Crown Bolt, Inc. and Wholesale Delivery Drivers, Salespersons, Industrial and Allied Workers, Local 848, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO. Cases 21–CA–33846, 21–CA–33850, 21–CA–33915, and 21–RC–20192
November 29, 2004
DECISION,
ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION
By Chairman Battista and Members Liebman, Schaumber,
Walsh, and Meisburg
On December 29, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Lana H. Parke issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions as modified below and to adopt the recommended Order.2
A unit of employees at one of the Respondent’s facilities voted against union representation by a 34-vote margin. During the critical period prior to the election, Respondent’s production manager told employee Gilbert Astorga that at the end of the year when the lease was up Respondent’s owner would move the facility if employees voted for union representation. We agree with the judge’s finding that this remark constituted a threat and violated Section 8(a)(1). Astorga related the threat to two others, but the record fails to reveal whether those two told anyone else. Applying Springs Industries, 332 NLRB 40 (2000), the judge presumed that the threat had been widely disseminated and recommended that the election be set aside. For the reasons explained below, we will overrule Springs Industries, but prospectively only. Accordingly, we will set the election aside and direct a second election.
Background
The Respondent manufactures hardware fixtures at its
In her decision, the judge dismissed every unfair labor practice allegation except one: Garcia’s alleged plant-closure threat.5 In finding that this threat was made, she credited Astorga’s testimony that about a month before the election, Garcia, a production manager, told Astorga that the lease was up at the end of the year, and that if the employees voted union the Respondent’s owner would close the plant and go somewhere else. The judge also found that Astorga related Garcia’s threat to two individuals: employee Leonard Arias, who was no longer employed by the Respondent at the time of the hearing, and Union Organizer Manny Valenzuela. There is no record evidence that Arias or Valenzuela told anyone else about the threat; there is also no evidence that they did not. Based on this record, and applying Springs Industries, the judge found that the Respondent had failed to rebut the presumption that Garcia’s threat had been disseminated among employees sufficiently widely to set the election aside. Accordingly, she recommended sustaining Objections 2 and 4, which correspond to the 8(a)(1) plant-closure threat violation, and setting aside the election.
Discussion
The Respondent urges us to overrule Springs Industries and to reinstate the evidentiary requirement of Kokomo Tube Co., 280 NLRB 357 (1986), where the Board found a threat of plant closure made to a single employee insufficient to overturn an election in the absence of evidence of dissemination. In other words, consistent with the Board’s fundamental allocation of evidentiary burdens in representation cases, Kokomo Tube imposed on the objecting union the burden of proving dissemination of a threat. Springs Industries relieved the objecting union of this burden by expressly overruling Kokomo Tube and holding that a plant-closure threat is presumed disseminated among employees sufficiently widely to set aside an election absent evidence to the contrary. In sum, Springs Industries shifted the burden from the objecting party, requiring the employer to prove that the threat was not disseminated or not disseminated sufficiently to have impacted the election results.
According to Springs Industries, presuming dissemination
“of at least the most serious threats, such as threats of plant closure,”
represents the Board’s “traditional practice.”
In support of this proposition, the Board cited General Stencils,
Inc., 195 NLRB 1109 (1972), enf. denied 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972). In General Stencils, the employer’s
general manager threatened an employee with plant closure. Based in significant part on this threat, a
Board majority granted a remedial bargaining order. In doing so, the Board presumed dissemination
of the threat, stating that “[a] threat of such serious consequences for all
employees for selecting the Union will, all but inevitably, be discussed among
employees,” and that “while there may exist a situation in which a serious
threat may, in fact, remain isolated, the burden of proving such an unlikely
event rests with the Employer.”
We agree with the Springs Industries majority that a threat of plant closure is a grave matter. We also acknowledge that Kokomo Tube created uncertainty by declining to presume dissemination of a plant-closure threat without expressly overruling General Stencils or Coach & Equipment Sales and without the kind of analysis provided by former Chairman Miller in his dissent in General Stencils, supra, and former Member Hurtgen in his dissent in Springs Industries, supra. Nevertheless, for the reasons more fully set forth below, we agree with the Respondent, former Chairman Miller and Member Hurtgen that Kokomo Tube represents the better evidentiary rule in requiring the party that seeks to rely on dissemination throughout the plant to show it. We return to that rule by our decision today.6
First, the Springs Industries presumption is contrary to the general rule that the burden of proof should rest on the party who “seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.” John William Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 337 (4th ed. 1992). This basic rule has been emphasized in representation cases. Because “[t]here is a strong presumption that ballots cast under specific NLRB procedural safeguards reflect the true desires of the employees,” NLRB v. Hood Furniture Mfg. Co., 941 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1991), “the burden of proof on parties seeking to have a Board-supervised election set aside is a ‘heavy one,’” Kux Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Harlan #4 Coal Co. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1974)). By shifting the burden of proof from the objecting party to the party seeking to uphold the results of a Board-supervised election, Springs Industries runs counter to the burden-allocation norm.
