Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973.
94th Congress 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT
COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973
Staff Report of the Select Committee To Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
UNITED STATES SENATE
December 18, 1975
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To
Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 63-372
Washington: 1975
Note: Since
the December 4, 1975 hearing the Select Committee has, in the course
of its continuing investigation received new information which supplements
the following sections of the Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile:
Section III.A.4, the Role of Multinational Corporations; Section IV.B.1.e,
Intelligence Estimates and Covert Action; and Section IV.C, Congressional
Oversight. All pertinent information on the above will be reflected
in the Select Committee's Final Report to the Senate.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FRANCK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP, A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER,Jr., Tennessee
- WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona - WALTER D.
HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATTHIAS,Jr., Maryland - ROBERT
MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania - GARY HART,
Colorado - HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee - BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
- CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland - RICHARD SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ,Jr., Chief Counsel
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority
AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee
Preface
The statements of facts contained in this report are
true to the best of the Committee staff's ability to determine them.
The report and any judgement expressed in it are tentative. Several
areas are merely touched on; investigation in these areas is continuing.
The purpose of the report is to lay out the basis facts of covert
action in Chile to enable the Committee to hold public hearings.
This report is based on an extensive review of documents
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and Defense,
and the National Security Council; and on testimony by officials and
former officials. With few exceptions, names of Chileans and of Chilean
institutions have been omitted in order to avoid revealing intelligence
sources and methods and to limit needless harm to individual Chileans
who cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The report does,
however, convey an accurate picture of the scope, purposes and magnitude
of United States covert action in Chile.
Table of Contents
I. Overview and Background
II. The
Range of Covert Action in Chile
III.
Major Covert Action Programs and Their Effects
IV. Chile: Authorization,
Assessment, and Oversight
V. Preliminary Conclusions
Appendix. Chronology: Chile 1962-1975
Covert Action in Chile: 1963-1973.
I. Overview and Background
A.
Overview: Cover Action in Chile
Covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade
between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence
Agency spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome
of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections. Eight million dollars
was spent, covertly, in the three years between 1970 and the military
coup in September 1973, with over three million dollars expended in
fiscal year 1972 alone.(1)
It is not easy to draw a neat box around what was "covert
action". The range of clandestine activities undertaken by the CIA
includes covert action, clandestine intelligence collection, liaison
with local police and intelligence services, and counterintelligence.
The distinctions among the types of activities are mirrored in organizational
arrangements, both at Headquarters and in the field. Yet it is not
always so easy to distinguish the effects of various activities. If
the CIA provides financial support to a political party, this is called
"covert action"; if the Agency develops a paid "asset" in the party
for the purpose of information gathering, the project is "clandestine
intelligence collection."
The goal of covert action is political impact. At the
same time secret relationships developed for the clandestine collection
of intelligence may also have political effects, even though no attempt
is made by American officials to manipulate the relationships for
short-run political gain. For example, in Chile between 1970 and 1973,
CIA and American military attache contacts with the Chilean military
for the purpose of gathering intelligence enabled the United States
to sustain communication with the group most likely to take power
from President Salvador Allende.
What did covert CIA money buy in Chile? It financed
activities covering a broad spectrum, from simple propaganda manipulation
of the press to large-scale support for Chilean political parties,
from public opinion polls to direct attempts to foment a military
coup. The scope of "normal" activities of the CIA Station in Santiago
included placement of Station-dictated material in the Chilean media
through propaganda assets, direct support of publications, and efforts
to oppose communist and left-wing influence in student, peasant and
labor organizations.
In addition to these "routine" activities, the CIA
Station in Santiago was several times called upon to undertake large,
specific projects.
When senior officials in Washington perceived special
dangers, or opportunities, in Chile, special CIA projects were developed,
often as part of a larger package of U.S. actions. For instance, the
CIA spent over three million dollars in an election program in 1964.
Half a decade later, in 1970, the CIA engaged in another
special effort, this time at the express request of President Nixon
and under the injunction not to inform the Departments of State or
Defense or the Ambassador of the project. Nor was the 40 Committee (2) ever informed. The CIA attempted, directly, to
foment a military coup in Chile. It passed three weapons to a group
of Chilean officers who plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnaping
of Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider. However, those
guns were returned. The group which staged the abortive kidnap of
Schneider, which resulted in his death, apparently was not the same
as the group which received CIA weapons.(3)
When the coup attempt failed and Allende was inaugurated
President, the CIA was authorized by the 40 Committee to fund groups
in opposition to Allende in Chile. The effort was massive. Eight million
dollars was spent in the three years between the 1970 election and
the military coup in September 1973. Money was furnished to media
organizations, to opposition political parties and, in limited amounts,
to private sector organizations.
Numerous allegations have been made about U.S. covert
activities in Chile during 1970-73. Several of these are false; others
are half true. In most instances, the response to the allegations
mus be qualified:
Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly,
in the 1973 coup in Chile? The Committee has found no evidence that
it was. However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a military
coup in Chile; after 1970 it adopted a policy both overt and covert,
of opposition to Allende; and it remained in intelligence contact
with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating
in coup plotting.
Did the U.S. provide covert support to striking truck-owners
or other strikers during 1971-73? The 40 Committee did not approve
any such support. However, the U.S. passed money to private sector
groups which supported the strikers. And in at least one case, a small
amount of CIA money was passed to the strikers by a private sector
organization, contrary to CIA ground rules. Did the U.S. provide covert
support to right-wing terrorist organizations during 1970-73?
The CIA gave support in 1970 to one group whose tacticts
became more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received small
sums of American money through third parties for specific purpose.
And it is possible that money was passed to these groups on the extreme
right from CIA-supported opposition political parties.
The pattern of United States covert action in Chile
is striking but not unique. It arose in the context not only of American
foreign policy, but also of covert U.S. involvement in other countries
within and outside Latin America. The scale of CIA involvement in
Chile was unusual but by no means unprecedented.
B. Issues.
The Chilean case raises most of the issues connected
with covert action as an instrument of American foreign policy. It
consisted of long, frequently heavy involvement in Chilean politics:
it involved the gamut of covert action methods, save only covert military
operations; and it revealed a variety of different authorization procedures,
with different implications for oversight and control. As one case
of U.S. covert action, the judgements of past actions are framed not
for their own sake; rather they are intended to serve as bases for
formulating recommendations for the future.
The basic questions are easily stated:
(1) Why did the United States mount such an extensive
covert action program in Chile? Why was that program continued and
then expanded in the early 1970's?
(2) How was this major covert action program authorized
and directed? What roles were played by the President, the 40 Committee,
the CIA, the Ambassadors and the Congress? (3) Did U.S. policy-makers
take into account the judgements of the intelligence analysts on Chile
when they formulated and approved U.S. covert operations? Does the
Chilean experience illustrate an inherent conflict between the role
of the Director of Central Intelligence as a producer of intelligence
and his role a manager of covert operations?
(4) Did the perceived threat in Chile justify
the level of U.S. response? What was the effect of such large concentrated
programs of covert political action in Chile? What were the effects,
both abroad and at home, of the relationships which developed between
the intelligence agencies and American based multinational corporations?
C. Historical Background to Recent United States-Chilean
Relations.
1. Chilean Politics and Society: an Overview.
Chile has historically attracted far more interest
in Latin America and, more recently, throughout the world, than its
remote geographic position and scant eleven-million population would
at first suggest.
Chile's history has been one of remarkable continuity
in civilian, democratic rule. From independence in 1818 until the
military coup d'etat of September 1973, Chile underwent only three
brief interruptions of its democratic tradition. >From 1932 until
the overthrow of Allende in 1973, constitutional rule in Chile was
unbroken.
Chile defies simplistic North American stereotypes
of Latin America. With more than two-thirds of its population living
in cities, and a 1970 per capita GNP of $760, Chile is one of the
most urbanized and industrialized countries in Latin America. Nearly
all of the Chilean population is literate. Chile has an advanced social
welfare program, although its activities did not reach the majority
of the poor until popular participation began to be exerted in the
early 1960's. Chileans are a largely integrated mixture of indigeneous
American with European immigrant stock. Until September 1973, Chileans
brokered their demands in a bicameral parliament through a multi-party
system and through a broad array of economic, trade union, and, more
recently, managerial and professional associations.
2. U.S. Policy Toward Chile.
The history of United States policy toward Chile followed
the patterns of United States diplomatic and economic interests in
the hemisphere. In the same year that the United States recognized
Chilean independence, 1823, it also proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine.
This unilateral policy pronouncement of the United States was directed
as a warning toward rival European powers not to interfere in the
internal political affairs of this hemisphere.
The U. S. reaction to Fidel Castro's rise to power
suggested that while the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles
which prompted it were still alive. Castro's presence spurred a new
United States hemispheric policy with special significance for Chile
- the Alliance for Progress. There was little disagreement among policymakers
either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration or at the beginning
of the Kennedy Administration that something had to be done about
the alarming threat that Castro was seen to represent to the stability
of the hemisphere.
The U.S. reaction to the new hemispheric danger - communist
revolution - evolved into a dual policy response. Widespread malnutrition,
illiteracy, hopeless housing conditions and hunger for the vast majority
of Latin Americans who were poor; these were seen as communism's allies.
Consequently, the U.S. undertook loans to national development programs
and supported civilian reformist regimes, all with an eye to preventing
the appearance of another Fidel Castro in our hemisphere.
But there was another component in U.S. policy toward
Latin America. Counterinsurgency techniques were developed to combat
urban or rural guerrilla insurgencies often encouraged or supported
by Castro's regime. Development could not cure overnight the social
ills which were seen as the breeding ground of communism. New loans
for Latin American countries' internal national development programs
would take time to bear fruit. In the meantime, the communist threat
would continue. The vicious circle plaguing the logic of the Alliance
for Progress soon became apparent. In order to eliminate the short-term
danger of communist subversion, it was often seen as necessary to
support Latin American armed forces, yet frequently it was those same
armed forces who were helping to freeze the status quo which the Alliance
sought to alter.
Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile was chosen
to become the showcase for the new Alliance for Progress. Chile had
the extensive bureaucratic infrastructure to plan and administer a
national development program; moreover, its history of popular support
for Socialist, Communist and other leftist parties was perceived in
Washington as flirtation with communism. In the years between 1962
and 1969, Chile received well over a billion dollars in direct, overt
United States aid, loans and grants both included. Chile received
more aid per capita than any country in the hemisphere. Between 1964
and 1970, $200 to $300 million in short-term lines of credit was continuously
available to Chile from private American banks.
3. Chilean Political Parties: 1958-1970.
The 1970 elections marked the fourth time Salvador
Allende had been presidential candidate of the Chilean left. His personality
and his program were familiar to Chilean voters. His platform was
similar in all three elections: efforts to redistribute income and
reshape the Chilean economy, beginning with the nationalization of
major industries, especially the copper companies; greatly expand
agrarian reform; and expanded relations with socialist and communist
countries.
Allende was one of four candidates in the 1958 elections.
His principal oponents were Jorge Alessandri, a conservative, and
Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the newly formed Christian Democratic
Party, which contended against the traditionally centrist Radical
Party. Allende's coalition was an uneasy alliance, composed principally
of the Socialist and Communist Parties, labeled the Popular Action
Front (FRAP). Allende himself, a self-avowed Marxist, was considered
a moderate within his Socialist Party, which ranged from the extreme
left to moderate social democrats. The Socialists, however, were more
militant than the pro- Soviet, bureaucratic -though highly organized
and disciplined- Communist Party.
Allende finished second to Alessandri in the 1958 election
by less than three percent of the vote. Neither candidate received
a majority, and the Chilean Congress voted Alessandri into office.
If Allende had received the votes which went to a leftist priest -who
received 3.3 percent of the votes- he would have won the election.
The Alessandri government lost popularity during its
tenure. Dissatisfaction with it was registered in the 1961 congresional
and 1963 municipal elections. The FRAP parties made significant gains,
and the Christian Democratic Party steadily increased its share of
the electorate until, in the 1963 elections, it became the largest
single party.
The 1964 election shaped up as a three-way race. Frei
was once again the Christian Democratic candidate, and the parties
of the left one again selected Allende as their standard-bearer. The
governing coalition, the Democratic Front, chose Radical Julio Duran
as their candidate. Due in part to an adverse election result in a
March 1964 by-election in a previously conservative province, the
Democratic Front collapsed. The Conservative and Liberals, reacting
to the prospect of an Allende victory, threw their support to Frei,
leaving Duran as the standard- bearer of only the Radical Party.
After Frei's decisive majority victory, in which he
received 57 percent of the vote, he began to implement what he called
a "revolution in liberty". That included agrarian, tax, and housing
reform. To deal with the American copper companies, Frei proposed
"Chileanization", by which the state would purchase majority ownership
in order to exercise control and stimulate output.
Frei's reforms, while impressive, fell far short of
what he had promised. Lacking a majority in Congress, he was caught
between the FRAP parties, which demanded extreme measures, and the
rightists, who withheld support from Frei in order to force a compromise
on the agrarian reform issue. Like its predecessor, the Frei government
lost popularity during its tenure; the Christian Democrats' portion
of the vote in congressional elections fell from 43 percent in 1965
to 31 percent in 1969. During the Frei years the internal strains
of the Party became more evident, culminating in the 1968 defection
of the Party's left-wing elements.
Frei's relations with the United States were cordial,
although he pursued an independent foreign policy. His government
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union immediately
after taking power and in 1969 reestablished trade relations with
Cuba.
II. The range of covert
action in Chile.
A. Covert Action
and Other Clandestine Activities.
This study is primarily concerned with what is labeled
"covert action" by the United States government. Covert action projects
are considered a distinct category and are authorized and managed
accordingly. But it is important to bear in mind what the category
excludes as well as what it includes. The Committee's purpose is to
evaluate the intent and effect of clandestine American activities
in Chile. Some secret activities by the United States not labeled
"covert action" may have important political impacts and should be
considered.
The CIA conducts several kinds of clandestine activity
in foreign countries: clandestine collection of positive foreign intelligence:
counterintelligence (or liaison with local services); and covert action.
Those different activities are handled somewhat differently in Washington;
they are usually the responsibility of different CIA officers in the
field. Yet all three kinds of projects may have effects on foreign
politics. All three rely on the establishment of clandestine relationships
with foreign nationals.
In the clandestine collection of intelligence, the
purpose of the relationship is the gathering of information. A CIA
officer establishes a relationship with a foreign "asset" -paid or
unpaid- in a party or government institution in order to find out
what is going on inside that party or institution. There is typically
no attempt made by the CIA officer to influence the actions of the
"asset". Yet even that kind of covert relationship may have political
significance. Witness the maintenance of CIA's and military attaches'
contacts with the Chilean military after the inauguration of Salvador
Allende: although the purpose was information-gathering, the United
States maintained links to the group most likely to overthrow the
new president. To do so was to walk a tightrope; the distinction between
collecting information and exercising influence was inherently hard
to maintain. Since the Chilean military perceived its actions to be
contingent to some degree on the attitude of the U.S. government,
those possibilities for exercising influence scarcely would have had
to be consciously manipulated.
Liaison relationships with local police or intelligence
services pose a similar issue. The CIA established such relationships
in Chile with the primary purpose of securing assistance in gathering
intelligence on external targets. But the link also provided the Station
with information on internal subversives and opposition elements within
Chile. That raised the difficulty of ensuring that American officials
did not stray into influencing the actions of Chileans with whom they
were in contact. And it meant that the CIA was identified, to some
degree, with the internal activities of Chilean police and intelligence
services, whether or not the U.S. government supported those actions.
That became a matter for great concern in 1973 with the advent of
the Pinochet regime.
The purpose of this case study is to describe and assess
the range of covert U.S. activities which influenced the course of
political events in Chile. Most of the discussion which follows is
limited to activities labeled and run as "covert action" projects.
That category is itself broad. But it excludes other clandestine activities
with possible political effects.
B. Covert Action in Chile: Techniques.
Even if the set of activities labeled "covert action" does
not include all clandestine American efforts with possible political
effects, that set is nonetheless broad. U.S. covert action in Chile
encompassed a range of techniques and affected a wide variety of Chilean
institutions. It included projects which were regarded as the framework
necessary for covert operations, as well as major efforts called forth
by special circumstances. The following paragraphs will give a flavor
of that range.
1. Propaganda
The most extensive covert action activity in Chile
was propaganda. It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at
a low level during "normal" times, then was cranked up to meet particular
threats or to counter particular dangers.
The most common form of a propaganda project is simply
the development of "assets" in media organizations who can place articles
or be asked to write them. The Agency provided to its field Station
several kinds of guidance about what sorts of propaganda were desired.
For example, one CIA project in Chile supported from one to five media
assets during the seven years it operated (1965-1971). Most of those
assets worked for a major Santiago daily which was the key to CIA
propaganda efforts. Those assets wrote articles or editorials favorable
to U.S. interests in the world (for example, criticizing the Soviet
Union in the wake of the Czechoslovakian invasion); suppressed news
items harmful to the United States (for instance about Vietnam); and
authored articles critical of Chilean leftists.
The covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included
"black" propaganda -material falsely purporting to be the product
of a particular individual or group. In the 1970 election, for instance,
the CIA used "black" propaganda to sow discord between the Communists
and the Socialists and between the national labor confederation and
the Chilean Communist Party.
TABLE I -Techniques of Covert Action
-Expenditures in Chile, 1963-73 (1).
Techniques |
Amount |
Propaganda for elections and other support for political
parties |
$8,000,000 |
Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass
media |
4,300,000 |
Influencing Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants,
women) and supporting private sector organizations |
900,000 |
Promoting military coup d'etat |
< 200,000 |
(1) Figures rounded to nearest $100,000
In some cases, the form of propaganda was still more
direct. The Station financed Chilean groups who erected wall posters,
passed out political panflets (at times prepared by the Station) and
engaged in other street activities. Most often these activities formed
part of larger projects intended to influence the outcomes of Chilean
elections (see below), but in at least one instance the activities
took place in the absence of an election campaign.
