Hearing :: The Uzbekistan Crisis: Assessing the Impact and Next Steps

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UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING:
THE UZBEKISTAN CRISIS:  ASSESSING THE IMPACT AND
NEXT STEPS


JUNE 29, 2005

               COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)
                         CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
               U.S. SENATOR KAY BAILEY
HUTCHISON (R-TX)
               U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
VACANT
               U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI)
               U.S. SENATOR HILLARY
RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
               VACANT

               U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
                         CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF (R-VA)
               U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
               U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT
B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
               U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN (D-MD)
               U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER (D-NY)
               U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
               U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE
MCINTYRE (D-NC)


               WITNESSES/PANELISTS:

               MIRA
RICARDEL
               ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MUHAMMAD SALIH
               CHAIRMAN
               ERK PARTY
HOLLY CARTNER
               EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
               EUROPE
& CENTRAL ASIA DIVISION
               HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
ROBERT TEMPLER
               DIRECTOR
               ASIA PROGRAM
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

               GALIMA BUKHARBAEVA
CORRESPONDENT
               INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING
MARCUS BENSMANN
               CORRESPONDENT
               INSTITUTE
FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING

               The hearing was held at 2:12 p.m.
in Room 124 Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Senator Sam
Brownback (R-KS), co-chairman, Helsinki Commission, moderating.

     [*]
BROWNBACK:  Good afternoon.  The hearing's going to come to
order.  Thank you
all for joining us today.

     We were hoping to have Mira Ricardel, the
acting assistant
secretary of defense for international security policy,
testify today,
as well as the Department of State.  However, we have not been
able to
work out an arraignment, but hope to have both State and Department of
Defense address the critical issues facing us in Uzbekistan at some
future
time.

     I do have a longer statement I'm going to go ahead and put in the
record, but I just want to make a few remarks as we get this hearing
going.
For many years, I've been hoping for gradual democratization in
Uzbekistan.
Nearly 15 years now after the collapse of the USSR,
Uzbekistan's political
system under President Karimov today still
retains many of the Soviet
characteristics.  Neither political nor
economic reforms have taken place
despite repeated calls for President
Karimov to begin this process, which I
personally have extended and
asked President Karimov to do, as well.
This commission over the years has held several hearings, as well
as issued
reports on the situation in Uzbekistan.  We have
consistently urged President
Karimov to reform.  His failure to do so
is one of the main reasons, I believe,
why the tragedy occurred in
Andijan in early May.

     And these protests
will continue, I believe.  And the violence
will continue if the president,
President Karimov, does not take
dramatic and decisive actions, which include
an independent
investigation of the events in Andijan.  Along with the U.S.
government, the European Parliament, the OSCE, and many international
organizations, the Helsinki Commission has urged President Karimov to
permit
such an independent international investigation.   

     He has refused to do
so, suggesting that we rely on the
conclusions of a parliamentary commission of
investigation.
Unfortunately, given the absence of meaningful separation of
powers in
Uzbekistan, we cannot place any faith in that commission, whose
conclusions will surely echo those already pronounced by President
Karimov.
It is essential that an internationally accepted account of the
events be
established.  The OSCE is the best form for organizing such
an inquiry.  For
that reason, I am suggesting that the United States
invoke the Moscow
Mechanism.  

     Though perhaps unfamiliar to many people, the Moscow
Mechanism is
so named because it was agreed to by all participating states at
the
OSCE meeting in Moscow in 1991.  It is an instrument available to the
OSCE
to investigate extraordinary events or serious, ongoing human
rights violations
in a member state.  The Moscow Mechanism allows the
state involved to name a
rapporteur and have input in the report.  

     I hope President Karimov will
rethink his opposition to an
independent investigation.  I do not hold a great
deal of hope that he
will do so.  

     So today, Uzbekistan presents
Washington with a classical
dilemma.  The leader of a dictatorial state in a
strategically
important, resource-rich region wants to seek cooperation and be
a
friend of the United States.  He cooperates with us on security
matters,
allowing us to use a military base.  

     He claims to be pursuing an agenda
of gradual democratization,
occasionally making some gestures, yet he allows no
fundamental
reforms of his own repressive policies at home, contradicts values,
alienates the population, and undermines the country's stability.  Nor
is
there any reason to expect any change while President Karimov is
ruling.
How long can we work with such a leader without damaging our own
interest?
Are we risking long-term losses for short-term gains?  Are
we strengthening
terrorism or fighting it by aligning ourselves with
President Karimov?
To address these questions, we've assembled our group of well-
qualified
witnesses.  I'm disappointed that we were not able to get
administration
witnesses for this hearing.  However, we have with us a
number of important
witnesses, including two reporters who were in
Andijan at the time of the
shootings and in the aftermath.

     Before identifying them, I should note
that we did invite the
Uzbek embassy to testify at this hearing, but Uzbek
authorities chose
not to attend.  I would also state that I have attempted
personally to
call President Karimov, and my call has been rejected.  I've
attempted
to work with the Uzbek government, and those efforts have been
rejected, as well.

     We will have a panel of five witnesses, that we would
like to
have the witnesses come forward.  And we start, actually, in the
testimony with the two eyewitnesses of the reporters.  But if I could
have all
five come forward and take your seats at the table, I would
appreciate it.
While they're taking their place, other members of the commission
will be
coming.  Congressman Pitts is here.  

     Congressman, I don't know if you
have an opening statement that
you would like to make?  If you would, we'd be
pleased to receive that
at this time.

     PITTS:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for holding this
important hearing.  I think it's vital that we
and other nations
continue to fight against terror in the war on terror and
that we
ensure that fundamental human rights are not violated.  

     And of
course, like everyone, we're deeply disturbed by events
that have occurred
there in Central Asia.  I look forward to the
insight and analysis that today's
witnesses will provide.

     And I'll submit my statement for the record.  I
do think it would
be important to hear from the government of Uzbekistan to get
their
view, especially of the involvement of the terrorist groups in the
activities that occurred there.

     Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BROWNBACK:  Thank you, Congressman.
     I do want to go to the two
eyewitnesses first on this.  So we'll
have the two reporters that were present
speak first on this panel.  I
want to apologize ahead of time if I mispronounce
your names.  I'm
best with Sam, and Smiths, and Lees, and these names are not
such, but
I do appreciate very much your being here and my lack of being able
to
enunciate your name correctly is no reflection on how much we do
appreciate
your coming.

      Galima Bukharbaeva, since 2005, she has been project
director
for the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting.  Born in
Tashkent, she graduated from State University in Tashkent, Journalism
Facility.
In 1997 to '98, she worked for Internews Network, an
American NGO supporting
independent media, as a correspondent and
training coordinator.  From 1998 to
2003, she was a correspondent for
AFP in Uzbekistan.  Her articles on Andijan
events have been reprinted
in numerous sources.  

     And so I would turn
to you first for your statement for the
commission.

     BUKHARBAEVA:  Thank
you very much.

     I would like to thank you, Senator Brownback, and other
distinguished members of this commission for giving me this
opportunity to
testify the massacre in Andijan on May 13, where I was
myself with my other
colleagues, journalists, among the people from
Andijan.  

     I am Galima
Bukharbaeva, journalist from Uzbekistan.  I work as a
country director of
Uzbekistan of Project IWPR in Uzbekistan since
2000.  

     I was in Bobur
Square in Andijan among thousands of Andijan
citizens, when, at 5:20 p.m. local
time on May 13th, the merciless
authorities of Uzbekistan opened fire on their
own people.  Before the
attack, the government didn't warn unarmed people to
leave the square. 

     Thousands of people were unarmed, and they were not
forced by
rebels to stay on the place.  Everybody, whom we speak to, came to
the
square by own will, either only to look or to protest.  It wasn't an
Islamic uprising.  I didn't hear any "Allahu Akbar" outcries or any
demands to
build Islamic state.  People demanded justice, human
rights, economical, and
social, and political reforms.  

     And the monument of Bobur, which was on
the center of the square
-- it was full of people.  And the monument itself, it
became
(inaudible) a tribune for all speakers.  And I was seen that these
demonstrations and some of the speeches were continued from the moment
when I
arrived to the square at 12 o'clock p.m. and until 5 o'clock
when fire was
opened.  

     And people, they didn't have even political demands, and they
didn't have for resignation of President Karimov.  I didn't see any
foreign
fighters, mujahedeens from Chechnya or Afghanistan.  The armed
people were
belong to the group of friends and relatives of 23
businessmen, who were
arrested a year before and were trailed in
Andijan city court since February
2005.  

     At the time of the government's attack, were no shootings from
the rebel's side or any aggressions from their side.  All armed person
were
inside the governor's office or in the yard of the buildings,
surrounded by the
fence.  

     And huge demonstration of Andijan unarmed citizens was taking
place on the square.  Government's troops attacked completely
unexpectedly for
everybody who was at that moment on the main square
of Andijan.  

     The
shooting of Andijan citizens, everyone who was on the square
that time --
children, teenagers, women, old people, journalists --
took place in the cold
blood without mercy or pity.  It was just
simply professional mass murder.
One of the soldiers also tried to kill me.  A bullet from his
weapon hit
my rucksack, which was on my back when I tried to escape
from this bullet, and
went through it, passing through my notebook and
my journalistic identity card.
I can even show you.  This is my notebook.  And the bullet went
through this and my press card.  And also, I have my rucksack where
you can see
the front bullet.  And I was really lucky, because bullet
left my rucksack from
this side.  It was the question of a few
centimeters.   

