UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS BRIEFING:
UNREST IN UZBEKISTAN: CRISIS AND PROSPECTS
MAY 19, 2005
COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM
BROWNBACK (R-KS)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR
GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
U.S. SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON (R-TX)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
VACANT
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D.
FEINGOLD (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
VACANT
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF
(R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L.
CARDIN (D-MD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER
(D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE MCINTYRE (D-NC)
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
SAMUEL ZBOGAR
SLOVENIA AMBASSADOR TO U.S.
ON BEHALF OF OSCE
MICHAEL
CROMARTIE
COMMISSIONER
U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT
SENIOR ASSOCIATE
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE
ABDURAHIM POLAT
OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER
UZBEKISTAN
DANIEL KIMMAGE
CENTRAL ASIA REGIONAL ANALYST
RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
RON MCNAMARA
INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIRECTOR
CSCE
The briefing was held at 1:32 p.m. in Room 138 Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Sam Brownback, Chairman, Helsinki
Commission, moderating.
[*]
C. SMITH: We'll begin this briefing of
the U.S. Helsinki Commission. My name is Chris Smith. We'll be joined very
shortly by Chairman Brownback. I'm the co-chairman of the Commission on
Security Cooperation in Europe. And we're joined by fellow commissioner Joseph
Pitts from Pennsylvania. And then we will do an introduction of all of our very
distinguished panelists.
Almost a year ago the Helsinki commission held a
hearing on Uzbekistan. At that time, we heard testimony about the closed nature
of Uzbek society. Some of the consequences now seem to be unfolding in the
Fergana Valley.
After Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, we may have become
used to largely peaceful transfers of power in former Soviet republics. Clearly
as we read about the ongoing situation in Andijan, it was too good to be true.
It seemed to me that after the revolutions in the former USSR over the last 18
months and the bloody confrontation last Friday in Uzbekistan that all bets are
off in that country. We have now witnessed the most lethal use of force
unleashed by an OSCE-participating state against protesters in the former Soviet
space.
In March 2002, when President Karimov came to Washington to sign the
agreement of strategic cooperation with the United States, I participated in his
meeting with congressional leadership, as a matter of fact raised issues
relevant to human rights.
During that conversation, he said a very
interesting thing. Responding to expressions of gratitude from some of the
other members of Congress for Uzbekistan's cooperation against international
terrorism, President Karimov countered that he should be grateful to the United
States for getting rid of the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.
That, he
explained, effectively ended the most serious security threat to Uzbekistan.
Yet President Karimov never drew the appropriate conclusions from his own
geopolitical premises. Instead of seeing the fall of the Taliban and their
allies as an opportunity to loosen the state's grip on Uzbek society, he made
gestures calculated to appease Western states calling for reform. For example,
a few independent human rights groups were registered. Tashkent allowed the
U.N. rapporteur on torture to visit the Uzbek penal system. And some policemen
who had tortured detainees were themselves convicted and jailed.
But no
fundamental changes have occurred. Though the U.N. rapporteur concluded that
torture was systemic in Uzbek jails and Tashkent drew up an action plan to
combat torture, the practice continues.
Last December's parliamentary
election went much as did previous Uzbek elections. Even though Uzbek's
spokesmen and apologists proclaimed that participation of five
government-created political parties to be major progress, the OSCE rightly
refused to send a full-fledged observer mission.
No opposition parties were
registered or allowed to take part. Individual members of opposition parties
could not run, despite assurances from Uzbek officials that they would be able
to do so.
Moreover, widespread religious persecution continues in the
country. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recently
recommended to Secretary of State Rice that Uzbekistan be designated a country
of particular concern, a CPC country, because of the severe, ongoing and
egregious violations of religious freedom.
I agree with that recommendation,
as designating Uzbekistan would send a clear message that the United States will
not tolerate the continued oppression of selected Muslims and other religious
groups.
Today, almost 15 years after independence, Uzbekistan remains a
police state, and President Karimov is confronting what I fear is only the
beginning of a major challenge, largely of his own making.
As we know, the
U.S. maintains a base in southern Uzbekistan. However, if peaceful protests
spread throughout the country and Uzbek forces respond indiscriminately with
deadly violence, the U.S. would be forced to reevaluate its strategic
partnership with Uzbekistan.
I'd like to now yield to my good friend and
colleague Joe Pitts for any opening comments he might have.
PITTS: Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important hearing.
And I want to
thank the distinguished witnesses for coming today.
In the interests of
time, I will yield. And I'm not sure who to yield to, by the way. Who's the
chair?
Mr. McIntyre (ph)?
MCNAMARA: Yes. My name is Ron McNamara. I'm
currently serving as the commission's international policy director.
I'm
pleased to welcome you here to this briefing, the latest of commission
initiatives focused on developments in Uzbekistan. The commission has had a
long series of engagement on issues relating to that country, and I would
encourage you to visit the commission's Web site where all of the materials are
available, at www.csce.gov.
I see that our ranking member from the House,
Mr. Cardin, has arrived. And I know that our chairman, Senator Brownback, is en
route as well. And I should also mention that Commissioner McIntyre has
arrived.
So certainly we'll entertain any statements or comments that they
may have before turning to our panelists.
CARDIN: Well, Ron, thank you.
Let me apologize for being a few minutes late. And obviously the members will
be moving in and out. On these briefings, the main purpose is for the
commission to get a better understanding of what's happening in trouble spots of
the world.
Uzbekistan presents to us a real challenge, a real dilemma.
There's no way that we can justify the actions of the government and what is
happening in that country. They are not complying with Helsinki commitments.
And we have a right to expect that they will, in fact, do that.
We don't
condone at all the violence of the population and what they're doing, the
rebels. That obviously needs to be brought under control. But the manner in
which the government has responded, in just creating an untenable situation, the
failure to comply with Helsinki principles, is of great concern to all of us.
So I have a full statement that I'm just going to make sure is available for
the record which expresses in detail these concerns. But the main purpose for
briefings is for us to get more information so that our commission can function
to bring these matters to the international attention.
So with that in mind,
Ron, you noticed that Commissioner McIntyre is here, and I'll be glad to yield
to Commissioner McIntyre.
MCINTYRE: Thank you very much. I too will be
brief.
Having been to Uzbekistan when I was visiting Afghanistan in August
of 2003, I found it very interesting. We did spend quite a bit of time in the
palace with President Karimov. And so now to see how things have transpired
since that visit that we had then has been very concerning to us. And so I'd
look forward to hearing the testimony today.
And also to find of interest
how these developments have affected the stability of the government and our
concerns, because we know of our military relationship as well. And as a member
not only of this commission but of the Armed Services Committee, I share
concerns about the unrest that is going on in Uzbekistan.
So thank you very
much. And we'll look forward to the hearing.
MCNAMARA: Thank you very
much. As with all commission briefings, we'll first hear from our expert
panelists before opening up to questions from our commissioners and if time
permits from the audience as well.
When approaching the microphone that's
been provided, please state your name, any affiliation, and pose your question
as succinctly as possible to a specific member of the panel.
An unofficial
transcript of today's proceedings will be available within 24 hours on the
commission's Web site, www.csce.gov.
I'm pleased to introduce -- and again,
the panelists will begin subject to the arrival of our chairman and whatever
statement he might have.
Our first panelist is Ambassador Zbogar, ambassador
of the Republic of Slovenia to the United States. Ambassador Zbogar will be
speaking on behalf of the OSCE chairman and office, Foreign Minister Rupel.
The OSCE is engaged with this crisis through the center in Tashkent, as well as
monitoring refugee flows in the border regions in neighboring southern
Kyrgyzstan.
Minister Rupel has expressed the OSCE's readiness to assist in
preventing further bloodshed as well as in finding a lasting solution to
developments of late.
Next we'll hear from Michael Cromartie, who serves as
a commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Mr.
Cromartie is a 2004 Bush appointee to the commission and also serves as vice
president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center here in Washington.
The
Commission on International Religious Freedom recently recommended to the
secretary of state that Uzbekistan be designated a country of particular concern
because of the severe, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom in
that country.
Next we'll hear from Dr. Martha Olcott, a senior associate
with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and one of the foremost
experts on Central Asia, who has testified several times before our commission.
She specializes in the problems of transitions in Central Asia and the Caucusus
region, as well as security challenges in the Caspian region more generally.
She testified at the commission's 2004 hearing on human rights in Uzbekistan.
And we welcome her as well.
Next we'll be hearing from Dr. Abdurahim Polat,
who has testified at that same commission hearing on Uzbekistan in 2004.
Since 1989, Dr. Polat has been the leader of Birlik, one of the main Uzbek
opposition parties. Dr. Polat has had to leave Uzbekistan in 1993, after he was
almost beaten to death on the streets of Tashkent in June of 1992.