Of thirty-odd covert action projects undertaken by
Chile by the CIA between 1961 and 1974, approximately a half dozen
had propaganda as their principal activity. Propaganda was an important
subsidiary element of many others, particularly election projects.
(See TABLE I). Press placements were attractive because each placement
might produce a multiplier effect, being picked up and replayed by
media oulets other than the one in which it originally came out.
2. Support for Media
In addition to buying propaganda piecemeal, the Station
often purchased it wholesale by subsidizing Chilean media organizations
friendly to the United States. Doing so was propaganda writ large.
Instead of placing individual items, the CIA supported -or even founded-
friendly media outlets which might not have existed in the absence
of Agency support.
From 1953 through 1970 in Chile, the Station subsidized
wire services, magazines written for intellectual circles, and a right-wing
weekly newspaper. According to the testimony of former officials,
support for the newspaper was terminated because it became so inflexibly
rightist as to alienate responsible conservatives.
By far, the largest -and probably the most significant-
instance of support for a media organization was the money provided
to El Mercurio, the major Santiago daily, under pressure
during the Allende regime. The support grew out of an existing propaganda
project. In 1971 the Station judged that El Mercurio, the
most important opposition publication, could not survive pressure
from the Allende government, including intervention in the newsprint
market and the withdrawal of government advertising. The 40 Committee
authorized $700,000 for El Mercurio on September 9, 1971,
and added another $965,000 to that authorization on April 11, 1972.
A CIA project renewal memorandum concluded that El Mercurio and other media outlets supported by the Agency had played an important
role in setting the stage for the September 11, 1973, military coup
which overthrew Allende.
3. Gaining Influence in Chilean Institutions
and Groups
Through its covert activities in Chile, the U.S. government
sought to influence the actions of a wide variety of institutions
and groups in Chilean society. The specific intent of those activities
ran the gamut from attempting to influence directly the making of
government policy to trying to counter communist or leftist influence
among organized groups in the society. That most of these projects
included a propaganda component is obvious.
From 1964 through 1968, the CIA developed contacts
within the Chilean Socialist Party and at the Cabinet level of the
Chilean government.
Projects aimed at organizade groups in Chilean society
had more diffuse purposes than efforts aimed at government institutions.
But the aim was similar: influencing the direction of political events
in Chile.
Projects were directed, for example, toward:
Wresting control of Chilean university student
organizations from the communists;
Supporting a women's group active in Chilean political
and intellectual life;
Combating the communist-dominated CENTRAL UNICA
DE TRABAJADORES CHILENOS (CUTCH) and supporting democratic labor groups;
and
Exploiting a civic action front group to combat
communist influence within cultural and intellectual circles.
4. Major Efforts to Influence Chilean Elections
Covert American activity was a factor in almost every
major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973. In several
instances the United States intervention was massive.
The 1964 presidential election was the most prominent
example of a large- scale election project. The Central Intelligence
Agency spent more than $2.6 million in support of the election of
the Christian Democratic candidate, in part to prevent the accession
to the presidency of Marxist Salvador Allende. More than half of the
Christian Democratic candidate's campaign was financed by the United
States, although he was not informed of this assistance. In addition,
the Station furnished support to an array of pro-Christian Democratic
student, women's, professional and peasant groups. Two other political
parties were funded as well in an attempt to spread the vote.
In Washington, an inter-agency election committee was
established, composed of State Department, White House and CIA officials.
That committee was paralleled by a group in the embassy in Santiago.
No special task force was established within the CIA, but the Station
in Santiago was reinforced. The Station assisted the Christian Democrats
in running an American-style campaign, which included polling, voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, in addition to covert propaganda.
The United States was also involved in the 1970 presidential
campaign. That effort, however, was smaller and did not include support
for any specific candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende's
election than at insuring another candidate's victory.
Nor have U.S. involvement been limited to presidential
campaigns. In the 1965 Chilean congressional elections, for instance,
the Station was authorized by the 303 Committee to spend up to $175,000.
Covert support was provided to a number of candidates selected by
the Ambassador and Station. A CIA election memorandum suggested that
the project did have some impact, including the elimination of a number
of FRAP (leftist coalition) candidates who might otherwise have won
congressional seats.
5. Support for Chilean Political Parties
Most covert American support to Chilean political parties
was furnished as part of specific efforts to influence election outcomes.
However, in several instances the CIA provided subsidies to parties
for more general purposes, when elections were not imminent. Most
such support was furnished during the Allende years, 1970-1973, when
the U.S. government judged that without its support parties of the
center and right might not survive either as opposition elements or
as contestants in elections several years away.
In a sequence of decisions in 1971 through 1973, the
40 Committee authorized nearly $4 million for opposition political
parties in Chile. Most of this money went to the Christian Democratic
Party (PDC), but a substantial portion was earmarked for the National
Party (PN), a conservative grouping more stridently opposed to the
Allende government than was the PDC. An effort was also made to split
the ruling Popular Unity coalition by inducing elements to break away.
The funding of political parties on a large scale in
1970-73 was not, however, without antecedents, albeit more modest
in scale. In 1962 the Special Group (predecessor to the 40 Committee)
authorized several hundred thousand dollars for an effort to build
up the PDC in anticipation of the 1964 elections. Small authorizations
were made, in 1963 and 1967, for support to moderate elements within
the Radical Party.
6. Support for Private Sector Organizations
As part of its program of support for opposition elements
during the Allende government, the CIA provided money to several trade
organizations of the Chilean private sector. In September 1972, for
instance, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 in emergency support
for an anti-Allende businessmen's organization. At that time, supporting
other private sector organizations was considered but rejected because
of the fear that those organizations might be involved in anti-government
strikes.
The 40 Committee authorized $100,000 for private sector
organizations in October 1972, as part of the March 1973 election
project. According to the CIA, that money was spent only on election
activities, such as voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote
drives. In August 1973, the Committee authorized support for private
sector groups, but with disbursement contingent on the agreement of
the Ambassador and State Department. That agreement was not forthcoming.
7. Direct efforts to Promote a Military Coup
United States covert efforts to affect the course of
Chilean politics reached a peak in 1970: the CIA was directed to undertake
an effort to promote a military coup in Chile to prevent the accession
to power of Salvador Allende. That attempt, the so-called "Track II",
is the subject of a separate Committee report and will be discussed
in section III below. A brief summary here will demonstrate the extreme
in American covert intervention in Chilean politics.
On September 15, 1970 -after Allende finished first
in the election but before the Chilean Congress had chosen between
him and the runner-up, Alessandri(4), -President Nixon met with Richard Helms,
the Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John
Mitchell. Helms was directed to prevent Allende from taking power.
This effort was to be conducted without the knowledge of the Departments
of State and Defense or the Ambassador. Track II was never discussed
at a 40 Committee meeting.
It quickly became apparent to both White House and
CIA officials that a military coup was the only way to prevent Allende's
accession to power. To achieve that end, the CIA established contact
with several groups of military plotters and eventually passed three
weapons and tear gas to one group. The weapons were subsequently returned,
apparently unused. The CIA knew that the plans of all groups of plotters
began with the abduction of the constitutionalist Chief of Staff of
the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider. The Committee has received
conflicting testimony about the extent of CIA/White House communication
and of White House officials' awareness of specific coup plans, but
there is no doubt that the U.S. government sought a military coup
in Chile.
On October 22, one group of plotters attempted to kidnap
Schneider. Schneider resisted, was shot, and subsequently died. The
CIA had been in touch with that group of plotters but a week earlier
had withdrawn its support for the group's specific plans.
The coup plotting collapsed and Allende was inaugurated
President. After his election, the CIA and U.S. military attaches
maintained contacts with the Chilean military for the purpose of collecting
intelligence. Whether those contacts strayed into encouraging the
Chilean military to move against Allende; or whether the Chilean military
-having been goadedtoward a coup during Track II- took encouragement
to act against the President from those contacts even though U.S.
officials did not intend to provide it: these are major questions
which are inherent in U.S. covert activities in the period of the
Allende government.
C. Covert Action
and Multinational Corporations.
In addition to providing information and cover to the CIA,
multinational corporations also participated in covert attempts to
influence Chilean politics. The following is a brief description of
the CIA's relationship with one such corporation in Chile in the period
1963-1973 -International Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. (ITT). Not
only is ITT the most prominent and public example, but a great deal
of information has been developed on the CIA/ITT relationship. This
summary is based on new information provided to this Committee and
on material previously made public by the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
1. 1964 Chilean Elections
During the 1964 presidential campaign, representatives
of multinational corporations approached the CIA with a proposal to
provide campaign funds to the Christian Democratic Party. The CIA
decision not to accept such funds, as well as other CIA contacts with
multinational corporations during that campaign, are fully described
in Part III.
2. 1970 Chilean Elections: Phase I
In 1970, the U.S. government and several multinational
corporations were linked in opposition to the candidacy and later
the presidency of Salvador Allende. This CIA-multinational corporation
connection can be divided into two phases. Phase I comprised actions
taken by either the CIA or U.S.-based multinational companies at a
time when it was official U.S. policy not to support, even covertly,
any candidate or party in Chile. During this phase the Agency was,
however, authorized to engage in a covert "spoiling" operation designed
to defeat Salvador Allende. Phase II encompassed the relationship
between intelligence agencies and multinational corporations after
the September 1970 general election. During Phase II, the U.S. government
opposed Allende and supported opposition elements. The government
sought the cooperation of multinational corporations in this effort.
A number of multinational corporations were apprehensive
about the possibility that Allende would be elected President of Chile.
Allende's public announcements indicated his intention, if elected,
to nationalize basic industries and to bring under Chilean ownership
service industries such as the national telephone company, which was
at that time a subsidiary of ITT.
In 1964 Allende had been defeated, and it was widely
known both in Chile and among American multinational corporations
with significant interests in Chile that his opponents had been supported
by the United States government. John McCone, a former CIA Director
and a member of ITT's Board of Directors in 1970, knew of the significant
American government involvement in 1964 and of the offer of assistance
made at that time by American companies. Agency documents indicate
that McCone informed Harold Geneen, ITT's Board Chairman, of these
facts.
In 1970 leaders of American multinational corporations
with substantial interests in Chile, together with other American
citizens concerned about what might happen to Chile in the event of
an Allende victory, contacted U.S. government officials in order to
make their views known.
In July 1970, a CIA representative in Santiago met
with representatives of ITT and, in a discussion of the upcoming election,
indicated that Alessandri could use financial assistance. The Station
suggested the name of an individual who could be used as a secure
channel for getting these funds to the Alessandri campaign.
Shortly thereafter John McCone telephoned CIA Director
Richard Helms. As a result of this call, a meeting was arranged between
the Chairman of the Board of ITT and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere
Division of the CIA. Geneen offered to make available to the CIA a
substantial amount of money to be used in support of the Alessandri
campaign. In subsequent meetings ITT offered to make $1 million available
to the CIA. The CIA rejected the offer. The memorandum indicated further
that CIA's advice was sought with respect to an individual who might
serve as a conduit of ITT funds to the Alessandri campaign.
The CIA confirmed that the individual in question was
a reliable channel which could be used for getting funds to Alessandri.
A second channel of funds from ITT to a political party opposing Allende,
the National Party, was developed following CIA advice as to a secure
funding mechanism utilizing two CIA assets in Chile. These assets
were also receiving Agency funds in connection with the "spoiling"
operation.
During the period prior to the September election,
ITT representatives met frequently with CIA representatives both in
Chile and in the United States and CIA advised ITT as to ways in which
it might safely channel funds both to the Alessandri campaign and
to the National Party. CIA was kept informed of the extent and the
mechanism of the funding. Eventually at least $350,000 was passed
by ITT to this campaign. A roughly equal amount was passed by other
U.S. companies; the CIA learned of this funding but did not assist
in it.
3. Following the 1970 Chilean Elections:
Phase II
Following the September 4 elections, the United States
government adopted a policy of economic pressure direct against Chile
and in this connection sought to enlist the influence of Geneen on
other American businessmen. Specifically, the State Department was
directed by the 40 Committee to contact American businesses having
interests in Chile to see if they could be induced to take actions
in accord with the American government's policy of economic pressure
on Chile. On September 29, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
of the CIA met with a representative of ITT. The CIA official sought
to have ITT involved in a more active way in Chile. According to CIA
documents, ITT took note of the CIA presentation on economic warfare
but did not actively respond to it.
One institution in Chile which was used in a general
anti-Allende effort was the newspaper chain EL MERCURIO. Both the
United States government and ITT were funneling money into the hands
of individuals associated with the paper. That funding continued after
Allende was in office.
A great deal of testimony has been taken on the above
matters, initially before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.
The degree of cooperation between the CIA and ITT in the period prior
to the September 1970 election raises an important question: while
the U.S. government was NOT supporting particular candidates or parties,
even covertly, was the CIA authorized to act on its own in advising
or assisting ITT in its covert financial support of the Alessandri
campaign?
III. Major Covert
Action Programs and Their Effects.
This section outlines the major programs of covert
action undertaken by the United States in Chile, period by period.
In every instance, covert action was an instrument of United States
foreign policy, decided upon at the highest levels of the government.
Each subsection to follow sets forth that policy context. Without
it, it is impossible to understand the covert actions which were undertaken.
After a discussion of policy, each subsection elaborates the covert
action tactics employed in each case. Finally, the effect of each
major program is assessed.
The section begins with the first major United States
covert action in Chile -the 1964 presidential elections.
A. The 1964 Presidential Election.
1. United States Policy
The United States was involved on a massive scale in
the 1964 presidential election in Chile. The Special Group authorized
over three million dollars during the 1962-64 period to prevent the
election of a Socialist or Communist candidate. A total of nearly
four million dollars was spent on some fifteen covert action projects,
ranging from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political
parties.
The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence
of Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would emerge
from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S, sought the most effective
way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an alliance of Chilean
Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule non-Marxist parties
of the left which backed the candidacy of Salvador Allende. Specifically,
the policy called for support of the Christian Democratic Party, the
Democratic Front (a coalition of rightist parties), and a variety
of anti-communist propaganda and organizing activities.
The groundwork for the election was laid early in 1961
by establishing operational relationships with key political parties
and by creating propaganda and organizational mechanisms capable of
influencing key sectors of the population. Projects that had been
conducted since the 1950's among peasants, slum dwellers, organized
labor, students and the media provided a basis for much of the pre-election
covert action.
The main problem facing the United States two years
before the election was the selection of a party and/or candidate
to support against the leftist alliance. The CIA presented two papers
to the Special Group on April 2, 1962. One of these papers proposed
support for the Christian Democratic Party, while the other recommended
support of the Radical Party, a group to the right of the Christian
Democrats. The Special Group approved both proposals. Although this
strategy appears to have begun as an effort to hedge bets and support
two candidates for President, it evolved into a strategy designed
to support the Christian Democratic candidate.
On August 27, 1962, the Special Group approved the
use of a third-country funding channel and authorized $180,000 in
fiscal year 1969 for the Chilean Christian Democrats. The Kennedy
Administration had preferred a center-right government in Chile, consisting
of the Radicals on the right and the Christian Democrats in the center.
However, political events in Chile in 1962-1969 -principally the creation
of a right-wing alliance that included the Radical Party- precluded
such a coalition.
Consequently, throughout 1963, the United States funded
both the Christian Democrats and the right-wing coalition, the Democratic
Front.
After a by-election defeat in May 1964 destroyed the
Democratic Front, the U.S. threw its support fully behind the Christian
Democratic candidate. However, CIA funds continued to subsidize the
Radical Party candidate in order to enhance the Christian Democrats'
image as a moderate progressive party being attacked from the right
as well as the left.
2. Covert Action Techniques
Covert action during the 1964 campaign was composed
of two major elements. One was direct financial support of the Christian
Democratic campaign. The CIA underwrote slightly more than half of
the total cost of that campaign. After debate, the Special Group decided
not to inform the Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, of
American covert support of his campaign. A number of intermediaries
were therefore mobilized to pass the money to the Christian Democrats.
In addition to the subsidies for the Christian Democratic
Party, the Special Group allocated funds to the Radical Party and
to private citizens' groups. In addition to support for political
parties, the CIA mounted a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign.
Extensive use was made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters,
leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall painting. It
was a "scare campaign," which relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks
and Cuban firing squads and was directed especially to women. Hundreds
of thousands of copies of the anti-communist pastoral letter of Pope
Pius XI were distributed by Christian Democratic organizations. They
carried the designation, "printed privately by citizens without political
affiliation, in order more broadly to disseminate its content." "Disinformation"
and "black propaganda" -material which purported to originate from
another source, such as the Chilean Communist Party- were used as
well.
The propaganda campaign was enormous. During the first
week of intensive propaganda activity (the third week of June 1964),
a CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day
in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts
five time daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets;
thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By the end
of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the
provinces, 26 weekly "commentary" programs, and distributed 3,000
posters daily. The CIA regards the anti-communist scare campaign as
the most effective activity undertaken by the U.S. on behalf of the
Christian Democratic candidate.
The propaganda campaign was conducted internationally
as well, and articles from abroad were "replayed" in Chile. Chilean
newspapers reported: an endorsement of Frei by the sister of a Latin
American leader, a public letter from a former president in exile
in the U.S., a "message from the women of Venezuela." and dire warnings
about an Allende victory from various figures in military governments
in Latin America.
