;stceffE fo tnetxE 
cimanyD /citatS 
dna gnitagitiM 
snoitidnoC 
gnitabrecaxE 
ecnallievruS -cit 
suoc A cinor tcelE-
fo noitcelloc ffo -
dnatS gnisu 
noitamrofnilausiv 
hgih ro saremac 
.shtnom yllausU 
eh t yllausu si sihT na 
fo ssoleht o t edulerp 
tsi.tessa rorret A 
,ngised gnid liuB 
senil gnikcolb 
ylla icepse gn iru 
sne dna thgis fo 
gn ippordsevae 
lausiV -
citsu oca ,scitpo 
derewop gnisu 
noitamrofni 
senohporcim 
lanoitcerid dna 
,sresaldna 

sdneps mae t 
ecnallievrus rof 
gnikool emit hcum 
scitcat dna se 
itilibarenluv 
.lufsseccus eb lliw taht 
dna sllaw roiretxe 
eht wolla ton od s 
wodniw ro 
noissimsnart 
dnuos nac 
,noitcelloc cit su 
oca 

n oitamrofnicinort 
cele llec 
,sretupmoc morf 
dleh-dnah dna 
,senohp noitcelloc 
decal.soPidar ec 
ived a gnittup yb f 
o tni"gub" op eht 
ta 

doirep emit eht s isihT 
tseb eh t sedivorp taht 
sa taerht fo tnemsses sa 
fo gnitegrat setacidni ti 
.ytilica f eht 
.drazah siht etag 
itim 

.esu 



yrtnE de z 
irohtuanU decroF -
rewop ro dnah fo 
esU ro ,snopaew ,s 
loo t 
,sruoh ot 
setuniM eht 
nopu gnidneped 
ro lae ts ot silaog fI ro 
stessa lacisyhp yortsed 
lacisyhp dradna t 
S ngised gn 
idliub ytiruce s 
trevoC -
a etaerc ot 
sevisolp xe r o 
gninepo de zis -
nam ylbmessa na 
etarep o ,)rood 
dekcol a sa hcus( 
slaitnederc eslaf 
esu r o .gnidliub a 
retne o t 
.tnetni 
,n 
oitamrofniesimorpmoc 
era st ceffe laitinieht 
yam egamad tub ,kciuq 
tnetni.gn fI itsalgnoleb 
snoitarepo tpursid o t si 
eht ,segat soh eka t ro a 
rof tsa lyam stceffe 
fiyllaicepse ,emit gnol 
.srucco htaed ro yrujni 
muminim eh t eb 
dluoh s .serusaem 
noitag roF itim 
,stessa lacitirc 
erom ekil,serusae 
m lanoitidda n 
oisivelet tiucric 
des olc taht w olf 
ciffart ro tsap 
srotisiv slennahc 
ni sdia ,lortnoc 
ssecca .dra zah 
siht fo no itceted 

Assigning a Threat Rating 
The ultimate product of a threat assessment is the assignment of a threat rating to each hazard of concern to a particular organiza-
tion. The threat rating, like protection priority, is based on expert judgment and may be as simple as high, medium, or low. 
. _	High Threat. Known terrorists or hazards, capable of causing loss of or damage to a facility exist. One or more 
vulnerabilities are present and the terrorists are known or reasonably suspected of having intent to attack the facility. 
. _	Medium Threat. Known terrorists or hazards that may be capable of causing loss of or damage to a facility exist. 
One or 

more vulnerabilities may be present. However, the terrorists 
are not believed to have intent to attack the facility. 
_	Low Threat. Few or no terrorists or hazards exist. Their capability of causing damage to a particular facility is doubtful. 
An organization may reasonably be concerned only with high threat ratings in the near term, but may want to consider ad-
dressing medium threats over time. 
Alternative: Assigning a Level of Protection Against Threat 
In the absence of experience, assessing terrorist threat is the most difficult aspect of planning to resist terrorist attack. An effective 
alternative approach may be to select a level of desired protection for a business operation based on management deci-sion-
making, and then proceed to a vulnerability assessment. The Department of Defense correlates levels of protection with potential 
damage and expected injuries. The GSA and Interagency Security Committee (ISC) also use the level of protection concept, 
though the definitions differ slightly. The following levels are based on DoD definitions: 
. _	High Protection. Facility superficially damaged; no perma-
nent deformation of primary and secondary structural
members or non-structural elements. Only superficial inju-
ries are likely.

. _	Medium Protection. Damaged, but repairable. Minor deformations of non-structural elements and secondary 
structural members and no permanent deformation in primary structural members. Some minor injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 
. _	Very Low Protection. Heavily damaged, onset of structural collapse. Major deformation of primary and secondary 
structural members, but progressive collapse is unlikely. Collapse of non-structural elements. Majority of personnel suffer serious 
injuries. There are likely to be a limited number (10 percent to 25 percent) of fatalities. 

Note that the �very low� level is not the same as doing nothing. No action could result in catastrophic building failure and high 
loss of life.


VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
A terrorism vulnerability assessment evaluates any weaknesses that can be exploited 
by a terrorist. It evaluates the vulnerability of facilities across a broad range of 
identified threats/hazards and provides a basis for determining physical and 
operational mitigation measures for their protection. It applies both to new building 
programming and design and to existing building management and renovation over 
the service life of a structure. 
The useful product of a vulnerability assessment is the assignment of a vulnerability 
rating of all appropriate aspects of building operations and systems to the defined 
threats for the particular facility. As with protection priority and threat ratings, 
vulnerability can be cast as high, medium, or low. 
. _	High Vulnerability. One or more significant weaknesses have been 
identified that make the facility highly susceptible to a terrorist or hazard. 
. _	Medium Vulnerability. A weakness has been identified that makes the 
facility somewhat susceptible to a terrorist or hazard. 
. _	Low Vulnerability. A minor weakness has been identified that slightly 
increases the susceptibility of the facility to a terrorist or hazard. 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, presented in abbreviated form in 
Appendix B, compiles a comprehensive list of questions to be addressed in assessing 
the vulnerability of facilities to terrorist attack. A subset of the checklist, discussed in 
the following section, is particularly useful in the initial screening of existing facilities 
to identify and prioritize terrorism risk reduction needs. Such an assessment can be 
integrated into a due diligence assessment associated with acquisition, refinancing, or 
insurance underwriting.


INITIAL VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE 
Because of the uncertainty of the threat, many insurers, lenders, and owners need a 
quick, qualitative assessment of the vulnerability of existing buildings to terrorist 
attack. As experience is gained and more robust vulnerability assessment tools are 
developed, the rigor of data collection and analysis will increase. For now, the estimate 
of vulnerability to a simple qualitative scale (high, medium, or low as defined by the 
vulnerability ratings described above) may provide useful information. 
Answering even basic questions concerning vulnerability to terrorist attack 
may involve three means of data collection: 
. _ Visual inspection 
. _ Document review 
. _ Organization and management procedures review 

Visual Inspection 
A property condition assessment of vulnerability to terrorist attack includes an onsite 
visual inspection encompassing evaluation of the site and all facility systems including 
architectural, structural, building envelope, utility, mechanical, plumbing and gas, 
electrical, fire alarm, communications and information technology systems. 
Equipment operations and maintenance procedures and records and security systems, 
planning, and procedures should also be scrutinized. The investigation may need to 
go beyond the site to vulnerability of utility and other infrastructure systems. 
Design Documents Review 
The on-site inspection team should work with the property owner to obtain plans, 
specifications and related construction documents as necessary. Equipment operation 
and maintenance procedures and records as well as security procedures should also 
be scrutinized. All documents should be reviewed assessing concerns related to 
terrorism vulnerability. 
Organization and Management Procedures Review 
Because of the transitory nature of the terrorist threat and its uncertain duration, the 
most effective approaches to terrorism risk reduction in facilities may emphasize 
reorganization of operational functions and procedures rather than modification of 
physical systems. The vulnerability assessment team must scrutinize business and 
operational practices to identify opportunities to reduce exposure to attack. This will 
involve scrutinizing both owner and tenant operations at the building site. 
Assessment of Vulnerability to Expected Methods and Means of Attack 
Each building system and business procedure should be assessed on its vulnerability 
to a range of terrorist attack methods and means. 
Based on military experience, common terrorist tactics include the use of moving or 
stationary vehicles, covert entry, and/or disguise in mail or shipping materials to 
deliver destructive weapons. 
At present, terrorist attacks might include blast effects, airborne contamination, 
waterborne contamination, or some combination of attack mechanisms. For 
additional information, see FEMA 426 and FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial 
Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks.


VULNERABILITY ESTIMATE SCREENING 
The following screening tool tables provide guidance for initial vulnerability 
assessment. The intention of this assessment is to distinguish facilities of high, 
medium, or low vulnerability to terrorist attack. The implication is that high 
vulnerability facilities should receive more detailed analysis. Specific strategies for 
risk reduction should be developed. 
These quick, qualitative 'vulnerability estimate' questions were selected from the 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426. Each question is 
characterized by how information concerning the question will likely be collected 
(visual inspection, design documentation, and/or review of organizational/ 
management procedures), and common terrorist attack tactics (delivery by moving, 
stationary vehicles, or covert entry, disguised in the mail or in supply materials; and 
blast pressure, airborne, or waterborne attack mechanisms). 
For this initial assessment, subjective ratings by qualified professionals familiar with the 
facility are appropriate. Assigning a "high, medium, or low" vulnerability rating to the 
responses to vulnerability questions for each building system will provide a solid 
preliminary basis for estimating the overall vulnerability of a particular facility to 
terrorist attack. The answers to the questions will also indicate areas of opportunity for 
mitigation actions to reduce terrorism risk. 
�Site� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of the �Site� will look at surrounding structures, terrain, 
perimeter controls, traffic patterns and separations, landscaping elements and 
features, lines of site, etc. 
�Site� questions focus primarily on visual inspection to develop ratings. The questions 
emphasize vulnerability to moving vehicle, stationary vehicle, and covert entry tactics. 
Vulnerability to blast is the primary concern addressed. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
Architectural� Questions 
Assessing �Architectural� vulnerability will investigate tenancy, services, public and 
private access, access controls, activity patterns, exposures, etc. 
�Architectural� questions focus equally on visual inspection and evaluation of 
organizational and management procedures to develop ratings. The questions 
emphasize vulnerability to moving vehicle, stationary vehicle, and covert entry tactics. 
Vulnerability to blast is the primary expressed concern. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.  = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Structural and Building Envelope Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Structural Systems� will look at construction type, 
materials, detailing, collapse characteristics, critical elements, etc. An assessment of 
�Building Envelope� will involve investigating strength, fenestration, glazing 
characteristics and detailing, anchorage, etc. 
�Structural and Building Envelop Systems� questions rely on review of construction 
documents and visual inspection to develop ratings. Vulnerability to blast is the 
primary concern. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Utility Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Utility Systems� will look at the full range of source and 
supply systems serving the facility including water, fuel, and electricity supply; fire 
alarm and suppression, communications, etc. 
�Utility Systems� questions rely equally on information obtained from visual inspection, 
review of construction documents, and organizational and management procedures 
to develop ratings. Vulnerability to waterborne contaminants is expressly considered. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Mechanical Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Mechanical Systems� will investigate air supply and 
exhaust configurations, filtration, sensing and monitoring, system zoning and control, 
elevator management, etc. 
�Mechanical Systems� vulnerability questions and ratings rely primarily on information 
obtained from review of construction documents and visual inspection. Vulnerability 
to airborne contaminants is the primary consideration, including contamination from 
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological attack. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Plumbing and Gas Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Plumbing and Gas Systems� will look at the liquid 
distribution systems serving the facility including water and fuel distribution, water 
heating, fuel storage, etc. 
�Plumbing and Gas Systems� questions rely primarily on information from review of 
construction documents to develop ratings. Vulnerability to waterborne contaminants 
is expressly considered. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Electrical Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Electrical Systems� will evaluate transformer and 
switchgear security, electricity distribution and accessibility, emergency systems, etc. 
�Electrical Systems� questions primarily on information from visual inspection and 
review of construction documents to develop ratings. No particular attack mechanism 
is emphasized. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Fire Alarm Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Fire Alarm Systems� will look at detection sensing and 
signaling, system configurations, accessibility of controls, redundancies, etc. 
�Fire Alarm Systems� questions rely both on information from review of construction 
documents and review of organizational and management procedures to develop 
ratings. No particular attack mechanism is emphasized. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question. 
�Communications and Information Technology Systems� Questions 
A vulnerability assessment of �Communications and Information Technology Systems� 
will evaluate distribution, power supplies, accessibility, control, notification, backups, 
etc. 
�Communications and Information Technology Systems� questions rely on 
information from visual inspection, review of construction documents, and review of 
organizational and management procedures to develop ratings. No particular attack 
mechanism is emphasized. 
LEGEND: _ = Determine high, medium, or low vulnerability rating.     = Applicability of factor to 
question.


ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF DETAILED FACILITY INFORMATION 
The foregoing questions provide a framework for a qualitative estimate of facility 
vulnerability to terrorist attack. A more detailed and quantitative evaluation will 
involve significantly more review of information in all areas, including additional 
information concerning 'Equipment Operations and Maintenance' (up to date 
drawings, manuals, and procedures, training, monitoring, etc.); 'Security Systems' 
(perimeter and interior sensing, monitoring, and control, security system 
documentation and training, etc.); and the 'Security Master Plan' (currency, 
responsibilities, etc.). 
Appendix B presents the complete list of detailed questions from FEMA 426 that 
should be considered in fully evaluating vulnerability to terrorist threats. The means of 
data collection that should be employed and the particular terrorist tactics and attack 
mechanisms addressed by each question are identified in the appendix so that 
specialized checklists can be created to assess vulnerability to terrorist tactics of 
particular concern to an individual organization.


VULNERABILITY REDUCTION COST INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES 
Typically, a property condition assessment for due diligence would be followed by 
consideration of the anticipated costs and timing of needed upgrades of facility 
systems. Certainly, estimates of expected costs of mitigation of system vulnerability to 
terrorist attack will become important at some point in the decision-mak-ing process. 
However, an assessment using the questions described above does not include the 
level of information needed to project costs. The qualitative analysis described simply 
determines broad preliminary options for reducing terrorism risk in a particular 
existing facility and does not give insight to expected costs of risk reduction. At some 
point in the future, fully capable due dili-gence tools for assessing vulnerability to 
terrorist attack will very likely include such information and detail. For further 
discussion of costs related to blast mitigation, see FEMA 427, Chapter 8.



GUIDE TO EXPERTISE AND TOOLS

Terrorism risk management is a new and 
evolving field with inputs from a diverse 
range of disciplines and organizations. This 
chapter introduces several key documents 
and resources for further exploration in the 
field. 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
Appendix A presents the full text of the TRIA as signed 
into law on November 26, 2002. 
TRIA is the basis for the current Federal program to 
provide reinsurance cover for claims resulting from 
defined categories of terrorism-caused damage. The full 
text of the law provides the key definitions and detailed 
conditions of the program. 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Screening 
Appendix B provides a tool for the comprehensive 
assessment of terrorism vulnerability in buildings, 
including both qualitative and quantitative measures. This 
screening tool contains a list of vulnerability questions 
that provide the basis for systematic due diligence related 
to both physical and operational vulnerability assessment. 
The vulnerability questions presented in Appendix B 
correspond to those in the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist provided in FEMA 426. The FEMA 
426 checklist includes further guidance and commentary 
related to the application of each question to assessments 
of building and building system vulnerability. 
Each question included in the Appendix B list is 
identified by type (either rapid estimation or detailed 
assessment), required methods of data collection, and 
common terrorist tactics (methods of delivery, and 
primary threat mechanisms). The appendix master list of 
questions can be re-sorted to create specialized lists of 
questions focused on a single parameter or multiple 
parameters. 
General Glossary 
Appendix C presents a general glossary of terrorism risk and building security 
related terms in common use within federal agencies and the research community. 
This glossary is intended to provide help in understanding 
the more specialized literature of the field and to assist in 
communication with specialized security consultants. The 
glossary includes terms related to physical security and to 
the organization and management of building security. 
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Glossary 
Appendix D presents separate glossaries of chemical 
terms, biological terms, and radiological terms in 
common use within federal agencies and research 
communities. 
The specialized terminology of chemical, biological and 
radiological threats is new to many otherwise experienced 
in building security and condition assessment. This 
specialized glossary is intended to provide help in 
understanding CBR issues and in communicating with 
specialized consultants. 
Acronyms 
Appendix E lists acronyms for government and private 
sector agencies as well as technical terms frequently used 
in the building security field. 
The list is intended to facilitate use of background federal 
documents and to help in communication with public 
authorities concerned with various aspects of homeland 
security.. 
Associations and Organizations 
Appendix F provides a listing of associations and 
organizations which are active in various aspects of 
homeland security. 
Many of these organizations produce materials on the 
subject of terrorism risk management. These references 
may be of value for building owners and tenants in search 
of further information or guidance. URLs are provided to 
access organizational homepages. 
Bibliography 
Appendix G is a bibliography of publications on a range of topics related to terrorism 
vulnerability and risk management in buildings. 
These publications have been prepared by government agencies, trade associations, 
professional societies, and other technical information providers. These publications 
provide access to the currently available expertise on terrorism risk management. 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 A


BUILDING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT SCREENING B 
The following screening tool includes questions 
concerning vulnerability to terrorism that need to be 
addressed for new or existing buildings. The questions are 
intended to provide the basis for a vulnerability 
assessment of building design and operation of various 
component systems. Subsets of questions in the screening 
tool can be used either for a rapid vulnerability estimation 
or for a comprehensive detailed assessment of buildings. 
This screening tool includes all of the vulnerability 
questions from the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426. The FEMA 426 checklist also 
presents extended guidance and observations regarding 
use of each question in assessing building vulnerability to 
terrorist attack. Both the FEMA 426 checklist and this 
screening tool are organized into 13 sections, listed 
below. 
A.	Site 
B.	Architectural 
C.	Structural Systems 
D.	Building Envelope 
E.	Utility Systems 
F.	Mechanical Systems (including Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological Systems)

G.	Plumbing and Gas Systems 
H.	Electrical Systems 
I.	Fire Alarm Systems 
J.	Communications and Information Technology Systems 
K.	Equipment Operations and Maintenance 
L.	Security Systems 
M. Security Master Plan The vulnerability questions presented in this screening tool 
are characterized by type (vulnerability estimate or detailed assessment), how 
information concerning the question will likely be collected (visual inspection, 
design documentation, and/or review of organizational/management 
procedures), and common terrorist attack tactics (delivery by moving, stationary 
vehicles, or covert entry, disguised in the mail or in supply materials; and blast 
pressure, airborne, or waterborne attack mechanisms). 
From the USAF Installation Force Protection Guide, tactics refer to the offensive strategies 
employed by aggressors, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more 
common tactics include: 
. _	Moving vehicle. The moving vehicle attack is a suicide attack where an 
explosive-laden vehicle is driven into a facility, and detonated. 
. _	Stationary vehicle. This type of attack may be detonated by
time delay or remote control.

. _	Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter the facility covertly using 
false credentials. The aggressor may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the 
facility. 
. _	Mail attack. Small bombs or incendiary devices are incorporated into 
envelopes or packages that are delivered to the targeted individual. 
. _	Supplies attack. Bombs or incendiary devices, generally larger than 
those found in mail bombs, are incorporated into various containers and delivered to 
facilities or installations. 
. _	Airborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical or biological 
agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation. 
. _	Waterborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or 
radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation." 

The table below arrays the compatibility of common tactics with a FEMA list of 
terrorist attack devices and methods. 
sedoM
/ sec 
iveD 
kcat 
tA 
AME 
F 

y rev il e D/ s c i t caT nommoC F A S U 


Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Airborne 
contamination
Waterborne 
contamination 
ms i 
ror re t 
-i rgA 







kca t t 
a 
demrA 







y ra 
idnecn 
i /n o s 
rA 







t nega 
l a c 
igo l o 
iB 







bmoB 







tnega 
lac 
imehC 







ms i 
ror re t 
-rebyC 







esae 
ler 
TAM 
Z A H 







bmob 
rae 
lcuN 







t nega 
lac i 
go l o 
idaR 








The following tables adapt the �common tactics/delivery� described above by adding 
�blast effects� as a category of terrorist attack �mechanisms.� 
Table 
A: 
Site
metI 
no itseu Q 
ytilibarenluV 
n oitaziretcarahC 

scitcaT tsirorreT 


epyT 
noitcelloC 

sdohteM yrevile D 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle

Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a 
1.eti
S 
?ytilicaf eht 
dnuorrus seru 
tcurts roja m 
tah W 

? 












b 
1.eti
S 
ro ,yratilim ,tne 
mnre vog 
,erutcur tsarfni 
lacitirc tah W 
tcapmitaht aera 
lacoleht ni era 
seitilicaf 
noitaercer kcat 
ta( egamad 
laretalloc dna 
,seitilitu ,n 
oitatropsnart r o 
serutcurt s 
rojam rehto eht 
gnitcapmiytilic
af s iht ta 
?)ytilicaf sih t 
gn 
itcapmiserutcurt
s rojam eht no 
kcatta 

? 












c 
1.eti
S 
edistuo yleta 
idemmisesu 
dnaltnecajda 
eht era tah W ? 
ytilicaf sih t fo 
re temirep eht 

? 












d 
1.eti
S 
sesu dnal eseht 
egnahc snalp 
tnempoleved 
erutu f o D 
?rete mirep 
ytilicaf eht 
edistuo 
? 













2.eti
S 
ro noisserped a 
nignidliub eht 
ecalp niarret eh 
t seo D ?aera w 
ol 
? 


? 










