Building a 3-1-1 System for Police Non-Emergency Calls

A Process and Impact 
Evaluation 

Austin Police Department
Austin's Answers for Police Non-Emergencies
Greter Austin Crime Commission

Prepared by
21st Century Solutions



Acknowledgements 
& Disclaimers

This report could not have been completed without the full cooperation 
of the women and men of the Emergency Communications 
Division and the Austin Police Department. We thank all of the 
Emergency Communications Division staff who took time from their 
busy schedules to talk with us about their work and who allowed us to 
observe their activities. 

We are especially grateful to Mr. Ed Harris, Emergency Communications 
Division Manager, who supported our work enthusiastically 
and provided us with complete access to all activities and documents 
associated with 3-1-1. 

Ms. Tammy Tomeff, Ms. Denise Baker and Mr. Cary Roberts were 
generous with their time and patiently answered all of our questions 
about what they had done and how they had implemented 3-1-1. 

Ms. Barby Eide gave us her support, advice and assistance throughout 
the project. Ms. Ronnelle Paulsen was always available to help us and 
consistently supported and guided our work. 

We thank the Austin Police Department, the Information Systems 
Department and City of Austin staff for their cooperation and assistance. 

We thank the representatives from Motorola and Avaya who allowed 
us to observe their proprietary sessions with APD and ISD staff. 
Finally, we thank Cher Stuewe-Portnoff, our copyeditor, for her 
patient and precise reviews and corrections on the many versious of 
this report. 
 

This project was supported by Grant No. 2000-CK-WX-K114, 
awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or 
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

Any errors of fact, omission or interpretation are those of the authors 
and are not the responsibility of the Austin Police Department or the 
COPS Office. 

Shellie E. Solomon 
Craig D. Uchida 
21st Century Solutions, Inc. 
Consulting on Crime and Public Policy 
www.e-21stCenturySolutions.com 
(301) 438-3132 

September 2003 

Copyright © 2003 by Shellie E. Solomon, Craig D. Uchida and 21st Century Solutions, Inc. 
in cooperation with the Austin Police Department. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a 
royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish or otherwise use, and 
to authorize others to use, this book for Federal Government purposes. No part of this book 
may be reproduced in any form, by any means (including electronic, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the U.S. Department of Justice and the 
authors.



Table of 
Contents 
& Bookmarks 

Executive Summary Page 1 
Chapter I: Background Page 11 
Chapter II: Implementation Elements Page 15 
Chapter III: Impact Evaluation Page 29 
Chapter IV: Conclusions & Recommendations Page 51 
About the Authors Page 57 


Executive 
Summary 
Introduction 

Introduction

Since 1967, 9-1-1 has been used to bring lifesaving emergency services 
to the scenes of innumerable crimes, fires, accidents, and medical crises. 
By the mid-1980s, 9-1-1 was being dialed increasingly by citizens who 
did not know whom to call for less urgent help, as well. This began to 
overburden the 9-1-1 system, interfering with the handling of genuine 
emergencies. 

By the summer of 1996, non-emergency use of 9-1-1 had reached a 
magnitude that required national attention. The White House and the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), U.S. 
Department of Justice, announced their intention to take corrective action. 
The COPS Office first requested the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to set aside 3-1-1 for use as a national help number for 
non-emergencies. In 1997, the FCC agreed, reserving 3-1-1 nationwide 
for use as a voluntary, non-toll, non-emergency telephone number. COPS 
budgeted funds for system implementation, and by FY 2003, thirteen 
jurisdictions had received financial assistance.1 

The subject of this report, the Austin Police Department (APD), was 
among those jurisdictions selected to receive federal assistance. In an 
earlier report, we described the necessary elements for APD’s 3-1-1 system, 
including each step in the selection of hardware and software, procurement 
issues, training needs, system maintenance, and lessons learned.2 In 
this report we evaluate the implementation process. We ask: How well 
does the system work? What were the obstacles and challenges faced by 
APD staff? Second, we describe the impact of the 3-1-1 system on police 
department operations and regional 9-1-1 call loads. We also discuss the 
perceptions of the project held by Department staff and the local community. 

Our research methods included interviews with key stakeholders throughout 
the process; observations of weekly implementation meetings (June-
September 2001); and observations of daily work meetings, especially 
during the critical implementation months of July and August 2001. The 3-
1-1 stakeholders we interviewed included emergency operations executives 
and managers, Information Technology Department staff, technology 
vendor staff, Capital Area Planning Council (CAPCO) executives, Greater 
Austin Crime Commission (GACC) executives, call takers and dispatchers, 
Research and Planning staff, and APD police officers (although contact with 
the latter was limited). We participated in four training sessions, including 
vendor trainings on the telephony equipment and the customer relations 
software. 



We observed Teleserve, 9-1-1, 3-1-1, and dispatch workers on the 
job before, immediately after, and 6 months following 3-1-1 system 
implementation. We monitored actual calls and observed operations 
during complete shifts across each of the three shift periods. We also 
conducted two surveys of call takers and dispatchers; the first survey 
immediately followed the 3-1-1 kick-off, and the second occurred six 
months after implementation.
 
Findings: Implementation Elements 

We found that APD had implemented 3-1-1 without delays and within 
budget. APD staff partnered effectively with experts in key city agencies, 
community organizations, and vendor organizations to build the system. 
Although they faced obstacles, none prevented the launch of the system 
and its use for its primary purpose – to reduce 9-1-1 call loads. The 
Austin 3-1-1 team leveraged their strengths and partnerships to design 
and select 3-1-1 system components in a timely and effective manner. 

We found one drawback. While all involved reported that they “nailed 
the implementation timeline,” on-time delivery of the front-end system 
may have come at the cost of essential back-end tools. These tools were 
important to the long-term management of 3-1-1 call loads. Considering 
the ultimate outcome -- diverting calls from the 9-1-1 call load as quickly 
as possible - APD benefited from expedited procurement options; 
however, having skipped the crucial, in-depth software evaluation 
steps required by the standard RFP process may have allowed them to 
overlook complications that the off-the-shelf software would later pose 
for their small staff. 

In this process evaluation, we detailed implementation problems as 
well as successes in order to help APD and other jurisdictions recognize 
potential potholes along the road to 3-1-1 implementation or expansion. 
We commend the Austin team for its determination and ability to work 
through these issues during the design phase, as well as to avoid the 
many other problems frequently encountered with complex technology 
projects. 

APD successfully implemented a 3-1-1 solution. Their enthusiasm, 
focus, skill, and dedication across the board allowed them to create 
a system that provides a viable option to citizens for non-emergency 
police calls. This system relies heavily on human elements rather than 



technological advances. First, the public education and marketing 
campaign won acceptance and wide usage of the system by Austin 
citizens. In-depth staff training and understanding of call resolution 
policies, procedures, and expectations ensured citizen satisfaction with 
this non-emergency alternative to 9-1-1. 

We encourage APD to bring the technological components of the 3-1-1 
system up to par with the human elements. By doing so, they will begin 
to reap the operational, management, and problem-solving benefits that 
this type of technology can provide. Specifically, we recommend that 
APD consider renewing the partnership and collaboration with ISD 
with the objectives of fully accessing data captured by the call tracking 
software, fully populating the CRM system, and resolving outstanding 
GIS issues. Once the system is completely operational, we encourage 
APD to maintain system support staffing to manage the complex 
technology on a daily basis, including making system adjustments, 
creating management and operational reports, and partnering with the 
Research and Planning unit to analyze the data created by 3-1-1 call 
tracking, so that it can be used to troubleshoot, manage, and improve 
the operation. 

Impact Evaluation 

How effective is the 3-1-1 system in reducing 9-1-1 calls for service? 
Did the new operation improve the management of all citizen calls to 
police (both emergency and non-emergency)? Did response times for 
high priority calls improve? Did citizen satisfaction with the police 
handling of calls for service change? Was patrol officer time freed to 
provide more opportunities for problem-oriented and community 
policing activities? These are among the questions we asked in 
determining the impact of 3-1-1 on police services. 

To answer these questions, we relied upon official data from within APD 
and conducted surveys of police officers, call takers, and those citizens 
who called 3-1-1. 

Findings 

Our analysis of the impacts of 3-1-1 in Austin reveals six principal 
findings: 



1. Implementation of the 3-1-1 call system resulted in a reduction of 
9-1-1 calls. During the first 12 months that 3-1-1 was in operation, 9-1-1 
calls were reduced by 20 percent, a remarkable reduction considering the 
public safety environment following 9/11. From September 2002 through 
July 2003, 9-1-1 calls were reduced by 72,000; once data are available for 
the entire year, we may find that 9-1-1 calls were reduced by more than 
25 percent in the second full year of 3-1-1’s existence. (We do note that 
data from different source documents conflict with respect to actual 9-1-1 
call loads; different reporting periods and reporting methods resulted in 
different results.) 

Bringing the 9-1-1 call load back down to 1994 levels has allowed APD to 
maintain service standards during peak call loads. As the APD Emergency 
Communications manager states, 3-1-1 has been a “godsend to Austin” 
in this era of heightened public safety requirements. It is allowing true 
emergency calls to be received by 9-1-1 call takers within the 10-second 
period required by their performance goals. 

2. The 3-1-1 system contributed to a significant increase in total calls 
for service. During the first full calendar year that 3-1-1 was in operation, 
calls for service to APD grew by 70 percent, from 854,136 to 1,445,271 
calls. More than 700,000 calls were received by the new 3-1-1 center 
alone. Fifty percent of them were from citizens dialing 3-1-1, while the 
other 50 percent were redirected from other phone lines to the 3-1-1 
switch. This explosion of calls for service far exceeds the rate of increase 
in any of the prior 10 years, and is evidence of the success of APD’s 
public education and marketing campaign. Some of the increase probably 
is due to heightened public concern and interest in public safety issues 
following 9/11. Citizens have accepted the 3-1-1 system, and consider it a 
viable non-emergency reporting alternative to 9-1-1. 

3. Dispatchable calls for service increased. Despite the reduction in 
9-1-1 calls, APD tracked 23,000 more dispatchable calls than in the prior 
year. Priority One and Three calls decreased, but Priority Two and Four 
calls for service increased. Our analysis was unable to uncover the source 
of the increases or to determine whether they were associated with the 
introduction of 3-1-1. We infer (but cannot prove) that the increase in 
Priority Four calls is related to the overall increase in calls attributable 
to 3-1-1. The CAD system does not support analysis of the sources 
of CAD entries – that is, whether they originate with 9-1-1 or 3-1-1 
callers. Call takers on the 3-1-1 system have the discretion to dispatch 

an officer on any call. Since we do not know the nature of 3-1-1 calls, 
however, we cannot assess whether 3-1-1 call takers are simply receiving 
more dispatchable calls than expected or may be opting, on occasion, to 
dispatch as a way of meeting time-per-call performance goals. 

4. Time available for community policing has not increased following 
the introduction of 3-1-1. Officer surveys showed that after 3-1-1 was 
introduced, officers reported working about the same amount of time 
on problem solving. They also reported answering roughly the same 
number of calls for service per shift. Added public safety responsibilities 
associated with homeland security appeared to absorb time that otherwise 
might have been available for increasing community policing efforts.3 

5. Citizens report satisfaction with emergency communication 
services in general, and with 3-1-1 services in particular. Surveys 
conducted by the City and as part of our research show that 94 percent of 
Austin’s citizens are pleased with the 9-1-1 system, and 75 percent believe 
that 3-1-1 has contributed to improvements in service. 

6. Communication between police officers and citizens, and between 
police officers and city agencies, does not appear to have changed 
due to the 3-1-1 system. Although 3-1-1 provides citizens with a viable 
way to report non-emergency concerns to police, it has not yet allowed 
them to become “another set of eyes and ears” for the police, as the APD 
Chief had hoped. This is probably due in large part to the way citizen 
information is handled. APD is not yet collecting, tracking, analyzing, 
and managing information about 3-1-1 calls, so opportunities to move 
in this direction are likely being missed. New incoming information 
is not systematically being disseminated to police officers or District 
Representatives. Likewise, APD is not systematically communicating 
citizen-reported public safety and quality of life issues to other city service 
agencies. According to discussions with the Emergency Communications 
Director, however, plans are underway to begin limited tracking of calls 
using the CRM system. The City Manager is expecting to expand 3-1-1 
city-wide in the near future. 

Summary. The use of 3-1-1 reduced 9-1-1 calls by 20 percent, achieving 
one of APD’s major goals for the system. Overall, total call load to APD, 
including 3-1-1 and 9-1-1, increased by over 70 percent during the first 
year of operations. In addition, dispatchable calls increased, especially in 
the Priority Four calls. Time available for community policing by patrol 



officers did not increase as a result of the implementation of 3-1-1. Seventy-
five percent of citizens surveyed believe that 3-1-1 improved emergency 
communications in Austin. APD is not systematically tracking or analyzing 
the information from 3-1-1 calls. 

Recommendations 

The above findings suggest that APD has successfully addressed its most 
critical issue – migrating non-emergency calls away from the 9-1-1 system 
has reduced the overall 9-1-1 call load and secured it for true emergencies. 
This accomplishment is especially remarkable post-9/11, when call loads 
were reported to have surged nationwide. As we said in the process 
evaluation, APD is to be commended for its focus on achieving its primary 
goal in a timely, cost-effective, and customer-oriented manner. 

At the same time, although APD has achieved success with this highly 
visible outcome, it has yet to use the full capabilities of the call-tracking 
and analysis software to achieve long-term management and customer 
service benefits. The following recommendations are intended to suggest 
how APD might expand 3-1-1’s external success to include internal 
management and problem-solving gains. 

Based on the above findings, we make the following recommendations: 

1. Before expanding the system city-wide, APD and City 
executives should confer to consider the budget, staffing, and 
other consequences of 3-1-1’s success for APD, and project the 
implications for the City of potential future call loads. 
Strategic decisions about the next goals of the 3-1-1 system need 
to be carefully evaluated. As the Baltimore study4 suggests, police 
departments and cities need to think carefully about whether they want 
to increase or reduce calls for service. 

APD’s Chief sought through 3-1-1 to involve the community in 
gathering relevant, useful information to use in making policing 
decisions. Some argue that greater citizen involvement provides 
police with “better information about the spatial distribution of crime 
and quality of life problems and thus a more accurate picture of the 
locations of ongoing problems.”5 Conversely, others argue that public 
education campaigns should dissuade citizens from calling police about 

low-level neighborhood problems, in order to reserve police resources 
for the most serious law enforcement matters. 

We assert that cities can and should do both – encourage citizen 
interaction with the department, while disseminating information 
that citizens can use independently to improve their quality of life 
and mitigate area problems. As chronic problems are addressed, call 
loads should theoretically decrease. Regardless of which objective is 
right for a given city, however, making a conscious decision about the 
objectives for a 3-1-1 system is critical not only to guide its actions, 
but to prevent unintended consequences. Without clearly defining 
its intentions, Austin could inadvertently create a new workload and 
another call center overload in the future. 

2. Establish a systematic process for reporting the number of 9-1-1 
and 3-1-1 calls received. For operational purposes, APD Emergency 
Communications Managers meticulously tracked the number of 
calls coming into both call for service systems. APD Research and 
Planning Division staff needed the tracking system for analysis 
and reporting requirements. Statistics generated within and across 
these two divisions varied, due to differences in reporting periods 
and data extraction techniques. Nevertheless, both sets of numbers 
were publicly available. As with many statistics, the specifics of how 
particular figures were generated are often lost as the number is used. 
Understandably, APD’s statistics are generated and used for differing 
purposes, but we suggest that APD document the differences between 
how the various statistics for call loads are generated in order to 
maintain credibility and to ensure that those who generate and use 
call load statistics fully understand the differences and the reasons for 
them. 

3. Use the full capacity of Customer Relations Management (CRM) 
software systematically to track the nature of 3-1-1 calls. With 
deployment of the upgraded CAD and record management systems, 
we anticipate that APD will have a much better system for tracking 
the nature of 9-1-1 calls. This information will be critical if APD 
wants to continue to analyze and manage information about calls for 
service by priority classification. For example, with more information 
about the nature of Priority Four calls, APD might be able to manage 
or reduce the number of dispatched “report only” calls, freeing more 
officer time for problem solving and other needs. 



Tracking the nature of 3-1-1 calls with the CRM system was an early 
goal set for the 3-1-1 system. In order for APD to make full use of 
information provided by citizens, that information must be recorded. 
Once recorded, it can be used for a variety of purposes, such as 
reducing calls through public education or solving quality of life 
problems with the help of police officers and District Representatives. 

Understanding the nature of 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 calls is essential to 
managing them effectively and to allocating APD resources. One 
reason APD pursued 3-1-1 was to avoid adding more telephone 
switches and call takers to handle growing call loads. Without 
tracking and managing the issues that underlie the call load, history 
may repeat itself – the same problems that plagued the 9-1-1 system 
may soon plague 3-1-1. Without more complete data, APD also runs 
the risk of limiting its ability to make well-grounded policy decisions 
about how to use their resources. 

4. Finally, renew and redirect the public education campaign. APD 
has demonstrated how human element rather than technological 
wizardry are at the heart of improving the public safety environment 
for citizens. The department reduced 9-1-1 call loads essentially by 
asking citizens to be more conscientious in their use of 9-1-1, and 
then giving them the means to comply. We encourage APD to build 
on this success and to continue to inform constituents about 3-1-1 
as the non-emergency call alternative. Using data collected with the 
CRM system, for example, APD might target neighborhoods that 
under-use the system. 

