Report on the January 1999 Detroit Snowstorm

PART II: FINDINGS

The review team was generally familiar with the events chronicled above before it conducted its interviews in Detroit and Minneapolis. Although the team did gather additional factual details in the course of the interviews, its primary purpose in conducting the interviews was to determine why the events of that first weekend in January unfolded in the manner that they did and what NWA and WCDA are doing to prevent a repetition of those events. The team has analyzed the information it obtained from the interviews and from NWA and WCDA documents. Based on that analysis, the team makes the following findings regarding why the January 1 Detroit snowstorm resulted in lengthy tarmac delays on January 2 and 3 that left passengers stranded on aircraft for up to 8½ hours. The findings are grouped into six subject-matter areas: (1) NWA’s arrival and departure planning; (2) NWA’s assessment of its preparations for Sunday’s operations; (3) WCDA’s and NWA’s snow removal operations; (4) aircraft positioning; (5) Sunday ground and flight crew staffing levels; and (6) NWA’s treatment of passengers stranded on its aircraft.

NWA’s Arrival and Departure Planning

• The decisions to reduce and then halt NWA operations on Saturday. As a result of the SOC Director’s decision to permit Saturday arrivals later than suggested by his Chief Dispatcher, a decision that the SOC Director believes was reasonable, additional aircraft would land at DTW, thus contributing to the gate congestion that evening and the following day. Also, additional aircraft would attempt to depart DTW that afternoon, increasing the number of passengers subject to lengthy tarmac delays into the early hours of Sunday.

Contributing to the SOC Director’s decision to keep NWA’s operations at DTW going after 1:30 p.m. on Saturday was his and NWA’s strong commitment to doing everything possible to safely transport its passengers to their destinations on time and avoid stranding them overnight at airports. While his decision achieved that goal for Detroit-bound passengers who arrived Saturday afternoon, it contributed to delaying and stranding passengers aboard aircraft that night and the next day.

Also contributing to departure delays on Saturday, and the number of aircraft queued for take-off that ultimately were forced to return to gates, were the rapid snow accumulation, poor visibility, and snow drifting onto active runways. These conditions forced de-iced aircraft to wait for additional plowing. These aircraft then required further de-icing.

• The decision to restart NWA operations on Sunday. The plan formulated on Saturday night to commence DTW operations at noon on Sunday was based on a central assumption that proved to be incorrect: that NWA would have enough gates available to accommodate the limited arrivals scheduled for Sunday. As explained below, the lack of clear and coordinated communications between the SOC Director and his staff in Minneapolis and NWA management at DTW prevented the SOC Director from realizing that this assumption was incorrect until it was too late to cancel or divert many of Sunday’s planned arrivals. (As explained in later sections of our findings, a variety of factors made gates unavailable.)

NWA management at DTW gave the SOC Director repeated assurances Saturday night and early Sunday morning that NWA’s DTW facilities would be ready for operations commencing at noon on Sunday. For the reasons listed below, the SOC Director did not question these assurances until he noticed that scheduled noon-hour departures were not leaving their gates. By this time, several flights had already departed for DTW.

• First, the storm total of 10.6 inches of snow, while uncommon for Detroit, did not seem to the SOC Director to be an amount that would present an insurmountable challenge to an airline accustomed to operating in harsh winter weather, especially at its Minneapolis hub and other airports in the northern tier of the United States. He was initially unaware that high winds were causing drifting and wind chills that reached –20 to –30 degrees on Sunday and did not fully appreciate that DTW’s infrastructure was not as well equipped as Minneapolis to respond to the aftermath of a large snowstorm.

• Second, in his initial contacts with NWA’s DTW Control Center Manager, he was told of problems that seemed surmountable in the time allotted and was given no indication that they were not. He was not given a clear indication of the magnitude of the problem created by the snowed-in aircraft and baggage carts that had been parked in the alleys the night before.

• Third, he was aware that DTW’s taxiways and runways were plowed and therefore assumed that the rest of the airport was sufficiently clear of snow to allow unimpeded operations. He did not know until 1:00 p.m. that some of the alleys were unplowed and blocked by parked aircraft and baggage carts.

