Chapter 6
The Speaker and the President:
Conflict and Cooperation
R. Eric Petersen
Analyst in American National Government
Congressional Research Service
It is all very well for the President of the United States to suggest
to Congress a forward-looking legislative program. That is one of the
duties of the President. It is a horse of another color to get such a
program accepted by even the President's own party in either House or
Senate . . . To accomplish this result it was necessary for the
President and the Speaker to work in close harmony.\1\
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\1\ Joseph Gurney Cannon, The Memoirs of Joseph Gurney ``Uncle Joe''
Cannon, transcribed by Helen Leseure Abdill (Danville, IL: Vermilion
County Museum Society, 1996), p. 128.
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Joseph G. Cannon, Speaker of the House, 1903-1911
Under the Constitution, Congress and the executive branch are coequal.
While the Constitution does not specify the relationship between the
Speaker of the House and the President of the United States, it has been
the practice in the past century that the Speaker regularly interacts
with the President on a variety of legislative and political matters. In
modern practice, political realities dictate that the Speaker and
President regularly work together as policymaking partners. In that
reality lies the potential for both tension and controversy. As
political scientist Harold Laski wrote, ``the President is at no point
the master of the legislature. He can indicate a path of action to
Congress. He can argue, bully, persuade, cajole; but he is always
outside Congress, and subject to a will he cannot dominate.'' \2\ On the
congressional side, the constitutionally grounded position of equality
is exemplified by Speaker Sam Rayburn. In an ABC news interview near the
end of his life, Speaker Rayburn asserted the constitutional position
between Speaker and President in the five decades he served in the
House. Angered at a reporter's suggestion of subservience to the
President, Rayburn replied, ``I never served under any President. I
served with eight.'' \3\
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\2\ Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, An Interpretation
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1940), p. 13.
\3\ Paul F. Boller, Congressional Anecdotes (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), p. 227, italics in original. See also Joseph Martin, My
Fifty Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 180 and Neil
MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York:
David McKay, Co., 1961), p. 67.
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Much has been written about the Presidents who have served during the
past century, but observers note that comparatively little has been
written about the Speakers. Twenty years ago, then-Speaker Thomas P.
O'Neill suggested that ``there is a great deal more we need to know
about the history of the office and the lives of the men who have been
Speaker.'' \4\ Observers note that an area of inquiry that is poorly
understood is how the Speaker and the President interact as leaders of
their respective branches. In the past century, 17 men have served as
Speaker of the House of Representatives,\5\ while 18 others have been
President of the United States.\6\ As national political leaders, the
Speaker and President undertake a number of similar public functions.
Each leader is in the public eye through speeches, appearances on radio
and television, press conferences, and the print media. The President
and the Speaker each publicize the achievements of their branches. They
also assist their party members seeking election and reelection. When
the majority party in the House is not the same as that of the
President, the Speaker may act as a spokesman for the loyal opposition.
Acts of Congress become law only when signed by the Speaker, presiding
officer of the Senate, and the President. By statute, the Speaker is
second in line, behind the Vice President, to succeed to the
Presidency.\7\
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\4\ Thomas P. O'Neill, Foreword in Donald R. Kennon, The Speakers of the
U.S. House of Representatives: A Bibliography, 1789-1984 (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. xxiii.
\5\ Those who have served in the past 100 years as Speaker of the House,
and their years of service as Speaker, are: Joseph G. Cannon, 1903-1911;
James B. ``Champ'' Clark, 1911-1919; Frederick H. Gillett, 1919-1925;
Nicholas Longworth, 1925-1931; John Nance Garner, 1931-1933; Henry T.
Rainey, 1933-1934; Joseph W. Byrns, 1935-1936; William B. Bankhead,
1936-1940; Sam Rayburn, 1940-1947, 1949-1953, and 1955-1961; Joseph W.
Martin, Jr., 1947-1949, and 1953-1955; John W. McCormack, 1962-1970;
Carl Albert, 1971-1977; Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., 1977-1987; James C.