Second, the rationale for the Springs Industries presumption invites a broader undermining of the burden-allocation principle the Board follows. The majority in Springs Industries appealed to the Board’s “traditional practice,” as exemplified by General Stencils. However, the Board majority in General Stencils relied on decisions that extend the dissemination presumption beyond plant-closure threats, and even beyond threats altogether: Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 172 NLRB 1122 (1968) (presuming dissemination of threats of plant closure and loss of benefits); Garland Corp., 162 NLRB 1570 (1967) (presuming dissemination of interrogations and threats of loss of benefits), enf. denied 396 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1968); W.T. Grant Co., 168 NLRB 93 (1967) (presuming dissemination of a variety of coercive statements, none of which were threats); Darby Cadillac, 169 NLRB 315 (1968) (presuming dissemination of promises of benefits). The Springs Industries majority also relied on a belief that it is “virtually inevitable” that plant-closure threats will be a topic of conversation among employees. We discuss the merits of that belief below. The point here is that it is not at all clear what would constrain the Board from deciding that other kinds of coercive statements are also likely to “make the rounds,” justifying presuming their dissemination as well sufficient to set the election aside. Further, if the dissemination presumption were allowed to stand, there is no apparent basis for declining to extend it to other kinds of coercive statements, undermining the general rule that places a heavy burden of proof on the party seeking to set aside the results of a Board-supervised election.7
Third, the presumption is unnecessary. Presumptions of fact are often created “to
assist in certain circumstances where direct proof of a matter is for one
reason or another rendered difficult.” Panduit
Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg.
Fourth, as easy as it is for a party asserting the coercive effects of an employer’s threat to prove its dissemination throughout the plant, it is correspondingly difficult for an employer to rebut the Springs Industries dissemination presumption. To do so, the employer must establish “through record evidence either that the employees threatened did not tell other employees about the threat, or that those employees whom they told did not in turn tell any other employees about the threat.” Springs Industries, supra at 40 fn. 4.8 Thus, to find out whether it has a nondissemination defense, and to prepare that defense in advance of the hearing, the employer needs to know the identity of the employees allegedly threatened. However, in many instances the employer will not have that information in advance of the hearing; and even if the employer does know that much, it could not compel its employees to name those told of the threat, and it is unlikely that employees will volunteer such information.9
These obstacles, present in any R case, are exacerbated in
a consolidated C and R case, where Board procedures make it even more difficult
for the employer to obtain the information it needs to prepare a nondissemination
defense. In communicating with charged
parties, Board agents are specifically instructed to “avoid providing details
that would likely disclose the identity” of witnesses. NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part One) Investigation
§ 10054.4. Moreover, the employer has no
advance access to witness statements because such statements remain
confidential until after the witness has testified at the hearing.
Finally, the Supreme Court has
cautioned the Board that our presumptions of fact “must rest on a sound factual
connection between the proved and inferred facts.” NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442
The issue we address here concerns the kind of proof that the Board should require from an objecting party before invalidating a vote cast by employees in a Board-conducted representation election. Our dissenting colleagues do not dispute that the objecting party generally bears the burden of proof in this respect. By acknowledging that an employer can rebut the presumption of dissemination they would impose, they concede that, however commonsensical dissemination may seem to be, there are occasions when a threat of plant closure is not objectionable because there is no dissemination sufficient to set aside an election. They also do not contend that the objecting party lacks access to evidence of dissemination.10
Instead, the dissent claims that the Board should adhere to the Springs Industries presumption because it is a traditional evidentiary practice and it is a more practical one from the standpoint of administrative efficiency. As previously stated, we regard the overall allocation of burdens of proof in objections cases as the controlling, and more venerable, evidentiary practice. Furthermore, we question the view that requiring an employer to prove nondissemination achieves any administrative efficiency. In any event, where the serious matter of determining the validity of employee choice on a question concerning representation is involved, we find the dissent’s reasons insufficient to justify substituting a presumption for actual evidence of dissemination.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will overrule Springs Industries, General Stencils, Coach & Equipment Sales, and all other decisions in which the Board has presumed dissemination of plant-closure threats or other kinds of coercive statements, to the extent that those decisions so presume. Where proof of dissemination of coercive statements, including threats of plant closure, is required, the objecting party will have the burden of proving it and its impact on the election by direct and circumstantial evidence. Again, we adhere to the view that a threat of plant closure in retaliation for or to thwart protected activity is a very severe threat and highly coercive of employees’ rights. However, the severity of a threat is one factor, among several, to be considered in deciding whether to set aside an election. See Caron International, 246 NLRB 1120 (1979) (noting the factors the Board considers in resolving the question whether misconduct affected the results of an election; factors include the number of violations, their severity, the extent of dissemination, and the size of the unit). In our view, the increased severity of a threat should not shift away from the objecting party the burden to prove dissemination and the extent thereof. However, the evidence supporting the factors other than dissemination (the number of violations, severity of violations, and the size of the unit) may be such as to affect the extent of the dissemination evidence required before an election should be set aside.
