Statement of Senator Carl Levin Senate Armed Services Committee Annual Posture Hearing With Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace back to the Armed Services Committee for their annual posture hearing. Much has happened in the world since last year’s posture hearing.

The rapid advance of our armed forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the total collapse of the Iraqi regime stand as a testament to the courage and dedication of our own men and women in uniform, who remain by far the best trained, best equipped, most capable military force in the world today, the standard against which all other military forces are measured.

Unfortunately, military operations in Iraq did not come to an end with the President’s announcement on May 1. In early July, General Tommy Franks announced that continued violence and uncertainty in Iraq would make significant reductions in U.S. force levels unlikely for the foreseeable future. Six months later, we still have roughly 125,000 troops in Iraq with almost 180,000 more serving in support roles outside the country, and we are in the process of rotating in fresh units to ensure that we will be able to sustain this presence for years to come.

The current rotation of U.S. forces into Iraq will result in a drawdown to 110,000 troops. The drawdown is based upon the belief that Iraqi police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps will be able to take the lead in providing security in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. I am concerned that this will set the Iraqi security forces up for failure as there is a real question as to whether they are ready to take on and defeat the insurgents who are targeting Iraqis as well as U.S. and other Coalition forces.

The new Iraqi Army, whose mission is limited to external defense, will not have a role in providing domestic security for their fellow citizens. I remain convinced, as I have written to Secretary Rumsfeld, the President and others in the Administration, that the recall of units of the Iraqi Army at the middle-grade and below would have been a better way to help handle the insurgent threat.

Our troops in Iraq face extremely hazardous conditions, including improvised explosive devices, ambushes, car bombs, mortar attacks, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.

In addition, roughly 10,000 American troops continue to engage in military operations against hostile forces in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands more soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are deployed in Korea and other hot spots around the world, including numerous countries that had not seen an American in uniform before September 11, 2001.

Congress and the American people will provide the support that is needed by our troops in the field. In less than a year, we have enacted two emergency supplemental appropriations acts – for $62 billion and $87 billion – to cover the costs of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been reported that an additional supplemental appropriation of $50 to $55 billion will likely be required to fund continued operations over the next fiscal year. I have no doubt that if our troops need the money, Congress will provide it. However, it should have been part of the budget before us, not left to a supplemental and therefore not part of the projected defiicit. A fair defense projection would have included those costs since we are planning on them.

Nonetheless, the pace of operations has placed great strains on our forces. We have seen the imposition of stop-loss requirements to prevent troops from leaving the force when their term of service is finished. Some have been deployed for extended periods, and some have been deployed repeatedly. Some units have been told that they would be going home soon, only to have their tours of duty extended. Others have been denied clear information about when their deployments would end. In the last two and a half years, we have seen the largest sustained call-ups of National Guard and Reserve components since the establishment of an all-volunteer military force.

A year ago, as our nation was being prepared to go to war in Iraq, a number of us expressed the view that our cause would be strongest and our long-term success would be more certain if we actively solicited the support of the international community toward a common goal. While America’s armed forces have proven and continue to prove every day that they are ready to take on any military challenge anywhere in the world, I continue to believe that we are paying a steep price for the failure to obtain the political support of the international community, which would make the occupation one of the world community, including Moslem nations, and not just an occupation by Western nations, and therefore less difficult and dangerous.

Mr. Chairman, the strains on our armed forces are very real. Concerns about morale and potentially about recruitment and retention are real. The risks posed to our Guard and Reserve system – are real. These are issues that we must do everything in our power to address.

Finally, in the wake of the testimony of chief weapon inspector Dr. David Kay, who concluded that the pre-war intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was fundamentally wrong, this Committee has a particular responsibility to look into how intelligence failures effected the planning for and the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I am deeply concerned that my request to the Department of Defense for information concerning the impact that intelligence had on the planning for, and the conduct of, Operation Iraqi Freedom has so far been denied by the Department.

My specific request was for a briefing on the planning process generally, including how the intelligence affected that planning, and an overview of the final approved war plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, to the extent that it can be shared with Congress.

I am also concerned that it has taken so long for the Department to respond to my request of November 25th of last year for information relating to the Office of Special Plans, which was established by Under Secretary Feith and which reportedly involved the review, analysis, and promulgation of intelligence outside of the U.S. intelligence community. My specific request in the case of the Office of Special Plans was for documents relating to the establishment, functions and responsibilities of that office and the Policy Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group; documents produced by either of those two entities; a list of personnel directly related to those two offices; and communications from those two offices to key agencies.

I understand Mr. Feith’s response has been delivered this morning.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.