3.eti
S 
e calp gnikrap 
ena lbru c seod 
,saera nabru 
,esned n I a ot 
esolc 
ylbatpeccanu 
selcihev dekrap 
dellortnocnu 
?ya w-f o -
sthgir c ilbup ni 
y tilicaf 














4.eti
S 
slortn oc reirrab 
fo sepyt reht o 
ro ecnef re 
temirep a s I 
?ecalp ni 














5.eti
S 
?ytilicaf eh t ot 
s tniop ssecca 
etis eht era tah 
W 














6.eti
S 
no ciffart nairt 
sedep morf 
detarapes ciffart 
elcihev s I ?etis 
eht 














7.eti
S 
eh t ta lortnoc 
ssecca 
nairtsedep dna 
elcihev ereht s I 
?et is eht fo 
retemirep 














a 
8.eti
S 
edistu o ro 
enilbruc eh t ta 
noit cep sni rof 
ecaps ereht s I 
?retemirep 
detcetorp eht 














b 
8.eti
S 
noitcepsn ieht 
morf e cnats id 
muminim eht 
sitah W 
?gnidliub eht o 
t noitacol 














9.eti
S 
ytilicaf ro etis 
eht ot ssecca 
laitnet op yna 
ereht s I ?ffonur 
retaw ro shtap 
ytilitu hgu orht 














a 0 
1.eti
S 
secived mar-
itna elcihev fo 
sep yt gnits ixe 
eht era tah W 
?ytilicaf eht r of 














b 0 
1.eti
S 
eht ta ro 
yradnuob y 
treporp eh t ta 
secived eseh t 
er A ?gnid liub 














1 
1.eti
S 
ecnatsid 
ffodnats enoz 
reffub maritna 
eht sitah W 
?gnikrap ro 
selcihe v 
deneercsnu ot 
gnidliub eht 
morf 















Table B: 
Architectural 
(continued)
met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
n oitaziretcarahC 

scitcaT tsir orreT 


epyT 
noitcelloC 

sdohteM yrevileD 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle

Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
31.hcrA 
elpoep fo 
sweiv 
detcurtsbonu 
evah setuor 
noitalucric 
oD ?stniop 
ssecca dellor 
tnoc 
gnihcaorppa 














41.hcrA 
snaem yb 
lennosrep de 
zirohtua ot 
det 
imilssecca fo 
or s I 
?smsinahcem 
gnikcolf o 














a51.hcrA 
s me tsys 
gnidliub 
,seitivitca 
,elpoep( 
stessa lacitirc 
erA ,e 
cnartne niam 
yna ot esolc 
detacol)stnen 
opmoc dna 
gnida ol ,aera 
e cnanetniam 
,gnikrap 
,noitalucric 
elcihev 
?gnikrap 
roiretn iro ,kc 
od 














b51.hcrA 
stnenop m oc 
dna smetsys 
gn idliub 
lacitirc eht 
erA 
?denedrah 
? 













61.hcrA 
eht otn iraf sa 
deta co 
lstessa 
lacitirc ro 
eulav-hg ih 
erA m orf de 
tarapes dna e 
lbissop sa 
gnidliub eht 
fo r oire tni 
?gnid liub eht 
fo saera 
cilbup eht 

? 












71.hcrA 
?stessa 
lacitirc morf 
ya wa 
ytivitca rotis 
iv hgih s I 














a81.hcrA 
deipucco era 
taht secaps 
nideta co 
lstessa 
lacitirc erA 
?yad rep 
sruoh 42 














b81.hcrA 
ot elbisiv era 
yeht erehw 
saera ni 
detacolstessa 
erA ?n osrep 
eno naht ero 
m 














91.hcrA 
saera gnippihs 
dna gniviecer 
dna skcod 
gnidaolerA yt 
ilitu ,s moor 
ytilitu morf n 
oitcerid yna 
ni detarapes 
,lacirtcele 
gnidulcni 
secnartne 
ecivres dna , 
snia m erif ,s 
me tsys mrala 
/n oitceted 
erif 
,atad/enohpel
et ,sniam 
gnitaeh dna 
gnilooc 
,sniam retaw 
noisserppus 
?.cte 














a02.hcrA 
niam ytilicaf 
morf yawa 
detacol sm 
oorlia m erA 
,seitilitu 
,secivre s 
lacitirc 
gniniatn oc 
saera ,se 
cnartne 
?stessa 
tnatropmi dna 
,smet sys 
noitubirtsid 














b02.hcrA 
?kcod 
gnidaoleh t 
raen de tacol 
mo orlia m 
eht s I 














12.hcrA 
rof elbalia va 
ecaps 
etauqeda e 
vah moorliam 
eht seoD na 
ro f dna 
segakcap gn 
imocni 
enimaxe ot 
tnempiuqe 
?reniatnoc 
lasopsid e 
visolpxe 














22.hcrA 
laiceps h tiw 
,deifitnedi 
egu fer fo 
saera erA 
?sserge ot 
nevig n 
oitaredisnoc 















Table C: 
Structural 
Systems
met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
n oitaziret carahC 
scitcaT tsir orreT 


epyT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yre vileD 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a1.s 
yScurtS 
?noitcurtsnoc 
fo epy t tah 
W 













b1.s 
yScurtS 
?leets 
gnicrofnier & 
etercnoc fo 
epy t tah W 













c1.s 
yScurtS 
?leets fo epy 
t tah W 













d1.s 
yScurtS 
?noitadnuof 
fo epy t tah 
W 













a2.s 
yScurtS 
niatnoc 
serutcurts 
etercnoc 
decrofnier eh 
t o D 
evitagen dna 
evitis 
op(tnemecr 
ofnier lee ts 
cirtemmys 
dna s maeb 
,sllaw ,sbals 
foor ,sbals r 
oolf lla 
ni)secaf dna 
tfilpu 
,dnuober ot 
de tcejbus eb 
yam taht 
sredrig 
?serusserp 
noitcus 













b2.s 
yScurtS 
eht fo 
yticapac eht 
poleved ylluf 
secilps paleh 
t o D ? 
tnemecro 
fnier 













c2.s 
yScurtS 
?dereggats 
seitiunitnocsi
d rehto dna 
secilps pal er 
A 













d2.s 
yScurtS 
?sliated 
elitcud 
ssessop 
snoitcennoc 
eh t o D 













e2.s 
yScurtS 
dna seit 
gnidulcni 
,tnemecrofnie
r raeh s 
laiceps s I 
citsale -tsop 
egralwolla o 
t elbaliava 
,spurrits ?r 
oivaheb 













a3.s 
yScurtS 
?snoitcennoc 
tnemom 
snoitcennoc 
emarf leets 
eht er A 













b3.s 
yScurtS 
ylbanosaer 
taht os 
deziminim 
gnicaps 
nmuloc eht s 
I dna 
sdaolngised 
eht t siser 
lliw srebme 
m dezis 
?metsys eht 
fo 
ycnadnuder 
eht esaercni 













c3.s 
yScurtS 
? sthgieh r 
oolf-ot-roolf 
eh t era tah 
W 













4.s 
yScurtS 
?eruliaf ot 
elbarenlu v 
stnemele la 
citirc er A 













5.s 
yScurtS 
fo level elba 
tpeccanu na 
re ffus erut 
curts eh t 
lliW 
tsalb(taerht 
de talutsop 
eh t m orf gn 
itluser ega 
mad ?)tcapmi 
nopaew r o 
gnida ol 













a6.s 
yScurtS 
?espalloc 
evissergorp ot 
elbarenluv 
erutcurts eht 
s I 













b6.s 
yScurtS 
a fo lavomer 
eht gn inia 
tsus fo 
elbapac 
ytilicaf eht s 
I gn idliub 
eht ta edarg 
evoba roolf 
eno rof 
nmuloc ?espa 
lloc 
evissergorp 
tuoht iw 
retemirep 














Table C: 
Structural 
Systems 
(continued)
met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenlu
V 
n oitaziret carahC 
scitcaT tsir orreT 


epyT 
noitcell oC 
sdohteM yre vileD 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
c6.s 
yScurtS 
na ni noi 
solpxe 
lanretni na 
fo tneve eht 
n I eht seod 
aera r oolf 
dnuorg c 
ilbup 
dellortn 
ocnu fo ssol 
eht ot eud 
espa lloc 
evissergorp 
tne verp 
ngised ?n 
mu loc 
yramirp eno 













d6.s 
yScurtS 
a edivorp 
seru taef 
larutcurts r o 
larutce tih 
cra o D 
?snmuloc 
lanretni eht 
ot ffodnats 
hcn i-6 
muminim 













e6.s 
yScurtS 
secaps 
lanretni 
deneercsnu 
eht ni snmul 
oc eht er A 
,sroo lf owt 
ot lauqe 
htgnel 
decarbnu na 
rof dengised 
fo slevel 
owt era 
ereht erehw 
sroolf eerht 
ro ?gnikrap 













7.s yScurtS 
eh t ni shtap 
daol 
tnadnuder e 
tauqeda 
ereht er A 
?erutcurts 













8.s yScurtS 
sn mu loc 
yb de 
troppus 
sredrig 
refsnart 
ereht er A 
fo roiretxe 
eht ta ro 
secaps 
cilbup 
deneercsnu 
nihtiw 
?gnidliub 
eht 













9.s yScurtS 
ot egamad 
timil ngised 
kcod 
gnidaol eh t 
lli W eht ot 
ecrof evis 
olpxe tnev 
dna saera 
tnecajda 
?gnidliub 
eht fo 
roiretxe 













01.s 
yScurtS 
dna 
deviecer era 
segakcap 
erehw , 
smoorliam 
er A secaps 
liater 
deneercsnu 
dna ,n 
oitcepsni rof 
denepo no 
tsalb a fo s 
tceffe eh t 
etagi tim ot 
dengised 
?srebmem 
gnicarb 
laretal ro 
lacitre v 
yramirp 














Table D:Building Envelope

met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenlu
V 
noitaziretcarahC 
scitcaT tsir orreT 


epyT 
noitce lloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
1.vnEgdl
B 
ro iretxe eht 
fo level 
noitcetorp 
detamitse ro 
dengised eht 
si tahW ? 
taerht eviso 
lpxe de 
talutsop eht 
tsn iaga 
sllaw 

? 











a 
2.vnEgdl
B 
?yab 
larutcurt s 
rep sgn 
inepo noitar 
tsenef % 0 4 
naht 
sselereht s I 













b 
2.vnEgdl
B 
ot decnalab 
eda�a f 
roiretxe eht 
no ng ised 
metsys 
wodn iw eht 
s I na 
gniwollof 
gnizalg 
gniylf fo 
stceffe 
suodrazah 
eht etagitim 
,sllaw gnitr 
oppus ot 
egarohcna , 
semarf 
,gnizalg( ? 
tneve ev 
isolpxe ). 
cte 













c 
2.vnEgdl
B 
noitacilppa 
na niatnoc 
etib hcni-1/2 
a htiw s me 
tsys gnizalg 
eht oD 
?enocilis 
larutcurts fo 













d 
2.vnEgdl
B 
rettahs itna 
na htiw 
detce torp 
tisi ro 
detanimal 
gnizalg eht 
s I ?mlif 













e 
2.vnEgdl
B 
kc iht lim -7 
a fo mu 
minim a ti s 
i,desu si 
mlif re ttah 
s -itna na f I 
?mlif kc iht 
lim -4 deru 
tcafunam 
yllaiceps ro 
,mlif 













a 
3.vnEgdl
B 
eht poleved 
ylluf gnimar 
f wodniw 
dna 
,egarohcna 
,slla w eht 
oD 
?detceles 
lairetam 
gnizalg eht 
fo yticapac 













b 
3.vnEgdl
B 
morf 
snoitcaer 
cimanyd eht 
gnidnatshti
w fo e 
lbapac 
sllaw eht 
erA ?swodn 
iw eht 













c 
3.vnEgdl
B 
ytilicaf eht 
fo sllaw eht 
ot dehca tta 
n iamer 
egarohcna 
eht lliW 
?eruliaf 
tuohtiw 
tneve 
evisolpxe na 
gnirud 













d 
3.vnEgdl
B 
larutcurts 
eht ot ro kc 
olb pu-kcab 
ot de 
tcennoc 
eda�af eht s 
I ?emarf 













e 
3.vnEgdl
B 
?decrofnier 
sllaw yrn 
osa m 
gniraeb-non 
erA 













a 
4.vnEgdl
B 
?gnizalg cit 
sillab 
niatnoc 
ytilicaf eht 
seoD 













b 
4.vnEgdl
B 
-telluB 257 
LU fo 
stnemer 
iuqer eht 
teem 
gnizalg 
citsillab eht 
seoD 
?gnizalG 
tnatsiseR 













c 
4.vnEgdl
B 
?gnizalg -
ytiruces 
niatnoc 
ytilicaf eht 
seoD 













d 
4.vnEgdl
B 
ro 3321F 
MTSA fo 
stnemeriuqe
r eht teem 
gnizalg -yt 
iruces eht 
seoD ?la 
iretaM gn 
izalG 
tnatsiseR 
yralgruB 
,279 L U 













e 
4.vnEgdl
B 
gnizalg 
tnatsiser 
yrtne decr of 
gniniatnoc 
seilbmessa 
w odniw eht 
oD ?885 F 
MTSA f o 
stnemeriuqe
r eht tee m 
)gnizalg eh t 
gnidu lcxe( 













5.vnEgdl
B 
des opxe 
dna stnev la 
cinahce m 
sa h cus , 
sgninepo 
wodn iw-
non oD eht r 
of deriuqer n 
oitcetorp f o 
level emas 
eht edivorp 
,smune lp 
?llaw r oire 
txe 














Table 
E: 
Utility 
Systems
metI 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitaziretcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


epyT 
noit ce lloC 
sd ohteM yrevile D 
sms inahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a1.s yS 
litU 
,lapicinum 
,ytilitu(?reta w 
citse mod fo 
ecruos eht sitah 
W )knat egarots 
,rev ir ,ekal,sllew 

? 











b1.s yS 
litU 
?ylppus retaw 
gniknird etanretla 
eruces a ereht sI 













2.s yS 
litU 
?y lppus re taw 
eht rof stniop 
yrtne elpitlum 
ereht er A 













3.s yS 
litU 
?noitacol eruces 
a niylppus re taw 
gnimocnieht sI 













a4.s yS 
litU 
citsemod rof 
yticapac egarots 
evah ytilicaf eht 
seo D ?retaw 













b4.s yS 
litU 
sn oitarepo wolla 
ti lliw gnol woh 
dna snollag ynam 
woH ?eunitnoc ot 













a5.s yS 
litU 
no isserppus erif 
eh t rof reta w fo 
ecruos eht sitah 
W h tiw skna t 
egar ots 
,senilynapmoc yt 
ilitu lacol( ? 
metsys )re vir ro 
,ekal,pukcab 
ynapmoc ytilitu 













b5.s yS 
litU 
?noisserppus erif 
rof seilppus reta 
w etanretla ereht 
er A 













6.s yS 
litU 
, tnailpmoc -edo 
c ,etauqeda 
metsys 
noisserppus erif 
eht sI 
?)noitacoleruces( 
detcetorp dna 













a7.s yS 
litU 
e vah )sresir( 
slortnoc ro ire 
tniepipdnats 
/relknirps eht o D 
?noitarapes 
tnatsiser-tsal-erb 
dna if 













b7.s yS 
litU 
etauqeda 
snoitcennoc 
epipdnats dna 
relknirps eht er A 
?tnadnuder dna 













c7.s yS 
litU 
sno itcennoc 
ylppus reta w dna 
tnardyh erif ereht 
er A ? snoitcenn 
oc 
epipdnats/relknirp
s eht raen 













a8.s yS 
litU 
,cirtcele eno 
,.g.e(spmup re 
taw erif 
tnadnuder ereht er 
A ?)leseid eno 













b8.s yS 
litU 
?reh t o hcae 
morf trapa 
detacolspmup eht 
er A 













a9.s yS 
litU 
?elbissecca 
smetsys rewes er 
A 













b9.s yS 
litU 
?deruces r o 
detce torp yeht er 
A 













01.s yS 
litU 
lac itirc r of nopu 
yler ytilicaf eht 
od seilppus leuf 
tah W ?n oitarepo 













a 11.s 
yS litU 
ytilicaf eht ta ro 
etis eht no derots 
sileuf hcum woH 
lacitirc troppus 
ytitnauq siht nac 
gnolwoh dna ?sn 
oitarepo 














Table E: 
Utility 
Systems 
(continued)
metI 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitaziretcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


epyT 
noit ce lloC 
sd ohteM yrevile D 
sms inahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
b 11.s yS 
litU 
?derots )leuf( 
tisiwoH 













c 11.s yS 
litU 
?deruces 
)leuf( 
tisiwoH 













a 21.s yS 
litU 
?deniatb o 
ylppus leuf 
eht siereh W 













b 21.s yS 
litU 
?dereviled 
)leuf( 
tisiwoH 













a 31.s yS 
litU 
?leuf fo 
secruos 
etanretla 
ereht er A 













a 31.s yS 
litU 
?leuf fo 
secruos 
etanretla 
ereht er A 













b 31.s yS 
litU 
?desu eb 
sleuf 
etanretla 
naC 













41.s yS litU 
eh t rof ec 
ivre s 
lacirtcele f o 
ecru os la 
mron eht 
sitah W 
?ytilicaf 













a 51.s yS 
litU 
?ecruos 
ecivres 
lacirtcele 
tnadnuder a 
ereht sI 













b 51.s yS 
litU 
y tilitu eno 
naht er om 
morf de f eb 
seitilicaf eht 
naC 
?noitatsbus 













61.s yS litU 
rof evah 
ytilicaf eht 
seod stniop 
yrtne ecivres 
yam woH 
?yticirtcele 













71.s yS litU 
?eruces 
gnidliub eht 
o t ec ivres 
cirtcele 
gnimocnieht 
sI 













a 81.s yS 
litU 
tahW ?tsixe 
rewop 
ycnegreme 
rof snoisivorp 
tah W 
yticapac 
evah dna 
rewop 
ycnegre me 
evie cer s 
metsys 
?detset neeb 
stne mer 
iuqer 













b 81.s yS 
litU 
laicrem moc 
eht htiw 
detacol-oc re 
wop 
ycnegreme 
eht sI 
?ecivres 
cirtcele 













c 81.s yS 
litU 
?rew op 
ycnegreme 
rof 
noitcennoc 
roiretxe na 
ereht sI 













91.s yS litU 
atad dna 
enohpelet 
nia m eht se 
od snaem 
tahw yB 
?ytilicaf eht 
ecafretni 
snoitacinu 
mmoc 













02.s yS litU 
eht rof 
snoitacol 
tnadnuder ro 
elpitlum 
ereht er A 
?ecivres 
noitac 
inummoc 
dna en ohpe 
let 













a 12.s yS 
litU 
h t iw noitac 
inumm oc 
eriuqer 
metsys mrala 
erif eht seo 
D ?se cruos 
lanre txe 













b 12.s yS 
litU 
eht ot tnes 
langis mrala 
eht sid 
ohtem tahw 
yB ?cte ,o 
idar 
,enohpele t 
:ycnega 
gnidnopser 













c 12.s yS 
litU 
?re tne c 
gniro t inom 
mrala 
yraidemretni 
na ereht sI 













22.s yS litU 
tcerid r o 
,dnu 
orgrednu 
,dnuorgevoba 
senilefilytilit
u er A 
?deirub 














Table F: 
Mechanical 
Systems 
(Including 
Chemical, 
Biological, 
and 
Radiologica
l Systems) 
(continued)
metI 
noit seuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitaz ire tcarahC 
scitcaT tsir orreT 


ep yT 
noit celloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
smsinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
b 
31.syShceM 
?saera eruces 
niyeh t erA 













c 
31.syShceM 
?detu or gniriw 
lortnoc eh t si 
w oH 













41.syShceM 
snalp troppu s 
sme tsys 
gnildna h ria fo 
lor tnoc eht 
seoD ?ecalp ni 
gniretlehs rof 













51.syShceM 
eht no detaco 
ltnempiuqe 
detnuom-f oor 
sierehW )fo or 
fo retnec ta 
,retemirep 
raen(?f oor 













61.syShceM 
?sreirrab er if 
lla ta 
dellatsnisrepma
d erif erA 













71.syShceM 
?ytirge tnirieh t 
n iatniam srood 
erif dna slla w 
erif oD 













81.syShceM 
ro tavele dna 
ytilibapac 
llacer e vah 
srotavele oD ? 
ytilibapac 
egasse m 
ycnegre me 














Table G: Plumbing and Gas Systems 
me t I 
no it seu Qy t il 
ibarenluV 
no i taz i re t carahC 
s c it caT t s iror reT 


epyT 
noi t ce l loC 
sd oh t eMyrev i l eD 
sms inahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
1 . 
saGbmulP 
?no itubi r t s id 
re tawfo doht e 
meht s itahW 













2 . 
saGbmulP 
, gni taeh(, ?n o 
i tubir t s idsag 
fo doht e meht s 
itahW ) s secorp 
, lac idem, gni k 
ooc 













3 . 
saGbmulP 
?n o i tubir t s 
idgnipipniameh
t ot y cnadnuder 
ereht s I 













a4 . 
saGbmulP 
? re ta wc it 
semod gni taeh 
fo doht e meht s 
itahW 













b4 . 
saGbmulP 
?desu s i ) s ( l 
euf tahW 













a5 . 
saGbmulP 
, gni taeh( ?de 
taco lsknat egar 
o t s sag era 
erehW ) s secorp 
, lac idem, gni k 
ooc 













b5 . 
saGbmulP 
no itubi r t s id 
eht ot depip ) s 
knat sag( yeht 
era woH )dnuorg 
wol eb ro 
evoba( ?me t sy 
s 













6 . 
saGbmulP 
? sesag lac i t ir 
c fo se ilppus 
evreser ereht 
erA 














Table H: 
Electrical 
Systems
met I 
n oitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a1.syStcel
E 
detacolsraeghct 
iws ro sremrofsnar 
t yna ereht er A 
gnidliub eht morf 
elbissecca ro 
gnidliub eht edis 
tuo ?roiretxe 













b1.syStcel
E 
ot elbarenluv 
)sraeghctiws ro 
sremrofsnart(yeht 
er A ?ssecca 
cilbup 













c1.syStcel
E 
?deruces 
)sraeghctiws ro 
sremrofsnart(yeht 
er A 













2.syStcelE 
ni gnithg il ytilicaf 
lanretxe eht fo 
tnetxe eh t si tah 
W desu sya wyrtne 
lamr on ta dna 
saera ecivres dna 
ytilitu ?stnapuc co 
gnidliub eh t yb 













3.syStcelE 
era ereh w dna 
deruces smoor 
lacirtcele eht era 
wo H gn itrats 
,saera k sir rehgih 
rehto ot evitaler 
detacol yeht 
ecivres eht ta moor 
noitubirtsidlacirtcel
e niam eht htiw 
?ecnartne 













a4.syStcel
E 
rehto htiw detac 
ol-oc s metsys 
lacirtcele lacitirc 
er A ?sme tsys 
gnidliub 













b4.syStcel
E 
fo edistuo saera 
nidetac ol s metsys 
lacirtcele lacitirc 
er A ?saera la 
cirtcele deru ces 













c4.syStcel
E 
morf yletarapes 
detacol gniriw 
metsys ytiruce s sI 
?smets ys ecivres 
rehto dna lac 
irtcele 