Since
then, he has been an opposition activist in exile, first in Turkey, then in the
United States, where he now resides. In February of 1998, he received political
asylum status here in the United States.
Finally, we'll hear from Dr. Daniel
Kimmage. Dr. Kimmage works at Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, as a Central
Asia regional analyst. He writes frequently about Central Asia and is one of
the best informed analysts here in Washington.
He also writes about the Arab
world and Russia, with a particular focus on the ideology of Islamic movements.
We'll turn to Ambassador Zbogar.
ZBOGAR: Thank you very much.
Members of the commission, and ladies and gentlemen, first, thank you very much
for giving me the opportunity to speak here at the commission and to brief you
on the activities and the role of the OSCE in Uzbekistan.
The OSCE is
closely monitoring the situation in Uzbekistan through its presence on the
ground. As it was mentioned, OSCE has a center in Tashkent that has been in
constant touch with the Uzbek government since the conflict in Andijan started
on the 13th of May.
OSCE chairman in office, minister for foreign affairs
in Slovenia, Dimitrij Rupel, has expressed concern about recent events in the
city of Andijan on the 15th of May. He has encouraged all sides to work toward
a peaceful resolution of the present crisis.
And to this end, the OSCE and
he, in the name of the OSCE, has offered its assistance to address both
immediate and deeper causes of unrest in order to find a sustainable solution.
The very fact that the OSCE has a presence on the spot allows the OSCE
community to have a clearer picture of the situation on the ground and it can
play a key role in working with the parties to reduce tensions.
First, the
OSCE first of all stands ready to facilitate immediate political dialogue. As
chairman in office put it, quote, "Further loss of human lives must be avoided
at all cost. Any differences that may exist should not represent an excuse for
the use of force on either side," end of quote.
This is something that the
OSCE is well placed to perform through the center, through the chairmanship in
office and/or through an envoy of the chairman.
Secondly, the organization
is ready to assist Uzbekistan with upholding its OSCE commitments. The center
in Tashkent is already implementing such assistance through concrete projects
across the OSCE three dimensions of security, the political, military, economic,
and the environmental and human dimensions.
The concrete examples what
OSCE is doing already is the prison reform program, the media program, the small
and medium enterprise development, the water management, the border management,
and helping with the trafficking in human beings.
Thirdly, in addition to
existing projects, OSCE has particular expertise and experience in a range of
issues related to conflict prevention and civil society building.
Through
its institutions, like representative on freedom of the media, high commissioner
on national minorities and order (ph), the organization is particularly well
placed to focus on issues such as access to information, promotion of
interactive dialogue, and human rights training for police, military and prison
officials.
If requested by the Uzbek authorities, such short-term activities
could have immediate impact.
Fourthly, trial monitoring activities,
particularly with regard to the case of the 23 businessmen in Andijan, could be
conducted with immediate effect.
And fifth, in close cooperation with the
Uzbek authorities and possibly partner organizations, such as the U.N., the OSCE
is ready to help conduct or support an international investigation into recent
events in Andijan.
The future involvement of the OSCE will depend on
several factors. The most important will be the political will of the Uzbek
government.
So first, what is needed in Uzbekistan now? We have immediate
needs and we have short- and medium-term needs.
Immediately, there is a need
for prevention of further use of force and/or prevention of humanitarian
problems on the border region with Kyrgyzstan. There is a need for independent
international investigation of the events in Andijan. There is a need to allow
local population and international community to get information. There is a
need to monitor trials, arrests and demonstrations. And there is a need for
closer cooperation in fighting terrorism. These are all immediate needs.
What are the short- and medium-term needs would be deepening of democratization
processes, like promotion of media freedom, rule of law and development of civil
society. And there is also a short- and medium-term need to intensify the speed
of economic reform through further liberalization.
What could be the
possible OSCE activities and OSCE role in the future? OSCE should focus on the
following possibilities: First, follow very closely the developments related to
events in Andijan and prevent other violent actions and help with post-conflict
and post-trauma assistance.
Next, OSCE could have a role in
confidence-building measures within the country and with the international
community. And OSCE has a role in reaching out to the local community.
Next, OSCE should be involved in international investigation of what happened.
An international expert commission should be established, and if it
materializes, the OSCE could offer international experts, like anti-terrorism,
policing, intelligence, prison, media, et cetera.
Next, OSCE could tailor
training based on the outcome of the investigation. The president acknowledged,
himself, that Andijan happened also as a consequence of serious shortcomings in
the work of different services, like military, police, prison and intelligence.
Next, the role of mass media: There has been informational blockade on
T.V. and Internet, and the government informed very late and has not offered
clear answers to several very important questions. This is something that OSCE
could address. Then OSCE could establish programs in promoting the freedom of
media through legal assistance, furthering access to information, holding of
training for local journalists, for government agency official spokespersons.
Next, is the trial monitoring activities. OSCE could get involved in close
monitoring of trials related to the events in Andijan.
And of course the
last, economic evaluation and assessment: An investigation should be conducted
of business development, for example, the availability of credit for small and
medium business development. There should be strengthening of business
associations and improve their lobbying capabilities with the government and
with parliament. And the OSCE could provide farmers and businesspeople with
knowledge about their legal rights.
So these are some of the activities that
OSCE has already been undertaking and others that OSCE could undertake or could
engage in in Uzbekistan with the aim of helping stabilize the situation and in
helping Uzbekistan government approach necessary reforms.
For all the
activities of the OSCE, given the role of the OSCE, the consensus role in the
OSCE, for all the activities that the mission at the center in Tashkent will
perform in Uzbekistan, we need the approval of the Uzbekistan government.
Thank you very much for your attention.
MCNAMARA: Thank you very much,
Ambassador.
Mr. Cromartie?
CROMARTIE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As
you know, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is an
independent government agency that was created by the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998. The commission monitors religious freedom in other
countries and advises the president and secretary of state and Congress on how
to best advance religious freedom abroad.
In October of last year, the
commission visited Uzbekistan and met with government officials, human rights
activists, religious leaders and former prisoners in the Fergana Valley,
including in Andijan as well as Tashkent and Samarkand.
The commission
notes that many of the Uzbek government policies toward religious groups and
individuals foreshadowed the tragedy in Andijan. In April 2005, the commission
found the government of Uzbekistan to be responsible for severe human rights
violations, including freedom of thought, freedom of conscience and religion,
and recommended to the secretary of state that Uzbekistan be named a country of
particular concern.
Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on religion that
severely limits the ability of religious communities to function and that
criminalizes all unregistered religious activity.
The 1998 Uzbek law on
religion is used by government officials to deny registration of various
religious groups, particularly minority religious communities, resulting in an
effective ban on activities of these groups. At present, some 100 unregistered
religious communities of all faiths are seeking registration.
The Uzbek
government also exercises a high degree of control over the manner in which the
Islamic faith is practiced. There are very few outlets for Muslims to learn
about or practice their faith, other than those provided by the government via
the Muslim Spiritual Board.
After 1998, the Uzbek government authorities
closed 3,000 of the reported 5,000 functioning mosques in the country. The
commission delegation in Uzbekistan experienced directly the government's
determination to monitor the activities of Muslim leaders.
Certain officials
from the Uzbek interior ministry insisted on being present at the commission's
meetings with local imams in Samarkand and in cities in the Fergana Valley.
Even more heavily handed tactics were used in the city of Farg'ona, where Uzbek
security agents made overt efforts to disrupt the commission delegation's
meeting with Uzbek human rights activists, former prisoners and other victims of
repression.
Government authorities crack down harshly on Muslim individuals,
groups and mosques that do not conform to government prescribed practices or
that the government claims are associated with extremist political programs.
This crackdown has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons in
recent years, many of whom are denied the right to due process.
There are
also credible reports that many of those arrested continue to be tortured or
beaten in detention. There are, according to the 2004 State Department Human
Rights Report (ph), approximately 5,500 prisoners in Uzbekistan who have been
convicted because they chose to exercise their faith outside the state's control
or the government claims are associated with extremist groups.
Mr. Chairman,
would you like me to stop while you make a statement?
BROWNBACK: Please go
ahead.
CROMARTIE: Sure? OK.
Confessions are the main evidence used to
convict persons accused of membership in suspect organizations. Such
confessions are often obtained before the accused has gained access to a lawyer
or doctor, and frequently result from ill treatment or torture.
A
defendant's lawyer frequently is denied access to his or her client until after
a confession has been obtained, although such access should be granted within 24
hours under Uzbek law.
There is also a widespread reliance on guilt by
association. Members of the same family are arrested and sentenced for alleged
involvement with proscribed religious organizations. Any outward display of
piety can arose suspicion and may lead to sanctions, including possible arrest.
Now security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members from
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other groups that claim a religious linkage. But these
threats do not excuse or justify the scope and harshness of the government's ill
treatment of religious believers.