The CIA ran political action operations independent
of the Christian Democrats' campaign in a number of important voter
blocks, including slum dwellers, peasants, organized labor and dissident
Socialists. Support was given to "anti-communist" members of the Radical
Party in their efforts to achieve positions of influence in the party
hierarchy, and to prevent the party from throwing its support behind
Allende.
3. U.S. Government Organization for the 1964
Chilean Election
To manage the election effort, an electoral committee was
established in Washington, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; the Western Hemisphere
Division Chief of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and McGeorge
Bundy from the White House; and the Chief of the Western Hemi sphere
Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction over Chile.
This group was in close touch with the State Department Office of
Bolivian and Chilean Affairs. In Santiago there was a parallel Election
Committee that coordinated U.S. efforts. It included the Deputy Chief
of Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads of the Political
and Economic Sections, as well as the Ambassador. The Election Committee
in Washington coordinated lines to higher authority and to the field
and other agencies. No special task force was established. and the
CIA Station in Santiago was temporarily increased by only three officers.
4. Role of Multinational Corporations
A group of American businessmen in Chile offered to provide
one and a half million dollars to be administered and disbursed covertly
by the U.S. Government to prevent Allende from winning the 1964 presidential
election. This offer went to the 303 Committee (the name of the Special
Group after June 1964) which decided not to accept the offer. It decided
that offers from American business could not be accepted, that they
were neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing business.
This decision was a declaration of policy which set the precedent
for refusing to accept such collaboration between CIA and private
business. However, CIA money represented as private money, was passed
to the Christian Democrats through a private businessman.
5. Role of the Chilean Military
On July 19, 1964, the Chilean Defense Council, which is
the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to President
Alessandri to propose a coup d'etat if Allende won. This offer was
transmitted to the CIA Chief of Station, who told the Chilean Defense
Council through an intermediary that the United States was absolutely
opposed to a coup. On July 20, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the
U.S. Embassy was approached by a Chilean Air Force general who threatened
a coup if Allende won. The DCM reproached him for proposing a coup
d'etat and there was no further mention of it. Earlier, the CIA learned
that the Radical candidate for election, several other Chileans, and
an ex-politician from another Latin American country had met on June
2 to organize a rightist group called the Legion of Liberty. They
said this group would stage a coup d'etat if Allende won, or if Frei
won and sought a coalition government with the Communist Party. Two
of the Chileans at the meeting reported that some military officers
wanted to stage a coup d'etat before the election if the United States
Government would promise to support it. Those approaches were rebuffed
by the CIA.
6. Effects of Covert Action
A CIA study concludes that U.S. intervention enabled
Eduardo Frei to win a clear majority in the 1964 election, instead
of merely a plurality. What U.S. Government documents do not make
clear is why it was necessary to assure a majority, instead of accepting
the victory a plurality would have assured. CIA assistance enabled
the Christian Democratic Party to establish an extensive organization
at the neighborhood and village level. That may have lent grassroots
support for reformist efforts that the Frei government undertook over
the next several years.
Some of the propaganda and polling mechanisms developed
for use in 1964 were used repeatedly thereafter, in local and congressional
campaigns, during the 1970 presidential campaign, and throughout the
1970-1973 Allende presidency. Allegations of CIA involvement in the
campaign, and press allegations of CIA funding of the International
Development Foundation contributed to the U.S. reluctance in 1970
to undertake another massive pre-election effort.
B.
Covert Action: 1964-1969.
During the years between the election of Christian
Democratic President Eduardo Frei in 1964 and the presidential election
campaign of 1970 the CIA conducted a variety of covert activities
in Chile. Operating within different sectors of society, these activities
were all intended to strengthen groups which supported President Frei
and opposed Marxist influences.
The CIA spent a total of almost $2 million on
covert action in Chile during this period, of which one-fourth was
covered by 40 Committee authorizations for specific major political
action efforts. The CIA conducted twenty covert action projects in
Chile during these years.
1. Covert Action Methods
In February 1965 the 303 Committee approved $175,000
for a short-term political action project to provide covert support
to selected candidates in the March 1965 congressional elections in
Chile. According to the CIA, twenty-two candidates were selected by
the Station and the Ambassador; nine were ejected. The operation helped
defeat up to 13 FRAP candidates who would otherwise have won congressional
seats.
Another election effort was authorized in July 1968,
in preparation for the March 1969 congressional election. The 40 Committee
authorized $350,000 for this effort, with the objective of strengthening
moderate political forces before the 1970 presidential election. The
program consisted of providing financial support to candidates, supporting
a splinter Socialist Party in order to attract votes away from Allende's
socialist party, propaganda activities, and assisting independent
groups. The CIA regarded the election effort as successful in meeting
its limited objective; ten of the twelve candidates selected for support
won their races, including one very unexpected victory. The support
provided to the dissident socialist group deprived the Socialist Party
of a minimum of seven congressional seats.
The 303 Committee also approved $30,000 in 1967 to
strengthen the right wing of the Radical Party.
A number of other political actions not requiring 303
Committee approval were conducted. The project to increase the effectiveness
and appeal of the Christian Democratic Party and to subsidize the
party during the 1964 elections continued into late 1965 or 1966,
as did a project to influence key members of the Socialist Party toward
orthodox European socialism and away from communism. During this period,
the CIA dealt with a Chilean official at the cabinet level, though
with scant result.
Covert action efforts were conducted during this period
to influence the political development of various sectors of Chilean
society. One project, conducted prior to the 1964 elections to strengthen
Christian Democratic support among peasants and slum dwellers, continued
to help train and organize "anti-communists" in these and other sectors
until public exposure of CIA funding in 1967 forced its termination.
A project to compete organizationally with the Marxists among the
urban poor of Santiago was initiated shortly after the 1964 election,
and was terminated in mid-1969 because the principal agent was unwilling
to prejudice the independent posture of the organization by using
it on a large scale to deliver votes in the 1969 and 1970 presidential
elections. In the mid-1960's, the CIA supported an anti-communist
women's group active in Chilean political and intellectual life.
Two projects worked within organized labor in Chile.
One, which began during the 1964 election period, was a labor action
project to combat the communist-dominated Central Unica de Trabajadores
Chilenos (CUTCh) and to support democratic labor groups. Another project
was conducted in the Catholic labor field.
Various CIA projects during this period supported media
efforts. One, begun in the early 1950's, operated wire services. Another,
which was an importaut part of the 1964 election effort, supported
anti-communist propaganda activities through wall posters attributed
to fictitious groups, leaflet campaigns, and public heckling.
A third project supported a right-wing weekly newspaper,
which was an instrument of the anti-Allende campaign during and for
a time after the 1970 election campaign. Another project funded an
asset who produced regular radio political commentary shows attacking
the political parties on the left and supporting CIA se1ected candidates.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, this asset organized
a march on the Soviet Embassy which led to major police action and
mass media coverage. Other assets funded under this project placed
CIA-inspired editorials almost daily in El Mercurio, Chile's major
newspaper and, after 1968, exerted substantial control over the content
of that paper's international news section.
The CIA also maintained covert liaison relations with
Chile's internal security and intelligence services, civilian and
military. The primary purpose of these arrangements was to enable
the Chilean services to assist CIA in information collection about
foreign targets. A subsidiary purpose of these relationships was to
collect information and meet the threat posed by communists and other
groups of the far left within Chile.
2. Effects Of Covert Action
The CIA's evaluations of the 1965 and 1969 election
projects suggest that those efforts were relatively successful in
achieving their immediate goals. On the other hand, the labor and
"community development" projects were deemed rather unsuccessful in
countering the growth of strong leftist sentiment and organization
among workers, peasants and slum dwellers. For instance, neither of
the labor projects was able to find a nucleus of legitimate Chilean
labor leaders to compete effectively with the communist-dominated
CUTCh.
The propaganda projects probably had a substantial
cumulative effect over these years, both in helping to polarize public
opinion concerning the nature of the threat posed by communists and
other leftists, and in maintaining an extensive propaganda capability.
Propaganda mechanisms developed during the 1960's were ready to be
used in the 1970 election campaign. At the same time, however, in
a country where nationalism, "economic independence" and "anti-imperialism"
claimed almost universal support, the persistent allegations that
the Christian Democrats and other parties of the center and right
were linked to the CIA may have played a part in undercutting popular
support for them.
C. The 1970
Election: a "Spoiling" Campaign.
1. United States Policy and Covert Action
Early in 1969, President Nixon announced a new policy
toward Latin America, labelled by him "Action for Progress." It was
to replace the Alliance for Progress which the President characterized
as paternalistic and unrealistic. Instead, the United States was to
seek "mature partnership" with Latin American countries, emphasizing
trade and not aid. The reformist trappings of the Alliance were to
be dropped; the United States announced itself prepared to deal with
foreign governments pragmatically.
The United States program of covert action in
the 1970 Chilean elections reflected this less activist stance. Nevertheless,
that covert involvement was substantial. In March 1970, the 40 Committee
decided that the United States should not support any single candidate
in the election but should instead wage "spoiling" operations against
the Popular Unity coalition which supported the 'Marxist candidate,
Salvador Allende. In all, the CIA spent from $800,000 to $1,000,000
on covert action to affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential election.
Of this amount about half was for major efforts approved by the 40
Committee. By CIA estimates, the Cubans provided about $350,000 to
Allende's campaign, with the Soviets adding an additional, undetermined
amount. The large-scale propaganda campaign which was undertaken by
the U.S. was similar to that of 1964: an Allende victory was equated
with violence and repression.
2. Policy Decisions
Discussions within the United States Government about
the 1970 elections began in the wake of the March 1969 Chilean congressional
elections. The CIA's involvement in those elections was regarded by
Washington as relatively successful, even though the Christian Democrats'
portion of the vote fell from 43 per cent in 1965 to 31 per cent in
1969. In June 1968 the 40 Committee had authorized $350,000 for that
effort, of which $200,000 actually was spent. Ten of the twelve CIA-supported
candidates were elected.
The 1970 election was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting
on April 17, 1969. It was suggested that something be done, and the
CIA representative noted that an election operation would not be effective
unless it were started early. But no action was taken at that time.
The 1970 Presidential race quickly turned into a three-way
contest. The conservative National Party, buoyed by the 1969 congressional
election results, supported 74-year-old, ex-President Jorge Alessandri.
Radomiro Tomic became the Christian Democratic nominee. Tomic, to
the left of President Frei, was unhappy about campaigning on the Frei
government's record and at one point made overtures to the Marxist
left. Salvador Allende was once again the candidate of the left, this
time formed into a Popular Unity coalition which inchided both Marxist
and non-Marxist parties. Allende's platform included nationalization
of the copper mines, accelerated agrarian reform, socialization of
major sectors of the economy, wage increases, and improved relations
with socialist and communist countries.
In December 1969, the Embassy and Station in Santiago
forwarded a proposal for an anti-Allende campaign. That proposal,
however, was withdrawn because of the State Department's qualms about
whether or not the United States should become involved at all. The
CIA felt it was not in a position to support Tomic actively because
ambassadorial "ground rules" of the previous few years had prevented
the CIA from dealing with the Christian Democrats. The Agency believed
that Alessandri, the apparent front runner, needed more than money;
he needed help in managing his campaign.
On March 25, 1970 the 40 Committee approved a joint
Embassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations -propaganda
and other activities- be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent
an election victory by Allende. Direct support was not furnished to
either of his opponents. This first authorization was for $135,000,
with the possibility of more later. On June 18, 1970, the Ambassador,
Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of
State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase
in support for the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a $500,000
contingency plan to influence the congressional vote in the event
of a vote between the candidates finishing first and second. In response
to State Department reluctance, the Ambassador responded by querying:
if Allende were to gain power, how would the U.S. respond to those
who asked what actions it had taken to prevent it ?
On June 27, the 40 Committee approved the increase
in funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation by $300,000.
State Department officials at the meeting voted "yes" only relunctantly.
They spoke against the contingency plan, and a decision on it was
deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.
CIA officials met several times with officials from
ITT during July. The CIA turned down ITT's proposal to make funds
available for CIA transmission to Alessandri but did provide the company
advice on how to pass money to Alessandri. Some $350,000 of ITT money
was passed to Alessandri during the campaign -$250,000 to his campaign
and $100,000 to the National Party. About another $350,000 came from
other U.S. businesses. According to CIA documents, the Station Chief
informed the Ambassador that the CIA was advising ITT in funding the
Alessandri campaign, but not that the Station was aiding ITT in passing
money to the National Party.
The 40 Committee met again on August 7 but did not
give further consideration to supporting either Alessandri or Tomic.
As the anti-Allende campaign in Chile intensified, senior policy makers
turned to the issue of U.S. policy in the event of an Allende victory.
A study done in response to National Security Study Memorandum 97
was approved by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on August 18. The
approved paper(5) set forth four options, one in the form
of a covert annex. The consensus of the Interdepartmental Group favored
maintaining minimal relations with Allende, but the Senior Review
Group deferred decision until after the elections.
Similarly, a paper with alternatives was circulated to 40 Committee
members on August 13, but no action resulted.
3. "Spoiling" Operations
The "spoiling" operations had two objectives: (1) undermining
communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces which
could gain control of the presidency in 1970; and (2) strengthening
non-Marxist political leaders and forces in Chile to order to develop
an effective alternative to the Popular Unity coalition in preparation
for the 1970 presidential election.
In working toward these objectives, the CIA made use
of half-a-dozen covert action projects. Those projects were focused
into an intensive propaganda campaign which made use of virtually
all media within Chile and which placed and replayed items in the
interna- tional press as well. Propaganda placements were achieved
through subsidizing right-wing women's and "civic action" groups.
A "scare campaign," using many of the same themes as the 1964 presidential
election program, equated an Allende victory with violence and Stalinist
repression. Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve
extensive public opinion polling, grass-roots organizing, or "community
development" efforts, nor, as mentioned, direct funding of any candidate.
In addition to the massive propaganda campaign, the
CIA's effort prior to the election included political action aimed
at splintering the non-Marxist Radical Party and reducing the number
of votes which it could deliver to the Popular Unity coalition's candidate.
Also, "black propaganda" -material purporting to be the product of
another group- was used in 1970 to sow dissent between Communists
and Socialists, and between the national labor confederation and the
Chilean Community Party.
The CIA's propaganda operation for the 1970 elections
made use of mechanisms that had been developed earlier. One mechanism
had been used extensively by the CIA during the March 1969 congressional
elections. During the 1970 campaign it produced hundreds of thousands
of high-quality printed pieces, ranging from posters and leaflets
to picture books, and carried out an extensive propaganda program
through many radio and press outlets. Other propaganda mechanisms
that were in place prior to the 1970 campaign included an editorial
support group that provided political features, editorials, and news
articles for radio and press placement; a service for placing anti-commimist
press and radio items; and three different news services.
There was a wide variety of propaganda products: a
newsletter mailed to approximately two thousand journalists, academicians,
politicians, and other opinion makers; a booklet showing what life
would be like if Allende won the presidential election; translation
and distribution of chronicles of opposition to the Soviet regime;
poster distribution and sign-painting teams. The sign-painting teams
had instructions to paint the slogan "su paredon" (your wall) on 2,000
walls, evoking an image of communist firing squads. The "scare campaign"
(campaña de terror) exploited the violence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia
with large photographs of Prague and of tanks in downtown Santiago.
Other posters resembling those used in 1964, portrayed Cuban political
prisoners before the firing squad, and warned that an Allende victory
would mean the end of religion and family life in Chile.
Still another project funded individual press assets.
One, who produced regular radio commentary shows on a nationwide hookup,
had been CIA funded since 1965 and continued to wage propaganda for
CIA during the Allende presidency. Other assets, all employees of
El Mercurio, enabled the Station to generate more than one editorial
per day based on CIA guidance. Access to El Mercuric had a multiplier
effect since its editorials were read throughout the country on various
national radio networks. Moreover, El Mercurio was one of the most
influential Latin American newspapers, particularly in business circles
abroad. A project which placed anti-communist press and radio items
was reported in 1970 to reach an audience of well over five million
listeners.
The CIA funded only one political group during
the 1970 campaign, in an effort to reduce the number of Radical Party
votes for Allende.
4. Effects
The covert action "spoiling" efforts by the United
States during the 1970 campaign did not succeed: Allende won a plurality
in the September 4 election. Neverteless, the "spoiling" campaign
had several important effects.
First, the "scare campaign" contributed to the political
polarization and financial panic of the period. Themes developed during
the campaign were exploited even more intensely during the weeks following
September 4, in an effort to cause enough financial panic and political
instability to goad President Frei or the Chilean military into action.
Second, many of the assets involved in the anti-Allende
campaign became so visible that their usefulness was limited thereafter.
Several of them left Chile. When Allende took office, little was left
of the CIA-funded propaganda apparatus. Nevertheless, there remained
a nucleus sufficient to permit a vocal anti-Allende opposition to
function effectively even before the new President was inaugurated.
D. Covert Action Between September 4 and October 24, 1970(6)
On September 4, 1970, Allende won a plurality in Chile's
presidential election, Since no candidate had received a majority
of the popular vote, the Chilean Constitution required that a joint
session of its Congress decide between the first-and second-place
finishers. The date set for the congressional session was October
24, 1970.
The reaction in Washington to Allende's plurality victory
was immediate. The 40 Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss
what action should be taken prior to the October 24 congressional
vote. On September 15, President Nixon informed CIA Director Richard
Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the
United States and instructed the CIA to ploy a direct role in organizing
a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to
the Presidency.
Following the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee
and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government
efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks(7). Track I comprised all covert activities
approved by the 40 Committee, including political, economic and propaganda
activities. These activities were designed to induce Allende's opponents
in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political
or military means. Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in
response to President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed
toward actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to
move against Allende.
