326. Editorial Note
Prime Minister Pearson visited the LBJ Ranch in Texas January 15-16, 1965, for talks with U.S. officials. During the visit, the President and Prime Minister signed an agreement on auto parts. For text of the agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 1040-1041. No memoranda of conversation of these meetings were found. Background papers for the Pearson visit are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2478. Documentation relating to subsequent efforts to secure Congressional support for the Canadian auto agreement is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 4. Pearson discussed the meeting in Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 3, pages 125-128.
327. Editorial Note
On April 2, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson, in an address at Temple University in Philadelphia, suggested changes in U.S. policy in the Vietnam conflict. President Johnson invited Pearson to meet with him the following day at Camp David, Maryland. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held between 12:30 and 2:45 p.m. (Johnson Library) No U.S. record of the discussions between the two men was found. At an April 22 press conference in Ottawa, Pearson confirmed reports that the meeting with the President centered on the question of Vietnam and had been acrimonious but insisted that they had parted on good terms. Pearson's account of the meeting is in Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 3, pages 138-142. Ambassador Charles Ritchie, who was also present at Camp David, commented on the meeting in Storm Signals, pages 80-83.
328. Editorial Note
On June 28, 1965, Ambassador Livingston Merchant and Canadian Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney presented the Secretary of State with their joint report, "Canada and the United States--Principles for Partnership." The report was the result of a January 1964 agreement by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson to establish a working group on improving cooperation between the two nations. A copy of the report, which was subsequently released to the public on July 12, is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 1044-1046.
329. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State/1/
Ottawa, July 26, 1965.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no transmission time on the telegram, which was received at 4:36 p.m. Passed to the White House.
91. Ref: Deptels 79, 127, and 128 July 25./2/ I saw the Prime Minister and delivered to him the letter contained in reftel 128 and gave him oral messages as per reftels. His immediate reaction was: "I am predisposed to be responsive to whatever the President asks. I will give ready and most sympathetic consideration to his request."/3/ He said that the members of the Cabinet are scattered now but he would discuss the problem as soon as the Cabinet could be called together. He added that this might have to be sooner than later if the postal strike did not take a turn for the better for in that case he would be left no option but to recall Parliament and legislate the postal workers back to their jobs. A move which he certainly did not wish to take.
/2/Circular telegram 127, July 25, instructed Embassies to deliver the immediately following letter to their respective heads of state. Circular telegrams 128, July 25, contained the text of the President's message, which concerned U.S. policy in Vietnam. Telegram 79 to Ottawa, July 25, contained instructions for the oral presentation of the letter. (All ibid.)
/3/In an August 5 reply to President Johnson, Pearson stated his satisfaction with the continued U.S. policy of restraint and reaffirmed his statements to Parliament of July 26 of support for the "purposes and objectives" of U.S. policy in Vietnam, reaffirming Canada's willingness to provide economic assistance to South Vietnam. He concluded by stressing the need to bring the United Nations more fully into the search for a peaceful solution to the war. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence, Canada-Pearson, Vol. 1)
I have the feeling, based on several conversations, that Pearson has now had a change of mind and has come to the view he would prefer an election this fall for a number of reasons including the fact that he would not like to fight through Parliament his medical insurance plan without a majority behind him. But knowing him as I do, I am sure that the final decision will be made not far in advance. Be this as it may, the increase in our military commitment in Vietnam and any further notable increases in Canada's civil benefactions will be regarded by his party as politically disadvantageous developments.
Incidentally the Embassy's information is that the additional $500,000 of aid to Vietnam which the Canadian Govt publicly announced at the time of Cabot Lodge's visit here last September has never been disbursed. Although the Canadians have been in touch with the Vietnamese Govt and our mission there suitable projects of which we thought building materials were one have never been agreed.
Butterworth
330. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC/12
New York, October 5, 1965, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Barry and approved in S on October 12. The memorandum is Part VI of VII; other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1965
SUBJECT
US-Canadian Auto Parts Agreement
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Mr. Robert L. Barry
Canada
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin
Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, M. Cadieux
Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, HBO Robinson
Mr. Martin asked if the Secretary had been briefed on the auto parts agreement now before the Congress. He pointed out that this issue was significant in the coming Canadian elections and that his party was concerned about it. It has gone through the House without problems but in the Senate it has been amended to provide for a Congressional review in 1968. While Martin said that he has been told that this problem will be ironed out in the Senate-House Conference, it would be a great disappointment if it were not. The Canadians feel that the agreement as negotiated provides adequately for automatic review, since the President would have to report on its implementation to the Congress after 1968. In any case it would be impossible to judge how the agreement is working by the beginning of 1968 and thus Congressional review could serve no useful purpose.
Martin pointed out that, if the Senate provision for review stands, there will be considerable political uproar in Canada. It would be claimed that the United States had repudiated the agreement and the Liberal Party would have to pay a price for this politically.
Mr. Martin said that he hoped that Secretary Rusk and the administration would throw their weight behind the agreement as reported out by the House. He has already been maintaining in his political statements that this is an agreement which serves both American and Canadian interests, and that, had relations between Canada and the US not been very good, it could not have been negotiated. Martin said the Liberals have been trying to avoid anti-American attacks by the Conservatives in the campaign and this would be most difficult to achieve if the Senate amendment was passed.