Wright, Jr., 1987-1989; Thomas S. Foley, 1989-1995; Newt Gingrich, 1995-
1999; and J. Dennis Hastert, 1999- .
\6\ Those who have served in the past 100 years as President of the
United States, and their years in office, are Theodore Roosevelt, 1901-
1909; William Howard Taft, 1909-1913; Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1921; Warren
G. Harding, 1921-1923; Calvin Coolidge, 1923-1929; Herbert C. Hoover,
1929-1933; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933-1945; Harry S Truman, 1945-1953;
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961; John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963; Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963-1969; Richard M. Nixon, 1969-1974; Gerald R. Ford, 1974-
1977; Jimmy Carter, 1977-1981; Ronald W. Reagan, 1981-1989; George H.W.
Bush, 1989-1993; William J. Clinton, 1993-2001; and George W. Bush,
2001- .
\7\ The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 380) provides that
if ``there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of the President, then the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and
as Representative in Congress, act as President.'' To succeed to the
Presidency, a Speaker would also need to qualify under the terms of
Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution, which requires that the
President be a ``natural-born citizen,'' at least 35 years of age, and a
resident within the United States for 14 years. No Speaker has succeeded
to the Presidency under these conditions. The 1947 law superseded the
Succession Act of 1886 (24 Stat. 1), which placed in the line of
Presidential succession after the Vice President the Cabinet officers in
the chronological order in which their departments were created.
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While the activities of these two leaders may often be similar,
relations between the Speaker and the President are complex and
influenced by a number of factors. Their relationships are influenced by
the Constitution, policy necessities, perceived prerogatives of the
executive and legislative branches, world events, domestic politics, and
their personalities and governing styles. At different times, these
factors have the potential to create divergent personal, political, and
institutional consequences. Understandably, the relationship between the
two officials has been marked by periods of both conflict and
cooperation. On occasion, the relationship between the Speaker and the
President attracts widespread public notice due to an isolated incident
that comes to the attention of the public. In spring 1991, for example,
President George H.W. Bush came to the Capitol to deliver an address to
a joint session of Congress regarding the role of the U.S. military in
operations leading to the liberation of Kuwait. Departing from the
typical protocol of these occasions, Speaker Thomas Foley said:
Mr. President, it is customary in joint sessions for the Chair to
present the President to the Members of Congress directly and without
further comment. But I wish to depart from tradition tonight and express
to you, on behalf of the Congress and the country, and, through you, to
the members of our Armed Forces our warmest congratulations on the
brilliant victory of the Desert Storm Operation.\8\
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\8\ Speaker Thomas Foley, ``Joint Session of the House and Senate Held
Pursuant to the Provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 83 to Hear an
Address by the President of the United States,'' remarks in the House,
Congressional Record, vol. 137, Mar. 6, 1991, p. 5140.
Although Speakers may support Presidential actions, there also have
been important instances of institutional, political, and even personal
conflict between the two leaders over the past century. Seemingly
isolated or trivial events may upset the relationship between the
Speaker and the President in a much greater fashion than the incident
appeared to warrant at the time. Noteworthy among such incidents are the
following:
In fall 1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich and other Members of
Congress were reportedly angry with President Bill Clinton over his
treatment of congressional leaders during a diplomatic trip. Gingrich
and Clinton had traveled together on Air Force One with a delegation of
current and former U.S. officials to attend the funeral of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had been assassinated. Before the trip,
congressional leaders were negotiating with President Clinton to set
spending levels for the Federal Government, but the leaders held no
talks regarding the budget during the flights between Washington, DC,
and Tel Aviv. On arrival in Israel, the President exited Air Force One
through the main door. The Speaker was reportedly angered that he and
other officials, including Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, and
former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Jimmy Carter, were asked to
disembark through the plane's rear door.\9\
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\9\ John E. Yang and Eric Pianin, ``Interim Measures Advance in House;
Spending, Debt Bills Include Provisions Strongly Opposed by Clinton,''
Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1995, p. A4; Todd S. Purdue, ``November 5-11:
on Air Force One, Cabin Fever,'' New York Times, Nov. 12, 1995, p. 4;
and Newt Gingrich, Lessons Learned the Hard Way: A Personal Report (New
York: Harper Collins, 1998), pp. 42-46.
