205. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)/1/
Washington, March 6, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Secret; Flash. Nothing on this telegram indicates how it was transmitted.
For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Svetlana Iosifovna Stalin, daughter of Josef Stalin, walked into U.S. Embassy New Delhi 6 March with passport and luggage and requested political asylum. Signed request for asylum in U.S.
2. Ambassador Bowles authorized issuance U.S. visa for sole purpose to permit Svetlana leave New Delhi and she departed shortly after midnight 6 March via Quantas flight to Rome. Embassy officer traveling on diplomatic passport accompanied her. She possesses open ticket from Rome to U.S. but has no reservations beyond Rome.
3. Svetlana reported she arrived India 20 December 1966 accompanying ashes her deceased common law husband, Brajesh Singh, expatriate Indian who lived Moscow and worked for foreign languages publishing house. She said Brajesh Singh is uncle of Dinesh Singh with whom she spent last week prior arriving at U.S. Embassy New Delhi. Dinesh Singh is Secretary of State in Indian Foreign Office.
4. Svetlana claims she came to India on one month visa but has made repeated attempts remain there, including appeals to Dinesh Singh and Mrs. Gandhi, all to no avail. 6 March she asked Soviet Ambassador Benediktov for permission remain but he flatly refused, insisted she return Moscow via Aeroflot on 8 March and told her she would not be allowed leave USSR again. She then came U.S. Embassy.
5. Ambassador Reinhardt has been advised that we feel it would be undesirable for Svetlana to proceed to U.S., both politically and from point of view her security. We consider it urgent that every effort be made arrange other safer asylum in Switzerland, Spain or Italy and have asked Ambassador Reinhardt to make every effort to have her persuaded that such course in her best interest. When she agrees, we will approach the govt concerned prior to her formal application for permission to enter. Arrangements are being made with the Italians for her to remain there safely for period sufficient to enable us to work out the problem./2/
/2/Rusk briefed the President on the situation with Svetlana Alliluyeva in a telephone conversation that began at 4:03 p.m. on March 6. A recording of the conversation is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F67.08, Side B, PNO 3.
6. Request your immediate comments and suggestions. Our own feeling is that as soon as scenario is worked out we should frankly inform Soviets, probably through Dobrynin here, emphasing that this was a matter thrust upon us by circumstances and not of our own seeking./3/
/3/Thompson replied in a March 7 telegram to Rusk, stating that the "more we can disengage from this operation the better from point of view of our relations with Soviets. They will in any event blame U.S. for facilitating subject's departure from India and possibly charge us with kidnapping." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva)
End of message.
206. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 10, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. Walt Rostow forwarded a copy to the President under a March 11 covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva)
SUBJECT
Case of Svetlana Alliluyeva
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Ambassador Dobrynin called on request. I told him that we wished to be completely frank and honest with him with respect to our involvement in the case of Madame Svetlana Alliluyeva.
In this connection I wanted him to know precisely what had happened in New Delhi and to realize that our intervention was purely humanitarian in accord with the long established American tradition. Since it contained the most complete account of these events and since it should be assumed that the document would likely become available to the Soviets, in one way or another, in Delhi, I read to him Ambassador Bowles' letter of March 10, 1967 to Mr. C.S. Jha, Foreign Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He took copious notes and has almost a complete version of that letter (copy attached)./2/ After he had fully noted this account of events in Delhi, I told him that it was my understanding that she had applied to the Swiss Government for a visa allowing her to visit there for rest and recuperation and that the Swiss Government had acceded to her request. I understood that she was already in Switzerland and assumed that there would be news confirming this out of Switzerland tomorrow.
/2/Not printed.
I went on to say that the United States has no desire whatsoever to exploit the case. As he would have been able to judge for himself, we had shown restraint by refusing any comment whatsoever up to the present time, and we would continue to show restraint. We would comment publicly only if we were obliged to do so because of what others might say, specifically either the Soviets themselves or the Indians. I continued that the United States Government hopes that this case will not do damage to Soviet-American bilateral relations at this delicate juncture; that our actions have been and continue to be guided by that consideration. This was the reason why I was being so full and explicit and frank in letting him know precisely the extent of our involvement.
I said that we had no desire to have Svetlana come to the United States and that she seemed to have agreed that this would not be in her own best interest or in the best interest of either the United States or the Soviet Union or of the relations between the two.
I said that Svetlana's future depended exclusively on her. She had never been in our custody nor had her movements been determined by us. I understood that at the present time she did not wish to return to the USSR but that it was really her decision where she would go after her visit to Switzerland.
Ambassador Dobrynin expressed what seemed to be real and heartfelt appreciation for this communication. He said that he had noted the press stories and had heard many rumors and had feared that troubles might ensue. He said he was accordingly very thankful to have this full explanation. He added with apparent relief that it would now be up to his colleague in Switzerland to pursue the case by trying to have a talk with Svetlana.
207. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 10, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PS 7-1 US-USSR/Wortham, Ray Buell. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved in G on March 10.
SUBJECT
Wortham Case
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler
During his call on me today, I referred to the efforts that everyone in the Executive Branch of the United States Government from the President on down has been making in connection with the ratification of the Consular Convention./2/ I said I was sure he had noted this and he indicated assent. I pointed out that the debates were still continuing in the Senate and that it was very important that nothing happen which would turn the tide against ratification.
/2/The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the convention out favorably by a 15-4 vote on February 28. The Senate voted 66 to 28 for ratification on March 16, and the President ratified the convention on March 31.
In this connection I said we were concerned about the handling of the Wortham case which we understood was to be considered tomorrow by the Court of Appeals./3/ Obviously, the most favorable thing that could happen would be that the Court of Appeals should release Wortham. I thought this would ensure passage of the Consular Treaty. However, as a very minimum, it was important that no action be taken which would cause a negative reaction. He asked whether postponement would be a good thing. I replied that release of Wortham would be the best thing, but that I would repeat as a minimum nothing adverse should be done tomorrow.
/3/On December 21, 1966, a Leningrad court had sentence Buel R. Wortham to 3 years in a labor camp on charges of theft of a statue and violation of Soviet currency regulations.
Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood my point and that he would promptly telegraph Moscow on this matter./4/
/4/On March 11 the Soviet Court of Appeals reversed Wortham's labor camp sentence and fine him 5,000 rubles. In a March 11 memorandum Kohler called it an "unprecedented reversal," which he also tied to his conversation with Dobrynin on March 10 concerning executive clemency for Igor Ivanov, a Soviet espionage agent on bail pending appeal of his 1964 conviction and sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Kohler considered the reversal one of a series of actions the Soviets counted on to give them "a certain amount of credit" toward eventual clemency for Ivanov. (Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin-Kohler Memoranda of Conversation)
208. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
New Delhi, March 18, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Secret; Eyes Only. Rostow forwarded the letter to the President under cover of a March 24 memorandum in which he stated: "Herewith Chet wraps up his end of the dealings with the lady. He feels he acted properly; and, in retrospect, I agree." (Ibid.)
Dear Walt:
I am enclosing some documents in regard to the Svetlana episode which I think will interest you; you may want to show them to the President. I have sent a similar set to the Secretary.
These enclosures are (1) a play by play description of the series of events that took place here in Delhi; (2) a copy of Svetlana's handwritten statement in which she described her family relationships and why she has determined not to return to the Soviet Union; and (3) a copy of a personal note of appreciation which she sent me from Switzerland./2/
/2/The first enclosure is printed below; the other two were not attached.
As you will sense from her Statement she is an extraordinary person.
Our operation here was a ticklish one and everyone concerned performed with competence. If we had refused to help her she would have gone to the press and the roof would have blown off at home. If we had gone directly to the Indians for "guidance" she would have pressured us formally for asylum and there would have been a major conflict among the Indians, Soviets and ourselves.
She is going to write a book (indeed it is already largely written) which will sell hundreds of thousands of copies./3/ As I suggested in a message to the Secretary this book with some timely guidance from some American whom she trusts could be written in a way that would help, not hurt, US-Soviet relations. If, after dealing with the Stalin years, her emphasis were on the new more liberal Soviet generation and hopes that it can develop a cooperative relationship with America the favorable impact could be very great.
/3/Reference is to Twenty Letters to a Friend, published by Harper & Row in October 1967.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Chet Bowles
Attachment
Memorandum for the Record/4/
New Delhi, March 15, 1967.
/4/Secret; Noforn. Prepared by Bowles. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR
SUBJECT
Defection of Svetlana Alliloueva
1. At 7:30 pm on March 6, 1967, a neatly dressed woman carrying a small suitcase appeared at the main door of the Chancery. Speaking good but accented English she told the Marine Guard Cpl. Daniel Wall that she was a Russian citizen and she wished to talk to an Embassy officer.
2. According to standard procedure Cpl. Wall called the Consular Officer George Huey, Security Officer John St. Denis, and appropriate [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers and asked the woman to wait in the Marine Guard Office near the entrance until the officers arrived.
3. The Consular Officer, Mr. Huey, arrived at the Chancery at 7:35 pm shortly followed by the Security Officer, John St. Denis and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers.
4. According to the woman's passport she was Svetlana Iosifovna Alliloueva, born in Moscow, February 22, 1926 and entered India December 20, 1966. She was taken to the DCM's empty office where she was interviewed by Mr. Huey and by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
5. The following are the pertinent points of the interview: (In addition, the text of a statement which she wrote out in longhand later in the evening is attached.)
A. Svetlana stated that she was the daughter of Joseph Stalin by his second wife, Nadezhda Alliloueva, and that she was the "common law wife" of Brajesh Singh, an uncle of Dinesh Singh, who had been an employee of the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow.
B. Svetlana stated she had arrived in India on December 20, 1966, accompanying the ashes of Brajesh Singh, who had died in Moscow in late October 1966. She and Brajesh had wanted to marry, but had been denied permission. This denial was conveyed to her by Kosygin personally. It was also Kosygin who personally approved her visit to India, evidently after strong representations from Dinesh Singh and T.N. Kaul.
C. The ceremony for immersion of Brajesh's ashes in the Ganges took place on December 25, 1966, near Brajesh's village in Uttar Pradesh. Dinesh Singh had wanted to use this occasion to demonstrate Indo-Soviet amity, and had invited the top Soviet Embassy officials, (neglecting to inform and invite many of Brajesh's old friends). The Soviet Embassy, however, was under orders to keep everything quiet, so none of them attended.
D. She had long been disillusioned with Communism. It was not just the disappointments related to governmental interference in her personal life in the past few years (i.e. refusal to allow her to marry Brajesh), nor was it a result of the 20th Party Congress. Her disillusionment she said had begun long before, but recent events had provided her with both the additional incentive to make this critical decision and the opportunity to carry it out, which would probably never be repeated.
E. Her initial permission had been for a two week stay in India and she had simply defied the Soviet Government by remaining in the village for two months, ignoring requests, then orders, from the Soviet Embassy that she return immediately.
F. Svetlana stated that she had fallen in love with India and her first desire was to remain here. She considered her late husband's family in U.P. her own; they felt the same way about her and wanted her to stay with them. She had discussed the matter with T.N. Kaul, who was strongly opposed to her remaining. In fact Kaul exchanged several letters with her while she was in U.P., urging her to return to Moscow. She also spoke with Dinesh Singh, who said that she could remain in India only if the Soviet Government gave her permission; "this was not the time when India could afford a disturbance in its relations with the Soviet Union." She requested Dinesh Singh to take the matter up with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He later told her that he had done so, and that she had agreed with him that it was impossible. With this hope gone she felt that her only hope of remaining in India rested with the Soviets.
G. Consequently on March 6 she had lunch with Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Benediktov and again requested that she be permitted to remain in India. But once again her request was bluntly refused. The tenor of the meeting left no doubt in her mind that she would never again be permitted out of the Soviet Union.
H. At one point either Dinesh Singh or T.N. Kaul (it is not clear which) suggested to her that, if she were determined not to return to the USSR, she might consider an approach to a "third country," as India could not accept her.