• Fourth, while the SOC Director anticipated a shortage of flight crews due to flight cancellations on Saturday, he did not anticipate that the storm’s aftermath would prevent crews already in the Detroit area from getting to the airport, thus creating a more serious crew shortage. Without sufficient crews, NWA could not launch enough aircraft from DTW to free sufficient gates to deplane passengers on incoming flights in a timely manner.

• Finally, while addressing the DTW situation, he and his staff were at the same time handling serious weather-related problems at other airports, some of which seemed at least as difficult as DTW’s: NWA had a total of about 50,000 passengers stranded at airports around the country and the storm was disrupting all of the airline's East Coast operations at the same time that the DTW situation was unfolding.

• The decisions to delay and then stop NWA arrivals on Sunday. Even when the SOC Director realized that DTW would not be able to accept flights at noon, he believed that the airport would be able to do so by mid-afternoon and thus he simply delayed the launching of other flights to time their DTW arrival for when he estimated that gates would be available. He subsequently ordered additional delays, but in the meantime, some flights had departed for DTW. Moreover, flights already in the air were allowed to continue to Detroit, as on one occasion were flights that had taxied away from gates but had not yet taken off for DTW. The SOC Director concedes that the latter decision was a mistake. When the SOC Director at 3:40 p.m. requested a national ground stop of flights scheduled to depart for DTW, 36 flights were already on the ground at DTW. Of the 36, 29 were still waiting on taxiways and ramps for gates, and the last of those to deplane its passengers did not do so until approximately 11:30 p.m., after a wait of 8 hours 38 minutes.

The arrival on Sunday of more aircraft than DTW had available gates, stranding passengers in aircraft for hours, resulted in large part from inadequate communication between the SOC Director and his staff in Minneapolis and NWA management at DTW. The information that was passed on to the SOC Director on Sunday morning was at times unclear and incomplete and was transmitted in an ad hoc manner. As such, the SOC Director and his staff had little basis for questioning their assumptions about the progress of Sunday’s preparations until too many aircraft were already committed to arrive in Detroit. Even after noon on Sunday, when the SOC Director and his staff began to get a better understanding of the extent of the problems at DTW, they still were not given a clear assessment of the situation at the airport and, as a result, first implemented rolling arrival delays rather than immediately requesting a national ground stop of NWA flights into DTW. Additionally, as a draft NWA internal review of the airline’s response to the storm concluded, "[t]he problems associated with a storm of this intensity should not have been a surprise." To a degree, then, the SOC Director and his staff did not ask the right questions under the circumstances.

Although NWA has no operating standard indicating what is a permissible ground delay, the SOC Directors and their staff stated that they never would have permitted aircraft to leave for DTW had they known that those aircraft might experience major ground delays. They would likely have had that knowledge, and avoided or mitigated any backlog of aircraft waiting for gates, had they and key DTW personnel reviewed major storm response issues in regularly scheduled conference calls on Saturday and Sunday.

NWA’s Assessment of its Preparations for Sunday’s Operations

• A number of the NWA managers interviewed stated that they always seemed a half hour away from reaching their goals of clearing snow, moving aircraft, and preparing gates. "We half-houred ourselves to death," stated one NWA manager. Another common observation was that the hours passed by like minutes that Sunday. These perceptions suggest that while NWA employees at DTW worked very hard in attempting to prepare the airport for Sunday operations, they were so preoccupied with "putting out fires" that they failed to recognize and communicate the overall severity and implications of the problems they faced throughout the day. Indicative of this problem was the fact that NWA management at DTW did not realize until noon, when Sunday’s first flights were scheduled to depart, freeing gates for arriving aircraft, that they were severely short of crews to operate those flights.

NWA management at DTW was not alone in experiencing this problem. The Airport Director, for example, was personally engaged in, among other things, assisting passengers stranded in the terminal buildings. As a result, he stated that he was unaware of the fact that dozens of aircraft full of passengers were stranded on his airport’s taxiways until, at approximately 4:00 p.m., he was informed of this situation by an individual in the terminal who had come to pick up one of these passengers.

