


Overview of the Economics of Climate Change

Billy Pizer

Presidential Management Forum on
Global Climate Change



Comparison of Emissions Reduction Goals in Legislation in the 110th Congress (as of July 11, 2007)




This graph depicts emissions targets from some of the major climate change bills in Congress. Targets are based on comparison with historical year emissions. Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, and Waxman specify future emissions as a percentage of 1990 emissions. For Lieberman-McCain, Udall-Petri, and Bingaman-Specter, emissions targets for covered sectors are related to historical emissions for those sectors, and total emissions are assumed to match those in the corresponding historical year.

¹ Bill contains flexibility mechanisms which allow actual emissions to rise above the target.

Summary of Market-Based Climate Change Legislation Introduced in the 110th Congress
As of July 25, 2007

	Who's Regulated	Allowance Allocation	Price Stability (Safety Valve & Borrowing)	Offsets	Technology
Bingaman-Specter (S. 1766)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: coal and process emissions at emitters; oil refiners, NG processors, and oil/NG importers; and F-gas producers and importers.	55% grandfathered to industry (phased out over time). 22% auctioned to support technology, transition assistance, and adaptation. 14% set aside for CCS and sequestration. 9% to states.	\$12/metric ton CO ₂ safety valve, rising at 5% per year above inflation.	Unlimited domestic offsets including methane and SF ₆ reductions. Domestic agricultural sequestration offsets limited to 5% of cap. Use of international offsets limited to 10%.	Detailed technology development programs funded from allowance auction revenues (12% of allowances auctioned in 2012, steadily increased to 26% by 2043).
Udall-Petri (based on May draft and discussion with Udall-Petri staff)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: primarily upstream sources (e.g., producers and importers of fuels).	20% grandfathered to industry. 80% auctioned to support RD&D, developing-country engagement, adaptation and dislocation aid, sequestration, and debt reduction.	\$12/metric ton CO ₂ safety valve, rising at 2% above inflation in first 2 years, and 2%-8% thereafter.	Unlimited geological sequestration offsets. 5% of allowances set aside to fund biological sequestration and 1% for CCS projects.	Establishes Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy to fund technology advancement and sequestration projects with 30% of allowances.
Lieberman-McCain (S. 280)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: large downstream at emitter; transport emissions regulated at refinery.	Some allowances given free to covered entities, others auctioned to fund transition assistance, adaptation measures, and technology support. Distribution at discretion of EPA.	Borrowing (with interest) – up to 25% of allowances, for no more than 5 years.	Up to 30% of obligation can be met with domestic sequestration projects and international offsets.	Revenues from some auctioned allowances used to finance advanced technology development, demonstration, and deployment.
Kerry-Snowe (S. 485)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: point of regulation at discretion of EPA Administrator.	Discretion of the President.	No provisions.	Secretary of Agriculture sets rules for domestic biological sequestration.	Each bill includes: vehicular emissions rules; energy efficiency & renewable standards for electric generation. All but Waxman have additional bill-specific mandates.
Waxman (H.R. 1590)				No provisions.	
Sanders-Boxer (S. 309)	Economy-wide cap on U.S. emissions. Discretion to implement a market-based allowance program to achieve this cap is left to the EPA Administrator.				
Feinstein-Carper (S. 317)	Electricity-sector emissions regulated at the power plant. (S. 1168 also regulates SO ₂ , NO _x , and mercury emissions from power plants.)	85% grandfathered to industry, based on generation. Free allocation phased out by 2036.	Borrowing (with interest) – up to 10% of allowances, for no more than 5 years.	Up to 25% through int'l offsets; extensive domestic biological sequestration offsets.	Distributes auction revenues to multitude of technology programs.
Alexander-Lieberman (S. 1168)		75% grandfathered to industry, based on heat input.	No provisions.	Domestic offsets in five categories, including methane, SF ₆ , efficiency, and forest sequestration.	New source performance standard for CO ₂ emissions from electric generation units.
Stark (H.R. 2069)	Economy-wide fossil fuel emissions regulated at the point of production.	Equivalent to 100% auction. (This legislation is an emissions tax.) Revenues to the general fund.	Tax on fuels of \$3/metric ton of CO ₂ emissions, rising by \$3 each year.	Tax refunds for fuels used in processes which sequester carbons (e.g., CCS, or manufacture of plastics).	No provisions.


Impacts



[†] Significant is defined here as more than 40%.


[‡] Based on average rate of sea level rise of 4.2 mm/year from 2000 to 2080.

Likely global warming from stabilization at different greenhouse gas concentrations




Note: "Likely" is defined as greater than a 66% probability of occurrence. Source: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.

Key Feature: Peak Emissions



CO₂ Price



CO₂ prices?