It remains to decide whether to apply the rule we announce
today retroactively to all pending cases, including this one. “The Board’s usual practice is to apply all
new policies and standards to all pending cases in whatever stage.” Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific,
333 NLRB 717, 729 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, in representation cases, the Board
has recognized a presumption in favor of applying new rules retroactively. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc.,
330 NLRB 914 fn. 1 (2000);
Here, we find that retroactivity would have ill effects that outweigh other concerns. At this late date, remanding for proof of dissemination of Garcia’s threat would be an exercise in futility. Unlike documentary evidence, which persists through time, the evidence of threat dissemination resides in people’s memories—and memories fade, and people move on. Arias, one of the two individuals Astorga told about the threat, has long since left the Respondent’s employ. He may be difficult or even impossible to locate. In addition, more than 4 years have elapsed since the hearing in this matter. Even assuming that Arias could be located, neither he nor Union Agent Valenzuela could reasonably be expected to recall, with reliable specificity, whether they related the threat, and to whom. Similar obstacles to eliciting reliable proof of dissemination could be expected in other pending cases. Thus, fairness to the objecting union favors limiting our new rule to prospective application.
In light of these considerations, we will apply the rule we announce today prospectively only. In all pending cases involving plant-closure threats, we will continue to apply Springs Industries and rebuttably presume that the threat was widely disseminated. Applying that presumption here, we find that the Respondent failed to rebut the presumption: although Astorga related Garcia’s threat only to Arias and Valenzuela, the Respondent did not establish that those two individuals did not relate the threat to others. Thus, we adopt the judge’s recommendation that Objections 2 and 4 be sustained, and we affirm her conclusion that the election must be set aside.11
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended
Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Crown
Bolt, Inc.,
It is further ordered that the election in Case 21–RC–20192 is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Regional Director for Region 21 to conduct a second election at a time and place to be determined by her.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from publication.]
Members Liebman And Walsh, dissenting in part.
Since the 1950s, at least, the Board rightly has recognized that when an employer threatens to close a plant if the union wins a representation election, the threat very likely will make the rounds of the workplace.1 It is, after all, an extraordinarily powerful message, for it implies the end of every employee’s job. Today, the majority jettisons the Board’s established practice, overruling Springs Industries and reinstating an evidentiary requirement that, in fact, represented an unexplained departure from precedent. We cannot agree with a holding so at odds with long-recognized realities.2
The Board has said that dissemination of plant-closure threats is “all but inevitabl[e].” General Stencils, supra; Springs Industries, supra. It has characterized the supposition that such threats would not be discussed as “totally unrealistic,” Continental Investment Co., 236 NLRB 237 (1978), and “the ultimate in naiveté,” C & T Mfg. Co., 233 NLRB 1430 (1977). The accuracy of these statements cannot be seriously questioned.3 Accordingly, as the Board stated in Springs Industries, presuming dissemination of at least the most serious threats represents the Board’s “traditional practice.”4 Going against that traditional practice, the majority invokes Kokomo Tube.5 In fact, as the majority is compelled to admit, the Kokomo Tube Board failed even to acknowledge that it was departing from precedent, let alone to explain why it was doing so. In truth, the Board’s failure to presume threat dissemination in Kokomo Tube was simply an aberration.6
The majority reasons that the union should bear the burden of proving dissemination because the burden of proof on election objections generally rests on the objecting party. However, burdens of proof are often allocated based on “the judicial estimate of the probabilities of the situation,” with the burden being placed on “the party who contends that the more unusual event has occurred.” John William Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 337 (4th ed. 1992). “[Courts] ask: ‘what will be the probable state of facts in most cases?’ so that the burden of showing an idiosyncratic course of events can be placed on the party asserting the unusual.” Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham Jr., 21 Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5122, at 557 (1977). Thus, historically, the Board has rightly placed on the employer the burden to prove what would be a highly idiosyncratic fact—namely, that contrary to every likelihood, employees did not talk with each other about their employer’s plant-closure threat.