Because the Uzbek criminal justice system
is not transparent, it is impossible to know fully the basis on which people
have been detained or convicted. Nonetheless, the State Department, as well as
domestic and international human rights organizations, concluded that many of
these prisoners have been convicted on charges that relate to their religious
beliefs or alleged association, not on specific evidence or advocacy of acts of
violence.
I should note that the commission's recommendation that Uzbekistan
be designated a CPC should not -- should not -- in any way be construed as a
defense of H.T., an extremist and highly intolerant organization that promotes
hatred against moderate Muslims, the West, Jews and others.
The strict
governmental control over the content and character of Islamic teaching,
worship, and practices results in the aspiration on the part of some in
Uzbekistan to seek alternative voices and sources of religious authority. The
commission delegation heard from many people that the absence of permitted
religious alternatives only serves to generate -- it only serves to generate
more support for underground groups, including H.T.
The U.N. special
rapporteur on torture concluded in his February 2003 report on Uzbekistan that,
and I quote, "Torture or similar ill treatment is systematic," unquote. Uzbek
human rights activists and relatives of prisoners confirmed these findings to
the commission delegation.
Prisoner's relatives are also often denied access
to the trials of their family members. Uzbek human rights activists told the
commission delegation that even after the publication of the report on U.N.
special rapporteur on torture, reliance on the use of torture in detention has
not decreased, indeed one Uzbek human rights lawyer said the methods of torture
have become more advanced.
Now the recent tragic events occurred as a result
of public protest over the trial of 23 local businessmen who reportedly employed
thousands of people in an impoverished region. The Uzbek government claims that
the charitable activities of these 23 businessmen are criminal and extremist and
linked to H.T.
Given the nature of the Uzbek judicial system along with the
Uzbek practice of convicting persons solely for their alleged membership in
banned organizations, it is impossible to ascertain the veracity of such
official claims. The commission joins those who are calling for an
international investigation, possibly by the OSCE which has on the ground
presence in Uzbekistan, to clarify the tragic course of events in Andijan.
Now I would like to highlight some of the policy recommendations made by the
commission to the U.S. government. And I would also like to request that the
full set of the commission's recommendations in its 2005 annual report section
on Uzbekistan be included in the record.
BROWNBACK: It will be in the
record.
CROMARTIE: Thank you, Senator.
First, the U.S. government
should ensure that it speaks in a unified voice in its relations with the Uzbek
government. This has not always been the case. For example, last year the
State Department refused to provide funding for the Uzbek government due to its
human rights violations. Yet, one month later, the Defense Department granted
funds to the Uzbek government.
U.S. statements and actions should be
coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. concerns about human rights
conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings with the Uzbek
government.
Second, U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the
exception of assistance to improve humanitarian conditions and advance human
rights, should be made contingent upon establishing and implementing a specific
timetable for the government to take concrete actions to improve conditions of
freedom of religion and observe international human rights standards.
Initial steps by the Uzbek government should include ending reliance on
convictions based solely on confessions; halting the detention and imprisonment
of persons on account of their religious beliefs; establishing a mechanism to
review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion or charged with
religious, political or security offenses; implementing the recommendations of
the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Panel of Experts on
Religion and Belief to revise the 1988 law on freedom of worship in religious
organization to bring it in accordance with international standards; registering
religious groups that comply with the legal requirements; and ensuring that
every religious prisoner has access to his or her family, adequate medical care,
and a lawyer, as specified in international human rights instruments.
Third,
the U.S. government should reinstate the Uzbek language radio broadcasts at
Voice of America and should use VOA and other appropriate avenues of public
diplomacy to explain to the people why religious freedom is an important element
of U.S. foreign policy, as well as specific concerns about religious freedom in
their country.
Fourthly, the U.S. government should advocate greater
involvement of the OSCE center in Tashkent, including the collection of
monitoring data on religious freedom and hiring a staff member in the OSCE
center in Tashkent for monitoring these activities. The staff member should
report to the OSCE tolerance unit in the Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights in Warsaw.
And finally, the U.S. government should urge the
Uzbek government to agree to a visit by U.N. special rapporteurs on freedom of
religion of belief and the independence of the judiciary and provide the full
and necessary conditions for such a visit.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much, Dr. Cromartie. Appreciate your being here and
appreciate your testimony.
I want to make a brief statement at this time and
then we will continue with our witnesses, if we could. I apologize for being
late. I've had a series of sessions today, and it's been a quite busy time on
Capitol Hill.
This is a very serious time and it's a very serious issue
regarding Uzbekistan. It's a country that I've dealt with over the years in
various capacities from being on the Foreign Relations Committee and now OSCE
chair. It is a country of vital and strategic interest to the United States.
It's a country coming out of the former Soviet Union that a number of us had
great hope and promise would be one that over a period of years, with engagement
from the United States, would liberalize economically, democratically, human
rights, and a number of us pushed that agenda for some period of time.
I've
traveled to the country myself. I've met with President Karimov previously,
have urged this liberalization.
Since 2001 and the initiation of the war on
terrorism, Uzbekistan has been a key ally of the United States. We maintain a
military base in that country that has been key for us, particularly in our
prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and continued efforts.
But the
economic and human rights and democratic liberalization that has been offered,
has been pushed by the West, particularly by the United States, has not been
heeded by President Karimov or the Uzbek government. And I think that's why we
are where we are today.
If that had been pursued, if economic
liberalization, human rights liberalization, democratic liberalization had been
pursued, there had been ways and means for people to legitimately express their
viewpoints. That's not taken place and then you have this sort of situation
that happens here today or that has happened here recently in Uzbekistan.
I
do want to note that there are apparently a series of factual questions
remaining to be investigated as to what actually took place and how it actually
occurred.
Undoubtedly, and we do know, that there were a number of
civilians who were killed by officials from the Uzbek government. That did
occur. It also appears that there was an armed assault on a government
institution taking place by militants within Uzbekistan. That did occur as
well.
Whatever specific provocations and the broader sources of frustration,
it was not appropriate for there to be a militant armed assault on a government
institution and it was not appropriate for the government to respond the way
they did.
I am very concerned and worried about how the government responded
to this situation. And the attack on unarmed civilians is deeply disturbing.
Even if armed groups had previously stormed a jail to release prisoners,
possibly even including terrorists and even if the number of killed and wounded
is far smaller than what had been reported by the media, it is a flagrant
application of lethal force by the Uzbek government. That's inappropriate, and
it is wrong.
Along with the State Department I condemn the indiscriminate
use of force against civilian populations in Uzbekistan.
But I think we come
now to a moment of serious thought and reflection and opportunity. We got here
because Uzbekistan has had too little democracy and economic opportunity and
human rights. It is my opinion, and I believe a number of people in the
legislative and executive branch and people around the world opinion that what
needs to take place now is for liberalization to occur, for human rights, for
democracy, and for economic opportunity.
Instead, despite rhetorical claims
to the contrary, the president, President Karimov of Uzbekistan, has insisted on
maintaining the tightest controls. The most basic freedoms are flouted. In
Uzbekistan, no opposition parties have been registered since the early 1990s, a
Soviet-era type of citizenship of the media remains in place.
President
Karimov has justified his policies by the need to crack down on Islamic radicals
who want to topple his secular regime. It's true, of course, that Uzbekistan
has faced and continues to face a genuine, albeit reduced threat from militant
radicals. But I fear President Karimov's approach has produced the very outcome
he wants to prevent.
We have many shared interests with Uzbekistan,
especially cooperating against international terrorism. I have long counseled
moderation in U.S. policy and called for realistic expectations, hoping for slow
and steady progress. But we have not seen that take place.
If there's any
hope to be found in what has recently happened, I believe that President Karimov
and the government in Uzbekistan has a major opportunity here. I urge them to
launch serious reforms to democratize the political system and liberalize the
economy and provide for human rights for the individuals of Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan stands at a crossroads, and time is of the essence. I believe it is
not too late to take this opportunity and try to salvage the situation of
liberalization for human rights, democracy and the economy. I sincerely hope
the Uzbek government and President Karimov understands the stakes that are
involved for his nation.
This briefing was intended to offer some concrete
suggestions on how to proceed. I am appreciative of the witnesses putting forth
their testimony. We cannot continue to see civilians shot and killed by the
government in Uzbekistan. That is wrong.
But I think the way forward is the
liberalization that many have pushed for some period of time, and that's
something that we need to see take place.
I'd also call for an outside,
exterior international investigation into the instances that have taken place in
Uzbekistan over the past several weeks. This needs to be investigated by
outside bodies, people outside of Uzbekistan, to get at the factual situation
and to make a report to the Uzbek government, but to the world community, of
what's taken place in that nation.
It's my hope that this hearing will help
move that process forward of the investigation and also reforms within
Uzbekistan.