     During the
shooting, when I fled on terror from bullets along
with the other people, I
felt a real animal fear.  I had never been so
scared in my life before.  The
bullets fell on us like hail, and I saw
people who were running next to me
falling down.  

     It seemed that all of Andijan had been turned into a
slaughterhouse, and all its inhabitants turned to cannon fodder.
President
Islam Karimov ignored the opinion of his people, the capital
of the most
densely populated part of the region, Fergana Valley.  He
scorned the life of
every person who was there.  

     And I will just very briefly will try to
explain to you like why
and how -- my understanding why this unrest happened.
This unrest was
closely connected with the trial of 23 businessmen charged with
belonging to the religious organization Akromiya.  The hearing of this
case
finished at the Andijan city court on May 11th, and the court
withdrew to
deliver a sentence.  

     These 23 businessmen were arrested in summer 2004.
Over the year
they were detained in a cellar of National Security Service in
Andijan
and were tortured.  Their families and lawyers tried all legal acts to
prove that they are not guilty.

     The last press-conference was held.  It
was in Tashkent on May
3rd, ten days before this massacre in Andijan.  And it
was at Freedom
House office in Tashkent.  

     And what is interesting, on
May 11th, just two days before the
massacre, my colleague, Marcus, he was in
Andijan.  And he interviewed
prosecutor.  And he was very interesting.  He was
asking for a six-,
seven-year sentence for these defenders, businessmen.
And when Marcus asked them, "What these people committed
actually?"  And
they said, "Oh, they didn't do anything yet."  "But
you ask six years.  Don't
you think it's very much for what they
didn't do or nothing?"  "But anyway, we
have to be careful.  Just in
case, we have to punish them."  So we have a tape
of this interview
(inaudible) included his interview in my testimony documents,
in
English.  

     When we arrived to Andijan on Friday, on May 13th, we had
a
chance to speak to some leaders of this unrest.  And one of the,
Sharif
Shakirov, his two brothers were among these 23 businessmen on
trial, explain us
how it happened.

     On the last two days of the court hearings, on 10 and
11th May,
up to 5,000 people gathered outside the court building who came to
express their support to businessmen on trial.  The crowd was so large
because
it was not ordinary people who were on trial, but successful
businessmen, heads
of various manufacturing companies.  

     These 23 businessmen provided jobs
to 2,000 people.  Their
employees, friends and relatives filled the entire park
by the court
building on Tuesday and Wednesday.  Later, as Sharif Shakirov told
us,
it was revealed that, starting on Wednesday and Thursday, 11 and 12
May,
the National Security Service arrested new six people who were
standing outside
the court.  

     Though the city traffic police department started to arrest
even
cars who were parking in front of the court and where belonged to the
families of these defendants.  And as we found out later, the verdict
was
announced secretly on Thursday 12th May in a jail.  And 23
businessmen got
sentences from 12 to 22 years of imprisonment.  

     This exhausted their
patience.  And people began to gather and
decided to go to the traffic police
in the late evening, Thursday, May
12th.  They gathered together and went
backwards to the traffic police
department together in demand for their cars to
be released.  But they
had no success at the traffic people.  

     They
angrily -- they were very angry.  And after they went to the
NSS, and also
demanded to release new six people who were arrested.
Of course, they couldn't
release them.  And after their attack
military unit, and took weapons, attack
(inaudible) security service,
at that moment, as Sharif Shakirov told us, 30
people were killed.
And they decided to go to prison and release prisoners in
the prison. 

     When we asked Sharif Shakirov (inaudible) were sitting in
this
governor's office, "So what you want?  What demands you have?"  And
she
said that they demand truth and justice.  She said that, in the
morning, they
had applied already to Russian President Vladimir Putin
through the Reuters
News Agency to regulate the conflict.  

     Evidently, they didn't imagine
that Andijan citizens would help
them, that the entire center would be blocked
with cars in order to
stop a storm by authorities.  Because when we tried to go
to the
center of the square, all the square, all roads were blocked by cars.
And I was thinking maybe this police did, but I didn't see any police
or
soldiers.  

     And as we understood later, that it was done by civilians,
who
tried to support these rebels inside the governor's office.  And when
we
asked these even rebels, "What do you control at the moment?" they
said, "We do
not control anything.  We're just sitting in this
governor's office."
And after we told them, "You know, all roads blocked," "This what
Andijan
people do."  

     Later, we could speak to (inaudible) we could speak with
another
one, leader Kabuljon Parpiev.  And he said that they had folks with
the Interior Ministry Zakir Almatov.  Parpiev said that also they
didn't have
any political demands and the only thing they want to, the
Uzbek constitution
to be observed, they want freedom and justice.  

     And they also if
Interior Minister Zakir Almatov can release,
Akrom Yuldashev.  This is guy who
wrote a book.  He was accused that
he is leader of this organization, Akromiya.
According to Parpiev,
Yuldashev didn't create any organization, but wrote a
book which
became a spiritual guide for many of them.  

     In the
afternoon, again, they had a call from Interior Minister
Almatov.   This time,
Almatov said that it would not be possible to
free Yuldashev, as the judge is
against it.  Then, said Parpiev, the
minister began making threats.
"He told us that there would be a storm anyway.  He said that
even if they had
to kill 300, 1,400 people, they would take the
rebels," Parpiev told us.
I asked Parpiev if he was afraid.  And he was looking in my eyes
and he
said, "Can you call this life?  It's better to die."  And
everybody who were in
the governor's office in that moment, there was
-- I had a feeling that all of
them like had made decision like to
die, because they said it's not a life
anyway.  It's better to die.

     I went out and interviewing people on the
square.  At that
moment, square was full of people.  I can't say how many.
Some people
were saying that 20,000, but I believe that not less than 10,000.
It
was really full.  The square was like 200 meters long, but it was full
of
people.

     BROWNBACK:  Ms. Bukharbaeva, if I could, I've got a vote on.
What I would like to do is for you to go ahead with your testimony.

     And
then, Mr. Bensmann, if you could proceed with your testimony
after that.  I go
vote and get back as quickly as I can.  If I'm not
back by the time you're done
testifying, if Congressman Aderholt or
Pitts would like to question those two
witnesses, and then we'll
proceed to the rest of the panel.  That would keep us
going and
flowing on forward.

     So please proceed with your statement.
And, Mr. Bensmann, as an eyewitness, as well, if you could.  And
if I'm
not back by then, two congressman will go with questions.  And
then I'll get
back for that.  My apologies, but I've got to slip out
to a vote.
Please proceed.

     BUKHARBAEVA:  So I was continuing interviewing people.
It was
almost 5 o'clock.  At the moment, I think it was 5:10 or maybe 5:20.
I
saw that on the main avenue, which is like going along the square, a
few APCs,
armored personal carriers, with two or three vehicles
driving one after
another.  

     People were frightened and began running.  And I also ran,
but
APC drove past at a very high speed.  But literally two minutes later,
a
new line of APCs appeared.  As they drove up to the square, they
opened fire
without warning.  And everyone run.  I also run. 

     The bullets flew at
such a rate that it seemed hail was falling
on all sides.  When the shooting
began, I was five meters from this
avenue.  But it's hard to say how many
people were killed on May 13-14
in Andijan.  Andijan is in fear now, and no one
can speak.  Even
people cannot complain that they lost relatives or someone was
killed
in their family.

     Uzbek government does everything to hide this
massacre, to
destroy evidences.  They repress people and journalists.  They
arrest
even taxi drivers who served journalists, and other locals, who also
helped journalists to work, stringers or fixers, and also human right
defenders
who were also eyewitnesses of this massacre.

     High official police source
in Andijan just two weeks ago gave us
secretly an interview.  And she said
that, that day were killed up to
a few thousand people.  He was eyewitness when
governments tried to
hide bodies in mass graves all over Uzbekistan, mostly in
Fergana
Valley.  And I ask U.S. government for help and assistance.
First, I ask president of USA, George Bush, to condemn this
massacre.  I ask
U.S. government to use all their pressure to convince
Uzbek government to let
international commission to come to Uzbekistan
for independent investigation.
Uzbek government will not let this
commission to investigate event in Andijan,
then I ask to start
sanctions against Uzbek government, reconsider your
relations with
Uzbekistan, limit or stop some kind of cooperation, including
military, and even to remove an American airbase in Khanabad, Karshi. 

     I
ask not to give U.S. visa to all members of Uzbek government,
if they will
refuse in independent investigation.  I ask U.S.
government to act through
international organizations as NATO, U.N.,
OSCE for letting international
commission to come to Uzbekistan and to
condemn massacre in Andijan.
And I ask to help a new government of Kyrgyzstan to save lives of
Uzbek
refugees and to protect them from pressure from Uzbekistan.  And
I ask to help
U.N. to send refugees as soon as possible to third
countries. 

     To make
clear -- also I ask to make clear statement that Uzbek
government shouldn't
prevent of work of local and international
journalists in Uzbekistan and to
stop repressions and abusing local
journalists in the Uzbek press.

     I
ask to help to release as soon as possible human rights
defenders, who were
arrested after Andijan massacre.  And I also ask
for help and financial
assistant for local human rights group and
journalists, who still doing great
job in Uzbekistan, besides all
threats.

     So thank you very much.
PITTS:  Thank you very much.

     Mr. Bensmann?