The 3-1-1 non-emergency call system allows citizens to become 
part of the solution for the problem of managing demand for police 
resources. It gives them some discretion about whether they need a 
patrol car dispatched, with 3-1-1 call takers having seamless access to 
the dispatch system. 

To reduce the need for dispatching officers, a targeted public 
education campaign could address recurring crime and quality of 
life issues, identified by using CRM software to monitor 3-1-1 call 
loads. We encourage the Department to use the information created 
from collective citizen input to educate the community about their 
problems and to involve them in the response. 


End Notes 

1 Baltimore Police Department was the first to receive 3-1-1 funding. The subject 
of this report, the Austin Police Department, also received funding. The other 11 
recipients were Birmingham (AL), Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC), Columbus (OH), 
Dukes County (MA), Framingham (MA), Houston (TX), Los Angeles (CA), 
Miami (FL), Minneapolis (MN), Orange County (FL), and Rochester (NY). For 
information on the program history, see the COPS 3-1-1 Fact Sheet and other 
related publications at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

2 Shellie E. Solomon and Craig D. Uchida, “Building a 3-1-1 System for Police 
Non-Emergency Calls: A Case Study of the City of Austin Police Department 
,” Final Report submitted to the Austin Police Department and the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, September, 2003. 

3 The relationship between 3-1-1 and time available for community policing is 
unclear. We could not verify time-related data using the CAD system data because 
the system does not track time information in a consistent and accessible manner. 

4 Lorraine Mazerolle, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, Christine Famega, and John E. 
Eck, “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: The Impact of Baltimore’s 3-1-1 Call 
System,” Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, Nov. 2002, at page 119. 

5 Ibid. 



Chapter I 
Background 

On February 16, 1968, in Haleyville, Alabama, State Speaker of the 
House Rankin Fite placed the very first 9-1-1 universal emergency 
number call in America; the groundbreaking demonstration call was 
answered by Congressman Tom Bevill. It had taken Congress and the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice nearly 10 years, from 1958 to 1967, to reach this moment. In 
November 1967, the U.S. Senate, with the House of Representatives 
concurring, issued a resolution stating: 

Resolved…That it is the sense of the Congress that the United 
States should have one uniform nationwide fire reporting 
telephone number and one uniform nationwide police 
reporting telephone number. 

The Nation recognized a good thing when it saw it. A mere 30 years 
later, across the country, 9-1-1 was being used to bring lifesaving emer-
gency services to the scenes of innumerable crimes, fires, accidents, 
and medical crises. By the mid-1980s, however, 9-1-1 was being dialed 
increasingly by citizens who did not know whom to call for less urgent 
help, as well. This began to overburden the 9-1-1 system, interfering 
with the handling of genuine emergencies. 

By the summer of 1996, non-emergency use of 9-1-1 had reached a 
magnitude that required national attention. The White House and the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), U.S. De-
partment of Justice, announced their intention to take corrective ac-
tion. COPS first requested the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to set aside 3-1-1 for use as a national help number for non-
emergencies. In 1997, the FCC agreed, reserving 3-1-1 nationwide 
for use as a voluntary, non-toll, non-emergency telephone number. 
COPS budgeted funds for system implementation, and by FY 2003, 
thirteen jurisdictions had received financial assistance .1 

The subject of this report, the Austin Police Department (APD), was 
among those jurisdictions selected to receive federal assistance. In an 
earlier report, we described the necessary elements for APD’s 3-1-1 
system, including each step in the selection of hardware and software, 


procurement issues, training needs, system maintenance, 
and lessons learned.2 In this report we evaluate 
the implementation process. We ask: How well 
does the system work? What were the obstacles 
and challenges faced by APD staff? Second, we 
describe the impact of the 3-1-1 system on Police 
Department operations and regional 9-1-1 call loads. 
We also discuss the perceptions of the project held 
by Department staff and the local community. 

Austin’s Need for 3-1-1 

Although initiating a 3-1-1 system requires 
sophisticated planning, technology, and training, the 
greatest challenge lies in altering public behavior. 
Almost every American man, woman, and child 
knows to dial 9-1-1 in a police, fire, or medical 
emergency. But increasing numbers of citizens are 
in the habit of dialing the emergency number for 
almost any public service need. Callers using the 
number for non-emergency purposes can and do 
cause delays in emergency personnel’s response 
to true emergencies. APD Chief Stan Knee 
realized that in order to protect the integrity and 
effectiveness of Austin’s 9-1-1 system, he would 
have to give his constituents a viable alternative for 
non-emergency situations. 

APD executives were already concerned that 
the 9-1-1 system was being stressed beyond its 
limits. During regional crises, such as weather 
emergencies, officials suspected that 9-1-1 lines 
were being overwhelmed – and that some callers 
were being placed on hold, or worse, were getting 
busy signals or no answer at all. However, they 
also suspected that as many as 40 to 50 percent of 
the incoming 9-1-1 calls were non-emergencies, 
situations that should be handled by someone other 
than police, fire, or rescue operations. 

Apart from the stress on the system caused by civil 
emergencies, 9-1-1 call volumes appeared to be 
growing at a faster rate than Austin’s population. At 
the beginning of its COPS grant period, APD was 
on track to receive more than a million 9-1-1 calls 
for the year. The city’s existing technology and staff 
could not support the demands of this growing call 
load. At the same time, it would be neither logical 
nor viable public policy simply to increase staffing 
to handle call volumes that were predicted to grow 
indefinitely. In addition, the existing 9-1-1 technology 
could not be upgraded to use more efficient and 
advanced software due to interagency compatibility 
issues and state regulations. 

Bringing a new 3-1-1 non-emergency call system 
to Austin offered a potential solution to all of these 
problems and more, if it could be implemented and 
marketed effectively. 

Austin: The Research Site 

Austin is diverse, with a growing population. 
The city is the 16th largest in the country, with a 
population of 656,562; the metropolitan area3 is 
home to over 1.2 million people. Austin covers 232 
square miles, served by four major highways. Since 
1990, the Hispanic and Asian populations have 
grown exponentially; the Hispanic population has 
increased by 88 percent, while the Asian population 
has more than doubled. Fifty-three percent of the 
population is White, 31 percent is Hispanic, 10 
percent is Black, and 5 percent is Asian. Austin’s 
citizens are well educated. High technology 
industries provide almost 15 percent of total 
nonagricultural employment. 

Austin ranks as the third safest major city in the 
U.S. with regard to violent crime, and the 35th safest 
with regard to property crime, according to Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) 2000 data. When walking 
alone in their neighborhoods, 94 percent of residents 
reported feeling safe during the day and 70 percent 
reported feeling safe at night.4 Citizens are active 
in numerous neighborhood associations. More than 


23,000 volunteer hours were logged in FY 2001 by 
the police department alone. Austin’s tradition of 
citizen involvement served as a key factor in setting 
the goals for APD’s 3-1-1 system. 

The Austin Police Department serves the 
community with a sworn force of more than 1,270 
officers and 600 civilians. Since 1998, APD has 
implemented Neighborhood-Based Policing, a 
philosophy that incorporates tenets of community 
policing. The last decade has seen an increase 
in police partnerships and collaboration with the 
community, major departmental organizational 
changes, and support for problem solving in 
facilitated settings on the part of police. APD’s 
Chief articulates two primary responsibilities for 
his patrol officers: respond to calls for service and 
engage in problem-solving activities. 

In a prior assessment of community policing 
in Austin,5 we reported that the practice of 
neighborhood-based policing permeated the 
Department. Everyone we interviewed and 
observed - executives, patrol officers, and civilian 
staff - was aware of the concept and of some 
ways in which it had been implemented. The 
majority were supportive of the approach, and had 
dedicated themselves to practicing neighborhood-
based policing. The Department had made a 
number of organizational changes in support of 
its neighborhood-based approach. Among them 
were decentralization, permanent shift scheduling, 
installation in each command of District 
Representatives (DR) and Street Response Units 
(SRU), and civilianization, along with issuance of 
new general orders, policies and procedures, and 
accountability mechanisms. 

Austin’s Chief considered the 3-1-1 non-emergency 
call system as a logical extension of neighborhood-
based policing. If they could more easily reach the 
Police Department in non-emergency situations, 
the Chief believed, Austin’s citizens would become 
“another set of eyes and ears for the Department.” 
In addition, APD managers believed that from 
240,000 to 360,000 of all annual calls for service 
could be handled effectively by well-trained call 
takers instead of by police officers. 

By the mid-1990s, non-emergency calls had also 
become a dilemma for 9-1-1 call takers, who had 
no place to route them. Call takers’ options were 
to attempt to respond to the diverse questions, or 
to dismiss callers tactfully, but without resolution. 
In 1996, APD obtained a COPS MORE grant6 
to create a Teleserve unit staffed by 10 full-time 
operators. By July 2000, Teleserve was operating 
7 days a week, around the clock. When 9-1-1 call 
takers received non-emergency police reports, 
they could redirect callers to Teleserve operators. 
Teleserve could be reached by dialing a direct 
seven-digit number listed in the blue pages of 
the telephone directory, by transfers from 9-1-1 
operators, or by leaving voice mail messages that 
would be returned by Teleserve operators. The 
majority of Teleserve calls involved property 
crimes, such as vehicle and residential burglaries 
where the suspect had already left the scene. 
Teleserve eventually had 28 operators fielding an 
average of 5,000 calls per month; meanwhile, the 
number of calls handled by 9-1-1 operators had 
decreased by almost 50 percent. Teleserve had 
succeeded in relieving the immediate pressure on 
9-1-1, but the Chief did not regard it as the ultimate 
solution. In 1999, the Chief directed his staff to find 
a way to build a 3-1-1 system. 


End Notes 

1 Baltimore Police Department was the first to receive 3-1-1 funding. 
The subject of this report, the Austin Police Department, also 
received funding. The other 11 recipients were Birmingham (AL),
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC), Columbus (OH), Dukes County (MA),
Framingham (MA), Houston (TX), Los Angeles (CA), Miami (FL),
Minneapolis (MN), Orange County (FL), and Rochester (NY). For
information on the program history, see the COPS 3-1-1 Fact Sheet and
other related publications at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

2 Shellie E. Solomon and Craig D. Uchida, “Building a 3-1-1 System 
for Police Non-Emergency Calls: Technical Assistance Guide,” Final 
Report submitted to the Austin Police Department and the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, March, 2002.

3 Austin-San Marcos, TX Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by 
the Census Bureau includes Bastrop County, Caldwell County, Hays 
County, Travis County, and Williamson County.

4 Source: FY 2001-2002 City of Austin Budget, Police Department 
Section

5 Uchida, Craig D., Shellie Solomon and Edward R. Maguire, 
“Neighborhood-Based Policing, Austin Style, An Assessment.” 
Washington, D.C.: 21st Century Solutions, Inc., September 2000.

6 The COPS Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) 
program seeks to increase the amount of time existing law enforcement 
officers can spend on community policing, by funding technology, 
equipment, and support staff, including civilian personnel.



Chapter II 
Implemenation 
Elements 


This section of the evaluation asks the following questions about 
3-1-1 in Austin: 

- How did APD choose its call routing and call-
management systems? 

- Who was involved and how did critical partnerships 
shape 3-1-1? 

- How successful was APD in developing call-
tracking systems and related databases? 

- How well did APD integrate customer relations 
management (CRM) software into the system? 

- How effective was the staffing and training for 3-1-1? 

- How did APD change public behavior through 
education and marketing? 

We discuss the steps that the Department took – what worked 
well, how APD addressed obstacles, and the lessons learned 
during implementation. Our research methods included 
interviews with key stakeholders throughout the process; 
observations of weekly implementation meetings (June-
September 2001); and observations of daily work meetings, 
especially during the critical implementation months of July 
and August 2001. The 3-1-1 stakeholders we interviewed 
included emergency operations executives and managers, 
Information Technology Department staff, technology vendor 
staff, Capital Area Planning Council (CAPCO) executives, 
Greater Austin Crime Commission (GACC) executives, call 
takers and dispatchers, Research and Planning staff, and APD 
police officers (although contact with the latter was limited). 

We participated in four training sessions, including vendor 
trainings on the telephony equipment and the customer relations 
software. We observed Teleserve, 9-1-1, 3-1-1, and dispatch 
workers on the job before, immediately after, and 6 months 
following 3-1-1 system implementation. We monitored actual 
calls and observed operations during complete shifts across 
each of the three shift periods. We also conducted two surveys 
of call takers and dispatchers – the first survey immediately 
followed the 3-1-1 kick-off, and the second occurred six 
months after implementation. 


Finally, we reviewed 
documents generated 
during planning and 
implementation, including: 

- APD policies and procedures for taking and 
dispatching calls 

- APD COPS grant application 

- Capital Area Planning Council (9-1-1 oversight 
organization) rules and regulations 

- Research materials concerning 3-1-1 
operations in other locations 

- 3-1-1 technology implementation project 
plan, including timeline 

- Vendor publicity materials for call 
management and telephony systems 

- System design models 

- Procurement evaluation documents 

- Software and hardware contracts with selected vendors 

- Telephony equipment specifications 

- Staffing charts for the emergency communications division 

- Vendors and APD training documentation 

- Physical space blueprints 

- Vendor maintenance and support plans and agreements 

- Information Technology Department, City 
of Austin, maintenance and support plans 
and agreements 

- Public education and marketing research materials 

- Public education and marketing implementation plan 

- Press releases and press release support materials 

- Media coverage 

- Daily call statistics 

- Internal and external operations briefing materials 

Image of Exhibit 1: Call Loads - FY 1993 to FY 1999 
Population Increases Compared to 9-1-1 and Dispatch Call Loads 


Choosing a System 

APD executives started the project by conducting 
a thorough assessment of Austin’s need for a non-
emergency system. Based on the assessment, they 
were able to develop and communicate a clear, 
complete vision of their goals for the new system. 

The assessment sought to determine how citizens 
currently placed calls for service to the Police 
Department. Initially, they found that people 
could call 9-1-1, or they could call personnel 
within the Department using a non-emergency 
telephone number (974-5000) that forwarded 
to a private business exchange (PBX), with two 
civilian operators answering calls between 8 a.m. 
and 5 p.m. Then in 1996, APD implemented the 
Teleserve system to reduce some of the burden 
on 9-1-1 call takers; operators now could accept 
non-emergency police reports over the phone 
at any time. Teleserve was well accepted by the 
public as a viable alternative to a dispatched 
officer, and its call load steadily grew. Teleserve 
quickly helped to reduce the average number of 
calls handled by 9-1-1 operators by almost 50 
percent, but the absolute number of 9-1-1 calls 
continued to grow faster than the population in 
Austin. Exhibit 1 shows that 9-1-1 call volume 
increased by an average of 2.4 percent in the first 
5 years represented; in FY 1998, call volume 
increased 10.6 percent. In subsequent years, 9


1-1 call volume steadily increased at the rate of 
4.4 percent annually - about 2 percent faster than 
population growth was forecast for the city. In FY 
2001, Austin 9-1-1 was on track to receive more 
than one million calls, 13 percent more than in 
FY 1999. The increase was partially attributed to 
population growth and partially to an explosion 
in cell phone use. Each call taker was fielding an 
average increase in calls of 10 percent per year. 
The added load threatened their ability to continue 
meeting their organizational service goals: to answer 
90 percent of 9-1-1 calls within 10 seconds. 

APD managers began measuring the impact 
of the heavy 9-1-1 call load on dispatch times. 
The Assistant Chief for Operations Support was 
concerned about the length of time it was taking 
officers to respond to emergencies and the amount 
of time that was elapsing from when a caller placed 
a 9-1-1 call to when an officer arrived on the scene. 
System congestion due to non-emergency calls was 
a critical factor affecting this performance measure. 

Meanwhile, the Manager of the Emergency 
Communications Division had another set of 
concerns for the near future. Population growth 
and peak call loads related to community crisis 
points (e.g., severe weather) could be predicted to 
overwhelm the existing 9-1-1 system’s capacity 
before long. Analysis of daily statistics showed 
that peak call loads were occurring on Fridays and 
Saturdays. Call volume started from a low around 
5 a.m. and steadily increased throughout the rest 
of the day, peaking around rush hour (5-6 p.m.), 
and then steadily decreasing through the evening. 
Weekend (noon on Friday through 11:59 a.m. on 
Sunday) call loads peaked between 11 p.m. and 
3 a.m., and were about 56 percent higher than 
for the same period during the week. Managers 
were accumulating anecdotal evidence that during 
extreme peak times, 9-1-1 callers were already 
being placed on hold and receiving busy signals, at 
the same time that non-emergency calls were being 
answered. 

The managers recognized that trying to address 
these problems within the existing 9-1-1 system 
framework would be challenging, at best. The 
Texas State Commission on State Emergency 
Communication provides funding, guidelines, and 
regulations for the state’s 9-1-1 systems, and the 
Capital Area Planning Council (CAPCO) serves as 
a regional coordinator, monitoring the APD 9-1-1 
system. CAPCO knew that Austin had an escalating 
problem, but interoperability issues between 
emergency agencies in the Austin metropolitan 
area prevented CAPCO from allowing APD to 
alter its system hardware or software. As a result, 
several potential solutions, such as different call 
interface systems, call-routing mechanisms, and 
call-tracking databases, were struck from APD’s list 
of possibilities. 