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The evening before President Jimmy Carter's inauguration in
1977, a gala was held at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing
Arts. Speaker O'Neill and his wife were to be seated with the President-
elect and Mrs. Carter. Speaker O'Neill requested an additional dozen
tickets for friends and members of his family, and White House staff
reportedly assured him that his guests would be seated near the stage in
an area reserved for Members of Congress. In his autobiography, Speaker
O'Neill described searching the audience for his relatives and friends.
After the program, he was reunited with them and told that their seats
were in the last row of the second balcony. On Inauguration Day, Speaker
O'Neill, concerned about the tone the incident set between Congress and
the White House, reportedly telephoned a senior Carter adviser to relate
his displeasure. In a short time, the new President's adviser appeared
in the Speaker's office to apologize in person and assure the Speaker
that the seating arrangements were the result of a mistake. In his
autobiography, Speaker O'Neill indicated that he had doubts about the
sincerity of the apology, saying that as far as he could see, the aide
appeared to regard ``a House Speaker as something you bought on sale at
Radio Shack. I could see that this was just the beginning of my problems
with these guys.'' \10\
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\10\ Tip O'Neill with William Novak, Man of the House: The Life and
Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O'Neill (New York: Random House, 1987),
pp. 310-311. See also John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the
Democratic Century (New York: Little, Brown, 2001), pp. 450-453.
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During President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, dinners
were held to honor the Cabinet, diplomatic corps and members of the
Supreme Court. An invitation to these affairs was routinely extended to
Speaker Joseph Cannon, who usually declined, often at the last minute,
because he objected to seating arrangements that did not recognize his
position in government. For the 1905 Supreme Court dinner, Cannon
reportedly learned he was to be seated below the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court at the banquet table. On the basis of his position as
Speaker, Cannon thought it more appropriate to be seated next in line to
the Chief Justice of the United Sates and the Vice President, with the
Associate Justices, who were among the honored guests, seated after him.
In a letter to President Roosevelt, Speaker Cannon reportedly wrote that
``even if `a wooden Indian' were Speaker of the House, he would deserve
that courtesy.'' Shortly thereafter, President Roosevelt instituted a
dinner to honor the Speaker, and to invite no one in government who
might be seated more prominently than the guest of honor.\11\
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\11\ See William Rea Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of the Insurgency:
A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1957), pp. 79-80; and Irwin Hood Hoover, Forty-Two Years at
the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 2992-2993. In his
memoirs, Speaker Cannon remembered a Presidential dinner given to honor
the diplomatic corps. Due to a scheduling conflict, the Speaker asked
the President's leave not to attend. Alluding to the importance placed
on such matters by other Members of the House, and precedent established
by Speaker Thomas Reed, who reportedly would not attend functions when
other government officials might outrank him, Cannon suggested that he
and Roosevelt discuss the matter and seek the assistance of the State
Department's protocol experts. The outcome of these discussions was the
Speaker's dinner. See Joseph Gurney Cannon, The Memoirs, pp. 123-124.
While the dinners for the Speaker continued after Roosevelt left office,
their efficacy was somewhat diminished. President William Howard Taft
continued the tradition of honoring the Speaker with an annual dinner,
and was accused of associating himself too closely with what some
observers thought was Cannon's autocratic style of overseeing the House.