I. Svetlana said that when Ambassador Benediktov made it clear that she would have to be on the flight to Moscow leaving Delhi early Wednesday morning/5/ and in view of the refusal of Dinesh Singh and T.N. Kaul to help her she resolved to appeal to the United States for help. On the evening of March 6 she packed one suitcase (leaving two others behind) in her room on the Soviet Embassy compound, called a taxi to the gate of the compound, and asked the driver to take her to the American Embassy. He did so without hesitation.
/5/March 8.
J. In response to persistent questioning Svetlana insisted that she definitely could not go back to the USSR, as she was determined to live her life as a free person. In the USSR she was not only subject to the restrictions that apply to all citizens, but to additional ones that applied to her because of her unfortunate position as some sort of "national relic." If she returned to the USSR Svetlana was not sure that her defiance of orders during her stay in India would be punished, but she was certain she would never have another opportunity to travel abroad.
K. Since she could not remain in India, she was appealing to the United States, which was a country she greatly admired. She wrote and signed a formal request for asylum in the United States in which she stated she is CPSU member but no longer favors the Communist system. No promises of any kind were made to her.
L. Svetlana was also told that we could not at this point definitely promise asylum to her, and asked her what other courses were open to her. She replied that if the United States could not or would not help her she did not believe that any other country represented in India would be willing to do so. Since she was determined not to return, her only alternative was immediately to tell her story fully and frankly to the press in the hope that she could rally public support in India and the United States.
M. Svetlana was reminded that at this time the Soviet Embassy, being occupied with a full formal reception in honor of Marshal Zakharov, was still probably unaware of her departure, and if she chose to return she could still do so without them being aware that she had ever left. She clearly and forcefully stated once again that she could not and would not go back.
6. During the evening [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk, the Embassy Soviet Affairs Specialist, and Richard F. Celeste, the Ambassador's Personal Assistant, were also called in. The interview was interrupted at approximately 9:00 pm to permit the preparation of a Flash cable/6/ to Washington.
/6/Not found.
7. The initial part of this cable summarized the facts outlined above and indicated that in our estimate we could count on no more than four hours before the Soviet Embassy discovered that Svetlana was missing. The message also pointed out that once her defection was discovered and the GOI informed we would almost certainly be prohibited from assisting her. The message concluded that "unless advised to contrary we will try to get Svetlana on Quantas Flight 751 to Rome leaving Delhi at 1945Zulu" (1:15 am March 7 local time) and stated that she will be accompanied by Embassy officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
8. This cable to Washington was transmitted at 9:40 pm (March 6, 1610Z) and its receipt was acknowledged by Washington eleven minutes later.
9. At this point it was explained to Svetlana that we could not guarantee her asylum in the United States, but we were willing to assist her in leaving India for Rome immediately if she should choose to do so. She was cautioned that this would mean burning her bridges behind her with no clear idea of what lay ahead. She asked whether we would abandon her in Rome if it should be decided not to let her go to the United States. She was told that if we could not grant her asylum we would certainly continue to assist her until she did find a haven. Svetlana then stated that she chose to proceed to Rome.
10. At this point, since a number of arrangements had to be made, Svetlana was asked whether she would be willing to write out a brief life history. She agreed to do so and spent the rest of the evening until her departure for the airport writing. The text of this longhand statement has been transmitted separately.
11. From Svetlana's statement to Embassy officers it was clear that (a) she was not prepared to return to the USSR; (b) she wanted to stay in India but that this had been ruled out by the GOI unless the Soviet Government would approve and she was told that such approval would not be forthcoming; (c) she wanted the assistance of the United States Government, at a minimum, to leave India and find a safe place to live and, at a maximum, to grant asylum in the US; and (d) if she could not get US assistance her only recourse would be to contact the press and appeal publicly for the help and support of the people of India and of the United States.
12. While awaiting response to the Embassy's cable to Washington I carefully reviewed the options with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk and Richard Celeste. Four courses of action were discussed.
A. To deny Svetlana our assistance and encourage her to return to the Soviet Embassy compound;
B. To keep Svetlana in the Chancery or Roosevelt House until her future could be resolved with the GOI and the Soviet Government;
C. To grant her a visa to the United States (Svetlana's Soviet documentation was in order and unrestricted) which would enable her to leave India and proceed to another point while the matter was considered further;
D. To spirit Svetlana out of India covertly in the hope that the US role in her departure could be kept secret.
13. I immediately ruled out alternatives A and D. In regard to the first option to reject Svetlana's appeal for assistance would be completely contrary to our national tradition. When it became known that the United States Government had refused an appeal for assistance from the daughter of Joseph Stalin, the public outcry in the United States and elsewhere would have been overwhelming. Moreover, since she had stated her intention to make a public appeal if we refused to help her a profoundly embarrassing situation would also be created with the Governments of India and the USSR.
14. Since it was impossible to confirm Svetlana's identity during the brief time at our disposal, since the possibility of a Soviet provocation could not be ruled out and, most important, since any US role would almost certainly eventually come to light I considered that the fourth option, i.e. to spirit Svetlana out of India covertly, involved unacceptable and unnecessary risks.
15. Thus the choice was between keeping her in the Chancery and informing the Indian Government that she sought asylum in the United States, and assisting her to leave India as quickly as possible. Careful consideration was given to both alternatives.
16. If Svetlana had been kept at the Embassy and the GOI informed, an issue between our Governments and that of the Soviet Union would have been immediately joined. The Government of India, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would have demanded Svetlana's "release" to Indian custody. We would have had to refuse since it was clear that the GOI could not be relied upon to permit her to stay on in India peacefully. The fact that Stalin's daughter had sought and received refuge in the United States Embassy would become known within a short time and the Chancery and Roosevelt House would be besieged by the world press. Thus the matter would have become an issue between the three governments in a most contentious fashion and in a situation which would leave us little room for maneuver. A first class international Donneybrook would have been inevitable with the outcome unpredictable.