Secretary Rusk said that he would look into the matter and get a report by the following day. The Administration also hopes that the agreement will not be altered by Congress, he said. But he cautioned that under the United States constitutional system if Congress turned down an administration proposal, there is no recourse.
At the close of the meeting the Secretary asked Martin what line should be taken with the Press. If Martin desired, the Secretary said, he could report that he had made the strongest representations on the auto parts agreement./2/
/2/The Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, P.L. 89-283, offered adjustment assistance to individuals and firms affected by the abolition of tariffs on cars and car parts between Canada and the United States. For text of the law, signed by President Johnson on October 21, see 79 Stat. 1016.
331. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State/1/
Ottawa, April 27, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 7:59 p.m. Passed to the White House.
1455. Deptel 1136, April 25./2/ I appreciate being asked "if there is anything constructive that we can do in relation to Canada at the present time." While there are several which I will list below, I believe there is no one thing which would be more constructive or work more good for US-Canadian understanding at this time than a visit here by the President. I will recommend certain specifics about this in Part II of this telegram.
/2/Telegram 1136 to Ottawa reads: "President has asked Dept 'if there is anything constructive that we can do in relation to Canada at this time.' Dept would appreciate any suggestions you may have by COB April 27." (Ibid.)
I. The political and psychological climate in Canada suggests that a visit by the President could have a tremendous impact in focussing the attention of Canadians upon enduring common interests between our countries and in redirecting their fixation away from such problem issues between us as Vietnam and China which they persistently view so astigmatically. Canadians need and would welcome new definitions and new challenges. Never in their hundred years of federation has there been less accommodation between French Canadian and English Canadian citizens or a less tenable division of power between the central government and the provinces. The political system is without reliable bearings or direction and is scarred by internal bickering and vituperation that has resulted in no major party's meriting enough popular confidence to hold an electoral majority. In these circumstances, it is truly remarkable that as Canada's only neighbor and potential scapegoat we are the recipients of less captious criticism or hostility than we might expect. Alongside the U.S. and its strong central guidance and purpose, Canadians feel an inferiority that is displayed in envy, resentment, and, particularly in foreign affairs, in sanctimoniousness. We have to recognize that against this backdrop of internal tensions and immaturity there are limits to what we can do. On such problem issues between us as Vietnam and China on which feeling is general and not merely regional, only peace in Vietnam or the success of a two-China policy (or its failure with Canada's getting badly burned in the process) would exorcise these diversionary subjects.
On most foreign issues, however, we are not far apart, and strictly bilateral problems usually yield to satisfactory settlement. Since the Pearson government came to power in 1963, we have accomplished a number of things as described in my 1964 and 1965 annual reviews (A-581 and A-638)/3/ such as: Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons, the Columbia River Treaty, the auto parts agreement, the civil air accord, elimination of lead and zinc quotas, a balance of payments agreement, etc. We have staved off but not yet dissuaded Canada from pursuing its Law of the Sea statute which provides for enclosure of waters, now part of the high seas, by new baselines. Since for good reason our opposition is implacable, we should seek to avoid a future public confrontation by making our position unmistakably clear.
/3/Neither printed. (Both ibid.)
II. Of the constructive things that we can do, I want to single out one from the following list as uniquely appropriate should the President be able to visit Ottawa. This is the St. John River project now nearing the end of negotiations. The President could expect to address a joint session of the two Houses of Parliament, and the announcement of a St. John River agreement on that occasion would accent our continental partnership and dramatize for Canadians our common interest and advantage in close cooperation. A Presidential visit customarily takes place when Parliament is in session so that he can address a joint session of both Houses. Parliament is expected to remain in session until about mid-July, and a visit in early July would be feasible. Parliament is not expected to resume its session until sometime in September, and in addition the President will no doubt wish to consider a brief trip to Montreal to visit the American Pavilion at the Exposition in the late spring or early summer of 1967. Therefore, the spacing of these visits is a consideration.
Other constructive things, no one of which by itself is calculated to change very much the tenor of U.S.-Canadian relations, but together are of cumulative importance, are as follows:
(1) Official designation of the NORAD regional headquarters at North Bay, Ontario, as alternate command post to CINCNORAD's main headquarters at Colorado Springs. Canadians would regard this designation as a matter of gratifying prestige and closer military partnership.
(2) Clarification by the U.S. Department of Defense of the desideratum for Canada's future military role and contribution to NORAD and Western defense. Canada is preparing itself increasingly and all but irrevocably for a small power capability and for restrictively peacekeeping operations--without nuclear weapons (see pp. 17 et seq. of A-638).
(3) Further reduction of trade barriers on both a multilateral and bilateral basis. Currently the US is rightly emphasizing negotiations in the Kennedy Round in connection with the efforts of both Canada and the US to achieve a liberalization of trade in multilateral context. Following the Kennedy Round we should examine with Canada prospects for further liberalization bilaterally such as was achieved by the US-Canadian automotive agreement.