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Despite periodic conflicts between the two leaders, the Speaker and
President must work together if policy proposals are to be enacted into
law. As Speaker Joseph Cannon stated, ``a President without both houses
of Congress back of him doesn't amount to much more than a cat without
claws . . .'' \12\ To better understand the relationship between a
Speaker and President, this chapter describes how two Speakers, Joseph
Gurney Cannon, and Sam Rayburn, and two Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt
and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, interacted on the national stage. The two
pairs of leaders were chosen for pragmatic and practical purposes. The
election of Representative Cannon as Speaker marked the high point of
the autocratic speakership. Representative Rayburn's career in Congress
spanned 48 years, and the administrations of 8 Presidents, with Rayburn
serving as Speaker during periods in which the House and speakership
were vastly changed from Cannon's time.
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\12\ ``Wise Sayings that Made Joe Cannon the Sage of His Party,''
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 13, 1926, p. 4.
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A review of the Speaker-President relationship during two contrasting
periods underscores the importance of political context, leadership, and
working relationships between leaders in shaping policy outcomes. The
first examines how President Theodore Roosevelt had to deal with Speaker
Cannon's ``command and control'' leadership of the House. As Speaker,
Cannon dominated the Chamber and all its committees. He often worked to
block Roosevelt's initiatives, which contributed to the revolt against
him by progressive Republicans and minority Democrats. By comparison,
Speaker Rayburn led a committee-centered institution where southern
committee chairs exercised large sway over the fate of Presidential
proposals. Rayburn employed a pragmatic leadership style of bargaining,
employing political and personal cajolery to win legislative victories
for President Franklin Roosevelt.
Conflict Between Leaders: Joseph Cannon and Theodore Roosevelt
By fall 1902, several weeks before the adjournment of the 57th
Congress (1901-1903), members of President Theodore Roosevelt's
administration concluded that Representative Joseph Gurney Cannon of
Illinois, then-chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, would be
elected Speaker at the commencement of the 58th Congress (1903-1905).
The two men knew each other from the periods when Roosevelt served at
various times as Civil Service Commissioner, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, and Vice President of the United States under William McKinley.
During Roosevelt's time with the Civil Service Commission, for example,
the agency had its budget cut by the House Committee on
Appropriations.\13\ For his part, Cannon said that his impressions of
Roosevelt from these earlier contacts were not positive.\14\ This
unfavorable opinion appears to have grown out of the two leaders'
divergent governing and political philosophies.
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\13\ Scott William Rager, The Fall of the House of Cannon: Uncle Joe and
His Enemies, 1903-1910 (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 1991), pp. 34-49.
\14\ Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 127.
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Roosevelt believed that the government should be the great arbiter of
the conflicting economic forces in the Nation, especially between
capital and labor, guaranteeing justice to each and dispensing favors to
none. By contrast, Speaker Cannon's world view was developed by his
early experiences as a self-made man, who had started adult life as a
store clerk. Cannon described how his life's experience had impressed
him ``with the value of conservatism, and warned me against advocating
`change for change's sake.' The span of 30 years in Congress, before I
became Speaker, had borne in upon me the dangers that lay in catch
phrases, and popular slogans, and the difficulty of transforming
reforming ideals into legislation that could be got through the Congress
of the United States in recognizable form, and that would work after it
became law.'' \15\
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\15\ Ibid., p. 128.
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In spite of such widely divergent views, it is noteworthy that both
leaders made a generally successful effort to work together. With
Cannon's ascendance to the Speaker's chair all but assured, members of
Roosevelt's Cabinet conveyed congratulations to the incoming Speaker.
Included in the congratulations were assurances that the President and
his Cabinet understood that, regarding Roosevelt's policies, ``nothing
could be done unless there was a `very general consent in Congress.' ''
\16\ President Roosevelt personally took steps to cultivate an improved
relationship with Cannon. In August 1903, Roosevelt met with several
Senate leaders in his summer home in Oyster Bay, NY, to discuss proposed
currency and financial legislation.\17\ When the meetings were finished,
the President wrote to Cannon to assure him that no financial plan would
be proposed without first taking into account the views of the House.
