Strategic Goal Chapters

Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security

Diplomatic, consular, and foreign assistance activities help shape the international security environment in ways that promote political and economic freedom and protect the dignity and human rights of all people

I. Public Benefit

The Department of State and USAID seek to achieve peace and security through diplomatic engagement with and development assistance to international partners. Through our international diplomatic and assistance programs, we promote good governance and sustainable civil institutions; fight terrorism and the proliferation of dangerous weapons; combat criminal activities that undermine legitimate governments; remove landmines and unexploded ordnance; and protect American citizens and our legitimate national interests overseas.

The Department of State and USAID, in partnership with other U.S. Government agencies and international organizations, have mobilized 180 partner countries to help identify, disrupt, and destroy international terrorist organizations. Since September 11, 2001, we have significantly improved our global partners' capabilities through anti-terrorism assistance, terrorist interdiction, and anti-terrorist finance programs, as well as through longer-term efforts to improve responsible governance and international security. We promote responsible defense trade, help to strengthen foreign military forces' accountability to legitimate civilian government, and help to remove the explosive remnants of war that undermine social and economic recovery.

The Department actively partners with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and other transnational threats. In 2006, the Department and DHS announced a joint venture to expand the use of technology to strike the most effective balance between stronger border security and the facilitation of travel and commerce that contribute to America's social and economic well-being. Working with international allies, the U.S. Government is bolstering the security of U.S. physical and cyber infrastructures critical to the reliable functioning of global networks upon which the free flow of information, travelers, goods, and services depends. With these programs, the Department is reducing risk to U.S. national security by combating the ability of terrorists to travel, plan, and finance activities, conduct attacks, and train recruits.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a clear, present, and serious challenge to American national security. The Department has undertaken a range of efforts to prevent proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and expertise, eliminate in a verifiable manner WMD and missile programs in North Korea, end Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, enhance the ability of allied governments to detect, disrupt and respond to terrorist acquisition or use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons, and strengthen existing multilateral frameworks such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Finally, the Department and USAID work with other agencies and governments to eliminate trafficking of persons, illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, movement of illicit drugs and other contraband, and to interdict the operations and prosecute the leaders of international groups involved in cyber crime and other criminal activities. On the diplomatic level, the Department works with international bodies to set counter-drug, anti-crime and counter-terrorist standards, foster cross-border law enforcement cooperation, and deny safe havens to crime, drug and terrorist groups. These efforts to strengthen judicial offices and create less corrupt and more transparent national and local government structures help strengthen law enforcement and establish political stability in countries struggling against narco-terrorists.

II. Resource Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 2006 Actual	FY 2007 Estimate	FY 2008 Request	Change from FY 2007	
				Amount	%
Staff	4,470	4,530	4,544	14	0.31%
Funds	$2,487,173	$2,361,649	$2,743,492	$381,843	16.17%

III. Strategic Goal Context

Shown below are the indicators, accounts, bureaus and partners that contribute to this strategic goal. Acronyms are defined in the glossary at the back of this publication.

Strategic Goal	Performance Indicator	Major Accounts	Lead Bureau(s)	Key Partners
Achieving Peace and Security	Progress Towards the Implementation of the Road Map	D&CP, ESF	NEA	NSC, CIA
	Capacity of the Afghan National Army	D&CP, IMET	SCA, PM	DoD
	Implementation of Sudan Peace Process	D&CP, PKO, NADR, CIPA	AF, PM	AU, ECOWAS
	Engaging Regional Partners on Korean Peninsula	D&CP	EAP	China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Intelligence Community
	Strength of Treaty Relationships - Japan and Korea	D&CP	EAP	DoD, Japan, Korea
	Status of Transatlantic Security Relationships: NATO-led and U.S.-led Coalition Operations	D&CP, FMF, IMET, ESF	EUR, PM	NATO
	Regional Security in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone	PKO, FMF, IMET, NADR, CIPA	AF, PM	AU, DoD, UNDPKO, ECOWAS
	U.S.-Trained African Units Deployed to Peace Support/Humanitarian Response Operations (PART)	D&CP, PKO, IMET, FMF	AF, PM	AU, DoD, EU, ECOWAS, UNDPKO, European and African partners
	Travelers Screened by Foreign Governments (PART)	NADR	S/CT	N/A
	Capability to Counter Terrorist Organizations and Threats (PART)	D&CP, NADR	S/CT, DS	N/A
	Percentage of Highest Priority Countries Capable of Screening for Terrorists	NADR	S/CT	N/A
	Number of Major Money Laundering Countries that have Implemented Laundering Legislation	D&CP	S/CT, EB, INL, INR	N/A

Strategic Goal	Performance Indicator	Major Accounts	Lead Bureau(s)	Key Partners
Achieving Peace and Security	Number of Financial Action Task Force Members Evaluated	D&CP, NADR	S/CT, EB, INL, INR	N/A
	Compliance With UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373	CIO, D&CP	S/CT, IO	UN
	Number of Foreign MANPADS Reduced	D&CP, NADR	PM	NSC, DHS, IC
	Near Eastern Countries Party to International Conventions on Terrorism	D&CP	S/CT, Regional Bureaus	N/A
	Full Implementation and Expansion of Container Security Initiative	D&CP	EB	DHS, DOJ
	Implementation of International Security Standards for Maritime Shipping and Ports	D&CP	EB	DHS, DOJ
	Critical Infrastructure Protection	D&CP	PM	DHS, DOJ, DOC, DoD, DOE, APEC, OAS, OECD, G-8, UNGA
	International Organizations' Agreements to Strengthen Cyber Security	D&CP	EB, PM	DHS, DOJ
	Security and Prosperity Partnership with Canada and Mexico	D&CP	WHA	DHS, DOC, Canada, Mexico
	Response Time for Active Response Corps and Standby Civilian Reserve	D&CP	S/CRS	DoD, DOJ, Treasury
	Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Ended	NADR, D&CP, CIO	ISN, NEA, VCI	DoD, DOE, NSC, UN, P-5, IAEA, G-8, EU-3, IC
	Status of North Korea's Missile Programs	D&CP, CIO	VCI, ISN, EAP	DOE, NRC, DoD, DOC, IC, IAEA, NSC, UN
	Countries with Safeguards Agreement and Protocols in Force	D&CP, NADR, CIO, FSA	ISN, VCI, IO	DOE, NRC, DoD, DOC, NGOs
	Chemical Weapons Convention	D&CP, CIO, FSA	ISN, VCI, IO	DoD, DOC, DOJ, DHS, HHS, DOE, IC, IOs
	U.S. Proposals to National Approaches of Controlling Biological Weapons Threat	D&CP, CIO, FSA	ISN, VCI, IO	DoD, DOC, DOJ, DHS, HHS, DOE, IC, IOs
	Level of International Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative	NADR, D&CP, IO	ISN, IO	DoD, DOT, DHS, DOC, DOJ, IC
	Implementation of UNSCR 1540	NADR, D&CP, IO	ISN, S/CT, IO	DoD, DOT, DHS, DOC, DOJ, IC, UN
	Foreign Cultivation of Coca in Hectares (PART)	ACI, CIO, D&CP, DA	INL, WHA	DoD, DEA, DOJ, ONDCP, CNC
	Seizures of Cocaine from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (PART)	ACI, CIO, D&CP, DA	INL, WHA	DoD, DEA, DOJ, ONDCP, CNC
	Hectares of Opium Poppy Cultivated in Afghanistan (PART)	CIO, D&CP, DA	INL, SCA	DoD, DEA, DOJ, ONDCP, CNC
	Status of UN Convention Against Corruption	CIO, D&CP, FSA, SEED, INCLE	INL, L	FBI, DEA, DHS, DOJ, DOC, OGC, Treasury, UN
	Foreign Governments that Increase Activities to Combat Trafficking Persons	ERMA, MRA	PRM	IOM, DHS
	Countries Identified for International Property Right Infractions	D&CP	EB	UN, WIPO

IV. Performance Summary

For each initiative/program that supports accomplishment of this strategic goal, the most critical FY 2008 performance indicators and targets are shown below.

Indicator #1: Progress Towards the Implementation of the Road Map, as Measured by the Existence of an Independent, Democratic Palestinian State Alongside Israel in Peace and Security			
Outcome			
TARGETS	FY 2008	Permanent Status Agreement and the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Implementation of prior agreements. Enhanced international monitoring of roadmap implementation. Second international conference convened by Quartet. Private Israelis and Palestinians participate freely with full official support in joint meetings, exchange projects, and people-to-people activities and receive coverage in the Israeli and Palestinian media. Development of full normal relations between Arab states and Israel.	
	FY 2007	Continued implementation of roadmap provisions. In Gaza, active public diplomacy and public affairs programming resumes with NGOs, professional associations, and academic institutions. Building on multilateral and bilateral contacts, Arab states and Israel increase contact to the level of semi-official ties (trade offices for some countries).	
RESULTS	FY 2006	Pursuant to Israel's successful disengagement from Gaza, the U.S. brokered an Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) in November 2005 which allowed for the opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and outlined a number of steps to promote greater movement of both people and goods. Free and fair legislative council elections in January, the first in a decade, brought to power a Hamas government elected on a platform of ending corruption and improving the lives of the Palestinian people. That government, however, rejected calls for it to be a partner for peace by accepting the principles outlined by the Quartet (U.S., EU, UN and Russia), leading most members of the international community, including the U.S. to break contact with those elements of the Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled by Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. PA President Mahmoud Abbas remained in office, providing a vehicle for continued limited U.S. engagement with the Palestinian leadership. The Hamas victory led to increased violence and lawlessness in Gaza, including frequent rocket attacks against Israel, resulting in increased Israeli security operations and closure of crossings. In June 2006, Hamas conducted an attack inside green-line Israel, killing two IDF soldiers and abducting a third. Israel responded with an extended air and ground operation. The USG has concentrated on the direct provision of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, while seeking to create the conditions that would allow the parties to return to the roadmap. Israeli settlement activity continued during the year and the GOI failed to make significant progress dismantling outposts. The U.S. Security Coordinator mission continued under LTG Keith Dayton, focusing on implementation of the AMA and supporting the office of President Abbas. President Bush reaffirmed U.S. commitment to a two-state solution, indicating U.S. efforts would focus on strengthening and reforming the Palestinian security sector, supporting dialogue between the parties, and engaging moderate Arab leaders to help create an environment conducive to progress towards a two-state solution. A July attack by Hizballah provoked a month-long war between Israel and Hizballah, preventing progress on the Syria and Lebanon tracks.	
	2005	Israel's Government has concluded its withdrawal from Gaza, and the focus has now shifted to Palestinian efforts to establish order. Disengagement produced coordination on a number of levels between the two sides. The Palestinian Authority has begun to take steps to restructure and reform its security forces throughout the West Bank and Gaza, with the support of U.S. Security Coordinator General William Ward and assistance from the international community. Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn continues work on his agenda of issues intended to restore the viability of the Palestinian economy. Restoration of pre-Intifada Arab links with Israel continues, as indicated by the return of the Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors to Tel Aviv.	