(4) An explicit decision to exempt Canada from present and future U.S. balance-of-payments corrective measures, in return for a continuing Canadian commitment to hold down and even to reduce Canadian gold and foreign exchange reserves. The existing agreement with Canada, whereby the GOC has agreed to reduce reserves in 1966 by $300 million to the advantage of the U.S., assures the U.S. that any Canadian B/P gains this year will in fact accrue to our benefit. U.S. direct investment capital outflow to Canada is nevertheless limited by the U.S. guidelines. Any restrictions applied against travel to Canada would gravely disturb our relationship particularly in view upcoming Expo 67 whereas situation in fact offers opportunity for cooperative action by US and Canada to promote tourism to North America given reserves agreement.
(5) Elimination or amelioration of extra-territorial effects of U.S. legislation on U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, e.g. such as section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act.
(6) Definitive liberalization or elimination of the cheddar cheese quota, particularly on aged cheddar.
(7) It would be useful now to clarify authoritatively for the Canadian Government the amendments to our 1965 Immigration Act insofar as they apply to Canada. This act [garble] long-term meaning, for example, especially in relation to the mobility of managerial, professional, and technical personnel in North America. Also, it is highly desirable that there be an authoritative clarification of our Selective Service Act in its application to legal alien residents in the US, persons with dual US-Canadian citizenship, and other persons resident in Canada who may be subject to it. Problems arising from ambiguities in this field are increasing and are getting into the political arena here.
(8) Establishment of an international park on Point Roberts, a small US appendage to British Columbia accessible to Americans only via Canada.
(9) Opening of a USIS office with a library in the Consulate General in Montreal manned by a young French-speaking officer for the counter--Gaullist and other reasons I have enumerated ad nauseum.
I will be glad to supply further information and detail as may be desired.
Butterworth
332. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 1, 1966, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved in G on June 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2.
SUBJECT
Law of the Sea
PARTICIPANTS
C.S.A. Ritchie, Ambassador of Canada
G.C. Langille, Counselor, Canadian Embassy
A.W. Mathewson, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Charles A. Kiselyak, Office of Canadian Affairs
Stanley Futterman, Special Assistant, L
At Ambassador Johnson's invitation, Ambassador Ritchie called on him the afternoon of June 1 to receive the US response to the suggestion that Foreign Minister Martin had made to Under Secretary Mann in February/2/ that a way be found so that Canada could declare certain large bodies of water--e.g., the Gulf of the St. Lawrence--to be Canadian fishing seas. Ambassador Johnson gave Ambassador Ritchie an Aide-Mémoire, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum,/3/ and said that while the US, after very careful consideration, could find no support in international law for the conversion of high seas into fishing seas, it was the intention of the US to be as helpful as possible in aiding Canada to achieve a solution to the problems its fishermen face or fear they will someday face.
/2/Martin made the suggestion February 18 during his visit to Washington. No U.S. record of the conversation was found. Ritchie supplied a copy of the Canadian record of conversation to Johnson on June 3. (Ibid., POL 33-4 CAN-US)
/3/Not printed.
Ambassador Ritchie expressed great disappointment that Mr. Martin's proposal had not received US assent and noted that not only did the proposal represent a retreat from the original Canadian intention of declaring the bodies of water in question to be internal Canadian waters but that, further, the proposal had been suggested by the US in the first place. Ambassador Ritchie said that Canada's retreat from its initial position had resulted from Canada's recognition of the security problem any diminution of the high seas would present to the US and expressed doubt that any international conservation scheme would meet Canada's needs.
Ambassador Ritchie added that it was Canada's wish to deny the areas in question to foreign fishermen, except for those with treaty rights, and had expected from the conversation in February that the US would help them do that. Ambassador Ritchie ended his remarks by saying that the US response seemed completely to ignore Mr. Martin's talk with Mr. Mann and that he was certain Mr. Martin would be disappointed at the US decision because he had been "counting on it".
Ambassador Johnson said that it was most regrettable if the Canadian Government had been misled and volunteered to review the record. He added, however, that his willingness to review the record ought not to be interpreted as detracting in any way from the Aide-Mémoire.
333. Editorial Note
During March and June 1966 the Government of Canada sent Chester Ronning, a retired diplomat and Sinologist, to Hanoi to conduct soundings regarding the willingness of the Government of North Vietnam to enter into negotiations with the United States to terminate hostilities in South Vietnam. At the conclusion of his second trip June 14-17, Ronning flew to Washington accompanied by Foreign Minister Martin, for a meeting with U.S. officials at which he outlined North Vietnamese positions. A copy of the June 21 memorandum of conversation between the Canadian delegation and a group of U.S. officials, headed by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, together with a June 22 memorandum for the record by Bundy analyzing the talks, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US.
334. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 22, 1966, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in S/AH on August 4 and in S and G on August 8. The memorandum is Part 2 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Dining Room.