After summarizing his discussions with the Senators, the President asked
Cannon, ``Now what are your views on the subject? We are all decided
that of course we would not make up our minds in any way until we found
out what your judgement was.'' \18\ Cannon reportedly responded that,
with a Presidential election to be held in 1904, he saw little benefit
from considering financial legislation.
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\16\ Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 74.
\17\ The legislative proposal considered at the Oyster Bay meeting was
the Aldrich bill, after Senator Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich of Rhode Island.
The proposal would have authorized the use of customs receipts and
nongovernmental securities as the basis for the issuance of currency.
\18\ Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 74-77.
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In November 1903, a month before the legislature was scheduled to
convene, President Roosevelt called the 58th Congress into special
session to consider Cuban reciprocity, but not financial issues.\19\
With the speakership vacant, however, House rules dictated that the
first order of business was the election of Joseph Cannon as the new
Speaker. On assuming the post, Cannon and Roosevelt worked to build an
effective working relationship. Throughout their time as leaders,
Roosevelt and Cannon met regularly to discuss measures that Congress was
to consider. President Roosevelt wrote informally to the Speaker
regarding matters before the House. The material in these missives could
be used by the Speaker as he saw fit to persuade other Members regarding
the President's positions.\20\ In his autobiography, Speaker Cannon
noted that, during the time he was Speaker and Roosevelt was the
President, ``Mr Roosevelt and I were on terms of full and free
consultation. I went often to the White House in the evening, and the
President came to my house at times to talk things over. When we
differed, in principle or method, we were frank about it, and threshed
the problem out to the end.'' \21\
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\19\ No legislation was passed during the special session, because the
Senate was unable to reach agreement on its own measure, and did not
adopt the version passed by the House.
\20\ Under the rules of the House, formal written communications from
the President of the United States to the Speaker of the House would be
referred to the appropriate committee.
\21\ Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 131.
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For Roosevelt, Cannon was the spokesman for a majority of the House
and a sounding board for the activist President. Roosevelt reportedly
conferred with the Speaker regarding all of his serious legislative
initiatives before making them public. Other notes reassured the Speaker
that the President would work with him despite publication in newspapers
of claims to the contrary. In one note to Cannon, who had returned to
his Illinois district between sessions, Roosevelt implored the Speaker
to visit the White House on his return to Washington, and dismissed
press speculation regarding differences between the two:
Stop in here as soon as you can. I care very little for what the
newspapers get in the way of passing sensationalism; but I do not want
the people of the country to get the idea that there will be any split
or clash between you and me . . .\22\
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\22\ Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Joseph Cannon, Jan. 13, 1905, in
Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), vol. 4, p. 1101.
While Roosevelt and Cannon were mostly able to look past public
speculation regarding their political relationship and work together,
the Speaker took care that the President was not given free rein by the
House. Cannon recognized that when a forceful, activist chief executive
was in office, the legislature could sometimes be led by the executive.
The Speaker's position was that while executive leadership was likely,
the House must not be driven by a President, and that ``Roosevelt was
apt to try to drive'' it.\23\ Consequently Cannon's task was to move the
President's programs forward in a House where some members had deep
reservations regarding the President's progressive inclinations.
Personally, Speaker Cannon, too, viewed certain Roosevelt policies with
dismay. Their disagreements, Cannon suggested, occurred because
``Roosevelt had the ambition to do things; I had the more confined
outlook of the legislator who had to consider ways of meeting
expenditures of the new departures and expansions in government.'' \24\
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\23\ Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 129.
\24\ L. White Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon: The Story of a Pioneer American,
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927, republished 1970), pp. 217-218.