		2004	Roadmap process is relaunched. Security cooperation renewed. Both sides progress through provisions in Phase I of the roadmap, including, but not limited to, on the GOI side: a) as comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides revert to the pre-September 28, 2000 status quo; b) immediate dismantlement of settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and freezing of all settlement activity; and c) steps to improve the humanitarian situation.
		2003	Roadmap is publicly released and used effectively as diplomatic tool to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Both sides progress through provisions in Phase I of the roadmap, including, but not limited to: a) as comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides revert to pre-September 28, 2000 status quo; b) immediate dismantlement of settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and freezing of all settlement activity; and c) steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the West Bank/Gaza. Israel's border with Lebanon remains quiet.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation		The indicator corresponds to the vision articulated by the President in his June 24, 2002, speech of two states, Israel and Palestine, existing side by side in peace and security, with goals geared to roadmap obligations. Progress is measured according to the degree to which an independent, democratic Palestinian state exists alongside Israel in peace and security.
	Data Source		Quartet announcements, Embassy and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs reporting.

Indicator #2: Capacity of the Afghan National Army to Defend the Credibly Elected Afghan Government and its Territory from External and Internal Threats

Outcome

<table>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">TARGETS</td>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>Current plans are for 50,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) (55 battalions) to be trained and equipped by September 2007 and capable of independent operations by 2013.</td>
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<td>FY 2007</td>
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Five additional battalions graduate, bringing total to 50, and over 35,000 ANA trained and assigned to a unit.
Third and fourth brigades of each Regional Command reach IOC. At least 10 ANA battalions reach Level 1 unit capability and can conduct independent operations without Coalition assistance. At least 25 battalions successfully complete unit validations and reach Level 2 capability.
Complete infrastructure projects for three brigades at each of the five regional commands. Initiate infrastructure builds for 3 additional brigade sites at Regional Commands.
Four brigades complete and fielded at end of FY 2007. All fielded ANA units can successfully deploy in support of coalition counter-terrorism operations and provide increased stability and central government control nationwide through regional commands.

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<td rowspan="4">RESULTS</td>
<td>2006</td>
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30,400 Afghan National Army forces trained and equipped and partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
Minor improvements to Ministry of Defense and General Staff action process are being initiated despite the delay in assigning personnel to key leadership positions. Assistant Minister for Defense for Personnel and Education office beginning to take on a more active role in policy development. Operational Planning Guidance complete; staff beginning to develop the seven operational plans based on this guidance.
48,100 Afghan National Police trained and equipped.

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<td>2005</td>
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ANA influence fully established in Kabul and throughout the country. Forty (25 combat, 15 support / logistics) battalions are operational and approximately three and a half battalions are trained. Force strength is over 26,000.
More than 62,000 militia were disarmed and demobilized, ending the formal disarmament and demobilization process in June 2005. The reintegration phase is scheduled for completion in 2006.
Four ANA regional centers are operational.

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<td>2004</td>
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Three brigades of "Kabul Corps" fully fielded to a minimum of 90% manning and equipment. At least 6 Central Corps battalions conduct operational deployments.
100% of heavy weapons collected and cantoned by June 2004 and 60% combatants disarmed and demobilized by September 2004.

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<td>2003</td>
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U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom drove the Taliban from power and began to destroy the country's terrorist networks.
Three battalions completed basic training at the Kabul Military Training Center and one began training. However, none were fully equipped nor completed the full training due to lack of weapons, munitions and demined training sites.
Other challenges included lack of warlord support, recruiting difficulties, and insufficient funding. No Border Guard battalions were trained.

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<tr>
<td rowspan="2">DATA QUALITY</td>
<td>Indicator Validation</td>
<td>The training and deployment of, and expansion of influence by, the Afghan National Army indicates progress towards establishing sustainable security in Afghanistan, without which the Global War on Terror will not succeed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Source</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces Update from the Joint Staff.</td>
</tr>
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Indicator #3: Implementation of Sudan Peace Process

Outcome

TARGETS		
	FY 2008	Continue implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in accordance with the agreed upon schedule. Strengthening of internal Sudanese dialogue. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) undertakes some downsizing in response to the withdrawal of Government of Sudan (GOS) forces from the south and progress on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). If peace holds, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)/refugees will return to their homes in Darfur. UNMIS Darfur operations continue.
	FY 2007	Continue implementation of the CPA in accordance with the agreed upon schedule. Strengthening of internal Sudanese dialogue. Government of Sudan (GOS) military forces withdraw from the south. Comprehensive peace agreement signed for Darfur and implementation activities beginning including integration of forces and return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. UNMIS Darfur operation fully staffed.
RESULTS	2006	CPA implementation showed progress in security arrangements; less progress on power- and wealth-sharing protocols. Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria and Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement completed. Both agreements complement framework of CPA. Planning for elections barely in preliminary phase; however, technical preparations for a national census, a precursor to elections, are on schedule. Military transformation and U.S. support for Security Sector Transformation have slowly begun in the South. UNMIS verified redeployment on schedule with 63 percent Sudanese Armed Forces redeployed and 65 percent Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forces redeployed. The National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Commission has not met since it was established in February 2006. The Northern Sudan DDR Commission started preliminary assessment work in Darfur. IDPs are returning in the South, but displacements are increasing in Darfur. UNSCR 1706 authorizes the extension of UNMIS to Darfur and expansion by up to 17,300 troops, 3,300 UN Police, and 16 Formed Police Units.
	2005	The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was concluded in January 2005. The donors conference in April succeeded in obtaining pledges to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement above request. The UN Mission in Sudan is deploying. Despite the untimely death of former Vice President John Garang in late July, the process continues to move forward under new leadership. Violence in Darfur and disruption of humanitarian assistance continue, despite some improvements. In spite of some difficulty, Darfur peace talks in Abuja continue.
	2004	The Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A achieve a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The interim period begins. There is a smooth transition as most elements of the peace agreement begin to be implemented; the U.S. and the international community maintain maximum pressure to implement the remaining elements. Military reform commences with additional assistance provided to southern Army. DDR on both sides results in force reduction of 10 percent globally. 25 percent of refugees and IDPs return home. International monitoring force deployed to monitor interim period arrangements. Darfur ceasefire solidified and differences resolved peacefully.
	2003	Both the GOS and the SPLM/Army began a peace process, resolving two of the most contentious issues: the role of religion and the right of self-determination. Nuba Mountains ceasefire agreement concluded, international monitoring operations begun, and humanitarian support provided. Civilian Protection Monitoring Team preparing to stand up. Zones of Tranquility and Slavery Commission work conducted.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	A peaceful Sudan with an inclusive government based on the rule of law could be a hedge against regional instability and an important partner in the global war on terrorism. Ending conflict will also alleviate one of the world's worst humanitarian situations and propel regional economic prospects. The U.S. Department of State does not support forced repatriation of refugees under any circumstances. Peace, stability, and the rule of law must be in place in order for refugees to return of their own volition.
	Data Source	Government of Sudan announcements and Embassy reporting.

Indicator #4: Engaging Regional Partners on Korean Peninsula

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Six-Party Talks agreement is implemented.
	FY 2007	Six-Party Talks concluded with an agreement to verifiably and irreversibly end and dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons programs.
RESULTS	2006	As of August, 2006, the DPRK has refused to rejoin the Six-Party Talks. Following the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) ballistic missile launches on July 4-5, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695 condemning the launches; demanding the DPRK suspend all activity on its ballistic missile program and return to its missile-launch moratorium; and requiring all member states, in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, to prevent missile and missile-related items and technology from being transferred to DPRK missile or WMD programs; the procurement of such items from the DPRK; and, the transfer of any financial resources in relation to the DPRK's missile or WMD programs. The foreign ministers of the Six-Party countries – the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and Russia, joined by the foreign ministers from Malaysia, Canada, Australia, Indonesia and New Zealand – met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur in July to discuss the DPRK's missile launches, its nuclear programs and proliferation activities, counterterrorism, and how to move forward in the Six-Party process. The DPRK declined to participate.
	2005	Engaged China, which has the closest political and economic relations with North Korea, to convince North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. Engaged South Korea to limit North-South economic cooperation without progress in the nuclear issue. Six-Party Talks reconvene.
	2004	North Korea continued to pursue and proliferate WMDs. Six-Party Talks, launched in 2002 to verifiably and irreversibly end and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, remain suspended due to North Korean refusal to participate. South Korea, Japan, China and Russia generally supportive of resuming the Six-Party Talks.
	2003	China played a crucial role in facilitating multilateral talks with North Korea on maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Other members of the Six-Party Talks, particularly China, are capable of playing a bigger role in resolving the threat posed by North Korea.
	Data Source	The clearest verification is the reconvening of the Six-Party Talks. Interim progress will be measured by press and cable reports from U.S. overseas posts and intelligence reporting.

Indicator #5: Strength of Treaty Relationships - Japan and Korea

Outcome

<table>
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<td rowspan="2">TARGETS</td>
<td>FY 2008</td>
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Japan - Continue specified relocation, land return and training activities.
Korea - Continue specified relocation activities.

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<td>FY 2007</td>
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Japan - Policy coordination for the Kitty Hawk replacement has been completed. Coordination with Government of Japan (GOJ) on implementing Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) has advanced and GOJ has begun allocating funding for GOJ-sponsored items.
Korea - Continued specified relocation activities and concluded Special Measures Agreement negotiations in calendar year 2006.

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<tr>
<td rowspan="4">RESULTS</td>
<td>2006</td>
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Japan - Implementation plans for specific DPRI items have been completed and agreement on implementation plans has been reached with the Government of Japan. New Special Measures Agreement (SMA) maintaining high level of GOJ host-nation support has been negotiated and signed.
Korea - Continued specified relocation activities. Begin and concluded a new round of SMA negotiations.