There are several other witnesses to present here today. I'm
going to have to be leaving myself in a little bit, but I do want to invite to
testify now Dr. Martha Olcott, who has testified previously in front of this
body, and I appreciate her thoughts, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. She's worked in the region of Central Asia for a
number of years.
I don't know that any of us anticipated -- I don't think
anybody anticipated how things would unfold in Central Asia. I think everybody
saw the factors building up in this region, but how those become expressed, I
don't know if anybody saw that, although I do believe this situation was
probably predictable, given the factors that have been developing in Uzbekistan.
Dr. Olcott, if you have particular thoughts on what we should be doing from
this point on forward, I'd be most appreciative.
OLCOTT: Thank you very
much. Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today, less than a
month after my most recent visit to Uzbekistan, which included a trip to the
Fergana Valley.
While many aspects of recent events in Uzbekistan remain
unclear, one thing is perfectly obvious. Unless the government of President
Islam Karimov moves quickly to introduce economic and political reforms, it will
not regain public confidence. And if it fails to regain public confidence it
will face an escalating series of political crises like the one it confronted in
Andijan, with little reason to assume that the Uzbek government will handle
these better than it did the current one.
The Karimov regime shows no signs
of outward remorse over how it handled last week's crisis and has given no
indication that it will forsake an exclusively force-driven solution to future
challenges.
Virtually all independent observers, though, concur that a
strategy based exclusively on the use of force cannot secure its desired outcome
--that of maintaining the government of Islam Karimov. And saying this does not
diminish the moral implications of allowing such a strategy to be perpetuated,
even if it was presumed to be able to succeed.
Recognizing that the
continued use of force in Uzbekistan -- in the absence of offering some economic
relief and allowing basic political freedoms to its population -- will create
diminishing public order in Uzbekistan creates a different set of moral
imperatives for the international community.
The recent actions in
Uzbekistan create preconditions that require policy-makers to examine whether
the rights of national sovereignty should be breached in the name of
international responsibility to protect populations who are endangered and to
restore their basic human rights.
As a result, it is encumbent upon the
U.S. government and the OSCE to be satisfied that they know what actually
occurred in Andijan and its environs on May 12th, 13th and 14th. This will not
occur without the creation of an independent international commission under the
auspices of the OSCE, the U.N., or as an independent commission.
The Uzbek
government has offered its version of events, not once, but several times, and
not only have their accounts been inconsistent, but they are seriously at odds
with what has been reported by journalists who have interviewed refugees in
Kyrgyzstan and interviewed witnesses in Uzbekistan -- eyewitnesses.
As
horrifying as some of these accounts are and as incompetent as the Uzbek
government has been in mounting its own defense, the international community has
to make clear that it is looking for answers to what wanted and not for
villains, answers that are necessary to provide the de-escalation of the
tensions between the government and its population.
And in asking for
answers, the international community must make clear that it is not prejudging
outcomes, it is not prejudging the guilt or innocence of the 23 businessmen who
stood accused of supporting an outlawed religious group, that it recognizes that
force was used to seize arms stores and to take control of a prison, that it
doesn't by definition preclude the version that siege takers from within the
crowd fired on government troops.
Furthermore, there is no way that the
Uzbek government will be permitting an international inquiry until they are
convinced that this will be done by neutral and unbiased observers. And even
then it is going to be a very hard sell, a point that I will return to in a
couple of minutes.
At the same time, U.S. policymakers and their OSCE
colleagues must continue to ensure that discourse about these events move from
the question of international terrorism where the Uzbeks would like them to rest
to the underlying causes of why so many people were drawn out to protest in the
squares of Andijan on May 13th and 14th.
We cannot allow the issue of
whether Hizb ut-Tahrir is a terrorist organization and whether it and splinter
groups like Akhromiya should be placed on a list of international terrorist
organizations become a focus of current concern. The focus must remain on why
the events in Andijan played out the way they did.
The U.S. administration
has drawn attention to the fact that armed individuals broke into weapon stores,
used weapons to forcibly release prisoners and then set siege to public
buildings. It is important to learn more about who these individuals were and
to do so from independent sources as well as from the government of Uzbekistan.
Knowing as much about the history of religious ferment in the Ferghana
Valley region as I do, it is hard for me personally to believe that the armed
individuals who helped plan and carry out the attack on the weapon stores and
prisons did not include at least a few individuals who passed through the
network of terror training camps that initially began in Tajikistan and then
moved to Afghanistan, where they enjoyed direct funding from Al Qaida.
But
the existence of such people -- and there were prisoners in Andijan convicted
for membership in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan --and the reality of the
threat that they may pose to the government of Uzbekistan is but one of the
questions before us.
The threat that armed individuals committed to the use
of terror in the name of Islam may pose is magnified exponentially when the
population they are appealing to has lost confidence in its government and lacks
the means of expressing this in peaceful fashion.
This is one of the things
that makes the current Uzbek strategy so dangerous.
But at the same time,
the international community must be aware of the security risks that will be
created if the Karimov regime is ousted. There are two ways that this might
come about, in my mind.
Karimov might be sacrificed a la Nicolae Ceaucescu
by the heads of the very power ministries upon which his survival depends. This
is unlikely, given the degree of rivalry that exists between these security
services, but it is not impossible.
However, these men are no more likely
to endorse an economic or political reform agenda than is the current president
and may come to power through making alliances with local quasi-Islamist
religious leaders.
More likely is the scenario where the government simply
crumbles in the face of widening popular opposition which can no longer be
contained through the use or the threat of force.
While Uzbekistan has the
region's largest and best-equipped internal and external security forces, its
capacity is limited and would not extend to squelching unrest in several cities
simultaneously.
It could not contain a nation-wide protest and might well
splinter into competing armed groups, each backing up claims of competing
regional elites, who might in turn be backed by competing clerics. The
situation would be roughly analogous to what we saw in Tajikistan in the early
and mid-1990s. But those invoking Islamic themes might find easy access to far
deadlier global networks.
Tragically, one thing is clear: There will not
be the same smooth transfer of power that we saw in Uzbekistan that we saw in
Georgia and Ukraine or even the bumpier Kyrgyz experience.
Among other
things, there is no Saakashvili or Yushchenko waiting in the wings in Tashkent.
While the secular democratic opposition in Uzbekistan includes many brave men
and women, these people lack the political clout and the proven administrative
skills of their Georgian and Ukrainian colleagues.
There are also members
of the ruling elite found in most walks of Uzbek life who support reform but who
have been frightened to speak up for fear of their jobs. But identifying them
will be a difficult job. And more difficult will be to convince the small group
of secular reformers and the long-time regime supporters to work together.
Rebuilding after regime collapse is difficult work, as we see in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and requires close international engagement of the kind that has been
lacking in Central Asia in the years since independence.
The consequences
of state collapse in Uzbekistan are profound and would endanger the survival of
the Kyrgyz and Tajik states and would change considerably the path of
development in Kazakhstan.
Even today, the crisis is creating serious
complications for the interim government in Kyrgyzstan. The Bishkek government
must manage refugee flow and sort through requests of asylum seekers in a way
that assures its own large Uzbek population of its fairness, while not
antagonizing the government in Tashkent, or permitting individuals that are part
of outlawed groups in Kyrgyzstan to inadvertently gain refuge.
In a
situation in which the risk of chaos or civil war is rapidly moving from vague
to impending, U.S. policymakers must find a way to translate noble
pronouncements into action plans. But they cannot simply decide to abandon a
sitting president without a plan of what they will do next and without making
sure that the Uzbek president understands the door to chaos and civil war that
he has opened.
An important first step is the formation of an international
commission to investigate what occurred in Andijan. This is a project worthy of
considerable back-door diplomacy to get Uzbek acquiescence through face-to-face
contact with this man, with President Karimov, to warn him of what fate awaits
him and his people if he does not change his policy.
Karimov will not be
able to survive politically unless he engages in a whole range of economic and
political reform. Some seemingly small changes in policy -- freeing the
purchase price of cotton and grain, introducing a flat tax system for income and
profit, offering a staged withdrawal of trade restrictions -- would all produce
new strains of support for the currently beleaguered Uzbek president and
substantially improve the lives of Uzbek citizens.
This is especially true
if they were accompanied by the registration of foreign NGOs and the removal of
restrictions on assembly, a new attitude toward open media, et cetera: all the
things we've heard about today.
Some of these steps would create quick, but
hopefully temporary, budget deficits, which, if the Uzbeks showed good faith
with key political reforms, the international community could help Tashkent
absorb.
But if the best offices of the U.S., the OSCE and the U.N. and, of
course, those of friendly European and Asian states are unable to convince the
current government of Uzbekistan that an independent inquiry into the events in
Andijan is required, the international community must prepare itself to face a
much greater humanitarian intervention in Uzbekistan and quite probably in the
Central Asian region more generally.
Thank you.
MCNAMARA: Thank you.
Dr. Polat?
POLAT: Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members
of the commission, I am grateful for this given opportunity to make this speech
here at the United States Helsinki Commission.