17. The appeal of assisting Svetlana to leave without officially deciding the matter of asylum in the United States was manifold. In the first place it could be done openly and legally since her Soviet and Indian documentation was in order. This would protect the United States against charges of another CIA plot and against the accusation of kidnapping her against her will. Secondly it would provide a breathing spell in which her future status could be considered without the direct glare of publicity and without the involvement of the new Government of India which would be almost certainly bound to bow to Soviet pressure if she were still in India.
18. At approximately 11:30 pm I decided that we should provide Svetlana with a visa and I confirmed the tentative arrangement to place Svetlana on the Qantas flight for Rome, accompanied by an American officer, unless we received contrary instructions from Washington in response to our earlier cable in the meantime.
19. With my concurrence Mr. Huey, the Consular Officer, endorsed a B-2 Visitor Visa in her passport, valid for one entry if used within three months (i.e. before June 6, 1967). The visa did not contain any mention of an INS waiver. Mr. Huey issued the visa on the understanding that in fact Svetlana would not proceed beyond Rome unless an appropriate determination were made in Washington that this was desirable. Only with such a valid visa would the commercial airlines accept Svetlana as a passenger to the West on the basis of her own documentation.
20. At 12:15 Svetlana was driven to the airport by Mr. Huey, accompanied by Marine Sgt. Michael Watson in civilian clothes and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk. There they met [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who had proceeded to the airport to purchase the airline tickets. At Palam Airport Svetlana checked through both Government of India immigration procedures and Government of India customs procedures in the normal manner, using her own documentation. Thereafter she waited in the public international departure lounge at the airport for approximately one and a half hours (the plane departure, which had been scheduled for 0115, was delayed for an hour and a half due to a leak in its hydraulic system). The absence of any effort at secrecy or coercion can be and has been attested to by numerous Indian immigration, customs and airport officials as well as the airline officers and employees with whom Svetlana was in contact.
21. As no contrary instructions were received from Washington, at approximately 0245 Svetlana departed New Delhi on the Quantas flight [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
209. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 23, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-4 US-USSR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel and approved in M on March 29. The memorandum is Part I of III.
SUBJECT
Incident Involving Soviet Trawler
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Rostow said he had asked the Ambassador to come in in order to stress to him the seriousness with which we regard the latest incident involving violation by a Soviet trawler of waters off Alaska, which we have restricted for fishing rights. Mr. Rostow noted that the trawler which has just been apprehended by the Coast Guard within the 9-mile contiguous zone/2/ had been observed previously in December fishing within the 3-mile territorial water limit in the Shumagin Islands area. This had been protested at the time to the Soviet Embassy but now the same trawler was involved in another incident. Further, Mr. Rostow noted several reports from Alaska that Soviet fishing vessels are concealing their hull identification numbers and that Soviet trawlers recently have damaged thousands of dollars worth of crabpots.
/2/On March 22 the trawler was observed by a U.S. Coast Guard aircraft fishing within the contiguous fishery zone at a point 5.5 miles from land near Seal Cape off Alaska. A Coast Guard cutter pursued the trawler into international waters and took it in tow. (State Department Activities Report, March 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 74 D 164)
Mr. Rostow said that the population in Alaska is aroused about the incidents involving Soviet trawlers and the Department is under a great deal of pressure from Alaskan officials as well as Congressional representatives to take a very strong stand on the incidents. Mr. Rostow mentioned that Senator Bartlett, who previously had approved the Administration's restraint in handling the case of the Soviet trawler apprehended early in March,/3/ has now said that he favors the strictest application of the applicable penalties and the maximum fine against the trawler.
/3/See Document 204.
Mr. Rostow said that the Department is now considering its position in the matter and the nature of the advice it should give to the Justice Department. In this regard, it is most important that we have a clear understanding of the Soviet attitude toward these incidents and Soviet policy regarding them. It is one thing if the incidents which have taken place are isolated events resulting from an excess of zeal on the part of the captains of the fishing vessels. On the other hand, if it is a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet fishing fleet to violate our regulations, this would obviously be much more serious. Mr. Rostow asked the Ambassador if the Soviet fishing fleets were under strict instructions to comply with US regulations.
The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that the trawlers had instructions to observe the US regulations; however, he would verify this with Moscow and would inform Mr. Rostow as soon as possible./4/
/4/On March 25 Alexander Zinchuk, Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy, advised Rostow that masters of all Soviet fishing trawlers had been informed of new restrictions on foreign fishing in U.S. coastal waters and that Soviet masters who violated foreign fisheries laws were punished by Soviet law. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69 POL 33-4 US-USSR.
Mr. Rostow concluded by stressing again the seriousness with which we view these incidents. He said that the Soviet Union had been given ample advance warning of our intention to establish the restricted zones and that an extended grace period had been given before we undertook to enforce the regulation. It would indeed be regrettable if these incidents were allowed to become another irritant in US-Soviet relations and he hoped the matter could be resolved satisfactorily.
210. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, March 23, 1967, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
Svetlana Alliluyeva
PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this evening, at his request, and made to me the following oral statement on the case of Svetlana Alliluyeva, replying to my statement to him/2/ on the same matter:
/2/See Document 206.
"The assurances of the American side in connection with the case of S. Alliluyeva, relayed by Kohler, have produced a rather strange impression. The U.S. Government is trying to impress us with the idea that it was not implicated in the departure of Alliluyeva from India and that allegedly it in general is not interested in the whole affair, having a clear understanding of the undesirable consequences it could have for Soviet-American relations. Moreover, the fact that Alliluyeva has not come to the U.S.A. is portrayed almost as a friendly gesture by the U.S. Government toward the U.S.S.R.
"Meanwhile, it is completely clear, even from the information passed by Kohler, that it was American officials, including the American Ambassador to India, who organized the travel of Alliluyeva from New Delhi to Western Europe by the use of underhanded (nizkoprobnii) methods which could only be dictated by feelings of ill-will toward the State of which she is a citizen.