We disagree with former Chairman Miller’s dissenting view in General Stencils, supra at 1114, that “[n]ondissemination is virtually impossible to prove except by the denial of most or all of the employees in the affected group.” That seriously overstates the employer’s burden under the Board’s traditional rule. As our colleagues acknowledge, the employer’s task is simply to establish “either that the employees threatened did not tell other employees about the threat, or that those employees whom they told did not in turn tell any other employees about the threat.” Springs Industries, supra at 40 fn. 4. If an employer finds itself having to put most or all unit employees on the stand, then obviously it does not have a nondissemination defense. The majority also says that the burden of proving dissemination is an easy matter. This ignores the reality that employees are often reluctant, even afraid, to testify against their employer, complicating the burden on the objecting party.7 Furthermore, since nondissemination is rare, the more practical rule from the standpoint of administrative efficiency is to presume the common event of dissemination and to require proof only of the rare one.8
The majority acknowledges that “a
clear and unequivocal threat of plant closure is more likely than not to be
disseminated,” but contends that a variety of circumstances sufficiently
diminish that likelihood to make proof of dissemination the better rule. We disagree with our colleagues’ assessment
of the impact of these circumstantial variations. A threat of plant closure is so explosive,
implying such serious and wide-ranging consequences for the lives of employees
and their families, that it will almost certainly be talked about no matter
where the threatener stands in the corporate hierarchy or how casually he or
she drops it into the conversation. Regardless
of the varying circumstances our colleagues cite, dissemination of a
plant-closure threat is “so probable that it is sensible
and timesaving to assume the truth” of that fact “until the [employer]
disproves it.” NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494
Our colleagues are troubled by the prospect that other coercive employer statements besides plant-closure threats might be presumed disseminated under the rationale of Springs Industries. The Board has already demonstrated, however, that it has no intention of applying Springs Industries without regard to the nature of the particular employer statement. See Bon Appetit Management Co., 334 NLRB 1042, 1044 fn. 12 (2001) (declining to presume dissemination of threat to one employee to reduce her wages). On the other hand, we see no reason to impose any a priori limitations on the application of the Springs Industries presumption in other contexts. Any threat or promise sufficiently coercive as to make it a likely topic of workplace conversation should be presumed disseminated, absent proof to the contrary by the party asserting the improbable fact of nondissemination. While plant-closure threats obviously fall into this category, there is no reason to assume that only such statements possess the requisite degree of coerciveness; and the Board has not so assumed. To the contrary, it has in other cases presumed dissemination of coercive employer statements in cases that did not include threats of plant closure.9
Finally, the Respondent contends that it is unfair to require employers to prove nondissemination because the necessary evidence is too difficult to obtain. Before abandoning the Board’s traditional presumption on this issue, however, our colleagues should ask whether the problem they purport to solve really exists. Neither the Respondent nor the majority cites a single case in which an employer has criticized the dissemination presumption as unfair or inappropriate. In truth, our colleagues exaggerate the employer’s evidentiary difficulties. The complaint typically will, and the objections may, disclose the identity of the employer’s agent responsible for the threat. In any event, the Act places no constraints on an employer’s interrogation of its supervisors to find out who said what, and to whom. Thus informed, in order to prepare a nondissemination defense, the employer may lawfully question its employees, subject to certain limitations and safeguards.10 To the extent employees decline to be interviewed, the employer may subpoena their attendance at the hearing; and if additional employees are identified at the hearing as having heard the threat, the employer could ask the judge for a continuance and subpoena those individuals as well. As a matter of due process, the employer would be entitled to a full opportunity to establish the facts necessary to its defense. The Respondent does not contend that it pursued the foregoing measures and found them unavailing. Instead, it advances a bare assertion of unfairness, unsupported by any evidence. Thus, we reject the Respondent’s assertion that the rule of Springs Industries is somehow unfair to this Respondent or to employers generally. For the reasons explained above, we would adhere to that rule.
Notice To Employees
Posted by Order
of the
National Labor Relations
Board
An Agency of the
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.
federal law gives you the right to
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
We will not threaten our employees that we may close our facility if they select Wholesale Delivery Drivers, Salespersons, Industrial and Allied Workers, Local 848, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, as their collective-bargaining representative.
We will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights set forth above.
Crown Bolt, Inc.
Ann Weinman, Atty., for the General Counsel.
Jamie L. Johnson, Atty. (Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), of
Manny Valenzuela, Wholesale Delivery Drivers, Salespersons, Industrial and Allied Workers, Local 848 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, of El Monte, California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Lana H. Parke, Administrative Law Judge. This consolidated case was tried in Los Angeles, California, on September 26 and 28, 2000,[1] pursuant to a report on objections in Case 21–RC–20192, order directing hearing, order consolidating cases and notice of hearing and order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and notice of hearing, issued by the Regional Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (Region 21) on July 10 and July 27, respectively. The consolidated complaint is based on charges in Cases 21–CA–33846, 21–CA–33850, and 21–CA–33915, filed by Wholesale Delivery Drivers, Salespersons, Industrial and Allied Workers, Local 848, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the Union) against Crown Bolt, Inc. (Respondent).