I am making my third
presentation to the members of the Helsinki Commission here. Perhaps some
people are bored to hear what I will say again.
On the positive side, I was
thinking that only hope that this will be beneficial for Mr. Brownback -- but
he's already left -- chairman of the commission, to hear the voice of Uzbek
opposition for the first time, as opposed to Congressman Christopher Smith, who
has heard us few times already.
I say my presentations are boring because
time and time again I make the same statements: President Karimov is dictator.
Democratic reforms are not taking place in Uzbekistan. Human rights are not
respected in this country.
In now third commission and first time I was
here in 1999 after Tashkent terrorist bombings event. And I told here that
Uzbek authorities killed at that time two members of our party who had no
relationship to terrorism. But what happened after the hearing? My friend, one
of the leaders of Birlik Party, a former member of Uzbek parliament, Shakhrukh
Ruzimuratov, was killed.
And I told about it last hearing in June 2004.
And what happened? Now, we are already hearing about mass killing in
Uzbekistan.
And I'm mathematician and I see some ties between our hearings
and behavior of Mr. Karimov.
There is Uzbek proverb: (SPEAKING IN UZBEK)
Here is my translation: If you say to person he is mad, he will be mad a little
bit more.
So that's the same with Karimov. We say he is dictator, we say
he's authoritarian leader; he has become more dictator and more authoritarian.
Maybe if it (inaudible) hearing it here. Maybe roots is here in Washington.
So everything is going on to become worse and worse. But there is another
proverb, it's a Russian proverb: Not everything is bad as it seems; but in
reality, it's even worse.
And I will give some examples why I think it's
worse more. And the example is not from Uzbekistan or from United States. But
events (ph) maybe it was in Uzbekistan with roots in the United States.
Two
months ago, Uzbek human rights activists conducted protests at the Tashkent
office of the American Organization, Freedom House. Did you think this
demonstration was organized to support the activities of this organization in
Uzbekistan? No.
On the contrary, it was organized against its
activities, which lately is attempting to validate activities of Karimov's
regime and does not deal with the human rights protection activities.
Can
you imagine Freedom House, the symbol of human rights and freedom on the wall
becomes a target for Uzbek human rights activists? What's going on? Maybe some
roots in the United States (inaudible).
In another example, the minister of
justice of Uzbekistan sent warnings recently to such organizations as National
Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, clearly telling
them not to cooperate with unregistered opposition parties.
As a result,
representatives of these organizations are even afraid to hold meetings with the
members of Birlik Party at their office locations. And often they have meetings
at barely visible chayhanas, tea homes.
I think if the guys from this
institute were a little bit smart, they can say: Ministry of Justice of
Uzbekistan, OK, we will help to register these political organization, political
parties and cooperate with them little bit using (inaudible).
Therefore, I
think it will not be coincidence if the Uzbek democrats start protesting near
the American Embassy in Tashkent, because the United States remained as the only
Western state that did not accuse the Uzbek authorities for their massacre of
peaceful citizens in Andijan.
I am confident that the last events in
Uzbekistan should be looked at in the context of the above-mentioned facts. And
what had happened in Andijan may (inaudible).
Early morning on May 13, a
group of unidentified armed people first attacked a military base, then local
prison and, finally, Regional Administration Building. Birlik Party issued
statements in May 13 and May 15 -- it's very important -- condemning these
unlawful and forcible acts of this unidentified group. At the same time, we
offered our help to the authorities to resolve this conflict, but no one was
interested in our advice.
Armed group, after taking charge the Regional
Administration Building, has requested to free people who were sentenced by
Uzbek courts heavy-handedly without following elementary rules of the justice
system.
It is very important to note this is the exact demand put forward
to the authorities by Uzbek and international human rights organizations. And
very interesting Islamic extremist groups are demanding the same as local and
international human rights organizations.
And after this, several thousand
demonstrators gathered around the building supporting demands of this group.
Here, we can already make a first very important conclusion: Several teams of
lightly armed people can easily take charge of the power in the city, one of the
biggest cities of Uzbekistan. This indicates in regional locations the power of
Karimov does not exist. Even police and the national security service are not
willing to protect this regime.
At that stage, President Karimov, who is at
the same time -- this is important, too -- commander-in-chief of the national
army, swiftly arrives to Andijan and throws military to deal with the situation.
Note that army should get involved in dealing with external danger and usually
is not trained to deal with such peaceful events.
In doing so, Karimov
completely dismissed the fact that there are several thousand peaceful civilians
out there in addition to only tens of armed group. As a result, several hundred
innocent citizens of the country were killed during the event.
Here we come
to our second conclusion: President of the country and the commander-in-chief
of the nation's army steps into criminal act by forcing the army to perform
activities which is not their responsibility in the first place.
And,
finally, we have to remember the shooting down of hundreds of innocent peoples
have occurred in country which is member of OSCE and strategic partner of United
States.
So now we're thinking -- we have to think, what to do next? And
I'm not thinking about opposition, about Birlik Party. We are doing something
and we will do it -- we are doing last 15 years.
But I want to say about
what we are waiting from international community, from OSCE and United States.
I think it necessary to do the following: OSCE commission should established to
investigate Andijan tragedy. If OSCE will not do it, I think OSCE will dead
already.
Second, United States should condemn the shooting of peaceful
demonstration in Andijan as did it other West countries. Maybe I didn't
understand well Mr. Brownback. He said that United States condemned it. I
think it's not true because United States never condemned it. They only
expressed some concern about this event...
MCNAMARA®MD+IN¯®MDNM¯: Just to
make a point on that. Definitely, there have been statements issued by the
administration condemning the indiscriminate use of force against the
population.
POLAT: OK. And next, OSCE and United States should require the
government of Uzbekistan to start democratic reforms. In particular,
registration of the opposition parties. And in the first place, Birlik Party
since it is the most prepared party amongst others. The requirement should be
made now without waiting OSCE commission results.
Furthermore, Uzbekistan
should take steps to conduct constitutional reforms where single chamber
parliament will be set up with the participation of opposition with limiting
powers of the president.
I am aware of the fact that Western countries are
worried that weak opposition and attempts of change the current setup of the
governance in the country will result in destabilization and enhancing power for
Islamic extremists.
I completely disagree with this position. Not wasting
too much time on this subject, let me point out that, first, it is impossible to
set up atheistic state in Uzbekisan which is what Karimov has attempted to do so
far. And second, Uzbekistan will have a religious model over time, very similar
to Turkish system. High secular educational level of population in the country
gives enough optimism to hope that this will be the case.
The people who
say that power maybe will catch by Islam's fundamentals in Uzbekistan, they're
only thinking about Uzbekistan very close to Afghanistan and very similar
country and we'll boot (ph) them.
It is impossible. Uzbekistan already
about 150 years, almost a European-style country under Russian control.
Let
me take last few points about opposition, last minutes. At this point in time,
Birlik is the most prepared democratic opposition in the country. Everybody
knows that authorities have been trying to destroy us over the last 15 years.
It's very important. Fifteen years, Karimov tried to destroy us. But he
cannot.
Most of similar national opposition movements around Commonwealth
of Independent Countries, which were set up at the time of Gorbachev era, have
disappeared. But Birlik is still functioning. It's very important. We have
over 20,000 registered members. Over the past two years, minister of justice
strictly followed Karimov's orders and refused Birlik to register five times.
You can imagine -- that we cannot to prepare the papers for registered political
parties. Very easy but they don't want it. But party is existing and we have
20,000 registered members of Birlik. But both OSCE and United States are
keeping silent about this tough violence of political rights of people of
Uzbekistan.
Nevertheless, I believe Birlik is in a position to resolve any
political problems. It is true that we may not have enough capabilities to work
in executive bodies, but we know that many people who are working in the
executive bodies under Karimov's regime are not supporters of this regime and
they are ready to work with us. And they will work with us.
In conclusion,
I would like to say the following: Andijan tragedy has showed a real weakness
of Karimov's regime. It will not last long. We have to be prepared -- I mean
we, Birlik -- to the change of power, and we are getting ready.
Many thanks
for your attention.
MCNAMARA: Thank you very much.
Mr. Kimmage?
KIMMAGE: Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the committee for this
opportunity. I prepared a written statement and I ask that it be entered into
the record. And the views that I express here today are my own.
The
events that took place on and after May 13 in Andijan, Uzbekistan, have drawn
the attention of the entire world and prompted the U.S. State Department to say
that there needs to be an open and credible transparent inquiry into this and
that the international community would stand ready to assist.
In the hope
that such an investigation will take place, I would like here to summarize some
of what we know about what happened in Andijan and put forward a number of
concrete recommendations for lines of inquiry.
On closer examination, the
bloodshed in Uzbekistan breaks down, into two events that raise two separate
groups of issues.