APD could, however, develop a completely new 
3-1-1 non-emergency call system, designing it to 
be compatible with the area wide 9-1-1 upgrade 
that was already underway. In 1998, Austin 
voters had approved a bond issue to pay for a 
Combined Emergency Communication Center. The 
Center would include a new 9-1-1 call handling 
system, a new 800-MHz trunked voice radio 
system, computer-aided dispatch (CAD), mobile 
data terminals, automatic vehicle location, and 
transportation and transit services; it was opened 
in Winter of 2003-04. Once it adopted the strategy 
of moving forward with a new non-emergency call 
system, APD began creating the vision for 3-1-1. 
APD sought to: 

- Provide citizens with a viable non-
emergency reporting alternative 

- Maintain service standards as the population 
grew 

- Maintain service standards during peak call 
loads 

- Maintain appropriate staffing levels 

- Transfer non-emergency public safety calls 
to the correct city service agency 

APD needed to select a model for 3-1-1 that would 
wean the public from using 9-1-1 to report non-
emergency concerns, but still encourage citizens 
to assist the Department with problem-solving, 
continuing to provide what the Chief called “another 
set of eyes and ears.” The Department decided early 
that it could not afford to assume lead responsibility 
for all of the City’s non-emergency public service 
calls; accordingly, they set conservative goals as 
they considered the staffing and budget requirements 
for the various 3-1-1 models. Eventually, APD 


selected the most basic “police-only” option. Once 
this decision was made and funding was assured by 
the COPS Office, APD executives began to establish 
critical partnerships that would help them implement 
the project. 

Establishing 
Critical 
Partnerships 

The project team included APD and City 
of Austin stakeholders, representing the 
various kinds of expertise necessary 
to make decisions and move the project 
forward. In addition, several external 
partners worked with APD to implement the 
call-routing and call-management systems. APD’s 
Emergency Communication Division was the 
system’s leading champion and end-user. The City’s 
Information System Department (ISD) and the 
Purchasing Department were also critical partners, 
as were system vendors Motorola, AVAYA, and Dell 
Computers. 

ISD’s project manager was responsible for designing 
the system and for all related system research, 
procurement, installation, and debugging. The ISD 
team included a telephony system expert and a 
hardware and network system expert. ISD’s project 
manager also assumed the lead in designing the 
customer relations management (CRM) software. 

The initial team met almost weekly for 
approximately one year, following standard 
information technology development procedures. 
The sequence of project management steps included 
project definition, analysis, design, procurement, 
construction, and implementation. The ISD project 
manager first developed a detailed project plan, 
including a timeline that listed each task, the staff 
responsible for completing it, start and end dates, 
and related tasks. At weekly meetings, the core 
team compared notes on the progress of each task, 
reviewed upcoming tasks, problem-solved for any 
delinquent tasks, and added new tasks, as needed. 
The communication and collaboration that took 
place in these meetings was critical for maintaining 
focus and momentum. 

APD’s 3-1-1 Goals 
With 3-1-1, APD sought to: 
•Provide citizens with a viable non-emergency reporting 
alterative. 
•Maintain service standards as the population grew 
•Maintain service standards during peak call loads 
•Maintain appropriate staffing levels. 
•Transfer non-emergency public safety calls to the 
correct city service agency. 

Once the system was designed, the Purchasing 
Department became a crucial partner. 
Governments establish protective policies and 
procedures for obtaining goods and services 
with public funds. As a result, procurement 
is a perplexing maze to most of those trying 
to implement a concept. However, within 
each government are individuals tasked with 
understanding and enforcing procurement policies 
and procedures. Recognizing the complexities 
likely to be involved in procuring 3-1-1 system 
components, APD and the ISD staff sought help 
from the Purchasing Office prior to initiating the 
procurement process. With its expert advice, APD 
was able to use special public safety and other 
purchasing regulations to expedite their process. 
They were able to leverage existing contracts, which 
gave them access to bulk discounts on a relatively 
small IT purchase, and they avoided common pitfalls 
such as costs overruns and timeline slippage. In the 
state of Texas, agencies may use direct procurement 
(also known as “sole source” procurement) in place 
of the standard request for proposal (RFP) process 
for items that will improve the safety of citizens. 
The collegial partnership with Purchasing saved the 
team from three to nine months by introducing them 
to this alternative. 


Having expert partners allowed the Department to 
expand and leverage much-needed expertise in order 
to deliver the 3-1-1 project on budget and on time. At 
the same time, the partnerships generated another set 
of challenges: 

- Role-related conflicts over control of the project 

- Problems integrating with other larger 
systems under development 

- Lack of timely involvement by GIS experts 

- Potential conflicts of interest among partners, 
e.g., the Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) 

From early in the project, boundaries of authority 
between the APD Emergency Communication 
Manager and the ISD Project Manager were not 
always clearly articulated, and occasionally, rational 
decisions made by one inadvertently created 
problems for the other. As project champion and 
end user of the 3-1-1 system, the APD Emergency 
Communication Manager naturally assumed the lead 
in defining performance priorities and requirements 
for equipment and software. He also directed his 
staff’s involvement in the planning phases; these 
staff were adding 3-1-1 to an already existing 
workload that would continue. 

The ISD Project Manager also assumed leadership in 
determining equipment and software requirements, 
especially where dictated by the need for future 
integration with other developing emergency 
communication system upgrades. Trained as a 
project manager, she systematically established 
detailed timelines and responsibilities for all who 
were involved in the 3-1-1 process, including APD’s 
emergency communication staff. 

The 3-1-1 project was a relatively small sideline 
system, being implemented on a much faster timeline 
than the overall emergency communication upgrade. 
Tensions surrounding the conflicting decision making 
roles, as well the scope of 3-1-1 within the larger 
upgrade, surfaced quickly. The ISD Project Manager 
recognized the potential for problems and requested 
a meeting with APD to clarify roles and expectations. 
The meeting was attended by the ISD Project 
Manager, the APD Emergency Communication 
Director, and the ISD Director (the City of Austin 
Chief Information Officer). Together, they agreed 
upon the need to build the 3-1-1 system with the 
potential for integration with other emergency 
communication system upgrades, but decided they 
could wait to specify exactly how that integration 
would occur. The other systems were complex and 
not yet clearly defined; trying to define integration 
requirements for 3-1-1 at this stage would have 
resulted in needless, costly delays for the smaller 
project. 

During the meeting, both parties came to an 
understanding of one another’s visions, expectations, 
and operational requirements and limitations. The 
APD Emergency Communications Director retained 
authority over the system’s functional requirements, 
and the ISD project manager retained responsibility 
for deciding how to meet those requirements. They 
agreed to meet frequently to review the project 
timeline and discuss APD’s workload issues. From 
this point, both sides reported that planning and 
implementation proceeded smoothly, and that the 
partnership between the two city organizations 
had been crucial to managing cost and timeline 
constraints successfully. 

Another problem arose due to a costly oversight 
in forming the project team. All too frequently in 
such projects, geographic information system (GIS) 
expertise is overlooked - something the Austin 
project team learned too late. The intricacies of GIS 
considerations and technologies would prove far 
more complicated and mission critical than the rest 
of the stakeholders recognized. Austin’s 3-1-1 system 
was designed to rely on address information to filter 
incoming calls, to track calls for immediate response 
and future analytical purposes, and to transfer calls 
to computer aided dispatch (CAD) systems. Address 
validation was critical for these functions. 

However, the address fields and geographic planes 
in each of the systems differed, creating serious 
interoperability conflicts. By the time Austin’s team 
recognized the problem, they could only develop 
alternative means of accomplishing the tasks that 
involved a series of complicated steps and data 
manipulations, referred to as workarounds. APD 
agreed to accept the CRM system missing one of 
its “must-have” functions. Consequently, lack of 


GIS interoperability precluded the use of valuable 
functions of CRM. If Austin had included a GIS 
expert on its original planning team, it is likely that 
the person would have foreseen and addressed this 
during the project’s design phase. 

Finally, APD had difficulty with its LEC partner. 
Among other things, the LEC decided to charge 
a 5-cent tariff for each 3-1-1 call it handled; that 
created significant additional work for APD during 
the solution development phase, not to mention 
the tariff’s impact on the City’s budget. (In other 
jurisdictions, LECs have not charged for 3-1-1 
routing.) APD faced a series of challenges working 
with this LEC. The carrier continually switched 
its liaisons with APD throughout the installation, 
resulting in confusion and frequent renegotiation of 
the service agreement. Contacting other agencies, 
we learned that LEC issues can be the Achilles heel 
of 3-1-1 systems. The apparent unwillingness of 
these private corporations to work cooperatively 
with various law enforcement agencies has stifled the 
introduction of 3-1-1 in some locations.1 To Austin’s 
credit, they did endure and survive these problems, 
eventually negotiating tolerable, if not favorable, 
tariff agreements. However, the project time and 
effort expended working around and resolving these 
issues were considerable. 

We address these issues within the evaluation to help 
other jurisdictions recognize potential obstacles to 
3-1-1 implementation. We commend the Austin team 
for its determination and ability to work through 
these issues during the design phase, as well as 
to avoid many of the other problems frequently 
encountered in similar technology projects. The 
Austin 3-1-1 team leveraged their strengths and 
partnerships to design and select 3-1-1 systems in a 
timely and effective manner. 

Developing Call-Tracking Systems and 
Related Databases 

Project definition took approximately four months, 
during which the team reviewed the scope of the 
project and the resources available. During the 
visioning process, APD had selected the most basic 
police-only 3-1-1 system model for Austin, and 
that determined the parameters of the hardware and 
software components. The Department wanted the 
system to support 24-hour/7-day operation. Call 
volumes were projected to reach 50,000 to 100,000 
calls per month. Eleven operators or concurrent users 
and two managers needed to be connected at any 
one time. This service level translated into 11 new 
workstations and a dedicated server, with appropriate 
wiring between the server and workstations. The 
budget had to cover an array of computer equipment 
including soft phones with observing capabilities, 
as well as the LEC’s unexpected 5-cent per call 
tariff. APD estimated that they spent $260,000 to 
implement 3-1-1, and budgeted $44,000 annually in 
recurring equipment and service costs. 

APD purchased call management software that 
added capabilities to existing call center software 
on the PBX switch. The new software would give 
APD supervisors the ability to track key statistics for 
monitoring 3-1-1 usage, call taker job performance, 
and overall system performance. Installing and 
customizing the call-tracking and customer relations 
management software was a major undertaking.2 

Calls to the 3-1-1 service can be generated from 
several sources: 

- Users dialing 3-1-1 from a residential or 
business phone (land line phone) 

- Users dialing 3-1-1 from a cell or pay phone 
through a competing local exchange provider 

- Users dialing the seven-digit APD main 
number (formerly, the PBX number), 
typically requesting information or specific 
APD staff 

- Users dialing the seven-digit Teleserve 
number 

- Wrecker and impound services calling APD 
about vehicles towed and impounded, as 
required by city ordinance 

Call-tracking software collects certain call data as 
calls are being handled by the phone switch. This 
allows managers to view the number of calls waiting, 
the origination points of calls, the length of time 
that the longest caller has been waiting, how many 
call takers are immediately available for incoming 
calls, and other information about each call taker 
station. The latter information includes the status of 


the call taker’s current call and the amount of time 
the call taker has been on that call. The software also 
provides access to a series of standardized report 
forms, with historical data recorded call-by-call or 
in aggregate forms, by date, point of origin, and call 
taker. 

Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) 
Software Challenges 

The back-end requirements of 
the “off the shelf” CRM soft-
ware proved challenging. 

The vendor installed the call-tracking software as 
an upgrade to the existing phone switch, working 
with the telephony expert, and provided training for 
managers and supervisors. In general, afterward, 
we observed supervisors using only the most basic 
functions of the software – monitoring the number 
of calls holding and the time spent by subordinates 
in various call statuses (i.e., available for a call, in 
report mode, and so forth.) 

Two APD managers attempted to use the software for 
complex reporting and management. Unfortunately, 
they were frustrated in their attempts to obtain key 
data from the system and to extract it systematically.3 
The data were being captured by the application, 
which apparently was capable of being programmed 
to extract and report it, but programming required 
more expertise than these users had. The software 
training had been limited in scope, and the managers 
responsible for generating management reports from 
the system had been unable to attend. 

The partnership with ISD appears to have effectively 
ended once the 3-1-1 system was transferred to APD. 
APD managers requested support to resolve the 
reporting problems, but neither ISD nor the vendor 
appeared to have been able or willing to invest this 
effort. Although not quite a failure, implementation 
was diminished by the gap between the software’s 
capabilities and the users’ ability to take advantage 
of it, seriously limiting the productivity of the 
call-tracking software for problem analysis and 
management purposes.4 

Integrating Customer Relations 
Management Software (CRM)


APD executives recognized that achieving 
success with 3-1-1 would require a shift in 
public attitudes toward 9-1-1. They also knew 
that 3-1-1 call takers would require advanced 
technological tools in order to resolve caller 
issues effectively and efficiently. Most 3-1-1 
callers would not need an officer to be 
dispatched, and their calls would not be entered 
into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
system. Customer relations management (CRM) 
software was procured to help call takers manage 
and track these calls. 

APD relied on ISD to research and select the CRM 
software within the project management process. ISD 
approached the task by conducting internet searches 
and requesting product demonstrations, hoping to 
identify an off-the-shelf solution that would allow 
them to meet the original project schedule, although 
remaining within their own staffing limitations. 
Technically, they succeeded; the CRM software 
selected was installed and functioning on time, but 
the installation suffered from problems caused by 
the rush. Because APD used the direct procurement 
process (described on page 8) and did not conduct 
a fuller review of the CRM software, they did not 
realize the complexities of the product. Ultimately, 
these problems coupled with a lack of user training 
contributed to an implementation failure. 

Attempts have since been made to resolve these 
problems, but at present, APD 3-1-1 call takers 
cannot use the software to capture, track, resolve, and 
analyze 3-1-1 calls that are not recorded in CAD. As 
a result, little is known about the content and nature 
of non-CAD 3-1-1 calls. 


We briefly discussed the problem of incompatible 
GIS components within the CRM system, above. 
GIS compatibility was a “must have” that should 
have been considered during software selection, 
yet the system was accepted in spite of its 
interoperability deficits. Otherwise, APD call takers 
could have tracked calls by area, validated that 
calls were within APD’s jurisdiction, and identified 
duplicate calls resulting from multiple reports of 
incidents such as traffic accidents. In addition, GIS 
compatibility would have supported integration of 
3-1-1 call data for analytical and problem-solving 
purposes. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
impact evaluation. 

Even apart from GIS incompatibilities, the CRM 
software was difficult to use and user training was 
inadequate. That generation of CRM systems had 
been plagued by ease-of-use problems in every 
industry.5 APD and ISD managers thought they had 
found a way around this, since the software they had 
chosen was designed specifically for non-emergency 
call systems and it had what seemed like a simple 
graphic user interface (GUI). In addition, the vendor 
was already involved in APD’s overall emergency 
system upgrade and was familiar with 3-1-1 
requirements. In spite of all of these advantages, the 
back-end requirements of the off-the-shelf software 
proved extremely challenging. 

Screens, tables, and relational structures were built 
and customized by the vendor. APD Emergency 
Communication staff were then made responsible for 
populating the tables with APD’s unique call types, 
questions, and resource materials. This involved 
entering detailed data into thousands of fields and 
tables. Populating the tables required only adeptness 
with the software, and extensive knowledge of 
APD’s calls and informational needs. The staff 
working on the project had both the Department 
expertise and the technological skills, but too few 
of them were assigned to complete the mammoth 
task in the short time available. Also, they needed 
to operate the software with the data in real time to 
complete and refine its capabilities, and this was not 
possible. 

Implementation problems were made worse by 
the call takers’ inexperience with graphic user 
interfaces (GUI). From our observations during 
training sessions and the call takers’ initial attempts 
to use the system, it appeared that the majority of 
them were not only inexperienced with GUI-based 
systems, but also with the underlying logic and 
methods for basic functions such as moving from 
screen to screen. 

A train-the-trainer session was conducted for about 
a dozen call takers who were viewed as leaders on 
their shifts. This 12-hour vendor training occurred 
approximately 2 weeks before deployment of the 
system. At the time, the software was populated 
with limited simulation data. The trainer reviewed 
each function of the CRM software, menu-by-menu, 
screen-by-screen, and button-by-button. The training 
was conducted in a computer training room with 
three monitors at each station. The middle monitor 
displayed the trainer’s screen, although attendees 
learned hands-on at the other two terminals. Too 
much time elapsed between this training and the 
time when the trainees were to pass on what they 
had learned to their colleagues. When it came time 
for the user-trainers to teach other call takers, no one 
except those who were regularly entering data into 
the system could recall how the functions worked. 

The training manager eventually met one-on-one 
with other call takers to go over the system. All 
received an APD customized training manual, and 
were given a chance to practice with a simulated 
database, three weeks prior to 3-1-1’s kick-off date. 
Lack of familiarity with the system, combined with 
limited training and a shortage of APD-specific 
data entry screens, made call takers reluctant, at 
best, to use the software. Supervisors supported 
staff in this, concerned that the numerous problems 
they confronted would interfere with their ability to 
handle calls in accord with time efficiency standards. 
In the end, it proved to be too challenging for call 
takers to learn and operate the new technology at 
the same time that they were expected to begin 
performing new job functions, assisting 3-1-1 
callers. 

Recognizing this, those responsible for populating 
the software with data quickly developed acceptable 
workarounds. For example, to replace the operator 
resource material in the software, they created a 


simple on-line resource document for call takers, 
with internet links to city phone books and 
important resource web sites. They established a set 
of working policies and procedures for handling the 
different types of information calls, including tips 
on how to give callers realistic expectations about 
the potential for resolutions to situations that were 
outside the scope of the Police Department. 

Without functional CRM software and links to 
other agencies, APD was left without a way to 
track calls or to assure that they were resolved, but 
fortunately, the workarounds have sufficed, and 
in some cases, have worked quite well. Although 
short of information for analysis and management 
purposes, so far APD has not especially missed 
functionalities that they never really had. CRM 
software applications have vast promise, but if they 
remain so difficult to install, customize, and use, 
their benefits may not be realized. 