5.syStcelE 
hcnarb gnivres 
slenap noitubirt sid 
lacirtcele era wo 
H ?sn oitacol 
eruces ni yeht era 
ro deruces stiucric 













a6.syStcel
E 
nihtiw saera lla rof 
t sixe re wop 
pukcab ycnegreme 
se o D ? ylno saera 
lacitirc rof r o 
ytilicaf eht 













b6.syStcel
E 
?detubir tsid rew 
op ycnegreme eht 
si wo H 













c6.syStcel
E 
eht morf 
tnednepednimetsys 
rewop ycnegreme 
eht sI ?saera la 
citir c 
niylralucitrap ,e 
civres la cirtcele la 
mron 













a7.syStcel
E 
?detubir tsid gniriw 
metsys lac irtcele 
yra mirp eht si wo 
H 













b7.syStcel
E 
?seitilitu r ojam 
reh to ht iw 
detacol-oc t isI 













c7.syStcel
E 
?saera lacitirc o t 
noitubirts id f o 
ycnadnuder ereht sI 














Table I: 
Fire 
Alarm 
Systems
met I 
n oitseuQ 
ytilibarenlu
V 
noi tazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a 1.mral 
AeriF 
r o 
dezilartnec 
metsys 
mrala erif y 
tilicaf eht sI 
?dezilacol 













b 1.mral 
AeriF 
dna yllacol 
ht ob ,deta 
icnunna s 
mrala era 
wo H ?yl 
lartnec 













c 1.mral 
AeriF 
ni detacol 
smetsys 
lortnoc dna s 
tnemu cod 
laci tirc er A 
?noi tacol e 
lb issec ca 
tey eruces a 













a 2.mral 
AeriF 
?detacol 
slenap mrala 
erif eht era 
ereh W 













b 2.mral 
AeriF 
?lennosrep 
de 
zirohtuanu ot 
ssecca wolla 
yeht er A 













a 3.mral 
AeriF 
de targetni 
ro enola-
dnats mets 
ys mrala erif 
eht sI dna 
ytiruce s sa 
hcus sn 
oitcnuf rehto 
hti w ?sme 
tsy s 
tnemegana 
m gnidliub 
ro latnemn 
orivne 













b 3.mral 
AeriF 
?ecafretni eh 
t si tah W 













4.mral 
AeriF 
-erif evah 
stnen opm 
oc metsys 
mrala erif 
yek o D dna 
?noitarapes 
tnatsiser-
tsalb 













5.mral 
AeriF 
?gnitroper 
mrala erif 
sesimerp-ffo 
tnadnuder 
ereht sI 














Table J: 
Communications 
and IT Systems
met I 
n oitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a1.T ImmoC 
dna moor 
noitubirtsid 
enohpelet 
niam eh t si 
ereh W ?saera 
ksir rehgih ot 
no italer niti s 
iereh w 













b1.T ImmoC 
?eruces moor 
noitubir t sid 
enohpelet 
niam eht sI 













a2.T ImmoC 
S PU na evah 
metsys 
enohpelet eht 
se o D 
?)ylppus 
rewop 
elbitpurretninu
( 













b2.T ImmoC 
lano itarepo 
,gnitar re wop 
,epyt )spu(sti 
si tah W ,enil-
no ,yret tab( 
?no itacoldna 
,dao lrednu 
noitarud 
)deretlif 













a3.T ImmoC 
stes olc gniriw 
smetsys no 
itacinu mmoc 
era ereh W 
)mrala ,langis 
,atad 
,eciov(?detaco
l 













b3.T ImmoC 
htiw deta col-
oc )ste solc 
noita cinu 
mmoc(yeht er 
A ?seitilitu 
rehto 













c3.T ImmoC 
?saera eruces 
ni)ste solc 
noita cinu 
mmoc(yeht er 
A 













4.T ImmoC 
?detubirtsid 
gniriw me t 
sys snoitacinu 
mmoc si wo H 
)saera cilbup 
elbissecca ,sre 
sir dna se sahc 
eruces( 













5.T ImmoC 
smets ys 
snoitacinum 
moc tnadnuder 
ereht er A 
?elbaliava 













a6.T ImmoC 
,sretnec atad 
,ytilicaf 
noitubirtsid 
niam eht era 
ereh W ?detac 
ol srevre s dna 
,s llawer if 
,sretu or 













b6.T ImmoC 
)TI 
(etaidemretni 
ro/dna 
yradnoces eht 
era ereh W 
?seitilicaf 
noitubirtsid 













7.T ImmoC 
aera ediw( 
NAW eht era 
ereh w dna 
epy t tah W 
?snoitcennoc 
)kro wten 













a8.T ImmoC 
SPU eht fo no 
itacoldna 
,gnitar rewop 
,epy t tah W 
,enil-no ,yret 
tab( ?)ylppus 
rewop 
elbitpurretninu
( )deretlif 













b8.T ImmoC 
?rewop 
ycnegreme o t 
detcenn oc 
osla S PU eht 
er A 













9.T ImmoC 
dna gn ilba c 
)kr owten aera 
lacol( N AL fo 
epy t tah W 
tibagiG , 5 
)taC(yr 
ogetaC(?desu 
siygo lopot 
lacis yhp 
)gniR nekoT , 
tenreht E 
,tenrehtE 













01.T ImmoC 
rieht era tahw 
,smetsys 
sseleriw/oidar 
dellatsniro F 
oidar( 
FR(?detacolye
h t era erehw 
dna sepyt hgih 
yrev( FHV ,)y 
cneuqerf 
hgih(FH 
,)ycneuqerf 
)evaw muide 
m( WM 
,)ycneuqerf 














Table J: 
Communications 
and IT Systems 
(continued)
met I 
n oitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
noitazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
11.T ImmoC 
)re tupmoc -ygo 
lonhceT 
noitamrofn I(TI eh 
t o D ,ytirgetni 
,ytilaitnedifnoc fo 
s tnemeriuqer 
teem smets ys 
?ytilibalia va dna 













21.T ImmoC 
?etis 
gnirorrim/yrevocer 
retsas id eh t si 
ereh W 













31.T ImmoC 
tahw dna etis 
egarots elif/epat 
pu-k cab eh t si 
ereh W ,tluav 
,efas 
(?tnemnorivne 
efas fo epyt eh t si 
eh t ninoitaregirfer 
tnadnuder ereht 
sI)dnuorgrednu ?e 
tis)egaro ts TI 
pukcab( 













41.T ImmoC 
)snoitacinum moc 
etilletas( 
MOCTAS yna 
ereht er A eraps 
,rewop ycnegreme 
,SP U ,re wop 
,noitac ol(?skn il 
)ytilibapac/yticap
ac 













a51.T ImmoC 
lla seh caer taht 
metsys n 
oitacifiton ssa m a 
ereht sI ,enohp 
llec ,regap 
,sserdda cilbup( 
?stnapucco gn 
idliub ).cte 
,edirrevo retupm 
oc 













b51.T ImmoC 
lan oitarepo eb 
smets ys eseht fo 
erom ro eno lliW 
)re wop y 
cnegreme 
,SPU(?snoitidn oc 
drazah rednu 













a61.T ImmoC 
etanretla 
detangised rieht 
dna sretnec lor 
tnoc o D rof 
ytilibapac decuder 
ro tnelaviuqe evah 
snoitacol 
ycnegreme(?.cte 
,noitacifiton ssam 
,atad ,eciov 
)noitamotua 
gnidliub ,smrala 
erif ,ytiru ces 
,snoitarepo 













b61.T ImmoC 
pukcab ot ssecca 
evah osla 
snoitacoletanretla 
eh t o D ?re wop 
ycnegreme 
gnidulcni,smets ys 














Table L: 
Security 
Systems
met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibaren luV 
noitazire tcarahC 

sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 

sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle

Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a1.mirePce
S 
)noisivelet tiucric 
de solc(VTCC 
roloc ro 
etihw/kcalb er A 
?desu saremac 














b1.mirePce
S 
a syad 7 /sruoh 4 
2 dedr ocer dna 
der otinom yeht er 
A ?moh w yB 
?keew 














c1.mirePce
S 
?ngised yb latigid 
ro golana yeht er 
A 














d1.mirePce
S 
-tlit-nap dna 
sseleriw ,dexif fo 
rebmun eht era 
tah W ?desu 
sarema c mooz 














e1.mirePce
S 
?saremac VTCC 
eht fo sreru 
tcafunam eht era 
oh W 














f1.mirePce
S 
?esu nisaremac 
VTCC eht fo ega 
eh t si tah W 














a2.mirePce
S 
yllacita motua 
dnopser ot de 
mmargorp sare 
mac eht er A ?s 
tneve mrala 
gnidliub retemirep 
ot 














b2.mirePce
S 
?se itilibapac 
noitom oediv ni-
tliub evah yeht o 
D 














3.mirePceS 
yeh t era dna desu 
era sgnisu oh 
aremac fo ep yt 
tah W ot eru 
sopxe t sniaga 
tcet orp ot ngised 
nila tnemn orivne 
?stnemele 
rehtaew dloc dna 
taeh 














4.mirePceS 
erehw ,desu 
srosnes ro snottub 
mrala sserud 
/cinap er A ?e 
lbatr op ro 
deriwdrah yeht 
era dna detac ol 
yeht era 














5.mirePceS 
ro saera gnikrap 
nidesu sexob llac 
mocretni er A 
?retemirep 
gnidliub eht gnola 














6.mirePceS 
timsnart o t desu 
aidem 
noissimsnart eh t 
si tah W ,eriw en 
ohpele t ,enil eriw 
,rebif :slangis 
oediv aremac 
?sseleriw , 
laixaoc 














7.mirePceS 
?mets ys VTCC 
eht sr otinom oh 
W 














a8.mirePce
S 
eh t gnirud h tob 
segami oediv f o 
ytilauq eh t si tah 
W ?ssen krad fo 
sru oh dna yad 














b8.mirePce
S 
?desu sro 
tanimulliaremac 
derarfni er A 














9.mirePceS 
na yb detroppus 
saremac rete 
mirep eht er A 
gnid liub r o 
,yrettab ,ylppus re 
wop elbitpurre 
tninu ?re w op 
ycnegreme 














01.mirePce
S 
:desu era srosnes 
S D I roiretxe fo 
ep yt tah W 
citatsib 
,derarfnievitca 
,citpo rebif 
,citengam ortcele 
ssalg ,ecnef ,dnu 
org ,cirtce leotohp 
,cimsies ,e 
vaworcim pullor 
dna elbuod ,elgnis 
,)kc 
ohs/noitarbiv(kaer
b .sehc tiws ro s 
tcatnoc citengam 
rood 















Table L: 
Security 
Systems 
(continued)
met I 
noitseuQ yt 
ilibarenluV 
noitazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
c23.retn 
IceS 
no isurtn ifo 
gnirotinom 
ruoh-42 etis -
ffo ereh t s I 
?smetsys 
noitceted 













33.retn IceS 
nietauqeda 
moor lor tno 
c dna elosn 
oc y tiruces 
eh t s I 
etauqeda 
evah ,no 
isnapxe rof 
mo or 
edivorp ,e 
zis .g.eria 
,gnitaeh 
,gnithgil , 
c/a (slortnoc 
tnemnorivne 
ylla 
cimonogre si 
dna ),cte ,re 
wop pukcab 
,noitalucric 
?dengised 













43.retn IceS 
aera eruces 
a nimoor 
ytiruces eht 
fo noitacoleh 
t s I 
nislortnoc 
ssecca detcir 
tser dna 
dellortn oc 
,detimilht iw 
?ecalp 













a53.retn 
IceS 
ytiruces dna 
ytilicaf 
hcihw yb 
snae m eht 
era tahW 
elbatr op 
:rehtona eno 
htiw 
etacinummo
c nac lenn 
osrep s 
tnatsissa 
atad 
lanosrep 
,enohp llec 
,regap ,oidar 
?)cte ,)s' AD 
P( 













b53.retn 
IceS 
dna e seht h 
tiw 
decneirepxe 
neeb evah 
smelborp 
tahW 
?smetsys 
ytiruces cin 
ortcele rehto 













63.retn IceS 
gnitroper 
tnedicniy 
tiruces 
dezire 
tupmoc a 
ereh t s I 
ytiruce s 
kcart dna 
stroper 
eraperp ot 
desu metsys 
?snrettap 
dna sdnert 
tnedicni 













73.retn IceS 
a esu o t 
ssecca e vah 
ecrof 
ytiruces 
tneserp eht 
seoD ? 
metsys ruot 
draug 
deziretupmo
c 













a83.retn 
IceS 
?ytilicaf eht 
ni sefas ro 
stluav erA 













b83.retn 
IceS 
?detacolyeht 
era erehW 













9 
3.scoDceS 
detareneg 
neeb 
sgniward 
tliub-sa me 
tsy s ytiruces 
erA ?weiver 
r of ydaer 
dna 













0 
4.scoDceS 
sdradnats 
gniward dna 
ngised mets 
ys y tiruces 
e vaH 
?depoleved 
neeb 













1 
4.scoDceS 
?denifed aire 
tirc noitce 
les 
tnempiuqe 
ytiru ces erA 













2 
4.scoDceS 
ni era ro 
depoleved 
neeb evah 
snalp ycnegn 
itnoc tahW y 
cnadnuder 
retnec lortn 
oc y tiruces 
h tiw laed ot 
ecalp ?sn 
oitarepo 
pukcab dna 













3 
4.scoDceS 
noita 
cificeps 
noitcurtsnoc 
mets ys y 
tiruces e 
vaH 
?dezidradnat
s dna 
deraperp 
neeb 
stnemucod 













4 
4.scoDceS 
tliub-sa 
edulcni ot 
stnemucod 
metsys 
ytiruces lla 
erA ?tnerru 
c sgniward 














Table L: 
Security 
Systems 
(continued)
met I 
noitseuQ 
ytilibarenluV 
n oita ziretcarahC 
scitcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdoh teM yre vileD 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
5 
4.scoDceS 
y tiruces 
gnisu 
nidenimreted 
neeb 
snoitacifilauq 
eva H , 
sreenigne 
dna 
srengised 
metsys 
,stnatlusnoc 
? srotcar 
tnoc dna 
,srodne v 
noita llatsni 













6 
4.scoDceS 
,dezilartnec 
,dezilartnece
d smetsys 
ytiruces erA 
ro kro wten 
TI gnitsixe 
rev o etarep 
o dna 
,detargetni 
?noitarep o 
fo dohtem 
eno ladnat s 













7 
4.scoDceS 
?elbaliava 
era slaunam 
smetsys y 
tiruces tahW 













8 
4.scoDceS 
rof tsixe 
stnemeerga 
ecivres ro 
ecnanetniam 
tahW ?sme 
tsys ytiruce s 














Table 
M: 
Security 
Master 
Plan
met I 
noitseuQ yt 
ilibarenluV 
noi tazire tcarahC 
sc itcaT tsirorreT 


ep yT 
noitcelloC 
sdohteM yrevile D 
s msinahceM 


Vulnerability 
estimate
Detailed 
assessment
Visual 
inspection
Document 
review
Org/Mgmt 
procedure
Moving 
vehicle
Stationary 
vehicle
Covert 
entry
Mail
Supplies
Blast 
effects
Airborne 
(contamination)
Waterborne 
(contamination) 
a 1.nal 
PceS 
?ytilicaf siht rof 
tsixe nalp ytiruces 
nettir w a seoD 













b 1.nal 
PceS 
t sal dna nettir w 
nalp ytiruces lait 
ini eht saw nehW 
?desi ver 













c 1.nal 
PceS 
eht gniwei ver dna 
gniraperp rof 
elbisnopser s i 
ohW ?nalp 
ytiruces 













2.nal 
PceS 
dna detacinu 
mmoc neeb nalp 
ytiruces eht saH 
dna lennosrep 
tnemeganam yek 
ot detani mess id 
?s tnemtraped 













3.nal 
PceS 
derapmoc ro dekra 
mhcneb neeb nalp 
ytiruces eht saH 
?seititne 
lanoitarepo dna 
snoitazinagro 
detaler tsniaga 













4.nal 
PceS 
detaulave dna det 
set neeb reve nalp 
ytiruces eht saH 
dna ycnei ciffe lan 
oitarepo dna 
tifeneb-ts oc a 
morf ?e vitcepsrep 
ssenevitceffe 













5.nal 
PceS 
ytiru ces mre t 
gnol-troh s ,noisiv 
,noissim enifed ti 
seoD ?sevi tcejbo 
dna slaog margorp 













6.nal 
PceS 
denifed yletauqeda 
sk sir 
,seitilibarenluv 
,staerht erA de 
zitir oirp dna 
desserdda 
serusaemretnuoc y 
tiruces dna fo yti 
libaborp dna y 
tilacitirc rieh t ot 
tnaveler 
?ecnerrucco 













7.nal 
PceS 
neeb eludehcs 
noitatne melpmi 
ytiruces a saH 
?snoitu los ytiruces 
dednemmocer 
sserdda ot 
dehsilbatse 













8.nal 
PceS 
neeb stegdub 
latipac dna gn 
itarepo y tiruces e 
vaH eht troppus ot 
dehsilba tse dna de 
vorppa ,desserdda 
?nalp 













9.nal 
PceS 
ere w 
sdradnats/senilediu
g yrtsudni ro 
yrotaluger tahW 
?nalp ytiruces eht 
fo noitaraperp eht 
ni dewollof 













0 1.nal 
PceS 
ytiruces gnit sixe 
sserdda nalp 
ytiruces eht seoD 
,lan oitarepo 
,evitartsinimda na 
m orf sn oitidnoc 
?evitcepsrep s 
metsys ytiruce s 
lacinhcet dna 
laireganam 













1 1.nal 
PceS 
,elpoep f o 
noitcetorp eht 
sserdda nalp 
ytiruces eht seoD 
?noi tamrofni dna , 
stessa ,ytreporp 













2 1.nal 
PceS 
rojam gn iwollof 
eht sserdda nalp 
ytiruces eht seoD 
,esnopser 
,ecnallievrus ,l 
ortnoc ssecca 
:stnenopmoc 
,lacigol oib tsniaga 
noitce torp dna 
gninedrah gnidliub 
?skcat ta krowten-
rebyc dna 
lacigoloidar 
,lacimehc 















GENERAL GLOSSARY

A

Access Control. Any combination of barriers, gates, electronic security equipment, 
and/or guards that can deny entry to unauthorized personnel or vehicles. 
Access Control Point. A station at an entrance to a building or a portion of a building 
where identification is checked and people and hand-carried items are searched. 
Access Controls. Procedures and controls that limit or detect access to minimum 
essential infrastructure resource elements (people, technology, applications, data 
and/or facilities), thereby protecting these resources against loss of integrity, 
confidentiality accountability and/or availability. 
Access Control System. Also referred to as an electronic entry control system; an 
electronic system that controls entry and egress from a building or area. 
Access Control System Elements. Detection measures used to control vehicle or 
personnel entry into a protected area. Access control system elements include locks, 
electronic entry control systems, and guards. 
Access Group. A software configuration of an access control system that group 
together access points or authorized users for easier arrangement and maintenance 
of the system. 
Access Road. Any roadway such as a maintenance, delivery, service, emergency, or 
other special limited use road that is necessary for the operation of a building or 
structure. 
Accountability. The explicit assignment of responsibilities for oversight of areas of 
control to executives, managers, staff, owners, providers, and users of minimum 
essential infrastructure resource elements. 
Acoustic Eavesdropping. The use of listening devices to monitor voice 
communications or other audibly transmitted information with the objective to 
compromise information. 
Active Vehicle Barrier. An impediment placed at an access control point which may 
be manually or automatically deployed in response to detection of a threat. 
Aerosol. Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas, for example, fog or smoke. 
Aggressor. Any person seeking to compromise a function or structure. 
Airborne Contamination. Chemical or biological agents introduced into and 
fouling the source of supply breathing or conditioning air. 
Airlock. A building entry configuration with which airflow from the outside can be 
prevented from entering a toxic-free area. An airlock uses two doors, only one of 
which can be opened at a time, and a blower system to maintain positive air pressures 
and purge contaminated air from the airlock before the second door is opened. 
Alarm Assessment. Verification and evaluation of an alarm alert through the use of 
closed circuit television or human observation. Systems used for alarm assessment are 
designed to respond rapidly, automatically, and predictably to the receipt of alarms at 
the security center. 
Alarm Printers. Alarm printers provide a hard-copy of all alarm events and system 
activity, as well as limited backup in case the visual display fails. 
Alarm Priority. A hierarchy of alarms by order of importance. This is often used in 
larger systems to give priority to alarm with greater importance. 
Annunciation. A visual, audible, or other indication by a security system of a 
condition. 
Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, 
forces, and property to terrorist acts. 
Area Commander. A military commander with authority in a specific geographical 
area or military installation. 
Area Lighting. Lighting which illuminates a large exterior area. 
Areas of Potential Compromise. Categories where losses can occur that will impact 
either a department or agency�s minimum essential infrastructure and its ability to 
conduct core functions and activities. 
Assessment. The evaluation and interpretation of measurements and other 
information to provide a basis for decision-making. 
Assessment System Elements. Detection measures used to assist guards in visual 
verification of intrusion detection system alarms and access control system functions 
and to assist in visual detection by guards. Assessment system elements include closed-
circuit television and protective lighting. 
Asset. A resource of value requiring protection. An asset can be tangible such as 
people, buildings, facilities, equipment, activities, operations, and information; or 
intangible, such as processes or a company�s information and reputation. 
Asset Value. The degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the 
incapacity or destruction of an asset. 
Asset Protection. Security program designed to protect personnel, facilities, and 
equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and 
integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations 
security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and other security programs. 
Attack. A hostile action resulting in the destruction, injury or death to the civilian 
population, or damage or destruction to public and private property. 
Audible Alarm Devices. An alarm device which produces an audible announcement 
(bell, horn, siren, etc.) of an alarm condition. 
B