"Strictly speaking, we are not at all concerned here with the fact that Alliluyeva left India for some place or other. No one intended to prevent her from doing this. In what country or countries she is and how long she stays there is her personal affair. The attitude of the Soviet authorities toward this is clear from the very fact that she was given a visa for departure from the Soviet Union. Moreover, it has long been well-known that she is a person who is not completely sound (zdorovii) with pathological traits (elementi) which have been reflected in her general behaviour. Soviet authorities did not see any reason on the basis of this not to permit her to go abroad, but I am instructed to inform you of this aspect of the affair.
"But what cannot but surprise us are the above-mentioned activities of U.S. representatives, and, consequently, of the U.S. Government. These activities are saturated with a spirit of open unfriendliness toward our country and are in direct conflict with statements about striving for an improvement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. Indeed, there are in Soviet-American relations many problems with which one might be occupied with much greater benefit for both sides than fussing over dubious business of such a kind.
"This is what we wished to say about this matter with complete frankness, having in mind that what we have said would be brought to the attention of President Johnson.
"It is of course for the American side to draw the appropriate conclusions from all of this. We do not intend to suggest (podskazivat) to [the American side]/3/ any sort of decisions on this score."
/3/Brackets in the source text.
At my request and only for my convenience in making an accurate report of the conversation, he left with me the attached copy of his talking notes in Russian./4/
/4/Not printed.
I told the Ambassador I took note of his statement. I regretted that the Soviet authorities had seen fit to take the unhelpful attitudes indicated therein. As the Ambassador knew, we had been frank and straightforward and had tried to handle this matter in a way designed to avoid creating obstacles to our relationship; we would continue to do so. Ambassador Dobrynin nodded in what seemed to be an expression of personal agreement but made no comment. The Ambassador did, however, refer to the TASS report of McCloskey's press briefing which he said indicated the Department had approved in advance the issuance of a visa to Alliluyeva. I told him this was not true, and I thought it was unlikely that McCloskey could have said so. I had seen the statement he was to make to the press and it contained no such assertion./5/
/5/Note: In fact, McCloskey following his reading of the authorized statement on March 22, 1967 did state in reply to a question that Washington had authorized the issuance of the visa by New Delhi. This, of course, was not true. [Footnote in the source text.]
211. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, April 24, 1967, 1330Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret; Limdis.
4566. 1. At lunch today I asked Dobrynin what had brought him back to Moscow. He replied that government wanted to talk about Soviet-American relations but went on to say that question foremost on everyone's mind was Vietnam. He said many members of government were convinced that we were not ready for negotiations but were bent on achieving a military victory and that our peace moves were merely a screen to cover each escalation. He went over past history and cited as the most recent example our having proposed a withdrawal ten miles on each side of the DMZ and then almost immediately had bombed targets around Haiphong. This particularly concerned Soviets as their ships were frequently in the port.
2. Dobrynin said that government was still considering the ABM question but said that this like all other questions of relations with the US was affected by the Vietnam problem.
3. He said Soviets would ratify Consular Convention in due course but they would probably ratify Treaty on Outer Space first.
Thompson
212. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)/1/
Washington, May 1, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret; Official-Informal. Read forwarded a copy of the letter to Walt Rostow under cover of a May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.)
Dear Tommy,
I have been trying to arrange a reconsideration of the approach to the Soviets about Vietnam we have discussed at intervals ever since I came to the Department last fall. First my recent trip to Europe, then Punta del Este, and now Adenauer's funeral have caused delays.
Meanwhile, the process of hostilities in Vietnam asserts a dynamic force which continues to cause both of us great concern. We-we, the civilians, that is-have failed to produce a political solution for the war. It is almost reflexive action to allow more leeway to the soldiers, and especially to the Air Force. In turn, the pressure on China and the Soviet Union mounts.
Your interesting telegram No. 4491,/2/ and then 4566,/3/ as well as the corresponding message in the other series,/4/ leads me to write this letter, both to carry on our own conversation, and to try to clear my mind.
/2/In telegram 4491, April 19, Thompson questioned whether the "continuing campaign of Vietnam peace moves" served to further the possibility of peace negotiations. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Thompson stated, initiatives with a remote chance of success, especially those involving the Soviets, "may be positively harmful as adding to Soviet suspicions of our sincerity." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 137.
/3/Dated April 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 USSR-US)
/4/Not further identified.
I believe, as you do, that we are on a tricky and dangerous course, and that relative success in South Vietnam is increasing the risk of a confrontation with the U.S.S.R.
The Soviets are putting more and more material into North Vietnam. So far-in use at least-it is material mainly to defend North Vietnam. They are sending us warnings--i.e., Zhukov's talks here,/5/ and Brehznev's latest speech calling on us to get out of Europe. And they are letting it be known that they think the following somewhat inconsistent thoughts: (1) that we are not interested in negotiation, but in military victory, which they say is impossible; and (2) that the recent move towards détente was at our initiative; that we need a posture of détente with them for domestic purposes; and that so far we have given them nothing in return (never mind that we can't see what they have "given" us in this minuet).
/5/Walt Rostow's memorandum of his conversation with Yuri Zhukov on April 18 is at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject Files, Z misc.
Whatever these signals mean--whether they are preparations for serious talks between us, or serious warnings, or nothing in particular but noise--there is no doubt that at some point, over some issue, there is a risk of forcing them to a confrontation, and that the risk would be less if bombing could be confined to the infiltration routes. Dobrynin told me once there were some steps the Soviets could not tolerate. I suppose the loss of North Vietnam to the Communist camp would be one.
As you know, I have felt for some time that unless the war were settled, it would enter a more dangerous phase,--a phase of danger for the Soviet Union as well as for other people--and that sooner or later we should have to follow the procedure which, with some variations, led to the end of all the post-war crises, that is, a secret, low-keyed warning to the U.S.S.R., followed by joint or parallel U.S.-Soviet action to put out the fire.
I have recently checked with Dean Acheson about the stages of settlement in Korea.