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
by denying employee Manuel Leon (Leon) a regularly scheduled wage increase,
imposing more onerous work conditions on employees Jose Martinez (Martinez)
and Leon by prohibiting them from
speaking with their coworkers, imposing more onerous work conditions on employees
Gilbert Astorga (Astorga) and Martinez by prohibiting their continued use of
Respondent’s computers and prohibiting contact between them. The consolidated complaint further alleges
that the Respondent undertook these actions because employees Leon,
The consolidated complaint also contains allegations that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by granting an employee a wage increase so as to dissuade support for the Union, threatening an employee with facility closure if the Union was selected as the employees’ representative, and offering an employee a management position so as to dissuade support for the Union, and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Respondent filed its answer on July 10. Respondent denies that any of its actions or its supervisors’ statements to employees was unlawful under the Act.
On April 20, the
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
Findings of Fact
i. jurisdiction
Respondent, a corporation, engages in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of hardware fixtures at its facility in
ii. labor organization
At all relevant times the
iii. alleged unfair labor practices
A. Background
Respondent installed a new computer system for its operations in 1999 with the object of becoming Y2K compliant. Implementation commenced in November 1999. The accounting/finance department was the first to receive the new computer process. The system for the manufacturing and distribution department wasn’t addressed until after the first of the year. Some computers, notably those in the production area were designed for multiple use. Respondent experienced significant and widespread malfunctioning of its computer system. J. D. Edwards, the software firm contracted to set up the system, conducted reviews and tests of the system. The consultants reported to Mark Pelley (Pelley), executive vice president of Respondent, that individuals without computer identification and/or passwords were operating the computers, and there was no way to trace errors or system breakdowns. The consultants recommended tightening security to ensure that only authorized employees use the system. Respondent therefore notified all employees without assigned passwords that they could not use the computers.[3]
B. The Union Campaign
Manny Valenzuela (Valenzuela), head organizer of the
Respondent campaigned against the
C. Alleged Violations of the Act
The General Counsel’s unfair labor practice allegations fall into two broad categories: (1) violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by denial of a wage increase to employee Leon; imposition of more onerous work conditions on employees Martinez and Leon by prohibiting talking to coworkers; imposition of more onerous work conditions on employees Astorga and Martinez by prohibiting computer use and contact between them. (2) violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by grant of a wage increase; threat of company closure; offer of promotion.
1. Events respecting Manuel Leon
Consolidated complaint paragraph 6 (a) alleges that Respondent denied employee Leon his regularly scheduled wage increase in violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1)
Employees’ work performances are reviewed yearly by their
supervisors. The supervisor gives each
employee a numerical rating on a review form, which is turned in to
On April 6,[9]
The credible evidence regarding denial of a wage increase
to
1. Events
respecting imposition of more onerous
work conditions
(a) Consolidated complaint paragraph 6 (b)
alleges that Respondent imposed more onerous work conditions on employees Jose
Martinez (
Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
During his employment with Respondent, and prior to the
union campaign,
Leon said he was sure people would be disciplined if they
were just standing and talking, but would not be if they were working while
talking as long as the work got done, and as long as employees did not turn
from their work or use conversational gestures.
He stated that he was doing a little more talking than he had in the
past, but everyone at work was talking, and he did not see management speaking
about it to anyone but him. He said that
in the past employees had been told not to talk too much and to get back to
work.
Seventy-five to 80 percent of employees in the receiving
area where
Garcia testified regarding this allegation as follows:
In March, at about 5 a.m., he saw
I credit
While a prohibition of talking about union-related matters
on company time is overly broad as it could reasonably be construed as
including nonworking time spent at an employer’s premises[14]
in the circumstances of this case, the statement to
The direction to
(b) Consolidated complaint paragraph 6 (c) alleges that Respondent imposed more onerous work conditions on employees Astorga and Martinez by prohibiting their continued use of computers and prohibiting contact between them
Astorga testified regarding this allegation. He has been
an employee of Respondent for 2-1/2 years and a receiving associate for 2 of
those years. He was aware that sometime
before Christmas 1999, Respondent installed a new computer system. In early 2000, he participated in the union
campaign by handbilling, talking to employees, and passing out T-shirts and buttons. About a month prior to the election, Taccolini
came to where Astorga was looking up product numbers on the computer in the
receiving area with Jose Martinez. Taccolini
said that things were getting pretty hectic outside. When Astorga and
When
Taccolini then spoke to
Taccolini testified that because of significant problems
with the installation of Respondent’s new computer system, he told
I credit the testimony of Astorga and
Although I have accepted that Taccolini, in this instance,
couched his restriction on computer use as a restraint on “Union” employees, I
conclude Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by restricting
employees’ computer use, including that of Astorga and
3. Events respecting the grant of a wage increase to an employee consolidated complaint paragraph 7 alleges that Respondent granted an employee a wage increase to dissuade his union support
Montoya, an open union supporter who had been employed for
more than 5 years with Respondent, testified that wage increases were dependent
on performance reviews that were given employees on a yearly basis. In about the first part of February,
Although
4. Events regarding threat of plant closure
Consolidated complaint paragraph 8 alleges that
Respondent threatened an employee with plant closure if employees selected the
Regarding this allegation, Astorga testified that about a
month before the election, Garcia spoke to Astorga as he worked in the
warehouse. Garcia told Astorga that
Respondent’s owner would close if the employees voted union, that the lease was
up at the end of the year, and the owner would close and move. Garcia said the
Garcia unequivocally denied making any such statement and pointed out that he worked a different shift than Astorga and was, therefore, not present at the Company when Astorga was working.