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A discussion regarding the President's 1905 annual message to Congress
illustrates the different outlooks of the two leaders. In preparing the
message, Roosevelt enquired of congressional leaders as to the
possibility of revising the tariff. Based on those discussions,
Roosevelt sent Cannon, who was at his home in Danville, IL, a draft of
what he would say. The draft statement included a proposal that Congress
create a minimum and maximum scale for setting tariffs that could be put
into force at the discretion of the Executive. Cannon viewed this
proposal as a power grab by the White House. On returning to Washington,
Cannon and Roosevelt discussed the matter further. In the course of
these discussions, which Cannon described as ``very frank,'' the Speaker
suggested that tariff legislation not be concluded during the lame duck
session of the 58th Congress.\25\ When the President's message arrived
on Capitol Hill, it included legislative proposals to expand the
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix railroad rates, a
number of measures related to the District of Columbia, the creation of
a forest service in the Department of Agriculture, and several other
proposals. There was no mention of tariff revision.\26\ Tariff policies,
would, however, remain an issue between the two leaders throughout
Roosevelt's tenure as President.
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\25\ Ibid., pp. 207-209; and Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 91-92.
\26\ See Theodore Roosevelt, ``Fourth Annual Message to the Senate and
House of Representatives,'' Dec. 6, 1904, in James D. Richardson, comp.,
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols.
(New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897-1911), vol. XIV, pp.
6894-6930.
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The collaboration between the Speaker and the President produced
success for the President's legislative program, ``. . . modified in
practical ways by individuals and committees of the House and Senate . .
.'' \27\ During the 58th and 59th Congresses (1903-1907), Congress
enacted changes to the railroad rates, the creation of the Bureau of
Corporations in the newly established Department of Commerce and Labor,
meat inspection laws, and other measures. The success of Roosevelt's
legislative program was strongly determined by his ongoing consultation
and cordial relations with Speaker Cannon.
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\27\ Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 130.
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Of course, some difficulties did develop during this period, due to
political differences between the two men. The establishment of a forest
service within the Department of Agriculture and the creation of
national forests in the southern Appalachians and the White Mountains of
New Hampshire were initiatives that caused personal tension between a
conservationist President and a Speaker who, while Appropriations
Committee chairman, would consider ``not one cent for scenery.'' \28\
Personal and institutional tensions between the leaders and branches
were also exacerbated during frequent considerations of tariff policy
throughout Roosevelt's time as President.
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\28\ Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt Brace,
1947), pp. 203-212, 242-243; quote found on p. 243.
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On balance, the working relation between the two leaders appears
productive. The wear and tear of conflict and compromise, however, may
have contributed to a serious rift between the two men regarding the
Secret Service. By statute, the agency's role was to detect the
counterfeiting of currency. Since the assassination of President William
McKinley in 1901, the Secret Service had also unofficially assumed
responsibility for Presidential protection. For several years the agency
had exceeded its statutory mandate by spending some of its
appropriation, which was intended to fund anticounterfeiting laws, on
Presidential security and investigations.
In 1908, the House Committee on Appropriations amended the Sundry
Civil Appropriation bill to institute restrictions on employment in the
Secret Service as a way to curb its activities. The measure was
subsequently passed by both Chambers and signed into law by Roosevelt.
Later that year, the chief of the Secret Service requested that all
limitations on the $125,000 appropriation provided to the agency be
lifted to allow him and the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate funds
as they saw fit. The House Committee on Appropriations declined to
remove the limitation.\29\
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\29\ Rager, The Fall of the House of Cannon, pp. 47-48.
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President Roosevelt's response to the committee's action was to appeal
directly to Speaker Cannon. In another personal message arguing that the
provisions regarding the employment of Secret Service agents would
``work very great damage to the government in its endeavor to prevent
and punish crime,'' \30\ Roosevelt suggested that only criminals need
fear the proposed changes. Before Speaker Cannon could solicit the
thoughts of House Members, or respond to Roosevelt's personal message,
the President's annual message arrived on Capitol Hill. In a departure
from previous practice, Speaker Cannon reported that he had neither been
consulted, nor seen a draft of the document before the message was
officially presented. Cannon described himself ``as much surprised as
any one when it was found that this Message contained an assault upon
Congress, and especially upon the House of Representatives,'' due to the
limitations on the activities of the Secret Service.\31\
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\30\ Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 231.