	Yearly cost per tons of CO ₂ equivalents	Amount reduced (Gigatons)
High cost	<\$100 per ton	16-31 Gt
Medium cost	<\$50 per ton	13-26 Gt
Low cost	< \$20 per ton	9-18 Gt

What It Means For Consumers

49¢ more for a gallon of gasoline

\$52 more a month for electricity from a coal-fired utility

\$44 more a month for electricity from oil


\$28 more a month for electricity from gas-fired utility

\$0 more a month for electricity from nuclear power


\$0 more a month for electricity from wind or solar power

Average monthly electricity bill ~ \$80

CO₂ emissions price from CCSP: 5! ~650 ppm CO₂e stabilization




CO₂ emissions price from EMF-21: 5 ~650 ppm CO₂e stabilization



Marginal Benefit (Tol)

R.S.J. Tol / Energy Policy 33 (2005) 2064–2074




Marginal Benefits (Nordhaus 2007)

	2010	2100
	2005 US \$ per ton CO ₂	
No controls		
250 year delay	0.1	4.7
50 year delay	0.1	56.3
Optimal	8.1	56.1
Concentration limits		
Limit to 1.5X CO ₂	27.6	223
Limit to 2X CO ₂	8.9	130
Limit to 2.5X CO ₂	8.1	57.1
Stern Review discounting	42.0	259

Effect of discount rate uncertainty on discounted climate damages

		Benefits from 1 ton of carbon mitigation	Relative to constant rate
Government bond rate (4%)	Constant 4% rate	\$5.74	—
	Random walk model	\$10.44	+82%
	Mean-reverting model	\$6.52	+14%
2% rate	Constant 2% rate	\$21.73	—
	Random walk model	\$33.84	+56%
	Mean-reverting model	\$23.32	+7%
7% rate	Constant 7% rate	\$1.48	—
	Random walk model	\$2.88	+95%
	Mean-reverting model	\$1.79	+21%

Costs



Costs Estimates

Table 4. Core price and welfare results: U.S. + World Policy.

	CO ₂ -e Price (\$/tCO ₂ -e)			Change in Welfare (%)		
	287 bmt	203 bmt	167 bmt	287 bmt	203 bmt	167 bmt
2015	18	41	53	0.01	-0.04	-0.07
2020	22	50	65	-0.13	-0.32	-0.55
2025	26	61	79	-0.36	-0.69	-1.05
2030	32	74	96	-0.45	-1.08	-1.47
2035	39	90	117	-0.19	-0.77	-1.51
2040	47	109	142	-0.12	-0.92	-1.84
2045	57	133	172	-0.24	-1.28	-1.90
2050	70	161	210	-0.18	-1.45	-1.79



Scenario Comparison

GHG Allowance Prices

Table: Allowance Price Comparisons (2005 \$/tCO₂e)

	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
2) S. 280 Senate Scenario								
ADAGE	\$13	\$16	\$21	\$27	\$34	\$43	\$55	\$70
IGEM	\$15	\$20	\$25	\$32	\$41	\$52	\$67	\$85
3) S. 280 Scenario with Low International Actions								
ADAGE	\$13	\$16	\$21	\$27	\$34	\$43	\$55	\$70
IGEM	\$15	\$20	\$25	\$32	\$41	\$52	\$67	\$85
4) S. 280 Scenario Allowing Unlimited Offsets								
ADAGE								
IGEM	\$10	\$13	\$16	\$21	\$26	\$34	\$43	\$55
5) S. 280 Scenario with No Offsets								
ADAGE								
IGEM	\$40	\$51	\$65	\$82	\$105	\$134	\$171	\$219
6) S. 280 Scenario with Lower Nuclear Power Generation								
ADAGE	\$14	\$17	\$22	\$28	\$36	\$46	\$58	\$74
IGEM								
7) S. 280 Scenario with No Carbon, Capture & Storage Technology								
ADAGE	\$19	\$25	\$31	\$40	\$51	\$65	\$83	\$105
IGEM								



Scenario Comparison

GDP Impacts (Percentage Change)

Table: GDP Comparisons (% Change from Reference)


	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
2) S. 280 Senate Scenario								
ADAGE	-0.22%	-0.36%	-0.40%	-0.55%	-0.61%	-0.67%	-0.69%	-1.07%
IGEM	-0.79%	-1.04%	-1.32%	-1.60%	-1.94%	-2.30%	-2.73%	-3.21%
3) S. 280 Scenario with Low International Actions								
ADAGE								
IGEM	-0.79%	-1.05%	-1.31%	-1.60%	-1.94%	-2.30%	-2.73%	-3.19%
4) S. 280 Scenario Allowing Unlimited Offsets								
ADAGE								
IGEM	-0.54%	-0.71%	-0.89%	-1.07%	-1.31%	-1.58%	-1.88%	-2.25%
5) S. 280 Scenario with No Offsets								
ADAGE								
IGEM	-1.76%	-2.26%	-2.78%	-3.31%	-3.93%	-4.58%	-5.30%	-6.08%
6) S. 280 Scenario with Lower Nuclear Power Generation								
ADAGE	-0.23%	-0.38%	-0.42%	-0.58%	-0.63%	-0.70%	-0.72%	-1.11%
IGEM								
7) S. 280 Scenario with No Carbon, Capture & Storage Technology								
ADAGE	-0.57%	-0.70%	-0.83%	-0.97%	-1.14%	-1.34%	-1.58%	-1.82%
IGEM								