I accept Astorga’s testimony. As set forth above, I found him to be careful in his testimony. He is still employed by Respondent and is apparently considered an able and trustworthy employee as, following the election, he was given a computer password and access. As a current employee, testimony adverse to his employer is given against self-interest, a factor not to be regarded lightly. Moreover, he evinced no animosity toward either the company or Garcia, and his manner and demeanor were convincing. I do not find Garcia’s working a different shift to create an impossibility of his having had any communication with Astorga. Although an explanation has not been proffered by General Counsel as to how it transpired that such a conversation occurred between two individuals who worked different shifts, no evidence was submitted to establish that neither Garcia nor Astorga was ever present at the company except during his own shift. Further, no evidence was presented to controvert the statement attributed by Astorga to Garcia that the facility lease was up at the end of the year, a piece of information presumably within the particular purview of management. Under all the circumstances, after a careful examination of the testimony, and upon consideration of the manner and demeanor of the witnesses, I find Astorga’s testimony to be credible.
The Board and the courts view the threat of plant closure
as particularly coercive as it goes to the heart of the employment relationship
and employee job security. NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395
As stated in Spring Industries, 332 NLRB 40, 40 (2000), the Board’s practice is to presume dissemination of threats as serious as those of plant closure, “absent evidence to the contrary.” Here, Astorga testified that he told one employee and the union representative of the threat. Even though he told only two people,[20] under the reasoning of Springs Industries, id, “the threat of plant closure . . . necessarily carries with it serious consequences for all employees . . . [and] . . . will, all but inevitably, be discussed among employees.” The presumption applies unless rebutted.[21] The burden of proving that the threat of plant closure remained undisseminated and thus isolated rests with the employer. Springs Industries, supra at fn. 6. Respondent has not met that burden. Therefore, I conclude that, by Garcia’s statement that Respondent would close if the employees voted for the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. Events regarding an offer of benefit
Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that Respondent
offered an employee a management position so as to dissuade
union support
Taccolini testified that 4 or 5 years ago, he observed
As to the instant allegation, Taccolini testified that he
engaged in a “little conversation” with
Taccolini said, “Manuel, we have women, men, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, in our management, lead positions. Manuel, you are going to take that discrimination thing to your grave with you. It will never fly around here. Look at all of our management.”
Taccolini also testified that he referred to a past
conversation with
I credit the account of Taccolini over that of
iv. objections to conduct affecting results of
election
The
Prior to the hearing, the Union withdrew Objections 1, 3,
5, 6, 8, 10, and 12, leaving extant Objections 2, 4, 9, 11, and 13. At the hearing, the
In its Objection 2, the Union alleged that Respondent
threatened plant closure in an effort to discourage support for the
In its Objection 4, the
In its Objection 9, the
In its Objection 11, the
In its Objection 13, the
An employer’s preelection communications to employees must
not contain any threat of reprisal. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
I recommend that Case 21–RC–20192 be remanded to the Regional Director for appropriate action.
Conclusions of Law
1. By threatening employees with plant closure if employees selected the above-named labor organization as their collective-bargaining agent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Crown Bolt, Inc. has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The General Counsel has failed to prove its allegations in paragraphs 6(a), (b), (c), and (d), 7, 9, and 10 of the Act.
3. The
4. The
5. The unfair labor practices and campaign misconduct of Respondent described above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended[24]
ORDER
The Respondent, Crown Bolt, Inc.,
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening its employees that it may close its facility
if the employees select the
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
(c) It is further ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall substitute a new notice in accordance with our decision in Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
3 All dates are 2000 unless otherwise indicated.
4 A few days before the
hearing, the
5 The judge also recommended overruling Objections 9, 11, and 13. Absent exceptions, we adopt pro forma the judge’s recommendation.
6 The dissent’s introduction suggests that our action today overrules an unbroken line of precedent dating from the 1950s. Obviously, that is not so. The requirement in Kokomo Tube that an objecting party bear the burden of proving dissemination of a threat was no mere single case aberration. In fact, Kokomo Tube was the law from 1986 until overruled by Springs Industries in 2000, and it was consistent with the overall allocation of evidentiary burdens that has been in effect since the Board began conducting representation elections.
