Experience with the Review of the Safety Analysis Reports

Marián Krištof Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic

5th International Information Exchange Forum Safety Analysis for NPPs of VVER and RBMK types 16 – 20 October 2000, Obninsk, Russia



Content

- process of NPP licensing, role of the ÚJD SR, legislation, procedures and documentation requested
- Safety Analysis Report purpose, format, structure and content
- review of the SAR focused on chapter 15 (safety analysis), description of the review process
- revision process initial, main, final phase
- content and format of the revision report
- major findings, statistics, internal surveillance



NPP licensing process (in regard to Safety Analysis Report)

- operator's request to operate the nuclear facility
- permission issued by ÚJD SR based on the operator's request documented by (Act 130/98, §15, 2):
 - 4 technical documents for approval (technical specifications, operating program, QA program and internal emergency operating procedures)
 - 11 technical documents for review (among others Preoperational Safety Report)
- periodical reassessment during the plant operation the safety of the installation is evaluated on the regular basis - intervals and scope are defined by ÚJD SR (Act 130/98, §20, 6)
- ÚJD SR evaluates the nuclear safety of the nuclear installations independently from the operator (Act 130/98, §32, 2f)



Safety Analysis Report

- prepared by the operator and submitted to ÚJD SR for review
- most comprehensive information about the nuclear installation describing its behavior during all possible phases (the start-up phase, normal operation, abnormal operation, emergency conditions, refueling, etc.)
- content and format in general according the US NRC RG 1.70, ÚJD SR guides and other international documents
- specific requirements for particular SAR defined in ÚJD SR decisions content, time schedule, additional information
- independent review by ÚJD SR in cooperation with external organizations (domestic and/or international, research institutes, universities, private companies)



Chapter 15 of SAR and its review

- dealing with safety analysis
- content defined by the ÚJD SR guide BNS I.11.1/1995, latest edition from 1999 (only for transients and accidents considered in the reactor design):
 - list of initiating events and their categorization
 - acceptance criteria
 - assumptions for accident analysis (initial conditions, availability and functioning of systems and components, operator actions, modeling assumptions)
 - quality assurance
- revision done by the Department of the Safety Analysis and Technical Support
- neutron kinetics, thermal hydraulic response of the primary and secondary circuit and containment (other parts done by external organizations – structural analysis, radiological analysis, PTS)





- focused on the completeness of the document, fulfillment of the acceptance criteria, use of the appropriate methodology, data correctness
- time available for the revision 2 months



Revision process

- Initial phase
- Main phase
- Final phase

Initial phase

- receipt of the documentation
- formal revision for completeness and correctness
- definition of the working groups and responsibility, distribution, definition of the schedule, intermediate progress meetings, deadline time
- definition of the output (report, format of the report ...)
- contracts for the external cooperation



Main phase

- collection of the information and documents necessary for the revision (technical documentation, blueprints, database, previous reports, independent analysis, site inspection ...)
- first revision of the SAR general, focused on completeness, content, acceptance criteria taken into account, list of initiating events, sources …, partition among the working group members
- draft of the revision report
- second revision of the SAR in depth, independent comparison of technical parameters, codes, nodalization schemes, initial and boundary conditions, steady state parameters, kinetic parameters, material characteristics, safety systems, single failure criterion, operator actions, mathematical models, results
- independent comparison of the calculated results to the previous calculations (SARs, database, ÚJD SR and/or other organizations' calculations …)



- independent calculations selection based on following criteria:
 - availability (codes and input deck we have)
 - most penalizing cases (ideal for every group of initiating events)
 - controversial calculations (disputable assumptions, disputable or unrealistic calculation results, ...)
 - codes: RELAP5, MELCOR, (ATHLET)



Final phase

- report work-out
- comparison of calculations (described in SAR and independent calculations of ÚJD SR)
- internal annotation (within ÚJD SR technical departments)
- finalization and incorporation to the ÚJD SR statement
- shortcomings highlighted, summary of the requested information to be complete, controversial parts to be explain, missing information to be add
- approval/disapproval



Content and format of the revision report

- obligatory parts introduction, objectives and scope of the report
- review of the methodology used in SAR
 - list of initiating events and their categorization
 - acceptance criteria
 - analysis assumptions (initial conditions, availability and functioning of systems and components, single failure criterion, operator actions, modeling assumptions, quality assurance)
- detailed review of each group of the initiating events (except radiological analysis, PTS and Structural analysis)
- conclusions
- Appendix (list of major findings and questions submitted to the utility, independent calculations)



Typical findings

- categorization (frequency calculations)
- acceptance criteria (not taken into account, insufficient/uncertain interpretation)
- classification of the safety vs. control systems
- application of the single failure criterion
- operator actions (inappropriate use, not defined)
- missing, wrong data, deficient description
- degree of the conservatism
- inappropriate use of the computer code or nodalization scheme



Statistics

- Chapter 15 represents in average over 1,000 pages (last one had 1,346 pages)
- 3-4 members of the department involved in revision
- approximately 2 months of work ~ 1,000 man-hours

Internal surveillance

- during the first years of the existence of the department within the SWISSLOVAK project (Swiss inspectorate, ERI) revision of POSAR for Mochovce NPP
- internal annotation within the ÚJD SR technical departments
- revisions done: POSAR for Mochovce NPP, ATWS Accidents included in SAR for V2 Bohunice NPP, SAR for V1 Bohunice NPP after the gradual reconstruction
- existence of the department has a positive feedback on the SAR quality