Summary

Target	Impacts (2100)	Price (2030)	Cost (2030)	Benefits
450 ppm CO ₂ e	<2°C	<i>Requires global peaking <10 years</i>	? 3% ?	<i>Avoids risk of major impacts</i>
550 ppm CO ₂ e	1-3.5°C	\$20-60	1.0-2.5%	<i>Consistent with low discounting benefit estimates</i>
650 ppm CO ₂ e	1.5-5°C	\$5-30	0.1-1.5%	<i>Consistent with conventional benefit estimates</i>
No limit	3-8°C			

End

Comparison of Emissions Reduction Goals in Legislation in the 110th Congress (as of July 11, 2007)




This graph depicts emissions targets from some of the major climate change bills in Congress. Targets are based on comparison with historical year emissions. Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, and Waxman specify future emissions as a percentage of 1990 emissions. For Lieberman-McCain, Udall-Petri, and Bingaman-Specter, emissions targets for covered sectors are related to historical emissions for those sectors, and total emissions are assumed to match those in the corresponding historical year.

¹ Bill contains flexibility mechanisms which allow actual emissions to rise above the target.


Summary of Market-Based Climate Change Legislation Introduced in the 110th Congress
As of July 25, 2007

	Who's Regulated	Allowance Allocation	Price Stability (Safety Valve & Borrowing)	Offsets	Technology
Bingaman-Specter (S. 1766)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: coal and process emissions at emitters; oil refiners, NG processors, and oil/NG importers; and F-gas producers and importers.	55% grandfathered to industry (phased out over time). 22% auctioned to support technology, transition assistance, and adaptation. 14% set aside for CCS and sequestration. 9% to states.	\$12/metric ton CO ₂ safety valve, rising at 5% per year above inflation.	Unlimited domestic offsets including methane and SF ₆ reductions. Domestic agricultural sequestration offsets limited to 5% of cap. Use of international offsets limited to 10%.	Detailed technology development programs funded from allowance auction revenues (12% of allowances auctioned in 2012, steadily increased to 26% by 2043).
Udall-Petri (based on May draft and discussion with Udall-Petri staff)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: primarily upstream sources (e.g., producers and importers of fuels).	20% grandfathered to industry. 80% auctioned to support RD&D, developing-country engagement, adaptation and dislocation aid, sequestration, and debt reduction.	\$12/metric ton CO ₂ safety valve, rising at 2% above inflation in first 2 years, and 2%-8% thereafter.	Unlimited geological sequestration offsets. 5% of allowances set aside to fund biological sequestration and 1% for CCS projects.	Establishes Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy to fund technology advancement and sequestration projects with 30% of allowances.
Lieberman-McCain (S. 280)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: large downstream at emitter; transport emissions regulated at refinery.	Some allowances given free to covered entities, others auctioned to fund transition assistance, adaptation measures, and technology support. Distribution at discretion of EPA.	Borrowing (with interest) – up to 25% of allowances, for no more than 5 years.	Up to 30% of obligation can be met with domestic sequestration projects and international offsets.	Revenues from some auctioned allowances used to finance advanced technology development, demonstration, and deployment.
Kerry-Snowe (S. 485)	Economy-wide emissions regulation: point of regulation at discretion of EPA Administrator.	Discretion of the President.	No provisions.	Secretary of Agriculture sets rules for domestic biological sequestration.	Each bill includes: vehicular emissions rules; energy efficiency & renewable standards for electric generation. All but Waxman have additional bill-specific mandates.
Waxman (H.R. 1590)				No provisions.	
Sanders-Boxer (S. 309)	Economy-wide cap on U.S. emissions. Discretion to implement a market-based allowance program to achieve this cap is left to the EPA Administrator.				
Feinstein-Carper (S. 317)	Electricity-sector emissions regulated at the power plant. (S. 1168 also regulates SO ₂ , NO _x , and mercury emissions from power plants.)	85% grandfathered to industry, based on generation. Free allocation phased out by 2036.	Borrowing (with interest) – up to 10% of allowances, for no more than 5 years.	Up to 25% through int'l offsets; extensive domestic biological sequestration offsets.	Distributes auction revenues to multitude of technology programs.
Alexander-Lieberman (S. 1168)		75% grandfathered to industry, based on heat input.	No provisions.	Domestic offsets in five categories, including methane, SF ₆ , efficiency, and forest sequestration.	New source performance standard for CO ₂ emissions from electric generation units.
Stark (H.R. 2069)	Economy-wide fossil fuel emissions regulated at the point of production.	Equivalent to 100% auction. (This legislation is an emissions tax.) Revenues to the general fund.	Tax on fuels of \$3/metric ton of CO ₂ emissions, rising by \$3 each year.	Tax refunds for fuels used in processes which sequester carbons (e.g., CCS, or manufacture of plastics).	No provisions.


SO₂ Market




NO_x OTC Current Vintage Price



Permit v. Electricity Price



Coal at different prices



Household costs at different prices