1. Track I
A. POLITICAL ACTION
Initially both the 40 Committee and the CIA fastened
on the so-called Frei re-election gambit as a means of preventing
Allende's assumption of office. This gambit, which was considered
a constitutional solution to the Allende problem, consisted of inducing
enough congressional votes to elect Alessandri over Allende with the
understanding that Alessandri would immediately resign, thus paving
the way for a special election in which Frei would legally become
a candidate. At the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee, the
Frei gam-bit was discussed, and the Committee authorized a contingency
fund of $250,000 for covert support of projects which Frei or his
associates deemed important. The funds were to be handled by Ambassador
Korry and used if it appeared that they would be needed by the moderate
faction of the Christian Deniocratic Party to swing congressional
votes to Alessandri. The only proposal for the funds which was discussed
was an attempt to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri.
That quickly was seen to be unworkable, and the $250,000 was never
spent.
CIA's Track I aimed at bringing about conditions in
which the Frei gambit could take place. To do this, the CIA, at the
direction of the 40 Committee, mobilized on interlocking political
action, economic, and propaganda campaign. As part of its political
action program, the CIA attempted indirectly to induce President Frei
at least to consent to the gambit or, better yet assist in its implementation.
The Agency felt that pressures from those whose opinion and views
he valued -in combination with certain propaganda activities- represented
the only hope of converting Frei. In Europe and Latin America, influential
members of the Christian Democratic movement and the Catholic Church
were prompted either to visit or contact Frei. In spite of these efforts,
Frei refused to interfere with the constitutional process, and the
re-election gambit died.
B. PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
On September 14, the 40 Committee agreed that a propaganda
campaign should be undertaken by the CIA to focus on the damage that
would befall Chile under an Allende government. The campaign was to
include support for the Frei re-election gambit. According to a CIA
memorandum, the campaign sought to create concerns about Chile's future
if Allende were elected by the Congress; the propaganda was designed
to influence Frei, the Chilean elite, and the Chilean military.
The propaganda campaign included several components.
Predictions of economic collapse under Allende were replayed in CIA-generated
articles in European and Latin American newspapers. In response to
criticisms of El Mercurio by candidate Allende, the CIA, through its
covert action resources, orchestrated cables of support and protest
from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international
press association, and world press coverage of the association's protest.
In addition, journalists -agents and otherwise- traveled to Chile
for on-the-scene reporting. By September 28, the CIA had agents who
were journalists from ten different countries in or en route to Chile.
This group was supplemented by eight more journalists from five countries
under the direction of high-level agents who were, for the most part,
in managerial capacities in the media field.
Second, the CIA relied upon its own resources to generate
anti-Allende propaganda in Chile. These efforts included: support
for an underground press; placement of individual news items through
agents; financing a small newspaper; indirect subsidy of Patria y
Libertad a group fervently opposed to Allende, and its radio programs,
political advertisements and political rallies; and the direct mailing
of foreign news articles to Frei, his wife, selected leaders, and
the Chilean domestic press.
Third, special intelligence and "inside" briefings
were given to U.S. journalists, at their request. One Time cover story
was considered particularly noteworthy. According to CIA documents,
the Time correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's
protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings
requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in
a change in the basic thrust of the Time story on Allende's September
4 victory and in the timing of that story.
A few statistics convey the magnitude of the
CIA's propaganda campaign mounted during the six-week interim period
in the Latin American and European media. According to the CIA, partial
returns showed that 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and similar
items directlv resulted from Agency activity. The Agency had no way
to measure the scope of the multiplier effect -i.e., how much its
"induced" news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated
additional coverage- but concluded that its contribution was both
substantial and significant.
C. ECONOMIC PRESSURES
On September 29, 1970, the 40 Committee met. It was
agreed that the Frei gambit had been overtaken by events and was dead.
The "second-best option" -the cabinet resigning and being replaced
with a military cabinet- was also deemed dead. The point was then
made that there would probably be no military action unless economic
pressures could be brought to bear on Chile. It was agreed that an
attempt would be made to have American business take steps in line
with the U.S. government's desire for inimediate economic action.
The economic offensive against Chile, undertaken as
a part of Track I, was intended to demonstrate the foreign economic
reaction to Allende's accession to power, as well as to preview the
future consequences of his regime. Generally, the 40 Committee approved
cutting off all credits, pressuring firms to curtail investment in
Chile and approaching other nations to cooperate in this venture.
These actions of the 40 Committee, and the establishment
of an interagency working group to coordinate overt economic activities
towards Chile (composed of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division Chief
and representatives from State, the NSC, and Treasury), adversely
affected the Chilean economy; a major financial panic ensued. However,
U.S. efforts to generate an economic crisis did not have the desired
impact on the October 24 vote, nor did they stimulate a military intervention
to prevent Allende's accession.
2. Track II
As previously noted, U.S. efforts to prevent Aliende's
assumption of office operated on two tracks between September 4 and
October 24. Track II was initiated by President Nixon on September
15 when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing
a military coup d'etat in Chile. The Agency was to take this action
without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and
without informing the U.S. Ambassador. While coup possibilities in
general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession
to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period,
the 40 Committee never discussed this direct CIA role. In practice,
the Agency was to report, both for informational and approval purposes,
to the White House.
Between October 5 and October 20 1970, the CIA made
21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in
Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given
assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government
both before and after a coup.
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the
month after September 15. Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded
from Track II, was authorized to encourage a military coup, provided
Frei concurred in that solution. At the 40 Committee meeting on September
14, he and other "appropriate members of the Embassy mission" were
authorized to intensify their contacts with Chilean military officers
to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit." The Ambassador
was also authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware
that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further
military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, Korry was
authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military
sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the congressional
election on October 24.
The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as
evidenced by instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period,
was not that Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both
had this objective in mind. There were two differences between the
two tracks: Track I was contingent on at least the acquiescence of
Frei; and the CIA's Track II direct contacts with the Chilean military,
and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known
only to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA.
Despite these efforts, Track II proved to be no more
successful than Track I in preventing Allende's assumption of office.
Although certain elements within the Chilean army were actively involved
in coup plotting, the plans of the dissident Chileans never got off
the ground. A rather disorganized coup attempt did begin on October
22, but aborted following the shooting of General Schneider.
On October 24, 1970, Salvador Allende was confirmed
as President by Chilean Congress. On November 3, he was inaugurated.
U.S. efforts, both overt and covert, to prevent his assumption of
office had failed.
E. Covert Action During the Allende Years, 1970-1973
1. United States Policy and Covert Action
In his 1971 State of the World Message, released February
25, 1971, President Nixon announced: "We are prepared to have the
kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared
to have with us." This public articulation of American policy followed
internal discussions during the NSSM 97 exercise. Charles Meyer, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, elaborated that "correct
but minimal" line in his 1973 testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations:
Mr. MEYER. The policy of the Government, Mr. Chairman,
was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of
Chile. We were consistent in that we financed no candidates, no political
parties before or September 8, or September 4... The policy of the
United States was that Chile's problem was a Chilean problem, to be
settled by Chile. As the President stated in October of 1969, "We
will deal with governments as they are." (Multinational Corporations
and United States Foreign Policy, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Ninety Third Congress Washington: GPO, 1973
Part 1, p. 402).
Yet public pronouncements not withstanding, after Allende's
inauguration the 40 Committee approved a total of over seven million
dollars in covert support to opposition groups in Chile. That money
also funded and extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign. Of the
total authorized by the 40 Committee, over six million dollars was
spent during the Allende presidency and $84,000 was expended shortly
thereafter for commitments made before the coup. The total amount
spent on covert action in Chile during 1970-73 was approximately $7
million, including project funds not requiring 40 Committee approval.
Broadly speaking, U.S. policy sought to maximise pressures
on the Allende government to prevent its conso1idation and limit its
ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests.
That objective was stated clearly in National Security Decision Memorandum
(NSDM) 93, issued in early November1970. Other governments were encouraged
to adopt similar policies, and the U.S increased efforts to maintain
close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere.
The "cool but correct" overt posture denied the Allende government
a handy foreign enemy to use as a domestic and international rallying
point. At the same time, covert action was one reflection of the concerns
felt in Washington: the desire to frustrate Allende's experiment in
the Western Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model;
the fear that a Chile under Allende might harbor subversives from
other Latin American countries; and the determination to sustain the
principles of compensation for U.S. firms nationalized by the Allende
government.
Henry Kissinger outlined several of these concerns
in a background briefing to the press on September 16, 1970, in the
wake of Allende's election plurality:
Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende
wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period
of years some sort of communist government. In that case you would
have one not on an island off the coast which has not a traditional
relationship and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin American
country you would have a Communist government, joining, for example,
Argentina, which is already deeply divided, along a long frontier;
joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have
been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone
in a more leftist, anti-U.S. direction, even without any of these
developments.
So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an
Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us,
and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America,
and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere. What would happen to the
Western Hemisphere Defense Board, or to the Organization of America
States, and so forth, in extremely problematical... It is one of those
situations which is not too happu for American interests ( Multinational
Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Washington:
GPO, 1973, Part2, pp. 542-3)
As the discussion of National Intelligence Estimate
in Section IV of this paper makes clear the more extreme fears about
tbe effects of Allende's election were ill-founded; there never was
a significant threat of a Soviet military presence; the "export" of
Allende's revolution was limited, and its value as a model more restricted
still; and Allende was little more hospitable to activist exiles from
other Latin American countries than his predecesor has been. Nevertheless,
those fears, often exagerated, appear to have activated officials
in Washington.
The "cool but correct" public posture and extensive
clandestine activities formed two-thirds of a triad of official actions.
The third was economic pressure, both overt and covert, intended to
exacerbate the difficulties felt by Chile's economy. The United States
cut off economic aid, denied credits, and made efforts -partially
successful- to enlist the cooperation of international financial institutions
and private firms in tightening the economic "squeeze" on Chile. That
international "squeeze" intensified the effect of the economic measures
taken by opposition groups within Chile, particularly the crippling
strikes in the mining and transportation sectors. For_instance the
combined effect of foreign credit squeeze and domestic copper strikes
on Chile's foreign exchange position was devastating. Throughout the
Allende years, the U.S. maintained close contact with the Chilean
armed forces, both through the CIA and through U.S. military attachés.
The basic purpose of these contacts was the gathering of intelligence,
to detect any inclination within the Chilean armed forces to intervene.
But U.S. officials also were instructed to seek influence within the
Chilean military and to be generally supportive of its activities
without appearing to promise U.S. support for military efforts which
might be premature. For instance, in November 1971, the Station was
instructed to put the U.S. government in a position to take future
advantage of either a political or a military solution to the Chilean
dilemma, depending on developments within the country and the latter's
impact on the military themselves.
There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance
to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid. Rather the
United States - by its previous actions during Track II, its existing
general posture of opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts
with the Chilean military- probably gave the impression that it would
not look with disfavor on a military coup. And U.S. officials in the
years before 1973 may not always have succeeded in walking the thin
line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating
it.
2. Techniques of Covert Action
A. SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES
More than half of the 40 Committee-approved funds supported
the opposition political parties: the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
the National Party (PN), and several splinter groups. Nearly half-a-
million dollars was channeled to splinter groups during the Allende
years. Early in 1971 CIA funds enabled the PDC and PN to purchase
their own radio stations and newspapers. All opposition parties were
passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal elections and a congressional
by-election in July. In November 1971 funds were approved to strengthen
the PDC, PN, and splinter groups. An effort was also made to induce
a breakup of the UP coalition. CIA funds supported the opposition
parties in three by-elections in 1972, and in the March 1973 congressional
election. Money provided to political parties not only supported opposition
candidates in the various elections, but enabled the parties to maintain
an anti-government campaign throughout the Allende years, urging citizens
to demonstrate their opposition in a variety of ways.
Throughout the Allende years, the CIA worked to forge
a united opposition. The significance of this effort can be gauged
by noting that the two main elements opposing the Popular Unity government
were the National Party, which was conservative, and the reformist
Christian Democratic Party, many of whose members had supported the
major policies of the new government.
B. PROPAGANDA AND SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION MEDIA
Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee
approved large amounts to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain
a hard-hitting propaganda campaign. The CIA spent $1.5 million in
support of El Mercurio, the country's largest newspaper and the most
important channel for anti-Allende propaganda. According to CIA documents,
these efforts played a significant role in setting the stage for the
military coup of September 11, 1973.
The 40 Committee approvals in 1971 and early 1972 for
subsidizing El Mercurio were based on reports that the Chi1ean government
was trying to close the El Mercurio chain. In fact, the press remained
free throughout the Allende period, despite attempts to harass and
financially damage opposition media. The alarming field reports on
which the 40 Committee decisions were based are at some variance with
intelligence community analyses. For example, an August 1971 National
Intelligence Estimate -nine months after Allende took power- maintained
that the government was attempting to dominate the press but commented
that El Mercurio had managed to retain its independence. Yet one month
later the 40 Committee voted $700,000 to keep El Mercurio afloat.
And CIA documents in 1973 acknowledge that El Mercurio and, to a 1esser
extent, the papers belonging to opposition political parties, were
the only publications under pressure from the government.
The freedom of the press issue was the single most
important theme in the international propaganda campaign against Allende.
Among the books and pamphlets produced by the major opposition research
organization was one which appeared in October 1972 at the time of
the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) meeting in Santiago. As
in the 1970 period, the IAPA listed Chile as a country in which freedom
of the press was threatened.
The CIA's major propaganda project funded a wide range
of propaganda activities. It produced several magazines with national
circulations and a large number of books and special studies. It developed
material for placement in the El Mercurio chain (amounting to a total
daily circulation of over 300,000); opposition party newspapers; two
weekly newspapers; all radio stations controlled by opposition parties;
and on several regular television shows on three channels. El Mercurio
was a major propaganda channel during 1970-73, as it had been during
the l970 elections and pre-inaugura tion period. The CIA also funded
progressively a greater portion -over 75 percent in 1973- of an opposition
research organization. A steady flow of economic and technical material
went to opposition parties and private sector groups. Many of the
bills prepared by opposition parliamentarians were actually drafted
by personnel of the research organization.
C. SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Committee has taken testimony that 40 Committee-approved
funds were used to help maintain and strengthen the democratic opposition
in Chile. It has been stressed that CIA had nothing to do with the
truck owners' strike and the disorders that led to the coup. The question
of CIA support to Chilean private sector groups is a matter of considerable
concern because of the violent tactics used by several of these groups
in their efforts to bring about military intervention.
The issue of whether to support private groups was
debated within the Embassy and the 40 Committee throughout late 1972
and 1973. In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 for
"emergency support" of a powerful bussinesmen's organization, but
decided against financial support to other private sector organizations
because of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes.
In October 1972, the Committee approved $100,000 for three private
sector organizations -the bussinesmen's organization, associations
of large and small bussinesmen and an umbrella organization of opposition
groups- as part of a $1.5 million approval for support to opposition
groups. According to ~ CIA testimony, this limited financial support
to the private sector was confined to specific activities in support
of the opposition electoral campaign, such as voter registration drives
and a get-out-the-vote campaign.
After the March 1973 elections, in which opposition
forces failed to achieve the two thirds majority in the Senate that
might have permitted them to impeach Allende and hold new elections,
the U.S. Government re-assessed its objectives. There seemed little
likelihood of a successful military coup, but there did appear to
be a possibility that increasing unrest in the entire country might
induce the military to re-enter the Allende government in order to
restore order. Various proposals for supporting private sector groups
were examined in the context, but the Ambassador and the Department
of State remained opposed to any such support because of the increasingly
high level of tension in Chile, and because the groups were known
to hope for military intervention.
Nevertheless, on August 20, the 40 Committee approved
a proposal granting $1 million to opposition parties and private sector
groups, with passage of the funds contingent on the concurrence of
the Ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, and the Department of State. None
of these funds were passed to private sector groups before the military
coup three weeks later. While these deliberations were taking place,
the CIA Station asked Headquarters to take soundings to determire
whether maximum support could he provided to the opposition, including
groups like the truck owners. The Ambassador agreed that these soundings
should be taken, but opposed a specific proposal for $25,000, of support
to the strikers. There was a CIA recommendation for support to the
truck owners, but it is unclear whether or not that proposal came
before the 40 Committee. On August 25 -16 days before the coup- Headquarters
advised the Station that soundings were being taken, but the CIA Station's
proposal was never approved.
The pattern of U.S. deliberations suggests a careful
distinction between supporting the opposition parties and funding
private sector groups trying to bring about a military coup. However,
given turbulent conditions in Chile, the interconnections among the
CIA-sup- ported political parties, the various militant trade associations
(gremios) and paramilitary groups prone to terrorism and violent disruption
were many. The CIA was aware that links between these groups and the
political parties made clear distinctions difficult.
The most prominent of the right-wing paramilitary groups
was Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), which formed following
Allende's Septamber 4 election, during so-called Track II. The CIA
provided Patria y Libertad with $38,000 through a third party during
the Track II period, in an effort to create tension and a possible
pretext for intervention by the Chilean militarv. After Allende took
office, the CIA occasionally provided the group small sums through
third parties for demonstrations or specific propaganda activity.
Those disbursements, about seven thousand dollars in total, ended
in 1971. It is possible that CIA funds given to political parties
reached Patria y Libertad and a similar group, the Rolando Matus Brigade,
given the close ties between the parties and these organizations.
Throughout the Allende presidency, Patria y Libertad
was the most strident voice opposing all compromise efforts by Christian
Democrats, calling for resistance to government measures, and urging
insurrection in the armed forces. Its tactics came to parallel those
of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) at the opposite end
of the political spectrum. Patria y Libertad forces marched at opposition
rallies dressed in full riot gear. During the October 1972 national
truckers' strike, Patria y Libertad was reported to strew "miguelitos"
(three-pronged steel tacks) on highways in order to help bring the
country's transportation system to a halt. On July 13, 1973, Patria
y Libertad placed a statement in a Santiago newspaper claiming responsibilitv
for an abortive coup on June 29, and on July 17, Patria y Libertad
leader Roberto Thieme announced that his groups would unleash a total
armed offensive to overthrow the government.