The first step, according to Dean's recollection, was a talk between George Kennan and Malik in the middle of June, 1951. George was about to go back to Moscow as Ambassador. He asked to see Malik in New York to go over the list of new men in the Soviet Foreign Office. In the course of that talk, he was instructed to talk along these lines: "His boss (i.e., Dean Acheson) was beginning to wonder if Malik's boss knew where this thing was going. He couldn't figure out Soviet intentions. He hoped they knew. Did they really want a blow-up?"
A few days later (on June 23) Malik made a speech which contained a hint. We followed it up in Moscow. This led to Kaesong.
I'm checking the files. But I remember Dean telling the story the same way some years ago.
My thought, as you know, is to convey both a warning and an offer to the U.S.S.R.: a warning that the present course could get out of hand, with results no one wants; an offer, in the spirit of our "special relationship" to join with them in procedures that could bring this affair to an end.
The essence of that approach (at least the second part: there was no visible warning) was put to Dobrynin by the Secretary in January,/6/ and recently followed up by Harriman and me. There are different ways to formulate the idea. It rests in the end on the assumption that we have a common interest in ending the war on the basis of the status quo ante, since further hostilities carry risks we both wish to avoid. How to get there? They will know best about how to bring influence on Hanoi. The essential is to face the issue in this form.
/6/Regarding Rusk's conversation with Dobrynin on January 5, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 7, footnote 2. The resulting Sunflower negotiations during January and February, in which Kosygin played a major role, are documented ibid.
You say a proposal that the Soviet cut off aid to NVN could be interpreted as a move on our part to turn Hanoi over to the Chinese. Agreed. But it should be possible to meet that concern, both through our warning as to the alternatives, and through the suggestion that we jointly guarantee the outcome of the settlement, directly or indirectly. In that connection, I am intrigued by recent Soviet moves with regard to Laos. The 1962 agreement/7/ rests on the notion of joint guarantee, after all.
/7/Dated July 23; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083.
I'm sure that some people in the Soviet Union would like to see us continue to flounder in Vietnam, and to have the President punished politically in 1968. Such a result would paralyze American foreign policy for the forseeable future, and open the door to a renewal (or should I say intensification?) of Soviet adventurism in the many soft under-bellies of the world.
Even though there are risks, as you say, that efforts to involve the Soviets may be misunderstood or rebuffed, I remain convinced that the time has come to try. The alternatives are all worse. And we've been rebuffed by experts, after all.
I should think that we have nothing to lose by moving forward, and a lot to gain, even if we do no more than deter and diminish Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam. It should not be hard to work out a formula both for the warning, and for the offer--a statement calculated to allow them political credit as peace makers if they want it, to meet their political interest in North Vietnam, and to point the way to stability.
This is the only path I can see now for reaching the posture you mention in paragraph 7 of your 4491./8/
/8/In paragraph 7 Thompson proposed making a dramatic announcement, such as of a substantial increase of U.S. forces in South Vietnam combined with a leveling off of the bombing of the North, that would hurt the Viet Cong at the same time that it reduced the risk of increased Soviet aid to the North. Such a course might reduce criticism at home and thus North Vietnam's hope of an early U.S. withdrawal.
It might help counter Zhukov's campaign here-intended to make our flesh crawl-if you dropped the remark that some of your colleagues thought the situation in Vietnam was approaching that in Korea at the time of the Kennan-Malik talk.
Yours, as always,
Eugene V. Rostow/9/
/9/Printed from a copy that indicates Rostow signed the original.
213. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/
SNIE 11-11-67
Washington, May 4, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board. An explanatory note indicates that the SNIE was prepared at the request of the Department of State. In telegram CAP 67378 to President Johnson at his Texas ranch, May 5, Walt Rostow transmitted the full text of SNIE 11-11-67, noting that the President had already received the summary of "this thoughtful report" that morning. The telegram is marked with an "L," indicating that the President saw it. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. LXX)
SOVIET ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS
TOWARD THE VIETNAM WAR
The Problem
To examine the USSR's policies toward the Vietnam war and its views of relevant US policies, and to estimate Soviet intentions in relation to that conflict.
Conclusions
A. While the Soviet leaders see the war as advantageous to them in many ways, they also see disadvantages which make their options unpromising and hazardous. They probably believe that there is no prospect of movement toward a political solution for several months at best and appear to have concluded that for the time being they have no alternative but to help Hanoi to carry on the war, hoping that changes of attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or both, will make a political solution possible later.
B. The Soviet leaders fear that the US, in its impatience to get the war over, will escalate the conflict in a way which will increase the risks and costs for the USSR; in an effort to forestall this they are currently stressing their intention to move to more vigorous support of North Vietnam. We believe that during the coming months they will continue to supply equipment designed to strengthen air and coastal defenses in North Vietnam and to increase the firepower of both the regular North Vietnamese forces and the Communist forces fighting in the South.
C. Whether or not there are formal arrangements covering the transit of Soviet supplies across China, we believe that Peking will not pose serious obstacles to such transit. But the relations between Moscow and Peking are still fundamentally hostile, and their attitudes toward major issues of war and peace in Vietnam will continue to differ profoundly.
D. The North Vietnamese at some point will probably press the Soviets for more sophisticated equipment than those types now arriving on the scene or in the pipeline. These might include cruise missiles and tactical rockets which could be used to support North Vietnamese operations in the DMZ area and against US warships. The USSR might believe it had to respond to such pressure, although it would be concerned that the use of such weapons would provoke a still more dangerous US response.
E. If the intensity of the conflict were to be increased by the US, we believe that at some point the USSR would create an atmosphere of heightened tension with the US. The Soviets might take certain actions designed to bolster North Vietnam and to warn the US, such as the provision of limited numbers of volunteers or crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft. They might also break off negotiations with the US on various subjects and suspend certain agreements now in effect. The mining or the blockade of the North Vietnamese coast would be most likely to provoke these responses, since this would constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets, and there would be little they could do on the scene. We do not think the Soviets are prepared to resort to strong and direct threats of general war as a means to protect North Vietnam or to preserve Soviet face.
F. There would also be a good chance that at some juncture the Soviets would exert strong efforts toward a political solution, but they would probably not make Hanoi's acceptance of talks an explicit condition of continued material support.