SUBJECT
Law of the Sea
PARTICIPANTS
Canadian Side
Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
A. E. Ritchie, Ambassador to the US
Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
George P. Kidd, Minister, Canadian Embassy, Washington
Yvon Beaulne, Minister, Canadian Embassy, Washington
J. G. Hadwen, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
US Side
The Secretary
Governor W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Rufus Z. Smith, Director, Office of Canadian Affairs
Mr. Martin took the initiative to raise the subject of the Law of the Sea. He recalled that he had first discussed the matter with Ambassador Johnson two and one-half years ago./2/ Since then Canada had established a 12-mile fishing zone, and the Canadian Parliament had passed legislation authorizing the drawing of baselines in a manner which would incorporate certain bodies of water as Canadian territorial waters. The matter had now reached a stage where the Canadian Government would have to move further. He recalled that then-Assistant Secretary Tyler had made a personal suggestion that the US could accept the Canadian action if it involved only fishing, but Canada had not accepted the suggestion./3/ Later, Mr. Martin had discussed the matter with then-Deputy Under Secretary Mann./4/ He had told Mr. Mann that while Canada would be unhappy that no further progress had been made, the GOC was now proposing to move only with regard to fishing and not to the extent of claiming ownership of the waters, although on this latter point Canada would explicitly reserve its position.
/2/See Document 317.
/3/Apparent reference to the June 7, 1964, meeting of Tyler and Cadieux; see Document 321.
/4/See footnote 2, Document 332.
(During this discussion Mr. Stoessel intervened to stress that the Tyler proposal had not been official, and the Secretary remarked with a smile that this had been what the lawyers call "a frolic of his own".)
Mr. Martin went on to say that he hoped the US would now reconsider the fishing proposal. If the US cannot do so, Canada will have to go back to its original position, i.e. to claim the waters as exclusively Canadian for all purposes. This, he said, is what the Canadian legislation calls for, and he just could not face Parliament when it reconvenes this fall without being able to report progress. ("We have reached dead-end. There is no other course.") Under such circumstances his plea to the US would be that we limit our action to a protest.
The Secretary responded initially by pointing out that our major concern is the question of general applicability. If Canada can do what it proposes, others can close off the Java Sea and other bodies of water, the free access to which is of vital importance to us. The Secretary also commented that to refer, as Mr. Martin had done, to bodies of water such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence as "internal waters" was begging the question. Surely this very question was what was at issue.
Mr. Martin responded that in his view the Canadian action would not prejudice the US case elsewhere in the world. Surely there were unique circumstances involved in the Canadian case which any court would recognize are not paralleled elsewhere.
There followed a general discussion of possible action by the International Court of Justice. Mr. Martin doubted that Canada would agree that the US could take Canada to court on the matter, although he said he recognized clearly that the US could instigate court action by another party. If Canada were faced with a suit before the Court, he would simply turn the proposal over to the Canadian Department of Justice to be dealt with by the best lawyers they could find, and he thought the US would be wrong to assume that the Canadian case could not prevail.
Commenting that he saw real trouble ahead on this issue, the Secretary pressed Mr. Martin for a clear statement of what the real Canadian interest was. Was it fishing? The flag? Security? Mr. Martin responded emphatically that the interest was fishing.
At another point in the conversation, Mr. Martin recalled that the matter had also been discussed between Prime Minister Pearson and President Kennedy at their Hyannis Port meeting, but Ambassador Johnson pointed out that this was the one issue discussed at Hyannis Port on which President Kennedy had made clear, as indeed was indicated in the communiqué,/5/ that the US did not accept the Canadian view.
/5/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 371-374.
Mr. Martin added that fishing is not a legal matter.
Ambassador Johnson at one point recalled that the US had offered to accept one portion of the Canadian fishing proposal, that which had to do with Hudson Bay. Mr. Martin responded that, of course, this was the least important part of the proposal and therefore the offer was not acceptable to Canada.
At one point in the discussion, Mr. Martin pointed out that the Canadian fishing proposal concerned only the East Coast, and he argued that in preparing its proposal Canada had taken great care not to harm US fishing interests in any way whatsoever.
The Secretary reiterated his concern about the general applicability of a Canadian move to close off the waters in question. We cannot acquiesce in one area and still insist that it cannot be done elsewhere in the world. The Secretary at one point suggested that perhaps we ought to appoint people on either side to take a hard look at the matter, but nothing specific was agreed upon and this part of the conversation ended inconclusively./6/
/6/On August 15 Ambassador Ritchie presented Johnson with a letter from Martin to Rusk restating the decision to declare the St. Lawrence Gulf an "internal waterway" and requesting U.S. acquiescence. A memorandum of conversation with attached copy of Martin's letter are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US.
335. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in the White House on August 30. The memorandum is Part 9 of 9. A complete set of memoranda of conversation between Johnson and Pearson is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 70. The meeting was held in the Rossmount Inn.
SUBJECT
Law of the Sea
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth
Rufus Z. Smith, Director for Relations with Canada
Canada
Prime Minister Pearson
Ambassador A. E. Ritchie
H. Basil Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs
(The President met with Prime Minister Pearson on the occasion of his participation in a cornerstone laying ceremony at the Roosevelt Campobello International Park on Campobello Island, New Brunswick. He was the luncheon guest of the Prime Minister at Rossmount Inn in the little town of Chamcook, N.B. The lunch was preceded by approximately an hour and a half of serious conversation in a parlor of the Inn set aside for the purpose.)