Staffing and Training for 3-1-1 

Regardless of the technology used, the success 
of 3-1-1 would be determined by the quality of 
the interactions between the citizens who used it 
and the call takers responding to their calls. APD 
implemented 3-1-1 by reassigning existing staff 
from the Teleserve unit and the PBX operation. In 
total, 33 full-time equivalent staff were assigned to 
3-1-1, which was designed to operate 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. Shifts were 8 hours in length. 
3-1-1 did not lower the 9-1-1 staffing level, which 
remained at 72 call takers. 

Using existing staff to fill 3-1-1 call taker positions 
saved on training, but it also created some challenges 
that required management skills in organizational 
change. Call takers had to adjust to differences 
in their job descriptions, skill requirements, and 
performance objectives. For example, on average, 
each Teleserve call taker handled between 40 and 
70 calls per shift, and in a few cases, the duration of 
a single call could approach 20 minutes. Teleserve 
call takers were expert in gathering detailed information 
for detectives, asking a range of questions. 
When they started taking 3-1-1 calls, however, they 
had to complete calls much more quickly. The primary 
goal of 3-1-1 was to protect 9-1-1 from callers 
with non-emergencies. If callers were unable to 
reach a 3-1-1 operator because the lines were busy, 
they would be likely to resort again to calling 9-1-1. 

Managers also worked with detectives, who were 
accustomed to more comprehensive support 
from Teleserve, to explain that 3-1-1 call takers 
would support them, but would not assume their 
responsibilities. 3-1-1 call takers gather essential 
information on Teleserve type 3-1-1 calls about 
incidents such as thefts, burglaries, and forgery 
calls. With the implementation of 3-1-1, call takers 
had to handle an average of 80 calls per shift, 
averaging less than 2 minutes each. During peak 
periods, when the line was busy, 3-1-1 callers 
could choose to leave a message on an answering 
machine or wait for an operator. Leads and 
supervisors returned voice mail calls within an 
hour. The duration of some Teleserve type calls was 
longer than the average 3-1-1 call. However, with 
training, call takers also took less time to fill out the 
Teleserve questionnaire. 

APD Emergency Communications personnel 
were cross-trained to work in three major units: 
9-1-1, teletype, and 3-1-1. Every 6 months, call 
takers rotated between divisions, allowing for 
shift changes. Rotations built the skill levels of 
everyone in the division, promoted understanding 
and cooperation between the units, and improved 
staffing options for peak times and overtime 
requirements. Most important, 3-1-1 call takers 
were also certified 9-1-1 emergency call takers. If a 
3-1-1 call escalated to a 9-1-1 emergency, the call 
takers were trained to handle the call appropriately 
and to forward it to dispatch. Providing this level 
of service was critical to APD’s vision of 3-1-1. It 
ensured that if callers dialed 3-1-1 by mistake in 
an emergency situation, highly trained call takers 
would be handling their call. 

With the introduction of 3-1-1, Teleserve call 
takers were wary of their changing roles. They 
enjoyed the depth of their Teleserve jobs, as fact 
finders who completed police reports. They were 
less interested in taking general purpose calls, like 
those made to the phone company’s 4-1-1 service. 
To mitigate their concerns, the managers took a 
number of steps. First, they involved call takers in 


the procurement process for the CRM software. Call 
takers questioned vendors during the demonstration 
about how the system would handle different day-
to-day situations. The changes would be significant, 
but 3-1-1 managers were able to reassure call takers 
about their new jobs, build excitement about the 
changes, and address negative rumors quickly. 
They also set new standards for performance and 
aligned the 3-1-1 call taker position with department 
priorities. 

Changing Public Behavior through 
Education and Marketing 

From the conceptual phase of the 3-1-1 project, 
APD understood that changing citizen perceptions 
about 9-1-1 was at the crux of the effort. In the 
original concept paper presented to the APD Chief, 
the Emergency Communications Division Manager 
said, “Success or failure of this program will 
heavily depend on the public embracing and using 
3-1-1 for legitimate non-emergencies.” He believed 
that $375,000 for education and marketing would be 
needed to succeed. Yet APD’s public education and 
marketing campaign secured the success of 3-1-1, 
despite the technology challenges discussed above, 
with only $45,000 for publicity. 

The first step in marketing 3-1-1 involved 
leveraging the support of community leaders. APD 
approached the Greater Austin Crime Commission 
(GACC)6 about becoming APD’s marketing partner. 
Enlisting the assistance of these well-known 
community leaders opened doors to the print and 
television media. The Commission was able to 
reach corporate funding decision makers and to 
garner support from area marketing experts. The 
marketing team consisted of APD staff from the 
public information office, the community outreach 
office, and the emergency communications staff. 
Representatives from CAPCO and the City of 
Austin public information office were also involved. 

The team leader conducted a two-phased research 
effort to draft a marketing plan outline, reviewing 
3-1-1 materials from other jurisdictions. The 
marketing team began meeting 4 months prior 
to the planned 3-1-1 start date. Team members 
reviewed the marketing plan and samples of 
marketing materials from other 3-1-1 sites. The plan 
documented the following: 

- Target launch date 

- Objectives for the marketing effort 

- Control points for decision-making and 
financial oversight 

- Key milestones and dates 

- Budget estimate for the effort by media 
category 

- Evaluation measurement tools 

- Special media news events 

- Orintation materials to be developed 

- Potential community partners 

By the end of the first month, Austin’s 3-1-1 
initiative had a logo and slogan, Austin’s Answers. 
They also had draft brochure materials. By the 
middle of the second month, production of all kinds 
of printed materials had begun - a tri-fold brochure, 
wallet cards, bookmark cards with guidelines for 
calling 3-1-1 versus 9-1-1 and, on the reverse side, 
a quiz (with answers) that tested the ability to 
distinguish between appropriate 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 
calls, pencils, bumper stickers, logo T-shirts, and 
logo balloons. Designed in English and Spanish, 
the brochure provided a description of 3-1-1 as “a 
toll-free telephone number that allows people within 
the city limits to request police services in non-
emergency situations.” From donations, $45,000 
was raised for these items. APD did not run paid 
radio, television, or print advertisements. They did 
obtain significant free television and print coverage 
for 3-1-1. Television coverage of APD ’s plans for 
3-1-1 began on July 31, 2001. The GACC President 
held a media briefing. The media advisory stated: 

The 3-1-1 launch is the city’s 
largest public safety initiative in 
recent memory. The Austin Police 
Department and the Greater Austin 
Crime Commission need your help 
to educate the public concerning the 
importance of this new system. 

GACC’s President invited 86 editors and station 
managers to the 11 a.m. briefing, but entire crews 
arrived with them, bringing cameras and reporters. 
Despite GACC’s best efforts, the briefing evolved 


into a press release for 3-1-1 rather than a discussion 
about how to garner future media coverage. During 
the 6 o’clock news that evening (July 31), 3-1-1 was 
announced to the public. Fortunately, the Emergency 
Communication Manager anticipated this possibility; 
the 3-1-1 number had been connected. On August 1, 
3-1-1 calls began trickling into the Teleserve system. 

Following this announcement, APD received 
editorial reviews in print media. In addition, 
APD executives received numerous requests for 
interviews. Over the next month, members of the 
marketing team began handing out the printed 
brochures and attending community meetings to 
announce 3-1-1. The school district provided every 
student with printed brochures about the system, 
integrating the new information into educational 
efforts related to 9-1-1. 

Terrorism Strikes. On the morning of September 
11, 2001, APD Emergency Communication staff 
were preparing to participate in a media event 
highlighting 9-1-1 Day at the Texas State Capitol. 
According to the plan, at the end of this event, 
CAPCO staff were to foreshadow the announcement 
of 3-1-1 as an alternative to 9-1-1. Then the terrorist 
attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. took 
place. Along with every other police department 
in every community and city in the U.S., APD 
quickly refocused its activities. Calls into 9-1-1 and 
Teleserve surged. The entire 3-1-1 team realized 
that it was even more imperative now that public 
announcements about 3-1-1 occur the following week. 

On September 17, the Mayor, Chief, and 
other city and APD executives gathered 
to officially announce the 3-1-1 service during 
a media briefing. APD seized the opportunity to 
remind everyone that “public safety is a community 
concern” and that “9-1-1 was endangered” by the 
growing number of non-emergency calls. All of the 
major media carriers attended the briefing. The three 
leading networks carried the 3-1-1 announcement, 
spending from 45 seconds to 3 minutes on the story. 

This was a remarkable level of coverage, especially 
given the amount of time needed for extensive 
coverage of national events. 

The wide television coverage had a positive impact 
on the launch of 3-1-1. Following the official 
kick-off announcement, 3-1-1 continued receiving 
scattered coverage over the next 2 months. For 
example, 3-1-1 was featured in a story about a rash 
of flag thefts. APD’s public education campaign was 
innovative. They leveraged their contacts. They were 
prepared and poised to make the connection with 
3-1-1 and 9-1-1 when the unforeseeable September 
11 tragedies created media interest in public safety 
reporting. The success of the campaign was evident 
in the significant 3-1-1 call load immediately after 
kick-off. We confirmed its reach through targeted 
questions in our surveys. In our initial patrol officer 
survey, we verified the impact of widespread media 
coverage: 51 percent of APD’s own officers first 
heard about 3-1-1 through the media. 

In the citizen survey, we learned that half of the 
respondents had heard about 3-1-1 from media 
reports. Nineteen respondents had learned about 
3-1-1 from a friend or by word of mouth, and an 
additional 10 reported having learned about it from 
police department employees. Fourteen had heard 
about 3-1-1 during a call to 9-1-1. Eight reported 
having seen 3-1-1 advertised, most of these reporting 
that they had seen the number printed on police 
cars. Five individuals had learned about 3-1-1 at 
a community meeting, including two at 
commander forums. 

Findings and 
Recommendations: 
Implementation 
Elements


APD implemented 3-1-1 without 
delays and within budget. APD staff partnered 
effectively with experts in key city agencies, 
community organizations and vendor organizations 
to build the system. Although they faced obstacles, 
none prevented the launch of the system and its use 
for its primary purpose – to reduce 9-1-1 call loads. 
The Austin 3-1-1 team leveraged their strengths 


and partnerships to design and select 3-1-1 system 
components in a timely and effective manner. 

Although all involved reported that they “nailed 
the implementation timeline,” on-time delivery of 
the front-end system may have come at the cost of 
essential back-end tools. These tools were important 
to the long-term management of 3-1-1 call loads. 
Considering the ultimate outcome - diverting calls 
from the 9-1-1 call load as quickly as possible 
-APD benefited from expedited procurement 
options; however, skipping the crucial in-depth 
software evaluation steps required by the standard 
RFP process may have allowed them to overlook 
complications that the off-the-shelf software would 
later pose for their small staff. 

In this process evaluation, we detailed implementation 
problems as well as successes in order to help APD 
and other jurisdictions recognize potential potholes 
along the road to 3-1-1 implementation or expansion. 
We commend the Austin team for its determination 
and ability to work through these issues during the 
design phase, as well as to avoid the many other 
problems frequently encountered with complex 
technology projects. 

APD successfully implemented a 3-1-1 solution. 
Their enthusiasm, focus, skill, and dedication 
across the board allowed them to create a system 
that provides a viable option to citizens for non-
emergency policy calls. This system relies heavily 
on human elements rather than technological 
advances. First, the public education and marketing 
campaign won acceptance and wide usage of the 
system by Austin citizens. In-depth staff training and 
understanding of call resolution policies, procedures, 
and expectations ensured citizen satisfaction with 
this non-emergency alternative to 9-1-1. 

We encourage APD to bring the technological 
components of the 3-1-1 system up to par with the 
human elements. By doing so, they will begin to 
reap the operational, management, and problem-
solving benefits that this type of technology 
can provide. Specifically, we recommend that 
APD consider renewing the partnership and 
collaboration with ISD with the objectives of 
fully accessing data captured by the call tracking 
software, fully populating the CRM system, and 
resolving outstanding GIS issues. Once the system 
is completely operational, we encourage APD to 
maintain system support staffing to manage the 
complex technology on a daily basis, including 
making system adjustments, creating management 
and operational reports, and partnering with the 
Research and Planning unit to analyze the data 
created by 3-1-1 call tracking, so that it can be used 
to troubleshoot, manage, and improve the operation. 


End Notes 

1 During our interviews, agencies in Florida reported the inability to 
reach agreements between law enforcement agencies and the LEC as 
the most significant barrier to 3-1-1 implementation. 

2 Other back-end software needed for server management was also 
installed. This included server disaster recovery software, server 
defragmenter software, and Client PC emulation software. 

3 Built-in reports can be saved as delimited text files that can be 
imported into spreadsheet programs, but these are quite limited. For 
example, the software will not create one report listing the number of 
calls taken by every call taker during a given shift. Instead, a built-in 
report for each call taker must be saved, one by one, to a spreadsheet 
in order to create an aggregate report. 

4 As researchers, we took extensive time – time not available to APD 
Emergency Communications managers - to extract and convert 
the data manually for a one-year period. As the impact evaluation 
outlines, some of this data could be very useful for analyzing the 
new expanding 3-1-1 call load. 

5. Gallagher, Sean, “The End of the Big Bang,” Baseline, June, 2003, 
p. 30.

6 GACC was formed in October 1997, to support law enforcement, 
raise public awareness about crime prevention programs, and 
promote a cooperative and coordinated anti-crime effort in the 
community. Its 32 members are recognized business and community 
leaders.



Chapter III 
Impact 
Evaluation 

How effective is the 3-1-1 system in reducing 9-1-1 calls for 
service? Did the new operation improve the management of all 
citizen calls to police (both emergency and non emergency)? 
Did response times for high priority calls improve? Did citizen 
satisfaction with the police handling of calls for service change? 
Was patrol officer time freed to provide more opportunities for 
problem-oriented and community policing activities? These are 
among the questions we asked in determining the impact of 3-1-1 
on police services. 

To answer these questions, we relied upon official data from APD 
and conducted surveys of police officers, call takers, and those 
citizens who called 3-1-1. 


Did 3-1-1 Change 9-1-1?  

We examined calls for service data for both 
3-1-1 and 9-1-1 systems in order to analyze 
the impact of the 3-1-1 system on the 9-1-1 
call load. To obtain a complete picture of the 
respective call loads and their interactions, 
we attempted to triangulate data collected 
from four sources: 

- Official City of Austin Police 
Department budget documentation 

- data presented and reported by 
the Emergency Communications 

- CAD data on computer printouts
provided by the Emergency 
Communications Division 

- CAD data prepared by the Research and 
Planning unit 

Unfortunately, each available internal data source 
was organized using a different time period (i.e., 
fiscal vs. calendar years), differing variables, and 
unique field definitions. We made several attempts 
to disaggregate data and match time periods, but 
we were unable to reconcile these differences. On 
a more positive note, although totals varied from 
source to source, the trends depicted by each data 
set were consistent. In the sections that follow, we 
present overall totals from each data source for 
purposes of comparison. We then discuss call loads 
in more detail, based on the source containing the 
most appropriate level of data. 

Total Number of 9-1-1 Calls 

The most useful data on 9-1-1 calls for service 
came from official city budget documents and from 
information that appeared in presentations made by 
the Emergency Communications Division. Exhibit 
2 depicts these data. In FY 1993, APD received 
more than 692,000 9-1-1 calls. The number then 
steadily increased, until in FY 2000, the annual call 
volume had grown to 915,462. The 3-1-1 system 
was introduced in September, the final month of FY 
2001. No 9-1-1 call total is reported for FY 2001,2 
but FY 2002 shows a significant decline in 9-1-1 
calls during the previous 2 years, down to FY 1994 
levels. From FY 2000 to FY 2002, APD appears to 
have experienced a 20 percent drop in the number 
of 9-1-1 calls, a decrease that was realized in spite 
of heightened public concerns about safety, fostered 
by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 

Image of Exhibit 2: 9-1-1 Calls Reported by APD 
Emergency Communications
Year 9-1-1 Calls % Change 
92-93 692,223 
93-94 736,010 6 
94-95 754,154 2 
95-96 764,515 1 
96-97 759,539 -1 
97-98 839,919 11 
98-99 877,496 4 
99-2000 915,462 4 
2000-01 Not Reported 
2001-02 736,726 -


We drew 9-1-1 call totals from City of Austin 
budget documents beginning with FY 1999, 
continuing through FY 2003.3 These totals differed 
significantly from the Emergency Communication 
Division numbers cited above, by more than 
100,000 calls. The downward trend in the total 
number of 9-1-1 calls is consistent, however, as it 
appears in both sources. 

Exhibit 3 is a comparison of numbers taken from 
the two data sources, for FY 1999 through FY 2003. 
The numbers reflect APD’s anticipation of a further 
decline in the number of 9-1-1 calls for FY 2003. 