\31\ Ibid., pp. 231-232.
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The President's message included a passage referring to the issue of
the limitations imposed on the Secret Service. Regarding that matter,
Roosevelt wrote, in part:
Last year an amendment was incorporated in the measure providing for
the Secret Service, which provided that there be no detail from the
Secret Service and no transfer therefrom. It is not too much to say that
this amendment has been of benefit only, and could be of benefit only,
to the criminal classes . . . The chief argument in favor of the
provision was that the Congressmen did not themselves wish to be
investigated by Secret Service men. Very little of such investigation
has been done in the past; but it is true that the work of the Secret
Service agents was partially responsible for the indictment and
conviction of a Senator and Congressman for land frauds in Oregon. I do
not believe that it is in the public interest to protect criminally
[sic] in any branch of the public service, and exactly as we have again
and again during the past seven years prosecuted and convicted such
criminals who were in the executive branch of the Government, so in my
belief we should be given ample means to prosecute them if found in the
legislative branch. But if this is not considered desirable a special
exception could be made in the law prohibiting the use of the Secret
Service force in investigating Members of the Congress.\32\
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\32\ Theodore Roosevelt, ``Eighth Annual Message to the Senate and House
of Representatives,'' Dec. 8, 1908, in Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, vol. XVI, pp. 7198-7240; quote found on pp. 7225-7226.
The House responded to this message with what Speaker Cannon described
as indignation. On December 9, 1908, Representative James Breck Perkins,
a friend of Roosevelt's and fellow Republican from New York, introduced
H. Res. 451 (60th Congress) to authorize the Speaker to appoint a
special committee to consider what action the Chamber should take in
response to Roosevelt's message. In introducing the measure,
Representative Perkins said ``to the Congress is granted great power.
And upon it are imposed great responsibilities. We can not neglect our
duties nor shirk our responsibilities. The dignity of that body . . .
should be properly maintained. The statements made by the President of
the United States can not be lightly disregarded . . .'' \33\
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\33\ Representative James Breck Perkins, ``Question of Privilege,''
remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 43, Dec. 11, 1908, p.
140.
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Cannon supported the special committee to appease House Members who
wished to immediately introduce a measure to censure the President.
After a week of deliberation, the committee, on December 17, was
prepared to report a measure to the House when it convened at noon. As
Speaker Cannon was about to assume the chair and call the House to
order, he received word from the President that he was to come to the
White House for a consultation with the President. Upon being told that
the Speaker was in the hall of the House, the President reportedly
directed that the message be delivered to the Speaker personally, and
that the consultation be held before the House considered the report of
the special committee. Speaker Cannon indicated that:
. . . when the Secretary to the Speaker brought the message to the
Chair, Mr. Perkins was on his feet demanding recognition to present his
report . . . I held the gavel in the air for a moment as my secretary
delivered the President's telephone message, which was probably the only
one of its kind ever sent by the President to the Speaker of the House.
I was indignant, but the business in hand saved me from making any
comment. I simply brought down the gavel and recognized Mr. Perkins.
Then I told my secretary to telephone the President's secretary just
what had occurred and to say that the Speaker would be pleased to call
upon the President as soon as the report of the committee was disposed
of.\34\
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\34\ Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 235-236.
The special committee unanimously reported a resolution that the
President be requested to provide any evidence upon which he based his
claims, including: (1) that Members of Congress did not wish to be
investigated by the Secret Service; (2) any evidence connecting any
Member of the current Congress to criminal activity; and (3) whether the
President had referred any Member to the courts for trial or reported
any illicit behavior by Members to the House of Representatives.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Representative James Breck Perkins, ``The Secret Service--
President's Annual Message,'' remarks in the House, Congressional
Record, vol. 43, Dec. 17, 1908, p. 373.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The resolution was adopted by the House on December 17, 1908, and
forwarded to the President. On January 4, 1909, the President responded
with a special message, the contents of which Cannon described as ``more
offensive than the one to which the House had taken exception.'' \36\
Roosevelt's message included references to a newspaper article written
by a reporter who was currently serving as Speaker Cannon's personal
secretary. Again, the reaction of the House was to interpret the
President's response as an attack on a coequal branch of government. In
addition, some Members considered the inclusion of work done by the
Speaker's secretary before he was employed by the government as a veiled
broadside at the Speaker himself. In due course, the newspaper article
was referred to the special committee established to respond to the
first report. After three days of deliberation, the committee reported
back, recommending that the House table the message from the President.
