### MICROBES AS WEAPONS: IS THERE A LINE IN THE SAND?

Arturo Casadevall Ph.D., M.D.

Albert Einstein College of Medicine

Bronx, NY

## A REMINDER ABOUT 'DUAL USE' TECHNOLOGY

### PICTURE OF CAR

### THE CIVILIAN PASSENGER SEDAN IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON OF WAR IN IRAQ

### **WEAPON**

1 : something (as a club, knife, or gun) used to injure, defeat, or destroy

2: a means of contending against another


# WEAPON TYPES KINETIC RADIOLOGIC NUCLEAR CHEMICAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATIC

**BIOLOGICAL** 

TYPES AND VARIETY
LIMITED BY PHYSICAL LAWS

 VARIETY IS ENORMOUS EFFICACY %f(host, microbe) NOT UNDERSTOOD

### **VISIONS OF MICROBES AS WEAPONS**



NOT SO BAD
SOMEWHAT BAD
VERY BAD

TUNNEL VISION

TUNNEL-MYOPIC VISION

**OUTCOME: SELECT AGENT LIST** 

MULTIPLE LISTS A, B, C CATEGORIES

### IS THIS A WEAPON?



Saccharomyces cerevisiae

JOURNAL OF CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY, June 2004, p. 2840–2842 1098-1137/045[6:00+0 DOI: 10.1128/JCM.42.6.2840–2842.2004 Copyright © 2004, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved. Vol. 42, No. 6

### Use of Paraffin-Embedded Tissue for Identification of Saccharomyces cerevisiae in a Baker's Lung Nodule by Fungal PCR and Nucleotide Sequencing

Ping Ren,1 Sundara Sridhar,2 and Vishnu Chaturvedi1,38


Mycology Laboratory, Wadsworth Center, New York State Department of Health, and Department of Biomedical Sciences, SUNY School of Public Health, University at Albany, and Department of Pathology, Comer Island Hospital, Brookhy, New York


Received 17 November 2003/Returned for modification 16 December 2003/Accented 4 March 2004

A 40-year-old healthy male employed in a bakery presented with a single lung nodule and underwent investigations to rule out pulmonary carcinoma. Biopsy was positive for yeast cells, which did not match common fungal pathogens. PCR assay of parafin-embedded tissue and nucleotide sequencing with ribosomal TTS1-TTS2 universal primers revealed the presence of Saccharomyresy cereisiae.

Identification of fungal pathogens in histological sections frequently requires application of specialized stains (6). Many pathogenic yeasts appear as budding, rounded cells without any characteristic tissue forms (9). This situation is alleviated in instances in which the incriminating fungus can be isolated in culture. However, tissue specimens are not always available for culture. Recently, the application of PCR and nucleotide sequencing has been extended for identification of pathogenic fungi in histological sections. The paraffin-embedded tissue is used as a source of template DNA for a PCR assay with universal fungal ribosomal gene primers and/or a nested PCR assay with pathogen-specific primers, and the amplicons are then analyzed by restriction fragment length polymorphism and/or nucleotide sequencing for confirmation of fungal identity (2-5, 8, 11, 13). This approach is very promising in diagnostics, as it could lead to conclusive identification of the causal pathogen independently of histological or culture observations. We describe a case of a lung nodule in a healthy male that proved to be histologically negative for suspected lung carcinoma and instead revealed budding yeast cells, which were confirmed as Saccharomyces cerevisiae by PCR and nucleotide sequencing.

A 40-year-old healthy male was referred to the surgeon at Coney Island Hospital for a lung nodule discovered during a routine chest X-ray done as part of an annual physical examination. The patient was a nonsmoker with no history of any medical illness. A wedge resection of the lung was performed. A 0.7-cm-diameter solid grey-tan nodule was present in the lung parenchyma. The edges of the lesion were sharply demarcated from the surrounding normal lung parenchyma without any calcification. Histopathologic examination revealed an inflammatory mass composed of a background of fibrotic tissue with a moderately dense population of inflammatory cells composed of an equal admixture of historycts and lymphocytes.





<sup>\*</sup> Corresponding author: Mailing address: Mycology Laboratory, Wadsworth Center, New York State Department of Health, SUYS School of Public Health, University at Albany, Albany, NY 12201-2002, Phone: (518) 453-6412. Fax: (518) 486-7811. E-mail: vishnu @wadsworth.org.