Balanced Magnetic Switch. A door position switch utilizing a reed switch held in a 
balanced or center position by interacting magnetic fields when not in alarm 
condition. 
Ballistics Attack. Attack in which small arms (such as pistols, submachine guns, 
shotguns, and rifles) are fired from a distance and rely on the flight of the projectile 
to damage the target. 
Barbed Tape or Concertina. A coiled tape or coil of wires with wire barbs or blades 
deployed as an obstacle to human trespass or entry into an area. 
Barbed Wire. A double strand of wire with four-point barbs equally spaced along the 
wire deployed as an obstacle to human trespass or entry into an area. 
Barcode. Black bars printed on white paper or tape that can be easily read with an 
optical scanner. 
Biological Agents. Living organisms or the materials derived from them that cause 
disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants or cause deterioration of material. 
Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders. 
Biometrics. The use of physical characteristics of the human body as a unique 
identification method. 
Biometric Reader. A device that gathers and analyzes biometric features. 
Blast Curtains. Heavy curtains made of blast resistant materials that could protect 
the occupants of a room from flying debris. 
Blast-Resistant Glazing. Window opening glazing that is resistant to blast effects 
because of the interrelated function of the frame and glazing material properties 
frequently dependent upon tempered glass, polycarbonate, or laminated glazing. 
Blast Vulnerability Envelope. The geographical area in which an explosive device will 
cause damage to assets. 
Bollard. A vehicle barrier consisting of a cylinder, usually made of steel and sometimes 
filled with concrete, placed on end in the ground and spaced about 3 feet apart to 
prevent vehicles from passing, but allowing entrance of pedestrians and bicycles. 
Boundary Penetration Sensors. Interior intrusion detection sensors which detect an 
attempt by individuals to penetrate or enter a building. 
Building Hardening. Enhanced construction that reduces vulnerability to external 
blast and ballistic attack. 
Building Separation. The distance between closest points on the exterior walls of 
adjacent buildings or structures. 
Business Continuity Program. An ongoing process supported by senior management 
and funded to insure that the necessary steps are taken to identify the impact of 
potential losses, maintain viable recovery strategies and recovery plans, and ensure 
continuity services through personnel training, plan testing and maintenance. 
C

Cable Barrier. Cable or wire rope anchored to and suspended off the ground or 
attached to chain link fence to act as a barrier to moving vehicles. 
Capacitance Sensor. A device that detects an intruder approaching or touching a 
metal object by sensing a change in capacitance between the object and the ground. 
Card Reader. A device that gathers or reads information when a card is presented as 
an identification method. 
Chemical Agent. A chemical substance that is intended to kill, seriously injure, or 
incapacitate people through physiological effects. Generally separated by severity of 
effect: lethal, blister, and incapacitating. 
Clear Zone. An area that is clear of visual obstructions and landscape materials that 
could conceal a threat or perpetrator. 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). An electronic system of cameras, control 
equipment, recorders, and related apparatus used for surveillance or alarm 
assessment. 
CCTV Pan-Tilt-Zoom Camera (PTZ). A CCTV camera that can move side to side, up 
and down, and zoom in or out. 
CCTV Pan-Tilt-Zoom Control. The method of controlling the PTZ functions of a 
camera. 
CCTV Pan-Tilt-Zoom Controller. The operator interface for performing PTZ control. 
CCTV Switcher. A piece of equipment capable of presenting any of multiple video 
images to various monitors, recorders, and so forth. 
Chimney Effect. Air movement in a building between floors caused by differential air 
temperature (differences in density), between the air inside and outside the building. 
It occurs in vertical shafts, such as elevator, stairwell, and conduit/wiring/piping 
chase. Hotter air inside the building will rise and be replaced by infiltration with 
colder outside air through the lower portions of the building. Conversely, reversing 
the temperature will reverse the flow (down the chimney). Also know as stack effect. 
Collateral Damage. Injury or damage to assets that are not the primary target of an 
attack. 
Combating Terrorism. The full range of federal programs and activities applied 
against terrorism, domestically and abroad, regardless of the source or motive. 
Community. A political entity which has the authority to adopt and enforce laws and 
ordinances for the area under its jurisdiction. In most cases, the community is an 
incorporated town, city, township, village, or unincorporated area of a county. 
However, each State defines its own political subdivisions and forms of government. 
Components and Cladding. Elements of the building envelope that do not qualify as 
part of the main wind-force resisting system. 
Confidentiality. The protection of sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure 
and sensitive facilities from physical, technical or electronic penetration or 
exploitation. 
Consequence Management. Measures to protect public health and safety, restore 
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, 
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. state and local 
governments exercise primary authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism. 
Contamination. The undesirable deposition of a chemical, biological, or 
radiological material on the surface of structures, areas, objects, or people. 
Continuity of Services and Operations. Controls to ensure that, when unexpected 
events occur, departmental/agency minimum essential infrastructure services and 
operations, including computer operations, continue without interruption or are 
promptly resumed and critical and sensitive date are protected through adequate 
contingency and business recovery plans and exercises. 
Control Center. A centrally located room or facility staffed by personnel charged with 
the over sight of specific situations and/or equipment. 
Controlled Area. An area into which access is controlled or limited. It is that portion 
of a restricted area usually near or surrounding a limited or exclusion area. 
Correlates with exclusion zone. 
Controlled Lighting. Lighting illumination of specific areas or sections. 
Controlled Perimeter. A physical boundary at which vehicle and personnel access is 
controlled at the perimeter of a site. Access control at a controlled perimeter should 
demonstrate the capability to search individuals and vehicles. 
Conventional Construction. Building construction that is not specifically designed to 
resist weapons, explosives, or chemical, biological and radiological effects. 
Conventional construction is designed only to resist common loadings and 
environmental effects such as wind, seismic, and snow loads. 
Coordinate. To advance systematically an exchange of information among principals 
who have or may have a need to know certain information in order to carry out their 
role in a response. 
Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted 
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; or international 
terrorist activities, excluding personnel, physical, document, and communications 
security programs. 
Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to 
terrorism. 
Covert Entry. Attempts to enter a facility by using false credentials or stealth. 
Crash Bar. A mechanical egress device located on the interior side of a door that 
unlocks the door when pressure is applied in the direction of egress. 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). A crime prevention 
strategy based on evidence that the design and form of the built environment can 
influence human behavior. CPTED usually involves the use of three principles: natural 
surveillance (by placing physical features, activities, and people to maximize visibility); 
natural access control (through the judicial placement of entrances, exits, fencing, 
landscaping, and lighting); and territorial reinforcement (using buildings, fences, 
pavement, signs, and landscaping to express ownership). 
Crisis Management. The measures taken to identify, acquire, and plan the use of 
resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. 
Critical Assets. Those assets essential to the minimum operations of the organization, 
and to ensure the health and safety of the general public. 
Critical Infrastructure. Primary infrastructure systems (utilities, telecommunications, 
transportation, etc.) whose incapacity would have a debilitating impact on the 
organization�s ability to function. 
D

Damage Assessment. The process used to appraise or determine the number of 
injuries and deaths, damage to public and private property, and the status of key 
facilities and services such as hospitals and other health care facilities, fire and police 
stations, communications networks, water and sanitation systems, utilities, and 
transportation networks resulting from a man-made or natural disaster. 
Data Gathering Panel. A local processing unit that retrieves, processes, stores, and / 
or acts on information in the field. 
Data Transmission Equipment. A path for transmitting data between two or more 
components (such as a sensor and alarm reporting system, a card reader and 
controller, a CCTV camera and monitor, or a transmitter and receiver). 
Decontamination. The reduction or removal of a chemical, biological, or 
radiological material from the surface of a structure, area, object, or person. 
Defense Layer. Building design or exterior perimeter barriers intended to delay 
attempted forced entry. 
Defensive Measures. Protective measures which delay or prevent attack on an asset or 
which shield the asset from weapons, explosives, and CBR effects. Defensive measures 
include site work and building design. 
Delay Rating. A measure of the effectiveness of penetration protection of a defense 
layer. 
Design Basis Threat. The threat (tactics, and associated weapons, tools, or explosives) 
against which assets within a building must be protected and upon which the security 
engineering design of the building is based. 
Design Constraint. Anything which restricts the design options for a protective 
system or which creates additional problems for which the design must compensate. 
Design Opportunity. Anything which enhances protection, reduces requirements 
for protective measures, or solves a design problem. 
Design Team. A group of individuals from various engineering and architectural 
disciplines responsible for the protective system design. 
Detection Layer. A ring of intrusion detection sensors located on or adjacent to a 
defensive layer or between two defensive layers. 
Detection Measures. Protective measures which detect intruders, weapons, or 
explosives; assist in assessing the validity of detection; control access to protected 
areas; and communicate the appropriate information to the response force. Detection 
measures include detection system, assessment system, and access control system 
elements. 
Detection System Elements. Detection measures which detect the presence of 
intruders, weapons, or explosives. Detection system elements include intrusion 
detection systems, weapons and explosives detectors, and guards. 
Disaster. An occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident or human-
caused event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple 
injuries. 
Disaster Field Office (DFO). The office established in or near the designated area of 
a Presidentially declared major disaster to support federal and state response and 
recovery operations. 
Disaster Recovery Center (DRC). Places established in the area of a Presidentially 
declared major disaster, as soon as practicable, to provide victims the opportunity to 
apply in person for assistance and/or obtain information relating to that assistance. 
Domestic Terrorism. The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a 
group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto 
Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance 
of political or social objectives. 
Door Position Switch. A switch that changes state based on whether or not a door is 
closed. Typically, a switch mounted in a frame that is actuated by a magnet in a door. 
Door Strike, Electronic. An electro-mechanical lock that releases a door plunger to 
unlock the door. Typically, an electronic door strike is mounted in place of or near a 
normal door strike plate. 
Dose Rate (Radiation). A general term indicating the quantity (total or accumulated) 
of ionizing radiation or energy absorbed by a person or animal per unit of time. 
Dosimeter. An instrument for measuring and registering total accumulated exposure 
to ionizing radiation. 
Dual Technology Sensors. Sensors that combine two different technologies in one 
unit. 
Duress Alarm Devices. Also known as panic buttons, these devices are designated 
specifically to initiate a panic alarm. 
E

Effective Standoff Distance. A standoff distance at which the required level of 
protection can be shown to be achieved through analysis or can be achieved through 
building hardening or other mitigating construction or retrofit. 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). A sharp pulse of energy radiated instantaneously by a 
nuclear detonation which may affect or damage electronic components and 
equipment. EMP can also be generated in lesser intensity by non-nuclear means in 
specific frequency ranges to perform the same disruptive function. 
Electronic Emanations. Electro-magnetic emissions from computers, communications, 
electronics, wiring and related equipment. 
Electronic-Emanations Eavesdropping. Use of electronic-emana-tion surveillance 
equipment from outside a facility or its restricted area to monitor electronic 
emanations from computers, communications, and related equipment. 
Electronic Entry Control Systems. Electronic devices which automatically verify 
authorization for a person to enter or exit a controlled area. 
Electronic Security System. An integrated system which encompasses interior and 
exterior sensors, closed-circuit television systems for assessment of alarm conditions, 
electronic entry control systems, data transmission media, and alarm reporting 
systems for monitoring, control, and display of various alarm and system information. 
Emergency. Any natural or man-caused situation that results in or may result in 
substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of 
property. 
Emergency Alert System. A communications system of broadcast stations and 
interconnecting facilities authorized by the Federal Communication Commission. 
The system provides the President and other national, state, and local officials the 
means to broadcast emergency information to the public before, during, and after 
disasters. 
Emergency Environmental Health Services. Services required to correct or improve 
damaging environmental health effects on humans, including inspection for food 
contamination, inspection for water contamination, and vector control; providing for 
sewage and solid waste inspection and disposal; cleanup and disposal of hazardous 
materials; and sanitation inspection for emergency shelter facilities. 
Emergency Medical Services. Services including personnel, facilities, and equipment 
required to ensure proper medical care for the sick and injured from the time of 
injury to the time of final disposition, including medical disposition within a hospital, 
temporary medical facility, or special care facility, release from site, or declared dead. 
Further, emergency medical services specifically include those services immediately 
required to ensure proper medical care and specialized treatment for patients in a 
hospital and coordination of related hospital services. 
Emergency Mortuary Services. Services required to assure adequate death 
investigation, identification, and disposition of bodies; removal, temporary storage, 
and transportation of bodies to temporary morgue facilities; notification of next of 
kin; and coordination of mortuary services and burial of unclaimed bodies. 
Emergency Operations Center. The protected site from which state and local civil 
government officials coordinate, monitor, and direct emergency response activities 
during an emergency. 
Emergency Operations Plan. A document that: describes how people and property 
will be protected in disaster and disaster threat situations; details who is responsible 
for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, 
supplies, and other resources available for use in the disaster; and outlines how all 
actions will be coordinated. 
Emergency Planning Zones. Areas around a facility for which planning is needed to 
ensure prompt and effective actions are taken to protect the health and safety of the 
public if an accident or disaster occurs. In the Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Program the two EPZ�s are: 
Plume Exposure Pathway (10-mile EPZ). A circular geographic zone (with a 
10-mile radius centered at the nuclear power plant) for which plans are 
developed to protect the public against exposure to radiation emanating 
from a radioactive plume caused as a result of an accident at the nuclear 
power plant. 
Ingestion Pathway (50-mile EPZ). A circular geographic zone (with a 50-mile 
radius centered at the nuclear power plant) for which plans are developed to 
protect the public from the ingestion of water or ford contaminated as a result 
of a nuclear power plant accident. 
In Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, the EPZ is divided into 
three concentric circular zones: 
Immediate Response Zone (IRZ). A circular zone ranging from 10 to 15 
kilometers (6 to 9 miles) from the potential chemical event source, depending 
on the stockpile location on-post. Emergency response plans developed for the 
IRZ must provide for the most rapid and effective protective actions possible, 
since the IRZ will have the highest concentration of agent and the least 
amount of warning time. 
Protective Action Zone (PAZ). An area that extends beyond the IRZ to 
approximately 16 to 50 kilometers (10 to 30 miles) from the stockpile location. 
The PAZ is that area where public protective actions may still be necessary in 
case of an accidental release of chemical agent, but where the available 
warning and response time is such that most people could evacuate. However, 
other responses (e.g., sheltering) may be appropriate for institutions and 
special populations that could not evacuate within the available time. 
Precautionary Zone (PZ). The outermost portion of the EPZ for CSEPP, 
extending from the PAZ outer boundary to a distance where the risk of adverse 
impacts to humans is negligible. Because of the increased warning and re-
sponse time available for implementation of response actions in the PZ, 
detailed local emergency planning is not required, although consequence 
management planning may be appropriate. 
Emergency Public Information. Information which is disseminated primarily in 
anticipation of an emergency or at the actual time of an emergency and in addition 
to providing information, frequently directs actions, instructs, and transmits direct 
orders. 
Emergency Response Team (ERT). An interagency team, consisting of the lead 
representative from each federal department or agency assigned primary 
responsibility for an ESF and key members of the FCO�s staff, formed to assist the FCO 
in carrying out his/her coordination responsibilities. 
Emergency Response Team Advance Element (ERT-A). For federal disaster response 
and recovery activities under the Stafford Act, the portion of the ERT that is first 
deployed to the field to respond to a disaster incident. The ERT-A is the nucleus of 
the full ERT. 
Emergency Response Team National (ERT-N). An ERT that has been established and 
rostered for deployment to catastrophic disasters where the resources of the FEMA 
Region have been, or are expected to be, overwhelmed. Three ERT-Ns have been 
established. 
Emergency Support Function (ESF). In the Federal Response Plan (FRP), a 
functional area of response activity established to facilitate the delivery of federal 
assistance required during the immediate response phase of a disaster to save lives, 
protect property and public health, and to maintain public safety. ESFs represent 
those types of federal assistance which the state will most likely need because of the 
impact of a catastrophic or significant disaster on its own resources and response 
capabilities, or because of the specialized or unique nature of the assistance 
required. ESF missions are designed to supplement state and local response efforts. 
Emergency Support Team (EST). An interagency group operating from FEMA 
headquarters. The EST oversees the national-level response support effort under the 
FRP and coordinates activities with the ESF primary and support agencies in 
supporting federal requirements in the field. 
Entity-Wide Security. Planning and management that provides a framework and 
continuing cycle of activity for managing risk, developing security policies, assigning 
responsibilities, and monitoring the adequacy of the entity�s physical and cyber secu-
rity controls. 
Entry Control Point. A continuously or intermittently manned station at which entry to 
sensitive or restricted areas is controlled. 
Entry-Control Stations. Entry-control stations should be provided at main perimeter 
entrances where security personnel are present. Entry-control stations should be 
located as close as practical to the perimeter entrance to permit personnel inside the 
station to maintain constant surveillance over the entrance and its approaches. 
Equipment Closet. A room where field control equipment such as data gathering 
panels and power supplies are typically located. 
Evacuation. Organized, phased, and supervised dispersal of people from 
dangerous or potentially dangerous areas. 
Evacuation, Spontaneous. Residents or citizens in the threatened areas observe an 
emergency event or receive unofficial word of an actual or perceived threat and 
without receiving instructions to do so, elect to evacuate the area. Their movement, 
means, and direction of travel is unorganized and unsupervised. 
Evacuation, Voluntary. This is a warning to persons within a designated area that a 
threat to life and property exists or is likely to exist in the immediate future. 
Individuals issued this type of waning or order are NOT required to evacuate, however 
it would be to their advantage to do so. 
Evacuation, Mandatory or Directed. This is a warning to persons within the 
designated area that an imminent threat to life and property exists and individuals 
MUST evacuate in accordance with the instructions of local officials. 
Evacuees. All persons removed or moving from areas threatened or struck by a 
disaster. 
Exclusion Area. A restricted area containing a security interest. Uncontrolled 
movement permits direct access to the item. See controlled area and limited area. 
Exclusive Zone. An area around an asset which has controlled entry with highly 
restrictive access. See controlled area. 
Explosives Disposal Container. A small container into which small quantities of 
explosives may be placed to contain their blast pressures and fragments if the 
explosive detonates. 
F

Facial Recognition. A biometric technology that is based on features of the human 
face. 
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The person appointed by the FEMA Director to 
coordinate federal assistance in a Presidentially declared emergency or major 
disaster. 
Federal On-Scene Commander. The FBI official designated upon JOC activation to 
ensure appropriate coordination of the overall 
U.S. Government response with federal, state and local authori-ties, until such time 
as the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA. 
Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP establishes a process and structure for the 
systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal assistance to address the 
consequences of any major disaster or emergency. 
Fence Protection. An intrusion detection technology that detects a person crossing a 
fence by various methods such as climbing, crawling, cutting, etc. 
Fence Sensors. Exterior intrusion detection sensors which detect aggressors as they 
attempt to climb over, cut through, or otherwise disturb a fence. 
Fiber Optics. A method of data transfer by passing bursts of light through a strand of 
glass or clear plastic. 
Field Assessment Team (FAsT). A small team of pre-identified technical experts that 
conduct an assessment of response needs (not a PDA) immediately following a 
disaster. 
Field of View. The visible area in a video picture. 
First Responder. Local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel who first 
arrive on the scene of an incident and take action to save lives, protect property, and 
meet basic human needs. 
Flash Flood. Follows a situation in which rainfall is so intense and severe and runoff so 
rapid that it precludes recording and relating it to stream stages and other 
information in time to forecast a flood condition. 
Flood. A general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of 
normally dry land areas from overflow of inland or tidal waters, unusual or rapid 
accumulation or runoff of surface waters, or mudslides/mudflows caused by 
accumulation of water. 
Forced Entry. Entry to a denied area achieved through force to create an opening in 
fence, walls, doors, etc., or to overpower guards. 
Fragment Retention Film. A thin, optically clear film applied to glass to minimize the 
spread of glass fragments when the glass is shattered. 
Frame Rate. In digital video, a measurement of the rate of change in a series of 
pictures, often measured in frames per second (fps). 
Frangible Construction. Building components which are designed to fail to vent 
blast pressures from an enclosure in a controlled manner and direction. 
G

Glare Security-Lighting. Illumination projected from a secure perimeter into the 
surrounding area making it possible to see potential intruders at a considerable 
distance while making it difficult to observe activities within the secure perimeter. 
Glass-Break Detector. Intrusion detection sensors that are designed to detect 
breaking glass either through vibration or acoustics. 
Glazing. A material installed in a sash, ventilator, or panes such as glass, plastic, etc., 
including material such as thin granite installed in a curtain wall. 
Governor�s Authorized Representative. The person empowered by the Governor to 
execute, on behalf of the State, all necessary documents for disaster assistance. 
Grid Wire Sensors. Intrusion detection sensors that use a grid of wires to cover a wall 
or fence. An alarm is sounded if the wires are cut. 
H

Hand Geometry. A biometric technology that is based on characteristics of the human 
hand. 
Hazard. A source of potential danger or adverse condition. 
Hazard Mitigation. Any action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to 
human life and property from hazards. The term is sometimes used in a stricter sense 
to mean cost-effective measures to reduce the potential for damage to a facility or 
facilities from a disaster event. 
Hazardous Material. Any substance or material that when involved in an accident and 
released insufficient quantities, poses a risk to people�s health, safety, and/or property. 
These substances and materials include explosives, radioactive materials, flammable 
liquids or solids, combustible liquids or solids, poisons, oxidizers, toxins, and corrosive 
materials. 
High-Hazard Areas. Geographic locations that for planning purposes have been 
determined through historical experience and vulnerability analysis to be likely to 
experience the effects of a specific hazard (e.g., hurricane, earthquake, hazardous 
materials accident, etc.) resulting in vast property damage and loss of life. 
High-Risk Target. Any material resource or facility that, because of mission sensitivity, 
ease of access, isolation, and symbolic value, may be an especially attractive or 
accessible terrorist target. 
Human-Caused Hazard. Human caused hazards are technological hazards and terrorism. 
These are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate from human 
activity. Within the military services, the term threat is typically used for human-caused 
hazard. See definitions of technological hazards and terrorism for further information. 
Hurricane. A tropical cyclone, formed in the atmosphere over warm ocean areas, in 
which wind speeds reach 74 miles per hour or more and blow in a large spiral around 
a relatively calm center or �eye.� Circulation is counter-clockwise in the Northern 
Hemisphere and clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere. 
Impact Analysis. A management level analysis which identifies the impacts of losing 
the entity�s resources. The analysis measures the effect of resource loss and escalating 
losses over time in order to provide the entity with reliable data upon which to base 
decisions on hazard mitigation and continuity planning. 
Incident Command System. A standardized organizational structure used to 
command, control, and coordinate the use of resources and personnel that have 
responded to the scene of an emergency. The concepts and principles for ICS include 
common terminology, modular organization, integrated communication, unified 
command structure, consolidated action plan, manageable span of control, 
designated incident facilities, and comprehensive resource management. 
Insider Compromise. A person authorized access to a facility (an insider) 
compromises assets by taking advantage of that accessibility. 
Intercom Door/Gate Station. Part of an intercom system where communication is 
typically initiated, usually located at a door or gate. 
Intercom Master Station. Part of an intercom system that monitors one or more 
intercom door/gate stations; typically, where initial communication is received. 
Intercom Switcher. Part of an intercom system that controls the flow of 
communications between various stations. 
Intercom System. An electronic system that allows simplex, half-duplex, or full-
duplex audio communications. 
International Terrorism. Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any 
state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the 
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts 
occur outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the 
means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or 
intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 
Intrusion Detection Sensors. Devices that initiate alarm signals by sensing the stimulus, 
change, or condition for which they were designed. 
Intrusion Detection System. The combination of components, including sensors, 
control units, transmission lines, and monitor units, integrated to operate in a 
specified manner. 
Isolated Fenced Perimeters. Fenced perimeters with 100 feet or more of space 
outside the fence that is clear of obstruction making approach obvious. 
J