Exhibit 4 shows 9-1-1 call numbers by month, 
relying on APD Emergency Communication 
Division data. Comparing FY 2002 to FY 2003, 
it appears that APD will realize a reduction in the 
9-1-1 call load. Although it is unlikely to reach 17 
percent, as projected, if the trend does continue 
it will represent a 10 percent reduction. In real 
numbers, the load on the 9-1-1 system will have 
been reduced by more than 72,000 calls during FY 
2003. If call numbers remain at FY 2002 levels in 
August and September of FY 2003, the 9-1-1 call 
load will have declined by more than 25 percent 


Exhibit 3: Comparison of 9-1-1 Calls Reported 


Table with column headers Year, 9-1-1 Calls Reported by 
Emergency Communications, % Change, 9-1-1 Calls Reported 
in the City of Austin Budget, % Change Difference 

Row Data:
98-99 877,496 4% 775,269 102,227 
99-2000 915,462 4% 797,275 2.8% 118,187 
2000-01* Not Reported 800,288 0.4% 
Introduction of 3-1-1 in Sept. 2001 
2001-02 736,726 -734,341 -8.2% 2,385 
2002-03** 612,450 -17% 

* A calculated figured based on supporting budget documentation (Budget Presentation) stated that 854,136 
9-1-1 and 3-1-1 calls were received by the Communication Center. 3-1-1 was officials operating on September 17, 2001, and 53,850 3-1-1 calls were received during September. 

** Estimated 


since FY 2000. This finding is consistent with the 
decline in 9-1-1 calls for police services documented 
in the study of Baltimore’s 3-1-1 system.4 

Did Call Management Change? 

The second 3-1-1 goal was to improve management 
of all citizen calls to the police, both emergency and 
non-emergency. According to data from the City’s 
budget documents from FY 1999 to FY 2002, the 
number of 9-1-1 calls that resulted in an officer 
being dispatched increased by 10 percent, while 


Exhibit 4: Change in 9-1-1 Calls by Month 

Table column headers, Month, FY 2002, FY 2003, % Change, Difference in # of Calls 
Row Data:
October 66,518 57,004 -14 -9,577 
November 60,889 53,893 -11 -6,996 
December 59,863 54,810 -8 -5,053 
January 57,224 51,555 -10 -5,669 
February 54,605 34,691 -36 -19,914 
March 63,879 57,272 -10 -6,607 
April 63,337 57,057 -10 -6,280 
May 68,685 62,423 -9 -6,262 
June 62,985 58,200 -8 -4,785 
July 61,415 59,837 -3 -1,578 
August 62,133 _ _ -
September 55,130 _ _ -
Total 619,463 546,742 -12% -72,721 

the absolute number of calls to 9-1-1 decreased; 
therefore, a higher percentage of all 9-1-1 calls 
were dispatched. Of 800,286 incoming 9-1-1 calls 
reported in FY 2001, 42.5 percent (340,485) were 
reported as dispatched in budget documents. In FY 
2001, the percentage of calls reported as dispatched 
(360,025) rose to 49 percent of all 9-1-1 calls 
received (734,341). (See exhibit 5.) 

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data from 
Research and Planning and the Emergency 
Communications Divisions were used to further 
analyze dispatch trends, by priority 
level and by area. Once again, 
we found differences between the 
numbers from the two divisions. An 
in-depth analysis of those data would 
have required a degree of knowledge 
about call types that is beyond the 
scope of this study.5 However, we 
were able to provide limited analysis 
of CAD data to highlight trends 
in dispatched calls. This analysis 
provides insight into the types of 
calls received by APD and the 
activities of APD officers. 

CAD data provided by the Research 
and Planning Division show that 
overall, CAD calls increased by 5 
percent between calendar years 2000 
and 2002, corresponding with the  


Exhibit 5: Dispatched Calls Reported 

Table column headers - Year,  Dispatched Calls Reported 
in the City of Austin Budget, % Change 
98-99 325,848 
99-2000 332,427 2% 
2000-01 340,485 2.4% 
Introduction of 3-1-1 in Sept. 2001 
2001-02 736,726 5.7% 
2002-03** 346,396 -4% 

introduction of 3-1-1. (See exhibit 6.) The increase 
was 8 percent from 2001 to 2002. (Fewer CAD 
calls were reported in 2001 than in 2000 because 
of a drop in officer-initiated efforts in 2001.) The 
increase from 2001 included 18,135 more officer-
initiated efforts and 23,996 dispatched calls. 
This finding of an absolute increase of more than 
23,000 dispatchable6 calls was perplexing, given 
that total 9-1-1 calls were reduced during 2001 and 
2002. 

In our next analysis, we use the same data set 
to examine calls by priority level. Exhibit 7 
shows that Priority One and Priority Three calls 
decreased each year, beginning in 1999. This is 
a positive outcome, since Priority One calls are 
the most urgent and complicated ones - resource 
intensive, requiring officers to interrupt their 
current activities in order to respond to the 
emergency without delay. 

Analysis was somewhat complicated by the fact 
decrease in the number of Priority Three calls, as 
well as for the increase in the number of Priority 
Four calls during 2002. CAD data by area and 
priority level (exhibit 8) document a decrease 
from 2001 to 2002 in Priority Three calls in every 
policing area. We note, however, that the creation 
in 2002 of the new “George” and City areas 
downtown confounds the analysis. This changed 
the physical boundaries of existing policing areas. 

To understand the decrease in Priority One calls, 
we examined the types of calls represented in 
Research and Planning CAD data. Priority One 
calls decreased by more than 24,000 calls from 
FY 1999 to FY 2002. Exhibit 9 highlights call 
type variables that show large increases; this 
degree of change suggests that the calls were 
reassigned to other priority levels, or they may 
have been decreasing within the call population 
more generally. The calls were organized by the 
following categories: “person down,” assisting 
EMS (emergency medical services), assisting 
with collisions involving EMS, responding to 
suspicious persons, addressing disturbances of a 
particular type, and “nature unknown.” Inversely, 
9-1-1 “hang-up” calls at residences appear to have 
been reclassified at some point as Priority One 
calls, where we see an increase of almost 23,000 
calls from 1999 to 2002. (These calls were not 
included in the 1999 Priority One calls.) 

It does appear that at least a portion of the 
disturbance calls and suspicious person calls 
were simply reclassified as Priority Two calls. 
The number of Priority Two “disturbance or other 
that APD apparently modified the types of 
calls that were assigned to each priority level 
sometime during this period. We suspect this 
change may account for at least some of 
the increases shown in Priority Two call 
numbers. On the other hand, the 3-1-1 system 
may have partially contributed to the 

Exhibit 6: Dispatched Calls: Net of Officer-Initiated 
Efforts 

Table column headers Year, Total CAD Calls,  Officer-Initiated 
Efforts*, Dispatched calls: Net of Officer-Initiated Efforts 

Row Data:
1999 546,079 155,344 390,728 
2000 332,427 155,054 387,813 
2001 340,485 138,762 390,001 
Introduction of 3-1-1 in Sept. 2001 
2002 736,726 156,897 413,997 
** Officer-initiated calls include traffic stops (TS), Special Assignments 
(SA), and Directed Patrols (DP). 



Image of Exhibit 7: CAD Calls by Priority Level and Year
(line graph)

calls” increased from 230 calls in 1999 to 4,126 
calls in 2002. It is unclear what happened to the 
remaining 14,000 “disturbance or other” calls; we 
suspect that they were reclassified to a new type of 
call, but it may be that fewer reports were received 
about this type of disturbance. 

Priority Two “suspicious person” calls increased 
from 302 calls in 1999 to 12,704 calls in 2002. The 
majority of “nature unknown” calls disappeared; 
these were most likely to have been reclassified 
into more specific call types. The increase in 
Priority Four calls was likely due to the increase in 
the total number of calls received by APD; this is 
discussed below. 

Summary. Although the number of 9-1-1 calls 
decreased, the number of dispatched calls increased 
from 42 percent of calls to 49 percent of calls. 
Priority One and Priority Three calls decreased, 
but Priority Two and Priority Four calls increased. 
Changes in the call assignments may have caused 
the changes in the first two priority levels. However, 
we suspect that 3-1-1 impacted the changes in the 
number of Priority Three and Priority Four calls. 

Exhibit 8: CAD Data by Policing Area 

% Change in # of Dispatched Calls by Priority Level 

Table columns headers - Priority, Adam, Bakr, Char, David, 
Edwd, Frnk, Grge*, City* 

Row Data
1 -10.97 0.40 -10.02 -4.60 -9.94 -0.37 154.26 304.87 
2 32.00 57.20 81.79 65.42 65.42 74.25 780.77 9036.54 
3 -42.94 -31.29 -34.41 -33.43 -33.43 -32.22 99.34 216.88 
4 -5.62 -6.21 -5.99 0.94 -15.11 5.64 173.26 634.20 

*George (Grge) and City are new police areas. Calls were transferred from Baker (Bakr) District to create these downtown areas. 


Exhibit 9: Prioirty One Call Types 
Table column headers - Call Type, 1999, 2002, Difference in # of Calls(1999-2002) 

Row Data:
Person down 1,716 466 -1,250
Assist EMS 3,227 49 -3,178
Collision/EMS 4,761 104 -4,657
Suspicious person 9,472 223 -9,249
Disturbance/ other 19,685 1,242 -18,443
Nature unknown 21,625 2,974 -18,651 
Total -55,428 

Impact of 3-1-1 

With the inception of 3-1-1, the total number of calls 
to APD increased substantially. In FY 2002, APD 
received 1,445,271 calls, with more than 700,000 
calls received at the new 3-1-1 center. This represents 
a 70 percent increase in the total call volume for 
the Department. Since then, monthly call load levels 
have been similar for both 9-1-1 and 3-1-1, as shown 
in Exhibit 10. Some would question whether the 
sizable increase in calls for service, all originating 
with the new 3-1-1 service, is a good outcome. Has 
the management of all citizen calls to the police 
– both emergency and non-emergency calls -- 
improved?7 


To understand the impact of 3-1
1 on the Department’s total call 
load, one needs to understand the 
public safety environment that 
existed when 3-1-1 was put into 
operation. The national tragedies 
of September 11, 2001, stunned the 
country exactly one week before 31-1 opened for business. September 
17, 2001, had been the scheduled 
kick-off date. Law enforcement 
and 9-1-1 call centers nationwide 
faced enormous challenges, not the 
least of which were increased calls 
for service. Afterward, the public 
was more prone to report suspicious activity and
more willing to contact public safety officials for 
information when they had safety concerns. Calls 
for service increased by 65 percent from September 
11, 2001, to January 2002.8 A USA Today editorial 
reported that many citizens now viewed themselves 
as “first responders.”9  

The additional media coverage gave the Department 
an unanticipated platform for educating the public 
on the importance of reserving 9-1-1 for emergency 
calls. They initiated and participated in as many 
media opportunities as possible with television, 
radio, and the print press. In the wake of the 

Image of Exhibit 10: 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 Calls by Month line graph




tragedies, news media allotted significant coverage to 
the launch of 3-1-1. One television station produced 
a 3-minute piece on the new service on its official 
kick-off date. Later opportunities expanded the 
reach of this coverage beyond Austin audiences. For 
example, in a USA Today article dated March 2002, 
Ed Harris, Emergency Communications Manager 
for the Austin Police Department, lauded the success 
of 3-1-1 after 9/11. “3-1-1 has been a miracle. It has 
been a godsend for us… 3-1-1 saved us not only 
from having our 9-1-1 system swamped, but saved 
our citizens who had true emergencies, such as heart 
attacks and crime in progress, from getting a busy 
signal.”10 APD’s quick action and consistent follow-
through with public information have clearly driven 
the wide acceptance and use of 3-1-1. 

Citizens benefited from being able to contact 
police for general information in this time of 
great uncertainty. They also used the system to 
report non-emergency incidents, such as the rash 
of flag thefts that peaked after the tragedy. The 
total number of calls to APD increased during the 
terrorist attacks and anthrax scares, but calls to the 
APD 9-1-1 center eased. The positive impact of the 
3-1-1 system on emergency systems held up even 
during a period of public crisis and its uncertain 
aftermath. 

Since 9/11, crime has increased in Austin, perhaps 
in part because of the downturn in the economy. In 
addition, police have been diverted from everyday 
patrol duties to homeland security responsibilities, 
including 17 APD officers who were called to 
military duty as reservists. Index crime increased by 
20 percent from September 2000 to January 2001, 
according to APD FY 2004 budget presentation 
materials. Through 2002, the situation appears to 
have improved; the FBI Uniform Crime Report data 
show only a one percent increase in index crimes 
from 2001 to 2002. Nevertheless, crime did increase 
in the most serious categories during the same 
period that calls to 9-1-1 were decreasing. 

In addition to having more frequent reasons to call 
the police, citizens today have a new tool to use 
– the cell phone. Nationally, 137 million people 
now own cell phones. Emergency 9-1-1 calls dialed 
from cell phones have increased from 193,333 in 
1985 to over 56.9 million in 2001.11 Some predict 
that the majority of emergency calls now or soon 
will originate from cellular telephones.12 Austin 
callers often use cell phones to contact the police, 
especially to report traffic incidents. As both APD 
and local cellular companies, known as competitive 
local exchange carriers (CLEC), quickly learned, 
Austinites embraced 3-1-1 in non-emergency and 
traffic situations and expected it to be offered as a 
cellular service. Exhibit 11 shows that CLEC calls 
to 3-1-1 have steadily increased, from 3 percent at 
the introduction of the service to 16 percent one 
year later. 

Considering these factors - heightened public safety 
concerns following the terrorist attacks, anthrax, 
and the war on terrorism; escalating crime rates 
within the City; and exploding cellular telephone 
use - we assert that 3-1-1 was timely. It improved 
management of calls for service, and it may even 
have prevented a 9-1-1 call load crisis in Austin. 
According to a public report from APD Emergency 
Communications managers, 3-1-1 reduced the 
9-1-1 call load by more than 30 percent in 2002, 
and it is projected to have reduced it by more than 
40 percent since 3-1-1 first became operational. To 
make these calculations, APD anticipated what the 
9-1-1 call load would have been without 3-1-1, 
replicating the month-to-month rate of increase in 
demand experienced in the previous year. Although 
call loads cannot be projected with certainty, this 
approach is a straightforward and reasonable model, 
given the historical data. APD’s original projection, 
that without preventive action 9-1-1 calls would 
exceed one million, was probably accurate; this 
would have created a tremendous burden on 9-1-1 
staffing and the aging system. 

The public education campaign succeeded in 
exposing citizens to the new service and convinced 
them to call 9-1-1 with less frequency, returning 
9-1-1 call loads to 1994 levels. This outcome 
improves the management of 9-1-1 calls. 

What Was the Response to Calls? 

Next we asked: What are the 3-1-1 calls about, how 
are they being managed, and how are they affecting 
operations in the Police Department to improve 


customer service? How do 3-1-1 calls improve 
the response times for high priority calls? Do they 
increase citizen satisfaction with the police handling 
of calls for service? Do they free patrol officer time 
to provide more opportunities for problem-oriented 
and community policing activities? 

Exhibit 11: 3-1-1 Calls from Competitive Local 
Exchange Carriers (CLEC), including Cellular 
Users 

Table column headers - Month, Year, # of CLEC Calls, 
CLEC as % of Total 
Row Data:
September 2001 1,842 3 
October 2001 6,646 10 
November 2001 7,714 12 
December 2001 5,851 10 
January 2002 5,516 10 
February 2002 5,347 11 
March 2002 6,158 11 
April 2002 6.187 11 
May 2002 6,231 11 
June 2002 7,382 13 
July 2002 8,502 13 
August 2002 9,395 15 
September 2002 9,408 16 

APD Response Times. Response times are a 
continuous concern for APD. “Over the course of 
2001, Austin police officers’ average response to 
Priority One emergencies – the most serious calls 
– crept up from 8 minutes 20 seconds in January 
to 9 minutes 1 second in December, while the 
number of crimes committed climbed 12 percent. 
Now the entire department, from street cops to the 
chief, are pushing to drive that response time back 
to 8 1/2 minutes, still a longer time than other big 
Texas cities.”13 APD set 8 1/2 minutes response time 
as their goal, considering the size of their forces and 
the monthly call load, along with traffic conditions, 
construction delays, and road and communication 
technology factors. 

In FY 2001, Austin 9-1-1 staff averaged 1 minute 
20 seconds to take an emergency call. Dispatch staff 
averaged 1 minute 50 seconds in FY 200114 (see 
exhibit 12). Emergency Communications Division 
managers believe that the 3-1-1 system augmented 
with policy improvements should reduce their 
segment of the overall response time total.Timing 
data suggested that improvements were made in 
the dispatch portion, with response times reduced 
43 seconds to 1 minute 7 seconds in FY 2002. We 
believe that this reduction was attributable in part to 
3-1-1. 

The number of dispatchable calls increased in part 
because Priority Two and Four calls increased. 
We suspect that the increase of more than 20,000 
Priority Four calls may be associated with 3-1-1. 
As certified 9-1-1 call takers, 3-1-1 call takers have 
decision-making authority to dispatch 3-1-1 calls 
automatically whenever appropriate, while they are 
attempting to collect address and name information.15 
However, it is impossible to track whether this is 
the case, because APD cannot currently distinguish 
between CAD calls from 9-1-1 or 3-1-1, outside of 
some 3-1-1 calls that lack address data. 

Considering the 70 percent increase in the number 
of calls for service, we would speculate that having 
a non-emergency call number may encourage police 
reports where none might have been made before, 
e.g., for thefts of items from a vehicle. During our 
observations of 3-1-1 call takers, we noted that call 
takers had discretion when determining whether 
a “report only” call is a Priority Four or Teleserve 
call. Priority Four calls are dispatched as soon 
as possible; they are defined as incidents where 
protection of life and property is not an issue and a 
delay is not likely to adversely affect investigation. 
Examples include abandoned property, checking 
welfare, fireworks violations, and prostitution. 
Teleserve calls are defined as incidents where (1) 
no threat to life or injury to a person exists, and/or 
there is no retrievable evidence; (2) it is unlikely that 
a suspect can be apprehended; and (3) the incident 
is “old” and there is little or no suspect description 
available. Examples include auto thefts, assaults by 
threat, credit card abuse, requests to locate a missing 
person, and theft.16 

The increase in Priority Four calls may be associated 
with a combination of the increased willingness 
of citizens to call the police using 3-1-1 and the 



Image of Exhibit 12: Average Response Time for Priority One Calls
Bar Graph

decision of the 3-1-1 call taker to more readily 
dispatch “gray area” report calls. Without the ability 
to track the type or number of calls dispatched by 
3-1-1, we can only examine changes in the number 
of Teleserve reports. Thus, we sampled Teleserve 
reports to gain a sense of the types of report calls 
that were being directed to 3-1-1. 