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<td>2005</td>
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Japan - Establishment of a permanent night landing practice site was incorporated into the Defense Policy Review Initiative process. The Joint Committee adopted an agreement on environmental and accident site issues. DPRI developed joint strategic goals, which were unveiled at "2+2" Ministerial.
Korea - Secured land and commenced construction of new facilities to support Yongsan and other facilities relocation. Convened Security Policy Initiative meetings. Concluded the 2005-2006 SMA negotiations.

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<td>2004</td>
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Japan - United States and Japan reach agreement on assurances for U.S. military members in Japanese custody. U.S. Forces complete removal of all Polycholorinated Biphenyl, a toxic chemical, in storage on U.S. bases. Bilateral talks on replacement of U.S.S. Kitty Hawk begin. U.S. and Japan discuss concrete proposals on the remaining elements for the Futenma replacement facility under the Defense Policy Review Initiative.
Korea - ROK National Assembly approved the Future of the Alliance agreement on the reconfiguration of U.S. Forces Korea including relocation from Yongsan and other facilities. The two governments agreed to continue high-level security consultation by establishing the U.S.-ROK Security Policy Initiative.

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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Talks between the U.S. and South Korea on the Future of Alliance produced a timetable and division of costs for the reconfiguration of U.S. Forces in Korea during 2004-2008.</td>
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<tr>
<td rowspan="2">DATA QUALITY</td>
<td>Indicator Validation</td>
<td>Strengthened alliances will foster long-term stability in East Asia and the Pacific. Implementation of the measures approved by the Future of the Alliance and DPRI will strengthen the security alliance and bilateral relations with both Japan and Korea.</td>
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<td>Data Source</td>
<td>Cable reports and memoranda of communication from U.S. overseas reports. Public announcements and documents at the conclusion of negotiations and agreements.</td>
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Indicator #6: Status of Transatlantic Security Relationships: NATO-led and U.S.-led Coalition Operations		
Outcome		
TARGETS	FY 2008	European countries continue to contribute significantly to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO begins handover of training to the Iraqi government. Afghan security forces begin to assume greater responsibility for internal security, while ISAF retains a robust presence. NATO seeks to complete Balkan advisory missions.
	FY 2007	European countries contribute significantly to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. troop contribution decreases as a percentage of the total force in Afghanistan. NATO Training Mission in Iraq expands to include additional training. NATO helps maintain security in accord with the terms of a settlement on Kosovo's status.
RESULTS	2006	• NATO increased the size and scope of its training mission in Iraq. • NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan and completed expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. • NATO completed Kosovo Force transition from a Multinational Brigade Force to a Multinational Task Force structure. • NATO Response Force improved but is not yet at full operating capability. • Ukraine committed to strengthening cooperation with NATO. • Russia and NATO work together to improve military interoperability, but Russia has not yet established a fully interoperable peacekeeping unit.
	2005	• Improvements made in NATO Response Force but not yet at full operating capability. • Increased European military capabilities through engagement in the ISAF and NATO's Training Mission in Iraq. • NATO's Stabilization Force completed its mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina. NATO-EU handover completed. NATO headquarters in Sarajevo was established on schedule. • NATO completed Stage 2 (West) and initiated Stage 3 (South) of the Interim Security Assistance Force expansion. Established the Training, Education and Doctrine Center at ar-Rustamiyah in Iraq. • NATO began Kosovo Force transition to a Multinational Task Force structure to eliminate redundant administrative and support forces.
	2004	• European and Eurasian partners contribute troops to the Multinational • Force-Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom. • NATO-ISAF operation expanded beyond Kabul. NATO expands operations in • Iraq, possibly by taking over command of the Polish-led Multinational Division. • Minimal NATO presence in Bosnia & Herzegovina with possible handoff to EU.
	2003	• Europeans made pledges at Prague to improve their capabilities. Seven new members invited at Prague. • Allied Heads of State and Government committed at Prague to enhance military capabilities by filling key shortfalls through the New Capabilities Initiative. The initiative will encourage pooling and specialization, introduce the NRF and reform NATO's Command Structure. • U.S. export controls with key European allies streamlined to promote transatlantic defense industrial integration. NATO-Russia Council and 2002 work plan established.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	NATO is the United States' foremost security relationship. Effective ties with our NATO allies are essential to promoting stability and protecting U.S. interests in worldwide.
	Data Source	Reports from NATO.

Indicator #7: Regional Security in the Mano River Countries of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	• The Mano River region remains at peace and gross domestic product growth is greater than population growth. • Liberia and Sierra Leone fully reintegrated within the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union. • Civilian Governments fully in control of their security forces. • International/regional forces withdraw from Liberia.
	FY 2007	• Liberia holds acceptable elections with nonviolent aftermath. • Security sector reform continues in Liberia with newly trained police and military units deployed. • The countries remain at peace, posting growth twice that of population growth and boosting their rankings in Freedom House's index. • International/regional forces downsize in Liberia.
RESULTS	**2006**	• Administration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated January 16, 2006, with no significant violence or unrest. • Security sector reform programs are underway for the army; training of units begun in July 2006. UN is making progress on police training and reform with U.S. assistance. • All three countries remain at peace although there is some concern about the post-Conte transition in Guinea. The most recent World Bank data indicate the following ratios of GDP growth to population growth: Guinea -- pop 2.2%, GDP 2.7%; Liberia -- pop 0.7%; GDP 2.6%; Sierra Leone -- pop 4.2%, GDP 7.4%. • 2006 Freedom House rankings are as follows: Guinea -- "Not Free"; Liberia -- "Partly Free"; Sierra Leone -- "Partly Free". • All IDP camps closed in 2006. Approximately 100,000 refugees voluntarily returned to Liberia in 2006, some through UN facilitation. • UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) withdrew from Sierra Leone in December 2005, replaced by UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) political mission.
	2005	• Liberia's transitional government held elections in October 2005, and Sierra Leone continues post-conflict recovery. • UNAMSIL withdrew from Sierra Leone in December 2005. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform activities have been incomplete and greatly delayed respectively. • As of the end of 2004, Sierra Leone had an estimated 47,000 Liberian refugees, Liberia 350,000 IDPs and thousands of Sierra Leone refugees, while Guinea was hosting 1,700 Sierra Leoneans and 74,000 Liberians.
	2004	• Liberians agree to, and honor, a cease-fire. UN and Liberia make preparations for elections scheduled for October 2005, per comprehensive peace agreement. • DDR proceeds smoothly; Liberians cease their involvement in the internal difficulties of Côte d'Ivoire; the transitional government agrees to the restructuring of its security forces and transparency in its finances. UN sanctions are lifted. • Sierra Leone and Guinea are at peace and cut off support for Liberian insurgents. • 25% decrease in numbers of refugees and IDPs in the region as people are able to return home. • UNAMSIL continues phased withdrawal. International/regional force to monitor Liberian peace process deploys.

	2003	• The International Contact Group on Liberia has persuaded Liberia to talk directly with insurgents, but fighting continues to disrupt the country with no guarantee the government will agree to comprehensive reform. • UN sanctions have not contained Liberians from fighting and looting in Côte d'Ivoire, while elements in Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea continue to support Liberian insurgents. • The peace in Sierra Leone is fragile, and Guinea's stability is questionable. • Increasing numbers of IDPs are flooding Monrovia, and more Liberian refugees are streaming into Guinea and Sierra Leone. 259,000 refugees and 425,000 IDPs in the region. UNAMSIL begins phased withdrawal.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	These countries have been the site of war and other instability for at least the past 15 years, at untold humanitarian and economic cost to the countries and the region. Realizing a just peace will ensure that human resources and markets can better prosper and thereby decrease the region's potential as the site for potential terrorist or other illicit activities (including environmental degradation). The U.S. Department of State does not support forced repatriation of refugees under any circumstances. Peace, stability, and the rule of law must be in place in order for refugees to return voluntarily.
	Data Source	UN Mission in Sierra Leone reports. Freedom House.

Indicator #8: Percentage of U.S.-Trained African Units Deployed to Peace Support/Humanitarian Response Operations (PART)

Output

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">TARGETS</td><td>FY 2008</td><td>Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in peacekeeping operations globally, approximately 80 percent will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.</td></tr>
<tr><td>FY 2007</td><td>Of all African units deployed in peacekeeping operations globally, 75 percent will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">RESULTS</td><td>2006</td><td>Approximately 79 percent of all African battalions (or other military contingents) deployed on peacekeeping missions globally have significant staff and/or unit training experience through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2005</td><td>African units trained by U.S. trainers come from Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Kenya in significant numbers.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2004</td><td>Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed globally, approximately 65% had significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2003</td><td>Seven African contingents trained by the U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers engaged in peace support missions. An additional five contingents planned for Peace Support Operations participation in Liberia and Burundi. Economic Community Of West African States forces, with significant U.S. support and training, deployed to Liberia.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">DATA QUALITY</td><td>Indicator Validation</td><td>A U.S.-trained African unit or one trained by U.S.-trained trainers will perform better than one not provided such training or its equivalent. Also, African peacekeeping operations requirements are expected to remain high and therefore improved African capability will lessen calls for the use of U.S. forces.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Data Source</td><td>Embassy, Bureau of African Affairs, UN, non-governmental organizations, and press reporting.</td></tr>
</table>

Indicator #9: Percentage of Travelers Screened by Foreign Governments with the Terrorist Interdiction Program's Watchlisting System (PART)		
Output		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	96 percent
	FY 2007	88 percent
RESULTS	2006	80 percent. The number of installation sites that are screening all or nearly all travelers has steadily increased, which has enabled the program to attain its overall target despite technical difficulties with some country-unique systems and deteriorating security situations that have impacted system usage in certain countries.
	2005	75 percent. The number of installation sites that are screening all or nearly all travelers has steadily increased, thereby enabling the target to be attained despite technical difficulties with some country-unique systems that are impacting system usage there.
	2004	60 percent. Unexpected lingering technical difficulties with some country-unique watchlisting systems had the effect of dragging down the overall average of traveler screening program-wide.
	2003	58 percent
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	A key element of this program is maximizing the usage of the terrorist watch listing system to screen travelers passing through ports of entry at which it is installed. The system is effective only to the extent it is used by participating nations.
	Data Source	Close monitoring of host nation system usage by U.S. personnel based in the host country and examination of system usage reports by temporary duty U.S. technical personnel.