• One NWA executive observed that NWA management at DTW, confronted with a combination of problems that it had never before encountered, did not listen correctly to its staff, did not close loops, and did not manage its resources effectively. Had NWA had a snow emergency plan for DTW that designated a person to oversee and assess the airline’s response to this severe snowstorm -- that is, to see the forest and not just the trees -- and communicate its progress to the SOC Director, then the SOC Director would have received a more accurate assessment of that progress and would likely have implemented a more conservative Sunday arrival schedule.

Snow Removal

• NWA’s view. According to NWA, there were serious shortcomings in WCDA’s snow removal efforts. NWA noted that on Saturday afternoon and early evening, although DTW never officially closed and at least one runway was at all times open, WCDA’s plows could not always keep up with the rate of snowfall and drifting snow on runways, on taxiways, on ramps, and on the de-icing pad being used by NWA. This caused departure delays that were then exacerbated by recurrent aircraft de-icing. On Sunday, NWA complained that WCDA did not plow NWA’s alleys as required by WCDA’s snow plan, did not notify NWA of the movement of its snowplow crews as required by WCDA’s snow plan, left snow piles and drifts at the throats of alleys, created high ridges of plowed snow along the sides of taxiways, and did not plow a de-icing pad and areas where empty aircraft could have been parked, all of which impeded or prevented the movement of aircraft, particularly the removal of empty aircraft from gates that were needed to deplane passengers from arriving flights.

NWA concedes that it lacked sufficient equipment to adequately plow the areas it was responsible for -- from the terminals out to the end of the aircraft’s tail, including the area around the tires of its jet bridges. This impeded the use of the jet bridges and rendered at least one of them inoperable. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that this was the first major snowstorm experienced by DTW since NWA had switched from gate to remote de-icing of aircraft. De-icing fluid applied to aircraft at the gate would run off and help keep gate areas free of snow and ice. NWA had not anticipated the impact of the absence of de-icing fluid run-off at the gate areas.

NWA agreed that its decision to park aircraft and baggage carts in alleys on Saturday night prevented it from using gates in those areas on Sunday after that equipment became snowed in. (See Appendix D.) NWA noted, however, that because of weather conditions, the aircraft could not have been towed elsewhere on Saturday night and that there was no other space for the baggage carts given that virtually all NWA gates were occupied.

• WCDA’s view. According to WCDA, it essentially fulfilled its snow removal responsibilities. WCDA notes that all of its snowplow drivers were working that weekend with the exception of one driver whose wife was having a baby. WCDA insists that on Saturday, at least one runway was always safe to use, and WCDA is proud of the fact that it did not need to close the airport. WCDA notes that the de-icing pad might not have been plowed as soon or as often as needed by NWA, but WCDA plowed the pad in the order of priority that it was listed in the airport snow plan and did the best it could to keep up with the heavy rate of snowfall.

WCDA concedes that on Sunday it did not notify NWA of the movement of its snowplow crews. Moreover, it is undisputed that icy conditions in plowed alleys and taxiways on Sunday delayed aircraft movements and caused skidding, and that some larger aircraft required wing walkers to negotiate taxiways lined with snow banks. WCDA disagrees with many of NWA’s other complaints, however. Specifically, WCDA noted that it was impossible to plow NWA’s alleys per the snow plan schedule because they were clogged with aircraft and baggage carts that had been parked there the night before and had become snowed in. As to snow piles, drifts, and ridges, WCDA concedes that some might have existed, but insists that it did the best it could to eliminate those obstacles and that NWA’s complaints are exaggerated. The Airport Director noted that he personally counted 37 out of the total of 60 NWA gates that were clear of snow and from which parked aircraft could have been moved by NWA. WCDA also insists that the de-icing pad and prospective aircraft parking areas were plowed.

WCDA noted that after the snowstorm, it asked all the airlines to critique its snow plan in light of its performance during the storm. NWA suggested a few changes that WCDA made and are discussed below. WCDA considers these changes minor. The other airlines suggested no changes to the plan and generally thought that WCDA had done a good job removing snow during and after the storm.