[Here follow 5 pages of Discussion and a 4-page Annex.]
214. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 12, 1967, 1:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret. Bator forwarded the memorandum to the President under a May 12 covering memorandum which stated: "The Russians last gave us a prod on this two or three days ago. Nevertheless, we would hold up on consultation until it is clear that the game of naval 'chicken' in the Japan Sea [in early May the USS Walker was scraped by two Soviet destroyers] does not show a pattern." (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Port Restrictions on Soviet Ships
The Russians are once again putting pressure on us (Kosygin-Thompson) to reduce our present tough restrictions on access by Soviet ships to U.S. ports. On the face of it, they have a beef. They treat U.S. ships on a par with others. We keep them out of all but 12 of our ports, and put them through a lot of red tap, frisking, etc. before we let them in anywhere--restrictions which we do not apply to non-communist nations. The result is that they almost never use our ports. Our ships don't much use theirs either, but that is by choice.
On the basis of an interagency staff level recommendation, Nick Katzenbach suggests that we explore with key labor people (Meany, Gleason, et al)--and then on the Hill--the possibility of some careful easing of the restrictions. A brief summary of the kind of easing we have in mind is at Tab A./2/ It would be designed to forestall a row with Moscow, without any risk to the security of our ports. (The present arrangements were designed to keep the Russians from sneaking nuclear weapons into U.S. big-city harbors. This made some sense in the mid-50s before the Russians developed intercontinental missiles with hydrogen warheads. It makes little sense now. In any case, we would maintain enough control to hedge our bets.)
/2/Not printed.
In any case, we must proceed carefully. This is the sort of thing that could cause a rapid rise of George Meany's temperature. And he would have plenty of allies among the more edgy of our security people, who tend to think there is a communist under every bed.
The recommendation to consult comes from Katzenbach and has the support of the appropriate people in the other agencies, including Defense and the Chiefs. If you approve, we would go ahead only/3/ after it is clear that the current game of naval chicken in the Sea of Japan does not develop into a pattern. And after taking soundings, we would lay out for you the choices for final decision.
/3/"Only" is underlined in pen.
FMB
OK for Katzenbach, Wirtz/George Weaver, et al, to take soundings with Meany/Gleason and then on the Hill/4/
No
Speak to me
/4/None of the options is checked, but to the right of Bator's signature, Rostow wrote "OK." The President wrote, "I would hold this for the present."
215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, May 19, 1967, 8:58 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk.
198583. Literally Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary.
There follows the text of a message which the President wishes to send to Kosygin, possibly on Monday./2/ We feel that it might be useful to have some such message taken into account in present deliberations going on in Moscow. You should, however, hold this message for a further execute authorization.
/2/The message was forwarded to Kosygin on Monday, May 22.
This gives you a chance to make any comments which you might have on the text or the timing. You should know that at least one more strike on the Hanoi power plant is authorized and its timing will depend upon weather.
"Dear Mr. Chairman: I wish to address you at this time because we appear to be faced by a series of situations which are dangerous in themselves but which, taken together, could seriously impair the interests of our two countries and the attempts which have been made on both sides to improve our relations.
I would wish you to consider if-whatever our differences-our common interests do not now require concerted or parallel action to bring these situations under control.
First, Viet Nam. There the increasingly large scale of North Vietnamese forces moving through the DMZ, the increased use of Laotian territory for the movement of men and arms to the south, and the growing use of Cambodian territory by the forces of North Viet Nam create dangers of widening the already dangerous hostilities in Southeast Asia. Secretary Rusk has recently written Mr. Gromyko about Laos/3/ and our desire to see the Accords of 1962 fully carried out as we had a right to expect they would be. As you know, we have repeatedly affirmed that we consider the Accords of 1954 as an adequate basis for peace insofar as North and South Viet Nam are concerned. Further, we have urged that international action be taken to assist Prince Sihanouk in maintaining the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. You are already familiar with a considerable number of proposals which we and others have made which could lead to a military de-escalation of the conflict. You are also aware of a number of steps which we have taken de facto in this direction without any response from Hanoi. We have been disappointed in this lack of response and will try to probe such a possibility further. Therefore, I urge you once again, as I did in my letter of December 6, 1966,/4/ to lend your help in bringing this conflict to a close by exercising fully your prerogatives as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conferences which yielded those Accords.
/3/Rusk's message was transmitted in telegram 191165 to Moscow, May 10; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 285.
/4/For text, see ibid., vol. IV, Document 330.
Second, the Middle East. The increasing harassment of Israel by elements based in Syria, with attendant reactions within Israel and within the Arab world, has brought the area close to major violence. Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over action by the United Nations./5/
/5/Documentation on U.S.-Soviet relations concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict during late May is scheduled for publication ibid., volume XIX. Included are Thompson's report of his meeting with Gromyko on May 23, transmitted in telegram 5078, May 23; Thompson's assessment of the crisis as seen from Moscow, transmitted in telegram 5125 from Moscow, May 25; an exchange of messages between Kosygin and Johnson on May 27; and Rusk's May 28 message to Gromyko.
Third, Cuba. In Venezuela and elsewhere the government of Cuba is engaging in quite open and active support of violent movements, including the illegal transit of international frontiers with men and arms.
I found in my recent meeting with Presidents of the Western Hemisphere at Punta del Este/6/ a great deal of excitement and determined concern on the part of my fellow Presidents about these actions by Cuba. I would hope there is some way in which your influence in Havana could be used to halt these dangerous activities.
/6/For documentation on the Punta del Este meeting on April 12-14, see ibid., volume XXXI.
Beyond these points of danger and conflict, there are two areas of opportunity where I deeply believe it is our common interest and common duty to humanity to achieve constructive results: the achievement of understandings which would limit our respective deployments of ABM's and ICBM's and the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty./7/ These two enterprises are not explicitly linked; but I am sure you are conscious that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to begin to bring the nuclear arms race under better control. I hope, therefore, your government will find it possible to respond positively to our proposals to enter into serious discussions on the ABM and ICBM problem.