Indicator #10: Participant Countries Achieving and Sustaining a Capability to Effectively Deter, Detect, and Counter Terrorist Organizations and Threats (PART)		
Outcome		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Sustain training capabilities within the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) countries that have ascended from basic antiterrorism training courses into more advanced training.
	FY 2007	Ascend countries from basic through advanced training and sustaining competence in countering terrorist activities and threats.
RESULTS	2006	The Department conducted counterterrorism training for 77 partner nations and performed 269 training events. Two new countries ascended from basic through advanced training and attained competence in countering terrorist activities.
	2005	This year proved to be another highly productive and successful year for the ATA Program and its training participants. ATA continues to proceed with existing antiterrorism training and assistance efforts to help partner nations in the global war on terrorism. ATA sponsored 217 training events to 78 countries.
	2004	Two countries (Israel and South Africa) ascended from basic through advanced training and have attained competence in countering terrorist activities and threats
	2003	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	ATA not only provides quality training to priority counterterrorism countries but enables each country to achieve sustainment by providing them with the capability to incorporate anti-terrorism curriculum into their own training methods over a set course of time.
	Data Source	Embassy reporting, intelligence/law enforcement reporting, after-action reports by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security/ATA program implementers and regional bureau area offices and individual country assessments.

Indicator #11: Percentage of Highest Priority Countries Capable of Screening for Terrorists Through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (PART)

|			
		Output	
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	58 percent (35 countries)	
	FY 2007	45 percent (27 countries)	
RESULTS	2006	38 percent (23 out of 60 countries). The level of funding in FY 2006 was insufficient to achieve the target number of new countries to receive the program's terrorist watchlisting capability.	
	2005	35 percent (21 out of 60 countries). The level of funding in FY 2005 was insufficient to achieve the target number of new countries to receive the program's terrorist watchlisting capability. The program has been operating at the same funding level since 2003.	
	2004	33 percent (20 out of 60 countries)	
	2003	20 percent (12 out of 60 countries)	
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator provides a key annual measurement of progress toward the program's long-term goal of establishing terrorist screening capabilities in all countries where terrorists pose a threat to the United States or are likely to use as transit points.	
	Data Source	Terrorist Interdiction Program Office.	

Indicator #12: Number of Countries/Entities on the President's List of Major Money Laundering Countries that have Implemented Comprehensive Anti-Money Laundering Legislation		
Outcome		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Five countries implement comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation.
	FY 2007	Three countries implement comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation.
RESULTS	2006	New indicator
	2005	N/A
	2004	N/A
	2003	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Globalization, abetted by the nearly universal use of the Internet, requires that financial sectors in all jurisdictions protect themselves from all-source money launderers while simultaneously accepting their responsibility to respond to legitimate requests from foreign jurisdictions to share vital financial information. While the international community has been successful in establishing global norms and standards for combatting financial crimes and money laundering through multi-lateral and regional organizations, instituting an effective international anti-money laundering regime requires implementation of these norms and standards in each host government. The first step in developing a viable regime is enacting comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation.
	Data Source	International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report.

Indicator #13: Number of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Members Evaluated

Output

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	At least 2/3 of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members have been evaluated against the Nine Special Recommendations. FATF initiates a comprehensive review of progress and implementation obstacles based upon the finding of the mutual evaluation of its members. At least four members from each FATF-style Regional Body are evaluated against the Nine Special Recommendations. All FATF members have completed their National Assessments of their NGO sector. Note: The FATF is a multilateral organization and the conduct and scheduling of mutual evaluations and assessments is not under U.S. control
	FY 2007	Continue with FATF members being evaluated against the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. At least 8 new mutual evaluations of FATF members are conducted. See that FATF's Tour d' Table international cooperation initiative is institutionalized. At least 1/2 of all FATF members have completed their National Assessments of their NGO sector.
RESULTS	2006	To date, seven Mutual Evaluations under the new criteria have been conducted. The FATF is a multilateral organization and the scheduling of mutual evaluations is not under US control. Efforts are underway to increase the pace of mutual evaluations by the FATF and we have seen some increase in the pace of these mutual evaluations.
	2005	New FATF Special Recommendations established. Fewer evaluations of FATF members conducted than anticipated due to new recommendations added to the evaluation process.
	2004	Developed viable anti-terrorist financing legal and regulatory regimes in twelve of the priority countries. FATF incorporated Eight Special Recommendations into its evaluation methodology. USG conducted three FATF training and technical assistance evaluations.
	2003	Conducted in-country assessments of six of the 19 priority countries most heavily involved in funding Al Qaeda. Conducted tabletop assessment of one priority country. Provided technical assistance to 15 of the 19 priority countries, with three of these countries receiving technical assistance in at least three of the five functional areas.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Completed evaluations increase capabilities of FATF members to effectively detect, deter and seize financial accounts and records associated with terrorist activities and organizations; thus, U.S. interests at home and abroad are safer from the threat of terrorism. We do not like to measure the success of the program in amount frozen or blocked or seized, because the more sophisticated nations become in their anti-money laundering regimes, the less likely terrorists are to use their systems to raise and transfer funds. We therefore measure success according to the training we have provided and the new measures instituted by the recipient country (e.g., the enactment of a new law, the establishment of a financial intelligence unit, etc.).
	Data Source	FATF Annual Reports, available on the FATF website (www.fatf-gafi.org) and provide summaries of mutual evaluations. Other information includes internal FATF documents that are not publicly available but are available to the USG.

Indicator #14: Compliance With UN Security Council Resolution 1373

Outcome

TARGETS	FY 2008	The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) are actively engaged in brokering needed assistance to UN Member States unable to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373.
	FY 2007	The CTC completes transition from gathering information to assessing Member States' implementation of UNSCR 1373 and increasing Member States' compliance through dissemination of best practices and facilitation of technical assistance. The CTC identifies standards that could facilitate this process and assesses whether Member States have met their basic obligations under UNSCR 1373 to enact legislation covering all aspects of UNSCR 1373 and have established the necessary executive and administrative machinery to enforce the new legislation. The CTC continues to urge all Member States to become parties to the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, with a view to maximizing participation to all of the treaties by the end of 2008 that had not been amended before FY 2005/2006 and take steps to become parties to the additional instruments.
RESULTS	2006	A directory of best practices was developed, published on the CTC's website, and promoted to Member States. Five Member State visits and two field missions were conducted. The CTC began its transition from gathering information to assessing Member States' implementation of UNSCR 1373, adopting a comprehensive matrix for assessing Member States' compliance with UNSCR 1373 and applying it to individual Member States. The CTC strengthened its relationship with the G8's Counter-Terrorism Action Group, including in the area of technical assistance.
	2005	169 of 191 UN members have submitted follow-up reports as requested by the CTC. Although enhancements to the CTC staff of the CTED were authorized in March 2004, they did not become fully staffed until September 2005. Since the 2005 target was largely predicated on increased CTC staff capacity, the CTC did not achieve as much as expected. However in Calendar Year 2005, it did stage one international conference for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations to exchange counterterrorism standards and best practices (in Almaty in January 2005), and conduct five field missions (to Morocco, Albania, Kenya, Thailand and Algeria).
	2004	191 countries completed their second and third reports and 100 countries report they have executive machinery implementing counter-terrorism legislation required under UNSCR 1373. CTC initiates limited number of field missions to monitor compliance and to assess needs for technical assistance and training. CTC implements restructuring of its expert staff to enable it to meet its responsibilities, including serving as a clearinghouse for counter-terrorism standards, codes, and best practices of 60-plus international, functional, and regional and sub-regional organizations and sending field missions for first-hand information on implementation and technical assistance needs.
	2003	All UN Member States have submitted at least one report. Assistance has begun to reach those states having difficulty complying. CTC begins to identify States seriously out of compliance with UNSCR 1373 and provides written notification to such States that corrective action must be taken to avoid UNSC (or other) action. New round of CTC reporting begins. Outreach to regional and other relevant organizations is undertaken systematically.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Repeated reporting by countries indicates progress in meeting UNSCR 1373's requirements.
	Data Source	Member States' reports to the UN/CTC, other UN/CTC reports, and reporting from U.S. Embassies and USUN.

Indicator #15: Number of Foreign MANPADS Eliminated

Outcome

TARGETS	FY 2008	9,000
	FY 2007	9,000

RESULTS	2006	Total MANPADS missiles destroyed: 5206.
	2005	Total MANPADS missiles destroyed: 5504. Target was not reached because some destruction events projected for late FY 2005 slipped to FY 2006.
	2004	Approximately 5500 were destroyed.
	2003	Approximately 3,400 MANPADS were destroyed.

DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	An estimated 750,000 to 1 million MANPADS have been produced, although it is unclear how many of those are excess to national defense requirements. The target numbers are a function of both funding and a reasonable estimate of what will be taken out of circulation. Amount of MANPADS destroyed is an easily quantifiable measure. There may not be a direct correlation between the numbers of MANPADS destroyed and a decrease in the threat of attacks on civilian and military aircraft. However, MANPADS acquired through illicit trafficking, loosely secured stocks and the black market are a distinct threat to aviation, and it is prudent to limit the number and availability of MANPADS held around the world through efforts to reduce and better secure existing stocks.
	Data Source	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs compiles reports from project managers, contractors and embassy personnel, including State Department and Defense Attaches.