     BENSMANN:  First of
all, I would like to say thank you that you
are ready to hear my statement
about what I saw in Andijan.  My name
is Marcus Bensmann, and I am working
since 10 years in Central Asia,
mainly for the Swede newspaper Neue Zurcher
Zeitung.

     I was in Andijan two days before the massacre, because I wrote
a
story about this trial against the 23 businessmen in Andijan.  And the
interesting thing at this trial was -- usually in Uzbekistan, this
kind of
trials are common.  You have at least every week a trial
against a person who
has been accused to be a member of an Islamic
terrorist group and he's better
here.

     But in that case, the people belong to this defenders, the
relatives, friends, and employees which worked in the companies, they
stood up.
They started to protest against this arresting and the
trial.  And they did it
already for a year.  And they used every
method to make clear that the
defendants are innocent.

     And as I was there, there was quite an
impressive picture.  In
front of this court, more than other -- I count in the
evening more
than 2,000 people, women, and men, and children, kids, young men,
were
standing in front of the court, saying nothing, no placards in their
hands.  There was only standing, and they had their best suits on.

     And I
went inside the court.  And I was attending as the
defendant saying their last
words.  And you have to know, usually, if
you have a trial against Islam
radicalists in Uzbekistan, I observed
two moments.  One, if the defendant
completely broken and confess
everything.  Or you have defendant saying, "I'm
not accepting this
trial.  I'm only believing in God, and we will build up the
Islamic
state."

     But in this case, these people were not broken, but
they were
defending with the constitution in their hand.  They were defending,
quoting the president, and saying, "We are businessmen.  We did what
the
president want to build up our economy.  We are not guilty.  We
are not member
of any group."  

     And one even said, "It's absurd to turn men running a
bakery to a
terrorist, giving work to the people."
     And also, they were
very -- they had high knowledge about their
rights.  They was demanding, "We
don't have the right to see our
lawyers."  Then they were saying that they were
tortured to sign
testimonies.  And the torture is common in Uzbekistan.
I went back at the same day to Tashkent and was really impressed
about this
kind of trial, because I haven't seen it before.  And I,
just after the day I
met this interview with this prosecutor asking
him -- because I was very
impressed of this testimony of the defendant
that, "What did these people
commit?"  (inaudible)  

     And they told me, "Nothing.  They commit
nothing.  But we will
put them in jail because they may in future do something.
And they
are terrorists."  No, that they are not terrorists.  "That they are
making anti-constitutional?"  "No."  "But what is their guilt?"  "Yes,
they are
members of this Islamic group."

     And then I went back to Tashkent.  And
on Friday morning, I got
the information that the uprising started.  And we,
together with
Galima and two journalists from A.P., we succeed to sneak in into
the
city in Andijan.  And the place is full of people.

     And it was
really interesting, because I also observed the
uprising in Kyrgyzstan.  And in
Kyrgyzstan, that was (inaudible) from
the mountain, which was forced by the
leaders of the clan to go into
the city.  But this, it was really a feeling of
a city uprising.
Everybody went on the street and be participate on it.
And then they started to gathering around this monument of Bobur,
making
speeches.  But I didn't hear any "Allahu Akbar."  I didn't hear
any demands to
build an Islamic state.  And you know, I worked during
the Tajik civil war.  I
worked in Afghanistan and recently also in
Iraq.  I know how these trained
fighters looks like, but there wasn't.

     These people who was armed in
this night before (inaudible) the
prisoner, and I see I haven't been there at
that day in Andijan,
therefore I do not know exactly what happened.  But the
people which I
saw which were armed, there were same people from Andijan that
was not
well-trained Chechen Mujahedeen or Taliban.  

     But they were
separated in this (inaudible) yard, which was
surrounded by the fence.  And
there I saw mostly these armed people.
And on the place, these meeting
continues, people making speeches,
people camped.  

     You have to know
Andijan is a provincial city, yes?  If something
happened, everybody is going
to place to see what's going on.  And
even there was a rumor that Karimov is
coming.  They want to see
Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, to demand and
say, "What's going
wrong?"  That means it was natural that the people was
there.  

     And suddenly, 5 o'clock or 5:20, they started.  These armed
personal carrier passed by, soldiers sitting on there armed personal
carrier,
started to fire into the crowd.  There was no warning before.
They didn't give
the people on the square the chance to run.
     They could say, "In ten
minutes, we will shoot.  Please leave the
place."  They could even wait four
hours when it became dark and
everybody went voluntarily home, because in the
same evening was
heavily raining.  But they didn't give the people a chance.
And even -- I would say -- even in this -- if it were even Osama
bin Laden
would be sitting in this governor building, yes, at least
give the people the
chance to go.  And they were not forced to be
there, because went and camped.
There was no armed people who said,
"You have to be here."

     And I was
there at -- sent one APC by APC, and the soldiers were
sitting and shooting.
And we escaped.  And the next day, we were
forced to leave Andijan.  But on
Sunday, I sneak in again.  And I have
the chance to work another week there.
That was very difficult,
because every person was frightened by the secret
service and the
police inside.

     But I succeed to meet families, go to
funeral service.  I succeed
to get from one person some death certification,
where we had
(inaudible) the number 372.  I do not know.  Maybe it's become
higher,
but that is the number which I have.  

     I saw a mass grave
(inaudible) with the number 49.  And then I
had to leave, also, because they
arrested my stringer.  But I went
Friday to the police station and said, "Give
my man back."  And I
brought him back to Tashkent, and now he is safe in
another country.

     Thank you very much.

     PITTS:  Thank you very
much, Mr. Bensmann, for your testimony,
and Ms. Bukharbaeva.

     In
accordance with the instruction of the chairman, we will
proceed to ask some
questions, if that's OK, before going to the other
witnesses.

     Galima, I
have a couple of questions.  Some analysts see Andijan
as Karimov's Tiananmen
Square, if you will, a brutally violent gesture
to intimidate any existing or
potential opposition.  And I suppose it
could be argued that violence has
worked for the Communist Party in
China, which is still in power 15 years
later.

     What is your perspective regarding whether or not President
Karimov deliberately ordered his troops to shoot to send a message?
Do you
think that can work in Uzbekistan like it worked in China?
Give me your
perspective.

     BUKHARBAEVA:  I also agree that massacre in Andijan is
possible
to compare with Tiananmen Square tragedy.  And it was the same, like
shooting people without no mercy, without any chance for them to leave
the
square or to save their life.

     And for me, as an Uzbek citizen, and for
many people in
Uzbekistan, I'm sure for all country, it was something like
September
11th for America, because everything something like a change.
Because, for instance, I'm like not as a journalist, but I'm just only
like a
(inaudible) is an Uzbek citizen, I can't imagine how it's
possible to live in a
country to know that your president, he's a
murderer.

     And because what
happened in Andijan, it was mass murder.  And
I'm sure that all country, of
course, absolutely shocked.  And they're
afraid.  But at the same time, in
China after Tiananmen Square, it was
also still possibility for economical
reforms, yes?  Countries thought
it should grow very like -- like very fastly.
But in Uzbekistan, I'm sure that this government will not be able
to
provide economical reforms.  And as long as this government will
stay in power,
so it will be countries like really falling down.  It
will be collapse.  And
everybody in descendent.  And it's really scary
to think about the future of my
country.

     PITTS:  Mr. Bensmann, what's your perspective?  Do you think
Mr.
Karimov deliberately ordered troops to shoot to send a message, or
what's
your perspective?

     BENSMANN:  He is saying that he support everything,
that he
controlled every minute of the Andijan massacre.  He's not naming the
massacre.  He's even saying that everything happened one hour later.
They even
changed the time.

     But it could be also that there is other -- Uzbekistan
is always
like an old former Soviet country.  You have (inaudible) the minister
of internal affairs, and the minister of security.  And maybe even he
was not
so informed and they did something else, but Karimov, by
himself, he is saying
that "I am responsible with what's going on, and
I have everything under
control."  And therefore, you have to take him
by his word.

     PITTS:
Now, a London-based scholar, Shirin Akiner, has written a
report about Andijan,
which concludes that the government version is
much closer to reality than
yours.  Have you read her version?  What
do you think of it?  

     I'll ask
both of you.

     BENSMANN:  I will point two things of this report.  First
of all,
she is saying in this report they start to shoot at 6:30.  Is that
right?  But they start to shoot at 5:20.  And I can prove it by wire.
I can
prove it even by my sat-phone bill.  That means she even changed
the time,
because Karimov was saying nothing was happened before 6:00.

     And then
she is giving the own testimony -- I think it's the last
page -- saying, "We
went to Andijan on the border of," let's say,
maybe I can remember.  "The
deputy Hakim" -- the is the governor of
the province -- "met me and remained
the whole day with me."  And she
was only one day.

     And I'll tell you.
If you're invited by Deputy Hakima (ph) in
the Uzbek province, you have a very
big lunch.  You have a very big
dinner.  How she can make all these 40
interview and in the presence
of the deputy of the governor, every person will
be frightened into
saying only what the governor wants to hear.

     And I
think, as she is a scholar, that is desperately against
every, every ethic to
be a scientist.  And I hope that her
organization cooperating with her, like
NATO or Peace First, are
rethinking her cooperation with Mr. Hakima (ph).
PITTS:  Galima, would you like to respond?