• The review team cannot resolve the differences between NWA’s and WCDA’s recollections of snow removal efforts. Under either version of events, however, it is clear that communications between these two organizations regarding snow removal priorities were haphazard. Indeed, their lingering differences over this issue are indicative of these communications problems. Both NWA and WCDA could have improved snow removal efforts through formal communications channels set up as part of a snow emergency plan and through a clearer understanding of their respective snow removal obligations.

Aircraft Positioning

• This issue is important because the positioning of aircraft at various times during the weekend of the snowstorm had an impact on NWA’s ability to use its gates for the aircraft that arrived on Sunday and its ability to cater stranded aircraft or deplane passengers using mobile or integrated aircraft stairs.

• As noted above, NWA’s decision to park aircraft and baggage carts in alleys on Saturday night prevented the airline from using gates in those areas on Sunday after that equipment had become snowed in.

• NWA and WCDA do not agree on where the aircraft that experienced lengthy Sunday tarmac delays were parked. NWA stated that most of their aircraft were parked on the relatively remote Papa, Tango, and Whiskey taxiways. (See Appendix C.) According to NWA, access to aircraft at these locations for remote deplaning or catering was virtually impossible because the taxiways are relatively narrow to begin with and snow banks further impeded access. WCDA stated that NWA aircraft were parked on the relatively wide Uniform taxiway and on Zulu taxiway, which provides access to hangers and various DTW ground service support facilities. (See Appendix C.) WCDA stated that these areas were plowed. NWA, on the other hand, stated that it was actually denied use of Zulu for all but two of its occupied aircraft because Zulu had not been completely plowed and because the presence on Zulu of two Air Canada diversions from Toronto prevented use of that taxiway as a parking area for empty aircraft. WCDA stated that it was unaware of any request for aircraft parking space that was denied.

• The review team cannot resolve the differences between NWA’s and WCDA’s recollections of where aircraft were parked on the Sunday after the storm and on other aircraft positioning issues. However, NWA’s and WCDA’s persistent differences over this issue are symptomatic of the communications problem between these two organizations during the snowstorm and its aftermath. Had a coordinated plan existed prior to the storm that identified areas available for the "overflow" parking of empty aircraft, and had WCDA clearly understood NWA’s aircraft positioning needs on Sunday, then sufficient gates could have been made available to accommodate much of Sunday’s incoming aircraft. In addition, NWA might have been able to initiate remote deplaning and catering operations as needed, although the other factors discussed below would have influenced that decision.

Sunday Ground and Flight Crew Staffing Levels

• Although it had stopped snowing at approximately 6:00 a.m. Sunday, partially plowed and unplowed streets and highways, bitter cold temperatures, high winds, and drifting snow made travel to the airport difficult. Heavy traffic and partially unplowed roads and parking lots hampered entry to the airport itself.

• NWA’s overall Sunday staffing at DTW was less than 50% in the morning, increasing to about 66% through the afternoon. NWA’s Maintenance Department, the group assigned NWA’s snow removal responsibilities, was almost fully staffed on Sunday due to the fact that the midnight maintenance shift was held over Sunday morning and that many maintenance employees drive four-wheel drive vehicles and thus did not have as difficult a time driving to work on Sunday. NWA management in Detroit indicated that it had sufficient ground personnel to handle the number of departures or movements of empty aircraft from gates that would have been necessary to allow the timely deplaning of passengers on arriving aircraft.

• WCDA had 98% staffing on Sunday. As noted above, all but one of the snow plow drivers, who are contract employees, reported to work. Many WCDA employees reported to work even though it was their day off. Lack of staff did not hinder WCDA’s Sunday operations. WCDA booked hotel space for employees so they would not need to make difficult trips to and from the airport.

• Most other airlines serving DTW had close to 100% staffing once they restarted their operations on Sunday. Although one airline experienced departure delays of up to two hours, lack of staff generally did not hinder most airlines’ Sunday operations. Most of these airlines booked hotel space for employees so they would not need to make difficult trips to and from the airport, but none of these airlines indicated that the availability of these hotel rooms was critical to maintaining adequate staffing levels that weekend.

