UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Southeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
SURFACE NONMETAL MINE
FATAL ELECTRICAL ACCIDENT
Mine I.D. No. 08-01058
White Rock Quarries
Vecellio & Grogan, Incorporated
Miami, Dade County, Florida
April 10, 1995
By
W. L. Wilkie
Supervisory Mine Inspector
And
Charles Pittman
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212
Birmingham, Alabama 35209
Martin Rosta, District Manager
GENERAL INFORMATION
James W. Knapp, foreman, age 32, was electrocuted at
approximately 12:05 p.m. on April 10, 1995, when the cable on a
boom truck contacted a 13,200 volt overhead power line. The
victim had been a foreman for about six years and had a total of
7-1/2 years mining experience, all with White Rock Quarries.
The MSHA Southeastern District office was notified of the
accident at approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 10, 1995, by a
telephone call from Stevens Hale, assistant superintendent for
White Rock Quarries. An investigation was started the following
day.
White Rock Quarries, a crushed limestone operation, owned
and operated by Vecellio & Grogan, Incorporated, was located on
186th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. The principal
operating official was James Hurley IV, vice president. The pit
normally operated two, 8-hour production shifts, and one, 8-hour
maintenance shift a day, 5 days a week. A total of 110 persons
was employed.
The limestone deposit was mined by drilling and blasting.
Material was excavated from under water by draglines and
stockpiled adjacent to the pit for drying. The material was then
loaded by front-end loaders into trucks and hauled to a primary
crusher where it was crushed, then sized, screened and
stockpiled. The finished product was used in the construction
industry.
The last regular inspection at this operation was conducted
October 19, 1994 and a regular inspection was conducted in
conjunction with this investigation. MSHA is prohibited by
budget restrictions from enforcing the training requirements of
30 CFR, Part 48, Subpart B at this crushed limestone operation.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
The area where the accident occurred was known as the parts
storage yard. About a month prior to the accident, Florida Power
and Light installed a 13,200 volt, three-phase power line to be
used at the mine to assemble a new dragline. The incoming power
was placed directly over the parts storage yard. It consisted of
three phase conductors and a static wire. The phase conductors
were spaced approximately 2-1/2 feet apart and ranged from 33
feet to 38 feet above ground level. The static wire was placed
approximately 28 feet above ground level.
The truck involved in the accident was a flatbed, 1991 Ford
diesel F-900 series with a Manitex, model No. 1461 boom mounted
on the truck bed. The boom was hydraulically-controlled and
could be extended from 14 feet to 61 feet. The boom, at the
pedestal, measured 12 feet above ground level and was capable of
operating to an almost vertical position. It was controlled from
a platform which was positioned behind the cab of the truck.
At the time of the accident, the truck was positioned parallel
to, and approximately 15 feet from the overhead power line. The
boom was extended about 34 feet and raised to an angle of
approximately 52 degrees which placed the end of the boom at the
same height as the lowest phase wire.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, James W. Knapp (victim) arrived at
the mine site at 6:00 a.m., his normal starting time, and carried
out his duties as a foreman. Shortly before the accident,
Knapp instructed James Jean, boom truck operator, to get the boom
truck and meet him at the parts storage yard. The two men
planned to pick up two crusher mantels and take them to the
crusher in preparation for changing the mantels. Jean drove the
truck to the parts storage yard and parked parallel to the 13,200
volt power line. Knapp arrived in the area and the two men began
to load the crusher mantels.
Jean extended the boom so he could reach under the power line
and Knapp hooked the chain sling which was attached to the boom
cable, to the first 1500 pound crusher mantel. Jean then swung
the boom away from under the power line, raised it and placed the
mantel onto the bed of the truck. This was done without
incident.
After Knapp unhooked the chain sling from the first mantel,
he signaled Jean to swing the boom around to pick up the
second mantel. While the boom was still in a raised position,
Jean began swinging it back toward the energized power line. At
this time, Knapp was walking back toward the next mantel to be
loaded, holding the chain sling in one hand and signaling with
the other. As Jean watched Knapp signal direction, the cable on
the boom contacted the power line. Jean saw Knapp fall to the
ground and at the same time saw sparking at the end of the boom.
He immediately pulled the control lever which moved the boom away
from the power line.
Jean called out to Knapp but received no response. He ran to
a nearby office trailer and called for help. First aid and CPR
were administered to the victim by on site employees. The Metro
Dade County Rescue Squad was called. They arrived in
approximately 15 minutes and continued CPR. Knapp was
transported by air life flight helicopter to Jackson Memorial
Hospital in Miami. He was pronounced dead by the attending
physician at 2:45 p.m. The cause of death was determined to be
electrocution.
CONCLUSION
The direct cause of the accident was the failure to deenergize
the high-voltage power line before attempting to operate the boom
truck near it.
VIOLATIONS
Citation No. 4525377 was issued on April 11, 1995, under
the provisions of Section 103(K):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine site on April 10,
1995, at about 12:05 p.m. when a Manitex boom truck,
Model No. 1461 contacted a 13,200 high voltage power
line. The serial number of the boom truck was
FD4L90A GNVA 0214. This order prohibits the use of the
boom truck and the movement. The area will be secured
until an authorized representative of the Secretary of
Labor reviews the accident and releases the boom truck.
This order was terminated on April 12, 1995. The boom of
the Manitex boom truck was removed from the disconnected
overhead power lines.
Citation No. 4088141 was issued on April 13, 1995, under the
provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation
of Standard 56.12071:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine at about 12:05
p.m. on April 10, 1995, when a Manitex boom truck, Model
No. 1461 came in contact with a 13,200 volt overhead
power line. The victim was holding onto the boom cable
preparing to hook up for a lift when the extended boom
was swung into the power line resulting in electrocution.
The foreman (victim) was aware of the vicinity of the
power lines and was also directing the operation by hand
signals.
This is an unwarrantable failure.
This citation was terminated on April 13, 1995. The
citation was issued to company officials, discussed and
terminated at the close-out conference.
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin: [FAB95M15]
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