     BUKHARBAEVA:  Yes, I have
the same idea, because Shirin Akiner,
she was also like a P.R. person for the
government.  But when she was
gone into Uzbekistan during elections, during
this last year
elections, parliament elections, December 2004, all before
referendum
and before for some important events, like EDRC meeting in Tashkent.
At that time, she all the time was doing this black P.R. for the
government.  But that time, maybe we could tell her red, because it
was none on
the blood.  But now, when I see that she's doing this, on
people's blood, when
1,000 people died, and she ignored this life, and
now she tries to, like, prove
that this shooting, it was something
like they had to do, and wants to turn all
peaceful people who were in
the square to terrorists, it's something like I
cannot accept at all.

     Because she is saying that there were no shootings
to peaceful
civilians.  Of course, at least they were shooting at me.  I'm
terrorist or who I am?  So I don't think so.

     PITTS:  Thank you.  One
more question.

     What is your opinion regarding whether or not the people
of
Uzbekistan perceive the U.S. military base as a powerful symbol of
U.S.
support for Karimov?  What's your opinion of that?

     BUKHARBAEVA:  If you
will talk to some analyst in Uzbekistan,
people who do as policy, they said
that, if not this support from USA
to Karimov, maybe this president will now
feel himself uncomfortable.
It's very important to strengthen the power of
President Karimov.
This airbase is very tight military cooperation.

     But
at the same time, you know, people, like ordinary people,
they still have hope
that USA can help them.  Because when they watch
TV and see President George
Bush in Tbilisi when he was there first
week of May, when it was like a
celebration of freedom, they think,
"Why they did not do something like this in
Tashkent?  At least why
they do not condemn violation of human rights of this
terrible
massacre?

     And even when before Andijan, it was terrible,
terrible stories
about this violation of human rights.  And when I talk to
people,
usually they said, "Why is the international society keep silent?
Where is America?  Where is Europe?"

     PITTS:  Mr. Bensmann, do you want
to comment?

     BENSMANN:  I think -- first of all, I (inaudible) already
for a
long time in Central Asia.  And Central Asia is an Islamic region.
But
you don't meet anti-Americanism there.  The people are like to be
near to
America or to Europe.  They like to go there, yes?

     They feel near to
this country.  And I think it's very difficult
-- as I'm a German, as Germany
also has military base in Germany, and
I think it's very difficult to endure
freedom in a country -- from out
a country which shoot to its people.  This is
a contradiction.

     And in the end, I think that people know this, also,
and if they
see that America, or even Germany, is not responding to this, then
all
the words, you know, of support freedom, support democracy, they
become
nothing.  

     And we are not able -- there was one point, as we came to
this
place, the people would think, "Oh, people from the west came from
Europe.  We are safe," yes?  I mean, the hope that they are coming
from the
west and they demand of building up democracy.  But we are --
I think our
governments shouldn't be send people into the fire and not
to protect them.
PITTS:  Thank you.  Your testimony has been very informative, and
you're
both very eloquent.  Thank you.

     Congressman Aderholt?

     ADERHOLT:
Thank you.

     Thank you each for being here.  I've got another commitment
at
3:00, so let me just ask one question before I have to leave.

     It's
pretty clear that the authorities in Uzbekistan have tried
to cut off foreign
sources of information about, of course, what has
happened there, and about
some of the testimony you've talked about
today.  And of course, in general,
what our indication is, that they
have censored different point of views about
what has happened in
Uzbekistan.

     My question to both of you would be,
how effective do you think
that censoring has been?  In other words, that
people over -- all over
Uzbekistan know what's going on and what has been said
about it by
non-government sources?

     BENSMANN:  Can you repeat it?
ADERHOLT:  Just do the people of the Uzbekistan know what is
going on, even
though the government is trying to suppress what has,
you know, happened,
through your testimony here today and through
various other reports?  But in
general, has that been successful by
the government to suppress that or do the
people there know what is
going on, even though they've tried to cover it up?
BENSMANN:  I think in the first days after, the people didn't
know,
because there was only state TV and they also closed down the
transmission of
the Russian TV.  But still, radio, like BBC, German
Wave, and Radio Freedom,
and Voice of America is (inaudible) as I
heard.  That means radio is a very
important source for the people.
And then the rumors that's going on, you are
not able to hide this
kind of massacre.
     And even as I was a week later in
Tashkent, I already felt that
everybody and their brother in Tashkent was
speaking about it.  And
they had a very clear picture what was going on there.
BUKHARBAEVA:  Yes.  When we were leaving Andijan the next day,
even
people in the neighbor cities didn't know what happened.  And
they were just,
like, surrounded us, asking what happened.  And when
we told, of course, all
people were really shocked that this really
happened.

     And after just a
few days after, whole country knew already.
Like my friends in Tashkent, they
were saying that they're absolutely,
deeply stressed and shocked.  And even
they were saying that streets
were absolutely empty in the evening, even
markets.  

     All people, they look like -- and were just sitting in shock.
And they were even afraid to go out, even to speak loudly.  It was
absolutely
like whole country was turned to look like a prison, and
they were afraid.  And
of course, it was deeply, deeply something
terrible, a terrible experience for
all people in Uzbekistan.

     And I know, even people from police, Uzbek
police, whom I talked
to, they were also shocked.  And even some people from
Uzbek
government, as I know from some like friends, from sources, they were
also -- for them, it also something what they couldn't expect.  They
were also
like really angry or deeply shocked of what happened.

     But, yes, people
know what happened.

     ADERHOLT:  One other thing.  Is there any reason to
believe that
systemic reforms are possible in Uzbekistan under the current
administration there?

     BUKHARBAEVA:  I'm absolutely sure that this
administration will
not be able to provide any reforms.  And this
administration is the
biggest obstacle for any reforms.  And you can see that
even such a
huge organization like EBRD, IMF, they couldn't convince to do
something.  And all what they're doing is really very artificial.

     And
people, in Andijan, for instance, they had such a simple
demands, if you will
see.  Next day, this unrest was in Karasuniba
City (ph), which is Kyrgyzstan.
And the first thing what people
started to do, rebuild the bridge which was
broken by government on
January 2003 because government didn't want us Uzbek
people to go to
Kyrgyzstan for shopping because some prices are lower.
And they broke it that one night the bridge.  And now, two years
ago, when it
was just one shot for people to do something, they
started to rebuild bridge.
And I don't think that it's anything from
Islamic terrorism.  It's such a
simple thing.

     And even just only one thing I can show you, this is a
letter.
And this is the blood from Andijan.  And this letter, it was written
from one, I think, according to text -- it wasn't signed -- by one guy
who was
released from the prison, these 23 businessmen.  And I
included, also, in
English translation on this letter.
     The first thing what these people
saying is just economical,
social problems.  And even in their last letter,
they're still saying
that they're not a Crimea (ph), that organization, this
Islamic
organization is not exist.  They just were businessmen, and several
from the government decided to take their business.  That's why they
were
arrested, and nothing they put them is (inaudible)

     And it's happened
more like a countrywide everywhere.  And if you
read this letter, it's really
impressive.  This is like a voice from
Andijan, Andijan (inaudible)
ADERHOLT:  Thank you.

     Mr. Bensmann?

     BENSMANN:  I doubt that it's
possible to make with these people
on the top reforms, because which kind of
reform you would like to do?
You would like to make a dialogue with the person
to say, "You know,
friend, next time you're not shooting on people?  You didn't
know it
before?"

     But I understand.  I also do not know what's going on
know.
Maybe it Uzbekistan turns now to an (inaudible) of Central Asia or
maybe
internal struggle is going on, because I hope still, because
there are a lot of
people, yes, which graduated either in Europe or in
America.  They had to
experience outside.

     And maybe, even if they are working for the
government, they know
that this was a crossing of a red line.  And maybe
something internal
will change.

     ADERHOLT:  Thank you.

     I'm going
to turn over back to Mr. Pitts for the testimony of the
other people here.  So
thank you very much.

     PITTS:  Thank you, Congressman Aderholt.
We'll proceed now to the other witnesses.  And I'll ask them to
go in this
order:  Holly Cartner, who's the executive director of the
Europe and Central
Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, first; and
then Robert Templer, who is the
Asia Program director of International
Crisis Group; and then, finally,
Muhammad Salih, who's a well-known
writer and poet, leader of the Erk Freedom
Party.

     Holly Cartner?

     CARTNER:  Thank you very much to the
commission for inviting us
to speak today on this extremely important and
timely topic.

     I want to focus also on the events of May 13th in Andijan.
Human
Rights Watch researchers were deployed to the region within days of
the
massacre and interviewed more than 50 witnesses to the violence in
Kyrgyzstan
and in Andijan.  Much of what I say, at least at the
beginning, will, I think,
be quite consistent with what you've heard
already, but I think it's
nevertheless important to know that when
interviewed separately, many, many
people have a very, very consistent
story of what happened there.

     As
we've already heard, the May 13th killings, the massacre,
began with thousands
of people participating in what was a very rare
protest in Bobur Square in the
center of Andijan.  And all indications
are that they were expressing their
anger about growing poverty and
government repression.  

     The protests
were sparked, as we've heard from the previous two
witnesses, by the freeing
from jail of the 23 businessmen, who had
been charged and tried for religious
fundamentalism.  And I would just
note that that particular charge is often
made by the Uzbek
authorities against anyone they consider to be a threat to
their
power.  

     The armed men who broke into the prison, took over
government
buildings, took hostages, and used people as human shields,
committed
serious crimes, and those are punishable under Uzbek criminal law.
But nothing that was done by the armed men, nor certainly nothing that
was done
by the peaceful protestors in the square, could justify the
government's
response.  