• Approximately 70% of the NWA flight crew members who are based in Detroit do not live there and therefore must commute to Detroit from other cities, usually on NWA flights. Some of these crews were unable to get to Detroit as planned on Saturday. Others were stranded on Sunday arrivals that sat for hours on taxiways waiting for gates to clear. In one case, a flight carrying a number of flight crews from Minneapolis was assigned a gate only after a member of one of those crews used his cell phone to call a dispatcher in Minneapolis and advise him of the situation. Because of poor road conditions, many hotels in the area were not running their airport shuttles, thus stranding crews staying at those hotels. Crews that were able to make it to the airport were not necessarily qualified on the types of aircraft that were scheduled to depart.

• NWA’s various automated crew communication and scheduling systems were overloaded and in many cases rendered ineffective. Crew Schedulers and Crew Coordinators were so overwhelmed by the flight crew call volume that they were unable to pass crew availability information on to Operations Planners. Many crew members could not get through to Coordinators and Schedulers to report their status, and they eventually stopped trying. Operations Planners were unable to work with Crew Coordinators because they were taking calls directly from crews. Scheduling and coordination problems created by these circumstances exacerbated crew shortages.

• As noted above, although the SOC Director anticipated a shortage of flight crews due to flight cancellations on Saturday, he did not anticipate that the storm’s aftermath would prevent crews already in the Detroit area, in hotels or on incoming aircraft, from getting to the airport terminal. NWA management at DTW also did not anticipate this additional shortage. One NWA manager interviewed considered the flight crew shortage the airline’s "biggest downfall" on Sunday, a "piece that we missed." Without sufficient crews, NWA stated that it could not launch enough aircraft from DTW to free sufficient gates to deplane passengers on incoming flights in a timely manner, and that it could not taxi or tow unloaded aircraft away from the gates because of inadequate space to park the aircraft.

NWA’s Treatment of Passengers Stranded on Its Aircraft

• The efforts of NWA’s employees. Even some of the angriest complaint letters received by DOT from passengers who experienced hours-long ground delays complimented the fine performance of the flight crews on those aircraft. While flight crews could not reduce ground delay time, they prevented a very bad situation from getting worse. Additionally, NWA management at DTW stressed to the review team that the NWA employees who worked at DTW during the snowstorm and its aftermath worked extremely hard to make a very difficult situation as bearable as possible for passengers on aircraft and in the terminal. They noted that they had received many positive comments and letters from passengers about NWA’s performance that weekend.

It should be noted, however, that many passengers interviewed by DOT stated that when they finally deplaned and sought out their baggage on Sunday night, there were few, if any, NWA personnel to be found in a terminal environment that was characterized as "a zoo," lacking any organization whatsoever. Some passengers who were assisted by NWA personnel thought they were doing the best they could under the circumstances, while others stated that NWA personnel were "clueless" and "couldn’t have cared less." The latter type of observation was also made by passengers who were returned to the terminal on Saturday night.

• NWA’s customer service orientation. Many NWA managers interviewed by the review team unequivocally agreed that ground delays of the length experienced on the first weekend of January are unacceptable from a customer service standpoint. In addition, as noted above, many NWA employees received high praise from their customers and management for their exceptional efforts in assisting travelers during and after the snowstorm. It should also be noted, however, that some NWA executives interviewed minimized the impact of the long ground delays. One NWA executive suggested that experiencing these delays, which resulted in passengers spending up to 8½ hours in a confined space at times without food, lavatories, and, in some cases, water, was no worse than being diverted to another airport and being forced to sleep in a terminal. Another observed that many NWA customers pay considerable sums to sit in their aircraft for as many as 13 hours on non-stop flights from the United States to Asia, implying that passengers’ experiences at DTW were somehow comparable. Some also stated that the remedial measures that NWA has implemented or is contemplating are to correct "errors on the margin" and would not necessarily prevent a recurrence of lengthy passenger strandings.