Jersey Barrier. A protective concrete barrier initially and still used as a highway 
divider and now functions as an expedient method for traffic speed control at 
entrance gates and to keep vehicles away from buildings. 
Joint Information Center (JIC). A central point of contact for all news media near the 
scene of a large-scale disaster. News media representatives are kept informed of 
activities and events by public information officials who represent all participating 
federal, state, and local agencies that are collocated at the JIC. 
Joint Interagency Intelligence Support Element (JIISE). An interagency intelligence 
component designed to fuse intelligence information from the various agencies 
participating in a response to a WMD threat or incident within an FBI JOC. The JIISE 
is an expanded version of the investigative/intelligence component which is part of 
the standardized FBI command post structure. The JIISE manages five functions 
including: security, collections management, current intelligence, exploitation, and 
dissemination. 
Joint Information System (JIS). Under the FRP, connection of public affairs 
personnel, decision-makers, and news centers by electronic mail, fax, and telephone 
when a single federal/state/ local JIC is not a viable option. 
Joint Operations Center. Established by the LFA under the operational control of the 
Federal OSC, as the focal point for management and direction of on-site activities, 
coordination/es-tablishment of state requirements/priorities, and coordination of the 
overall federal response. 
Jurisdiction. Typically counties and cities within a state, but states may elect to define 
differently in order to facilitate their assessment process. 
L

Laminated Glass. A flat lite of uniform thickness consisting of two monolithic glass 
plies bonded together with an interlayer material as defined in Specification C1172. 
Many different interlayer materials are used in laminated glass. 
Landscaping. The use of plantings (shrubs and trees), with or without landforms 
and/or large boulders, to act as a perimeter barrier against defined threats. 
Laser Card. A card technology that use a laser reflected off of a card for uniquely 
identifying the card. 
Layers of Protection. A traditional approach in security engineering using concentric 
circles extending out from an area to be protected as demarcation points for different 
security strategies. 
Lead Agency. The federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility under 
U.S. law to manage and coordinate the federal response in a specific functional area. 
Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The agency designated by the President to lead and 
coordinate the overall federal response is referred to as the LFA and is determined by 
the type of emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and 
procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in 
order to provide an initial assessment of the situation, develop an action plan, monitor 
and update operational priorities, and ensure each agency exercises its concurrent 
and distinct authorities under U.S. law and supports the LFA in carrying out the 
President�s relevant policy. Specific responsibili-ties of an LFA vary according to the 
agency�s unique statutory authorities. 
Level of Protection. The degree to which an asset is protected against injury or 
damage from an attack. 
Liaison. An agency official sent to another agency to facilitate interagency 
communications and coordination. 
Limited Area. A restricted area within close proximity of a security interest. 
Uncontrolled movement may permit access to the item. Escorts and other internal 
restrictions may prevent access to the item. See controlled area and exclusion area. 
Line of Sight. Direct observation between two points with the naked eye or hand-held 
optics. 
Line-of-Sight Sensor. A pair of devices used as an intrusion detection sensor that 
monitor any movement through the field between the sensors. 
Line Supervision. A data integrity strategy that monitors the communications link for 
connectivity and tampering. In intrusion detection system sensors, line supervision is 
often referred to as two-state, three-state, or four-state in respect to the number of 
conditions monitored. The frequency of sampling the link also plays a big part in the 
supervision of the line. 
Local Government. Any county, city, village, town, district, or political subdivision of 
any state, and Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska Native village 
or organization, including any rural community or unincorporated town or village or 
any other public entity. 
M

Magnetic Lock. An electro-magnetic lock that unlocks a door when power is 
removed. 
Magnetic Stripe. A card technology that use a magnetic stripe on the card to encode 
data used for unique identification of the card. 
Mail-Bomb Delivery. Bombs or incendiary devices delivered to the target in letters 
or packages. 
Man-Trap. An access control strategy that use a pair of interlocking doors to prevent 
tailgating. Only one door can be unlocked at a time. 
Mass Care. The actions that are taken to protect evacuees and other disaster victims 
from the effects of the disaster. Activities include providing temporary shelter, food, 
medical care, clothing, and other essential life support needs to those people that 
have been displaced from their homes because of a disaster or threatened disaster. 
Mass Notification. Capability to provide real-time information to all building 
occupants or personnel in the immediate vicinity of a building during emergency 
situations. 
Microwave Motion Sensors. Intrusion detection sensors that uses microwave energy to 
sense movement within the sensors field of view. These sensors work similar to radar 
by using the Doppler effect to measure a shift in frequency. 
Military Installations. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps bases, posts, stations, 
and annexes (both contractor and Government operated), hospitals, terminals, and 
other special mission facilities, as well as those used primarily for military purposes. 
Minimum Essential Infrastructure Resource Elements. The broad categories of 
resources, all or portions of which constitute the minimal essential infrastructure 
necessary for a department, agency or organization to conduct its core mission(s). 
Minimum Measures. Protective measures that can be applied to all buildings 
regardless of the identified threat. These measures offer defense or detection 
opportunities for minimal cost, facilitate future upgrades, and may deter acts of 
aggression. 
Mitigation. Those actions taken to reduce the exposure to and impact of an attack 
or disaster. 
Motion Detector. Intrusion detection sensor that changes state based on movement 
in the sensors field of view. 
Moving Vehicle Bomb. An explosive-laden car or truck driven into or near a 
building and detonated. 
Mutual Aid Agreement. A pre-arranged agreement developed between two or more 
entities to render assistance to the parties of the agreement. 
N

Natural Hazard. Naturally occurring events such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, 
tsunami, coastal storms, landslides, and wildfires that strike populated areas. A natural 
event is a hazard when it has the potential to harm people or property (FEMA 3862, 
Understanding Your Risks). The risks of natural hazards may be increased or decreased 
as a result of human activity. However, they are not inherently human-induced. 
Protective Barriers. Natural protective barriers are mountains and deserts, cliffs and 
ditches, water obstacles, or other terrain features that are difficult to traverse. 
Non-Exclusive Zone. An area around an asset that has controlled entry but shared or 
less restrictive access than an exclusive zone. 
Non-Persistent Agent. An agent that, upon release, loses its ability to cause casualties 
after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high evaporation rate, is lighter than air, and will 
disperse rapidly. It is considered to be a short-term hazard; however, in small, 
unventilated areas, the agent will be more persistent. 
Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Weapons. Also called Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). Weapons that are characterized by their capability to produce mass 
casualties. 
Nuclear Detonation. An explosion resulting from fission and/or fusion reactions in 
nuclear material, such as that from a nuclear weapon. 
O

On-Scene Coordinator (OSC). The federal official pre-desig-nated by the EPA and U.S. 
Coast Guard to coordinate and direct response and removals under the National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. 
Open System Architecture. A term borrowed from the IT industry to claim that 
systems are capable of interfacing with other systems from any vendor, which also 
uses open system architecture. The opposite would be a proprietary system. 
Operator Interface. The part of a security management system that provides that 
user interface to humans. 
Organizational Areas of Control. Controls consist of the policies, procedures, practices 
and organization structures designed to provide reasonable assurance that business 
objectives will be achieved and that undesired events will be prevented or detected 
and corrected. 
P

Passive Infrared Motion Sensors. Devices that detect a change in the thermal energy 
pattern caused by a moving intruder and ini-tiate an alarm when the change in energy 
satisfies the detector�s alarm-criteria. 
Passive Vehicle Barrier. A vehicle barrier which is permanently deployed and does 
not require response to be effective. 
Patch Panel. A concentrated termination point that separates backbone cabling from 
devices cabling for easy maintenance and troubleshooting. 
Perimeter Barrier. A fence, wall, vehicle barrier, landform, or line of vegetation 
applied along an exterior perimeter used to obscure vision, hinder personnel access, 
or hinder or prevent vehicle access. 
Persistent Agent. An agent that, upon release, retains its casualty-producing effects for 
an extended period of time, usually anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A 
persistent agent usually has a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier than air; 
therefore, its vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term 
hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution should be 
taken to avoid skin contact as well. 
Physical Security. The part of security concerned with measures/ concepts designed 
to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 
materiel, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, 
and theft. 
Planter Barrier. A passive vehicle barrier, usually constructed of concrete and filled 
with dirt (and flowers for aesthetics). Planters, along with bollards, are the usual street 
furniture used to keep vehicles away from existing buildings. Overall size and the 
depth of installation below grade determine the vehicle stopping capability of the 
individual planter. 
Plume. Airborne material spreading from a particular source; the dispersal of 
particles, gases, vapors, and aerosols into the atmosphere. 
Polycarbonate Glazing. A plastic glazing material with enhanced resistance to 
ballistics or blast effects. 
Predetonation Screen. A fence which causes an anti-tank round to detonate or 
prevents it from arming before it reaches its target. 
Preliminary Damage Assessment. A mechanism used to determine the impact and 
magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs of individuals, businesses, the 
public sector, and the community as a whole. Information collected is used by the 
State as a basis for the Governor�s request for a Presidential declaration, and by FEMA 
to document the recommendation made to the President in response to the 
Governor�s request. PDAs are made by at least one state and one federal 
representative. A local government representative familiar with the extent and 
location of damage in the community often participates; other state and federal 
agencies and voluntary relief organizations also may be asked to participate, as 
needed. 
Preparedness. Establishing the plans, training, exercises, and resources necessary to 
enhance mitigation of and achieve readiness for response to, and recovery from all 
hazards, disasters, and emergencies including WMD incidents. 
Pressure Mat. A mat that generates an alarm when pressure is applied to any part of 
the mat�s surface, as when someone steps on the mat. Pressure mats can be used to 
detect an intruder approaching a protected object, or they can be placed by doors and 
windows to detect entry. 
Primary Asset. An asset which is the ultimate target for compromise by an aggressor. 
Primary Gathering Building. Inhabited buildings routinely occupied by 50 or more 
personnel. This designation applies to the entire portion of a building that meets the 
population density requirements for an inhabited building. 
Probability of Detection. A measure of an intrusion detection sensor�s performance 
in detecting an intruder within its detection zone. 
Probability of Intercept. The probability that an act of aggression will be detected and 
that a response force will intercept the aggressor before the asset can be 
compromised. 
Progressive Collapse. A chain reaction failure of building members to an extent 
disproportionate to the original localized damage. Such damage may result in upper 
floors of a building collapsing onto lower floors. 
Protective Barriers. Define the physical limits of a site, activity, or area by restricting, 
channeling, or impeding access and forming a continuous obstacle around the object. 
Protective Measures. Elements of a protective system which protect an asset against a 
threat. Protective measures are divided into defensive and detection measures. 
Protective System. An integration of all of the protective measures required to 
protect an asset against the range of threats applicable to the asset. 
Proximity Sensors. Intrusion detection sensors that change state based on the close 
distance or contact of a human to the sensor. These sensors often measure the 
change in capacitance as a human body enters the measured field. 
Public Information Officer. A federal, state, or local government official responsible 
for preparing and coordinating the dissemination of emergency public information. 
R

Radiation. High-energy particles or gamma rays that are emitted by an atom as the 
substance undergoes radioactive decay. Par-
ticles can be either charged alpha or beta particles or neutral neutron or gamma 
rays. 
Radiation Sickness. The symptoms characterizing the sickness known as radiation 
injury, resulting from excessive exposure of the whole body to ionizing radiation. 
Radiological Monitoring. The process of locating and measuring radiation by means 
of survey instruments that can detect and measure (as exposure rates) ionizing 
radiation. 
Recovery. The long-term activities beyond the initial crisis period and emergency 
response phase of disaster operations that focus on returning all systems in the 
community to a normal status or to reconstitute these systems to a new condition that 
is less vulnerable. 
Regional Operating Center (ROC). The temporary operations facility for the 
coordination of federal response and recovery activities located at the FEMA Regional 
Office (or Federal Regional Center) and led by the FEMA Regional Director or 
Deputy Director until the DFO becomes operational. Once the ERT-A is deployed, the 
ROC performs a support role for federal staff at the disaster scene. 
Report Printers. A separate, dedicated printer attached to the electronic security 
systems used for generating reports using information stored by the central 
computer. 
Request-To-Exit Device. Passive infrared motion sensors or push buttons that are 
used to signal an electronic entry system that egress is imminent or to unlock a door. 
Resolution. The level to which video details can be determined in a CCTV scene is 
referred to as resolving ability or resolution. 
Resource Management. Those actions taken by a government to: identify sources and 
obtain resources needed to support disaster response activities; coordinate the supply, 
allocation, distribution, and delivery of resources so that they arrive where and when 
most needed; and maintain accountability for the resources used. 
Response. Executing the plan and resources identified to perform those duties and 
services to preserve and protect life and property as well as provide services to the 
surviving population. 
Response Force. The people who respond to an act of aggression. Depending on the 
nature of the threat, the response force could consist of guards, special reaction 
teams, military or civilian police, an explosives ordnance disposal team, or a fire 
department. 
Response Time. The length of time from the instant an attack is detected to the 
instant a security force arrives onsite. 
Restricted Area. Any area with access controls that is subject to these special 
restrictions or controls for security reasons. See also controlled area, limited area, 
exclusion area, and exclusion zone. 
Retinal Pattern. A biometric technology that is based on features of the human eye. 
RF Data Transmission. A communication link using radio frequency to send or 
receive data. 
Risk. The potential for loss of, or damage to, an asset. It is measured based upon the 
value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with it. 
Rotating Drum or Rotating Plate Vehicle Barrier. An active vehicle barrier used at 
vehicle entrances to controlled areas based on a drum or plate rotating into the path 
of the vehicle when signaled. 
Routinely Occupied. For the purposes of these standards, an established or 
predictable pattern of activity within a building that terrorists could recognize and 
exploit. 
RS-232 Data. IEEE Recommended Standard 232; a point-to-point serial data protocol 
with a maximum effective distance of 50 feet. 
RS-422 Data. IEEE Recommended Standard 422; a point-to-point serial data protocol 
with a maximum effective distance of 4000 feet. 
RS-485 Data. IEEE Recommended Standard 485; a multi-drop serial data protocol with 
a maximum effective distance of 4000 feet. 
S

Sacrificial Roof or Wall. Walls or roofs that can be lost in a blast without damage to 
the primary asset. 
Safe Haven. Secure areas within the interior of the facility. A safe haven should be 
designed such that it requires more time to penetrate by aggressors than it takes for 
the response force to reach the protected area to rescue the occupants. It may be a 
haven from a physical attack or air-isolated haven from CBR contamination. 
Scramble Keypad. A keypad that uses keys on which the numbers change pattern with 
each use to enhance security by preventing eavesdropping observation of the entered 
numbers. 
Secondary Asset. An asset which supports a primary asset and whose compromise 
would indirectly affect the operation of the primary asset. 
Secondary Hazard. A threat whose potential would be realized as the result of a 
triggering event that of itself would constitute an emergency. For example, dam 
failure might be a secondary hazard associated with earthquakes. 
Secure/Access Mode. The state of an area monitored by an intrusion detection 
system in regards to how alarm conditions are reported. 
Security Analysis. The method of studying the nature of and the relationship between 
assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. 
Security Console. Specialized furniture, racking, and related apparatus used to house 
the security equipment required in a control center. 
Security Engineering. The process of identifying practical, risk managed short and 
long-term solutions to reduce and/or mitigate dynamic man-made hazards by 
integrating multiple factors, including construction, equipment, manpower, and 
procedures. 
Security Engineering Design Process. The process through which assets requiring 
protection are identified, the threat to and vulnerability of those assets is determined, 
and a protective system is designed to protect the assets. 
Security Management System Database. In a Security Management System, a database 
that is transferred to various nodes or panels throughout the system for faster data 
processing and protection against communication link downtime. 
Security Management System Distributed Processing. In a Security Management 
System, a method of data processing at various nodes or panels throughout the system 
for faster data processing and protection against communication link downtime. 
Segregation of Duties. Policies, procedures, and an organizational structure 
established so that one individual cannot control key aspects of physical and/or 
computer-related operations and thereby conduct unauthorized actions or gain 
unauthorized access to minimum essential infrastructure resource elements. 
Semi-Isolated Fenced Perimeters. Fence lines where approach areas are clear of 
obstruction for 60 to 100 feet outside of the fence where there is little reason for the 
general public or other personnel seldom have reason to be in the area. 
Senior FEMA Official (SFO). The official appointed by the Director of FEMA, or his 
representative, that is responsible for deploying to the JOC to: (1) serve as the senior 
interagency consequence management representative on the Command Group; and 
(2) manage and coordinate activities taken by the Consequence Management Group. 
Serial Interface. An integration strategy for data transfer where components are 
connected in series. 
Shielded Wire. Wire with a conductive wrap used to mitigate electromagnetic 
emanations. 
Situational Crime Prevention. A crime prevention strategy based on reducing the 
opportunities for crime by increasing the effort required to commit a crime, 
increasing the risks associated with committing the crime, and reducing the target 
appeal or vulnerability (whether property or person). This opportunity reduction is 
achieved by management and use policies such as procedures and training, as well as 
physical approaches such as alteration of the built environment. 
Smart Card. A newer card technology that allows data to be written, stored, and read 
on a card typically used for identification and/or access. 
Software Level Integration. An integration strategy that use software to interface 
systems. An example of this would be digital video displayed in the same computer 
application window and linked to events of a security management system. 
Specific Threat. Known or postulated aggressor activity focused on targeting a 
particular asset. 
Standoff Distance. A distance maintained between a building or portion thereof and 
the potential location for an explosive detonation or other threat. 
Standoff Weapons. Weapons such as anti-tank weapons and mortars that are 
launched from a distance at a target. 
State Coordinating Officer. The person appointed by the Governor to coordinate 
State, Commonwealth, or Territorial response and recovery activities with FRP-
related activities of the Federal Government, in cooperation with the FCO. 
State Liaison. A FEMA official assigned to a particular state, who handles initial 
coordination with the State in the early stages of an emergency. 
Stationary Vehicle Bomb. An explosive-laden car or truck stopped or parked 
near a building. 
Storm Surge. A dome of sea water created by the strong winds and low barometric 
pressure in a hurricane that causes severe coastal flooding as the hurricane strikes 
land. 
Strain-Sensitive Cable. Strain-sensitive cables are transducers that are uniformly 
sensitive along their entire length and generate an analog voltage when subject to 
mechanical distortions or stress resulting from fence motion. They are typically 
attached to a chain-link fence about halfway between the bottom and top of the fence 
fabric with plastic ties. 
Structural Protective Barriers. Man-made devices (such as fences, walls, floors, roofs, 
grills, bars, roadblocks, signs, or other construction) used to restrict, channel, or 
impede access. 
Superstructure. The supporting elements of a building above the foundation. 
Supplies-Bomb Delivery. Bombs or incendiary devices concealed and delivered to 
supply or material handling points such as loading docks. 
System Events. Events that occur normally in the operation of a security 
management system. Examples include access control operations and changes of 
state in intrusion detection sensors. 
System Software. Controls that limit and monitor access to the powerful programs 
and sensitive files that: (1) control the computer hardware; and (2) secure 
applications supported by the system. 
T

Tactics. The specific methods of achieving the aggressor�s goals to injure personnel, 
destroy assets, or steal materiel or information. 
Tamper Switch. Intrusion detection sensor that monitors an equipment 
enclosure for breach. 
Tangle-Foot Wire. Barbed wire or tape suspended on short metal or wooden pickets 
outside a perimeter fence to create an obstacle to approach. 
Taut-Wire Sensor. An intrusion detection sensor utilizing a column of uniformly 
spaced horizontal wires, securely anchored at each end and stretched taut. Each wire 
is attached to a sensor to indicate movement of the wire. 
Technical Assistance. The provisioning of direct assistance to states and local 
jurisdictions to improve capabilities for program development, planning, and 
operational performances related to responses to WMD terrorist incidents. 
Technological Hazard. Incidents that can arise from human activities such as 
manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. For the sake of 
simplicity, it is assumed that technological emergencies are accidental and that their 
consequences are unintended. 
TEMPEST. An unclassified short name referring to investigations and studies of 
compromising emanations. It is sometimes used synonymously for the term 
�compromising emanations;� e.g., TEMPEST tests, TEMPEST inspections. 
Terrorism. The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Thermally Tempered Glass. Glass which is heat-treated to have a higher tensile 
strength and resistance to blast pressures, although a greater susceptibility to 
airborne debris. 
Threat. Any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause loss of, or 
damage to an asset. 
Threat Analysis. A continual process of compiling and examining all available 
information concerning potential threats and hu-man-caused hazards. A common 
method to evaluate terrorist groups is to review the factors of existence, capability, 
intentions, history, and targeting. 
Time/Date Stamp. Data inserted into a CCTV video signal with the time and date of 
the video as it was created. 
TNT Equivalent Weight. The weight of TNT (trinitrotoluene) that has an 
equivalent energetic output to that of a different weight of another explosive 
compound. 
Tornado. A local atmospheric storm, generally of short duration, formed by winds 
rotating at very high speeds, usually in a counter-clockwise direction. The vortex, up to 
several hundred yards wide, is visible to the observer as a whirlpool-like column of 
winds rotating about a hollow cavity or funnel. Winds may reach 300 miles per hour or 
higher. 
Toxicity. A measure of the harmful effects produced by a given amount of a toxin on 
a living organism. 
Toxic-Free Area. An area within a facility in which the air supply is free of toxic 
chemical or biological agents. 
Triple-Standard Concertina (TSC) Wire. This type of fence uses three rolls of stacked 
concertina. One roll will be stacked on top of two rolls that run parallel to each other 
while resting on the ground, forming a pyramid. 
Tsunami. Sea waves produced by an undersea earthquake. Such sea waves can reach a 
height of 80 feet and can devastate coastal cities and low-lying coastal areas. 
Twisted Pair Wire. Wire that uses pairs of wires twisted together to mitigate 
electromagnetic interference. 
Two-Person Rule. A security strategy that requires two people to be present in or gain 
access to a secured area to prevent unobserved access by any individual. 
U

Unobstructed Space. Space around an inhabited building without obstruction large 
enough to conceal explosive devices 150 mm (6 inches) or greater in height. 
Unshielded Wire. Wire that does not have a conductive wrap. 
V 
Vault. A reinforced room for securing items. 
Vertical Rod. Typical door hardware often used with a crash bar to lock a door by 
inserting rods vertically from the door into the doorframe. 
Vibration Sensors. Intrusion detection sensor that change state when vibration is 
present. 
Video Intercom System. An intercom system that also incorporates a small CCTV 
system for verification. 
Video Motion Detection. Motion detection technology that looks for changes in the 
pixels of a video image. 
Video Multiplexer. A device used to connect multiple video signals to a single 
location for viewing and/or recording. 
Visual Displays. A display or monitor used to inform the operator visually of the status 
of the electronic security system. 
Visual Surveillance. The aggressor uses ocular and photographic devices (such as 
binoculars and cameras with telephoto lenses) to monitor facility or installation 
operations or to see assets. 
Voice Recognition. A biometric technology that is based on nuances of the human 
voice. 
Volumetric Motion Sensors. Interior intrusion detection sensors which are designed to 
sense aggressor motion within a protected space. 
Vulnerability. Any weakness in an asset or mitigation measure than can be 
exploited by an aggressor (potential threat element), adversary or competitor. It 
refers to the organization�s susceptibility to injury. 
W

Warning. The alerting of emergency response personnel and the public to the threat 
of extraordinary danger and the related effects that specific hazards may cause. 
Watch. Indication in a defined area, that conditions are favorable for the specified 
type of severe weather (e.g., flash flood watch, severe thunderstorm watch, tornado 
watch, tropical storm watch). 
Waterborne Contamination. Chemical, biological, or radiological introduced into and 
fouling a water supply. 
Weapons-Grade Material. Nuclear material considered most suitable for a nuclear 
weapon. It usually connotes uranium enriched to above 90% uranium-235 or 
plutonium with greater than about 90% plutonium-239. 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, 
grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, or a missile having 
an explosive incendiary charge of more than 0.25 ounce, or mine or device similar to 
the above; poison gas; weapon involving a disease organism; or weapon that is 
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. Any 
device, material, or substance used in a manner, in a quantity or type, or under 
circumstances evidencing an intent to cause death or serious injury to persons, or 
significant damage to property. 
Weigand Protocol. A security industry standard data protocol for card readers. 
Z

Zoom. The ability of a CCTV camera to close and focus or open and widen the field 
of view. 