The Prime Minister said there was one bilateral problem which he wanted to raise. He briefly reviewed the history of discussions between Canada and the US on the Law of the Sea, and he referred to the proposal recently set forth by his Foreign Minister in a letter to Secretary Rusk regarding Canada's proposal to establish fishing rights over the Bay of Fundy, the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, and parts of the west coast./2/ He noted there had been some discussion of the legal problems involved, but he supposed these were not things that could be settled by the World Court because of the US problem with the Connally Amendment.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 334.
Ambassador Butterworth interjected that in view of this aspect of the legal question, the US had a long time ago proposed that the two governments join in a friendly suit before the International Court of Justice to seek a determination prior to any action by Canada. He pointed out that Canada had turned down the proposal. The Prime Minister appeared not to have heard of this aspect of the matter and remarked, "That's something we shall have to look into." It was noted, in closing, that the Canadians had not yet received a reply to the Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary.
336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada/1/
Washington, September 14, 1966, 5:24 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved by Smith.
46813. Subject: Law of the Sea.
1. There follows text of letter from Secretary to Martin intended to be handed Canadian Ambassador by Deputy Under Secy Johnson at 5:30 pm today:
"Dear Mr. Secretary: I regret my absence from Washington delayed for a time a reply to your letter of August 10 on the Law of the Sea./2/ In the meantime, I understand, the matter was raised by Prime Minister Pearson with President Johnson during their August 21 Campobello meeting./3/
I agree completely with you that this is a matter of great importance. We have again thoroughly reviewed your proposal in the light of international law, the general interests of the Free World as we see them, and our own fishing interests. We have concluded that we cannot accept, even tacitly, the establishment of the waters in question as Canadian fishing seas.
/2/See footnote 6, Document 334.
/3/See Document 335.
Therefore, I want to state again our willingness to give vigorous support to a Canadian effort to establish a fisheries conservation regime in the waters of concern to you.
During his meeting with the President, the Prime Minister indicated he wanted to look into our suggestion of a friendly suit between the two countries, prior to any action by your Government, before the International Court of Justice. Should a less public proceeding seem desirable to Canada, we would also be willing to engage in a suitable arbitration.
I would very much regret it if your Government were unable to see its way clear to pursuing any of the alternatives we have suggested and were to proceed with the action your letter contemplates. I do not know precisely how we would be obliged to respond to the assertion of your claim that certain portions of the high seas have become internal Canadian waters. It seems clear, however, that we would be forced to protest it directly and publicly, to avail ourselves of the legal remedies open to us, and to instruct our vessels and aircraft to disregard it. If such a situation were to develop, we should, of course, be faced with detailed inquiries from the Congress and from our press to which we would be obliged to respond. Among the aspects of the matter which it seems to me inevitably would thus become a matter of public record would be that we had made clear our strong opposition prior to the introduction of your legislation in Parliament and that we had suggested means by which in our judgment the problem could be resolved equitably.
This subject, like others that have troubled us in the past, will eventually be, no matter what the outcome, a part of history. In the meantime, I trust that the officials of both countries will do all possible to ensure that it does not adversely affect any of the other myriad subjects that concern our two countries.
Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk"
2. FYI. Letter approved by President and also by small number selected senators on confidential basis. End FYI.
Rusk
337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
New York, September 21, 1966, 4:19 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 75. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wabeke and authorized by Shaver. Repeated to Ottawa and Paris. Rusk and Martin were attending the sessions of the UN General Assembly.
Secto 6. NATUS. Subject: Sec's Canadian Bilateral. Following is uncleared, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review:
1. In hour-long friendly but essentially unproductive conversation with Secretary, Canadian FonMin Martin made lengthy plea to let Chicoms in UN this GA, stating that "if we miss this session, we create tragic situation for world. Right course politically is to get it over with now." Martin repeatedly indicated he seriously considering parting company with US this issue during current GA session, but he also reaffirmed that Canada would not act without prior consultation. Martin stated he would like have another chat before ChiRep issue voted in GA.
2. Secretary refuted Martin point by point, arguing that Chicoms constitute major obstacle to ending Viet-Nam war; that to reward Chicoms for misbehavior would prolong this war; that to have Chicoms in SC would destroy its effectiveness for peacekeeping. Secretary also suggested that Martin give more weight to views of Asian nations on firing line in Far East; invited him to consider question from purely Canadian national interest, and asked if Martin's alleged problems vis-á-vishis own public could not be solved by enlightening Canadian opinion on Chicom adamancy. Secretary appeared make no dent on Martin except for grudging admission that ChiRep issue is indeed "important" (from context, however, it was not even clear if Martin views ChiRep as "important question" in technical sense in context of UNGA rules).
3. Discussion of Law of the Sea likewise tended underscore basic US-Canadian differences, though it did not completely slam door on further negotiation. Martin took line that it would be politically impossible for Canadian Govt to retreat from public position taken by Canadian parliament. Martin argued that contemplated Canadian action would not hurt US fisheries or security; would for present not be extended West Coast; would not--as Secretary suggested--set legal precedent for claims by other, notably, LA nations.