### **YOGURT - IS THERE A WEAPON HERE?**



June 2001, Volume 21, Number 4, Pages 258-260

Table of contents Previous Abstract Next Article PDF

Clinical Perinatal/Neonatal Case Presentation

#### Lactobacillus acidophilus Sepsis in a

Charles Thompson MD¹, Yvette S McCarter PhD², Peter J Krause MD³ and Victor C Herson

L. acidophilus
FOOD?
MICROBE?
COMMENSAL?
OPPORTUNIST?
PATHOGEN?
WEAPON?

### SELECT LIST ASSIGNMENT

### **HISTORICAL USE: PRIOR USE BY MILITARY?**

e.g. Y. pestis, B. anthracis

### HISTORY OF CAUSING PANDEMICS

e.g. Variola major

### 'JUDGEMENT' CALLS

e.g. Assessment of deliverability, weaponization potential, etc

#### **MANY ISSUES**

- 1. UNSUITABLE FOR NEW AGENTS
- 2. MANY MICROBES EXCLUDED

e.g. INFLUENZA VIRUS

NEISSERIA MENINGITIDIS

GROUP A STREPTOCOCCUS

- 3. NOT BASED ON MICROBIAL PATHOGENESIS
- 4. FIXED IN TIME
- 5. SPECIES BASED (NET IS TOO BROAD)
- 6. DOES IT MAKES US SAFER OR MORE VULNERABLE?


# WANTED: A SYSTEM TO DETERMINE THE WEAPON POTENTIAL OF A MICROBE GROUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MICROBIAL PATHOGENESIS

### **ASSUMPTIONS:**

- 1. EACH MICROBES HAS SOME WEAPON POTENTIAL
- 2. WEAPON POTENTIAL IS A FUNCTION OF VARIABLES THAT DETERMINE MICROBIAL PATHOGENESIS
- 3. WEAPON POTENTIAL IS QUANTIFIABLE

REQUIREMENT: A THEORY OF MICROBIAL PATHOGENESIS THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MICROBE AND THE HOST.


### FOR TUNNEL AND TUNNEL-MYOPIA VISUAL DISTURBANCES...




PRESCRIPTION: DAMAGE-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (AND ITS IMPLICATIONS)

### DAMAGE-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK BASIC TENETS (OBVIOUS AND INCONTROVERTIBLE)

#### 1. TWO ENTITIES



2. RELEVANT OUTCOME = HOST DAMAGE





3. DAMAGE CAN COME FROM HOST, MICROBE OR BOTH

### DAMAGE-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

### **TYPE OF HOST-MICROBE INTERACTION**


**DAMAGE = f(HOST RESPONSE)** 

### STATE OF HOST-MICROBE INTERACTION

$$DAMAGE = f(TIME)$$




### BASIC RELATIONSHIP FOR 'DAMAGE-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK'




### BIOWEAPONS: THE VIEW FROM THE 'DAMAGE-RESPONSE FRAMEWORK'

#### TYPE OF HOST-MICROBE INTERACTION

**DAMAGE = f(HOST RESPONSE)** 



### STATE OF HOST-MICROBE INTERACTION



BIOLOGICAL WEAPON = ↑ DAMAGE ↓TIME'

### A WEAPON POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

**WEAPON POTENTIAL**  **BASIC MICROBIAL PATHOGENESIS PARAMETER** 

**TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY OF** AGGRESSOR

**NATURE** (PANIC...)

f(VIRULENCE)

**AMPLIFICATION FACTORS** 

**WEAPON POTENTIAL**  **BASIC MICROBIAL** 

$$D = 1.0$$

$$X = 1.0$$

### **VIRULENCE**

# DEFINED AS THE RELATIVE CAPACITY OF A MICROBE TO CAUSE DAMAGE IN A HOST [Casadevall & Pirofski, Infect.Immun 1999; Casadevall & Pirofski, Nature Microbiol, Rev. 2003]

A NECESSARY FOR BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR ASSESSING WEAPON POTENTIAL

FOR CALCULATING WEAPON POTENTIAL NEED A

QUANTITATIVE DEFINITION FOR VIRULENCE

V WEAPON POTENTIAL = FRACTION SYMPTOMATIC INOCULUM

### **WEAPON POTENTIAL**

DEPENDS ON VIRULENCE BUT INFLUENCED BY COMMUNICABILITY (1 < C < 100)

STABILITY (0 < S < 1.0)

TIME (IN DAYS)

$$WP = \frac{V_{WP} CS}{T} = \frac{F_{SI} CS}{IT}$$

WP = WEAPON POTENTIAL
C = COMMUNICABILITY
S = STABILITY
T = TIME
I = INNOCULUM (LD<sub>50</sub>, LD<sub>10</sub>...)