     Based on our research, it's clear that the overwhelming
majority
of the people in Bobur Square at all times of the day were unarmed
protesters.  While some armed men were in the square, they remained
usually on
the fringes or on the margins of the crowd.  This is
confirmed both by
eyewitness testimony and by photographs that we have
reviewed.
Despite the overwhelming presence of unarmed civilians, of men,
women, old,
elderly, women, children, the Uzbek government never made
an announcement to
the crowd to disperse, as we've heard from other
speakers already.  And they
gave no warning of the impending attack.
They did not make any attempt to use
any form of crowd control or to
take any other steps that might have minimized
the risk and danger to
the unarmed protesters.  

     Instead, armored
personnel carriers and military trucks, as well
as snipers from various
buildings, fired indiscriminately into the
crowd during the day and more
directly at the crowd in the evening.
In fact, our research showed that
security forces never targeted the
few gunmen who were around the margins of
the square, but instead
focused on the innocent and unarmed civilians who were
protesting
there. 

     No ambulances were allowed into the area after the
shooting was
over to collect the wounded.  Instead, the wounded were simply
left in
the streets -- many of them were left in the streets to die.  And what
is more, Human Rights Watch received testimony that soldiers summarily
executed
some of the wounded who were still lying in the streets the
next day, on the
morning of May 14.  

     The scale of the killings was so extensive and so
unjustified
that we can call this, as the other witnesses, a massacre.
Eyewitnesses have told us that between 300 and 400 people were present
at the
worst shooting incident, which took place near the cinema.
That was only one,
though, of several shooting incidents that resulted
in casualties during the
day.  So this is just an effort to try and
get a very rough estimate of how
many might have been killed.

     The Uzbek government has denied all
responsibility for the
killings.  It claims that the death toll was 176 people
and that the
only ones who died were either law enforcement officials or
civilians
killed by the gunmen, as well as the gunmen themselves.  

     Not
surprisingly, the Uzbek government claims that the attackers
were Islamic
extremists.  For nearly a decade now, the Uzbek
government has cast nearly all
of its domestic critics as terrorists,
extremists, and Islamic fundamentalists.
Human Rights Watch research found no evidence that the protesters
or
the gunmen had an Islamist agenda.  Interviews with numerous people
present at
the demonstration consistently showed that the protesters
spoke about economic
conditions in Andijan, government repression, and
unfair trials, not the
creation of an Islamic state.  

     Uzbek authorities have done everything
possible to hide the truth
behind the massacre.  In the hours after the
violence, the government
forces removed most of the bodies and washed away the
evidence of the
brutality without first doing any time of forensic
investigation.  

     At the same time, the city was virtually closed down to
strangers
and to -- and there was a strict clampdown on media coverage.
Journalists who happened to witness the killings in Andijan often had
their
materials confiscated and were threatened.  

     The Uzbek authorities have
also tried to ensure that other
witnesses to the May events keep silent.
People in Andijan have
reported to us that the police had explicitly warned
them not to speak
to journalists or other outsiders.  Government agents have
also gone
from house to house trying to identify those who were missing and
confiscating passports and identification documents to further
intimidate the
families of the protesters.  

     Since the May 13th events, authorities
have also arrested at
least ten human rights defenders and opposition activists
in Andijan.
Others have been beaten by unknown assailants, threatened by local
authorities, set upon by mobs, and placed under house arrest.  

     More
than six weeks after the massacre, Andijan residents
continue to live in
extreme fear of government retribution for
speaking out about the event.  The
city remains essentially closed to
journalists and human rights investigators.
Despite the Uzbek government's best efforts to hide the truth
behind
the killings of May 13th, authoritative accounts on what
happened in Andijan do
exist, including the excellent report released
last week by the OSCE's Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights.  

     The OSCE report is
consistent with our own findings as to the
sequence of events and the
undeniable responsibility of Uzbek
government forces for the large number of
killings of unarmed
civilians.  The OSCE report concluded that, quote, "Force
was used
repeatedly against unarmed civilians throughout the day, that it was
indiscriminate and disproportionate, and that many unarmed civilians
were
wounded or killed," unquote.

     Our respective investigations are only a
first step toward
setting the record straight, however.  Many questions remain
unanswered, including the precise death toll and the government -- the
identity
of government troops that were responsible for the killings.  

     For this
reason, the main recommendation flowing from both Human
Rights Watch's report
and the OSCE report is that an independent
international investigation into
Andijan events is needed.  Only a
full-fledged international investigation,
with access to official
records, can give a true picture of what actually
happened and provide
the basis for the beginning of an accountability process.
However, the Uzbek government has rejected an international
investigation.  Instead, earlier this month, it invited a number of
governments
with diplomatic presence in Tashkent, including the U.S.
and France, to monitor
a commission of inquiry underway by the Uzbek
parliament.  

     Both the
United States and France rightfully declined, but
others, including Russia,
China, India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan's
Central Asian neighbors, are taking
part.  Needless to say, we do not
view this as a credible effort.
Given the government's overall poor human rights record, and in
particular its
record of impunity for human rights violations, it is
unlikely that any
government-led investigation could possibly be
credible.  This makes an
independent, international investigation, led
by the U.N. high commissioner for
human rights, imperative for the
establishment of a true record of the killings
and the start of
accountability.

     I would also like to highlight one
other troubling situation
related to the events in Andijan.  More than 500
Uzbek citizens who
fled their homes after the events in Andijan have sought
refuge in
Kyrgyzstan.  Many are currently sheltered in the camp near Sasyk,
Kyrgyzstan, and there's growing concern that the Kyrgyz government,
which is
itself under intense pressure from Uzbek authorities, may not
be able or
willing to provide these refugees with adequate protection.

     Human Rights
Watch has maintained staff in the refugee camp and
in the region since the
events in Andijan.  And we have growing
concern that the refugees risk refumont
(ph).  

     Twenty-nine Uzbek citizens are currently in Kyrgyz custody and
were transferred there from the refugee camp and are at an extremely
high risk
of being return to Uzbekistan in the next days.  Already on
June 10th, the
Kyrgyz authorities extradited four Uzbek asylum seekers
back to Uzbekistan,
although they clearly -- their asylum applications
had not yet been reviewed,
and they clearly face a serious risk of
torture.  No international monitor, to
my knowledge, has had access to
the four since their return to Uzbekistan.
To date, the Uzbek authorities have requested the extradition of
133
individuals who sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan after the May 13th
violence.  It's
especially important to stress that everyone in the
group in Kyrgyzstan,
whether ultimately recognized as a refugee or
not, is at great risk of torture
if returned to Uzbekistan.  

     It's therefore absolutely prohibited by the
Convention Against
Torture for them to be returned to Uzbekistan.  And
Kyrgyzstan is a
signatory to that convention.

     It should also be noted
that Uzbek officials have been
particularly eager to have these individuals
return to Uzbekistan in
part because, as I noted before, it's trying to prevent
anyone with
details about the massacre from being able to tell his or her
story.
Uzbek security officials are operating in the area around the refugee
camp inside Kyrgyzstan and pose a real danger to those who have sought
shelter
there. 

     I agree with all of the recommendations that the previous two
speakers have already made, and so I won't take much more time on
this.
Clearly, the international community must make sure that the
continued refusal
on the part of the Uzbek government to cooperate
with an independent
international investigation carries real
consequences and to set a timeline for
compliance.

     In a welcome note, the European Union has stated that it
expects
the Uzbek government to reconsider its position on an international
investigation by the end of June, and that continued lack of
cooperation will
trigger a partial suspension of its Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with
Uzbekistan. 

     With the E.U. deadline drawing near, the U.S. needs to
follow
suit.  As a first step, the administration should publicly announce
that it is suspending discussions on a long-term military base and
explore
alternative basing arrangements until the Uzbek government
agrees to an
international investigation.  

     Should the Uzbek government persist in
its refusal to accept an
international investigation, the United States should
bring to an end
its post-September 11th strategic partnership with the country
and
discontinue its military presence.  

     The administration should also
urgently determine whether any of
the Uzbek military units involved in the
Andijan killings received
U.S. military or counterterrorism assistance,
equipment, or training,
in the interest of ensuring that U.S. policy is in full
compliance
with the Leahy Amendment.  

     And finally, the U.S. should do
its share as a NATO member state
to suspend all military activities with
Uzbekistan in the framework of
the Partnership for Peace program until the
Uzbek government has
agreed to an international investigation into the Andijan
events.  

     Thank you for your attention.

     BRYANT:  Thank you very
much.

     And now we'll go to Mr. Templer, his testimony.  Robert Templer
is the Asia Program director of International Crisis Group.  He heads
a team of
more than 20 researchers working in eight offices covering
20 countries in
Asia.  Formerly a correspondent for Agency France
Press and a visiting scholar
the University of Cal, Berkeley.  He's
the author of "Shadows and Wind:  A View
of Modern Vietnam," and two
forthcoming works on conflict.

     And so, Mr.
Templer, I look forward to your testimony.  If you
could hold within the
timeframe of what we've got on the time clock so
we can get onto to some
questions, too.  

     And I'll apologize to the panel and to those present
that I had
to stay on the floor longer than I thought was necessary.
Mr. Templer?

     TEMPLER:  Thank you, Senator, for the invitation to speak
before
the Helsinki Commission.