4. Martin appeared reject all suggestions made by Secretary and Legal Adviser Meeker for litigation before ICJ or arbitration and even claimed to see little practical value in further bilateral discussion. Martin did suggest the possibility of amending the law so that it would apply only to fishing, "for parliament only knows about fishing." But when Secretary suggested he go back and amend the act in this sense, Martin indicated he would only consider doing this in return for US acceptance of Canadian position. In final aside with Meeker, Martin evinced willingness to continue bilateral discussion of the issue./2/
/2/On October 17 U.S. and Canadian officials met for further discussions of Canada's plan to extend its exclusive fishing rights. After intensive discussions, the two sides failed to make progress on their disagreements. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US.
5. On removal of NAC from Paris, Martin seemed somewhat less intractable. When Secretary suggested that 14 PermReps be allowed take decision quietly without referral to FonMins, Martin commented: "that is way it is developing." Martin seemed, however, want suspend judgment until he had talked with Couve Sept 26.
Rusk
338. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 25, 1966.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 69 D 35, Pol 7 Visits. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Dining Room.
SUBJECT
Secretary's Conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin: US-Canadian Relations and Over-all Policies
PARTICIPANTS
US Side:
The Secretary
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR
Canadian Side:
Foreign Minister Martin
Yvon Beaulne, Minister
Martin said that the problem of Canada "and other small countries" vis-á-visthe United States is that they are forced to talk so much on the periphery of things. All of them are very concerned as to what they say to Uncle Sam and they do not speak frankly, nor do they feel that the United States is completely frank in return.
The Secretary disagreed, saying that he had always felt in his talks with Martin that both were being very frank, and that the exchanges they had had were often very lively. Saying that he would take advantage of Martin's emphasis on the desirability of frankness, the Secretary said that he had the impression that Canadian foreign policy did not evolve from a systematic calculation of the kind of world Canada would like to see in its own interest. He thought Canada reacted to situations and tried to find a middle point, but it had no over-all framework within which to make its judgments. The Secretary suggested that it might be useful if discussions could be held between the two governments at the policy planning level. For example, Canada obviously has interests in Southeast Asia and the outcome of the situation there; likewise Canada has interests in Africa and other areas of the world. A thorough discussion of such things from the standpoint of Canadian interests might lead to conclusions which would be different from what we have seen out of Ottawa so far.
Martin noted that he is three-fourths French and that the French are always sensitive about the persons with whom they deal. He had profound respect for the Secretary, and the Secretary should know that the last week, in which Canada seemed to be taking a different line from that of the US, had caused him real agony. However, Martin continued, the Canadians feel that they do not really know the actual plans of the US. Canada is the neighbor of the US and Canadians have a similar origin to Americans; if this were not the case, Canada would probably take a very strong stand against the US. Martin said that the Canadian Government is always under great pressure from the public for being a satellite of the United States. This is a difficult situation.
The Secretary said he appreciated this, but he asked again what Canadian policy would be if it were enunciated only in Canadian national terms. Martin said that, for one thing, Canada wanted a world where the US and the Soviet Union would be on better relations than is now the case. He felt that the UK, in the interests of such relations, should take a chance and stop the bombing in North Viet-Nam. Martin said that, in general, the Soviets are developing in the right direction in their society. He cited his talk with Kosygin as being reassuring on this score. Martin continued that the United States could not expect Canada to say "yes" to US policy in every situation. He said that Canada believes in the Commonwealth and believes very strongly in the UN.
The Secretary asked if this included Article I of the UN Charter, providing for collective security. Martin responded affirmatively, although he said that the Canadian people were divided on Viet-Nam, just as the American people. So far as NATO was concerned, the French population of Canada had nothing to do with Canada's stand on the relocation of NAC. At the same time, Canada feels close to France, and believes that no steps should be taken which could be interpreted as being against the French people.
The Secretary said that it is fundamental to the kind of world we want that the US should meet its commitments. The Soviets and the Chinese must see that we mean business; otherwise we could have war.
Martin said he understood our policy in Europe and in NATO and he felt this was important. The Secretary commented that what we did in Asia was equally important; we cannot be a virgin in Europe and a whore in the Pacific.
The Secretary concluded by stressing again his desire for frank understanding with Canada, and he urged Martin to query us if he had any questions concerning our policies.
339. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 16, 1966, 3:45 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in U on December 30. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.
SUBJECT
Law of the Sea Dispute with Canada: Possible Multilateral Solution
PARTICIPANTS
Canada
A. E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
US
Acting Secretary Katzenbach
Rufus Z. Smith, Director, EUR/CAN
Donald L. McKernan, S/FW
Carl F. Salans, L
The Canadian Ambassador called at the Department at the invitation of the Acting Secretary, who handed him an Aide-Mémoire/2/ setting forth, he pointed out, the views of the United States fisheries experts in the form of a proposal for a multilateral agreement which, from our point of view, would provide a rather happier solution to Canada's fisheries problems than would the Canadian proposal for unilateral action.
/2/Not printed.