With regard to the truckers' strike, two facts are
undisputed. First, the 40 Committee did not approve any funds to be
given directly to the strikers. Second, all observers agree that the
two lengthy strikes (the second lasted from July 13, 1973 until the
September 11 coup) could not have been maintained on the basis of
union funds, It remains unclear whether or to what extent CIA funds
passed to opposition parties may have been siphoned off to support
strikes. It is clear that anti-government strikers were actively supported
by several of the private sector groups which received CIA funds.
There were extensive links between these private sector organizations
and the groups which coordinated and implemented the strikes. In November
1972 the CIA learned that one private sector group had passed $2,800
directly to strikers, contrary to the Agency's ground rules. The CIA
rebuked the group but nevertheless passed it additional money the
next month.
3. United States Economic Policies Toward
Chile: 1970-1973
A. COVERT ACTION AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE
The policy response of the U. S. Government to the
Allende regime consisted of an interweaving of diplomatic, covert,
military, and economic strands. Economic pressure exorted by the United
States formed an important part of the mix. It is impossible to understand
the effect of covert action without knowing the economic pressure
which accompanied it.
B. CHILEAN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
The demise of the brief Allende experiment in 1970-73
came as the cumulative result of many factors -external and internal.
The academic debate as to whether the external or the internal factors
weighed more heavely is endless. This is not the place to repeat it.
A brief description of the Chilean economy will suffice to suggest
the probable effect on Chile of U.S. economic actions and the possible
interactions between economic and political factors in causing Allende's
downfall.
Chile's export-oriented economy remained, in 1970,
dependent for foreign exchange earnings on a single product -copper-
much as it had depended on nitrate in the 19th century. However, the
Allende Administration consciously adopted a policy of beginning to
diversify Chile's trade by expanding ties with Great Britain, the
rest of the Western European countries, and Japan, and by initiating
minor trade agreements with the Eastern Bloc countries.
Nevertheless, Chilean economic dependence on the United
States remained a significant factor during the period of the Allende
government. In 1970, U.S. direct private investment in Chile stood
at $1.1 billion, out of an estimated total foreign investment of $1.672
billion. U.S. and foreign corporations played a large part in almost
all of the critical areas of the Chilean economy. Furthermore, United
States corporations controlled the production of 80 percent of Chile's
copper, which in 1970 accounted for four-fifths of Chile's foreign
exchange earnings. Hence, the Allende government faced a situation
in which decisions of foreign corporations had significant ramifications
throughout the Chilean economy.
Chile had accumulated a large foreign debt during the
Frei government, much of it contracted with international and private
banks. Chile was able, through the Paris Club, to re-negotiate $800
million in debts to foreign governments and medium-term debt to major
U.S. banks in early 1972. It also obtained in 1972 some $600 million
in credits and loans from socialist bloc countries and Western sources;
however, a study done by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance
for Progress, concluded that these credits were "tied to specific
development projects and [could] be used only gradually".
Even with a conscious policy of diversifying its foreign
trading patterns, in 1970 Chile continued to depend on the import
of essential replacement parts from United States firms. The availability
of short-term United States commercial credits dropped from around
$300 million during the Frei years to around $30 million in 1972.
The drop, a result of combined economic and political factors, seriously
affected the Allende government's ability to purchase replacement
parts and machinery for the most critical sectors of the economy:
copper, steel, electricity, petroleum, and transport.
By late 1972, the Chilean Ministry of the Economy estimated
that almost one-third of the diesel trucks at Chuquicamata Copper
Mine, 30 percent of the privately owned city buses, 21 percent of
all taxis, and 33 percent of state-owned buses in Chile could not
operate because of the lack of spare parts or tires. In overall terms,
the value of United States machinery and transport equipment exported
to Chile by U.S. firms declined from $152.6 million in 1970 to $110
million in 1971.
C. THE INSTRUMENTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY TOWARD ALLENDE.
United States foreign economic policy toward Allende's
government was articulated at the highest levels of the U.S. government,
and coordinated by interagency task forces. The policy was clearly
framed during the Track II period. Richard Helm's notes from his September
15, 1970, meeting with President Nixon, the meeting which initiated
Track II, contain the indication: "Make the economy scream". A week
later Ambassador Korry reported telling Frei, through his Defense
Minister, that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach Chile
under Allende".
While the Chilean economy was vulnerable to U.S. pressures
over a period of a few years, it was not in the short run. That judgement
was clearly made by intelligence analysts in the government, but its
implications seem not to have affected policy-making in September
and October of 1970. A February 1971 Intelligence Memorandum noted
that Chile was not immediately vulnerable to investment, trade or
monetary sanctions imposed by the United States. In fact, the imposition
of sanctions, while it would hurt Chile eventually, was seen to carry
one possible short-run benefit -it would have given Chile a justification
for renouncing nearly a billion dollars debt to the United States.
The policy of economic pressure -articulated in NSDM
93 of November 1970- was to be implemented through several means.
All new bilateral foreign assistance was to be stopped, although disbursements
would continue under loans made previously. The U.S. would use its
predominant position in international financial institutions to dry
up the flow of new multilateral credit or other financial assistance.
To the extent possible, financial assistance or guarantees to U.S.
private investment in Chile would be ended, and U.S. businesses would
be made aware of the government's concern and its restrictive policies.
The bare figures tell the story. U.S. bilateral aid,
$35 million in 1969, was $1.5 million in 1971. (See Table II.) U.S.
Export-Import Bank credits, which had totalled $234 million in 1967
and $29 million in 1969, dropped to zero in 1971. Loans from the multilateral
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), in which the U.S. held what
amounted to a veto, had totalled $46 million in 1970; they fell to
$2 million in 1972 (United States A.I.D. figures). The only new IDB
loans made to Chile during the Allende period were two small loans
to Chilean universities made in January 1971(8). Similarly, the World Bank made no new loans
to Chile between 1970 and 1973. However, the International Monetary
Fund extended Chile approximately $90 million during 1971 and 1972
to assist with foreign exchange difficulties.
TABLE II.- FOREIGN AID TO CHILE FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS - TOTAL OF LOANS AND GRANTS (In
millions of dollars)
Fiscal year |
1953-61 |
1962 |
1963 |
1964 |
1965 |
1966 |
1967 |
1968 |
1969 |
1970 |
1971 |
1972 |
1973 |
1974 |
Total U.S. economic aid |
339.7 |
169.8 |
85.3 |
127.1 |
130.4 |
111.9 |
260.4 |
97.1 |
8.8 |
29.6 |
8.6 |
7.4 |
3.8 |
9.8 |
U.S. Aid |
76.4 |
142.7 |
41.3 |
78.9 |
99.5 |
93.2 |
15.5 |
57.9 |
35.4 |
18.0 |
1.5 |
1.0 |
.8 |
5.3 |
U.S. Food for Peace |
94.2 |
6.6 |
22.0 |
26.9 |
14.2 |
14.4 |
7.9 |
23.0 |
15.0 |
7.2 |
6.3 |
5.9 |
2.5 |
3.2 |
U.S. Export-Import Bank |
169.0 |
.8 |
16.2 |
15.3 |
8.2 |
.1 |
234.6 |
14.2 |
28.7 |
3.3 |
------- |
1.6 |
3.1 |
(1) 98.1 |
Total U.S. Military aid |
41.8 |
17.8 |
30.6 |
9.0 |
9.9 |
10.1 |
4.1 |
7.8 |
11.8 |
.8 |
5.7 |
12.3 |
15.0 |
15.9 |
Total U.S. economic and military aid |
381.5 |
187.6 |
115.9 |
136.1 |
140.3 |
122.0 |
264.5 |
104.9 |
91.8 |
30.4 |
14.3 |
(2) 21.3 |
(2) 21.9 |
(2) 123.8 |
Total international organizations (3) |
135.4 |
18.7 |
31.2 |
41.4 |
12.4 |
72.0 |
93.8 |
19.4 |
49.0 |
76.4 |
15.4 |
(2) 8.2 |
9.4 |
111.2 |
IBRD (World Bank) |
95.2 |
------- |
------- |
22.6 |
4.4 |
2.7 |
60.0 |
------- |
11.6 |
19.3 |
------- |
------- |
------- |
13.5 |
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). |
5.7 |
15.1 |
24.4 |
16.6 |
4.9 |
62.2 |
31.0 |
16.5 |
31.9 |
45.6 |
12.0 |
2.1 |
5.2 |
97.3 |
(1) Includes Ex-Im: 57.0 and other: 41.1.
(2) Total per chart plus Export-Import Bank.
(3) U.S. contributions to I.O's included above; therefore
U.S. aid and international aid should not be added together.
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1974, pp. 39, 175. Prepared
by Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Financial Management,
Agency for International Development.
Reactions to events in Chile accounted for much of the
momentum in the United States Government for the development of a policy
on expropriation. In what came to be known as the Allende Doctrine,
Chile proposed to deduct a calculation of "excess profits" (over and
above reinvestments and a 10-12 percent profit margin) from any compensation
paid to nationalized firms in the copper sector. By this calculations,
U.S. copper companies were in fact told they owed money. The reaction
of the U.S. Government was strong. In January 1972, President Nixon
announced that, when confronted with such situations, the U.S. would
cut off bilateral aid and "withhold its support from loans under consideration
in multilateral development banks."
While the State Department, the CIA, and the Department
of Commerce all participated in the United States economic policy toward
Chile, a central point in the execution of this policy was the Department
of the Treasury. The Department instructs U.S. representatives on multilateral
lending institutions. In the IDB, for instance, the U.S. controlled
40 percent of the votes, sufficient to veto any "soft" IDB loans. Loan
proposals submitted to the IDB were held under study, never coming up
for a vote by the IDB Board. Whether U.S. actions, and those of multilateral
institutions, were motivated by political interests or economic judgements
of Chile's "credit worthiness" is a debate not yet definitely settled.
However, it seems clear from the pattern of U.S. economic actions and
from the nature of debates within the Executive Branch that American
economic policy was driven more by political opposition to an Allende
regime than by purely technical judgements about Chile's finances.
The posture of the Export-Import Bank, a United States
public institution, reflected the tone of U.S. economic policy toward
Chile during the Allende period. In the fall of 1970, the Bank dropped
Chile's credit rating from "B", the second category, to "D", the last
category. Insofar as the rating contributed to similar evaluations by
private U.S. banks, corporations, and international private investors,
it aggravated Chile's problem of attracting and retaining needed capital
inflow through private foreign investment. In mid-August 1971 the Bank
decided that a $21 million credit for Boeing passenger jets would be
deferred pending a resolution of the controversy over compensation for
nationalized U.S. copper companies. That Bank decision came one month
after the nationalization and two months before the final decision on
compensation. In fact, the Boeing decision had been first announced
in May, BEFORE the nationalization occurred.
The United States linked the question of indemnization
for U.S. copper companies with Chile's multilateral foreign debt. That
foreign debt, an inheritance from the obligations incurred by the Alessandri
and Frei governments, was the second highest foreign debt per capita
of any country in the world. Yet, in the 1972 and 1973 Paris Club foreign
debt negotiations with Chile's principal foreign creditor nations, the
United States alone refused to consider rescheduling Chile's foreign
payments until there was movement toward indemnization for the U.S.
copper companies. The United States also exerted pressure on each of
the other foreign creditor nations not to renegotiate Chile's foreign
debt as a group.
4. U. S. Relations with the Chilean Military
United States relations with the Chilean military during
1970-1973 must be viewed against the backdrop not only of the tradition
of close cooperation between the American and the Chilean military services
and the continuing intelligence collection efforts, but also in the
context of Track II -an attempt to foment a military coup. Track II
marked a break in the nature of relations between U.S. officials and
the Chilean military.
Close personal and professional cooperation between Chilean
and U.S. officers was a tradition of long standing. The American military
presence in Chile was substantial, consisting both of military attaches,
the Embassy, and members of the Military Group who provided training
and assistance to the Chilean armed services. In the late 1960s the
Military Group numbered over fifty; by the Allende period, it was reduced
to a dozen or so, for reasons which had primarily to do with U.S. budget-
cutting.
A. PRE-TRACK II
In July 1969 the CIA Station in Santiago requested and
received Headquarters approval for a covert program to establish intelligence
assets in the Chilean armed services for the purpose of monitoring coup
plotting. The program lasted for four years; it involved assets drawn
from all the three branches of the Chilean military and included command-level
officers, field- and company-grade officers, retired general staff officers
and enlisted men. From 1969 to August 1970, the program adhered closely
to its stated objective of monitoring and reporting coup-oriented activity
within the Chilean military.
During August, September and October of 1969, it became
increasingly clear from the agents' reports that the growing dissatisfaction
and unrest within the armed forces was leading to an unstable military
situation. These events culminated in the abortive military revolt of
October 1969 -the "Tacnazo", named after the city where it occurred,
Tacna. How close the amauterish "Tacnazo" came to success was a lesson
to remember, particularly in light of the upcoming Presidential election
of 1970 and the strong possibility that Salvador Allende would emerge
victoriuos.
B. TRACK II
The Track II covert action effort to organize a military
coup to deny Allende the Presidency caught the Santiago Station unprepared.
Its two assets in the Chilean military were not in a position to spark
a coup. To accomplish the mission directed by Washington, the Station
had to use a U.S. military attache and other hastily developed contacts
with the two main coup plotting groups in the Chilean military. These
contacts not only reported the plans of the groups but also relayed
the Station's advice about mechanics and timing, and passed on indications
of U.S. Government support following a successful coup. With the death
of Schneider, the plotters' effort collapsed in disarray, leaving the
Station with only its initial assets in the military. It took the Station
another ten months to rebuild a network of agents among the cautious
Chilean military.
As part of its attempt to induce the Chilean military
to intervene before the October 24 congressional vote, the United States
had threatened to cut off military aid if the military refused to act.
That was accompanied by a promise of support in the aftermath of a coup.
However, military assistance was not cut off at the time of Allende's
confirmation (see Table III). Military sales jumped sharply from 1972
to 1973 and even more sharply from 1973 to 1974 after the coup (see
Table IV). Training of Chilean military personnel in Panama also rose
during the Allende years (see Table V)
C. 1970-1973
After the failure of Track II, the CIA rebuilt its network
of contacts and remained close to Chilean military officers in order
to monitor developments within the armed forces. For their part, Chilean
officers who were aware that the United States once had sought a coup
to prevent Allende from becoming president must have been sensitive
to indications of continuing U.S. support for a coup.
By September 1971 a new network of agents was in place
and the Station was receiving almost daily reports of new coup plotting.
The Station and Headquarters began to explore ways to use this network.
At the same time, and in parallel, the Station and Headquarters discussed
a "deception operation" designed to alert Chilean officers to real or
purported Cuban involvement in the Chilean army. Throughout the fall
of 1971 the Station and Headquarters carried on a dialogue about both
the general question of what to do with the intelligence network and
the objectives of the specific operation.
TABLE III.-MILITARY ASSISTANCE (1)
Fiscal Year |
Programed |
Delivered |
1966 |
$8,806,000 |
$8,366,000 |
1967 |
4,143,000 |
4,766,000 |
1968 |
1,801,000 |
7,507,000 |
1969 |
734,000 |
2,662,000 |
1970 |
852,000 |
1,966,000 |
1971 |
698,000 |
1,033,000 |
1972 |
870,000 |
2,227,000 |
1973 |
941,000 |
918,000 |
1974 |
912,000 |
619,000 |
(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response to
a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.
TABLE IV.-MILITARY SALES (1)
Fiscal Year |
Orders |
Delivered |
1966 |
$1,057,000 |
$1,490,000 |
1967 |
2,559,000 |
1,690,000 |
1968 |
4,077,000 |
2,100,000 |
1969 |
1,676,000 |
2,147,000 |
1970 |
7,503,000 |
9,145,000 |
1971 |
2,886,000 |
2,958,000 |
1972 |
6.238,000 |
4,583,000 |
1973 |
14,972,000 |
2,242,000 |
1974 |
76,120,000 |
4,860,000 |
(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response to
a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.
TABLE V.- TRAINING IN PANAMA (1)
Fiscal Year |
Number of people |
1966 |
68 |
1967 |
57 |
1968 |
169 |
1969 |
107 |
1970 |
181 |
1971 |
146 |
1972 |
197 |
1973 |
257 |
1974 |
268 |
(1) Figures are from a Department of Defense response
to a Senate Select Committee document request and are unclassified.
The Station proposed, in September, to provide information
-some of it fabricated by the CIA- which would convince senior Chilean
Army officers that the Carabineros' Investigations unit, with the approval
of Allende was acting in concert with Cuban intelligence (DGI) to gather
intelligence prejudicial to the Army high command. It was hoped that
the ettort would arouse the military against Allende's involvement with
the Cubans, inducing the armed services to press the government to alter
its orientation and to move against it if necessary. A month later CIA
Headquarters suggested that the deception operation be shelved, in favor
of passing "verifiable" information to the leader of the coup group
which Headquarters and the Station perceived as having the highest probability
of success.
After a further Station request, Headquarters agreed
to the operation with the objective of educating senior Chilean officers
and keeping them on alert. In December 1971 a packet of material, including
a fabricated letter, was passed to a Chilean officer outside Chile.
The CIA did not receive any subsequent reports on the effect if any,
this "information" had on the Chilean military. While the initial conception
of the operation had included a series of such passages, no further
packets were passed.