The first is an attack by armed militants on the night of
May 12 on a military garrison and prison, freeing of prisoners and the seizure
of the Regional Administration Building in Andijan.
The second is the use
of deadly force on May 13 against unarmed demonstrators in Andijan.
President Islam Karimov and his government have presented official explanations
for both events. But independent reports cast the first event in a different
light and paint a radically different picture of the second.
I will briefly
speak about both of these questions now.
On the assault, the basic details
are relatively clear that on the night of May 12, a group of armed men attacked
a police unit, military garrison and prison. They freed several hundred
prisoners and then went on to seize the Regional Administration Building in
Andijan.
President Karimov has described them as religious extremists whose
goal was to set up a caliphate in Uzbekistan which he said would have then gone
to include Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and all other
countries.
He has also linked the attackers to Hizb ut-Tahrir, which we
heard Commissioner Cromartie speak about earlier. Independent reports do not
refute Karimov's statement that these attackers resorted to violence. But they
provide little support for his other assertions. And as Commissioner Cromartie
noted, this is a crucial in Uzbekistan with issues of militant ties.
As the
State Department has documented, there is ample evidence of rights violations
and unfair trials and it is very difficult exactly what connections to militant
groups may exist.
What I would say is that at present, the evidence we have
does not allow us to conclude that these were or were not extremists. Rather,
it shows that there are ample grounds to doubt the official Uzbek claim.
Thus far, none of the independent accounts we have of the events in Andijan
indicates that the armed men on the anti-government side employed extremist
rhetoric or symbolism.
On the second count, which is the use of deadly
force against armed civilians. The Uzbek official version is that the rebels
who are responsible for the violence, which they say killed 169 people, 32
members of government forces, five women and children, and the remaining dead
would then be either armed terrorists or their hostages. President Karimov has
stressed that no one gave any orders to shoot.
Independent accounts
contrast this. In addition to my statement, I've prepared a list of media
accounts, of reported eyewitness statements which you could find on the table.
I will quote one eyewitness statement from a reporter for the Institute for
War and Peace reporting who was in Andijan who said that, "armored personnel
carriers appeared out of nowhere, moving through the streets at speed. A second
column arriving five minutes later suddenly opened up on the crowds, firing off
round after round without even slowing down to take aim."
There are even
more disturbing eyewitness accounts of troops moving through the crowds and
killing wounded protesters.
The independent death toll -- and this is all
unconfirmed, I have to say -- stands at 745.
Given this, an inquiry
should proceed along two groups of issues: The first, as I said, is the attack
by armed militants.
The questions we need to ask are: Who were the armed
men who attacked a military garrison and prison? Did they have any ties
supported by hard evidence to an extremist organization? What were their
ultimate aims? How many inmates did they release from prison? Are there
reasonable grounds for believing that any of those inmates were members of
extremist or terrorist organizations?
What are the current whereabouts of
the inmates who were released? Did negotiations take place between the
government and the rebels? And if so, what was their substance and outcome?
On the second group of issues involving the use of deadly force: Who started
the violence in the center of Andijan on the center of May 13? Did Uzbek troops
fire on unarmed civilians? If so, were they acting under orders? If so, who
gave those orders? Finally, how many people were killed, and under what
circumstances?
The precise format of a future investigation can only emerge
through cooperation between the Uzbek government and the international
community. One possible vehicle, as has been suggested today, is the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Finally, I would like
to say one remark about the refugee situation. There are over 500 Uzbek refugees
now in Kyrgyzstan, many of them from Andijan. They've been accorded asylum
secret status but President Karimov has said that he does not consider them
refugees. And some Kyrgyz officials have said that they can't stay.
Kyrgyz NGOs have warned that they could face torture or other reprisals if
they're returned to Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyzstan recently experienced
significant political upheaval and they could thus be especially vulnerable to
pressure from its larger and more powerful neighbor. In order to forestall this
potential pressure on the Kyrgyz government and safeguard the wellbeing of the
refugees, the operation and management of the camp where they are housed should
be transferred with the consent of the Kyrgyz government, to the United Nations
or Red Cross. And international organizations should also take responsibility
for the admission of new refugees from Uzbekistan.
In conclusion, I would
say that the tragic events in Andijan have left many questions unanswered. But
the information available is sufficient to justify a concerted search for
answers. What I hope to have done here is to underscore the pressing need for
the "credible and transparent accounting" that the State Department has urged,
as well as to suggest some of the lines along which it might be conducted.
Thank you.
MCNAMARA: Thank you very much.
Excuse me. Before we proceed
with questions, I would point out just perhaps a historical note. And that is
that President Karimov is certainly no stranger to the OSCE. Indeed, the
president himself signed the original Helsinki Final Act document in 1992 when
his country joined the OSCE accepting all the commitments relating to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
So we have a signature, if you will, on
paper.
Before opening up to questions from the audience, there were a few
questions that came to my mind. One has the impression that the regime has been
quite effective in eliminating alternative voices in Uzbek society. Even if
President Karimov were open to dialogue, which is certainly an outstanding
question, are there meaningful interlocutors for him to engage with?
Who
would like to address that question?
OLCOTT: I'll start then. And I'm sure
(inaudible). (OFF-MIKE)
I think myself, I mean, Abdul-Rahim (Ph) talked
about that he believed that Birlik would have strong support in the executive
branch and, in fact, the Senate. And I think that's really a very critical
point.
I think if we talk about potential interlocutors, one of things
that if anybody could get President Karimov to begin political reform, you would
find this that a very large part of the Uzbek ruling -- I mean, not the top top,
but even very close to the top include individuals in every different walk of
life, in judiciary and some of the new parliamentarians, members of the economic
ministries, even in the military, are people that really do want to see
meaningful economic and political reform.
So I think if you are really
creative at changing political environment in the country where the existence of
independent groups made it easier for dependent groups even to speak their mind,
then I think that you would find that interlocutors do develop.
Interlocutors can't appear overnight but Uzbekistan is more than capable of
producing interlocutors. Also, I think there's been a lot said about religious
life in Uzbekistan.
As somebody who has been studying Uzbek religion
intimately for the past four years and non-intimately for the last 30, I mean, I
think that there's a lot more fluidity in Islam in Uzbekistan than we see --
that the state's attitude is much more -- it's changed in the last few years,
creating a real alternative within Islam for people to be debating what the
nature of their own religious life is.
Here, it's really focused on these
religious groupings that are illegal. But there is a dynamism in Uzbek Islam
which is critical, I think, for Uzbekistan to develop a civic society because
Uzbekistan has been under Russian rule for 150 years. But it's also been an
Islamic country for 1,500 years -- I'm probably not doing the math right --
about 1,400 years. And this part of its heritage has to be brought back on the
table if civic life is to have any meaning.
MCNAMARA: And just picking up
on that last point, and certainly, others are welcome to chime in as well. One
has a sense, though, and correct me if I'm wrong, that the regime has also
vilified all Muslims operating outside of sort of the structures of state
control. That's the impression that one gets.
OLCOTT: I think that
impression has -- I mean, I think the situation is really changing and I'm not
always sure how close to the very top people are aware of how it's changing.
And so early this year, Uzbek government introduced an experimental program --
it's the second year it's pursued this -- of teaching history of religion in
state schools. And next year it's going to become nationwide. And I
interviewed people on my most trip involved in that program. And it's really
under the guise of history of religion. There's an awful lot of propagation of
the faith. I saw the books being used. I mean, it's not just text being
written by atheists in the state. This is really a form of almost what used to
exist in some European countries of state religion being taught in state
schools.
So I think there's this -- a much more fluid religious life under
the banner of state-sponsored Islam. And that's increased. There have been
legal changes. The 1998 law is still there. And I'm not making excuses for the
way it's implemented. But from 2000 on, there have been changes in the way the
official Islamic community is able to do its activities which has really created
a great deal more space for independent religious actors. And that's very
different from saying "organized religious actors" but independent religious
actors.
I mean, I just see a much more vibrant religious life there than is
often reported in the pages of Western publications. I'm not talking about
those that monitor this for a living.
That doesn't mean that the abuses
that the commission reports or are that covered in the Western press do not
exist. I mean, individuals may have their rights abused but at the same time,
you can also have a vibrant religious life developing. And I see both realities
in Uzbekistan.
Which is why so many of the actions of the regime seem to
me so troubling because I do see, as Abdul-Rahim (Ph) was implying, there are
exit strategies available out of this current situation that would produce a
better life for everybody in Uzbekistan if somehow the people at the top could
be made to understand this.
MCNAMARA: Anyone else? (inaudible)
POLAT:
I'm sorry for my bad English. Maybe I speaking not bad but my understanding
absolutely worse. Because I'm staying in United States seven years, but I'm
saying staying not living. I'm not living here. It's true. I'm living in
Uzbekistan. But now you can do it because Internet, telephone. That's why my
English very bad. That's why I'm not sure I understand what (inaudible) and
what say it matter.