CBR GLOSSARY D

GLOSSARY OF CHEMICAL TERMS 
A 
Acetylcholinesterase. An enzyme that hydrolyzes the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. 
The action of this enzyme is inhibited by nerve agents. 
Aerosol.  Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas; for example, fog or smoke. 
Atropine.  A compound used as an antidote for nerve agents. 
Casualty (toxic) agents. Produce incapacitation, serious injury, or death. They can be 
used to incapacitate or kill victims. These agents are the choking, blister, nerve, and 
blood agents. 
Blister Agents. Substances that cause blistering of the skin. Exposure is through 
liquid or vapor contact with any exposed tissue (eyes, skin, lungs). Examples 
are distilled mustard (HD), nitrogen mustard (HN), lewisite (L), mus-
tard/lewisite (HL), and phenodichloroarsine (PD). 
Blood Agents.  Substances that injure a person by interfering with cell 
respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide between blood and 
tissues). Examples are arsine (SA), cyanogens chloride (CK), hydrogen chlo-
ride, and hydrogen cyanide (AC). 
Choking/Lung/Pulmonary Agents. Substances that cause physical injury to the 
lungs. Exposure is through inhalation. In extreme cases, membranes swell and 
lungs become filled with liquid. Death results from lack of oxygen; hence, the 
victim is "choked." Examples are chlorine (CL), diphosgene (DP), cyanide, 
nitrogen oxide (NO), perflurorisobutylene (PHIB), phosgene (CG), red phos-
phorous (RP), sulfur trioxide-chlorosulfonic acid (FS), Teflon and 
perflurorisobutylene (PHIB), titanium tetrachloride (FM) and zinc oxide 
(HC). 
Nerve Agents.  Substances that interfere with the central nervous system. 
Exposure is primarily through contact with the liquid (skin and eyes) and 
secondarily through inhalation of the vapor. Three distinct symptoms associ-
ated with nerve agents are: pin-point pupils, an extreme headache, and severe 
tightness in the chest. Also see G-se-ries and V-series nerve agents. 
Chemical agent. A chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to 
kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through its physiological effects. Excluded 
from consideration are riot control agents, and smoke and flame materials. The agent 
may appear as a vapor, aerosol, or liquid; it can be either a casualty/toxic agent or an 
incapacitating agent. 
Cutaneous. Pertaining to the skin. 
D 
Decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by 
absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing the hazardous 
material. 
G

G-series nerve agents.  Chemical agents of moderate to high toxicity developed in the 
1930s. Examples are tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), phosphonofluoridic acid, 
ethyl-, 1methylethyl ester (GE) and cyclohexyl sarin (GF). 
I

Incapacitating agents. Produce temporary physiological and/or mental effects via 
action on the central nervous system. Effects may persist for hours or days, but victims 
usually do not require medical treatment. However, such treatment speeds recovery. 
Vomiting agents. Produce nausea and vomiting effects, can also cause 
coughing, sneezing, pain in the nose and throat, nasal discharge, and tears. 
Examples are adamsite 
(DM), diphenylchloroarsine (DA), and
diphenylcyanoarsine (DC).

Tear (riot control) agents. Produce irritating or disabling effects that rapidly 
disappear within minutes after exposure ceases. Examples are 
bromobenzylcyanide (CA), chloroacetophenone (CN or commercially as 
Mace), chloropicrin (PS), CNB (CN in benzene and carbon tetrachloride), 
CNC (CN in chloroform), CNS (CN and chloropicrin in chloroform, CR 
(dibenz-(b,f)-1,4-oxazepine, a tear gas), CS (tear gas), and Capsaicin (pepper 
spray). 
Central nervous system depressants. Compounds that have the predominant 
effect of depressing or blocking the activity of the central nervous system. 
The primary mental effects include the disruption of the ability to think, 
sedation, and lack of motivation. 
Central nervous system stimulants. Compounds that have the predominant 
effect of flooding the brain with too much information. The primary mental 
effect is loss of concentration, causing indecisiveness and the inability to act in 
a sustained, purposeful manner. 
Examples of the depressants and stimulants include agent 15 (suspected Iraqi 
BZ), BZ (3-quinulidinyle benzilate), canniboids, fentanyls, LSD (lysergic acid 
diethylamide), and phenothiazines. 
Industrial agents. Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial 
operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not 
primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or 
rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for use by man. Hydrogen 
cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, chloropicrin and many herbicides and 
pesticides are industrial chemicals that also can be chemical agents. 
L

Liquid agent. A chemical agent that appears to be an oily film or droplets. The color 
ranges from clear to brownish amber. 
N

Nonpersistent agent. An agent that upon release loses its ability to cause casualties 
after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high evaporation rate and is lighter than air and will 
disperse rapidly. It is considered to be a short-term hazard. However, in small 
unventilated areas, the agent will be more persistent. 
O

Organophosphorous compound.  A compound, containing the elements phosphorus 
and carbon, whose physiological effects include inhibition of acetylcholinesterase. 
Many pesticides (malathione and parathion) and virtually all nerve agents are 
organophosphorous compounds. 
P

Percutaneous agent.  Able to be absorbed by the body through the skin. 
Persistent agent. An agent that upon release retains its casualty-producing effects for 
an extended period of time, usually anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A 
persistent agent usually has a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier than air. 
Therefore, its vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term 
hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution should be 
taken to avoid skin contact as well. 
Protection.  Any means by which an individual protects his body. Measures include 
masks, self-contained breathing apparatuses, clothing, structures such as buildings, 
and vehicles. 
V-series nerve agents.  Chemical agents of moderate to high toxicity developed in the 
1950s. They are generally persistent. Examples are VE (phosphonothioic acid, ethyl-, 
S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] O-ethyl ester), VG (phosphorothioic acid, S-[2-
(diethylamino)ethyl] O,O-diethyl ester), VM (phosphonothioic acid, methyl-, S-[2-
(diethylamino)ethyl] O-ethyl ester), VS (phosphonothioic acid, ethyl-, S-[2-[bis(1-
methylethyl)amino]ethyl] O-ethyl ester), and VX (phosphonothioic acid, methyl-, S-
[2-[bis(1-methylethyl)amino]ethyl] O-ethyl ester). 
Vapor agent.  A gaseous form of a chemical agent. If heavier than air, the cloud will be 
close to the ground. If lighter than air, the cloud will rise and disperse more quickly. 
Volatility.  A measure of how readily a substance will vaporize. 
Placards Associated With Chemical Incidents 
Gases � Toxic and/or Corrosive Substances � Toxic (Combustible)



A

Aerosol. Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas; for example, fog or smoke. 
Antibiotic. A substance that inhibits the growth of or kills microorganisms. 
Antisera. The liquid part of blood containing antibodies, that react against disease 
causing agents such as those used in biological warfare. 
B

Bacteria. Single-celled organisms that multiply by cell division and that can cause 
disease in humans, plants, or animals. 
Biochemicals. The chemicals that make up or are produced by living things. 
Biological warfare agents. Living organisms or the materials derived from them that 
cause disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants, or cause deterioration of 
material. Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders. 
Biological warfare. The intentional use of biological agents as weapons to kill or 
injure humans, animals, or plants, or to damage equipment. 
Bioregulators. Biochemicals that regulate bodily functions. Bioregulators that are 
produced by the body are termed "endogenous." Some of these same bioregulators 
can be chemically synthesized. 
C

Causative agent. The organism or toxin that is responsible for causing a specific 
disease or harmful effect. 
Contagious. Capable of being transmitted from one person to another. 
Culture.  A population of micro-organisms grown in a medium. 
D 
Decontamination. The process of making people, objects, or areas safe by absorbing, 
destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing the hazardous material. 
F

Fungi. Any of a group of plants mainly characterized by the absence of chlorophyll, 
the green colored compound found in other plants. Fungi range from microscopic 
single-celled plants (such as molds and mildews) to large plants (such as mush-
rooms). 
H

Host. An animal or plant that harbors or nourishes another organism. 
Incapacitating agent. Agents that produce physical or psychological effects, or 
both, that may persist for hours or days after exposure, rendering victims incapable 
of performing normal physical and mental tasks. 
Infectious agents. Biological agents capable of causing disease in a susceptible host. 
Infectivity.  (1) The ability of an organism to spread. (2) The number of organisms 
required to cause an infection to secondary hosts. (3) The capability of an organism to 
spread out from the site of infection and cause disease in the host organism. Infectivity 
also can be viewed as the number of organisms required to cause an infection. 
L

Line-source delivery system.  A delivery system in which the biological agent is 
dispersed from a moving ground or air vehicle in a line perpendicular to the direction 
of the prevailing wind. (See also "point-source delivery system.") 
M 
Mycotoxin. A toxin produced by fungi. 
Microorganism.  Any organism, such as bacteria, viruses, and some fungi, that can 
be seen only with a microscope. 
N 
Nebulizer.  A device for producing a fine spray or aerosol. 
O 
Organism. Any individual living thing, whether animal or plant. 
P 
Parasite. Any organism that lives in or on another organism without providing 
benefit in return. 
Pathogen. Any organism (usually living) capable of producing serious disease or 
death, such as bacteria, fungi, and viruses. 
Pathogenic agents. Biological agents capable of causing serious disease. 
Point-source delivery system.  A delivery system in which the biological agent is 
dispersed from a stationary position.  This delivery method results in coverage over a 
smaller area than with the line-source system. (See also "line-source delivery system.") 
R

Route of exposure (entry).  The path by which a person comes into contact with an 
agent or organism; for example, through breathing, digestion, or skin contact. 
Single-cell protein. Protein-rich material obtained from cultured algae, fungi, protein 
and bacteria, and often used as food or animal feed.


GLOSSARY OF RADIOLOGICAL TERMS 
A 
Acute radiation Syndrome.  Consists of three levels of effects: hernatopoletic (blood 
cells, most sensitive); gastrointestinal (GI cells, very sensitive); and central nervous 
system (brain/muscle cells, insensitive). The initial signs and symptoms are nausea, 
vomiting, fatigue, and loss of appetite. Below about 200 rems, these symptoms may be 
the only indication of radiation exposure. 
Alpha particle (�). The alpha particle has a very short range in air and a very low ability 
to penetrate other materials, but it has a strong ability to ionize materials. Alpha 
particles are unable to penetrate even the thin layer of dead cells of human skin and 
consequently are not an external radiation hazard. Alpha-emit-ting nuclides inside the 
body as a result of inhalation or ingestion are a considerable internal radiation hazard. 
B

Beta particles (�). High-energy electrons emitted from the nucleus of an atom during 
radioactive decay. They normally can be stopped by the skin or a very thin sheet of 
metal. 
C

Cesium-137 (Cs-137). A strong gamma ray source and can contaminate property, 
entailing extensive clean-up.  It is commonly used in industrial measurement gauges 
and for irradiation of material. Half-life is 30.2 years. 
Cobalt-60 (Co-60). A strong gamma ray source, and is extensively used as a 
radiotherapeutic for treating cancer, food and material irradiation, gamma 
radiography, and industrial measurement gauges. Half-life is 5.27 years. 
Curie (Ci). A unit of radioactive decay rate defined as 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations per 
second. 
D

Decay.  The process by which an unstable element is changed to another isotope or 
another element by the spontaneous emission of radiation from its nucleus. This 
process can be measured by using radiation detectors such as Geiger counters. 
Decontamination. The process of making people, objects, or areas safe by absorbing, 
destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing the hazardous material. 
Dose. A general term for the amount of radiation absorbed over a period of time. 
Dosimeter.  A portable instrument for measuring and registering the total 
accumulated dose to ionizing radiation. 
G

Gamma rays (�). High-energy photons emitted from the nucleus of atoms; similar to x 
rays. They can penetrate deeply into body tissue and many materials. Cobalt-60 and 
Cesium-137 are both strong gamma-emitters. Shielding against gamma radiation re-
quires thick layers of dense materials, such as lead. Gamma rays are potentially lethal 
to humans. 
H

Half-life. The amount of time needed for half of the atoms of a radioactive material 
to decay. 
Highly enriched uranium (HEU). Uranium that is enriched to above 20% Uranium-
235 (U-235). Weapons-grade HEU is enriched to above 90% in U-235. 
I

Ionize. To split off one or more electrons from an atom, thus leaving it with a positive 
electric charge. The electrons usually attach to one of the atoms or molecules, giving 
them a negative charge. 
Iridium-192. A gamma-ray emitting radioisotope used for gamma- radiography.  
The half-life is 73.83 days. 
Isotope. A specific element always has the same number of protons in the nucleus. 
That same element may, however, appear in forms that have different numbers of 
neutrons in the nucleus. These different forms are referred to as "isotopes" of the ele-
ment. For example, deuterium (2H) and tritium (3H) are isotopes of ordinary 
hydrogen (H). 
L

Lethal dose (50/30). The dose of radiation expected to cause death within 30 days to 
50% of those exposed without medical treatment. The generally accepted range 
from 400-500 rem received over a short period of time. 
N

Nuclear reactor.  A device in which a controlled, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction 
can be maintained with the use of cooling to remove generated heat. 
P

Plutonium-239 (Pu-239). A metallic element used for nuclear weapons. The half-
life is 24,110 years. 
R

Rad. A unit of absorbed dose of radiation defined as deposition of 100 ergs of energy 
per gram of tissue. A rad amounts to approximately one ionization per cubic micron. 
Radiation. High energy alpha or beta particles or gamma rays that are emitted by an 
atom as the substance undergoes radioactive decay. 
Radiation sickness. Symptoms resulting from excessive exposure to radiation of the 
body. 
Radioactive waste. Disposable, radioactive materials resulting from nuclear 
operations. Wastes are generally classified into two categories, high-level and low-
level waste. 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). A device (weapon or equipment), other than a 
nuclear explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to 
cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay 
of such material. 
Radioluminescence. The luminescence produced by particles emitted during 
radioactive decay. 
REM or rem.  A Roentgen Man Equivalent is a unit of absorbed dose that takes into 
account the relative effectiveness of radiation that harms human health. 
S

Spore.  A reproductive form some micro-organisms can take to become resistant to 
environmental conditions, such as extreme heat or cold, while in a "resting stage." 
T

Toxicity.  A measure of the harmful effect produced by a given amount of a toxin on 
a living organism. The relative toxicity of an agent can be expressed in milligrams of 
toxin needed per kilogram of body weight to kill experimental animals. 
Toxins.  Poisonous substances produced by living organisms. 
Vaccine.  A preparation of killed or weakened microorganism products used to 
artificially induce immunity against a disease. 
Vector.  An agent, such as an insect or rat, capable of transferring a pathogen from 
one organism to another. 
Venom.  A poison produced in the glands of some animals; for example, snakes, 
scorpions, or bees. 
Virus.  An infectious micro-organism that exists as a particle rather than as a 
complete cell. Particle sizes range from 20 to 400 manometers (one-billionth of a 
meter). Viruses are not capable of reproducing outside of a host cell.



ACRONYMS E

A

AA&E Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives AAR After Action Report ACL Access 
Control Lists ACP access control point AECS Automated Entry Control System 
AFMAN Air Force Manual AFJMAN Air Force Joint Manual, also may be known as 
AFMAN 
(I) for Air Force ManualALERT Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time AMS Aerial 
Measuring System ANS alert and notification system ANSI American National 
Standards Institute ANSIR Awareness of National Security Issues and Response 
Program AOR Area of Responsibility AP Armor Piercing APHL Agency for Public 
Health Laboratories ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ARC American 
Red Cross ARG Accident Response Group ARS Agriculture/Research Service ASTHO 
Association for State and Territorial Health Officials AT Antiterrorism ATC Air Traffic 
Control ATSD(CS) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support ATSDR 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
B

BCA Benefit-Cost Analysis BCP Business Continuity 
Plan BDC Bomb Data Center 
C

CAMEO Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations 
CB Citizens Band CBIAC Chemical and Biological Defense Information and 
Analysis Center 
CBR Chemical, Biological, or Radiological 
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Material, or High-Yield Explosive 
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CDR Call Detail Report CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group CEO Chief 
Executive Officer CEPPO Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention 
Office 
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
CERT Community Emergency Response Team CFO Chief Financial Officer CFR 
Code of Federal Regulations 
CHEMTREC Chemical Manufacturers� Association Chemical Transportation 
Emergency Center CHPPM Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 
CIAO Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer, also, Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Officer CICG Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group 
CIO Chief Information Officer CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection CIRG Crisis 
Incident Response Group CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CM 
Consequence Management CMS Call Management System CMU Crisis Management 
Unit (CIRG) CO/DO Central Office/Direct Outdial COB Continuity of Business 
COBITTM Control Objectives for Information Technology CONEX Container Express 
CONOPS Concept of Operations COO Chief Operations Officer COOP Continuity of 
Operations COR Class of Restriction COS Class of Service CPG Civil Preparedness 
Guide CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CPX Command Post 
Exercise CRU Crisis Response Unit CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program CSREES Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension 
Service CST Civil Support Teams CSTE Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists CT Counterterrorism CW/CBD Chemical Warfare/Contraband 
Detection 
D

DBMS Database Management System DBT Design Basis Threat DBU Dial Backup DD 
Data Dictionary DES Data Encryption Standard DEST Domestic Emergency Support 
Team DFO Disaster Field Office DISA Direct Inward System Access DMA Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team DMCR Disaster 
Management Central Resource DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response 
Team DoD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of 
Justice DOS Department of State DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DPP 
Domestic Preparedness Program DRC Disaster Recovery Center DTCTPS Domestic 
Terrorism/Counter Terrorism Planning 
Section (FBI HQ) DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
DWI Disaster Welfare Information 
E

EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EECS Electronic 
Entry Control System EFR Emergency First Responder EM Emergency Management 
EMAC Emergency Medical Assistance Compact EMI Emergency Management 
Institute EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC 
Emergency Operating Center EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EOP Emergency 
Operating Plan or Emergency Operations Plan EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act EPG Emergency 
Planning Guide EPI Emergency Public Information EPZ Emergency Planning Zone 
ERT Emergency Response Team ERT-A Emergency Response Team Advance 
Element ERT-N Emergency Response Team National ERTU Evidence Response 
Team Unit ESC Expandable Shelter Container ESF Emergency Support Function ESS 
Electronic Security System EST Emergency Support Team EU Explosives Unit 
F

FAsT Field Assessment Team FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCO Federal 
Coordinating Officer FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEST Foreign 
Emergency Support Team FHBM Flood Hazard Boundary Map FIA Federal Insurance 
Administration FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FIRM Flood Insurance 
Rate Map FIS Flood Insurance Study FISCAM Federal Information Systems Control 
Audit Manual FMFIA Federal Manager�s Financial Integrity Act FNS Food and 
Nutrition Service FOIA Freedom of Information Act FOUO For Official Use Only 
FPEIS Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement FRERP Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan FRF Fragment-retention film FRMAC Federal 
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center FRP Federal Response Plan FRL 
Facility Restriction Level FS Forest Service FSTFS Frame-Supported Tensioned Fabric 
Structure FTP File Transfer Protocol FTX Functional Training Exercise 
G

GAO General Accounting Office GAR Governor�s Authorized Representative GP 
General Purpose GIS Geographic Information System GSA General Services 
Administration 
H

HAZMAT Hazardous materials HAZUS Hazards US HEPA High Efficiency Particulate 
Air HHS Department of Health and Human Services HIRA Hazard Identification and 
Risk Assessment HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
HQ Headquarters
HRCQ Highway Route Controlled Quantity
HRT Hostage Rescue Team (CIRG)
HTIS Hazardous Technical Information Services (DoD)
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