     And thank you to the other members.
I'm not going to repeat what we've heard from the eyewitnesses
and from
other researchers, though the counts very much coincide with
our own research
into the events in Andijan.  Crisis Group has been
working actually in Andijan
for six months before the massacre,
interviewing people in connection with the
trial of the 23
businessmen.

     We had reached the conclusion even before
the massacre that they
had no engagement in violent Islamic activity of any
kind and that the
trial was just another example of an unfair persecution of a
religious
group by the government of Islam Karimov.

     It's quite clear
throughout the Islamic world that groups that
are intent on imposing an extreme
vision of Islam on people, or
establishing Islamic faith, or carrying out acts
of violence in the
name of Islam, are very rarely shy about their desire to do
this.
They more often than not go out there and tell people that this is
exactly what they want to do and why they're doing it.

     This has never
been the case in this situation.  And I think all
evidence points to the fact
that this was not driven by an Islamist
agenda in any way.

     Everybody
heard in considerable detail about the events of May
13th and 14th.  I'm going
to focus on the wider picture of Uzbekistan
and Central Asia, and how it might
be done in terms of a policy
response to the massacre, and also to the failure
of the government of
Karimov to really move Uzbekistan forward in any way.
I think there's now a widespread recognition that Karimov has set
Uzbekistan
on an extremely dangerous path of self-destruction and that
he will not be
persuaded by any other government that his policies are
a disaster for his
country and a disaster for the region.  

     Uzbekistan is now a member of
that group of countries -- and
those include Zimbabwe, Burma, North Korea,
Belarus and a few others
in this list -- who are ruled by men who don't just
show a lack of
concern for people but are willing to inflict any level of
suffering
and hardship, as long as they remain in power.  
     The United
States has taken strong stands against the leaders of
those other countries.
It is time to take the same stand against
Karimov.  

     Karimov's past
behavior provides us with no hope that he will
change his policies.  His
background is as a Soviet state planner, and
he still views the world through
the lens of a Brezhnev-era
apparatchik.  He wants to see what he calls
"civilized trade," by
which he means that all businesses are controlled by his
officials.  

     His edicts have crushed all economic opportunity in
Uzbekistan,
leaving people despairing and unable to earn the sparsest of
incomes.
He is contemptuous of the ideas of parliamentary democracy, religious
freedom, press freedom, or economic freedom.  He runs one of the most
repressive police states in the world.  

     He targets people of faith and
employs his feared secret services
to torture and abuse them.  He has banned
Moslem and Christian groups
and sent thousands to some of the most terrible
prison camps on Earth
purely for the expression of their religious beliefs.  As
a result of
these policies, he rules a country in which people are now
nostalgic
for the time of the Soviet Union.  

     There's a growing
expectation that the end of Karimov's rule will
be violent.  A civil conflict
in Uzbekistan could be a disaster for
Central Asia.  It's likely to send large
numbers of refugees into
neighboring countries, and these countries
ill-equipped to cope.  

     There's a real risk that the very fragile states
of Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which border Uzbekistan, could be
seriously undermined by any conflict that would break out within
Uzbekistan.
U.S. policymakers should still aim to get Karimov onto the right
path, but
they should recognize that this is unlikely to happen now
and start planning to
minimize the dangers he presents to the wider
security of Central Asia.  There
are very few good options for the
short term in Uzbekistan.  There is simply no
set of policies that can
make Karimov open up his country and deal with the
real grievances of
his people.  

     I think there are some steps that are
important to take because
they would at least signal to the Uzbek people that
the United States
is on their side, not the side of their despot.  Among the
steps we
would like to see is a consistent demand from all parts of the U.S.
government calling for an independent international investigation into
events
in Andijan.  This demand should be made in all fora, within the
U.N., within
the OSCE, within NATO, as well as in all bilateral
contacts, including those
from the military and Department of Defense. 

     Suspension of negotiations
on the lease of the airbase until
Uzbekistan agrees to this investigation.
Given the lack of
cooperation in recent months over the base, defense planners
should
give careful consideration to the usefulness of having such a grudging
ally in the region when other countries might be more cooperative.  
     The
use of the Moscow Mechanism of the OSCE that would allow for
the appointment of
a special rapporteur to investigate events in
Andijan.  The calling of a
high-level meeting of the United States,
the European Union, Japan to discuss a
joint political and aid
strategy for Central Asia.  A full review of all
engagement in
Uzbekistan by the international financial institutions, including
the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian
Development
Bank.  

     We do not argue for the withdrawal of all aid from Uzbekistan,
as
this would not help many of the people in the country.  Aid is
currently so
limited that making it conditional's unlikely to have
much effect on Uzbek
policy.  

     It is time, however, to consider some targeted sanctions if
the
Uzbeks do not agree to an investigation.  Such sanctions could include
visa and travel bans for officials known to have been involved in the
massacre
and investigations into corrupt wealth held by Uzbek
officials overseas.  The
security units involved in the massacre
should not receive U.S. training or
equipment.  

     In recognition of the difficulties of implementing aid
projects,
particularly those that help civil society organizations and small
groups, Congress might consider allowing USAID and the U.S. Embassy
greater
latitude to implement small grants in a manner that prevents
them from being
obstructed by the Uzbek government.  

     In the longer term, a critical
priority is to develop a strategy
that both prepares Uzbekistan for change and
tries to minimize the
regional fallout of possible state failure there.  All
around the
world, we have seen the collapse of one country -- more often than
not, a state driven into the ground by it's own leader -- infects
other
countries and leads to widespread regional conflict. 

     We need to make
sure this does not happen in Central Asia.
Kyrgyzstan has found it difficult to
cope with 500 refugees.  If the
number were in the hundreds of thousands, it
would simply push the
neighboring states to the point of collapse themselves.
If Uzbekistan does collapse, it would imperil efforts to bring
stability and democracy to Afghanistan, and it would risk creating a
haven for
extremists in what is already a dangerous neighborhood.  It
would mean a
worsening of drug trafficking and crime.  It would be a
direct threat to
security around the world.  

     There are some steps that could be taken to
ensure longer-term
stability in the region.  One is to work with the key
neighboring
states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Afghanistan, to start planning for a possible internal conflict in
Uzbekistan.
Work to expand their capacity to handle natural and man-made
disasters, including improving information and management systems and
the
pre-positioning of supplies to handle possible refugee flows.
Expand
educational contacts with Uzbekistan, including exchanges with
all various
groups in that society.  
     Exposure to education in the United States,
Europe or at such
institutions as the American University in Bishkek can only
help
create a cadre of pro-Western thinkers who oppose what Karimov is
doing
to the country.  Expand the training of and support for local
independent
journalists, human rights activists, and lawyers, and the
local NGOs that
support them.  

     We recognize that Uzbek government places enormous
obstacles in
the way of efforts such as this but believe that they should
continue.
Expand training in key areas that would be needed to run any
transition to democracy in Uzbekistan, including civilian security,
military
experts, legal reform experts, parliamentary experts, and
civil service reform
experts.  In short, we need to prepare all of the
expertise that would be
necessary for a post-Karimov transition.  

     Expand broadcasting to
Uzbekistan in Uzbek and Russian to ensure
that Uzbeks can get news and
educational opportunities beyond what is
offered by the state-controlled media
and schools.  Start planning
regional transport links in a way that means
Uzbekistan cannot block
trade and regional development, which is the currently
case.
Uzbekistan obstructs most of trade from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that
would go through Uzbekistan to other countries.  

     Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan are very vulnerable to disruptions in
road and rail transport within
Uzbekistan.  To work through the
International Labour Organization and other
partners to end the use of
forced and child labor to pick cotton, which is a
major source of
economic grievance in the Fergana Valley.  

     Events in
Andijan show that we cannot wait to come up with
effective policies that
stabilize Central Asia.  All members of the
OSCE need to come together to find
ways to ensure that change comes
peacefully and quickly to Uzbekistan and that
its young people do not
become another lost generation in this part of the
world, without hope
and potentially attracted to extremism.  

     We also
need to work with other countries in the region to ensure
that any possible
violence in Uzbekistan does not become the spark
that sets off a regional
conflagration.

     Thank you.

     BROWNBACK:  Thank you, Mr. Templer.
Final witness is Muhammad Salih.  He's a well-known writer and
poet.
Muhammad Salih is the leader of Erk, the Freedom Party.  In
December of 1991,
he was a contender in Uzbekistan's presidential
election, receiving, according
to official tallies, 12 percent of the
vote.

     In 1993, after President
Islam Karimov closed down all opposition
activity, Mr. Salih fled the country,
first to Turkey, then to Norway.
He remains an opposition leader in exile and
now resides in Germany.
This is his first visit to the United States in ten
years.

     Mr. Salih, welcome to the committee.  I'm pleased to receive your
testimony.  And we look forward to the discussion.

     Mr. Salih?
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  Ladies and gentlemen, Chairman,
Senator Brownback,
thank you very much for giving me an opportunity to
come to this audience today
to these hearings.  Thank you very much.

     The scale of atrocities that
took place in Uzbekistan last month
are becoming very clear to the world.  And
the testimonies of the
previous three panelists, they only confirm this.  I
just want to
emphasize the political aspects and overall political situation
there.
And therefore, in order to save our time, I want to give it to the
interpreter to read the testimony.

     The group which took over the
governor's office was prepared for
compromises and requested the mediation of
Russian President Putin in
order to avoid a bloodshed.  However, President
Karimov denounced this
proposal and ordered his forces to shoot the protesting
residents of
Andijan.  The targeted were not extremists, but the crowd of
Andijanis.