But I will say something about role of religious or in
our country. Yet even when Soviet Union, it was official atheistic country.
But even everybody feel themselves as Muslim, that means about Muslim peoples.
And very important is what country was secular country and religions were
separated from politics. That's very important.
But Karimov tried to
continue these policies. It's impossible. And I think, in general, Uzbekistan
will take place in this specter of distribution between secular and religious
countries. It will be something between Pakistan and Turkey. Of course, we
will try to -- it should be close to Turkey and I lived before the United
States, six years in Turkey. That's why I have good experience about Turkey.
And actually, Uzbekistan should be -- looks like it's Turkey country.
Maybe
I will say very tough things but I have to say it. For example, if Mr. Karimov
sometimes will visit mosque, the situation will change for 60 degrees. Because
you said 90 persons Muslims and know that the president is atheist. For 15
years, one time he visited mosque when he was at Saudi Arabia.
It is
impossible. But in other case, I know some people are worrying that it will
pick up power Islam fundamentalists. It is impossible that in all this -- the
population is not supporting fundamentalism. They're Muslims. I'm Muslim. But
now under the pressure of the Karimov regime, they are becoming maybe not more
powerful. No. It is small groups but they are becoming more active, maybe.
That's why I told you if Mr. Karimov and some representatives of Uzbek Embassy
here will go time from time as I am doing, and I see it in Turkey -- of course,
now the power in Turkey is almost religious party but before was secular
president, prime ministers. Before.
They are visiting mosque and the people
saw it is the same Muslim as they are. That's why it should be changed in
Uzbekistan something cardinally. It's in big degree.
And second about
opposition. And I'm not saying about only because I'm Birlik Party leader. And
I'm saying about it to (inaudible) understanding responsibly to what I'm saying.
Many peoples know about Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan's opposition's activity
from Russian media. It's fact. Many peoples will not regard (inaudible). But
it is fact. But nobody -- very few people even in United States know the real
situation with opposition.
Birlik is a real power in Uzbekistan.
Everybody now who is Karimov -- and Karimov, 15 years, tried to destroy it but
he couldn't. And he cannot do it. Never. Because it's very strong
organization. And now it is not only worth about 20,000 but registered members
of party in the country. They've gone totalitarian. (inaudible) authoritarian.
It's not dictatorship. It's totalitarian country, Uzbekistan. Here we have
20,000 registered members, not peoples who are saying 20,100 registered party.
It's very important and I'm sure it will take power...
MCNAMARA: Thank
you very much for comments.
POLAT: ... through the secular regime but it
will be role of religious Muslim, of course, will be improved or increased. I
don't know how much person, but it should be increased.
MCNAMARA: Thank you
very much.
If the...
CROMARTIE: Just quickly.
MCNAMARA: Sure. Go
ahead.
CROMARTIE: Your question was who are the potential interlocutors for
engagement? We shouldn't, of course, forget the former (inaudible) mock deal
Uzbek Mohammed Saadiq (Ph) who is in Tashkent now and he's returned from exile,
voluntary exile. He met with our commission. He's a scholar who has published
a lot on Islam and human rights. He's certainly a (inaudible) partner.
MCNAMARA: As I said at the -- earlier, rather, we're now open to questions from
the audience. If there's a representative from the Embassy of Uzbekistan who
would like to pose the first question, certainly, I'm very pleased to allow that
to happen.
Again, we would ask that you ask questions and avoid making
statements. And please, if you could indicate your name and the affiliation
that you have and utilize the microphone because that will be part of the
transcription and unofficial record of today's briefing.
So I open to the
floor. So it's your time.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Erica Schlager
and I'm with the staff of the Helsinki Commission. I think my question might
principally be directed to Dr. Olcott, although others may wish to comment as
well.
The United States has certainly counseled Uzbekistan to undertake
political and economic human rights democratic reform. And particular concern
has been raised here about ongoing problems such as torture and abuse in
Uzbekistan.
At the same time, ti's been widely reported that the United
States is rendering detainees to Uzbekistan. And I'm wondering if you think
that might send a mixed message or suggest that we're not as serious about our
concerns regarding torture as we really are. Thank you.
OLCOTT: I think
that the question is really complicated. I honestly don't think -- I think this
is much more an issue for the way the U.S. is perceived outside of Uzbekistan
and the way the U.S. is perceived inside of Uzbekistan.
I think that there
is very little awareness about the U.S. having sent prisoners -- the accusations
that were made, I think, initially by former Ambassador Craig Murray was the one
who started this whole campaign.
I've made several trips to Uzbekistan since
that first emerged as an issue. And I actually had heard more about some of the
way Ambassador Murray -- some of the things associated with his public
statements there than I did about the torture issue.
I do think it has
colored how the U.S. is perceived elsewhere because of the sending of people
there. But I think you're really talking about a small group of human rights
activists within Uzbekistan who would even know of the issue and be bothered by
the double standard.
I think more seriously, and I'm not diminishing the
importance of this issue, I think the United States, which was very vivid to
Uzbekistan in 2001 at the time of the war in Afghanistan and when the base first
opened, has become more and more remote for the Uzbeks over the past few years.
I mean, I think we are just seeing this not counting in the same way. I
think it's really important to note that when -- apparently -- I mean, this was
reported everywhere and they got somebody to put their declaration on the Web --
that when these people took -- the hostage takers took hostages, they sent a
message in Russian to Vladimir Putin to intervene in their behalf.
They
did not write to the U.S. They did not appeal to the U.S. And if you want to
turn to, I mean, Russia's record on some of these issues is well more
problematic than ours, but this was a more vivid personage (ph) to these people
than we were. That's something that as an American, not to mention a policy
activist, as well as analyst, is something that deeply disturbs me -- that
America is being eclipsed in this part of the world by states that are much less
visible as defenders as democratic values. I mean, you know, I think that's
really the much bigger tragedy.
MCNAMARA: Any other questions?
NAZIROV:
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I want to take an opportunity to make a short
one-minute statement if you permit, and it relates to your original question
about the interlocutors.
MCNAMARA: If you can sort of pose it as a
question, that would be very helpful, or if not, please make it as brief as
possible.
NAZIROV: Make it quick and short.
Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
My name is Atabek Nazirov, and I'm the chairman of the Global
Uzbek Council. It's a diversified group of professionals from Uzbekistan who
mostly work and live abroad.
But first of all, let me on behalf of the
founders and fellows of the Uzbek Global Council, to express sorrow and deepest
condolences to the friends and families of the people who lost their relatives
and loved ones during the tragic events that took place past week in Uzbekistan.
Unfortunately, nothing will ever replace the loss of these human souls.
Now, dear audience and panel, allow me to take this unique opportunity to
publicly introduce our group, established as a de facto organization last year
in London.
Since our inception, we have expanded our membership to include
fellows in New York, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Moscow and, of course,
Uzbekistan.
Over the last couple of months, we've been in the process of
formalizing the existence of our organization and registering it as a nonprofit
entity in the U.S.
Our objective has been to effectively utilize a diverse
pool of human capital available within our group for the benefit of Uzbek
society, and more importantly now for the stability in Uzbekistan.
We're
planning on sponsoring various educational research initiatives, facilitating
networking and development opportunities, and also promoting charitable work,
all of which in the long run would contribute, we hope, to the improvement of
the socioeconomic environment of Uzbekistan and to the challenging process of
democratization.
Given the current situation in Uzbekistan, I would like to
inform the audience and the public that the members of the Global Uzbek Council
are eager to become actively engaged in helping to fund and implement solutions
that will bring Uzbekistan out of this crisis.
I'll be available after the
briefing to provide any information or details to the audience if necessary.
Thank you, Chairman.
MCNAMARA: Thank you for keeping it short.
And
again, there is material available, and if you have materials outside, people
can avail themselves of those items.
Don't be shy, please. I see a
representative of the media, which are usually not shy.
BANIONIS: Yes, the
media.
Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Liberty. Asta Banionis.
Is
anyone on the commission possibly -- the religion commission -- could think back
to another situation where violence has been used against civilians to? From
that experience, what is the next step?
You've all spoken and recommended
investigations to go forward and independent investigations to go forward. How
likely is that? What methodology would you use under the trigger of the CSCE
documents to try to implement that?
CROMARTIE: Wait. Let me ask you, is
the question what -- after violence against civilians, what kind of pressure can
be applied to...
BANIONIS: (OFF-MIKE) the investigation...
(CROSSTALK)
CROMARTIE: Right, I mean...
BANIONIS: (OFF-MIKE)
CROMARTIE: Well,
let me just say that as with anywhere else, I would -- Dr. Olcott would know the
answer to that better I think than anyone. Well, maybe the chair would like to
answer that one.
MCNAMARA: Sure.