7 Our dissenting colleagues do just that. They would not only affirm Springs Industries, but extend it. They say that “any threat or promise sufficiently coercive as to make it a likely topic of workplace conversation should be presumed disseminated.” We say it is far better to have evidence of dissemination before invalidating a Board election.
8 We do not necessarily agree with former Chairman Miller’s observation in General Stencils, supra at 1114, that the employer must secure “the denial of most or all of the employees in the affected group.” We believe that the burden is as we have stated it above, and that this burden is substantial.
9 Unlike our colleagues, we do not find that an employer’s ability to interview supervisors and sift through the plant for cooperative employees and to compel testimony of other less cooperative employees justifies shifting the traditional burden of proof. Our colleagues also say that the employer can lawfully interrogate supervisors and employees as to dissemination. We agree as to the former, but under extant Board law the lawfulness of interrogating employees will depend on the circumstances.
10 The dissent reasons that the objecting party would encounter difficulty in securing the testimony of employee witnesses against their employer. This argument proves too much or too little. On the one hand, employees would seemingly be as reluctant, if not more so, to testify about the threat itself than about its dissemination. Surely, the dissent is not suggesting that we rely on this reluctance to shift the burden of proof entirely to the employer to refute a bare allegation of an objectionable threat. On the other hand, absent any evidence of employer intimidation of witnesses or interference in the hearing process, there is no basis for finding that employees are so fearful of reprisal that they will not tell the truth about what they said or heard.
11 In setting aside the election, the judge, applying Board precedent, found that it is not virtually impossible to conclude that Garcia’s threat affected the results of the election. In the absence of exceptions, we do not pass on the judge’s finding or the precedent upon which it was based.
1 See, e.g., Springs Industries, 332 NLRB 40 (2000); Petaluma Hospital, 271 NLRB 412 fn. 1 (1984); Coach & Equipment Sales Corp., 228 NLRB 440 (1977); General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB 1109, 1110 (1972), enf. denied 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972); Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 172 NLRB 1122 (1968); Plum Creek Logging Co., 113 NLRB 800, 813 (1955).
2 We do
agree with our colleagues that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act
by threatening to close its
3 Indeed, the Board’s commonsense practice of rebuttably presuming that a threat of plant closure will be disseminated among employees is entirely consistent with another well-accepted analogous principle: that of the “lore of the shop.” The Board can assume that certain unfair labor practices, such as threats of plant closure, “live on in the lore of the shop and continue to repress employee sentiment long after most, or even all, original participants have departed. The Board is not compelled to infer that past practices have attenuated, especially practices striking directly at the heart of the security of the employees, such as threats to close the plant . . . . [T]he Board could find that regardless of turnover the taint of the practices would continue.” Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Aldworth Co., 338 NLRB 137, 152 (2002), enfd. 363 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Garvey Marine, Inc. v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2001); NLRB v. Q-1 Motor Express, Inc., 25 F.3d 473, 481–482 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1080 (1995); Piggly Wiggly v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1983). If the Board can reasonably assume that plant closing threats will be repeated to new employees for months or years after an election, it can, a fortiori, assume that they will be disseminated throughout the bargaining unit during the election campaign.
4 See, e.g., Mid-South Drywall Co., 339 NLRB 480, 481 (2003); Jonbil, Inc., 332 NLRB 652, 668 (2000); Springs Industries, 332 NLRB 40 (2000); Spring City Knitting Co., 285 NLRB 426, 448 (1987); Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc., 284 NLRB 258, 263 (1987); Times Wire & Cable Co., 280 NLRB 19, 38 (1986); Stop N’ Go Inc., 279 NLRB 344, 354 (1986); Petaluma Hospital, 271 NLRB 412 fn. 1 (1984); Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 265 NLRB 1527, 1529 (1982), enf. denied 739 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984); Gordonsville Industries, Inc., 252 NLRB 563, 603 (1980), enfd. mem. 673 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 250 NLRB 1341, 1343 (1980); Northern Telecom, Inc., 250 NLRB 564, 565 (1980); Ste-Mel Signs, Inc., 246 NLRB 1110 (1979); Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 243 NLRB 927, 928 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. 634 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1980); C & T Mfg. Co., 233 NLRB 1430 (1977); Petersburg Mfg. Co., 233 NLRB 1236, 1237 (1977); Coach & Equipment Sales Corp., 228 NLRB 440 (1977); Viele & Sons, Inc., 227 NLRB 1940, 1949 fn. 22 (1977); The Meat Cleaver, 200 NLRB 960, 965 (1972), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Asher, 492 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1974); General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB 1109, 1110 (1972), enf. denied 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972); Stoutco, Inc., 180 NLRB 178 (1969); Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 172 NLRB 1122 (1968); Plum Creek Logging Co., 113 NLRB 800, 813 (1955).