     Karimov was not afraid of extremists with Kalashnikovs in
their
hands.  He feared unarmed crowds of peaceful populations who were
protesting in the square and talking about their problems.  He ordered
to kill
them in order to spread fear among the population and do not
let them even
think about what happened in Ukraine, Georgia, or
Kyrgyzstan.

     An armed
group gave him a good excuse to commit a mass murder.
Some of those say that
the group who stormed government buildings
using weapons were guided the
government, and such versions should not
be ignored, too.

     The Andijan
massacre could be compared to Tiananmen Square
crisis, but the response from
the world community to the events in
Andijan is many times smaller.  The
attempts of the western
governments to prevent further repression against our
people are
regarded by our great neighbors, like Russia and China, as the
interference in domestic affairs of Uzbekistan, although they do not
consider
their open support of the Karimov regime, which is
responsible for the Andijan
massacre, as an open interference in the
internal affairs, again, in
Uzbekistan.

     This concludes that, when they regard sovereignty of the
Uzbek
state, they mean only the sovereignty and independence of its
authoritarian leader.  Such support inspires President Karimov to
continue what
he has been doing.

     Getting embarrassed after the Western criticism for
what's
happened in Andijan, Karimov rushed to secure Chinese support for what
he did.  Contrary, he offered China oil and gas projects in Uzbekistan
worth
$600 million.  The danger of such cooperation with China, with
its expansionist
policy towards Central Asia, must not be
underestimated.

     The regime of
Karimov is coming to its end.  That problem is to
end it bloodless.  Karimov
may think otherwise, but he must understand
that he would be brought
accountable for any violence.  The role of
America in this peaceful end of the
regime would be crucial.  

     But first of all, America and the rest of the
world must
understand that estimate that Islamic fundamentalists would come to
take over after Karimov are not true.  There is no religious group in
Uzbekistan that has the real support of mass populations.  They are
rather
marginalized and disintegrated.  And most importantly, they do
not have a
support platform among the population.

     They are usually gathered around
one mullah or religious scholar
who has no political vision nor concrete
program.  They could be one
-- they could be one exception, Hizbut-Takhrir, but
even this group
will never progress in Central Asia because its ideology is
based on
pan-Arabism, which is alien to our people.

     Their effective
activities could be explained by the social and
economic crisis in Uzbekistan,
or simply by poverty of the population,
where well-funded men, Hizbut-Takhrir,
can hire large numbers of
unemployed youth to distribute its propaganda.
Another feature of this group is that they call as non-believers
those who do
not join them.  And such radical approach has distanced
our people from them.
Therefore, such groups like Hizbut-Takhrir will
remain alien, even for the most
vigorous opponents of Karimov.  

     The attempts of certain political
analysts and experts to portray
Islamic fundamentalism as the only alternative
to the Karimov regime
only endures the regime's assertion that, if Karimov is
gone, the
Islamists will take over.  Such obligations only help Karimov to
remain in power.

     These quasi-estimates are simply baseless without any
statistics
and public opinion researchers, such as now as are produced outside
Uzbekistan, and geopolitical interests of certain great powers are
taken into
account while producing them.  

     We must understand that the sense of
unaccountability has played
a big role after the events in Andijan.  Karimov is
convinced that he
will not be accountable for what happened there.  And now it
is the
time to eliminate such sense.

     Last year, the United States
Congress has passed an act on
democracy in Byelorussia against the regime of
Lukashenko.  It would
be fair to pass such act on Uzbekistan, too.  While
meeting many
people in organizations in the U.S., numerous times I hear, "How
America could help to progress democracy in Uzbekistan?"

     What we ask are
following:  the legalization of the Uzbeks
democratic opposition, safe return
of the democratic opposition
leaders to Uzbekistan under the Western and U.N.
security guarantees,
ensure free and fair parliamentary and presidential
elections with
participation of the opposition groups.

     At first stage,
this would be sufficient to change anti-
democratic regime by democratic
methods.  All other attempts of
replacing bad Karimov by good Karimov would
only mean betrayal of our
people and democracy.  Presently, such scenarios are
actually being
concerned by certain groups inspired by the inner-circle --
inspired
by the support of Karimov's inner-circle.  

     It's important to
have fundamental changes, bringing young
leaders with new mentality, free of
Communism radiation.  After the
collapse of USSR, all newly formed states
renamed their Red Squares to
the Freedom or Independence Squares.  But yet,
they have not become
free and independent, overshadowed by dictatorship and
tyranny.

     The Western world must support the democratic movements of
Central Asia, Uzbekistan in particularly.  Democratic forces are the
only key
to the solution of conflicts, of problems of Central Asia.  

     You could
see this phenomenon in the example of Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan.
There's no other alternative.  Events in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have
given (inaudible) hope to millions of my
hopeless countrymen.  Please support
our democracy.

     Thank you very much for your attention.
BROWNBACK:  Thank you very much.  And I'm pleased that you're
hear to testify.
And I have some questions.

     Mr. Salih, first, I would want to -- I want
to start off with a
question, that there's been a number of accusations about
you from
Uzbek authorities.  

     They say you're responsible for
explosions in Tashkent in 1999,
that you've had tied with the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan.  It's a
terrorist organization.  You've also been accused of
contacts with a
Chechen terrorist.  And even charges last week that your son
trained
at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan.  

     Because those
are out and swirling around, I would like for you
to, if you would, to please
address those questions directly.

     SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman,
for asking this question, because it's really, indeed,
a very
important question, because I can feel the hand of Karimov behind
this.
And actually, I wanted to read out my statement that I prepared.
And it
would answer, actually, all of these questions, if you allow.

     BROWNBACK:
Yes, please.

     SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  After being exiled from
Uzbekistan
in early-'90s, I sought many avenues to bring democratic reforms to
Uzbekistan.  From 1994 to 1996, I met with many groups offering
assistance in
liberating Uzbekistan.  I do not deny meeting with some
of these people.
However, I do deny supporting them.

     The Karimov regime, in order to
discredit me as its opponent, for
many years blamed me for the contacts with
Islamic radicals.  The only
witness who has testified against me during the
trial of 1999 bombing
in Tashkent, Zaynettin Askarov, a member of the Islamic
Movement of
Uzbekistan.  On 26 November, 2003, during an interview to Radio
Liberty and BBC from the Tashkent prison, publicly denied his previous
testimony, which he gave during 1999 trials.

     During his interview with
the Radio Liberty and BBC, Zaynettin
Askarov said that Muhammad Salih has never
had any connection with
their group or any other religious groups and that his
previous
statement accusing Salih in connection with IMU and other groups were
given under extreme pressure at the direct order of Zakir Almatov,
Uzbekistan
interior minister.  He publicly apologized for the lie that
he had to tell
during the 1999 Tashkent trial.

     Furthermore, in 1999, after the bombings
in Tashkent, President
Karimov stated during the press conference that Muhammad
Salih's son,
Timor (ph), at that time was in one of Afghanistan's terrorist
training camps.  Ironically, at that time, my son -- Muhammad Salih's
son,
Timor (ph) and himself were in Istanbul and gave an interview to
BBC Radio
Uzbek service.  The interview is available in BBC radio
archives.

     I
state with full responsibility that my son, Timor Salih (ph),
has never been in
Afghanistan.  As for the so-called evidence, it is
photographs of my links to
terrorists that have been circulating.  The
picture of me and IMU leader, Tahir
Yuldosh, was made in 1996.  At
that time, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan did
not exist as a terrorist
organization.

     Furthermore, Tahir Yuldosh, now
a well-known terrorist, met with
many other politicians in his capacity as the
member of the United
Tajik Opposition, which later joined the Tajik-coalition
government.
Once I realized his radical stance on the issues, I quickly
distanced
myself from him.

     I have no link and never supported the
Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan ideology, which is based on violence.  And as I
have always
been a dedicated democrat, I condemn violence in any form.
The photograph was then-President of Chechnya Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev, my former
classmate at the Moscow Institute of
Literature, was made during Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev's official visit to
Turkey in 1996, after he was received by the
Kremlin in Moscow where
he signed a peace accord with President Yeltsin.
I do not -- and never will -- support the use of terrorism by any
group.  In
1998 bombing on the embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, the bombing
of the USS Cole in
2000, the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001,
all these acts are
deplorable.  The use of terrorism is a disdainful
practice and does not bring
about true reform.

     I urge the world community not to believe in the lies
and old
Soviet-style disinformation of the Karimov regime.  Thank you.
BROWNBACK:  Mr. Salih, some analysts have been going back and
forth on the U.S.
connection and role in Uzbekistan.  I believe Ms.
Cartner was saying we should
pull out of Uzbekistan, if I'm
paraphrasing her correctly, if no progress is
being made.  We should
not negotiate a long-term base agreement.

     Others
are saying we should not abandon Uzbekistan because that
will have a negative
impact on the growth of -- the future growth of
democracy in this regime and
economic liberalization in a post-Karimov
era.  What are your thoughts on the
U.S. connection to Uzbekistan in
the future?

     SALIH (THROUGH
TRANSLATOR):  The U.S. military presence, the
presence of the U.S. military
bases in Uzbekistan, actually have made
a positive psychological effect in
Uzbekistan, because our situation,
where our countries squeezed between to
other great powers with their
expansionist policies, China and Russia, it
provided us some sort of
security guarantees.