• Use of other airlines’ gates. One airline, Continental, provided an unused gate for NWA’s use at NWA’s request. NWA deplaned passengers from three flights at this gate. Other airlines indicated that NWA either did not ask them for use of their gates or that when NWA did ask, their gates were not available because they were occupied or about to be occupied by their own aircraft. All of the airlines that NWA did not ask for gates stated that they would have made unused gates available had NWA asked. Only one airline, US Airways, declined to offer an available gate when asked for fear that NWA would not be able to move its aircraft from the gate once passengers had deplaned. The other airlines were not aware of NWA’s stranded passenger situation until NWA contacted them about the use of their gates.

NWA conceded that it did not clearly communicate the urgency of its gate requests and the temporary nature of its use of the gates. NWA stressed, however, that cost of gate rental was not a consideration in requesting other airlines’ gates, given the minimal cost for such rental (approximately $150 per use).

NWA clearly could have done more to secure use of other airlines’ gates. As with other aspects of their response to the snowstorm, NWA’s efforts in this regard lacked foresight and coordination. While the use of other airlines’ gates might not have eliminated Sunday’s tarmac delays, it certainly would have mitigated them.

• Stair deplaning. NWA considered and rejected twice using the integrated stairs on some of its aircraft to deplane passengers away from the gates into waiting car rental company buses that had been requisitioned by WCDA per WCDA’s contract with those companies. It was NWA's ultimate judgment, including that of a veteran NWA de-icing manager, that it was too cold, windy, and icy on Sunday to safely deplane passengers in this manner.

Representatives from every other airline interviewed stated that they would have found a way to safely accomplish remote deplaning to avoid stranding passengers on their aircraft for up to 8½ hours. Moreover, NWA’s own irregular operations plan for its Minneapolis hub includes stair deplaning procedures. And at DTW that Sunday, Spirit Airlines did in fact safely deplane passengers using the integrated stairs on one of its DC-9 aircraft, which are similar to the DC-9s flown by NWA. That deplaning occurred in Spirit’s hangar, with passengers being taken into waiting rental car company buses and then to the terminal. Spirit indicated that while its hangar offered its passengers some protection from the elements, the passengers were still exposed to the cold. Stranded NWA passengers who were later interviewed almost unanimously indicated that they would have preferred deplaning by remote stairs, and many urged NWA to formulate a plan to do so should similar circumstances arise in the future.

While NWA’s hangars were not available for deplaning because they were filled with aircraft, NWA did not consider all of its stair deplaning options. NWA could have worked with WCDA to identify and, if necessary, plow and de-ice a relatively protected area of the airport to deplane passengers, such as an area near a gate or other structure. With respect to its aircraft lacking integrated stairs, NWA understandably rejected the use of relatively unstable maintenance stairs, the only type of mobile stairs they owned, but apparently did not consider borrowing the appropriate mobile passenger stairs from another airline. It is possible that even if NWA had considered these options, it still would have rejected stair deplaning. However, these options should have been considered, at least as a last resort for deplaning passengers that had been subject to the longest ground delays.

 

• Remote catering and lavatory servicing. Remote catering of aircraft on Sunday ran the risk of damaging aircraft given that the drivers for catering contractors are not necessarily trained to service aircraft parked on potentially icy areas of the airport. However, as was the case with remote deplaning, NWA could have worked with WCDA to plow and de-ice areas near the aircraft to allow safe remote catering. (If an area were safe enough to perform catering, however, then stair deplaning would likely also have been possible and might have been the preferred option.) NWA was able to service lavatories on three aircraft in an area near US Airways’ gates. It had to cease this operation when US Airways indicated that it was blocking access of its aircraft to its gates. NWA’s ability to perform limited remote lavatory servicing suggests that with proper planning, a greater number of such operations could have been performed if necessary.

• Baggage problems. An examination of the problems NWA had in delivering checked baggage to its passengers who arrived at DTW on Sunday was beyond the scope of this report. It should be noted, however, that almost every passenger interviewed had major complaints about NWA’s handling of their baggage. Most of these passengers did not see their baggage for days, and some did not for weeks. Most found it difficult or impossible to obtain information about their baggage from NWA, and many who did receive information found that it was incorrect.

Report on the January 1999 Detroit Snowstorm
Part I ~ Part II ~ Part III ~ Appendices ~ Table of Contents