I

IC Incident Commander ICDDC Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact ICP 
Incident Command Post ICS Incident Command System IDS Intrusion Detection 
System IED Improvised Explosive Device IEMS Integrated Emergency Management 
System IID Improvised Incendiary Device IND Improvised Nuclear Device IPL Initial 
Program Load IRZ Immediate Response Zone IS Information System ISACF 
Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation ISO International Organization 
for Standardization ISP Internet Service Provider IT Information Technology 
J 
JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System 
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center JOC 
Joint Operations Center JTF-CS Joint Task Force for Civil 
Support JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force JTWG Joint 
Terrorism Working Group 
LAN Local Area Network LAW Light Antitank Weapon LCM Life Cycle Management 
LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee LFA Lead Federal Agency LLNL 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LOP Level of Protection LOS Line of Sight 
LPHA Local Public Health Agency LPHS Local Public Health System 
M

MAC Moves Adds Changes MEDCOM Medical Command MEI Minimum Essential 
Infrastructure MEP Mission Essential Process MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response 
System MOU/A Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement mph miles per hour 
MSCA Military Support to Civil Authorities MSDS material safety data sheet MSS 
Medium Shelter System 
N

NACCHO National Association for County and City Health Officials NAP 
Nuclear Assessment Program 
NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical NCP National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
NDA National Defense Area NDMS National Disaster Medical System NDPO National 
Domestic Preparedness Office NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team NETC 
National Emergency Training Center NFA National Fire Academy NFIP National 
Flood Insurance Program NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health NMRT National Medical Response Team NMS Network Management Systems 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; National Response Center NRT National Response Team NSC National 
Security Council NTIS National Technical Information Service NUREG Nuclear 
Regulation NWS National Weather Service 
O

ODP Office of Disaster Preparedness OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness OES 
Office of Emergency Services OFCM Office of the Federal Coordinator for 
Meteorology OHS Office of Homeland Security OJP Office of Justice Programs OMB 
Office of Management and Budget OPA Oil Pollution Act OSC On-Scene 
Coordinator OSD Office of Secretary of Defense OSHA Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration OSLDPS Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness 
Support 
P 
PA public address PAZ Protective Action Zone PBX Public Branch Exchange PCC 
Policy Coordinating Committee PCCIP President�s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection PCM Procedures Control Manual PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment 
PDD Presidential Decision Directive PHS Public Health Service PIN Personal 
Identification Number PIO Public Information Officer PL Public Law POC Point of 
Contact POL Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants PPA Performance Partnership 
Agreement PT Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate (FEMA) PTE 
Potential Threat Element PZ Precautionary Zone 
R

RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RAP Radiological Assistance Program 
RCRA Research Conservation and Recovery Act RDD Radiological Dispersal Device 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation REACT Radio Emergency 
Associated Communications Teams REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance 
Center/Training Site REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program ROC 
Regional Operating Center ROD Record of Decision RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
RRIS Rapid Response Information System (FEMA) RRP Regional Response Plan RRT 
Regional Response Team 
S

SAA State Administrative Agency SAC Special Agent in Charge (FBI) SAME Specific 
Area Message Encoder SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
SBCCOM Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (U.S. 
Army) SCADA Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition SCBA Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus SCO State Coordinating Officer SEA Southeast Asia SEB State 
Emergency Board SEL Standardized Equipment List SEMA State Emergency 
Management Agency SERC State Emergency Response Commission SIOC Strategic 
Information and Operations Center (FBI HQ) SLA Service Level Agreement SLG 
State and Local Guide SOP standard operating procedure SPCA Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals SPSA Super Power Small Arms SSS Small Shelter 
System STC Sound Transmission Class SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics 
T

TAC Trunk Access Codes TEA Threat Environment Assessment TEMPER Tent, 
Extendable, Modular, Personnel TERC Tribal Emergency Response Commission TIA 
Terrorist Incident Appendix TM Technical Manual TNT Trinitrotoluene TRIS Toxic 
Release Inventory System TSO Time Share Option 
U

UC Unified Command UCS Unified Command System UL Underwriters Laboratories 
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply USC U.S. Code USDA U.S. Department of 
Agriculture USFA U.S. Fire Administration USGS U.S. Geological Survey US&R Urban 
Search and Rescue 
V

VA Department of Veterans Affairs VAV Variable Air Volume VAP 
Vulnerability Assessment Plan VDN Vector Directory Number VRU 
Voice Response Unit 
W

WAN Wide Area Network WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD-CST WMD Civil 
Support Team 

ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS F

American Lifelines Alliance 
http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.org 
Applied Technology Council http://www.atcouncil.org 
Battelle Memorial Institute, National Security Program 
http://www.battelle.org/natsecurity/default.stm 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
http://www.csis.org 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) / National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) http://www.cia.gov 
Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH) 
http://www.ctbuh.org 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  http://www.faa.gov 
Healthy Buildings International, Inc. 
http://www.healthybuildings.com 
Institute of Transportation Engineers  http://www.ite.org 
Interagency Security Committee (ISC) led by U.S. General Services Administration 
International CPTED [Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design] 
Association (ICA) 
http://new.cpted.net/home.amt 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) 
http://securebuildings.lbl.gov 
National Academy of Sciences 
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/nas/nashome.nsf 
_	Federal Facilities Council (FFC) Standing Committee on
Physical Security and Hazard Mitigation

http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ffc/ 
Physical_Security_Hazard_Mitigation.html 
_	National Research Council
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc

National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 
http://www.ndia.org Public Entity Risk Institute http://www.riskinstitute.org Security 
Design Coalition http://www.designingforsecurity.org Security Industry Association 
(SIA)  http://www.siaonline.org/ Technical Support Working Group (Departments of 
Defense and 
State) http://www.tswg.gov 
 .U.S. Air Force Electronic System Center (ESC), Hanscom AirForce Base 
http://eschq.hanscom.af.mil/ 
 U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command(SBCCOM): Basic 
Information on Building Protection 
 http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil 
 .U.S. Department of Justice http://www.usdoj.gov 

 _	Federal Bureau of Investigation: Terrorism in the United
States reports

 http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm 
. _	Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp

. _	National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

. _	U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals


The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP) 
http://www.tisp.org


Founding Organizations: 
American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) 
http://www.acec.org 
The American Institute of Architects (AIA), Security Resource Center 
http://www.aia.org/security 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) http://www.asce.org 
. _	Architectural Engineering Institute (AEI) of ASCE
http://www.asce.org/instfound/aei.cfm

. _	Civil Engineering Research Foundation (CERF) of ASCE
http://www.cerf.org

. _	Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) of ASCE 
http://www.seinstitute.org Associated General Contractors of America 
http://www.agc.org 

Construction Industry Institute  http://construction-institute.org Federal Facilities 
Council � See National Academy of Sciences above. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
http://www.fema.gov 
. _	Building Performance Assessment Team
http://www.fema.gov/mit/bpat

. _	Mitigation Planning
http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning.shtm

. _	Human Caused Hazards http://www.fema.gov/hazards 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Building and Fire Research 
Laboratory http://www.bfrl.nist.gov Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
http://www.navfac.navy.mil 
_	Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC),
Security Engineering Center of Expertise ESC66

http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil 
Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) 
http://www.same.org 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers http://www.usace.army.mil 
 _	Blast Mitigation Action Group, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Center of 
Expertise for Protective Design 
 http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mil 
. _	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Electronic Security Center
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/esc

. _	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center
http://pdc.nwo.usace.army.mil



Selected Member Organizations: 
Air Conditioning Contractors of America http://www.acca.org Air-Conditioning 
and Refrigeration Institute, Inc 
http://www.ari.org Airport Consultants Council http://www.acconline.org Alliance 
for Fire & Smoke Containment & Control 
http://www.afscconline.org 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO) http://www.transportation.org American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety http://www.aiche.org/ccps 
American Planning Association http://www.planning.org American Portland 
Cement Alliance 
http://www.portcement.org/apca American Public Works Association  
http://www.apwa.net American Railway Engineering & Maintenance of Way 
Association http://www.arema.org 
American Society for Industrial Security International (ASIS) 
http://www.asisonline.org 
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE) http://www.ashrae.org American Society of Interior Designers 
http://www.asid.org American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) 
http://www.asla.org 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
http://www.asme.org 
American Underground Construction Association (AUA) 
http://www.auca.org> or <http://www.auaonline.org 
American Water Resources Association (AWRA) 
http://www.awra.org Associated Locksmiths of America http://www.aloa.org 
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 
http://www.amwa.net 
Association of State Dam Safety Officials 
http://www.damsafety.org Building Futures Council http://www.thebfc.com Building 
Owners and Managers Association International 
(BOMA), Emergency Resource Center 
http://www.boma.org/emergency 
California Department of Health Services, Division of Drinking Water & 
Environmental Management 
http://www.dhs.cahwnet.gov/ps/ddwem Construction Industry Roundtable  
http://www.cirt.org Construction Innovation Forum http://www.cif.org Construction 
Specifications Institute http://www.csinet.org Construction Users Roundtable 
http://www.curt.org 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) http://www.dtra.mil 
Design-Build Institute of America http://www.dbia.org 
Drexel (University) Intelligent Infrastructure & Transportation Safety Institute 
http://www.di3.drexel.edu 
Federal Highway Administration http://www.fhwa.dot.gov 
Florida Department of Transportation, Emergency Management Office 
http://www11.myflorida.com/safety/Emp/emp.htm or 
Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management 
http://www.floridadisaster.org/bpr/ EMTOOLS/Severe/terrorism.htm  or 
http://www.dca.state.fl.us/bpr/EMTOOLS/CIP/ 
critical_infrastructure_protecti.htm 
George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management 
http://www.cee.seas.gwu.edu or http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm 
Homeland Protection Institute, Ltd. http://www.hpi-tech.org 
Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals  http://www.irpt.net 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. � USA 
http://www.ieeeusa.org or http://www.ieee.org/portal/index.jsp 
International Association of Foundation Drilling 
http://www.adsc-iafd.com 
International Code Council (ICC) http://www.intlcode.org Consolidates services � 
products and operations of BOCA (Building Officials and Code Administrators), 
ICBO (International Conference of Building Officials), and SBCCI (Southern 
Building Code Congress International) into one member service organization � 
the International Code Council (ICC) in January 2003. 
International Facility Management Association (IFMA) 
http://www.ifma.org 
Market Development Alliance of the FRP Composites Industry 
http://www.mdacomposites.org 
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research 
http://mceer.buffalo.edu 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
http://www.nasa.gov 
National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) 
http://www.ncpc.gov 
_	Security and Urban Design
http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security.html

National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
http://www.ncms.org National Concrete Masonry Association  http://www.ncma.org 
National Conference of States on Building Codes and Standards 
http://www.ncsbcs.org 
National Council of Structural Engineers Associations (NCSEA) 
http://www.ncsea.com or http://dwp.bigplanet.com/engineers/homepage 
National Crime Prevention Institute 
http://www.louisville.edu/a-s/ja/ncpi/courses.htm National Fire Protection 
Association http://www.nfpa.org National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) 
http://www.nibs.org and http://www.wbdg.org National Park Service, 
Denver Service Center 
http://www.nps.gov/dsc National Precast Concrete Association 
http://www.precast.org National Wilderness Training Center, Inc. 
http://www.wildernesstraining.net 
New York City Office of Emergency Preparedness 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem 
Ohio State University http://www.osu.edu/homelandsecurity Pentagon Renovation 
Program http://renovation.pentagon.mil Portland Cement Association (PCA) 
http://www.portcement.org Primary Glass Manufacturers Council 
http://www.primaryglass.org Protective Glazing Council 
http://www.protectiveglazing.org Protective Technology Center at Penn State 
University 
http://www.ptc.psu.edu SAVE International  http://www.value-eng.org Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers http://www.sfpe.org Southern Building Code Congress, 
International 
http://www.sbcci.org 
Sustainable Buildings Industry Council 
http://www.sbicouncil.org 
The Security and Hazards Mitigation Alliance, Contact Susan Ballard Hirsch at 
Email Address: sballard@g-and-o.com Transit Standards Consortium  
http://www.tsconsortium.org Transportation Research Board/Marine Board 
http://www.trb.org 
Transportation Security Administration - Maritime and Land 
http://www.tsa.dot.gov 
 U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
 http://www.afcesa.af.mil 
 .U.S. Coast Guard http://www.uscg.mil 
 .U.S. Department of Energy http://www.energy.gov 

_	Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) http://www.sandia.gov
-Architectural Surety Program

http://www.sandia.gov/archsur 
-	Critical Infrastructure Protection initiative 
http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-11-00/ 
steam_story.html 
 .U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 .http://www.hhs.gov 
 .U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
 .http://www.va.gov/facmgt 
 .U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Chemical Emergency Preparedness 
and Prevention Office (CEPPO) -Counter-terrorism  
http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/cntr-ter.html 
 .U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)  http://www.gsa.gov 

. _	Office of Federal Protective Service (FPS) of GSA 
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/ 
orgs_content.jsp?contentOID=117945&contentType=1005&P=1&S=1 
. _	Office of Public Building Service (PBS) of GSA
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?
contentOID=22883&contentType=1005&PPzz=1&S=1

. _	Office of the Chief Architect of GSA http://www.gsa.gov/
Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?contentOID=22899&
contentType=1005> and <http://www.oca.gsa.gov


 .U.S. Green Building Council http://www.usgbc.org 
 .U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters http://www.usmc.mil 
 .U.S. Society on Dams http://www.ussdams.org 

University of Missouri, Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, 
National Center for Explosion Resistant Design 
http://www.engineering.missouri.edu/explosion.htm 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
http://www.ce.vt.edu 
Water and Wastewater Equipment Manufacturers Association 
http://www.wwema.org


The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure (PCIS) 
http://www.pcis.org (Note: Involved mainly with information systems and not 
building real property.)


Government: 
Department of Commerce Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) 
http://www.ciao.gov Department of Energy (DOE) http://www.energy.gov 
Department of Homeland Security 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 
http://www.nipc.gov


Private Sector: 
Anser Institute for Homeland Security (ANSER) 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org 
The Financial Services Roundtable Technology Group (BITS) 
http://www.bitsinfo.org CERT� Coordination Center (CERT/CC)  
http://www.cert.org Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA)  http://www.ewa.com 
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) 
http://www.itaa.org The Institute for Internal Auditors (IIA) http://www.theiia.org 
National Cyber Security Alliance (Alliance) 
http://www.staysafeonline.info 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
http://www.nerc.com 
SANS Institute (SANS � SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) 
http://www.sans.org 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Corporate Citizenship (CCC) 
http://www.uschamber.com/ccc


Selected States and Local Organizations: 
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 
http://www.amwa.net The Council of State Governments (CSG)  http://www.csg.org 
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) 
http://www.iaem.com 
National Association of State CIOs (NASCIO) 
http://www.nascio.org 
National Emergency Managers Association (NEMA) 
http://www.nemaweb.org National Governor's Association (NGA) 
http://www.nga.org The National League of Cities (NLC) http://www.nlc.org



BIBLIOGRAPHY G

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection, 
May 2002 , The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials� 
Security Task Force, Washington, D.C. http://security.transportation.org/ 
community/security/guides.html 
The American Institute of Architects 
Building Security Through Design: A Primer for Architects, Design Professionals, and their 
Clients, November 2001, The American Institute of Architects (book) 
http://www.aia.org/security 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
Pub No: G-79, Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities at Fixed 
Chemical Sites, 2002, Center for Chemical Process Safety, ISBN No: 0-8169-0877-X 
http://www.aiche.org/ ccpssecurity 
American Medical Association 
Physical injuries and fatalities resulting from the Oklahoma City bombing, August 7, 1996, 
Mallonee, S., Shariat, S., Stennies, G., Waxweiler, R., Hogan, D., and Jordan, F., The 
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 276 No. 5., pp 382-387 Abstract at 
URL: http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/ abstract/276/5/382 
American Society of Civil Engineers 
Blast Effects on Buildings: Design of Buildings to Optimize Resistance to Blast Loading, 1995, 
G.C. Mays and P.D. Smith, London: Thomas Telford, Ltd., American Society of Civil 
Engineers, ISBN: 0-7277-2030-9 http://www.pubs.asce.org/BOOKdisplay.cgi?9990338 
Blast Resistant Design of Commercial Buildings, 1996, M. Ettouney, R. Smilowitz, and T. 
Rittenhouse, Practice Periodical on Structural Design and Construction, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
February 1996, American Society of Civil Engineers 
http://ojps.aip.org/dbt/dbt.jsp?KEY= PPSCFX&Volume=1&Issue=1 A preprint of the 
final article is available at http://www.wai.com/AppliedScience/Blast/blast-struct-
design.html 
Design of Blast Resistant Buildings in Petrochemical Facilities, 1997, American Society of 
Civil Engineers, ISBN: 0-7844-0265-5 
http://www.pubs.asce.org/BOOKdisplay.cgi?9704510 
Glass-Related Injuries in Oklahoma City Bombing, Journal of Performance of 
Constructed Facilities, May 1999, 13, No. 2, H Scott Norville, Natalie Harville, 
Edward J. Conrath, Sheryll Shariat, and Sue Mallonee http://www.pubs.asce.org/ 
WWWdisplay.cgi?9902006 
Lessons from the Oklahoma City Bombing: Defensive Design Techniques, January 1997, Eve E. 
Hinman and David J. Hammond, January 1997, American Society of Civil Engineers 
(ASCE Press), Reston, VA, ISBN: 0784402175 http://www.asce.org/publications/ 
booksdisplay.cfm?type=9702295 
Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-02, 
2002, American Society of Civil Engineers, ISBN: 0-7844-0624-3, [note revision of 7-
98, does not include building security or antiterrorism but covers all natural 
hazards] 
http://www.asce.org/publications/dsp_pubdetails.cfm?puburl= 
http://www.pubs.asce.org/ASCE7.html?9991330 
Vulnerability and Protection of Infrastructure Systems: The State of the Art, An ASCE Journals 
Special Publication compiling articles from 2002 and earlier available online 
http://ascestore.aip.org/ OA_HTML/aipCCtpSctDspRte.jsp?section=10123 
Architectural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil Engineers AEI 
Newsletter, The Team, Special Terrorism Issue, Fall 2001, Volume 4, Issue 3 
http://www.asce.org/pdf/aei_11_1.pdf 
Structural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil Engineers Structural 
Design for Physical Security: State of the Practice, 1999, Edward Conrath, et al., Reston, 
Virginia, Structural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil Engineers 
http://www.pubs.asce.org/BOOKdisplay.cgi?9990571 
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
Defensive Filtration, ASHRAE Journal, December 2002, James D. Miller 
http://resourcecenter.ashrae.org/store/ashrae/ 
newstore.cgi?itemid=9346&view=item&categoryid= 409&page=1&loginid=29483 
Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Committee for Building Health and Safety under Extraordinary 
Incidents on Risk Management Guidance for Health, Safety and Environmental Security under 
Extraordinary Incidents, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2003 
http://xp20.ashrae.org/about/extraordinary.pdf 
Risk Management Guidance for Health and Safety under Extraordinary Incidents, ASHRAE 
2002 Winter Meeting Report, January 12, 2002 
http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil/pdf/ASHRAE%20CBR% 20Guidance.pdf or 
http://engineering.tamu.edu/safety/ 
guidelines/faclab/ASHRAE_Security_Rpt_12Jan02.pdf 
Standard 62-2001, Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality (ANSI Approved), 
ISSN 1041-2336, addenda to basic ANSI/ ASHRAE Standard 62 basic (1989) 
http://resourcecenter. ashrae.org/store/ashrae 
newstore.cgi?itemid=6852&view= item&categoryid=311&page=1&loginid=29483 
Building Owners and Managers Association International 
How to Design and Manage Your Preventive Maintenance Program, 1996 
http://www.boma.org/pubs/bomapmp.htm 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health 
Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from 
Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological 
Attacks, May 2002, Cincinnati, Ohio www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/ 2002-139.html 
Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne 
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002, Cincinnati, Ohio < Publication No. 
2003-136, Guidance for Filtration and Air Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments 
from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, April 2003, Cincinnati, Ohio 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ docs/2003-136/2003-136.html 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological Incident Handbook, October 1998 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cbr_handbook/ cbrbook.htm 
Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat 
Building Safety Enhancement Guidebook, 2002 http://www.ctbuh.org 
Task Force on Tall Buildings: "The Future," October 15, 2001 
http://www.lehigh.edu/ctbuh/htmlfiles/hot_links/report.pdf or 
http://www.ctbuh.org/htmlfiles/hot_links/report.pdf 
Federal Aviation Administration 
DOT/FAA/AR-00/52, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and 
Construction, Revised June 2001, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 
Office of Civil Aviation Security, Policy and Planning, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Washington, DC 20591 (not available on Internet) 
FAA Order 1600.69A, FAA Facility Security Management Program, update d FAA Order 
1600.69B to be published shortly � The Federal Aviation Administration�s criteria for 
the protection of its facilities. [For Official Use Only] (not available on Internet) 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FEMA 152, Seismic Considerations: Apartment Buildings, Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Series 37, November 1988, Washington, D.C. (not available on Internet) Contact 
FEMA Distribution Center, 
 P.O. Box 2012, 8231 Stayton Drive, Jessup, MD 20794-2012,Telephone: 1-800-
480- 2520, Fax: 301-362-5335 
 FEMA 153, Seismic Considerations: Office Buildings, Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Series 38, November 1988, Washington, D.C. (not available on Internet) Contact FEMA 
Distribution Center, 
 .P.O. Box 2012, 8231 Stayton Drive, Jessup, MD 20794-2012,Telephone: 1-800-480- 
2520, Fax: 301-362-5335 