     But on the other hand, we
did not want America to become a
hostage of its own base there, when the
questions of human rights and
democracy advancement are sidelined.  The ideal
option, of course,
would be to have both, to have United States military
presence there,
and also, at the same time, to continue to use pressure on the
government of Uzbekistan, if there was an opportunity for that.

     But it
is highly unlikely that both could come together.  And we
hope that America
chooses freedom.  And thinking long term, the long-
term interests of the
United States, as well as the interests of the
people of Uzbekistan are
establishing to a democracy there, and even
if it comes at the expense of
abandoning a military base there.

     BROWNBACK:  Let me understand then
correctly, because I thought
you were saying at the outset that the presence of
U.S. military has
had a positive impact on the region, but are you saying now
that, if
democracy is not engaged in Uzbekistan, the U.S. should pull military
presence out?

     SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  As an Uzbek, as a person who
knows
this regime, this unchangeable regime, very well, and also knowing
that
the regime understands only the word of pressure, I do believe
that, if there
was an opportunity to have both, to preserve the
military base and at the same
time to continue to put pressure on the
government, on the regime, I would
support this.

     Because we also have concerns of growing Chinese interest.
And
they could be interested in establishing a military presence in
Uzbekistan.  And that could put in danger not only Uzbekistan but the
entire
Central Asian region.

     BROWNBACK:  Some analysts see Andijan as Islam
Karimov's
Tiananmen Square -- you cited to that analogy -- a violent gesture to
intimidate any existing or potential opposition.  Do you think
President
Karimov deliberately ordered his troops to shoot to send a
message?
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  I'm convinced that President Karimov
deliberately
ordered to kill people in order to give a message, in
order to prevent people
of Uzbekistan to go protesting to the streets,
just like it happened in
Kyrgyzstan, in Ukraine, in order to keep
people under fear.
     BROWNBACK:
Congressman Pitts?

     PITTS:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  I'll continue with
Mr. Salih.

     You said pressure is important, it's good.  What kind of
pressure
specifically might induce Islam Karimov to make meaningful changes in
Uzbekistan?

     SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR):  First of all, the pressure
could
include economic pressure, including financial, and also political
pressure.  And it is -- but at the same time -- and also to put
pressure, the
United States could use the neighboring countries,
neighboring republics
surrounding Uzbekistan to put those kind of
pressure, as well.

     And
also, at the same time, I wouldn't want to see Uzbekistan as
completely
isolated from the western world.  So in this way, the
pressure could be
calculated in a way that they could be some -- in a
very balanced way that
there could be some, at least, some minimum
opportunity left for President
Karimov under which he could either
agree to reform or under that pressure he
could peacefully resign or
agree to resign, to give up power.

     PITTS:
Let me ask the other panelists to comment.  I'll rephrase
the question.
Is there any form of pressure that might induce Islam Karimov to
make
meaningful changes in Uzbekistan?  And is there any reason to
believe that
systemic reforms are possible in Uzbekistan while Karimov
is in power?
Ms. Cartner first?

     CARTNER:  Taking your last question first, I have
very serious
doubts that any kind of systemic reform can be carried out with
the
current administration, the current government in Uzbekistan.
Karimov and others in the government have shown no willingness to
take up
recommendations and the engagement of the international
community on human
rights issues, even in terms of working out a long-
term action plan, for
example, on torture.  And it's something that
was very concrete and would
theoretically be something that could be
taken on step-by-step.

     There's
no willingness of the government to do so.  I don't see
any indication there of
any -- and on the contrary, efforts to do
quite superficial changes only when
there's real pressure coming, then
superficial at best.  So I don't have great
hope that we'll see
significant changes at this point.

     I honestly don't
know the answer to your first question.  I think
that our colleague from the
ICG has put it very well, that it's hard
to see what pressure there is that
will change this particular
government at this point.  

     However, I
would argue that that doesn't mean that we shouldn't
be trying. And that
doesn't mean that the U.S. government shouldn't be
trying.  Everyone in their
own capacity has to look for the things
that the government might care about
and to push in that way.  

     That's why we've make the recommendation on
the base.  We've
looked at economic -- what does Karimov care about?  Money,
perhaps.
A military engagement, and the close ties that he has with the U.S.
government.  And therefore, those things have to be linked to progress
on human
rights issues.

     As I think some of your colleagues in the Congress have
said,
after a government massacres its citizens, the relationship with the
United States cannot remain the same.  And I would say that, even if
it doesn't
make a difference in the very short term for changing the
Karimov government,
changing its conduct, that it's a very important
signal that you send to the
people of Uzbekistan who are ultimately
the ones who have to hear the message
that the U.S. government, that
the E.U., and that others in the international
community support them
and stand with them.

     It may be a long-term
strategy.  But they need to know that the
U.S. government stands on the side of
the people of Uzbekistan and the
protection of their rights.

     And
ultimately, I would also argue that it's a question for the
U.S. government
itself.  Is the relationship with Uzbekistan at this
point bringing such
benefits that it's worth compromising some of the
most fundamental values that
you have articulated that the government,
that the administration has
articulated, as priorities in the region,
including fighting terrorism and also
creating stability?

     And I would say that the policies being pursued at
this point are
actually counterproductive for both of those goals.
PITTS:  Mr. Templer?

     TEMPLER:  Since 2001, the U.S. government has made
very generous
offers to the Uzbek government to support a process of reform,
and has
encouraged that process in a whole range of ways.  And yet, the Uzbek
government has taken a whole array of steps backwards, particularly in
the
economics sphere.

     So it does seem that no array of incentives or
pressures is
willing to -- is capable of moving Karimov, particularly in terms
of
opening up the economy and lifting some of the extreme restrictions on
individual economic activity that still exist.

     I do think that the
United States needs to continue to apply both
an offer of incentive, a plan of
action for reform, and also to
intensify some of the pressure that it can apply
through the base
issue, through a number of critical commodities that are the
mainstay
of Karimov's rule, and certainly most of that money goes mostly to the
elite.  Cotton and gold, for example, mostly provide wealth to a very
small
group of people in Tashkent.  

     It's extremely difficult to control the
trade in those
commodities in any way.  But I do think it would be possible to
develop a series of increasing steps that would apply increasing
pressure to
Karimov and would certainly make him understand that his
current behavior's
been unacceptable.

     PITTS:  Mr. Bensmann or Galima, would you like to
comment on that
question?

     BENSMANN:  I strongly believe that
Uzbekistan, even Karimov, I
would say, has a desire to be accepted by the rest.
And even as I
attend during the election day, reelected in this (inaudible)
election, and you praising other -- I think it was Senator Lugar, that
he went
to Uzbekistan and he was so impressed what he was saying.
That means he wants
to be loved by the West.  

     And I think what very important is, and that
cost not too much,
to make clear statement by all (inaudible) of what is
possible --
also, in Germany and in Europe, to make clear statement that that
is,
first of all, a massacre and that we condemn it.  And that must be
clear.
And if that is reported also to those people in Uzbekistan by
various
radio stations, that is a strong support.  And I also
(inaudible) of this
high-ranking bureaucrat and employees of the
government, which know that they
don't want to go to China.  They want
to go to the West.  

     I think you
have to support this kind of movement.

     BUKHARBAEVA:  What happened in
Andijan is really a great tragedy
for, not just for Uzbekistan, sure, but for
whole Central Asia, and
maybe for whole people in the world, because it was
absolutely a clean
murdering during a daylight, when these APC were -- and a
line of APC
were driving along the square, and soldiers were sitting on APC,
shooting everybody who went in the square.

     And everybody was thinking
what they have to do, like a pressure
(inaudible) happens.  I don't think that
they have to even now at the
moment think what will happen to the government
after you press or not
press, as it's human.  We have to just condemn it.
What happened in Andijan, it's something that shouldn't happen
ever.  And
we're just people, not just politics or something like
that.  We have to say
it's something wrong, and say against because
it's not like an attack against
Andijan people there.  It was just
real attack against humanity, against all
our moral, against humanity
in all the world.

     So it's clear that it
should be condemned.  And after, you have
to think yourself, do you want to
continue like to have any deal for
business with this government or not?
PITTS:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

     BROWNBACK:  I want to thank the
panelists for being here, and Mr.
Salih in particular, after ten years not
being here.  And I understand
you're also going to be meeting with a number of
other U.S. government
officials and members of Congress.  And I'm delighted
that your
information will be getting out.

     It's a very serious
situation in Uzbekistan.  And now the
contemplation of, what are the next steps
to take?  I think this
panel's been very helpful on advising just what it is
that we should
be doing in the aftermath of the massacre in Andijan and what
should
be our response to the government in Uzbekistan?

     The United
States seeks to build positive relationships with
every country in the world,
and particularly, I might add, to those
countries in Central Asia that have
come out from underneath the
Soviet Union, that are starting or reestablishing
themselves.  And now
it's been 15 years.  It does take time.  But we want to
build positive
relationships in the region.  

     I think that's been
everybody's desire for some period of time
with President Karimov.  And yet
repeatedly he has denied very request
for economic or political liberalization
whatsoever, and then this
most recent killing of his own people that's taken
place.  

     We will be, as the United States government, seriously
contemplating what additional steps that we can use and do to move on
forward
with the people of Uzbekistan and pressing forward democratic
and economic
reforms in that nation, a very important nation in the
region.

     Thank
you all for attending.  The hearing's adjourned.
Whereupon the hearing ended at 4 p.m.

     END