/7/Documentation on negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty and initiation of strategic arms talks is ibid., volume XI.
I am aware that neither of our nations fully controls the forces at work in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or the Caribbean. Indeed, we cannot determine by ourselves whether a non-proliferation treaty will prove acceptable to the governments, parliaments, and peoples of the principal non-nuclear nations. Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains formidable if it is used in the same direction. At this critical moment I believe we must try consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away from each other and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation and peace.
I have outlined my own thoughts on certain of these matters and would be glad to have your own thoughts and any suggestions which you might wish to make.
Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson"
216. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 31, 1967.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 30 USSR. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
Case of Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary
The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called on me at 5:30 this afternoon at his request. Referring to penciled notes from time to time, he made roughly the following statement with respect to the case of Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva.
He said that in the view of the Soviet Government, the actions of the United States Government in this case were hostile toward them and contrary to the statement which I had made on March 10 to Ambassador Dobrynin./2/ In this connection, he referred to my statements at that time that we had trusted this case would not become an obstacle in relations between us, and had emphasized the President's sincerity in seeking to follow the line of normalizing relations. He also repeated that I had then wanted Moscow to believe that the United States Government in no way had a direct interest in this matter and was not interested in bringing her to the United States. Continuing, he said the Soviet Government had taken note of these statements but that almost at once, we had started to act in a contrary manner.
/2/See Document 206.
He said that Mrs. Alliluyeva was not a normal person but that there were distinct signs of mental disturbances in spite of which she was actually being exploited for concrete and definite political purposes. The Soviet side could not ignore the fact that this exploitation was deliberately timed to coincide with the date of great importance in the history of the Soviet Union. The question, therefore, arose as to whether the United States Government realized that there are many other problems in which both sides could be more profitably engaged than in intriguing in a matter of this kind.
The Soviet side, he continued, would point out that there were in the Soviet Union a number of people who have been anxious to write about events relating to the death of the late President Kennedy, and yet they had been restrained and were not allowed to elaborate on certain theories and arguments. The Soviets had not been guided by opportunistic motives but by realization that such things do no good.
Incidentally, he said, the Soviet side was guided by the same motivations in connection with the observations of the Secretary of State about Soviet statements relating to American personalities including the President of the United States.
To speak frankly, he said, whatever might be said about freedom of expression and the like in connection with Svetlana Alliluyeva, the Soviet side understood that everything which would be stated or written by her or ascribed to her would be coached and endorsed by the American side. Besides this, the Soviets knew very well the mental and intellectual capacities of Mrs. Alliluyeva herself.
In saying all this straightforwardly, the Soviet side was not pretending to give advice or to make recommendations as to particular steps. This was the business of the American side. But naturally, it was quite another matter as to what reaction and what response would follow the actions of the American side in the Alliluyeva case, what emotions it could stir up in the Soviet Union, and what its influence would be on relations between our two countries which even without all this are already strained enough.
After hearing him out, I told Mr. Tcherniakov that I would like to make some immediate remarks in reply, reserving the right to make further reply after fully studying his statement and consulting my superiors. I said first of all I wanted to reject any charge or implication of United States Government involvement or exploitation of Mrs. Alliluyeva. I could assure him, and I wanted him to assure the Soviet Government that no American official, indeed no official or any Agency of the American Government had been in touch with Mrs. Alliluyeva since she arrived in Switzerland. There was no question whatsoever of any intrigue or any coaching, or any approval of anything she had said, or might say. Mr. Leddy had informed him, Mr. Tcherniakov, of the revalidation of a visitor's visa to Mrs. Alliluyeva and of the fact that she was coming to this country. This was an action which we had taken in conformity with American laws and traditions.
During the time when she had been in Switzerland, she had had an opportunity to decide what she wanted to do and where she wanted to go, whether it was to any country in the world, or whether it was to return to the Soviet Union. She had decided that she wished to come to the United States and in accordance with our laws and traditions she had been given a visa to do so. In the circumstances, however, there had been no question of defection or asylum, and she was here on a visitor's visa. She was completely free any day to go elsewhere or to return to the Soviet Union. She was in no sense in the custody or under the influence of the American Government or any agent or Agency of the American Government.
As to what she might say or write this was not only not under the control of the American Government, but could not be controlled by the American Government. Freedom of expression is embodied in our Constitution and even the President of the United States could not change this.
Incidentally, I added so far as the reported publication of her book was concerned, this would be the case even if she were not in the United States but still in the Soviet Union. If she had found a way to get her manuscript out as had Sinyavsky and Daniel, there was no way to prevent its publication in the United States even had we wished to do so.
Reviewing my own notes regarding this statement, I said that I failed to understand the reference to the death of President Kennedy and could not accept any parallel whatsoever between this and the question of Mrs. Alliluyeva. I could not conceive that anyone in the Soviet Union was in a position to contribute any information about the death of President Kennedy and that it would be very interesting if anyone were. So far as I knew the manuscript which Mrs. Alliluyeva would be having published not only in the United States but elsewhere concerned her own life and was written even before she left the Soviet Union having been brought out according to her own statement by "Indian friends". We could not and would not object to any Soviet citizen publishing his own memoirs whether it was in the Soviet Union or outside the Soviet Union.
In this connection, I said that I wanted to confirm every word that I had previously said to Ambassador Dobrynin on this subject. Furthermore, the spirit in which this was said remained unchanged. So far as we were concerned, we had not even known that Mrs. Alliluyeva was outside the Soviet Union until the minute she walked in the American Embassy in New Delhi. We had in no way had anything to do with her appearance there and except for the immediate assistance in her departure from India had had no contact with her whatsoever. The United States Government had no interest in exploiting her or influencing her. She was strictly a private person and operating in a private capacity. We continued to hope that this case would not be made into an obstacle in the relationship between the two countries.
At the end, Mr. Tcherniakov asked a couple of questions, in reply to which I pointed out that the United States Government owned only one publishing house, while the Soviet Government owned all in the USSR. He then concluded by saying he was not in a position to add anything to the statement he had been instructed to make to me.
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