The Station/Headquarters dialogue over the use of the
intelligence network paralleled the discussion of the deception operation.
In November the Station suggested that the ultimate objective of the
military penetration program was a military coup. Headquarters responded
by rejecting that formulation of the objective, cautioning that the
CIA did not have 40 Committee approval to become involved in a coup.
However, Headquarters acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a firm
line between monitoring coup plotting and becoming involved in it. It
also realized that the U.S. government's desire to be in clandestine
contract with military plotters, for whatever purpose, might well imply
to them U.S. support for their future plans.
During I970-73, the Station collected operational intelligence
necessary in the event of a coup -arrest lists, key civilian installations
and personnel that needed protection, key government installations which
need to be taken over, and government contingency plans which would
be used in case of a military uprising. According to the CIA the data
was collected only against the contingency of future Headquarters requests
and was never passed to the Chilean military.
The intelligence network continued to report throughout
1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued
to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent
a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this group
than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the
Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had
successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary
with its leader.
During late 1971 and early 1972, the CIA adopted a more
active stance vis a vis its military penetration program, including
a short-lived effort to subsidize a small anti-government news pamphlet
directed at the armed services, its compilation of arrest lists and
other operational data, and its deception operation.
Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak
periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the
end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the
CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group
which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months
of July, August, and September 1973.
The CIA's information-gathering efforts with regard to
the Chilean military included activity which went beyond the mere collection
of information. More generally, those efforts must be viewed in the
context of United States opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende
government. They put the United States Government in contact with those
Chileans who sought a military alternative to the Allende presidency.
F. Post-1973
1. Chile Since the Coup
Following the September 11, 1973, coup, the military
Junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, moved quickly to consolidate
its newly acquired power. Political parties were banned, Congress was
put in indefinite recess, press censorship was instituted, supporters
of Allende and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed,
and elections were put off indefinitely.
The prospects for the revival of democracy in Chile have
improved little over the last two years. A 1975 National Intelligence
Estimate stated that the Chilean armed forces were determined to oversee
a prolonged political moratorium and to revamp the Chilean political
system. The NIE stated that the Junta had established tight, authoritarian
controls over political life in Chile which generally continued in effect.
It had outlawed Marxist parties in Chile as well as other parties which
had comprised Allende's coalition. In addition, the Christian Democratic
and National parties had been placed in involuntary recess. These two
parties were forbidden from engaging in political activity and restricted
to purely housekeeping functions.
In addition, charges concerning the violation of human
rights in Chile continue to be directed at the Junta. Most recently,
a United Nations report on Chile charged that "torture centers" are
being operated in Santiago and other parts of the country. The lengthy
docu ment, issued October 14, 1975, listed 11 centers where it says
prisoners are being questioned "by metbods amounting to torture." The
Pinochet government had originally offered full cooperation to the U.N.
group, including complete freedom of movement in Chile. However, six
days before the group's arrival in Santiago the government reversed
itself and notified the group that the visit was cancelled.
2. CIA Post-coup Activities in Chile
The covert action budget for Chile was cut back sharply
after the coup and all the anti-Allende projects except for one, a major
propaganda project, were terminated. Covert activities in Chile following
the coup were either continuations or adaptations of earlier projects,
rather than major new initiatives.
The goal of covert action immediately following the coup
was to assist the Junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home
and abroad, and to maintain access to the command levels of the Chilean
government. Another goal, achieved in part through work done at the
opposition research organization before the coup, was to help the new
government organize and implement new policies. Project files record
that. CIA collaborators were involved in preparing an initial overall
economic plan which has served as the basis for the Junta's most important
economic decisions.
With regard to the continuing propaganda project, a number
of activities, including the production of books, a mailing effort,
a military collection program, and the media coordination effort were
terminated. However, access to certain Chilean media outlets was retained
in order to enable the CIA Station in Santiago to help build Chilean
public support for the new government as well as to influence the direction
of the government, through pressures exerted by the mass media. These
media outlets attempted to present the Junta in the most positive light
for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists in Chile to
obtain facts about the local situation. Further, two CIA collaborators
assisted the Junta in preparing a White Book of the Change of Government
in Chile. The White Book published by the Junta shortly after the coup,
was written to justify the overthrow of Allende. It was distributed
widely both in Washington and in other foreign capitals.
Afer the coup, the CIA renewed liaison relations with
the Chilean government's security and intelligence forces, relations
which had been disrupted during the Allende period. Concern was expressed
within the CIA that liaison with such organizations would lay the Agency
open to charges of aiding political repression; officials acknowledged
that, while most of CIA's support to the various Chilean forces would
be designed to assist them in controlling subversion from abroad, the
support could be adaptable to the control of internal subversion as
well. However, the CIA made it clear to the Chileans at the outset that
no CIA support would be provided for use in internal political repression.
Furthermore, the CIA attempted to influence the Junta to maintain the
norms the Junta had set in its "Instructious for Handling of Detainees"
which closely followed the standards on human rights set by the 1949
Geneva Convention.
IV. Chile: Authorization, Assessment,
and Oversight.
A. 40 Committee Authorization and Control: Chile, 1969-1973.
1. 40 Committee Functions and Procedures
Throughout its history, the 40 Committee and its directs
predecessors- the 303 Committee and the Special Group- have had one
overriding purpose: to exercise political control over covert operations
abroad. The 40 Committee is charged with considering the objectives
of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these aims,
and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the American
interest. Minutes and summaries of 40 Committee meetings on Chile indicate
that, by and large, these considerations were discussed and occasionally
debated by 40 Committee members.
In addition to exercising political control, the 40 Committee
has been responsible for framing covert operations in such a way that
they could later be "disavowed" or "plausibly denied" by the United
States government- or at least by the President. In the case of Chile,
of course, this proved to be an impossible task. Not only was CIA involvement
in Chile "blown", but in September 1974, President Ford publicly acknowledged
at a press conference U.S. covert involvement in Chile.
Before covert action proposals are presented to the Director
for submission to the 40 Committee, an internal CIA intruction states
that they should be coordinated with the Department of State
and that, ordinarily, concurrence by the ambassador to the
country concerned is required."Should" and "ordinarily" were underscored
for an important reason- major covert action proposals are not always
coordinated among the various agencies. Nor, for that matter, are they
always discussed and/or approved by the 40 Committee. The Chile case
demonstrates that in at least one instance, the so-called Track II activity,
the President instructed the CIA not to inform nor coordinate this activity
with the Departments of State or Defense or the ambassador in the field.
Nor was the 40 Committee ever informed.
Not all covert activities are approved by the 40 Committee.
Projects not deemed politically risky or involving large sums of money
can be approved within the CIA. By CIA statistics, only about one-fourth
of all covert action projects are considered by the 40 Committee. The
Committee has not been able to determine what percentage of covert action
projects conducted by the CIA in Chile were approved within the CIA
or required 40 Committee authorization. Despite this fact, the Committee
has found evidence of projects not considered by the 40 Committee, thus
conforming to this general authorization rule. This is not to imply
that the CIA undertook activities in Chile behind the back of the 40
Committee or without its approval. The Agency was simply following the
authorization procedures for covert projects that then existed. These
same procedures exist today.
There have been numerous criticisms of 40 Committee procedures,
some of which follow:
The criteria by which covert operations are brought
before the 40 Committee appear to be fuzzy. The real degree of accountability
for covert actions remains to be determined.
There is a basic conflict between sufficient consultation
to insure accountability and sound decisions on the one hand, and secure
operations on the other. The risk of inadequate consultation may be
aggravated by the more informal procedure of telephone clearances, which
has been used by the 40 Committee for the last few years.
The review of covert actions by the 40 Committee
does not appear to be searching or thorough. There still appears to
be a serious risk that operations will end only when they come to grief.
2. 40 Committee Approvals
According to a chronology of 40 Committee meetings, the
Committee met on 23 separate occasions between March 1970 and October
1973 to authorize funds for covert activities in Chile(9). During this period, the Committee authorized
a total of $8.8 million for CIA covert activities in Chile. Of this
amount, $6.5 million was spent.
The range of CIA activities in Chile approved by the
40 Committee included "spoiling" operations against Allende prior to
the September 4th election, assistance to Chilean political parties,
a contingency fund for Ambassador Korry's use to influence the October
24 congressional vote, purchase of a Chilean radio station to be used
as a political opposition instrument against Allende, assistance to
specific political candidates, emergency aid to keep the Santiago paper, El Mercurio, afloat, and support for an anti-Allende businessmen's
association.
3. Policy Splits Within the 40 Committee
Unanimity was not a hallmark of 40 Committee meetings
on Chile, at least during the period April 1969 to October 1970. Stated
simply, the State Department was generally skeptical about intervening
in the Chilean electoral process, whereas the CIA, the U.S. Ambassador
to Chile, the Defense Department, and the White House favored intervention.
The question of whether anything should be done with
regard to the September 1970 presidential election in Chile was first
raised at a meeting of the 303 Committee on April 15, 1969. It was not
until December 1969, however, that a joint Embassy-CIA proposal for
a campaign directed against Allende was submitted to the Committee.
At this December meeting, two State Department officials questioned
the need for U.S. involvement in the election. One State official commented
that an Allende victory would not be the same as a Communist victory.
The U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, who had been recalled for
consultation, disagreed. He stated that operationally one must treat
an Allende victory as the same thing as a Communist victory. Korry went
on to state that, in his view, an Allende government would be worse
thana Castro government.
On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a "spoiling
operation" against Allende and approved $125,000 for this purpose. Again,
however, the State Department, represented by Under Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson, indicated that the Department remained lukewarm to
any involvement in the election anf informed the 40 Committee that the
Department would be quite cool to a more positive approach.
One further example of policy disagreement within the
40 Committee was evidenced in a summary of a September 29, 1970, 40
Committee meeting. This meeting occurred a little more than three weeks
after Allende had won his plurality victory on September 4. The question
of applying economic pressure to Chile was raised, with the hope that
this pressure would create the conditions which would lead to a military
coup. After a run-through of possible economic pressures that could
be brought to bear in Chile, provided by the CIA's Deputy Director for
Plans Thomas Karamessines, Under Secretary of State Johnson noted that
to swerve from 40 Committee-type action to economic warfare was tantamount
to a change in foreign policy. Despite this concern, the 40 Committee
did decide to increase economic pressures in Chile. The State Department
was not happy with this turn of events. Assistant Secretary of State
Charles Meyer remarked that should Allende be confirmed, the U.S. could
place the burden on Allende for all that he did, and, after all, he
would not be around forever. This view was not accepted by the CIA.
Director Helms remarked at the meeting that Allende's Marxist pronouncements
should be taken at face value while Karamessines added that a hands-off
policy in Chile at this time would be read as the U.S. throwing in the
sponge. As evidenced by later 40 Committee authorizations, the sponge
was not thrown in.
B. Intelligence Estimates and Covert Action.
The intelligence community produces several kinds of
assessments for policy makers. Of these, the most important are National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)- joint, agreed assessment of foreign politics
and capabilities- produced by the U.S. intelligence community. This
section, based on a review of NIEs and other intelligence memoranda(10) regarding Chile written during 1969-1973,
will trace the intelligence community's best estimates of what an Allende
government signified for U.S. interests.
NIEs are approved by the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB) ; dissenting agencies can register footnotes. Prior to 1973,
a formal Board of National Estimates supervised the production of drafts
by a special Office of National Estimates. In 1973, that structure was
replaced by a system of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) , senior
analysts drawn from the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
There have been persistent criticisms of NIEs and many
of these remain with the new structure : the documents are least-common-denominator
compromises and this are of little value to policy makers ; they are
oriented toward short-range predictions rather than long-run assessments.
Another criticism deals not with the NIEs themselves but with their
use or abuse. It is charged that policy makers ignore NIEs or consult
them only when estimates confirm their pre-existing policy preferences.
1. The Chile Estimates
Between 1969 and 1973, five Chile NIEs were produced, one
in each year. In addition, several Intelligence Memoranda and Intelligence
Notes relating to Chile were prepared by CIA and State. The likely policies
and goals of an Allende administration, as predicted by the intelligence
community, follow.
A. CHILE UNDER ALLENDE
A July 1970 Chile NIE, prepared a little over a month
before the September election, raised the question of what an Allende
victory would mean to Chile and the United States. The NIE occasioned
considerable disagreement within the Washington community. The disagreement
reflected a division between the Department of State on one side and
the U.S. Ambassador and the CIA Station on the other. The latter position
was that an Allende victory would mean the gradual imposition of a classic
Marxist-Leninist regime in Chile. This position was reflected, with
some qualifying remarks, in the NIE.
The 1970 NIE stated, in strong terms, that an Allende
administration would proceed as rapidly as possible toward the establishment
of a Marxist-Socialist state. It would be a Chilean version of a Soviet-style
East European Communist state. The intelligence community predicted
that although democracy was likely to survive in Chile over the next
two or three years, Allende could take Chile a long way down the Marxist-Socialist
road during the six years of his administration. To do this, however,
he would have to surmount some very important obstacles, such as Chile's
security forces, the Christian Democratic Party, some elements of organized
labor, the Congress, and the Catholic Church. The NIE noted that Allende
undoubtedly expected progress on basic bread and butter issues which
would afford him an apportunity to secure control of the Congress in
the 1973 election and thereby enable him to impose a socialist state
of the Marxist variety by the vía pacífica ("peaceful road").
The next NIE issued on Chile, in August 1971, was less
shrill on the threat which Allende represented to Chilean democracy.
He had been in office nine months. The NIE stated that the consolidation
of Marxist political leadership in Chile was not inevitable and that
Allende had a long, hard way to go to achieve this. The NIE warned,
however, that although Allende would almost certainly prefer to adhere
to constitutional means, he was likely to be impelled to use political
techniques of increasingly dubious legality to perpetuate his coalition
and power. Up to that point, the NIE observed, Allende had taken great
care to observe constitutional forms and was enjoying considerable popularity
in Chile.
The next NIE came out in June 1972. The prospects for
the continuation of democracy in Chile appeared to be better than at
any time since Allende's inauguration. The NIE stated that the traditional
political system in Chile continued to demonstrate remarkable resiliency.
Legislative, student, and trade union elections continued to take place
in normal fashion, with pro-govenment forces accepting the results when
they were adverse. The NIE noted that the Christian Democratic Party
and the National Party had used their combined control of both Houses
of Congress to stall government iniciatives and to pass legislation
designed to curtail Allende's powers. In addition, the opposition news
media had been able to resist government intimidation and persisted
in denouncing the government. The NIE concluded that the most likely
course of events in Chile for the next year or so would be moves by
Allende toward showing the pace of his revolution in order to accommodate
the opposition and to preserve the gains he had already made.
One final NIE on Chile was issued prior to Allende's
overthrow in September 1973. That NIE focused on the prospects for the
consolidation of power by Allende's regime. It concluded that at that
juncture a political standoff seemed to be the most likely course of
events in Chile. The NIE stated that Allende had not consolidated the
power of his Marxist regime ; the bulk of low-income Chileans believed
that he had improved their conditions and represented their interests
; and the growth in support for his coalition reflected his political
ability as well as the popularity of his measures. The NIE did warn,
however, that the growing polarization of the Chilean society was wearing
away the Chilean predilection for political compromise. Nevertheless,
the analysts predicted that there was only an outside chance that the
military would move to force Allende from office.
B. U.S.-CHILEAN RELATIONS
Almost two years before Allende was elected, the intelligence
community predicted that future U.S.-Chilean relations would be under
repeated strains, regardless of which party won the 1970 presidential
election. A 1969 NIE stated that whoever succeeded Frei in the presidency
was likely to continue to stress Chilean independence, to be less cooperative
with the U.S. than Frei had been, and to explore somewhat broader relations
with communist countries. This NIE noted that were Allende to win, his
administration would almost certainly take steps aimed at moving Chile
away from the U.S. The NIE also observed that steps toward either govenment
participation in or outright nationalization of U.S. copper holdings
in Chile were inevitable.
A 1970 NIE, issued one month before Allende's September
victory , was quite pessimistic about future U.S.-Chilean relations.
It stated that if Allende were to win the election, he would almost
certainly take harsh measures against U.S. business interests in Chile
and challende U.S. policies in the hemisphere. The NIE cited several
foreign policy problems an Allende regime would pose for the U.S., including
recognition of Cuba, possible withdrawal from the OAS, the deterioration
of relations with Argentina, and anti-U.S. votes in the United Nations.
The NIE predicted, however that Allende would probably not seek a break
with the United States over the next two years.
A 1971 NIE, issued ten months into Allende's term in
office, stated that U.S.-Chilean relations were dominated by the problems
of nationalization, although Allende himself seemed to wish to avoid
a confrontation. A 1972 Chile NIE noted that Allende, to date, had sought
to avoid irreparable damage to his relations with Washington. Although
the major problem concerning U.S.-Chilean relations continued to be
that of compensation for the nationalization of U.S. companies, the
1972 NIE stated that Allende had taken pains to publicly stress his
desire for amicable relations. A 1973 NIE concluded that Allende had
kept lines open to Washington on possible Chilean compensation for expropriated
U.S. copper companies.
C. ALLENDE'S RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
The 1969 Chile NIE predicted that any new administration
would explore somewhat broader relations with communist and socialist
countries. The NIE noted that Allende, in particular, would take such
steps but that even he would be deterred from moving too far in this
direction due to a Chilean nationalism which would as strongly oppose
subordinating Chile to the tutelage of Moscow or Havana as to Washington.
Allende did, over the years, expand Chile's relations with socialist
and communist countries. However, Allende was, as a 1971 NIE stated,
careful not to subordinate Chilean interests to any communist or socialist
poweror to break existing ties with non-communist nations on whom he
continued to rely for aid. Chile NIEs in 1971 and 1972 emphasized that
Allende was charting an independent, nationalistic course, both within
the hemisphere and internationally. Allende was, in short, committed
to a policy of non-alignment.