Prior to the introduction of 3-1-1, official budget 
materials documented that the APD Teleserve unit 
took 37,521 reports in FY 1999. The operation 
expanded its hours to 24 hours a day in FY 2001, 
when it processed more than 45,656 reports. During 
the first full year of operation, 3-1-1 call takers 
completed 51,836 Teleserve reports, representing 
7 percent of all 702,964 3-1-1 calls answered. 
The number of Teleserve reports only increased 

13.5 percent, while the number of calls for service 
increased 70 percent. If citizens were not calling to 
make reports, why were they making the remainder 
of the calls? Were citizens confused about calling 
3-1-1 versus 9-1-1? Or were 3-1-1 call takers 
becoming the City’s all-purpose 4-1-1 service, as 
they feared? 

Impact on Call Takers 

To assess the impact of 3-1-1 on APD call takers, 
we conducted two surveys of 3-1-1, 9-1-1, and dispatchers 
and their supervisors in Fall 2001 and 2002. The first 
survey asked about their views on calls for service, 
police-citizen interactions, and knowledge about 
and the impacts of the new 3-1-1 system. We 
also asked respondents for their perceptions, in 
general, of the Austin Police Department, and the 
community that it serves. One year later, in Fall 2002, 
we repeated the survey, altering five questions and 
adding three new questions about the 3-1-1 system 
after implementation. We also added five new 
questions about the perceived impact on call taker 
and dispatcher workload of September 11, 2001. 

In the first wave, 106 surveys were completed while 
95 were completed in the second wave. 

During each wave, we surveyed all call takers 
working each shift on one particular day. This did 
not allow us to survey every call taker, because 
shifts varied from day to day. However, we did 
reach a representative sample. The respondent 
samples for both survey waves are similar with 
respect to the number of call takers reached 
and distributions across the units, as well as 
demographically. The following summary describes 
and compares results from the two survey periods. 

Emergency Communications Work. We initially 
asked respondents for their views of emergency 
communications work in general, in order to 
establish a context for interpreting their responses 
on community interaction and engagement, and 
organizational adaptation or change, under the 3-1-1 
system. These questions focused on understanding 


what call takers viewed as emergency 
communication staff’s roles and responsibilities. 

Responses from both surveys were remarkably 
similar in this category. The vast majority of 
respondents (more than 95 percent in both surveys) 
believed that answering calls effectively was by 
far the call takers’ most important responsibility. 
Further, 83 percent in the first wave and 86 percent 
in the second wave believed that actually assisting 
citizens with their specific needs was just as 
important as how quickly calls were answered. 
Eighty percent of respondents in both surveys 
believed that a good 3-1-1 call taker will try to find 
out how to solve the caller’s issue during the call. 

With the introduction of 3-1-1, the percentage of 
respondents who felt that there were too few call 
takers to meet the call for service demand increased 
by 8 percent, from 68 percent in 2001 to 70 percent 
in 2002. 

Knowledge and Views of 3-1-1. In the first 
survey (before 3-1-1 implementation), 80 percent 
of respondents reported being aware of 3-1-1 as a 
universal non-emergency telephone number. When 
asked in the second survey about the impact of 
3-1-1 on their day-to-day work, 57 percent of the 
respondents reported that 3-1-1 had made positive 
changes in their job responsibilities, an increase of 5 
percent over the 2001 responses. Asked about their 
preferred assignment, 32 percent in the first survey 
said they preferred 9-1-1. In the second survey, this 
percentage had increased to 51 percent. Sixteen 
percent and 18 percent, respectively, preferred 
working in 3-1-1. 

During the first survey, 20 percent had believed 
that 3-1-1 would increase their workload; in the 
second survey, 34 percent reported that it had done 
so. Almost half of respondents in both surveys 
felt that 3-1-1 had increased their knowledge 
about APD and the City of Austin. In the second 
survey, 90 percent of call takers felt that 3-1-1 
had improved call loads for patrol officers, an 
increase of 8 percent over their 2001 responses. 
Eighty-four percent felt that 3-1-1 had improved 
customer service within the APD Emergency 
Communications Division. 

Organizational Adaptation. Organizational 
adaptation or change within a department is a 
major component of community policing. We asked 
respondents about their perceptions of management 
support for emergency communications with respect to 
the amount of time provided, information exchanged, 
and recognition given. Finally, we asked call takers 
about their perceptions of department management. 

Views of Department Management. Half of 
respondents in both surveys felt that executives 
understood call takers’ day-to-day jobs. Sixty-four 
percent of 2001 respondents felt that top leaders had 
made department priorities clear, compared to 70 
percent of 2002 respondents. More than 80 percent 
felt that the Emergency Communications Division 
was effectively handling calls, in both surveys. 

Impacts of Terrorism. After 9/11, the role of 
public safety agencies was perceived by the public 
to have changed significantly. During the first wave 
of surveys, call takers were receiving a new type 
of 9-1-1 emergency call, reflecting public concerns 
about anthrax and weapons of mass destruction. 
In our study, we anticipated that the shifting police 
role would have an impact on perceptions of 3-1-1. 
In the second wave of surveys conducted one year 
after 9/11, we asked call takers five questions about 
the impact of terrorism on workloads and their 
ability to do their jobs. Only 50 percent of call 
takers felt that calls for service had increased as 
a result of heightened public safety and security 
concerns. Seventy-three percent of respondents felt 
that officer responsibilities had increased. Thirty-
six percent felt that APD call takers had received 
adequate training, and just 22 percent felt that they 
had received adequate equipment to do their part 
in addressing terrorism concerns. Fifty-five percent 
of respondents felt that citizens were willing to call 
3-1-1 regarding terrorism security concerns, and 
66 percent felt that APD had done an excellent or 
good job of responding to crisis and emergency 
situations such as terrorist threats, flooding, and 
racial tensions during the past year. 

Perceived Calls Per Shift. We asked call takers 
in each unit about the number and types of calls 
they were handling. 9-1-1 calls takers perceived 


that they were receiving fewer calls than before in each priority 
area except non-emergency, non-police calls (exhibit 13), totaling 
approximately 10 fewer calls per shift.17 We did not receive an 
adequate number of responses from dispatchers to generalize 
about their perceptions on call types. 

Exhibit 13: Average # of Calls Per Shift As Perceived by 9-1-1 Call Takers 

Table column headers - Priority Level, 2001 responses, 2002 responses, Difference 
1 9.0 5.9 -3.10 
2 14.6 11.2 -3.42 
3 10.1 8.6 -1.47 
4 8.4 7.1 -1.29 
5 ---
Non-Emergency Police Call 11.7 8.8 -2.90 
Non-Emergency, Non-Police Related Call 6.0 7.8 1.80 


Exhibit 14 reflects the perception 
of 3-1-1 call takers that their 
call loads dropped over time. 
However, the statistics show 
that 3-1-1 call loads consistently 
increased instead. Perhaps as call 
takers became more familiar with 
their roles, they felt less overwhelmed and perceived 
that they were answering fewer calls. 

We asked 3-1-1 call takers to recall the nature of 
the non-emergency calls they received. Call takers 
perceived that the largest number of calls they 
handled were for directory information and general 
information requests (exhibit 15). 3-1-1 call takers 
estimated that they spent less than 1 minute with 20 
percent of the calls, 1 to 3 minutes on 30 percent 
of the calls, and 4 to 5 minutes on 40 percent of the 
calls. Call tracking data supported their estimates; 
the average 3-1-1 call time was 2 minutes. 

To learn more about the nature of the 3-1-1 calls, 
we look at their origination points. These data are 
generated by the 3-1-1 call tracking switch software 
purchased by APD. Calls to 3-1-1 can be generated by: 

- Users dialing 3-1-1 from residential or business phones 
(land lines) 

- Users dialing the seven-digit APD main number, the former 
PBX number These calls were typically requests for information 
or for APD staff. 

- Users dialing the seven-digit Teleserve number 

- Users dialing 3-1-1 from a cell or pay phone 
through local exchange providers 

- Wrecker and impound services calling APD 
about vehicles towed and impounded, as 
required by city ordinance 

We obtained these data for September 2001 to 
September 2002, when 764,780 calls were made 
to 3-1-1. Calls to the seven-digit Teleserve number 
represented almost 21 percent (159,364) of the total 
calls (exhibit 16). This finding raises questions about 
why only 52,000 Teleserve reports were completed, 
especially since Teleserve reports could be generated 
from calls placed with the seven-digit Teleserve 
number, 3-1-1 (dialed either way), or as a result of 
calling the APD main number. 

Exhibit 14: Average # of 3-1-1 Calls Per Shift As Perceived 
by 3-1-1 Call Takers 

Table column headers - Type of Call, 2001 responses, 2002 responses, Difference 
Roaw Data:
Emergency Police Calls - should have been a 91-1 Call 3.8 6.2 -2.4 
Non-Emergency Police Calls 33.6 30.0 -3.6 
Non-Emergency, Non-Police Related Call 17.6 13.0 -4.6 
Total 51.2 43.0 -8.2 


Since APD was unable to use the CRM software to 
gather information about the nature of each 3-1-1 
call, we are unable to answer those questions. We 
raise these issues about the “report calls” because of 
their possible link with the increase in the number 
of dispatchable Priority Four calls. If APD seeks 
to focus on reducing the officer element of the 
response times and to free officer time for other 
activities, further examination of the nature of calls 
to 3-1-1 is needed. Performance objectives limiting 
the amount of time spent per call could inadvertently 
motivate call takers to dispatch report calls 
whenever feasible, rather than take time to complete 
reports over the phone. This outcome would negate 
one of the primary reasons for having 3-1-1, to 
reduce the amount of time officers spend responding 
to dispatch calls.

Exhibit 15: Type and Nature of 3-1-1 Calls (Perceived) 

Table column headers - Type of Call, 2001 responses, 2002 responses, Difference 
Row data:
General Information Request - Police Related 17.2 13.7 (3.5) 
General Information Request - Non-Police Related 12.6 10.2 (2.4) 
Teleserve Report 8.9 8.4 (0.5) Directory Information - PBX Calls 14.0 9.6 (4.4) 
Report of Problem Referred to District Representative 4.5 5.1 0.6 
Other 1.0 13.0 12.0 
Total 58.2 60.0 1.8 

We sampled 105 Teleserve reports received in May 
2002, to get a snapshot of the types of reports that 
the system was receiving.18 The top ten offense types 
covered by the reports were: 

1. Burglary of Vehicle (23) 
2. Theft (17) 
3. Auto Theft (14) 
4. Criminal Mischief (10) 
5. Forgery and Passing (7) 
6. Shoplifting (5) 
7. Burglary of Residence (5) 
8. Burglary of Non-Residence (5) 
9. Harassment (4) 
10. Violation of Protective Order (3) 

Eighty-two of the reports were made within a week 
of the precipitating incident; 73 were reported 
within a day. Fifty-three percent were located in 
five census tract areas. This is a sample of the types 
of information that could be gleaned by collecting 
and analyzing data with the CRM software. It could 
be used to identify potential or emerging hotspots 
and problem types, and to examine how information 
about police department efforts such as 3-1-1 
are being received and used by citizens. For 
example, it could be that neighborhood 
associations and/or District Representatives19 
are actively promoting 3-1-1 in census tract 18. 
In the next section, we look at the impacts of 31-1 on 
problem-solving efforts by police. 

Exhibit 16: 3-1-1 Calls by Origination Point from 
to dispatch calls. Sept. 01 to Sept. 02 

Table column headers - 3-1-1 Origination Point, # of Calls, % of Total 
Row Data:
3-1-1 293,122 38.3 
APD Main 5000 185,255 24.2 
Teleserve 159,364 20.8 
CLEC 3-1-1 86,179 11.3 
Zone Wrecker 28,969 3.8 
Impounds 11,891 1.6 
Total 764,780 


Impact on Patrol Officers, Problem-
Solving and Community Policing 
Activities 

As discussed in the introduction, APD has a sworn 
force of more than 1,270 officers. Since 1998, APD 
has implemented Neighborhood-Based Policing, a 
philosophy that incorporates tenets of community 
policing. Problem solving is an element described 
in the literature as a fundamental component of 
community policing. The Community Policing 
Consortium (1994) suggests that problem solving 
is based on the assumption that “crime and disorder 
can be reduced in small geographic areas by 
carefully studying the characteristics of problems 
in the area, and then applying the appropriate 
resources…”20 APD’s Chief has articulated two 
primary responsibilities for his patrol officers: 
respond to calls for service and engage in problem-
solving activities. 

To assess the impact of 3-1-1 on APD patrol officers, 
we surveyed patrol officers and their supervisors. 
We asked about their views of calls for service, 
knowledge of the 3-1-1 system, and principal 
tenets of community policing, such as community 
interaction and engagement, problem solving, and 
organizational development. Respondents were 
surveyed about their perceptions of police work 
in general, of the Austin Police Department, and 
of the community that APD serves; they were also 
asked questions about public safety, their fears with 
respect to crime, and their own problem-solving 
efforts. One year later, in Fall 2002, we repeated the 
survey, altering five questions and adding four new 
questions about the 3-1-1 system. We also added 
five new questions about the perceived impact of 
September 11, 2001, on officer workload. 

Exhibit 17: Teleserve Calls By 
Census Tract - Top Census Tract 
Locations of Sample Teleserve Calls 

Table Coumn headers - Tract Number, # of Teleserve Reports 
18 20 
17 17 
23 7 
15 6 
19 6 

In 2001, from October through December, 232 
surveys were completed during “show-ups” (roll 
calls). The second wave of surveys was completed 
during 3 days in October 2002. Staff from 21st 
Century Solutions, Inc. administered 194 surveys; 
an additional 86 surveys were administered by 
supervisors during show-ups.21 These were mailed 
back within two weeks.22 In total, 281 surveys were 
collected during the second wave. During each 
wave, we surveyed respondents working all shifts 
that were scheduled on one particular day, at each 
substation, by attending every show-up on that 
day. This did not allow us to survey every officer, 
because not every shift works on all days. However, 
we did reach a representative sample of the patrol 
officers. The respondent samples are similar with 
respect to the number of officers reached and 
the distribution across areas (exhibit 18).23 This 
summary compares the surveys and points out 
similarities and differences between the respondents 
in each of the two waves. 

Police Work, General. First, we asked respondents 
for their general views of police work in order to 
establish a context for interpreting their responses 
about problem solving, community interaction 
and engagement, and organizational adaptation or 
change. These questions focused on understanding 
what patrol officers and supervisors viewed as 
police roles and responsibilities. Responses from 
both surveys are remarkably similar in this category. 
The vast majority of respondents (95 percent in 
both surveys) believed that listening to and assisting 
citizens was just as important as enforcing the law. 
The number of respondents who strongly agreed 
with this statement decreased by 14 percent between 
2001 and 2002, from 69 percent to 55 percent. 
Further, the number of respondents who agreed that 
police officers have reason to be distrustful of most 
citizens increased by 5 percent, from 24 percent to 
29 percent. 

We were somewhat surprised by the positive finding 
that the number of respondents who believed that 
too few patrol officers were available to answer calls 
for service dropped by 11 percent, from 91 percent 


in 2001 to 80 percent in 2002, in spite of increasing 
demands on public safety staff nationwide by Fall of 
2002. 

Exhibit 18: Officer Survey Response by Command Area

Table column headers - Area, Pre Survey, % of Respondents, Post Survey,
% of Respondents, Difference in the # of Respondents,  Difference in % of Respondents 
Row Data:
Northwest 25 11 45 16 20 5 
Northeast 30 13 39 14 9 1 
Central West 31 13 31 11 --2 
Central East 52 22 34 12 -18 -10 
Downtown 38 16 36 13 -2 -4 
Southwest 36 16 49 17 13 2 
Southeast 15 6 42 15 27 8 
Other 2 2 5 2 -0 
TOTAL 232 281 

Responding to Calls. Responses from the two 
survey waves were very similar. Officers reported 
that they are the primary responders to an average of 
3.6 Priority One calls per shift. In addition, they said 
that they responded as the primary unit to about 12 
calls per shift. In total, in the first wave of surveys, 
officers said they responded to about 27 calls per 
shift (including back-up units); in the second, they 
reported responding to about 25 calls per shift. In 
the first survey, officers indicated that the top three 
emergency calls were for family violence (35), 
collisions (30), and disturbances (26). In the second 
survey, officers reported responding to collisions 
(45), family disturbances (35), and family violence 
(25). Sixty-one percent reported that it took less than 
an hour to clear calls, with 18 percent of these calls 
taking less than 10 minutes each to clear in 2001. 
These responses dropped to 56.4 percent and 15 
percent, respectively, in the 2002 survey. 

Officers indicated that the top three non-emergency 
calls were for noise (26), animal control (18), and 
9-1-1 hang-up calls (17). Noise (40), 9-1-1 hang-up 
calls (31), and false alarms (35) topped the 2002 
response list. (Animal control calls did not appear on 
the non-emergency response list.) Eighty-one percent 
of these calls took 30 minutes or less to resolve in 
the 2001 survey. In the 2002 survey this response 
changed; only 69 percent of these calls took 30 
minutes or less to resolve. 