Indicator #16: Number of Near Eastern Countries Party to International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Thirteen countries party to ten or more of the thirteen international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Five countries party to all thirteen of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
	FY 2007	Twelve countries party to ten or more of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Four countries party to all twelve of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
RESULTS	2006	Eleven countries are party to 10 or more of twelve international counterterrorism conventions. Three (Libya, Tunisia and UAE) are party to all twelve.
	2005	Seven countries are party to 10 or more of twelve international counterterrorism conventions. Two (Tunisia and Libya) are party to all twelve.
	2004	Five countries party to ten or more of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Oman). Two countries party to all twelve of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
	2003	Four countries party to ten or more of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. One country party to all twelve of the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Greater cooperation with international terrorism conventions and protocols represents a greater willingness of countries in the region to cooperate with the international community in taking concrete and substantial actions against terror organizations.
	Data Source	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs bureau reporting

Indicator #17: Full Implementation and Expansion of Container Security Initiative

Outcome

TARGETS	FY 2008	Continue implementation of targeting mechanisms and risk management techniques developed as part of Container Security Initiative (CSI) throughout the supply chain. Extend radioactive scanning to further CSI ports.
	FY 2007	Five ports join CSI. Targeting mechanisms and risk management techniques developed as part of CSI are implemented throughout the supply chain covering 85% of U.S.-bound maritime containerized cargo. Supplement CSI with screening for radioactive material with scanners provided by the United States.
RESULTS	2006	Eleven ports in nine countries joined the CSI in FY 2006. CSI is now operational at 50 ports, accounting for approximately 82% of all containerized merchandise imported into the United States. Upon the initiative of the United States, the World Customs Organization has established a Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade that establishes tested U.S. procedures as international standards, including advanced electronic cargo information, common risk management criteria, inspection of high-risk containers at the outgoing port and business incentives for secure supply chains. The U.S. Government is providing technical assistance through the WCO for developing countries to implement the framework. As the next step in the Container Security Initiative, DHS is working with selected foreign ports to set up pilot integrated scanning systems combining radiation detection, non-intrusive inspection and optical imaging of the container exterior, to test for general use.
	2005	Four countries (UAE, Argentina, Brazil and Portugal) signed Declarations of Principles. 14 additional ports comply with CSI, including Kaohsiung and Dubai, for a total of 40 CSI ports overall.
	2004	Sign Declarations of Principles with 19 countries to participate in CSI. Place permanent personnel at 5 operational CSI ports.
	2003	Launch of the CSI. Nine countries signed on, encompassing fourteen of the initial twenty large ports. CSI "pilot phase" deployment began in two countries.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Security screening of containers at foreign ports before ships depart for the U.S. decreases both the appeal to terrorists and the vulnerability of the vital maritime transportation sector and, in the event of an incident, allows more expeditious resumption of maritime commerce.
	Data Source	Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security

Indicator #18: Implementation of International Security Standards for Maritime Shipping and Ports

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Implementation of best practices continues through multilateral fora. U.S. Coast Guard assesses further ports for compliance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards. IMO adopts standards for ship and port facility security. United States passes the Maritime Transport Security Act.
	FY 2007	U.S. Coast Guard continues international port assessments. Implement best practices promulgated through multilateral fora such as the International Maritime Organization, World Customs Organization, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, G-8 and other organizations. Assist noncompliant ports to implement IMO standards.
RESULTS	2006	U.S. Coast Guard continues to visit and share best practices with port authorities worldwide in accordance with UN International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) standards and the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 45 countries have been visited.
	2005	All major shipping registries serving the U.S. now conform with ISPS standards. In "port state control" checks, since the beginning of FY 2005, the Coast Guard detained only 26 ships, denied entry to one, and expelled two for deficiencies in their security arrangements.
	2004	US Coast Guard began international port inspections as mandated under Maritime Transport Security Act (MTSA) to verify compliance with ISPS and MTSA standards. Seafarer ID standards adopted by the International Labor Organization. Port security enhanced through access controls. Universal seamens' documents undergoing initial testing.
	2003	IMO adopted standards for ship and port facility security. United States passes the Maritime Transport Security Act.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Coast Guard audits of shipper compliance with UN International Ship and Port Facility Security standards are important to improve maritime security and prevent terrorist attacks.
	Data Source	International Maritime Organization and U.S. Coast Guard

Indicator #19: Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Principles Implemented by Bilateral Partners

Outcome

TARGETS		
	FY 2008	50
	FY 2007	50

RESULTS		
	2006	Over 100 countries, including 10 from ASEAN, 14 from the Baltimore Conference, over 100 from the ITU Cyber Security Conference, and 4 bilateral engagements. Priority effort applied to implementing the international component of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
	2005	45 countries, including 19 from the Sao Paulo conference, 13 from the Berlin conference, and 12 from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group.
	2004	34
	2003	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a measure of national awareness of and participation in CIP. Awareness of the problem is a critical first step to undertaking cooperative international activities. Target numbers are based on five CIP principles (appointment of a national CIP coordinator, establishment of a mechanism for information exchange, adoption of appropriate CIP legislation, a campaign for CIP awareness, and creation of a culture of security.) The priority of effort is to move beyond awareness raising and identify specific initiatives for implementation. At present we have 11 bilateral partners.
	Data Source	The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs compiles data on the adoption and implementation of CIP principles among bilateral partners.

Indicator #20: International Organizations' Agreements to Strengthen Cybersecurity

Outcome

TARGETS		
	FY 2008	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and International Telecommunication Union Standardization Sector (ITU-T) will continue analyzing and raising awareness of new issues of cybersecurity and develop strategies to counter emerging threats.
	FY 2007	APEC, OAS, and OECD developing recommendations and best practices for elements of cybersecurity, such as malware. ITU-T publishes cybersecurity recommendations.
RESULTS	2006	APEC, OAS and OECD have increased focus on cybersecurity and on raising cybersecurity awareness. OECD published anti-spam toolkit; APEC held symposium on spam and related threats. Following the 2006 World Summit on the Information Society, ITU developments include new work on cybersecurity in the ITU Development Bureau.
	2005	APEC, OAS, OECD and ITU-T identified issues relevant to securing networks and recognized that international cooperation and standards are key components of cybersecurity.
	2004	APEC and OAS kick off cybersecurity implementation with conference and training for members' officials as well as private sector. OECD members agree on key issues and best practices for implementing guidelines for both public and private sectors. UN World Summit on the Information Society agrees to include cybersecurity as a major theme in its activities. APEC establishes an Asia-Pacific network of Computer Emergency Response Teams. OAS and ITU-T members propose cybersecurity study programs.
	2003	UN adopts "Culture of Cybersecurity" resolution based on OECD guidelines. APEC adopts cybersecurity strategy with target date of October 2003 for implementation. U.S. launches cybersecurity initiative in OAS in December 2002. OECD develops implementation plan for OECD cybersecurity guidelines.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Agency reports are subject to auditing and public review. International cooperation is key to success because networks are interconnected globally.
	Data Source	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs data on the adoption and implementation of cyber security initiatives in international organizations.

Indicator #21: Implementation of the Security and Prosperity Partnership with Canada and Mexico

		Output
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Produce progress report/assessment of regulatory cooperation by 2008. Develop strategy to identify and manage threats to our food supply and agricultural sectors. Improve the security of aviation cargo through adoption of comparable screening and inspection protocols for inbound and outbound goods. Develop and deploy system for measuring/reporting border transit times.
	FY 2007	Develop Trilateral Regulatory Cooperation Framework by 2007. Implement import/export control programs to minimize the risk of illicit movements of radioactive materials. Prioritize critical infrastructure assets requiring vulnerability assessments, identify resources, and begin conducting coordinated assessments.
RESULTS	**2006**	• <u>Canada</u>: Targets largely achieved, with Phase One of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative on track, announcement of Rice-Chertoff initiative and movement toward development of a border crossing card. Transit time for Detroit-Windsor reduced by more than 25 percent. No terrorist incidents or exploitation; counterterrorism cooperation continues at a high level. To increase security, USG and the Government of Canada completed joint exercises on St. Clair and Detroit Rivers during Super Bowl in February. Completed Cyber storm exercise in February to prepare for potential incidents affecting critical infrastructure. Meeting and discussion are preparing Mutual Assistance Agreements to prepare for cross-border public health emergencies. • <u>Mexico</u>: USG and the Government of Mexico (GOM) aligned regulations to require manifest data be reported 24-hours in advance of loading ship. USG and GOM signed an Action Plan to Combat Violence and Improve Public Safety. • <u>Canada and Mexico (trilateral)</u>: Representatives of three governments completed training related to the protection of aircraft from terrorist threats, basic and advanced marksmanship skills, and emergency aircraft procedures. The USG, GOC and GOM cooperated to tighten and verify the security of key nuclear and radiological facilities. The governments established the Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza Coordinating Body to ensure governments act in a coordinated manner to meet a pandemic threat. Representatives of the three countries inaugurated the North American Aviation Trilateral to promote civil aviation security.
	2005	• <u>Canada</u>: Targets achieved with Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) launched and leaders and Ministers meetings held; working groups formed. Cooperative aspects of Border Accord continue being implemented and expanded initiatives under the SPP umbrella launched. No terrorist incidents associated with Canada; counterterrorism cooperation continues at a high level. • <u>Mexico</u>: USG and GOM agreed to establish a standardized Alien Smuggler Prosecutions Program; approved construction of expanded infrastructure at Nogales border crossing. Completed MANPADS training event to improve preparedness against this aviation/security threat. Agreed to programs to enhance detection and dismantling of criminal organizations engaged in sexual or labor exploitation of women and children.
	2004	• <u>Canada</u>: NEXUS lanes added at three border crossings. FAST lanes at one. SPP discussions continued but were not finalized by fiscal year-end. • <u>Mexico</u>: Consultant study initiated; SENTRI lanes under development; technology installation and public outreach underway; Advance Passenger Information System installed; protocols on sharing of information on aliens of interest near completion and technical review expected this fiscal year. SPP was not launched in FY 2004.

	2003	• <u>Canada</u>: Continued implementation of additional portions of the U.S.-Canada Border Accord in coordination with newly created Department of Homeland Security. Finalize a "safe third" asylee agreement, a pre-clearance agreement, and continued visa policy coordination. U.S.-Canada joint committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection established. No incidents of terrorist exploitation of Canadian territory to attack the U.S. or its interests. • <u>Mexico</u>: Border Partnership signed by both governments. Initial implementation meetings held in Mexico City and Washington. $25 million obligated for law enforcement assistance projects under some of the 22 points.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	This indicator measures progress in implementing a key border security agreement with countries bordering the continental United States.
	Data Source	DHS and Commerce, assisted by State, prepare annually a document which reviews previously agreed work plans and notes if key milestones were met as scheduled.