D. ALLENDE'S TIES WITH CUBA
The 1970 NIE on Chile predicted that Allende would recognize
Cuba. He did so, shortly after he was inaugurated. However, the pattern
of Chilean-Cuban relations was described in a 1971 NIE as one of ideological
distance and closer economic ties. The NIE stated that despite Allende's
long-standing personal relationship with Castro, he had refrained from
excessive overtures to him. A 1972 NIE noted that Havana had been circumspect
about trying to use Chile as a base for promoting revolution throughout
Latin America.
E. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CHILE
Concern about the expansion of Soviet influence in Chile
under Allende and the possible establishment of a major Soviet military
presence was expressed in 1970. A 1971 NIE predicted that although the
Soviet Union would continue to cultivate channels of influence into
Allende's government through the Chilean Communist Party, it would probably
be unsure of its ability to make a decisive impact on key issues given
Allende's desire for an independent posture. The same NIE noted that
neither Allende nor the Chilean military establishment would probably
tolerate a permanent Soviet military presence in Chile. A 1972 Chile
NIE focused on the Soviet attitude to the Allende regime and noted that
Soviet overtures to Allende had thus far been characterized by caution
and restraint. This was, in part, due to Soviet reluctance to antagonize
the U.S. and, more importantly, a Soviet desire to avoid with Allende
the type of open-ended commitment for aid that they had entered into
with Castro. A 1972 Intelligence. Note, prepared by the State Department,
stated that a Soviet-Chilean communique, issued following Allende's
December visit to the USSR, reflected Moscow's decision to continue
a cautious policy toward Chile and to avoid a major open-ended commitment
of aid to Allende. According to the Intelligence Note, the Soviets apparently
advised Allende to negotiate his differences with the U.S.
F. CHILE AS A BASE FOR LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSION
Prior to Allende's election, concern was expressed about
Chilean subversion in other countries. An Intelligence Memorandum, prepared
by the CIA and issued shortly after Allende's September 4 plurality
victory, stated that Chile had long been a relatively open country for
extreme leftists and would become even more so under Allende. The Memorandum
noted, however, that Allende would be cautious in providing assistance
to extremists for fear of provoking a military reaction in his own country.
The Memorandum went on to observe that the degree to which revolutionary
groups would be allowed to use Chile as a base of operations would be
limited to some extent by the orthodox Communist Party in Chile which
opposed violence-prone groups. A State Department Intelligence Note,
prepared in June 1971, stated that, contrary to some earlier indications
that Allende might provide clandestine assistance to neighboring insurgency
movements, evidence to date suggested that he had been sensitive to
the concerns of neighboring governments and had sought to avoid action
which would strain bilateral relations. The Intelligence Note stated
that Chile had warned Argentine and Mexican expatriates that they could
reside in Chile only if they did not engage in political activities
and that some of the more politically active Brazilian exiles had been
encouraged to depart Chile. The Note concluded by predicting that it
was unlikely that Allende would provide financial support or training
to facilitate the export of insurgency. A 1972 NIE stated that Allende
had gone to great lengths to convince his Latin American neighbors that
he did not share Castro's revolutionary goals ; although some revolutionaries
in Chile had received arms and funds from extremists in Allende's political
coalition, this had probably nnot occurred at his behest.
G. THREAT ASSESSMENT
The most direct statement concerning the threat an Allende
regime would pose to the United States was contained in a CIA Intelligence
Memorandum, issued shortly after Allende's September 4 election victory.
The Memorandum summarized the views of the Interdepartmental Group for
Inter-American Affairs, which prepared the response to National Security
Study Memorandum 97. The Group, made up of officials representing CIA,
State, Defense, and the White House, concluded that the United States
had no vital interests within Chile, the world military balance of power
would not be significantly altered by an Allende regime, and an Allende
victory in Chile would not pose any likely threat to the peace of the
region. The Group noted, however, that an Allende victory would threaten
hemispheric cohesion and would represent a psychological setback to
the U.S. as well as a definite advance for the Marxist idea.
2. Estimates and Covert Action
As a result of this look at the Chile estimates, a number
of comments can be made concerning them and their relation to decisions
about covert action:
(a) Despite the view expressed by the Interdepartmental
Group, and reported in a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, that the U.S.
had no vital mational interest in Chile, the decision was made by the
Executive Branch to intervene in that nation's internal political and
economic affairs, before the election, between it and the congressional
vote and during Allende's tenure in office.
It appears that the Chile NIEs were either, at best,
selectively used or, at worst, disregarded by policy makers when the
time came to make decisions regarding U.S. covert involvement in Chile.
40 Committee decisions regarding Chile reflected greater concern about
the internal and international consequences of an Allende government
than was reflected in the intelligence estimates. At the same time as
the Chile NIEs were becoming less shrill, the 40 Committee authorized
greater amounts of money for covert operations in Chile. The amounts
authorized by the 40 Committee rose from $1.5 million in 1970 to $3.6
million in 1971, $2.5 million in 1972, and, during the first eight months
of 1973, $1.2 million. Covert action decisions were not, in short, entirely
consistent with intelligence estimates.
(b) As noted, NIEs are designed to provide economic and
political assessments and an analysis of trends. As such, they are vulnerable
to being interpreted by policymakers to support whatever conclusions
the policymakers wish to draw from them. The estimates do, however,
serve to narrow the range of uncertainty about future events in Chile,
and thus narrow the range of justifiable U.S. policies. But a range
remained.
For example, a 1971 estimate stated that, on the one
hand, Allende was moving skillfully and confidently toward his declared
goal of building a revolutionary nationalistic, socialist society on
Marxist principles, but, on the other hand, the consolidation of the
Marxist political leadership in Chile was not inevitable, and Allende
had a long, hard way to go to achieve this. As a further example, a
1973 NIE which addressed the possibility of enhanced Soviet influence
in Chile stated that the Soviets were interested both in increasing
their influence in South America and in Allende's successful coalition
of leftists parties as a model for a Marxist revolution through election.
Yet, the estimate went on to say that the Soviets did not want another
Cuba on their hands and they were reluctant to antagonize the U.S.
(c) The Committee has determined that the analysts responsible
for drawing up the Chile NIEs were not privy to information concerning
covert operations approved by the 40 Committee and being implemented
in Chile by the CIA operators. The explanation for this is CIA compartmentation.
Analysts and operators often exist in separate worlds. Information available
to the Operations Directorate is not always available to the Intelligence
Directorate. As a result, those who were responsible for preparing NIEs
on Chile appear not to have had access to certain information which
could have added to, or substantially revised, their assessments and
predictions. That flaw was telling. It meant, for example, that the
1972 assessment of the durability of opposition sectors was written
without knowledge of covert American funding of precisely those sectors.
Thus, there was no estimate of whether those sectors would survive absent U.S. money.
Congressional Oversight.
With regard to covert action in Chile between April 1964
and December 1974, CIA's consultation with its Congressional oversight
committees- and thus Congress' exercise of its oversight function- was
inadequate. The CIA did not volunteer detailed information ; Congress
most often did not seek it.
Beginning in 1973, numerous public allegations were made
concerning activities undertaken by the CIA in Chile. In response, Congress
began to assume greater control in the exercise of its oversight function-
which it had badly neglected in the past- both in the number and depth
of consultations with the Central Intelligence Agency. Prior to 1973
there were twenty meetings between Congressional committees and the
CIA regarding Chile ; these meetings were held with the House and Senate
Armed Services and Appropriation Committees in their Intelligence Subcommittees.
From March 1973 to December 1974 there were thirteen meetings held not
only with these Committees, but also before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations and the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.
Based on CIA records, there was a total of fifty-three
CIA Congressional briefings on Chile between 1964 and 1974. At thirty-one
of these meetings, there was some discussion of covert action ; special
releases of funds for covert action were discussed at twenty-three of
them. After January 1973 these briefings were concerned with past CIA
covert activity. From information currently in the possession of the
Committee and public sources, severaltentative conclusions emerge :
on several important occasions the CIA did not report on covert action
until quite long after the fact ; and in one case- Track II- it omitted
discussion of an important, closely held operation, but one whose outcome
reverberated on the foreign policy of the United States and carried
implications for domestic affairs as well.
Of the thirty-three covert action projects undertaken
in Chile with 40 Committee approval during the period 1963-1974, Congress
was briefed in some fashion on eight(11). Presumbly the twenty-five others were
undertaken without Congressional consultation. These twenty-five projects
included : the $1.2 million authorization in 1971, half of which was
spent to purchase radio stations and newspapers while the other half
went to support municipal candidates and anti-Allende political parties
; and the additional expenditure of $815,000 in late 1971 to provide
support to opposition parties.
Of the total of over thirteen million dollars actually
spent by the CIA on covert action operations in Chile between 1963 and
1974, Congress received some kind of briefing (sometime before, sometimes
after the fact) on projects totaling about 7.1 million dollars. Further,
Congressional oversight committees were not consulted about projects
which were not reviewed by the full 40 Committee. One of these was the
Track II attempt to foment a military coup in 1970. The other- a later
CIA project involving contacts with Chilean military officers- was an
intelligence collection project and thus did not come before the 40
Committee, even though inthis instance the political importance of the
project was clear.
V. Preliminary Conclusions.
Underlying all discussion of American interference in
the internal affairs of Chile is the basic question of why the United
States initially mounted such an extensive covert action program in
Chile -and why it continued, and even expanded, in the early 1970s.
Covert action has been a key element of U.S. foreign
policy toward Chile. The link between covert action and foreign policy
was obvious throughout the decade between 1964 and 1974. In 1964, the
United States commitment to democratic reform via the Alliance for Progress
and overt foreign aid was buttressed via covert support for the election
of the candidate of the Christian Democratic party, a candidate and
a party for which the Alliance seemed tailor made. During 1970 the U.S.
Government tried, covertly, to prevent Allende from becoming President
of Chile. When that failed, covert support to his opposition formed
one of a triad of official actions: covert aid to opposition forces,
"cool but correct" diplomatic posture, and economic pressure. From support
of what the United States considered to be democratic and progressive
forces in Chile we had moved finally to advocating and encouraging the
overthrow of a democratically elected government.
A. Covert Action and U.S. Foreign Policy.
In 1964, the United States became massively involved
in covert activity in Chile. This involvement was seen by U.S. policy-makers
as consistent with overall American foreign policy and the goals of
the Alliance for Progress. The election of a moderate left candidate
in Chile was a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Latin America.
It is unclear from the record whether the 1964 election
project was intended to be a one-time intervention in support of a good
cause. It is clear that the scale of the involvement generated commitmments
and expectations on both sides. For the United States, it created assets
and channels of funding which could be used again. For the Chilean groups
receiving CIA funds, that funding became an expectation, counted upon.
Thus, when opposition to Allende became the primary objective of covert
action in 1970, the structure for covert action developed through covert
assistance to political parties in 1964 was well established.
A fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S.
covert activities persits: Did the threat to vital U.S. national
security interests posed by the Presidency of Salvador Allende justify
the several major covert attempts to prevent his accession to power?
Three American Presidents and their senior advisors evidently thought
so.
One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics
was spelled out by Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the
press on September 16, 1970, the day after Nixon's meeting with Helms.
He argued that an Allende victory would be irreversible within Chile,
might affect neighboring nations and would pose "massive problems" for
the U.S. in Latin America:
I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that
if Allende wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile...
Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there
is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some
sort of communist government. In that case, we would have one not on
an island off the coast (Cuba) which has not a traditional relationship
and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin American country you
would have a communist government, joining, for example, Argentine...
Peru... and Bolivia... So I don't think we should delude ourselves on
an Allende takeover and Chile would not present massive problems for
us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America,
and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere.
Another rationale for U.S. involvement in the internal
affairs of Chile was offered by a high-ranking official who testified
before the Committee. He spoke of Chile's position in a worldwide strategic
chess game in 1970. In this analogy, Portugal might be a bishop, Chile
a couple of pawns, perhaps more. In the worldwide strategic chess game,
one a position was lost, a series of consequences followed. U.S. enemies
would proceed to exploit the new opportunity, and our ability to cope
with the challenge would be limited by any American loss.
B. Executive Command and Control of Major Covert Action.
In pursuing the Chilean chess game, particularly the
efforts to prevent Allende's accession to power or his maintaining power
once elected, Executive command and control of major covert action was
tight and well directed. Procedures within the CIA for controlling the
programs were well defined and the procedures made Station officials
accountable to their supervisors in Washington. Unilateral actions on
the part of the Station were virtually impossible.
But the central issue of command and control is Accountability:
procedures for insuring that covert actions are and remain accountable
both to the senior political and foreign policy officials of the Executive
Branch and to the Congress.
The record of covert activities in Chile suggests that,
although established executive processes of authorization and control
were generally adhered to, there were - and remain - genuine shortcomings
to these processes:
Decisions about WHICH covert action projects are submitted
to the 40 Committee were and are made within the CIA on the basis of
the Agency's determination of the political sensitivity of a project.
The form in which covert action projects were cleared
with Ambassadors and other State Department officials varied. It depended
-and still depends- on how interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming
their Station Chiefs are.
Once major projects are approved by the 40 Committee,
they often continue without searching re-examination by the Committee.
The Agency conducts annual reviews of on-going projects, but the 40
Committee does not undertake a review unless a project is recommended
for renewal, or there is some important change in content or amount.
There is also the problem of controlling clandestine
projects not labeled "covert action". Clandestine collection of human
intelligence is not the subject of 40 Committee review. But
those projects may be just as politically sensitive as a "covert action";
witness U.S. contacts with the Chilean military during 1970-73. Similarly,
for security reasons, ambassadors generally know CIA assets only by
general description, not by name. That practice may be acceptable, provided
the description is detailed enough to inform the ambassador of the risk
posed by the development of a particular asset and to allow the ambassador
to decide whether or not that asset should be used.
There remains the question of the dangers which arise
when the very mechanisms established by the Executive Branch for insuring
internal accountability are circumvented or frustrated.
By Presidential instruction, Track II was to be operated
without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department,
or any 40 Committee member save Henry Kissinger. The President and his
senior advisors thus denied themselves the Government's major sources
of counsel about Chilean politics. And the Ambassador in Santiago was
left in the position of having to deal with any adverse political spill-over
from a project of which he was not informed.
The danger was greater still. Whatever the truth about
communication between the CIA and the White House after October 15,
1970 -an issue which is the subject of conflicting testimony- all participants
agreed that Track II constituted a broad mandate to the CIA. The Agency
was given to believe it had virtual carte blanche authority;
moreover, it felt under extreme pressure to prevent Allende from coming
to power, by military coup if necessary. It was given little guidance
about what subsequent clearances it needed to obtain from the White
House. Under these conditions, CIA consultation with the White House
in advance of specific actions was less than meticulous.
C. The Role of the Congress.
In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for
insuring that the Executive Branch is held to full political accountability
for covert activities. The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its
incompleteness.
CIA records note a number of briefings of Congressional
committees about covert action in Chile. Those records, however, do
not reveal the timeliness or the level of detail of these briefings.
Indeed, the record suggests that the briefings were often after the
fact and incomplete. The situation improved after 1973, apparently as
Congressional committees became more persistent in the exercise of their
oversight function. Furthermore, Sec. 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act should make it impossible for major projects to be operated without
the appropriate Congressional committees being informed.
The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These
pertain both to how forthcoming the Agency was and how interested and
persistent the Congressional committees were. Were members of Congress,
for instance, given the opportunity to object to specific projects before
the projects were implemented? Did they want to? There is also an issue
of jurisdiction. CIA and State Department officials have taken the position
that they are authorized to reveal Agency operations only to the appropriate
oversight committees.
D. Intelligence Judgements and Covert Operations.
A review of the intelligence judgements on Chile offered
by U.S. analysts during the critical period from 1970-1973 has not established whether these judgements were taken into account when
U.S. policy-makers formulated and approved U.S. covert operations. This
examination of the relevant intelligence estimates and memoranda has
established that the judgements of the analysts suggested caution and
restraint while the political imperatives demanded action.
Even within the Central Intelligence Agency, processes
for bringing considered judgements of intelligence analysts to bear
on proposed covert actions were haphazard -and generally ineffective.
This situation has improved; covert action proposals now regularly come
before the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the appropriate National
Intelligence Officer; but the operators still are separated from the
intelligence analysts, those whose exclusive business it is to understand
and predict foreign politics. For instance, the analysts who drafted
the government's most prestigious intelligence analyses -NIEs- may not
even have known of U.S. covert actions in Chile.
The Chilean experience does suggest that the Committee
give serious consideration to the possibility that lodging the responsibility
for national estimates AND conduct of operational activities with the
same person -the Director of Central Intelligence- creates an inherent
conflict of interest and judgement.
E.
Effects of Major Covert Action Programs.
Covert Action programs as costly and as complex as several
mounted by the United States in Chile are unlikely to remain covert.
In Chile in 1964, there was simply too much unexplained money, too many
leaflets, too many broadcasts. That the United States was involved in
the election has been taken for granted in Latin America for many years.
The involvement in 1964 created a presumption in Chile
and elsewhere in Latin America that the United States Government would
again be involved in 1970. This made secrecy still harder to maintain,
even though the CIA involvement was much smaller in 1970 than it had
been in 1964.
When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge,
the costs were obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions,
to have contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty
commitments and principles of long standing. At the same time it was
proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin American relations, the U.S. Government
was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.
The costs of major covert ventures which are "blown"
are clear enough. But there may be costs to pay even if the operations
could remain secret for long periods of time. Some of these costs may
accrue even within the calculus of covert operations: successes may
turn to failures. Several officials from whom the Committee took testimony
suggested that the poor showing of the Chilean Christian Democrats in
1970 was, in some part, attributable to previous American covert support.