Just my observation on that. In fact,
there is an impression that the government of Uzbekistan is open to a truly
independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding developments,
especially in the eastern part of the country, of late.
That said, certainly
the representative of the OSCE is Foreign Minister Rupel, and before one could
undertake a meaningful investigation, they would first obviously have to be some
direct communications. And it's my impression that even establishing the most
fundamental contact has been difficult, if not impossible.
So, again, there
are certain steps that would need to be taken. That said, there has been a
willingness on the part of the government -- in the past, I can recall at least
one circumstance of allegations that an individual had been tortured to death
while in detention, where the government did show a willingness to have
independent forensic experts visit the country and to try to do some kind of an
assessment very much after the fact.
OLCOTT: Could I be blunt, but subtle
on the record?
I mean, one of the problems is that he is the leader of a
sovereign state. And I would -- the parallel that I thought about -- I mean,
you're asking a question.
Of course, there is Russia and Chechnya. You
know, that's a dispute in which there has been violence, force used against
unarmed civilians to the best of all our knowledge, and the international
community has tried to come in and been rebuffed.
I mean, President Karimov
has given very, very mixed signals. He's talked about wanting some
investigation, but he doesn't want to be publicly slapped, and that's I think
part of the problem, that you are -- he doesn't have the international position
of somebody like the leader of Russia, that they can unilaterally say no.
But the whole question, I think, is really one of what is the proper approach to
get a leader, and that's very difficult. There is no easy formula. But that
was why I alluded to the need for backdoor diplomacy.
It's not simply a
question of what the rules of international engagement require. Oftentimes,
fulfilling those rules is a final stage and you get people to ask for things
they don't really want in order to not be put in the record publicly against it.
In my mind, the key is to find a way -- for international interlocutors to
find a way to convince this very proud and stubborn man who is not seeing things
in the way that many of us are seeing them -- you know, doesn't share the same
view of what the reality of the next stage in his country is that many of us do
to accept this view. And that's very problematic unless it is done at the
highest levels and in private, and that's one of the problems.
And you know
sometimes that it's been done, because it succeeded.
(LAUGHTER)
MCNAMARA: Well, again, I would just repeat that as a logical first step, there
would have to be some direct communication at the highest levels. And as I
understand it, even that first step has not occurred unfortunately.
ASSENOVA: Margarita Assenova, Freedom House. I would like to make one short
remark and pose one question.
The remark is in response to Mr. Polat when he
said that Freedom House was opposed in Tashkent for trying to open channels of
communication with the government. I would like to say the investigations --
there were three independent investigations of suspicious deaths in custody.
They were facilitated by Freedom House with the participation of international
experts. The second one was with local human rights defenders. And the third
one was a combination, international experts and local human rights defenders.
And we can see that this is a good sign of opening of communication with the
government officials in order to prevent cases of abuse and torture.
So
Freedom House has rated Uzbekistan as a not-free country in all its
publications. It's one of the worst regimes in the world. It's also in the
publications of Freedom House, it's very difficult to accuse Freedom House of
washing the bloody face of Karimov, as some human rights defenders pointed,
because the fact of the matter is the truth is set, but there has to be a
constructive approach to addressing grave human rights problems when one is
dealing with a country with lack of practices, lack of understanding of human
rights standards, and there is a lot of need for education and for mentality
change to make this work.
The question I would like to ask is, I have
insights about this, but it's important for the audience to here. Are there
reformers in this government? How homogeneous the government is? And what
would be the future of a -- what would be a future succession option for
Uzbekistan, sooner or later?
This moment is really critical, and everyone
regrets these tragic events took place, but for the sake of Uzbekistan and for
the sake of peace in the region, there has to be some alternative of succession
that would benefit both Uzbekistan and the entire region.
Maybe Martha or
Daniel could answer the question. Thank you.
KIMMAGE: I'll go first,
because it's very short.
I don't think this is the right forum to publicly
speculate on who a successor to President Karimov would be.
OLCOTT: I would
like to take a slightly -- take the same answer, but twist it back to the --
what our topic is today.
I think that's one of the reasons why this hearing
and this crisis is really so critical.
I don't see the prospect of -- I
think it's in a sense if there's not an opening of Uzbek society quickly, it's
pretty irrelevant who the successor is going to be.
The key is the opening
to proceed the succession struggle, and the whole nature of that what that
struggle is going to be is going to play out very differently if there is any
stability in the country itself, because as I alluded to in my testimony,
portenders to power regardless of who they are today and how they may change in
the next six months or year or two years are going to take advantage of this to
expand their own power base.
And that's why I think there is no tomorrow
with opening prospects for political reform. But the only way you're going to
get people off the street is if you have economic reform.
And so I think
that it's really -- I mean, you want political reform for reasons other than
just blowing off steam. But right now political reform in the absence of
economic reform will blow off steam for today or tomorrow, but it's going to
lead to even more demands for economic change.
In this case, they must come
hand in hand. And today is too late, but tomorrow is really too late.
MCNAMARA: A quick question, because corruption hasn't really come up as an
issue, per se, but certainly the corrosive nature of that -- I wonder if you
could touch briefly on that.
OLCOTT: I mean, I think that the corruption
issue is really critical to the difficult in our response to what's going on,
and even understanding it in five to seven minutes, and even we all go 10 it's
hard to get to that.
That it's really -- one of the reasons that the case of
the businessman was so troubling is that both versions of reality are plausible
to me, again, as somebody working in these -- with these -- with the development
of Islam in the Fergana region. The existence of -- and Dan knows way more
about Akramia than I do -- but the existence of the way Akramia exists is around
enterprises. And they use these enterprises to fund their activities. And
Akramia was based in Andijan.
So the charge that these businessmen, in
addition to employing 2,000 people, or whatever number of people, were giving
money to an Islamic charity that had as its goal creating a caliphate. Whether
through armed use or not, you know, I at this point certainly can't say. It's
plausible.
This is the model that the U.S. is investigating throughout the
world, you know, the use of Islamic charities to transfer funds to other kinds
of groups. So it's a plausible claim.
But equally plausible is the claim
that there were people in the local administration that wanted to buy the
enterprises of some of these people at below market price and that they went to
jail because of that.
Both realities exist in Uzbekistan, and it's
impossible to know sitting here or even sitting in Tashkent, and possibly even
sitting in Andijan, which is the version that's true unless you can get somebody
who can document in your presence the takeover. Until that takeover bid
succeeds, you usually never learn about it.
But both realities are part of
Uzbekistan. Corruption has been a serious problem, and anytime you open up the
prospects of making money, of expanding the private sector, the corruption
escalates.
The government has had some ineffectual and very slow economic
reform in recent years, and there is a slight improvement in the private sector
in Uzbekistan over the past two years, especially over the past 18 months or so,
which is why some of the changes I propose would really have a rapid effect on
de-escalating some of the economic tensions.
But anytime you do that,
corruption increases as a factor, and you can't go two steps in Uzbekistan
without people beginning to complain about corruption. It is something that the
Uzbeks are no longer frightened to discuss. This is -- and that's going to
continue. You know, this is really an issue that really disturbs everybody
deeply.
But you can't begin to cope with corruption issues unless you open
economic opportunity and build a constituency of your interlocutors, in a sense,
who are going to push within the regime and against the regime from outside for
economic protection.
Economic protection of private businesses is the
biggest problem I see in post-Soviet space. It's not simply an Uzbek
phenomenon. And the only thing that exerts pressure on it is the existence of a
local class that feels like it's going to disappear if not.
MCNAMARA: Thank
you very much.
POLAT: (OFF-MIKE)
MCNAMARA: Sure. A brief comment,
sure.
POLAT: (OFF-MIKE) understand almost anything, but I will try to say
something.
About the political and economic reforms, I read in many articles
in United States, in Internet, Web sites, about important economic reforms. But
I think some people -- they give the examples of Pinochet in Chile, he did
economic reforms without political reforms, example of Indonesia. But they
didn't understand one thing, that this is a quite different situation. I don't
know how the people -- they compare about it, because big problem in Uzbekistan,
for all former Soviet Union countries, is reprivatization. There was not
problem with reprivatization in Chile, Indonesia, in anywhere.
And so
without political reforms, it is impossible any economic reform in Uzbekistan.
And now you see it -- Yeltsin -- now everybody is blaming him, but he began to
economical -- political reform and as a result of his reform is now they have
something in economic, Russia.
The same in Kazakhstan. They have political
reform, that's why they have economic reform.
And look, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan -- they not any economic, political reform. As a result, they don't
really have any economic reforms. So that's why Karimov cannot do anything in
economic without changing the political system.
MCNAMARA: Thank you.
If
there are no further questions, then I will close the briefing, reminding you
that a transcription of today's proceedings will be available on the
commission's Web site at www.csce.gov.
Thank you for attending this
afternoon's briefing.
[Whereupon the briefing ended at
3:15 p.m.]
END
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