The Ambassador inquired whether the document contained the full draft of a possible agreement. The Acting Secretary responded that there were some interstices but he thought the gaps were not large ones and could be easily worked out. He stressed that he was hopeful the draft would provide a viable alternative solution to the problem. He thought the Aide-Mémoire was a self-contained paper and he only wanted to underline his great hope that it can provide a way out. Mr. Katzenbach also remarked that he understood the matter had been discussed in the last day or so with Foreign Minister Martin in Paris/3/ but, of course, he did not yet have a full account of that conversation.
/3/Documentation on these discussions is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 108.
Mr. McKernan commented that there was one other point he hoped the Ambassador would bear in mind. The fisheries experts in Canada and the United States have worked together most successfully for years and he thought he was correct in saying there is a high degree of respect on both sides.
The Ambassador said he had not had a full account of the most recent technical discussions between the experts of the two countries./4/ He asked how specific they had been. Had there been a discussion of an actual draft text?
/4/No record of the meeting, held December 5 in Ottawa, was found.
Mr. McKernan responded that they had not gotten down to a draft but they had considered cases. They had talked of specific areas and had proceeded to the point where there was reason to believe that our proposal would contribute more to the interests of Canadian fishing than would the Canadian plan since it would deal with greater areas. He noted that the Canadian experts had raised questions of time and plausibility and, in this connection, he said the US experts had made a genuine effort to approach these questions realistically in drawing up the present draft.
The Ambassador expressed some doubt on the question of time, noting that the draft spoke of 1968 whereas the Canadian intent had been to aim for July 1, 1967. He did not know how Canadian ministers would react to this aspect. The Acting Secretary replied to the effect that, after all, time passes very quickly when one is attempting to achieve major goals. He believed it was better to be conservative than to set an unrealistic date which could not be met. Mr. McKernan added that the US experts had tried hard to be conservative. He was aware, in any event, that the Canadian experts know as much about these problems as we do.
Ambassador Ritchie concluded this part of the conversation by saying he appreciated the effort which had been made and would promptly forward the text to Ottawa where, he was sure, it would receive full consideration.
(The text of the Aide-Mémoire is set forth in a cable to Ottawa, December 16, 1966.)/5/
/5/Telegram 103942 to Ottawa, December 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US)
340. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Harrington Lake, Quebec, May 25, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 185. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Rodger P. Davies and Rufus Z. Smith and approved by Rostow on May 29. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Pearson's summer residence at Lake Harrington where President Johnson and the Prime Minister flew following a joint appearance at the Expo '67 World's Fair in Montreal. A separate memorandum of their conversation, prepared by John Vought of the staff of the Embassy in Ottawa is in Department of State, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 70 D 89, Pol 7 Visits.
SUBJECT
President's Conversation with Prime Minister Pearson of Canada, May 25, 1967
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Canadian Prime Minister Pearson
(See attached list of others who were present)/2/
/2/Not printed.
(The President and the Prime Minister lunched together, each with only two key advisers, in the dining room of the Prime Minister's residence. Afterwards, they talked privately together for some minutes. Subsequent to their private conversation, the talks shifted to the sitting room. The following summarizes the conversation which took place in the sitting room.)/3/
/3/According to a July 26 memorandum prepared by Ambassador Butterworth, the major item of discussion at the luncheon was the Arab-Israeli crisis: "the basic position the President took . . . and that by the Prime Minister were repeated in the general discussion . . . in the living room." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 185)
Import of Canadian Oil into the U.S.
After indicating, in response to a query by Secretary Martin, that he and the President had talked of Vietnam when they were alone, the Prime Minister asked the President about the prospects for shipping Canadian oil in through Chicago. He said, with a smile, that the situation in the Middle East, about which they had been talking at lunch, shows how important it is not to be dependent on Middle East sources of oil.
The President responded that he had been talking along these lines only the night before with a group of Texas oilmen./4/
/4/According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson met with two Texas oil men for an off-the-record discussion of "industry problems" at 7:35 p.m. on May 24. (Johnson Library)
The Prime Minister remarked jokingly that after all, Canadian oil is all Texas-owned anyway and therefore the money all flows back into the United States in one form or another.
The President commented that the Executive Branch of the Government was generally more sympathetic than the Congress on matters of this kind. For example, there is considerable pressure right now from the Congress on dairy products; next week it might be meat. In his judgment, this also raised the possibility of not being able to rely on voluntary restraints.
Kennedy Round
The Prime Minister asked what effect pressures of this kind would have on the prospects for implementation of the Kennedy Round.
The President responded that he thought it was manageable. He recalled that President Franklin Roosevelt had once remarked to him just after his election for a third term that when you get a mandate you ought to execute it within six months.
The Prime Minister then wryly asked, "Have you ever had a minority?"
The President replied by citing his own experience some years ago when he had encountered a 13-0 vote against him in a committee with a Democratic majority and reminisced about some of his legislative experiences.
Vietnam
The Prime Minister indicated he had been having his own Parliamentary difficulties. He referred to a major debate on Vietnam which had just taken place in the House of Commons. The situation had been difficult for him since there were many, even some in his own party, who were pressing for the Government to oppose U.S. policy. It seemed to him that the bombing of North Vietnam had somehow become a symbol in Canada and in other countries.
The President agreed, saying that it had become a symbol because of very skillful propaganda. There were, in fact, very superior people in the U.S., too, who were always chanting "stop the bombing." But one had to remember there are real problems involved. In the first place, we don't want to tie our own hands. In the second place, we have pride too. Why should we always make the unrequited move?