FEMA 154, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Seismic Hazards: A Handbook (2nd Edition), 
2002, 1988, Washington, D.C. (not available on Internet) Contact FEMA Distribution 
Center, P.O. Box 2012, 8231 Stayton Drive, Jessup, MD 20794-2012, Telephone: 1-800-
480- 2520, Fax: 301-362-5335 
FEMA 277, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Improving Building Performance through Multi-
Hazard Mitigation, August 1, 1996, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.fema.gov/mit/bpat/bpat009.htm 
FEMA 372, Mitigation Resources for Success (CD-ROM), October 2001, Washington, 
D.C. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/ poster_fnl2.pdf 
FEMA 386-2, Understanding Your Risks, Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses, 
August 2001. http://www.fema.gov/fima/ planning_toc3.shtm 
FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation, September 2002, 
Planning http://www.fema.gov/fima/ antiterrorism/resources.shtm 
FEMA 403, World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, May 2002, 
Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.fema.gov/library/wtcstudy.shtm 
State and Local Guide 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 
6, Attachment G, Terrorism, April 2001 
General Services Administration 
Balancing Security and Openness: A Thematic Summary of a Symposium on Security and the 
Design of Public Buildings, November 30, 1999 
http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/gd_files/SecurityOpenness.pdf 
Cost Impact of ISC Security Criteria, GSA & Applied Research Associates, Inc., Bryant 
L. and Smith J., Vicksburg, Mississippi 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov/specialphp/References.php 
Facility Standards for the Public Building Service (PBS-P100); Chapter 8, Security Design, 
Revised November 2000 
http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/facilitiesstandards/ 
Mail Center Manager�s Security Guide � Second Edition, October 22, 2002 
http://www.gsa.gov//attachments/GSA_PUBLICATIONS/ 
extpub/MailCenterManagersSecurityGuideV2.pdf 
Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines for New Federal Office 
Buildings and Major Modernization Projects, November 2000 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov/ about_progressive_collapse/progcollapse.php 
Security Reference Manual, Part 3: Blast Design and Assessment Guidelines, July 31, 
2001 [For Official Use Only] 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov/specialphp/restrictedblast_effects.php 
Healthly Building International, Inc. 
Vulnerability Assessments and Counter Terrorist Protocols 
http://www.healthybuildings.com/s2/vacbt.pdf 
Interagency Security Committee (executive agent � GSA) 
ISC Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects, 
May 28, 2001, [For Official Use Only] 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov/restricted/protectedfiles/ 
ISCCriteriaMay282001.PDF 
Institute of Transportation Engineers 
The Influence of Traffic Calming Devices upon Fire Vehicle Travel Times, Coleman, Michael 
A., 1997, ITE Annual Meeting Compendium, 1997 pp. 838-845 
http://webservices.camsys.com/fhwa/cmn/ cmn33.htm 
Split Speed Bump, 1998, Mulder, Kathy, Washington, D.C., TE International 
Conference, 1998 http://www.ite.org/traffic/ documents/CCA98A33.pdf 
Lawrence Berkeley National Lab 
Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a 
release. LBNL/PUB-51959, January 10, 2003 
http://securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/bldgadvice.pdf 
National Academy of Sciences 
Combating Terrorism: Prioritizing Vulnerabilities and Developing Mitigation Strategies, 
Project Identification Number: NAEP-R-02-01-A, National Academy of Engineering, 
soon to be published 
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/webcr.nsf/ 
ProjectScopeDisplay/NAEP-R-02-01-A?OpenDocument 
National Capital Planning Commission 
Designing for Security in the Nation�s Capital, October 2001 
http://www.ncpc.gov/whats_new/ITFreport.pdf 
The National Capital Planning Urban Design and Security Plan, October 2002 
http://www.ncpc.gov/publications/udsp/ Final%20UDSP.pdf 
National Institute of Building Sciences 
Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security for Building Occupants and Assets, 
http://www.wbdg.org/design/ index.php?cn=2.7.4&cx=0 
National Research Council 
Protecting Buildings and People from Terrorism: Technology Transfer for Blast-effects Mitigation, 
2001, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., ISBN 0-309-08286-2 
http://books.nap.edu/books/ 0309082862/html/index.html 
Protecting Buildings From Bomb Blast, Transfer of Blast-Effects Mitigation Technologies from 
Military to Civilian Applications, 1995, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 
ISBN 0-309-05375-7 
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309053757/html/index.html 
Protection of Federal Office Buildings Against Terrorism, 1988, Committee on the Protection 
of Federal Facilities Against Terrorism, Building Research Board, National Academy 
Press, Washington, D.C., ISBN 0-309-07691-9 http://books.nap.edu/books/ 
0309076463/html/index.html 
Society of American Military Engineers 
National Symposium of Comprehensive Force Protection, October 2001, 
Charleston, South Carolina, Lindbergh & Associates For list of participants access 
http://www.same.org/ forceprot/force.htm 
The House National Security Committee 
Statement of Chairman Floyd D. Spence on the Report of the Bombing of Khobar 
Towers, August 1996, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.house.gov/hasc/Publications/104thCongress/ Reports/saudi.pdf 
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) 
Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card with Explanation of Use, 
http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/prods_pubs/newBTSCPress.ht
m 
U.S. Air Force 
ESL-TR-87-57, Protective Construction Design Manual, November 1989; Contact Airbase 
Technologies Division (AFRL/MLQ) at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, via e-mail to 
techinfo@afrl.af.mil. [Superceded by Army Technical Manual TM 5-855-1 (Air Force 
Pamphlet AFPAM 32-1147(I), Navy Manual NAVFAC P-1080, DSWA Manual 
DAHSCWEMAN-97), December 1997] 
Expedient Hardening Methods for Structures Subjected to the Effect of Nonnuclear Munitions, 
October 1990, Wright Laboratory Report (not available on Internet) 
Installation Entry Control Facilities Design Guide, October 2002, Air Force Center for 
Environmental Excellence 
http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/gate/index.html 
Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997, Air Force Center for Environmental 
Excellence http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/ dcd/arch/force.pdf 
Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide, July 1, 1999, Force Protection Battlelab [For Official 
Use Only] Contact the USAF Force Protection Battlelab, Lackland Air Force Base, 
Texas, phone: (210) 671-0058 
U.S. Army 
Field Manual (FM) 3-19.30, Physical Security, January 8, 2001, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/ fm/3-19.30/fm3-19.30.pdf or 
http://www.wood.army.mil/ mpdoctrine/PDF_Files/FM_3-19.30.pdf 
Field Manual (FM) 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, July 13, 1992 
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/5-114/toc.htm 
Technical Instruction 853-01 (Draft), Protecting Buildings and Their Occupants from 
Airborne Hazards, October 2001 http:// 
buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil/basic/airborne_hazards 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Engineer Technical Letters (ETL) 
ETL 1110-3-494, Airblast Protection Retrofit for Unreinforced Concrete Masonry 
Walls, July 14, 1999 [Restricted Access] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs 
ETL 1110-3-495, Estimating Damage to Structures from Terrorist Bombs Field 
Operations Guide, July 14, 1999 [Restricted Access] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs 
ETL 1110-3-498, Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, 
Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents, February 24, 1999 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/ usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs 
ETL 1110-3-501, Window Retrofit Using Fragment Retention Film with Catcher Bar 
System, July 14, 1999 [Restricted Access] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs 
Protective Design � Mandatory Center of Expertise � Technical Reports 
PDC-TR-91-6, Blast Analysis Manual, Part 1 � Level of Protection Assessment Guide, 
July 1991 [For Official Use Only] Contact U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Protective Design Center, ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST, 215 N. 17th Street, Omaha, 
Nebraska, 68102-4978, phone: (402) 221-4918 
Technical Manuals (TM) 
TM 5-853-1, Security Engineering Project Development, May 12, 1994, also Air Force 
Manual 32-1071, Volume 1 [For Official Use Only] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm 
TM 5-853-2, Security Engineering Concept Design, May 12, 1994, also Air Force 
Manual 32-1071, Volume 2 [For Official Use Only] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm 
TM 5-853-3, Security Engineering Final Design, May 12, 1994, also Air Force 
Manual 32-1071, Volume 3 [For Official Use Only] 
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/ armytm 
TM 5-853-4, Security Engineering Electronic Security Systems, May 12, 1994 
http://www.military-info.com/mphoto/ new1j98.htm#engineer 
TM 5-855-4, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning of Hardened 
Installations, November 28, 1986 http:// www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-
docs/armytm/tm5-855-4/toc.htm 
TM 5-1300, Structures to Resist Accidental Explosions, November 19, 1990, (also 
Navy NAVFAC (Naval Facilities) P-397, Air Force Regulation 88-2); Contact 
David Hyde, 
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry 
Road, Vicksburg, Mississippi 39180 or via e-mail to hyded@ex1.wes.army.mil 
U.S. Department of Commerce
Administrative Orders (DAO) 
DAO 206-5, Occasional Use of Public Areas in Public Buildings, December 9, 1986 
http://www.osec.doc.gov/ bmi/daos/206-5.htm 
DAO 207-1, Security Programs, June 24, 1991, Amended September 6, 1991 
http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/daos/ 207-1.htm 
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998 
http://www.ciao.gov/resource/vulassessframework.pdf 
Practices For Securing Critical Information Assets, January 2000 
http://www.ciao.gov/resource Practices_For_ 
Securing_Critical_Information_Assets.pdf 
U.S. Department of Defense
DoD Security Engineering Manual [Expected to have a major portion for public 
distribution once published as Unified Facilities Criteria and a smaller portion For 
Official Use Only similar to the UFC for AT Standards for Buildings listed below. 
This publication will replace Army Technical Manual 5-853 (Air Force Joint Manual 
32-1071) volumes 1, 2, and 3 and Navy Military Handbook 1013/1A] 
DoD O-2000.12-H, Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and 
Political Turbulence: Mandatory Standards and Implementing Guidance, with Changes 1 and 
2, February 1993, Change 1 � May 21, 1993, Change 2 � October 3, 1997 [For Official 
Use Only] http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ pub1.html 
Force Protection Equipment Demonstration IV, 6-8 May 2003 
http://www.fped4.org 
Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards, December 16, 1999 [For 
Official Use Only] Contact U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha, ATTN: CENWO-ED-
ST, 215 North 17th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-4978, phone: (402) 221-4918. 
Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards � Progressive Collapse 
Guidance, April 4, 2000 (not available on Internet) Contact U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers Protective Design Center, ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST, 215 N. 17th Street, 
Omaha, Nebraska, 68102-4978, phone: (402) 221-4918 
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 
UFC 3-340-01, Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional 
Weapons Effects, June 30, 2002 [For Official Use Only] [Formerly Army TM 
5-855-1] http://www.hnd.usace.army. mil/techinfo/ufc/ UFC3-340-
01WEB.PDF 
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, 
2002 http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ 
ccbdoc.php?category=ufc&docid=106&ref=1 
Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS) 
UFGS-02821A, Fencing, February 2002 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02821A.pdf 
UFGS-02840A, Active Vehicle Barriers, February 2002 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02840A.pdf 
UFGS-02841N, Traffic Barriers, August 2001 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02841N.pdf 
UFGS-08390A, Blast Resistant Doors, April 2001 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08390.pdf 
UFGS-08581, Blast Resistant Tempered Glass Windows, August 2001 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08581.pdf 
UFGS-08840A, Plastic Glazing, July 1995 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08840A.pdf 
UFGS-08850, Fragment Retention Film for Glass, July 1992 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08850.pdf 
UFGS-11020, Security Vault Door, August 2002 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11020.pdf 
UFGS-11025, Forced Entry Resistant Components, August 2001 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11025.pdf 
UFGS-11035, Bullet-Resistant Components, April 2000 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11035.pdf 
UFGS-13095A, Electromagnetic (EM) Shielding, July 2001 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/13095A.pdf 
UFGS-13420A, Self-Acting Blast Valves, November 1997 
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/13420A.pdf 
U.S. Department of Energy
DOE/TIC 11268, A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loadings on Structures, 
February 1992, Albuquerque, NM, Southwest Research Institute [not available on 
Internet] 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 
February 2003 http://www.dhs.gov/ interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ 
National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
The Avoidance of Progressive Collapse, Regulatory approaches to the problem, PB-248 781, 
October 1975, Division of Energy, Building Technology and Standards, Office of 
Policy Development and Research, Washington, D.C. 20410 (not available on 
Internet) 
Creating Defensible Space, April 1996, Oscar Newman, Washington, 
D.C. http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf 
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Terrorism in the United States, 1999, Washington, D.C., Counterterrorism 
Division http://www.fbi.gov/ publications/terror/terror99.pdf 
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment 
and Strategy Development Tool Kit, NCJ181200, May 15, 2000, [For Official 
Use Only] 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/assessment.txt 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in 
U.S. Schools: A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies, September 1999, with U.S. 
Department of 
Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program; and 
U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories 
http://www.ncjrs.org/school/home.html 
NIJ Guide 100-00, Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material 
Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, June 2000 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/184449.pdf 
NIJ Guide 101-00, An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First 
Responders, December 2001 http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/190747.pdf 
NIJ Guide 102-00, Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First 
Responders, Volumes I-IV, November 2002 http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/ 
191518.pdf 
NIJ Guide 602-00, Guide to the Technologies of Concealed Weapon and Contraband 
Imaging and Detection, February 2001 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/184432.pdf 
NIJ Standard 0108.01, Blast Resistant Protective Materials, September 1985 
www.ccb.org under Standards, Government Standards 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Community Policing, August 1996, 
Dan Fleissner and Fred Heinzelmann, Washington, D. C. http://www.ncjrs.org/ 
pdffiles/crimepre.pdf 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Parking Facilities, April 1996, Mary S. 
Smith, Washington, D. C. 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedpkg.pdf 
"Designing Out" Gang Homicides and Street Assaults, November 1998, James Lasley, 
Washington, D. C. http:// www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173398.pdf 
The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Premises Liability, 
April 1996, Corey 
L. Gordon and William Brill Washington, D. C. 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedlia.pdf 
Physical Environment and Crime, January 1996, Ralph B. Taylor and Adele V. 
Harrell, Washington, D. C. 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/physenv.pdf 
Visibility and Vigilance: Metro�s Situational Approach to Preventing Subway Crime, 
November 1997, Nancy G La Vigne, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/ 166372.pdf 
U.S. Marshals Service 
Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 28, 1995 
http://www.oca.gsa.gov 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of DiplomaticSecurity 
Architectural Engineering Design Guidelines (5 Volumes), March 1998 [For Official 
Use Only] (not available on Internet) 
Certification Standard SD-STD-01.01, Revision G (Amended), Forced Entry and 
Ballistic Resistance of Structural Systems, Amended April 30, 1993 www.ccb.org under 
Standards, Government Standards 
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, May 2002, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf 
Physical Security Standards Handbook, January 7, 1998 [For Official Use Only] (not 
available on Internet) 
Structural Engineering Guidelines for New Embassy Office Buildings, August 1995 [For 
Official Use Only] (not available on Internet) 
The Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam on August 7, 1998, January 1999, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/ accountability_report.html 
U.S. Department of the Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco and Firearms 
Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables, 1999, request in writing, 
address information available at 
http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/i54001.htm 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
Physical Security Assessment of Veterans Affairs Facilities, Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Building Sciences Task Group to the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, 6 September 2002 http://www.va.gov/facmgt/standard/etc/ 
vaphysicalsecurityreport.pdf 
U.S. Fire Administration (USFA of FEMA) 
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Process Job Aid, May 1, 2002 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/dhtml/fire-service/cipc-jobaid.cfm 
U.S. Navy 
Design Manual (DM) NAVFAC (Naval Facilities Command) 
NAVFAC DM 2.08, Blast Resistant Structures, December 1986 
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php? category=nav&docid=46&ref=1 
NAVFAC DM 13.02, Commercial Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), September 
1986 http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ 
ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=47&ref=1 
Military Handbooks (MIL-HDBK) 
MIL-HDBK-1002/1, Structural Engineering General Requirements, November 30, 
1987 http://www.wbdg.org/ 
ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=48&ref=1 
MIL-HDBK-1004/4, Electrical Utilization Systems, October 13, 1987 
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=49&ref=1 
MIL-HDBK-1012/3, Telecommunications Premises Distribution Planning, Design, and 
Estimating, May 31, 1996 
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category= 
nav&docid=50&ref=1 
MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based 
Facilities, December 15, 1993 For copies contact Defense Printing Service, 
Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, (215) 6972179, 
FAX (215) 697-1462 or available on the National Institute of Building Sciences� 
Construction Criteria Base 
MIL-HDBK-1013/10, Design Guidelines for Security Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and 
Guard Facilities, May 14, 1993 For copies contact Defense Printing Service, 
Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, (215) 6972179, 
FAX (215) 697-1462 or available on the National Institute of Building Sciences� 
Construction Criteria Base 
MIL-HDBK-1013/12, Evaluation of Security Glazing for Ballistic, Bomb, and Forced 
Entry Tactics, March 10, 1997 For copies contact Defense Printing Service, 
Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, (215) 6972179, 
FAX (215) 697-1462 or available on the National Institute of Building Sciences� 
Construction Criteria Base 
MIL-HDBK- 1013/14, Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers, February 1, 
1999 For copies contact Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700 Robbins 
Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, (215) 697-2179, FAX (215) 697-1462 or 
available on the National Institute of Building Sciences� Construction Criteria 
Base 
TechData Sheets � Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC) 
TDS-2062-SHR, Estimating Damage to Structures from Terrorist Bombs, September 
1998 [For Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to Naval 
Facilities Engineering Service Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66), 
1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, (805) 982-1582 (Primary), 
(805) 982-4817 (Alternate), (805) 982-1253 (Fax) 
TDS-2063-SHR, Blast Shielding Walls, September 1998 [For Official Use Only] 
Requests for publication can be made to Naval Facilities Engineering Service 
Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66), 1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, 
CA 93043-4370, (805) 982-1582 (Primary), (805) 9824817 (Alternate), (805) 
982-1253 (Fax) 
TDS-2079-SHR, Planning and Design Considerations for Incorporating Blast 
Mitigation in Mailrooms, May 2000 For copies contact Defense Printing Service, 
Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, (215) 6972179, 
FAX (215) 697-1462 
TDS-2090-SHR, Design Parametesr for a Controlled Entry Point For copies contact 
Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 
19111-5094, (215) 697-2179, FAX (215) 697-1462 
User Guides � Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC) 
UG-2030-SHR, Security Glazing Applications, May 1998, distributed June 25, 1998 
[For Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to Naval Facilities 
Engineering Service Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66), 1100 23rd 
Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, (805) 982-1582 (Primary), (805) 982-4817 
(Alternate), (805) 982-1253 (Fax) 
UG-2031-SHR, Protection Against Terrorist Vehicle Bombs, May 1998, distributed 
June 25, 1998 [For Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to 
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Security Engineering Division 
(ESC66), 1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, (805) 982-1582 
(Primary), (805) 982-4817 (Alternate), (805) 982-1253 (Fax) 
Other Books, Magazines, Magazine Articles, and Newspaper Articles 
Atlas, Randall I., June 1998, Designing for Crime and Terrorism, Security and Technology 
Design (not found on Internet � suspect this may be a magazine article in Security and 
Technology Design magazine) Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint 
Services, Jim Benesh, Phone: (800) 547-7377 x324, FAX: (920) 568-2244, E-MAIL: 
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com 
Archibald, Rae W., et al., 2002, Security and Safety in Los Angeles High-Rise Buildings 
after 9/11. RAND, Santa Monica, California, ISBN: 0-8330-3184-8 
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/ DB381 
Broder, James F., December 15, 1999, Risk Analysis and the Security Survey, 2nd Edition, 
Butterworth-Heinemann, Stoneham, Massachusetts, ISBN 0750670894 
http://www.amazon.com/ exec/obidos/ASIN/0750670894/ref=pd_sxp_elt_l1/103-
7416668-4182264#product-details 
Craighead, Geoff, December 2002, High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety, 2nd Edition, 
Academic Press, ISBN 0750674555 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0750674555/ qid=/br=1-
/ref=br_lf_b_//t/103-7416668-4182264?v=glance &s=books&n=173507#product-
details 
Crowe, Timothy D., 2000, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Applications Of 
Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd Edition), Stoneham, 
Massachusetts, Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 075067198X 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/ obidos/ASIN/075067198X/103-7416668-
4182264#product-details 
Fehr, Stephen C., July 1996, Parking Under Siege in D.C.: U.S. Anti-Terrorism Plan 
Threatens 360 Spaces, The Washington Post, July 13, 1996 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/ advanced.htm 
Fenelly, Lawrence J, June 1997, Effective Physical Security, 2nd Edition, Stoneham, 
Massachusetts, Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN 0-75-069873-X 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ 
ASIN/075069873X/ref=ase_lksmsubsite-df1-2-20/103-7416668-
4182264#product-details 
Garcia, Mary Lynn, February 23, 2001, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection 
Systems, Stoneham, Massachusetts, Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 0750673672 
http:// www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0750673672//103-7416668-
4182264?v=glance&s=books 
Gonchar, Joann, March 2002, Building for a Secure Future: Government 
Facilities under way incorporate already tough standards, Engineering News-
Record, March 25, 2002 http:// 
www.construction.com/NewsCenter/Headlines/ENR/ 20020325e.asp 
Greene, R.W., October 2002, Confronting Catastrophe: A GIS Handbook, ESRI 
Press, ISBN: 1589480406 http:// 
www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1589480406/ ref=ase_inktomi-bkasin-
20/103-7416668-4182264 
Hart, Sara, March 2002, In the aftermath of September 11, the urban landscape 
appears vulnerable and random: Architects and consultants focus on risk assessment 
and security through design, Architectural Record, March 2002 
http://archrecord.construction. com/CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/03_02_1.asp 
Kowalski, Wladyslaw Jan, P.E., Ph.D., September 26, 2002, Immune Building Systems 
Technology, McGraw-Hill Professional, ISBN: 0-07-140246-2 
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/stores/ detail/-/books/0071402462/002-
5179887-1245633#product-details 
Nadel, Barbara A, March 1998, Designing for Security, Architectural Record, March 
1998 http://www.archrecord.com/ CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/3_98_1.asp 
Owen, David D. and R.S.Means Engineering Staff, Building Security: Strategies and 
Costs, Construction Publishers & Consultants, ISBN: 0-87629-698-3, 2003. 
Pearson, Robert, September 1997, Security through Environmental Design, Security and 
Technology Design, Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint Services, Jim 
Benesh, Phone: (800) 547-7377 x324, FAX: (920) 568-2244, E-MAIL: 
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com 
Rochon, Donald M., June 1998, Architectural Design for Security, Security and Technology 
Design, Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint Services, Jim Benesh, 
Phone: (800) 547-7377 x324, FAX: (920) 568-2244, E-MAIL: 
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com 
Security Magazine [on-line magazine] 
http://www.securitymagazine.com 
Security Solutions Online: Access Control and Security Systems [on-line magazine] 
http://industryclick.com/ magazine.asp?magazineid=119&siteid=24 
Security Technology and Design [on-line and print magazine] 
http://www.st-and-d.com 
Sidell, Frederick R., et al, 1998, Jane�s Chem-Bio Handbook, Jane�s Information Group, 
Alexandria, Virginia, ISBN 0-7106 2568-5 
http://www.janes.com/company/catalog/chem_bio_hand.shtml 
Smith, Keith, November 2000, Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing 
Disaster, Routledge, New York, New York, ISBN 0415224632 
http://www.routledge-
ny.com/books.cfm?isbn=0415224632