Officers estimated that at the busiest times during 
their shifts, an average of seven calls were holding 
in 2001. Even though dispatchable calls increased 
in 2002, officers estimated an average of six calls 
holding at the busiest times. 

Officers reported that 44 percent of the calls they 
responded to as a back-up unit were emergency 
calls, down slightly from 46 percent in the first 
survey. Officers reported that 47 percent of the calls, 
7 percent fewer than in 2001, were not emergency 
calls. Officers were attending to these calls for fewer 
than 30 minutes for 67 percent of the calls in 2001, 
and for 57 percent in 2002. These perceptions about 
call loads suggest that officers might have perceived 
that 3-1-1 was removing a fraction of non-emergency 
calls from their workload. 

Knowledge and Views of 3-1-1. In the first survey, 
nearly all officer respondents said they were aware 
of APD’s 3-1-1 system as a universal non-emergency 
telephone number. In the second survey, 90 percent 
reported that they were generally-to-very aware of 
the goals and functions of 3-1-1. Eighty-five percent 
of the officers had discussed 3-1-1 with citizens in 
their areas; 77 percent had discussed this during 
contacts made on non-emergency calls, 11 percent 
during problem-solving projects, and 10 percent 
during traffic incidents or stops. 

When asked about the impact of 3-1-1 on their day-
to-day work, 56 percent of the 2002 respondents 
reported that 3-1-1 had reduced the number of non-
emergency calls for which an officer was dispatched. 


However, respondents reported that this outcome 
was less positive than they had anticipated prior to 
implementation of 3-1-1. During the first survey, 
more than half believed 3-1-1 would reduce their 
workload; in 2002, only 43 percent reported that 
it had, in fact, reduced their day-to-day workload. 
Before implementation, only 2 percent had believed 
that 3-1-1 would increase their workload; after the 
fact, 3.2 percent reported that it had done so. 

Fifty-seven percent of the 2001 respondents had 
not anticipated any impacts from 3-1-1 on their 
interactions with citizens, and 42 percent of 2002 
respondents reported that it did not impact those 
interactions. Twelve percent had anticipated that 
3-1-1 would increase their citizen interactions, and 
9 percent reported this to be the case. A third of 
2002 respondents reported that they did not know 
whether 3-1-1 had changed their interactions with 
citizens. 

Forty-one percent of 2001 respondents did not 
anticipate any impact on their problem-solving 
efforts; 33 percent of 2002 respondents reported that 
3-1-1 had not affected those efforts. A disappointing 
finding: 30 percent anticipated 3-1-1 would improve 
their problem-solving efforts, but only 18 percent 
reported that it had done so. Approximately one-fifth 
of respondents were unsure whether 3-1-1 would 
have any impact on their problem-solving efforts; 
after a year of operation, one-third were unsure 
whether it had had any impact. 

Problem Solving. Over half of the respondents in 
each survey reported regularly working on problem-
solving efforts during their shifts. The responses 
for all problem-solving questions were remarkably 
similar. In each survey: 

- Forty-one percent of respondents reported 
spending between 30 minutes and 2 hours 
on problem-solving efforts during their most 
recent shifts. 

- Approximately 20 percent of officers and 
supervisors felt that APD had done a good 
job of giving officers enough time for 
problem solving. Fifteen percent reported 
that they were unable to spend any time 
problem solving. 

- Approximately one-third of officers and 
supervisors felt that APD has done a good 
or excellent job in providing information 
that officers need about the problem in their 
assigned areas. Up from 39 percent in 2001, 
42 percent felt that APD had done a fair job 
of providing the information, according to 
the 2002 survey. 

When asked to identify problems that officers 
targeted with problem-solving efforts, one quarter od 
respondents reported working on drug problems. Up 
from one-quarter in 2001, 30 percent reported in 2002 
working on problems related to burglary and breaking 
and entering. The number working on solving traffic 
problems increased from 16 percent to 21 percent. 

Approximately 30 percent of respondents reported 
that they targeted their problem-solving efforts to 
a geographical area covering two to four blocks. 
Seventy-one percent of officers and supervisors felt 
APD had done a fair-to-excellent job of distributing 
the workload fairly among patrol officers 
responsible for taking calls and specialized problem-
solving units such as District Representatives and 
Street Response Units. 

With respect to recognition, 13 percent of 
respondents on the 2002 survey - 5 percent more 
than on the 2001 survey - felt that APD had done 
a good job of rewarding officers who do well with 
problem solving. However, 47 percent still felt APD 
had done a poor job in this respect. 

Organizational Adaptation. To perform the 
functions of community interaction and problem 
solving, officers are required to change their 
thinking about their work and their environment. 
Instead of working in a reactive atmosphere, 
officers and partners are asked to shift their 
emphasis to a proactive, preventive mode. Also, 
rather than focusing on major crimes, they are 
asked to deal with disorders, disputes, and other 
quality of life problems. Organizational adaptation 
or change within a department is necessary in order 
to implement community policing. We asked all 
respondents about their perceptions of management 
support for community policing with respect to the 
amount of time provided, information exchanged, 


and recognition given. Finally, we asked officers 
and supervisors about their perceptions of 
department management. 

Remaining focused on the potential impacts of 
3-1-1, we asked questions about what 
organizational changes had improved over time 
for community policing. We also inquired about 
respondents’ current views of the Emergency 
Communications operations. 

Handling Calls. In both surveys, the majority 
of respondents stated that organizational changes 
had led to police officers responding to more 
appropriate and more important calls for service. 
Two-thirds of respondents felt that the Emergency 
Communications Division effectively handles 
calls. Over two-thirds also stated that establishing 
differential police response has led to police officers 
responding to more appropriate and more important 
calls for service. 

Specialized Units. Civilian crime scene specialists 
and Teleserve were perceived to have made the 
largest contributions to improving call loads. In the 
2001 survey, 90 percent of respondents felt these 
units were improving call loads for patrol officers. 
In the 2002 survey, 83 percent felt that the civilian 
crime scene specialists were improving call loads 
for patrol officers; 80 percent felt that the 3-1-1 call 
takers were having this effect; and two-thirds felt 
that District Representatives were reducing calls for 
service to patrol officers. 

Views of Department Management. The 
majority of respondents did not feel that 
management priorities were made clear or that 
executives understood officers’ day-to-day jobs; 
this perception changed only slightly between the 
two survey periods. Almost half (49 percent) of 
2001 respondents felt that top leaders had made 
department priorities clear; only 45 percent of 
2002 respondents felt priorities were being clearly 
communicated. As in other work places, rank 
and file officers perceived that leaders did not 
understand their day-to-day work; these perceptions 
increased slightly between 2001 (65 percent) and 
2002 (69 percent). 

Impacts of Terrorism. After 9/11, the role of 
public safety agencies was perceived by the public 
to have changed significantly. During the 2001 
surveys, officers had just been subjected to an influx 
of domestic security training courses and were 
responding to a new type of 9-1-1 emergency call- 
anthrax and weapons of mass destruction calls. In 
our study, we anticipated that this shift in the police 
role would have an impact on perceptions of 3-1-1 
and of police officer workloads. In the 2002 surveys 
conducted one year after the tragedies of 9/11, we 
asked five questions about the impacts of terrorism 
on the officers’ workloads. 

Eight-five percent of respondents felt that officer 
responsibilities increased as a result of the terrorist 
activities on 9/11. Sixty-six percent felt that 
APD officers had received adequate training, and 
75 percent felt that they had received adequate 
equipment and supplies to address terrorism 
concerns. 

Eight-three percent felt that calls for service 
increased as a result of heightened public safety and 
security concerns. Only 37 percent of respondents 
felt that citizens were willing to call 3-1-1 regarding 
terrorism security concerns. However, 56.4 percent 
felt APD had done an excellent or good job of 
responding to crisis and emergency situations such 
as terrorist threats, flooding, and/or racial conflicts 
during the past year. 

Officer Deployment Changes. Patrol allocation is 
an important issue for APD. Officers are assigned 
to Command Areas based on the number of calls 
for service. In exhibit 8, we highlight that APD had 
created two new policing areas, for a total of eight 
policing areas. APD created these new areas because 
call loads in the Downtown area had expanded, 
justifying the subdivision in order to improve call 
response times and to ensure equitable distribution 
of calls among the call areas. 

We had thought that if 9-1-1 calls were reduced, 
officer deployment could change dramatically. In 
areas where non-emergency calls were high, more 
time and more officers should be available for other 
activities, or officers could be shifted to other areas. 
In our pre- and post-implementation surveys, we 


asked officers about the impacts of organizational 
adaptations such as officer deployment changes. 
We note, however, the impacts of 9/11 on the police 
department may have absorbed any officer time that 
was freed by the reduction in 9-1-1 calls. 

Role of District Representatives 

Each command area has five to seven officers serving 
as District Representatives (DRs) – liaisons between 
patrol officers and neighborhoods who engage in 
problem solving. DRs are involved in a number of 
activities that have solved numerous problems. When 
the program first began, some confusion existed over 
the roles and responsibilities of the DRs, but with 
time and training, that has changed. We anticipated 
that 3-1-1 would increase the DRs’ communication 
with residents, businesses, and other officers. As the 
liaison between the community and the Department, 
DRs resolve numerous quality of life issues likely to 
be reported through 3-1-1. 

We attempted to survey the DRs within the Command 
Areas at the same time that we surveyed patrol 
officers. Because DRs work on flexible schedules, 
we relied on an electronic dissemination method for 
the first round of surveys, using an e-mail link to 
an online survey, and we distributed an interoffice 
mail survey in 2002. We received 17 surveys 
during the 2001 period and 26 during the 2002 
period. Given these low response rates combined 
with the small sample size, we have chosen not to 
generalize from their responses. We note that of 
those who responded, all were aware of 3-1-1 and 
had discussed it with citizens in their areas. In the 
pre-survey, slightly over half felt that 3-1-1 would 
increase their interactions with citizens; in the post 
survey, slightly less than half felt that it had done so. 
One-third anticipated that 3-1-1 would improve their 
problem-solving efforts, but less than a quarter felt it 
had accomplished this. 

In the second survey of call takers (described above), 
call takers reported that they referred approximately 
five calls to DRs per shift. If this is the case and 
referrals continue at this rate, it could amount to 500-
1,000 calls referred per week, or 35,000 calls referred 
per year. More data and analysis on the nature of the 
calls referred to DRs could be useful in helping them 
with their problem-solving efforts. We also note that 
DRs were relieved of answering calls to allow them 
time to focus on problems. If the 3-1-1 call loads 
continue to grow, it is important that the referrals 
are framed within the larger context of the DR’s 
priorities and are used to support problem solving 
within the area. As the key liaison between the Police 
Department and active community organizations, 
DRs play a critical role in facilitating neighborhood 
policing. With systematic information, DRs should 
be able to use 3-1-1 information to enhance Austin’s 
active citizens as an extra set of “eyes and ears” for 
the Police Department. 

Police Perceptions of Citizen Satisfaction 

Neighborhood-based policing encourages officers 
to develop mutual respect, trust, and support with 
community members (interaction), and then to use 
this foundation to build a series of active partnerships 
(engagement).24 In our surveys of call takers and 
police, we asked about their perceptions of citizen 
involvement with the police department. 

In each survey, officers rated citizen cooperation 
with police as high; however, approximately half 
of the respondents believed that some citizens are 
afraid to cooperate with police because others might 
retaliate. Approximately 80 percent of respondents 
believed that citizens would call the police if they saw 
something suspicious. The number of respondents 
who thought that citizens with information about a 
crime would reveal it if asked by the police increased 
a small amount - from 71 percent in 2001 to 75.7 
percent in 2002. Sixty-five percent of respondents in 
each survey reported believing that citizens would 
be willing to work with police to solve neighborhood 
problems. Although the percentages were slightly 
lower, call takers held the same perceptions about 
citizen cooperation as patrol officers. 

With respect to 3-1-1, in the 2002 wave of surveys, 
we asked patrol officers four questions about the 
impact of 3-1-1 on the community of Austin. The 
majority of respondents (60 percent) believed that 
most citizens were aware of 3-1-1. Fifty-three percent 
felt that citizens understood the difference between 
3-1-1 and 9-1-1; however, 73 percent felt that most 
citizens were continuing to call 9-1-1 for police-


related non-emergencies, even after being informed 
about 3-1-1. This result seems to contradict an earlier 
finding that 3-1-1 had reduced the number of non-
emergency calls dispatched. 

Call takers were not as sure as patrol officers about 
citizen awareness and use of 3-1-1. In the 2001 
survey, 49 percent of call takers responded that 
some or most citizens were aware of 3-1-1; this 
percentage had only risen to 54 percent a year later. 
In the first survey, 38 percent felt that citizens knew 
the differences between 9-1-1 and 3-1-1; a year later, 
only another 4 percent agreed with this statement. 
Fewer than 20 percent of the call takers believed 
that citizens understood that 3-1-1 was to be used 
for police non-emergencies only. On a positive 
note, in 2001 before the launch of the new system, 
70 percent of call takers anticipated that citizens 
would continue to call 9-1-1 for police-related non-
emergencies even when informed of 3-1-1; a year 
later, this response rate dropped by 7 percent (63 
percent). Forty-nine percent felt that some or most 
citizens would use 3-1-1 effectively for their issues. 

Perceptions of Citizens 

We turn now to the perceptions of citizens, 
themselves. Austin citizens are active on behalf of 
the community and have many opportunities to give 
feedback to city officials though the use of city-wide 
surveys. The FY 2004 APD budget presentation 
reported that the majority of citizens are satisfied 
with APD. According to these documents, 85 percent 
were satisfied with Emergency Police Response, 69 
percent were satisfied with neighborhood policing, 
and 94 percent were satisfied with 9-1-1 Emergency 
Services. 

Approximately one year after the 3-1-1 non-
emergency call system was implemented in Austin, 
we conducted a brief telephone survey with 105 
residents who had placed calls to 3-1-1 on one of two 
dates, September 30, 2002, or October 1, 2002. With 
this survey, we gathered information about changes in 
customer satisfaction with Austin police services, in 
general, and with the 3-1-1 system, in particular. 

We started by asking APD to use their Avaya Call 
Management software to generate a list of telephone 
numbers captured during our target periods. The list 
gave us 1,087 candidates. To gain a representative 
sample, we attempted to reach approximately 30 
callers from each of three shifts – morning (6 a.m. to 
2 p.m.), afternoon (2 p.m. to 9 p.m.), and night 
(9 p.m. to 6 a.m.), for a total of 105 respondents. We 
placed our calls between 10:00 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. 
Central Standard Time. 

From our survey, we learned that three-quarters 
of the respondents felt that 3-1-1 had improved 
the quality of service received from APD. Fifteen 
percent felt that 3-1-1 had made no impact on 
service, and 6.6 percent felt it had lowered the 
quality of APD’s service. 

During the survey, we asked respondents how many 
times they called before reaching a 3-1-1 call taker. 
Ninety-six percent (101 respondents) were able to 
speak with a 3-1-1 call taker on the first attempt. For 
59 respondents, this was their first call to 3-1-1. The 46 
respondents who had to call more than once to reach 
a call taker had made an average of five calls, 
excluding three respondents who stated that they 
had called 3-1-1 more than 100 times, or “two to 
three times per day, five days per week.” Almost half 
of the respondents (49) reported communicating more 
frequently with APD than they would have without 
the 3-1-1 service. 

Most respondents could remember the nature of their 
most recent call to 3-1-1. Forty had called to report 
a problem or incident: 26 were filing a police report, 
18 were victims of a crime, and one was involved in 
a motor vehicle accident. Fourteen respondents were 
calling to obtain information about a particular issue. 
Twenty-two callers reported thefts, 12 reported 
noise disturbances, and 12 reported traffic issues, 
including four hit-and-run accidents. Others called 
about medical, mental health, or animal problems, 
concerns about airplanes, child custody issues, and 
conflicts with neighbors. Five respondents called 
to request telephone numbers for police officers 
and other agencies. More than three-quarters of the 
respondents (78 percent) felt that 3-1-1 call takers 
were helpful and knowledgeable. Sixty-nine percent 
stated that 3-1-1 call takers had been excellent or 
good at solving their problems. More than half (56 
percent) stated that 3-1-1 call takers were excellent 


or good at providing referral information. 
Half of the respondents had heard about 3-1-1 from 
media reports. Nineteen respondents had learned 
about 3-1-1 from a friend or by word of mouth, and 
an additional 10 reported having learned about it 
from police department employees. Fourteen heard 
about 3-1-1 during a call to 9-1-1. Eight reported 
seeing a 3-1-1 advertisement, most of these reporting 
that they saw the number printed on police cars. 
Five individuals learned about 3-1-1 at a community 
meeting, including two at commander forums. One 
reported learning about 3-1-1 as the result of living in 
another community with 3-1-1 service. 

Thirty-seven respondents felt that most or some 
citizens were aware of 3-1-1. On the other hand, 39 
respondents felt that few or no citizens were aware 
of 3-1-1. The majority of respondents (61) shared 
suggestions for improving the 3-1-1 service: 

- Improve publicity (19). 

- Improve the response of call takers, 
including follow-up, answering more 
quickly, adding more Spanish-speaking call 
takers, and allowing call takers to provide 
more information, including internet-based 
information (16). 

- Improve training for 3-1-1 call takers (9). 

- Improve police response and response times (7). 

- Add cell phone access (3). 