Indicator #22: Response Time for Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby Response Corps (SRC)

Output

TARGETS	FY 2008	Active Response Corps (ARC) will have 33 individuals on board, and 75 percent of those will have received at least basic ARC training course. Targeted response time to deployment of ARC and personnel from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is one week, not including visa issuance.
	FY 2007	ARC will have 50 individuals on board and occupying full time equivalent positions by end of year. Seventy-five percent of those will have taken at least one of our training courses. Deployment baseline created for ARC and Standby Civilian Reserve (SCR) personnel. Targeted response time from identification of requirement to deploy personnel to the time it takes to place Corps members on the ground is one week, not including visa issuance.
RESULTS	2006	ARC was 25 authorized 15 positions, and succeeded in filling 8. Basic training requirements complete, all ARC members have received S/CRS orientation course, and first basic ARC training course held. Deployment of ARC members as backstop personnel for headquarters, to Geographic Combatant Command, and on field teams (Advanced Civilian Teams) in Sudan, Kosovo, Chad and Lebanon. Continued development of the SRC, including identification of individuals, training and exercises requirements, with 92 Department staff on roster and two deployed by end of year.
	2005	Conceptualized the function of the ARC and SRC in relation to overall R&S operations, and fully veted within interagency community. Obtained support for concepts and identified resource and budgetary needs, with objective of 100 ARC and 600 SRC by FY 2008. Developed rosters of eligible individuals and determined requirements of Human Resources Bureau.
	2004	Concept of civilian reserve corps discussed in creation of S/CRS and in discussions with Congress on overall USG needs.
	2003	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Those who have studied the topic of reconstruction and stabilization agree that having a quick response civilian capacity is vital to the transition from military to civilian control in post-conflict operations. Progress on development and deployment of the ARC and S/CRS is therefore an appropriate means of measuring USG capacity to provide for future diplomatic personnel needs in such crisis situations.
	Data Source	Training database at the Foreign Service Institute

Indicator #23: Status of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Output

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	UN Security Council continues to apply pressure on Iran to suspend its proliferation sensitive activities, consistent with UNSCRs 1696 and 1737. Upon Iranian suspension of such activities, multilateral negotiations commence with Iran toward a long-term settlement of outstanding international concerns. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues with Iran, with Iran providing full cooperation with the IAEA.
	FY 2007	Negotiations with Iran continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement. Iran maintains a full suspension of all proliferation-sensitive activities, verified by the IAEA. IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues in Iran. Iran provides full cooperation such that the IAEA is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program declarations appear correct and complete. UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors remain seized of the issue.
RESULTS	**2006**	Iran restarted its uranium enrichment activities in January 2006 by breaking seals on centrifuge components and beginning centrifuge operations. The IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council in February. In March, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to fully suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation. In May, the U.S. agreed to direct negotiations with Iran if it fully and verifiably suspended its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The U.S. joined the governments of China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom in offering a package of incentives in return for full compliance. Iran provided its official response to the P5+1 package of incentives, but did not suspend its operations. In July, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, making the call for suspension mandatory and giving Iran until August 31 to comply. Iran refused to do so and, on December 23, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, widening the scope of the required suspension to include heavy water-related projects and imposing Chapter VII sanctions on Iran. Included in these sanctions are prohibitions on Iran's procurement of technology that could contribute to its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, provision of technical or financial support to these activities or Iran's missile programs, and imposition of an asset freeze and travel notification requirement on key individuals associated with the nuclear and missile programs.
	2005	In August 2005, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. In response to this and other Iranian violations of its IAEA safeguards agreement, the IAEA formally found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.
	2004	Under pressure, Iran signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA in November 2003. U.S. continued to build an international consensus that Iran must cooperate fully with IAEA investigations, ratify and continue to implement an Additional Protocol, and suspend all enrichment-related activities.
	2003	IAEA establishes Iranian safeguards violations. Iran's noncompliance causes Russia and other potential nuclear suppliers to reconsider cooperation with Iran's program. U.S. makes case to the international community that Iran's nuclear fuel cycle is designed to support a nuclear weapons program.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Iran is a major threat to international security and to the global nonproliferation regime. The international community needs to improve its ability to deal with states that violate their NPT obligations. This indicator will record U.S. and international progress in managing this challenge. Maintaining international solidarity is key.
	Data Source	Developments will be recorded in embassies' reporting, bilateral consultations with relevant countries, and IAEA and Security Council reporting. Major developments will be publicly known through UN/IAEA reports and will be generally reliable. UN/IAEA information based on Iranian statements/access may be of limited utility.

Indicator #24: Status of Verified Elimination of North Korea's Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Long-Range Missile Programs

Outcome

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">TARGETS</th><td>FY 2008</td><td>Nuclear - Assuming resumption and continuation of negotiations throughout CY 2007, complete nuclear-related dismantlement negotiations with North Korea by early CY 2008. As a result of the negotiation process, agree on and begin to implement plan for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear programs and its associated dismantlement verification regime.
Chemical - Continue to monitor chemical transactions (using the agency of the Australia Group) and potential violators of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, and respond appropriately.
Biological - Continue to press for compliance. Firm up game plan for follow-on Biosecurity Review Conference. Review Confidence Building Measures.
Missile - Begin negotiations on an agreement on a verifiable missile export ban and limitations on indigenous missile programs, including elimination of all indigenous Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I missiles and associated programs.</td></tr>
<tr><td>FY 2007</td><td>Nuclear - Complete the development of the baseline framework for verifiably and irreversibly dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and consult with others, including the International Atomic Energy Agency and appropriate countries, to ascertain capability and willingness to contribute to its operational implementation. Continue nuclear-related dismantlement negotiations with North Korea. As a result of internal deliberations and the above international efforts, further refine the operational requirements for dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and its associated dismantlement verification regime and, if appropriate, take steps to secure necessary long-lead critical items.
Chemical - Continue to press for DPRK accession to CWC and halt to proliferation.
Biological - Develop game plan to press for compliance. Firm up strategy for Biosecurity Conference. Establish Confidence Building Measures.
Missile - Refine requirements for a verifiable missile export ban and limits on indigenous missile programs, including elimination of all indigenous MTCR Category I missiles and associated programs. Consult, as appropriate, with allies.</td></tr>
<tr><th rowspan="4">RESULTS</th><td>2006</td><td>DPRK conducted a nuclear test to "bolster the country's self-defense," reportedly against U.S. threats, sanctions, and pressures. UN Security Council condemned the test and imposed sanctions on the DPRK, calling for it to return immediately to the multilateral talks. There was no progress on implementing a DPRK agreement to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2005</td><td>The six participating nations unanimously adopted a Joint Statement of Principles, in which the DPRK committed to "abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards."</td></tr>
<tr><td>2004</td><td>Developed baseline nuclear verification regime to support USG negotiating efforts.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2003</td><td>Developed conceptual framework for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program.</td></tr>
<tr><th rowspan="2">DATA QUALITY</th><td>Indicator Validation</td><td>Implementation of a long-term monitoring regime. Continue to watch for proliferation activities of noncompliance with treaty obligations and political commitments. Address noncompliance concerns.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Data Source</td><td>UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." DPRK declarations, intelligence community reports, analysis and assessments, IAEA reports, Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological Weapons.</td></tr>
</table>

| Indicator #25: Number of Countries that have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in Force.		
Output		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	95
	FY 2007	87
RESULTS	2006	As of December 2006, 78 countries have both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in force. This leaves 30 NPT non-nuclear weapons states without the required Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force.
	2005	69 countries with both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in force. All NPT parties with nuclear power reactors have signed an Additional Protocol except for Argentina and Brazil. The Board of Governors approved an Additional Protocol for Malaysia, which represented an important step toward broader acceptance of the Additional Protocol by members of the Non-Aligned Movement. 35 NPT non-nuclear weapons states do not yet have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force. By contrast, in June 1995, when the NPT was extended indefinitely, the Additional Protocol did not exist, and 73 NPT non-nuclear weapon states did not yet have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
	2004	N/A
	2003	N/A
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The NPT and the IAEA safeguard program make up the cornerstones of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Particularly in the face of the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea, we need to keep the global regime vital, relevant, and effective. This Indicator tracks one measure of the regime's universality and, since safeguards cannot be applied without the necessary legal instruments, its effectiveness.
	Data Source	Information for tracking this Indicator is available on the IAEA website, www.iaea.org.

Indicator #26: Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	182 States Parties. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) sustains implementation of remedial measures to ensure that any delinquent states meet Article VII requirements; 75% of States Parties meet basic national implementation requirements.
	FY 2007	180 States Parties. OPCW adopts and implements effectively remedial measures to ensure that any delinquent states meet Article VII requirements; 70% of States Parties meet basic national implementation (Article VII) requirements.
RESULTS	2006	179 States Parties. All equipment for destruction of Albanian chemical weapons in place; destruction scheduled to begin in October 2006. OPCW inspection program expands to 235 sites inspected in 61 countries. Second Russian destruction facility completed; third facility also operating although construction not yet complete. All Article VII requirements met by 75% of States Parties.
	2005	174 States Parties at the end of FY05. The U.S. supported the Action Plan in 2005 through vigorous bilateral diplomacy and direct assistance to states, for example, in assisting with the drafting of national legislation.
	2004	164 Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In 2004, at U.S. urging, the OPCW adopted an Action Plan to ensure that all States Parties carry out their national implementation responsibilities as outlined in Article VII of the CWC. These include establishment of a National Authority, enactment of penal legislation governing CWC implementation, declaration and destruction of chemical weapons, declaration and destruction or conversion of chemical weapon production facilities, and declaration of production of certain dual-use chemicals above CWC thresholds.
	2003	150 States Parties
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Tracking the number of States Parties provides a measure of the CWC's growing influence and universality, and one measure of whether the CWC continues to be an effective instrument for reducing the WMD threat. There were 87 original States Parties when the CWC entered into force in 1997. Tracking success of the Action Plan provides another measure of CWC effectiveness. If all States Parties implement requirements for domestic implementation, it will be more difficult for proliferators and terrorists to obtain or transfer the chemicals needed to produce chemical weapons.
	Data Source	Data on signature or ratification of the CWC is publicly known from the states themselves or the OPCW. Information as to States Parties' progress in carrying out the Action Plan will be known through OPCW reporting as well as our bilateral consultations with states. This information is restricted to States Parties and not generally available to the public.

Indicator #27: Status of States Parties' Incorporation of U.S. Proposals in Their National Approaches to Controlling the Biological Weapons Threat

Outcome

TARGETS		
	FY 2008	5% more States Parties (above the baseline established after the Review Conference) have enacted legislation criminalizing biological weapons activities.
	FY 2007	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) States Parties agree at the November 2006 Review Conference to accelerate national efforts and review progress by all States Parties at regular intervals prior to the 2011 Review Conference. The USG will propose, as the priority focus, meetings on ensuring that all States Parties enact legislation criminalizing biological weapons activities.