BASIC RELATIONSHIP CAN BE MODIFIED BY TERROR POTENTIAL (X) AND DELIVERABILITY (D) PARAMETERS

Casadevall & Pirofski, Trends in Microbiology 2004 (June)

### **MAXIMUN WEAPON POTENTIAL**

### **SET:**

COMMUNICABILITY (1 < C < 100)	=100
STABILITY (0 < S < 1.0)	=1.0
TIME (IN DAYS)	=1.0
FRACTION SYMPTOMATIC	=1.0
INOCULUM	=1.0

$$WP = \frac{V_{WP} CS}{T} = \frac{F_{SI} CS}{IT}$$

$$WP_{MAX} = (1.0)(100)(1.0)/(1.0)(1.0) = 100$$

### SAMPLE CALCULATION FOR B. ANTHRACIS

### FOR THE FRACTION SYMPTOMATIC $(F_{SI})$

SVERDLOVSK ESTIMATE: 500 CASES AMONG 59,000 POTENTIALLY EXPOSED = 0.008
BRENTWOOD MAIL FACILITY ESTIMATE: 2 CASES AMONG 2446 POTENTIALLY EXPOSED = 0.0008

#### FOR THE INOCULUM – EXTRAPOLATIONS FOR MONKEYS

 $LD_{50} = 8000 \text{ SPORES}$ 

 $LD_{10} = 50$  SPORES

LD₁ = 1 SPORE

COMMUNICABILITY = NONE (C = 1.0)

STABILITY = 1.0 (EXTREMELY HARDY)

TIME TO DISEASE = 14.2 d (Sverdlovsk data)

WP =  $(0.008)(1/1.0)(1.0)(1.0)(1/14.2) = 5.6 \times 10^{-4}$ 

### WP OF SEVERAL MICROBES

MICROBE	CLASS	V WP		С	S	Т	WP
		FRACTION SYMPTOMATIC	INOCULUM				
B.anthracis	Α	0.008	1	1.0	1.0	14.2	5.6 x 10-4
VARIOLA	Α	0.76	100	90	0.25	10	1.7 x 10-2
HIV	NOT IN LIST	0.99	1000	5	0.25	2920	4.2 x 10-7
HIV	NOT IN LIST	0.99	1000	5	0.25	1	1.2 x 10-3
C. ALBICANS	NOT IN LIST	0.29	7.9 x 10 <sup>8</sup>	5	0.75	5	2.7 x 10-10
THEORETICAL MAXIMUM	?	1	1	100	1	1	100

IF TIME TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT:

VARIOLA > B. anthracis > HIV >> C. albicans

IF TIME IS NOT A CONSIDERATION


**VARIOLA > HIV > B.** anthracis >> C. albicans

### **APPLICATIONS**

### **ESTIMATE WP OF NEW MICROBES...CONSIDER SARS**

MICROBE	CLASS	V WP		С	S	Т	WP
		FRACTION SYMPTOMATIC	INOCULUM				
B.anthracis	Α	0.008	1	1.0	1.0	14.2	5.6 x 10-4
SARS VIRUS	NOT IN LIST	0.18	1000?	50	0.25	5.9	3.5 X 10-4
VARIOLA	Α	0.76	100	90	0.25	10	1.7 x 10-2

### DELIVERABILITY AND IMMUNITY CHANGE WEAPON POTENTIAL OF MICROBE OVER TIME



			_				
$D\Delta$	SIF	-112	X.	Kſ	и:н	റ1	890

CLASS A AGENT	1890	1945	2004	2020
Bacillus anthracis	NO	YES	YES	?
Yersinia pestis	YES	YES	YES	?
Variola major	YES	NO	YES	?
Francisella spp.	NO	NO	YES	?
Hemorrhagic fever viruses	NO	NO	YES	?
Coxiella spp.	NO	YES	YES	?
POLIO VIRUS	NO	YES	NO	YES?*
MEASLES VIRUS	NO	YES	NO	YES?*

### **CLOSING PERSONAL THOUGHTS**

#### ALL PATHOGENIC MICROBES ARE POTENTIAL WEAPONS

WP – A FUNCTION OF SUSCEPTIBILITY & INNOCULA DECISION OR WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE IS 'POLITICAL'

### PLACING OF MICROBES INTO THE VARIOUS 'LISTS' MAY ITSELF BE ACT OF 'DUAL USE': PROTECT AND/OR HARM HUMANITY?

THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: WOULD SARS HAVE BEEN
CONTAINED IN <6 MONTHS IF REGULATIONS ON SHIPPING
AGENTS, SELECT AGENT CLASSIFICATION, ETC BEEN IN PLACE
FOR HUMAN CORONAVIRUSES OR NEW VIRAL ISOLATES?

WP OF A MICROBE CHANGES WITH TIME
PUBLIC HEALTH SUCCESSES CREATE WEAPONS (eg smallpox)
ARE MEALES AND POLIO VIRUSES WEAPONS OF TOMORROW?

THE LINE IN THE SAND CANNOT BE FIXED FOR THE SANDS SHIFT WITH TIME...NEED SMARTER SYSTEMS IN PLACE