5 Kokomo Tube Co., 280 NLRB 357 (1986).
6 The majority disagrees with our characterization of Kokomo Tube, asserting that the objecting party’s burden of proving dissemination of a threat “was no mere single case aberration” because Kokomo Tube was the law from 1986 to 2000. In those 14 years, however, Kokomo Tube was never applied by the Board to require an objecting party to prove dissemination of a threat of plant closure. We stand by our characterization.
7 The majority says that our argument in this regard “proves too much” because “employees would seemingly be as reluctant, if not more so, to testify about the threat itself than about its dissemination.” To establish a violation, however, requires only one brave employee willing to testify to the threat itself. Under the majority’s new rule, by contrast, it could take many similarly brave employees to overturn the results of an election tainted by that threat. The majority also says our argument “proves too little” because, absent evidence of intimidation or other interference, employees will not be so fearful of reprisal that they will not tell the truth. Our concern, however, is more about getting them on the stand in the first place. The majority fails to appreciate the dilemma that its new rule imposes on the objecting union. If the union forgoes the dissemination testimony of reluctant employees, it risks losing the chance of a rerun election altogether. But if it compels their testimony, it may get another election—but then it likely will have incurred the hostility of employee witnesses who will vote in that election.
8 Without explanation, the majority questions whether the Springs Industries presumption achieves efficiencies. The majority also seeks to make a virtue of inefficiency by championing the “more venerable” principle that places the burden of proof on the objecting party. We also adhere to that principle, but it does not compel the Board to require proof of what is practically a foregone conclusion.
9 See, e.g.,
Vinyl-Fab Industries, 265 NLRB 1097, 1098 fn. 7 (1982) (threats of
layoff, discharge, and more onerous working conditions); Continental Investment
Co., 236 NLRB 237 (1978) (threat to discharge an entire work force); Warehouse
Market, Inc., 216 NLRB 216, 217 (1975) (threats of reprisal,
interrogations, promises of benefits).
10 See Johnnie’s Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 775 (1964), enf. denied 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
[1] All dates are in 2000 unless otherwise indicated.
[2] The admitted supervisors of Respondent and their titles are as follows:
Gerardo Ponce (
Renso Valdez (
Rudy Garcia (Garcia)—Manager
Ray Taccolini (Taccolini)—CEO
[3] The testimony of Pelley in this regard was uncontradicted. Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on the pleadings, the stipulations of counsel, and/or unchallenged credible evidence.
[4] Valenzuela could not recall the last names of these employees and the record does not reflect them.
[5]
The parties stipulated that Respondent engaged in a campaign against the
[6] The list of “Do’s” advised supervisors to answer questions with straightforward information, to state Respondent’s position on unionization, to listen to volunteered information, to tell employees that signing a union card is the first step to joining a union, to respond immediately to any potentially violent situation, and to inform the human resources manager of any union activities or rumors thereof. The list of “Do Not’s” directed supervisors not to spy on union activities, or create that impression, not to threaten reprisal, retaliation, or force, not to promise incentives, not to allege that current benefits would be taken away, not to discuss complaints or petitions with groups of employees, not to start or sign an antiunion petition, not to treat union sympathizers unequally, not to ask employees how they intended to vote, not to encourage employees to withdraw their authorization cards, or to prohibit wearing of union insignia.
[7]
The Charging Party stated at the hearing that the unfair labor practice
allegations and evidence adduced to support them constitute the basis of the
objections. The
[8]
[9]
[10] I
find
[11] Emery Worldwide, 309 NLRB 185 (1992).
[12]
Evidence regarding alleged imposition of more onerous work conditions is set
forth infra. It does not establish coercive conduct by
Respondent toward
[13] Perez was unavailable and did not testify.
[14] Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 300 NLRB 324 (1990).
[15]
[16] Astorga’s testimony of this conversation varied slightly as he recounted it in direct and cross-examinations, but no more than is expected in the retelling of a conversation. In essentials, his testimony was consistent.
[17]
Greg Holmes (Holmes), warehouse clerk;Frank Rena, supervisor in the receiving
department; or Ed Roy (
[18]
Under cross-examination,
[19]
There was no evidence presented to support the allegation of prohibiting
contact between employees Astorga and
[20] The fact that Valenzuela was one of the individuals Astorga told of the threat does not lessen the probability of dissemination. Indeed, as the union representative, Valenzuela is just as likely as an employee to discuss the threat with employees.
[21] The Board stated:
The presumption that a threat of plant closure by an employer to one or more employees will be widely disseminated among the employees is a rebuttable presumption. The employer may rebut the presumption by establishing through record evidence either that the employees threatened did not tell other employees about the threat, or that those employees whom he told did not in turn tell any other employees about the threat. [Spring Industries, supra at fn. 4.]
[22]
Taccolini testified that
[23] Through apparently inadvertent omission, there is no Objection 7.
[24] If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
[25] If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a