RESULTS		
	2006	Detailed Codes of Conduct have been endorsed by the 60 preeminent scientific academies that make up the Inter-Academy Panel (IAP). States Parties, universities, scientific institutions, and industry in 60 countries are following suit based in large part in IAP guidelines. USG responded to 12 requests for bilateral technical assistance on BWC implementation measures, including penal legislation. USG providing on-the-ground training in pathogen security and biosafety to six States Parties in the former Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The UN Secretary General's Mechanism for Investigations of Alleged Use has been strengthened; experts and laboratories have been provided by 40 States Parties for use should an unusual outbreak or alleged use occur. All EU member states and even many in the non-aligned movement are calling for a return to the topics and objectives of the U.S.-inspired 2003-2005 Work Program.
	2005	The last session of the U.S.-proposed Work Program was held, focusing on the growing need for codes of conduct for life scientists. Given the nature of biological weapons, self-regulation by universities and businesses, as well as individual scientists, is increasingly becoming a key deterrent in an area where traditional arms control approaches are inadequate. Although no additional states formally reported that they had incorporated U.S. proposals this year, our bilateral contacts indicate that a number of states have made substantive progress toward such implementation.
	2004	From 2003-2005, States Parties worked through the U.S.-proposed Work Program, including penal legislation, pathogen security, disease surveillance, and codes of conduct.
	2003	In 2001, the U.S. rejected the then on-going negotiating process among BWC States Parties leading toward a legally binding Protocol on verification of the BWC, and in 2002, we developed an alternative package of effective measures to strengthen the BWC and counter the growing threat, focusing on improved national implementation and enhanced international coordination.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	This indicator is a direct measure of the success of U.S. diplomacy in persuading other BWC States Parties to follow the U.S. approach for strengthening implementation of the BWC. Developed in FY 2004, it turned out to be less measurable than we anticipated. States Parties did not use the annual meetings to report on their national actions, as we had expected, but decided to wait until the 2006 Review Conference to report. For FY 2006 and beyond, we have developed targets that we should be able to measure, once we have created the baseline database, relating to two important aspects of controlling the biological weapons threat, where a lot of work needs to be done internationally. It is the U.S. belief that if all States Parties undertake the U.S.-proposed national actions, it will be more difficult for terrorists or rogue states to acquire biological weapons.
	Data Source	Data used to measure performance will derive from public announcements by States Parties, by States Parties' reports to other States Parties, and consultations with individual states. Information regarding the Targets for FY 2006 and beyond may not be publicly available.

Indicator #28: Level of International Participation in, and Readiness to Implement, the Proliferation Security Initiative

Output

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) matures as an active global partnership against WMD proliferation, with well-established channels of diplomatic and law enforcement communication and cooperation. Shipboarding agreements reached with all countries of priority interest. Three operational exercises maintain participants' readiness.
	FY 2007	Participation in PSI expands to more than 80 countries. At least four operational exercises are held, which significantly improve the interoperability of PSI participants, improve individual nations' capacities, and contribute to the ability to cooperate on interdictions. At least two additional shipboarding agreements reached with key states.
RESULTS	2006	Participation expanded to 81 states, 65 of which sent representatives to the High-Level Political Meeting held in June. Six PSI exercises were conducted during 2006 in locations around the world, attended by over 50 countries. In October, 24 States participated in the 25th interdiction exercise, the first in the Persian Gulf, which served to demonstrate the unity with Gulf States to combat proliferation. Two signed shipboarding agreements were ratified and entered into force during 2006.
	2005	In FY 2005, several dozen countries participated in six operational exercises, and three additional shipboarding agreements were signed.
	2004	More than 60 countries participated in the First Anniversary meeting in May 2004, demonstrating international support. Ten training exercises were conducted and shipboarding agreements were concluded with three of the world's largest flag registries.
	2003	In May 2003, President Bush announced the PSI, a new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on the land.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Revelation of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network demonstrated that preventing proliferators or terrorists from gaining access to WMD, or to WMD materials, technology, or equipment through traditional approaches, such as treaties or improved export controls, is insufficient. The PSI is both a deterrent and a safety net to stop proliferation efforts. The most direct measure of PSI success would be the ratio of successful to unsuccessful interdiction attempts. However, usually interdictions are carried out quietly and confidentially, and are based on very sensitive information. Therefore, we measure participation and number of the exercises which maintain readiness.
	Data Source	Decisions by states to endorse PSI are usually, but not always publicly known or available through U.S. or other governments' websites. PSI exercises are publicized in the local press at the time they are conducted. Assessments of readiness are based on embassies' reporting, consultations with foreign governments, reports of international meetings of participating states, and reports of exercises.

Indicator #29: Implementation of UNSCR 1540

Output

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Security Council makes appropriate determination regarding whether to renew the 1540 Committee's mandate again. U.S. assists over a dozen targeted States to improve their implementation of UNSCR 1540 requirements. Using Resolution 1540 as a lever, U.S. persuades still more States to implement export and legislative controls on WMD-related technology.
	FY 2007	U.S. works with States to encourage them to implement UNSCR 1540, including provision of assistance where it will have greatest impact. The Committee's work remains as a separate Security Council function to assist as a clearinghouse. The U.S. identifies a dozen or so high-priority countries for targeted assistance and coordinates assistance with other donor states and organizations.
RESULTS	2006	132 Member States have reported. UNSCR 1673 renewed the 1540 Committee for two years. The U.S. has been proactive in raising awareness and urging implementation of UNSCR 1540 through bilateral demarches, conferences, and outreach to regional forums such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Southeast Asian Regional Forum, and the Organization of American States. The first donor conference was held in June 2006. We are preparing to meet requests for assistance in meeting UNSCR 1540 requirements.
	2005	In 2005, 121 Member States submitted reports to the 1540 Committee on steps they had taken or planned to take to meet UNSCR 1540 obligations. The only state of proliferation concern that had not yet reported was North Korea. The U.S. assisted the Committee's development of a process for evaluating country reports.
	2004	In 2004, the U.S. led efforts to negotiate and get the UN Security Council to adopt UNSCR 1540. The 1540 Committee was established in New York to assist in developing guidelines for work. In compliance with the Resolution, the U.S. submitted reports to the 1540 Committee.
	2003	In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2003, President Bush calls for a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	UNSCR 1540 is a landmark initiative in UN efforts to address threats to international peace and security, the first time the UN Security Council has used its Chapter VII authorities to identify WMD proliferation as a threat to international peace and security. This Indicator will demonstrate the utility of this initiative and monitor whether it leads to the results we anticipate. If every country in the world enhances its ability to detect and interdict WMD materials and technology, it will be much more difficult for proliferators to trade and for terrorists to acquire WMD.
	Data Source	The 1540 Committee publicly releases states' reports, which reflect the states' own views and positions. Information on states' progress toward meeting 1540 requirements will be provided in reports of the 1540 Committee. The Department will supplement that information with information from embassies' reporting, and reports of consultations with governments. General information about U.S. assistance to states in meeting their 1540 obligations will be reported by the Department through various means, such as reports to Congress on export control assistance.

Indicator #30: Foreign Cultivation of Coca in Hectares (PART)		
Output		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	Under development (will be based on totals from overseas posts).
	FY 2007	Total coca: 138,000 hectares
RESULTS	2006	Data is currently unavailable for 2006. Data will be made available from Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) data source) in Spring 2007.
	2005	208,500 hectares
	2004	166,200 hectares
	2003	Total: 171,200 Colombia: 113,850 Peru: 31,350 Bolivia: 28,000 (Includes 12,000 hectares of legal coca)
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The best indicator for measuring the efforts to reduce the flow of cocaine to the US is the number of hectares of coca under cultivation and the estimated gross production.
	Data Source	CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center provides estimates on coca cultivation.

| Indicator #31: Seizures of Cocaine from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (PART)		
Output		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	35%
	FY 2007	Seizure rate: 30% of total net production
RESULTS	2006	This measure uses data that is collected and reported on an annual basis in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 2006 performance information will be published in March 2007.
	2005	Total seized: 246 metric tons Estimated Production: 780 metric tons Seizure Rate: 31 percent
	2004	Total seized 199 metric tons Estimated Production: 770 metric tons Seizure Rate: 26 percent of total net production
	2003	161 (24 percent)
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Statistics on seizures (measured as the ratio of total seized, in metric tons, to the estimated production) complement estimates on cultivation and production. They are an indication of law enforcement effectiveness but much less reliable as a snapshot of drug trafficking. Traffickers use skill and alternate routes for evasion, and supply and demand affect amounts trafficked.
	Data Source	Posts provide host nation seizure statistics, as does the Defense Intelligence Agency. CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center provides estimates on cocaine production. The International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report is U.S. government's annual report on the international counternarcotics effort.

Indicator #32: Hectares of Opium Poppy Cultivated in Afghanistan (PART)		
Outcome		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	89,000 hectares
	FY 2007	125,000 hectares
RESULTS	2006	172,600 hectares. An increase of 61 percent over the 2005 level, but 16 percent below the record poppy crop of 2004.
	2005	107,400 hectares under cultivation. A 48 percent reduction over 2004.
	2004	206,700 hectares under cultivation.
	2003	Baseline: 30,750 hectares under cultivation. Planting resumed in the fall of 2001 during Operation Enduring Freedom and the collapse of the Taliban regime. In 2002, Afghanistan resumed its position as the world's largest producer of opium and heroin.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The level of cultivation is the single best indicator of poppy and therefore heroin production. It has the added advantage of pinpointing poppy-growing areas so they can be targeted for eradication and other counter narcotics programs. The 48 percent reduction in 2005 is exceptionally large and may not be sustainable.
	Data Source	CIA Crime and Narcotics Center

Indicator #33: Status of UN Convention Against Corruption

Outcome

TARGETS	**FY 2008**	States Parties to the Convention initiate formal process to promote implementation and follow-up on progress.
	FY 2007	First Conference of Parties takes place. States Parties to the Convention meet formally to elaborate effective ways to promote implementation.
RESULTS	2006	Convention ratified by 60 parties (as of August 1, 2006). The Convention entered into force on December 14, 2005.
	2005	Thirty-three countries ratified in FY 2005.
	2004	Convention is completed and opened for signature.
	2003	Consensus reached on text of all major provisions.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	As with the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Convention Against Corruption represents the first stage of developing international cooperation to combat corruption by setting out international standards and norms. Once the treaty enters into force, it takes on the force of international law for the parties, who are under obligation to take the necessary domestic steps to implement its provisions.
	Data Source	UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Indicator #34: Percentage of Foreign Governments With PRM-funded Projects That Increase Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons

Outcome		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	80 percent of foreign governments with projects funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) increase their activities to combat trafficking in persons
	FY 2007	75 percent of foreign governments with projects funded by PRM increase their activities to combat trafficking in persons.
RESULTS	2006	87 percent of foreign governments with projects funded by PRM increase their activities to combat trafficking in persons.
	2005	80 percent of foreign governments with PRM-funded projects increased their activities to combat trafficking in persons in 2005.
	2004	65 percent of the foreign governments with PRM-funded projects increase their activities to combat trafficking in persons.
	2003	At least 60 percent of the foreign governments with PRM-funded projects increase their activities to combat trafficking in persons.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Concrete actions taken by governments to combat trafficking in persons are good indicators of the effectiveness of PRM-funded projects to improve the capacity of these governments to address this problem. However, it is important to recognize that the decision to increase efforts to combat trafficking in persons rests solely with the host government; PRM's decision to fund a project in such country may not always produce the desired result in a limited time. For this reason, we do not believe it would be realistic to expect to see more than an 80% success rate on an annual basis.
	Data Source	PRM, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP), the Department's Trafficking in Persons Report.