Of course there were many causes of that poor showing, but in 1964 the
PDC had been spared the need of developing some of its own grass roots
organizations. The CIA did much of that for it. In 1970, with less CIA
activity on behalf of the Christian Democratic Party, the PDC faltered.
Of course, the more important costs, even of covert actions
which remain secret, are those to American ideals of relations among
nations and of constitutional government. In the case of Chile, some
of those costs were far from abstract: witness the involvement of United
States military officers in the Track II attempt to overthrow a constitutionally-elected
civilian government.
There are also long-term effects of covert actions. Many
of those may be adverse. They touch American as well as foreign institutions.
The Chilean institutions that the United States most favored may have
been discredited within their own societies by the fact of their covert
support. In Latin America particularly, even the suspicion of CIA support
may be the kiss of death. It would be the final irony of a decade of
covert action in Chile if that action destroyed the credibility of the
Chilean Christian Democrats.
The effects on American institutions are less obvious
but no less important. U.S. private and governmental institutions with
overt, legitimate purposes of their own may have been discredited by
the pervasiveness of covert action. Even if particular institutions
were not involved in covert action, they may have been corrupted in
the perception of Latin Americans because of the pervasiveness of clandestine
U.S. activity.
In the end, the whole of U.S. policy making may be affected.
The availability of an "extra" means may alter officials' assessment
of the costs and rationales of overt policies. It may postpone the day
when outmoded policies are abandoned and new ones adopted. Arguably,
the 1964 election project was part of a "progressive" approach to Chile.
The project was justified, if perhaps not actually sustained, by the
desire to elect democratic reformers. By 1970, covert action had become
completely defensive in character: to prevent the election of Allende.
The United States professed a "low profile" but at the same time acted
covertly to ensure that the Chilean elections came out right, "low profile"
notwithstanding.
A special case for concern is the relationship between
intelligence agencies and multinational corporations.
In 1970, U.S. Government policy prohibited covert CIA
support to a single party or candidate. At the same time, the CIA provided
advice to an American-based multinational corporation on how to furnish
just such direct support. That raised all of the dangers of exposure,
and eliminated many of the safeguards and controls normally present
in exclusively CIA covert operations. There was the appearance of an
improperly close relationship between the CIA and multinational companies
when former Director John McCone used contacts and information gained
while at the CIA to advise a corporation on whose Board of Directors
he sat. This appearance was heightened because the contacts between
the Agency and the corporation in 1970 extended to discussing and even
planning corporate intervention in the Chilean electoral process.
The problem of cooperation is exacerbated when a cooperating
company -such as ITT- is called to give testimony before an appropriate
Congressional Committee. The Agency may then be confronted with the
question of whether to come forward to set the record straight when
it believes that testimony given on behalf of a cooperating company
is untrue. The situation is difficult, for in coming forward the Agency
may reveal sensitive sources and methods by which it learned the facts
or may make public the existence of ongoing covert operations.
This report does no attempt to offer a final judgement
on the political propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness
of American covert activity in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende
presidency justify covert American involvement in Chile? Did it justify
the specific and unusual attempt to foment a military coup to deny Allende
the presidency? In 1970, the U.S. sought to foster a military coup in
Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet after 1970 the government
-according to the testimony of its officials- did not engage in coup
plotting. Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the threat posed
to the national security interests of the United States so grave that
the government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during
1970-73? What responsibility does the United States bear for the cruelty
and political suppression that have become the hallmark of the present
regime in Chile?
On these questions Committee members may differ. So may
American citizens. Yet the Committee's mandate is less to judge the
past than to recommend for the future. Moving from past cases to future
guidelines, what is important to note is that covert action has been
perceived as middle ground between diplomatic representation and the
overt use of military force. In the case of Chile, that middle ground
may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it should
be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security
of the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in
Chile.
Appendix.
Chronology: Chile 1962-1975 (1)
1962
Special Group approves $50,000 to strengthen Christian
Democratic Party (PDC); subsequently approves an additional $180,000
to strengthen PDC and its leader, Eduardo Frei.
1963
Special Group approves $20,000 for a leader of the
Radical Party (PR); later approves an additional $30,000 to support
PR candidates in April municipal elections.
April 8 Municipal elections results show PDC has replaced
PR as Chile's largest party.
1964
April Special Group approves $3,000,000 to ensure election
of PDC candidate Eduardo Frei.
May Special Group approves $160,000 to support PDC
slum dwellers and peasant organizations.
September 4 Eduardo Frei elected President with 55.7
percent of the vote.
October 2 Ralph A. Dungan appointed U.S. Ambassador
to Chile.
1965
303 Committee approves $175,000 to assist selected
candidates in Congressional elections.
March 7 PDC wins absolute majority in Chamber of Deputies;
becomes largest party in Senate.
November 15 Salvador Allende, in an interview reported
in the New York Times, suggests the U.S. was among certain "outside
forces" that had caused his defeat in the 1964 presidential election.
1967
June 16 Edward M. Korry replaces Ralph A. Dungan
as U.S. Ambassador to Chile.
303 Committee approves $30,000 to strengthen a faction
of the Radical Party.
1968
July 12 303 Committee approves $350,000 to assist
selected candidates in March 1969 congressional elections.
1969
March 1 Congressional elections reflect an increase in
support for the National Party and a resulting loss in Christian Democratic
strength.
April 15 At a meeting of the 303 Committee the question
is raised as to whether anything should be done with regard to the September
1970 Presidential election in Chile. The CIA representative pointed
out that an election operation would not be effective unless an early
enough start was made.
1969--Continued
October 21 Army units stationed at Tacna, Chile, revolt,
ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for
higher pay. The revolt, engineered by General Roberto Viaux, is widely
interpreted as an abortive coup.
1970
March 25 40 Committee approves $125,000 for a "spoiling
operation" against Allende's Popular Unity coalition (UP).
June The possibility of an Allende victory in Chile
is raised at an ITT Board of Directors meeting. John McCone, former
CIA Director, and, at the time, a consultant to the Agency and a Director
of ITT, subsequently holds a number of conversations regarding Chile
with Richard Helms, the current CIA Director.
June 27 40 Committee approves $300,000 for additional
anti- Allende propaganda operations.
July 16 John McCone arranges for William Broe (CIA)
to talk with Harold Geneen (ITT). Broe tells Geneen that CIA cannot
disburse ITT funds but promises to advise ITT on how to channel its
own funds. ITT later passes $350,000 to the Alessandri campaign through
an intermediary.
August 18 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)
97 is reviewed by the Interdepartmental Group; the Group considers options
ranging from efforts to forge amicable relations with Allende to opposition
to him.
September 4 Salvador Allende wins 36.3 percent of the
vote in the Presidential election. Final outcome is dependent on October
24 vote in Congress between Allende and the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri,
who received 35.3 percent of the vote. Allende's margin of victory was
39,000 votes out of a total of 3,000,000 votes cast in the election.
September 8, 14 40 Committee discusses Chilean situation.
The Committee approves $250,000 for the use of Ambassador Korry to influence
the October 24 Congressional vote.
September 9 Harold Geneen, ITT's Chief Executive
Officer, tells John McCone at an ITT Board of Directors meeting in New
York that he is prepared to put up as much as $1 million for the purpose
of assisting any government plan designed to form a coalition in the
Chilean Congress to stop Allende. McCone agrees to communicate this
proposal to high Washington officials and meets several days later with
Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms. McCone does not receive a response
from either man.
September 15 President Nixon instructs CIA Director
Helms to prevent Allende's accession to office. The CIA is to play a
direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat. This involvement comes
to be known as Track II.
September 16 At on off-the-record White House press
briefing, Henry Kissinger warns that the election of Allende would be
irreversible, might affect neighboring nations, and would pose "massive
problems" for the U.S. and Latin America.
September 29 A CIA official, at the instruction
of Richard Helms, meets with a representative of ITT. The CIA officer
proposes a plan to accelerate economic disorder in Chile. ITT rejects
the proposal.
1970--Continued
October CIA contacts Chilean military conspirators;
following a White House meeting, CIA attempts to defuse plot by retired
General Viaux, but still to generate maximum pressure to overthrow Allende
by coup; CIA provides tear gas grenades and three submachine guns to
conspirators.
October 14 40 Committee approves $60,000 for Ambassdor
Korry's proposal to purchase a radio station. The money is never spent.
October 22 After two unsuccessful abduction attempts
on October 19 and 20, a third attempt to kidnap Chilean Army General
Rene Schneider results in his being fatally shot.
October 24 The Chilean Congress votes 153 to 35 in favor
of Allende over Alessandri.
November 3 Allende is formally inaugurated President
of Chile.
November 13 40 Committee approves $25,000 for support
of Christian Democratic candidates.
November 19 40 Committee approves $725,000 for a
covert action program in Chile. Approval is later superseded by January
28, 1971, authorization.
December 21 President Allende proposes a constitutional
amendment establishing state control of the large mines and authorizing
expropriation of all foreign firms working them.
1971
January 28 40 Committee approves $1,240,000 for the
purchase of radio stations and newspapers and to support municipal candidates
and other political activities of anti- Allende parties.
February 25 In his annual State of the World message,
President Nixon states, "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship
with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us".
March 22 40 Committee approves $185,000 additional
support for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC).
April 4 Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition garners
49.7 percent of the vote in 280 municipal elections.
May 10 40 Committee approves $77,000 for purchase
of a press for the Christian Democratic Party newspaper. The press is
not obtained and the funds are used to support the paper.
May 20 40 Committee approves $100,000 for emergency
aid to the Christian Democratic Party to meet short-term debts.
May 26 40 Committee approves $150,000 for additional
aid to Christian Democratic Party to meet debts.
July 6 40 Committee approves $150,000 for support
of opposition candidates in a Chilean by-election.
July 11 In a joint session of the Chilean Congress, a
constitutional amendment is unanimously approved permitting the nationalization
of the copper industry. The amendment provides for compensation to copper
companies within 30 years at not less than 3 percent interest.
August 11 The Export-Import Bank denies a Chilean
request for $21 million in loans and loan guarantees needed to purchase
three jets for the national LAN-Chile airline.
September 9 40 Committee approves $700,000 for support
to the major Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio.
September 28 President Allende announces that "excess
profits" will be deducted from compensation to be paid to nationalized
copper companies.
1971-Continued
September 29 The Chilean government assumes operation
of the Chilean telephone company (CHITELCO). ITT had owned 70 percent
interest in the company since 1930.
September 29 Nathaniel Davis replaces Edward Korry
as U.S. Ambassador to Chile.
October ITT submits to White House an 18-points plan
designed to assure that Allende "does not get through the crucial next
six months". The ITT proposal is rejected.
November 5 40 Committee approves $815,000 support
to opposition parties and to induce a split in the Popular Unity coalition.
December 1 The Christian Democratic and National Parties
organize the "March of the Empty Pots" by women to protest food shortages.
December 15 40 Committee approves $160,000 to support
two opposition candidates in January 1972 by-elections.
1972
January 19 President Nixon issues a statement to
clarify U.S. policy toward foreign expropriation of American interests.
The President states that the United States expects compensation to
be "prompt, adequate, and effective". The President warns that should
compensation not be reasonable, new bilateral economic aid to the expropriating
country might be terminated and the U.S. would withhold its support
from loans under consideration in multilateral development banks.
April 11 40 Committee approves $965,000 for additional
support to El Mercurio.
April 24 40 Committee approves $50,000 for an effort
to splinter the Popular Unity coalition.
May 12 President Allende submits a constitutional amendment
to the Chilean Congress for the expropriation of ITT's holdings in the
Chilean telephone company.
June 16 40 Committee approves $46,500 to support
a candidate in a Chilean by-election.
August 21 Allende declares a state of emergency in Santiago
province after violence grows out of a one-day strike by most of the
capital's shopkeepers.
September 21 40 Committee approves $24,000 to support
an anti- Allende businessmen's organization.
October 10 The Confederation of Truck Owners calls a
nation- wide strike.
October 26 40 Committee approves $1,427,666 to support
opposition political parties and private sector organizations in anticipation
of March 1973 Congressional elections.
December 4 Speaking before the General Assembly of the
United Nations, President Allende charges that Chile has been the "victim
of serious aggression" and adds, "we have felt the effects of a large-scale
external pressure against us".
1973
February 12 40 Committee approves $200,000 to support
opposition political parties in the Congressional elections.
March 4 In the Congressional elections, Allende's Popular
Unity coalition wins 43.4 percent of the vote.
March 22 Talks between the U.S. and Chile on political
and financial problems end in an impasse.
1973--Continued
June 5 Chile suspends its foreign shipments of copper
as miners' strikes continue.
June 20 Thousands physicians, teachers, and students
go on strike to protest Allende's handling of the 63-day copper workers'
strike.
June 21 Gunfire, bombings, and fighting erupt as government
opponents and supporters carry out a massive strike. The opposition
newspaper, EL MERCURIO, is closed by court order for six days following
a government charge that it had incited subversion. The following day
an appeals court invalidates the closure order.
June 29 Rebel forces seize control of the downtown area
of Santiago and attack the Defense Ministry and the Presidential Palace
before troops loyal to the government surround them and force them to
surrender. This is the first military attempt to overthrow an elected
Chilean government in 42 years.
July 26 Truck owners throughout Chile go on strike.
August 2 The owners of more than 110,000 buses and taxis
go on strike.
August 20 40 Committee approves $1 million to support
opposition political parties and private sector organizations. This
money is not spent.
August 23 General Carlos Prats Gonzalez resigns as Allende's
Defense Minister and Army Commander. General Pinochet Ugarte is named
Army Commander on August 24. Prats' resignation is interpreted as a
severe blow to Allende.
August 27 Chile's shop owners call another anti-government
strike.
September 4 An estimated 100,000 supporters of Allende's
government march in the streets of Santiago to celebrate the third anniversary
of his election. The Confederation of Professional Employees begins
an indefinite works stopagge.
September 11 The Chilean military ovethrows the government
of Salvador Allende. Allende dies during the takeover, reportedly by
suicide.
September 13 The new military government names Army Commander
Pinochet President and dissolves Congress.
September- October The Junta declares all Marxist political
parties October illegal and places all other parties in indefinite recess.
Press censorship is established, as are detention facilities for opponents
of the new regime. Thousands of casualties are reported, including summary
executions.
October 15 40 Committee approves $34,000 for an anti-Allende
radio station and travel costs of pro-Junta spokesmen.
1974
June 24 40 Committee approves $50,000 for political
commitments made to the Christian Democratic Party before the coup.
September 16 President Ford acknowledges covert operations
in Chile.
October 25 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
of the O.A.S. reports "grievous violations of human rights" in Chile.
December 30 U.S. military aid is cut off.
1975
June 20 Pinochet declares there "will be no elections
in Chile during my lifetime nor in the lifetime of my successor".
July 4 Chile refuses to allow the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights to enter the country.
October 7 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights reports
"with profound disgust" the use of torture as a matter of policy and
other serious violations of human rights in Chile.
Portions of the above chronology of events in Chile were
extracted from chronologies prepared by the Congressional Research Service
("Chile, 1960-70: A Chronology"; "Chile Since the Election of Salvador
Allende: A Chronology; "Developments in Chile, March 1973 to the Overthrow
of the Allende Government") and from material contained in the June
21, 1973, report of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations entitled "ITT and Chile".
(1) U.S. Actions are italicized
throughout.
Notes:
1. Moreover, the bare
figures are more likely to understate than to exagerate the extent of
U.S. covert action. In the years before the 1973 coup, especially, CIA
dollars could be channeled through the Chilean black market where the
unofficial exchange rate into Chilean ESCUDOS often reached five times
the official rate.
2. The 40 Committee
is a sub-Cabinet level body of the Executive Branch whose mandate is
to review proposed major covert actions. The Committee has existed in
similar form since the 1950's under a variety of names: 5412 Panel,
Special Group (until 1964), 303 Committee (to 1969), and 40 Committee
(since 1969). Currently chaired by the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, the Committee includes the Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs, The Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. This matter is discussed
extensively in the Committee's interim report entitled, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION
PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, 94 Cong., 1 sess. (November 1975),
pp. 225-254.
4. Allende received
36.3 percent of the vote, Alessandri 34.9 percent, Radomiro Tomic, the
PDC candidate, finished third with 27.8 percent.
5. The minutes of the
Interdepartmental Group and Senior Review Group deliberations have not
as yet been provided to the Committee.
6. This period, and
particularly Track II, are dealt with in detail in an interim Committee
Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94 Cong.,
1st Sess. November 1975, pp.221-254.
7. The terms Track
I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who
were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA.
8. As with bilateral
aid, disbursements were continued under previous commitments. $54 million
was disbursed between December 1970 and December 1972.(IDB figures)
9. The use of the term
"40 Committee meetings"must not be taken in a literal sense. At the
outset of the Nixon Administratation, the 40 Committee did meet frequently
to discuss and approve, as well as review, U.S. covert activities. However,
within a relatively short period of time, these formal meetings of the
40 Committee were replaced by less frequent meetings and a system of
telephone clearances. Today the 40 Committee rarely meets. Covert action
proposals, prepared by the DCI, are distributed to the various 40 Committee
principals and approvals or disapprovals are obtained over the phone
by the 40 Committee Special Group officer, a CIA officer on loan to
the NSC staff.
10. These include
Intelligence Memoranda produced by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence
(OCI) and Intelligence Notes produced by the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR).
11. Under section
622 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, the Director of Central Intelligence
is requiered to notify six Congressional oversight committees of every 40 Committee approval once the President has issued a finding that the
project is necessary for the national security of the United States.
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