The President deplored the one-sided demands which are always made on the United States, particularly since we had already stopped the bombing six times. The only result every time was increased casualties for the U.S. We even tried a cessation of 37 days and nothing came of it. It is always the same. Most recently, we have said we would stop the bombing "if you, Ho Chi Minh, will stop infiltrating." We had said we will also stop augmenting, but Ho Chi Minh rejected any such proposal.
The President reiterated that every time we stop bombing we lose men's lives, our own men's lives, and the blood is on his hands. He said he had recently been taken to task by his daughter's date, a young man who had suffered a severe head wound in Vietnam, for agreeing to pauses in the bombing. These men hold him responsible for the casualties accruing during such pauses.
The President went on about the futility of unilateral moves. He said that every time he accedes to such a suggestion he ends up behind his own goal line. Yet, every week we say in some way to the Communist camp that we are willing to stop if we can see the slightest indication of a response from their side.
The real trouble is, the President went on, that the enemy won't stop. What they want is Thailand, Laos, and the rest of Southeast Asia. This is a fundamental fact which has to be understood. For that matter, Communist mortars kill more people than our own bombing.
The Prime Minister asked about the chances of a cease-fire proposal.
The President thought the proposal had about as much appeal as a proposal to become a Yankee would have had to his Confederate grandmother.
The Prime Minister admitted that the President was right, but he said that was one of the disadvantages. He could talk this way to the President but he couldn't do so to Ho Chi Minh.
The President reiterated that last week we had said we were prepared to give up the bombing. But the question always is, what will the other side do? We never get an answer to this question. He thought it perhaps ought to be the price of making a suggestion that it be multilateral, or at least two-sided.
The President cited recent reports to the effect that the Middle East now confronts us with a dilemma, i.e., to choose between the Middle East and Vietnam. These were dangerous in both Cairo and Moscow. We could deal with both. He thought there ought to be no misunderstanding whatsoever of our determination regarding Vietnam. We will do what we have to do and we will pay what we have to pay in terms of money, men, and forces.
The President emphasized that we have fought a limited war with limited objectives. He had maintained this course against the advice of all his military advisers. Our aims are limited. All we want is self-determination. We have over 40 other countries in alliances with us and we will keep our word. We don't want to imperialize or colonize anybody. We are willing to stop, but it has to be both sides.
The Prime Minister interjected that he was not suggesting cessation for a short period. He understood that the President's military advisers would argue as they do. That's their job. But others, he thought, more clearly see that what the U.S. is after is a political and not a military objective.
The President agreed, but stressed again that cessation can't be unilateral. The North Vietnamese won't even say to their best friends what they might do. He thought it ought also to be recognized that if we offered such a unilateral move and it failed, the situation might be worse.
Foreign Minister Martin then asked, "But don't you stand to lose more by perhaps inevitable escalation?" The President responded simply that unilateral appeals carry no weight with us.
Mr. Martin noted that the Canadian Government's public position was not that there should be a unilateral move on the part of the U.S., and he cited his own four-point proposal.
The Prime Minister said his Government was under great pressure in Canada on Vietnam and was trying to stand up to it because they thought they were right in doing so. He asked, however, what about the public stance of the North Vietnamese that they will talk if the United States ceases bombing.
The President responded that he understood the Prime Minister was under pressure and he appreciated his support. He went on to say, however, that he would trade conversation for conversation, but he would not trade bombing for conversation. The U.S. simply cannot stop unilaterally. If he tried to do so he would have a revolution on his hands.
Middle East/5/
/5/On May 16 the United Arab Republic declared a state of emergency. Two days later it ordered UN peacekeeping forces to leave its side of the border with Israel. On May 21 both the UAR and Israel mobilized their armed forces. On May 23 the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and on May 24 it "sealed" the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.
With apparent reference to the earlier conversation at lunch, the Prime Minister said he thought the best course was to seek quadripartite agreement in the Security Council and that the U.S. should be most careful not to reject efforts toward this end. We must also be careful to avoid a tripartite position opposed by the Soviets and the UAR. If necessary, the U.S. and U.K. should accept quadripartite talks outside the U.N. French interests parallel those of the U.S. and the U.K. in the Near East. We must seek to strengthen French feeling on this and through them seek the quadripartite position.
The President responded that he would consider quadripartite talks only in the framework of the U.N.
As the session was breaking up, a message was brought in to the Prime Minister from British Prime Minister Wilson with information which Wilson asked be passed to the President immediately./6/ It contained the following points:
/6/Dated May 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 6, Prime Minister Wilson)
(1) George Brown reported that the Soviet attitude on the Near East was not particularly encouraging.
(2) Israeli Foreign Minister Eban told the British that any Israeli "first strike" would be withheld until he returned from his talks in Washington. If nothing had been worked out by then, Israel will have to strike first.
(3) The British support De Gaulle's proposal even if this means talks outside the U.N. The Foreign Office suggests we seek quadripartite talks at the level of our permanent delegates at the U.N. or, if the USSR prefers, at the Summit.
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