Indicator #35: Number of Countries Identified in the U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301 Report for International Property Right Infractions and/or Concerns		
Outcome		
TARGETS	**FY 2008**	46
	FY 2007	47
RESULTS	2006	48
	2005	52
	2004	51
	2003	50
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The Special 301 annual review examines in detail the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection in 87 countries. Based on a lengthy process of information gathering and analysis, the United States Trade Representative identifies countries that are designated in the categories of Priority Watch List, Watch List, or subject to Section 306 Monitoring. The Special 301 Report reflects the Administration's resolve to take consistently strong actions under the Special 301 provisions of the Trade Act of 1974.
	Data Source	Annual Special 301 Report published by the U.S. Trade Representative.

V. Illustrative Examples

Achieving Peace and Security	
Stopping the Financing of Proliferation	The Department worked closely with the Department of the Treasury to increase the pressure on entities and individuals involved in financing proliferation. During the past year, the U.S. designated entities pursuant to E.O. 13382 ("Blocking the Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters") associated with Iranian and North Korean WMD and ballistic missile programs, and worked with U.S. and international banks to close or freeze proliferation-related accounts. Such actions complement and reinforce the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1737 on North Korea and Iran, which require states to prevent assistance to those countries' missile and nuclear-related programs. These efforts play an important role in U.S. defensive measures to protect the U.S. and its allies from the proliferation and other illicit activities of WMD proliferators.
Regional Stability - NATO Contribution	NATO's role in building security in Afghanistan, far outside the traditional NATO area of operations, is a clear indication of NATO's commitment to combat increasingly global threats in the 21st century. NATO has over 33,000 soldiers from 36 countries under its command in Afghanistan, demonstrating the enhanced security posture and international commitment to continue fighting the war on terrorism. Additionally, since 2005, NATO has trained over 2,000 Iraqi officers and has provided airlift and other logistical and training support to the African Union's Darfur mission. NATO has also played a key role in maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. NATO's actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Mediterranean have proven its readiness and ability to meet the global security challenges of the 21st century, and its worth as a partner in the Global War on Terror.
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program	The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) works with foreign governments, international organizations, and non-state actors in a concerted, global, counterterrorism effort. The following are examples where students of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program of Diplomatic Security demonstrated success: The Indonesian Special Detachment FT88 Unit, supported by ATA trained bomb technicians, conducted an operation in Wonosobo on a building suspected of being a hideout for Indonesia's most-wanted terror fugitive, Noordin Topp (the Malaysian accomplice of Dr. Azahari.) After refusing to surrender, the building was breached and assaulted. Two terror suspects inside the house were killed and one was wounded. A fourth suspect was also taken into custody. Inside the house they found prepared explosive backpacks, suicide vests and other explosive devices and components. The explosives were rendered safe by ATA trained explosives experts. (April 2006) ATA support has helped Pakistan's Special Investigative Group (SIG) develop into an elite counter-terrorism unit. The SIG enjoyed considerable successes during 2006, to include: 1. In coordination with Interpol, the SIG arrested in Lahore a Belgium citizen who was plotting a suicide attack against POTUS. (3/2006) 2. The SIG investigated and raided a terrorist's financing office in Peshawar; analyzed and developed evidence to be used in the prosecution of the suspected terrorists, possibly in U.S. courts. (5/2006) 3. The SIG provided professional support to the FBI, in the investigation of the March suicide bombing of the U.S. Consulate Karachi, which resulted in the death of a Foreign Service Officer. (3/2006) In Albania, the ATA-trained Special Operations Unit of the Albanian State Police played a key role in an operation directed against weapons trafficking. The operation resulted in the detention of five persons, including three police officers, and subsequent searches of nine residences for illegal weapons. The raids were the culmination of a joint investigation with the Organized Crime Directorate and USG agencies. (12/2006).

Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1695	In early July 2006, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) test-launched a barrage of ballistic missiles, including a failed launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Department immediately sent formal messages to all capitals around the world condemning the launches, identifying the threats to regional and global security posed by the launches and DPRK proliferation activities, and highlighting the need for a strong response from the international community, including the UN Security Council. The Department undertook intensive negotiations with Security Council partners, and on July 15, the Council passed UNSCR 1695 demanding that the DPRK suspend all activity on its ballistic missile program and requiring all member states to prevent transfers of missiles and missile-related items, including financial resources, to the DPRK, and any procurement from the DPRK of such items. UNSCR 1695 was the first Security Council resolution on the DPRK since 1993, when the Council expressed concern about the DPRK threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Council took no action after DPRK missile launches in 1993 and 1998. The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1695 reflects the gravity with which the world views the DPRK's missile and nuclear programs.
Counterterrorism Finance Program	As a result of counterterrorism finance and anti-money laundering assistance provided to Indonesia by the U.S. after the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali, anti-money laundering legislation has been amended to meet international requirements. The Indonesian Central Bank has implemented rules and procedures to enhance anti-money laundering compliance for private sector banks. Indonesia's Financial Intelligence Unit has become fully operational, and is receiving and analyzing suspicious transaction reports -- over 20 cases have been successfully prosecuted. The Indonesian National Police has established a specialized counterterrorism unit that includes financial investigators who have received Counterterrorism Finance Program (CTF) finance and anti-money laundering training. The Indonesian Government is working with the U.S. Department of Justice to implement anti-money laundering legislation and to prepare financial crimes cases for prosecution.
Extension of U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs	Efforts to extend the 1992 U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement, which was once extended in 1999, had been at an impasse since 2004. With the aim of settling issues that complicated these negotiations and facilitate quick resolution, the Department was asked in 2005 to lead the interagency process and negotiations with Russia to extend the agreement for another 7 years. Time was short. Negotiations would not start until February, the agreement would expire on June 17 unless extended; a finally approved text required an extensive (nine ministries) and time-consuming review before President Putin's approval. The Department worked closely with DoD, DoE and the NSC, and held negotiations in February and March; the Extension Protocol was signed on June 16. This extension enables continuation of critical programs to secure, eliminate, and account for Russian weapons and materials of mass destruction.
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program	The Department trains and equips 18 African Partners' militaries to carry out peace support and humanitarian relief operations through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, the most prominent component of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Its comprehensive strategy and flexible approach to training, capacity building, sustainment factors, and team building encourages regional peace support operations for which African countries and security institutions take the primary responsibility for peacekeeping in the region. In FY 2006, ACOTA Partners grew from 12 to 18 in number. Since its inception in 1997, ACOTA has trained 62,000 soldiers and is increasing long-term self-sustainment through a train-the-trainer approach. Feedback from Peace Support Operations mission areas indicates ACOTA trained forces are significantly more professional than they otherwise would have been. Greater regional stability created by an enhanced African peace support capacity serves U.S. interests in promoting African democracy and economic growth.
Terrorist Interdiction Program	Suspects captured through TIP include terrorists, narcotics traffickers, insurgents, human traffickers, counterfeiters and other criminals. For example, TIP provided photos and travel history to Pakistan of three of the four July 7, 2005 London Metro bombers and hundreds of travelers have been interdicted in Pakistan on suspicion of using stolen passports.

Proliferation Security Initiative Continues to Yield Success	The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is designed to enhance the capabilities of like-minded states to cooperate in halting transfers of WMD-related equipment and technology to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Between April 2005 and April 2006, the U.S. worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East on some two dozen occasions to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of concern. For example, PSI cooperation has stopped the export to Iran's missile program of controlled equipment and dual-use goods. One PSI partner has also stopped the export of heavy water-related equipment to Iran's nuclear program. Fifteen countries have hosted 23 PSI exercises, attended by over 50 countries, to improve and test interdiction capabilities.
Liberia	The United States has taken the lead in helping Liberia make the transition from conflict to stability. Our diplomatic and military intervention in 2003 helped end the civil war, usher in a transitional government, and pave the way for democratic elections in 2005. In collaboration with other donors and multilateral organizations, we are helping Liberia rebuild its government and security functions, building infrastructure and roads, creating employment and training opportunities, and providing vital health and education services for the Liberian people.
Using UN Chapter VII Authorities to Counter WMD Proliferation	The Department has been actively raising awareness around the world of UN Member States' obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which established binding obligations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of WMD, and to report back to the UN Security Council's "1540 Committee" on steps taken. UNSCR 1540 also serves as an important legal basis for actions by states to stop the financing of proliferation-related activities. We worked with Security Council partners to adopt UNSCR 1673 in April 2006 extending the 1540 Committee for two years, until 2008, and are undertaking joint activities with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, and the ASEAN Regional Forum to encourage and assist their Member States in complying with their obligations under these resolutions.

V. Resource Detail

State Operations Appropriations by Bureau ($ Thousands)

Bureau	FY 2006 Actual	FY 2007 Estimate	FY 2008 Request
Bureau of International Organizations	1,722,521	1,561,976	1,847,246
Bureau of African Affairs	157,623	160,362	170,468
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs	139,003	136,316	151,589
Bureau of Diplomatic Security	65,350	101,000	138,070
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs	87,017	84,404	86,663
Other Bureaus	315,659	317,591	349,456
Total State Operations Appropriations	**$2,487,173**	**$2,361,649**	**$2,743,492**