Citizen Interactions with Police as a Result of 
3-1-1. Forty-five of the 105 respondents reported that 
an officer was dispatched in response to their 3-1-1 
calls. Twenty-seven of these respondents reported 
that the officer arrived in 15 minutes or less; eleven 
reported that the officer arrived within 30 minutes; 
three stated that the officer arrived within an hour. 
Seventy-one percent of the 45 respondents felt that 
the officer was courteous; 88 percent stated that, in 
their opinions, the officer addressed their problems 
appropriately. 


End Notes 

1 We also pulled results from the 3-1-1 call switch tracking data, 
which proved consistent with data used by the APD Emergency 
Communications Division in presentations and briefings. 

2 APD Emergency Communications Division did not have call data 
available for FY00-01. The annual data provided was compiled as 
part of the research completed by the division while exploring the 
3-1-1 option. It did not appear to be part of the normal reporting 
process. 

3 FY 2003 data is an estimate. 

4 Lorraine Mazerolle, Dennis Rogan, James Frank, Christine Famega, 
and John E. Eck, “Managing Citizen Calls to the Police: The Impact 
of Baltimore’s 3-1-1 Call System,” Criminology & Public Policy, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, Nov. 2002, at page 107. 

5 In order to compare these data, one would need to understand all of 
the types of calls that are included in the CAD system, and that are 
not “reactive,” such as traffic stops. One must also understand how 
CAD data are extracted from the mainframe system. This level of 
specialized knowledge is outside the scope of the evaluation. 

6 Referring to earlier comments about differences in the data and our 
understanding of the CAD data set, we note that it is unlikely that all 
of these calls were actually dispatched. 

7 The study of Baltimore 3-1-1 highlights that Baltimore had 
a reduction in the total number of calls received following the 
introduction of 3-1-1. However, the report states that “3-1-1 
call operators were more willing than were their 9-1-1 call taker 
counterparts to treat non-police calls coming into the 3-1-1 call 
system as “type 79” calls and not record them into the CAD system.” 
(Mazerolle et al., p. 108) 
Thus, it is unclear whether the calls for service to Baltimore were 
truly reduced or more likely just not recorded. APD statistics do not 
rely on call taker discretion. APD call takers can chose not to record 
the call in the CAD system but APD purchased and relies on the call 
tracking system to account for all 3-1-1 calls received by the switch. 

8 Source: APD FY 2003-04 Budget Presentation Materials 

9 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “All Citizen Must Be First Responders, 
USA Today, March 24, 2003. 

10 McMahon, Patrick, “311 Lightens Load for Swamped 911 Centers: 
Non-emergency Number Catches on After Sept. 11,” USA Today, 
March 5, 2002. 

11 USA Today, “Millions Dialing Wireless 911,” USA Today, March 
7, 2003. 

12 Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) report that they receive 
30 to 50 percent of emergency calls from wireless phones.” 
Source: Kathleen Q. Abernathy and Jonathan S. Adelstein, 
Commissioners, Federal Communications Commission, Joint Written 
Statement, Hearing on Wireless E911 before the Subcommittee 
on Communications, Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, United States Senate, March 5, 2003. 

13 Taylor, Alex, “ Austin Trails Other Cities in Police Response,” 
American-Statesmen, February 26, 2002. 

14 APD FY 2003-04 Budget Presentation materials. 

15 For non-emergency calls, State of Texas privacy laws prohibit 
forwarding Automatic Locator Information (ALI) to 3-1-1 call takers. 

16 Source: APD Special Order @ 2002 (Effective 03/01/2002). 

17 We do note that of the few dispatchers who indicated their 
perceptions of the number of calls by priority, these perceptions did 
not change significantly between the two surveys. They estimated 
that approximately 9 to 12 calls were holding during the busiest 
times; officers perceived that approximately five calls were holding. 

18 This represents about 2 percent of the 4,496 reports filed by 3-1-1 
call takers for May, 2002. 

19 District Representatives are sworn Austin police officers whose 
primary job responsibilities are to serve as liaisons between patrol 
officers and neighborhood members. District Representatives engage 
in extensive problem-solving activities and are relieved of handling 
calls for service. 

20 Community Policing Consortium, Understanding Community 
Policing: A Framework for Action, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994. 

21 On one day, shift show-up was missed in the North Substation. 

22 The majority of the mailed surveys were completed by officers in 
the Downtown and Central West Areas. 

23 Examining the demographic characteristics of the two survey 
respondent pools, we note only two differences. First, the number 
of Black/African American respondents dropped from 12 percent 
(27 respondents) of the pool in the first wave to 6.4 percent (18 
respondents) of the pool in the second wave. Second, the number of 
officers who had worked for APD for fewer than 2 years rose from 
29 percent (68 respondents) to 39 percent (110 respondents). 

24 Trojanowicz, Robert, Community Policing: A Survey of Police 
Departments in the United States, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994. 


Chapter IV
Impact 
Evaluation 

Conclusions & Recommendations 

Our analysis of the impacts of 3-1-1 in Austin reveals six principal 
findings: 
1. The 3-1-1 system successfully reduced the 9-1-1 call load. 

2. The 3-1-1 system accounted for an increase in APD’s total 
call load. 

3. Dispatchable calls for service increased after 3-1-1 was 
implemented, although it is not clear whether 3-1-1 
contributed to the increase. 

4. The addition of 3-1-1 has not freed more officer time for 
community policing, as had been expected. 

5. The majority of citizens report satisfaction with emergency 
services in general, and with 3-1-1 in particular. 

6. Citizens contact APD more frequently, probably 
about a broader range of problems, but APD is not yet 
systematically using this citizen input to guide problem-
solving efforts. So far, citizens are not serving as “another 
set of eyes and ears,” as the Chief had hoped. 

Implementation of the 3-1-1 call system resulted in a reduction 
of 9-1-1 calls. During the first 12 months that 3-1-1 was in operation, 
9-1-1 calls were reduced by 20 percent, a remarkable reduction 
considering the public safety environment following 9/11. From 
September 2002 through July 2003, 9-1-1 calls were reduced by 
72,000; once data are available for the entire year, we may find that 
9-1-1 calls were reduced by more than 25 percent in the second full 
year of 3-1-1’s existence. (We do note that data from different source 
documents conflict with respect to actual 9-1-1 call loads; different 
reporting periods and reporting methods resulted in different results.) 

Bringing the 9-1-1 call load back down to 1994 levels has allowed 
APD to maintain service standards during peak call loads. As the 
APD Emergency Communications manager states, 3-1-1 has been a 

 

“godsend to Austin” in this era of heightened public 
safety requirements. It is allowing true emergency 
calls to be received by 9-1-1 call takers within the 10-
second period required by their performance goals. 

The 3-1-1 system contributed to a significant 
increase in total calls for service. During the first 
full calendar year that 3-1-1 was in operation, calls 
for service to APD grew by 70 percent, from 854,136 
to 1,445,271 calls. More than 700,000 calls were 
received by the new 3-1-1 center alone. Fifty percent 
of them were from citizens dialing 3-1-1, while the 
other 50 percent were redirected from other phone 
lines to the 3-1-1 switch. This explosion of calls for 
service far exceeds the rate of increase in any of 
the prior 10 years, and is evidence of the success of 
APD’s public education and marketing campaign. 
Some of the increase probably is due to heightened 
public concern and interest in public safety issues 
following 9/11. Citizens have accepted the 3-1-1 
system, and consider it a viable non-emergency 
reporting alternative to 9-1-1. 

Dispatchable calls for service increased. Despite 
the reduction in 9-1-1 calls, APD tracked 23,000 more 
dispatchable calls than in the prior year. Priority One 
and Three calls decreased, but Priority Two and Four 
calls for service increased. Our analysis was unable 
to uncover the source of the increases or to determine 
whether they were associated with the introduction of 
3-1-1. We infer (but cannot prove) that the increase in 
Priority Four calls is related to the overall increase in 
calls attributable to 3-1-1. The CAD system does not 
support analysis of the sources of CAD entries – that 
is, whether they originate with 9-1-1 or 3-1-1 callers. 
Call takers on the 3-1-1 system have the discretion to 
dispatch an officer on any call. Since we do not know 
the nature of 3-1-1 calls, however, we cannot assess 
whether 3-1-1 call takers are simply receiving more 
dispatchable calls than expected or whether they may 
be opting, on occasion, to dispatch as a way of meeting 
time-per-call performance goals. 

Time available for community policing has not 
increased following the introduction of 
3-1-1. Officer surveys showed that after 3-1-1 was 
introduced, officers reported working about the 
same amount of time on problem solving. They 
also reported answering roughly the same number 
of calls for service per shift. Added public safety 
responsibilities associated with homeland security 
appeared to absorb time that otherwise might have 
been available for increasing community policing 
efforts.1 

Citizens report satisfaction with emergency 
communication services in general, and with 3-1-1 
services in particular. Surveys conducted by the City 
and as part of our research show that 94 percent of 
Austin’s citizens are pleased with the 9-1-1 system, 
and 75 percent believe that 3-1-1 has contributed to 
improvements in service. 

Communication between police officers and 
citizens, and between police officers and city 
agencies, does not appear to have changed due to 
the 3-1-1 system. Although 3-1-1 provides citizens 
with a viable way to report non-emergency concerns 
to police, it has not yet allowed them to become 
“another set of eyes and ears” for the police, as 
the APD Chief had hoped. This is probably due in 
large part to the way citizen information is handled. 
APD is not yet collecting, tracking, analyzing, 
and managing information about 3-1-1 calls, so 
opportunities to move in this direction are likely 
being missed. New incoming information is not 
systematically being disseminated to police officers 
or District Representatives. Likewise, APD is not 
systematically communicating citizen-reported 
public safety and quality of life issues to other city 
service agencies. According to discussions with the 
Emergency Communications Director, however, plans 
are underway to begin limited tracking of calls using 
the CRM system. The City Manager is expecting to 
expand 3-1-1 city-wide in the near future. 

Recommendations 

The above findings suggest that APD has successfully 
addressed its most critical issue – migrating non-
emergency calls away from the 9-1-1 system has 
reduced the overall 9-1-1 call load and secured it for 
true emergencies. This accomplishment is especially 
remarkable post-9/11, when call loads were reported 
to have surged nationwide. As we said in the process 
evaluation, APD is to be commended for its focus on 
achieving its primary goal in a timely, cost-effective, 
and customer-oriented manner. 


At the same time, although APD has achieved success 
with this highly visible outcome, it has yet to use 
the full range of capabilities of the call-tracking and 
analysis software to achieve long-term management 
and customer service benefits. The following 
recommendations are intended to suggest how APD 
might expand 3-1-1’s external success to include 
internal management and problem-solving gains. 


Based on the above findings, we make the following 
recommendations:
 
1. Before expanding the system city-wide, 
APD and City executives should confer to 
consider the budget, staffing, and other 
consequences for APD of 3-1-1’s success,  
and project the implications for the City of 
potential future call loads. 

Strategic decisions about the next goals of the 
3-1-1 system need to be carefully evaluated. 
As the Baltimore study2 suggests, police 
departments and cities need to think carefully 
about whether they want to increase or reduce 
calls for service. 

APD’s Chief sought through 3-1-1 to involve 
the community in gathering relevant, useful 
information to use in making policing 
decisions. Some argue that greater citizen 
involvement provides police with “better 
information about the spatial distribution 
of crime and quality of life problems and 
thus a more accurate picture of the locations 
of ongoing problems.”3 Conversely, others 
argue that public education campaigns should 
dissuade citizens from calling police about 
low-level neighborhood problems, in order to 
reserve police resources for the most serious 
law enforcement matters.  

We assert that cities can and should do both 
– encourage citizen interaction with the 
department, while disseminating information 
that citizens can use independently to improve 
their quality of life and mitigate area problems. 
As chronic problems are addressed, call loads 
should theoretically decrease. Regardless 
of which objective is right for a given city, 
however, making a conscious decision 
about the objectives for a 3-1-1 system is 
critical not only to guide its actions, but to 
prevent unintended consequences. Without 
clearly defining its intentions, Austin could 
inadvertently recreate a new workload and 
another call center overload in the future. 

2. Establish a systematic process for reporting 
the number of 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 calls received. 
For operational purposes, APD Emergency 
Communications Managers meticulously 
tracked the number of calls coming into both 
call for service systems. APD Research and 
Planning Division staff needed the tracking 
system for analysis and reporting requirements.
Statistics generated within and across these two 
divisions varied, due to differences in reporting 
periods and data extraction techniques. 
Nevertheless, both sets of numbers were 
publicly available. As with many statistics, 
the specifics of how particular figures were 
generated are often lost as the number is used. 
Understandably, APD’s statistics are generated 
and used for differing purposes, but we suggest 
that APD document the differences between 
how the various statistics for call loads are 
generated in order to maintain credibility and 
to ensure that those who generate and use call 
load statistics fully understand the differences 
and the reasons for them. 

3. Use the full capacity of Customer Relations 
Management (CRM) software systematically 
to track the nature of 3-1-1 calls. With 
deployment of the upgraded CAD and record 
management systems, we anticipate that APD 
will have a much better system for tracking the 
nature of 9-1-1 calls. This information will be 
critical if APD wants to continue to analyze
and manage information about calls for service 
by priority classification. For example, with 
more information about the nature of Priority 
Four calls, APD might be able to manage or 
reduce the number of dispatched “report only” 
calls, freeing more officer time for problem 
solving and other needs. 


Tracking the nature of 3-1-1 calls with the 
CRM system was an early goal set for the 
3-1-1 system. In order for APD to make full 
use of information provided by citizens, that 
information must be recorded. Once recorded, 
it can be used for a variety of purposes, such 
as reducing calls through public education or 
solving quality of life problems with the help 
of police officers and District Representatives.
 
Understanding the nature of 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 
calls is essential to managing them effectively 
and to allocating APD resources. One reason 
APD pursued 3-1-1 was to avoid adding more 
telephone switches and call takers to handle 
growing call loads. Without tracking and 
managing the issues that underlie the call load, 
history may repeat itself – the same problems 
that plagued the 9-1-1 system may soon plague 
3-1-1. Without more complete data, APD also 
runs the risk of limiting its ability to make 
well-grounded policy decisions about how to 
use their resources. 

4. Finally, renew and redirect the public 
education campaign. APD has demonstrated 
how human elements rather than technological 
wizardry are at the heart of improving the 
public safety environment for citizens. The 
department reduced 9-1-1 call loads essentially 
by asking citizens to be more conscientious 
in their use of 9-1-1, and then giving them 
the means to comply. We encourage APD to 
build on this success and to continue to inform 
constituents about 3-1-1 as the non-emergency 
call alternative. Using data collected with the 
CRM system, for example, APD might target 
neighborhoods that under-use the system. 

The 3-1-1 non-emergency call system allows 
citizens to become part of the solution for 
the problem of managing demand for police 
resources. It gives them some discretion about 
whether they need a patrol car dispatched, with 
3-1-1 call takers having seamless access to the 
dispatch system. 

To reduce the need for dispatching officers, 
a targeted public education campaign could 
address recurring crime and quality of life 
issues, identified by using CRM software to 
monitor 3-1-1 call loads. We encourage the 
Department to use the information created 
from collective citizen input to educate the 
community about their problems and to 
involve them in the response. 


End Notes 

1 The relationship between 3-1-1 and time available for community 
policing is unclear. We could not verify time-related data using the CAD 
system data because the system does not track time information in 
a consistent and accessible manner.

2 Mazerolle et al., page 119.

3 Ibid.


About the 
Authors 
Biographies 

Shellie E. Solomon is the former senior financial manager with the Census 
Bureau, and senior manager at the Justice Department. Ms. Solomon has more 
than 12 years experience in operations and management, budgets, strategic 
planning, criminal justice evaluation, and technology. She oversaw budget 
operations for Census 2000 and managed the annual budget of $1.3 billion for the 
COPS Office Grants Division for four years. 

With 21st Century Solutions Inc, Ms. Solomon has served as the on-site project 
director for the community policing evaluations in Fort Lauderdale, FL and 
Miami, FL as well as for the school-based evaluation in Miami, FL. She serves 
as the research associate for the 3-1-1 evaluation in Austin, TX; iris scanning 
as an emerging school technology evaluation in New Egypt, NJ; the lethality 
review in Colorado Spring, CO; and National Assessment of the School Based 
Partnership Program. She is working with U.S. Attorney’s offices on gun 
tracking and safe zone implementation. She has assisted with projects involving 
performance measurement, resource allocation, system implementation, and 
internet applications. 

Ms. Solomon holds degrees from the University of Oklahoma and Rochester 
University and is the recipient of the JustWorks award from the U.S. Department 
of Justice for innovation in government. 

Craig D. Uchida is a former senior executive at the U.S. Department of Justice 
and professor of criminology at the University of Maryland. He has more than 
23 years of experience in criminal justice research, planning, and administration. 
During his years at the Justice Department, he served as the Director of Criminal 
Justice Research at the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and as the Assistant 
Director of Grants Administration at the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS Office). He was responsible for developing and implementing 
the grant-making process, making grant awards, and monitoring. When he left 
the COPS Office he had provided $3.4 billion to over 9,000 law enforcement 
agencies for hiring more than 65,000 officers. His efforts at the COPS Office 
resulted in two major U.S. Department of Justice Awards – the Attorney 
General’s Distinguished Service Award in 1995 and the JustWorks Award for 
innovation in government in 1997. He has published numerous articles and book 
chapters in criminology and is the editor of two books on drug enforcement and 
police innovation. 

Dr. Uchida holds a doctorate in criminal justice and two Master’s degrees. He 
is currently President of Justice and Security Strategies, Inc., a consulting firm 
specializing in crime and public policy and homeland securities policies and 
serves as an adjunct professor at George Mason University’s Administration of 
Justice Program.