After extensive debate, the House voted 212 to 36 to accept the
committee's tabling proposal, and the President's message received no
further consideration by the House.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 239.
\37\ ``Annual Message of the President--Secret Service,'' Congressional
Record, vol. 43, Jan. 8, 1909, pp. 645-684. See also Rager, ``The Fall
of the House of Cannon,'' pp. 47-49.
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Tabling an item in the House constitutes the immediate, final, and
adverse disposition of a matter under consideration. At the time of the
controversy between Roosevelt and the House, messages from the President
and other executive branch communications were usually received by the
House, and referred to the appropriate committee for consideration. As
these communications were suggestive, and did not compel Congress to
take specific action, the committee referral signified the effective end
of congressional consideration. When the House went to the effort of
introducing, debating, and voting on a motion to table the President's
message, it signaled its symbolic refusal to accept the message. This
was and is a rare occurrence. Before Roosevelt's Secret Service
controversy, the House had not taken steps to refuse a Presidential
message since the administration of President Andrew Jackson, more than
70 years earlier. A few weeks later, Roosevelt's term ended. Cannon
continued as Speaker in the 61st Congress, and proceeded to forge a
relationship with the new President, William Howard Taft.
Cooperation Between Leaders: Sam Rayburn and Franklin D. Roosevelt
When Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas was elected Speaker on
September 16, 1940, following the death of Speaker William B. Bankhead,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt [FDR] was completing his second term as
President. Like Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph Cannon, Rayburn and FDR
had previous interactions, although Rayburn had come to view FDR more
positively than Cannon saw Theodore Roosevelt. During FDR's first term,
Rayburn had been chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce. Many of FDR's New Deal proposals were referred to the Rayburn-
led panel, including measures which became the Securities Act of 1933;
Home Owners Loan Act; Banking Act of 1933; National Industrial Recovery
Act; Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and Communications Act of 1934.\38\ Further, Rayburn, who
was majority leader during the 75th and 76th Congresses (1937-1940),
regularly served as Speaker pro tempore because of Bankhead's ill
health, and worked with FDR on a number of legislative issues, including
the President's unsuccessful effort to change the number of justices on
the Supreme Court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Booth Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn: A Political Partnership
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 45-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite general political agreement between the President and
congressional leaders during FDR's terms, Rayburn and Speaker Bankhead
were often unaware of the President's intentions regarding policy and
legislative proposals. Legislative initiatives, such as FDR's proposals
to enlarge the Supreme Court, and the contents of the President's 1937
annual message to Congress, were unknown to the House leaders until they
were delivered to the Chamber.\39\ Often, Speaker Bankhead would be
embarrassed when he made a statement to the media, only to find that the
President had already issued a message contradicting the Speaker. In one
instance when this occurred, Rayburn told Jimmy Roosevelt, the
President's son and liaison to Congress, to ``tell your father if I'm
ever Speaker this kind of thing won't happen to me more than once.''
\40\ Rayburn reportedly believed that FDR would have more success with
his legislative initiatives if communications were better between the
White House and Capitol Hill. To address this problem, Rayburn set out
to establish regular meetings between FDR and congressional leaders. He
told Tommy Corcoran, a lobbyist with access to the White House that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ``Basic Law Change Gains in Congress,'' New York Times, Jan. 8,
1937, p. 1. For a discussion of Speaker Bankhead's interactions with
FDR, see William J. Heacock, ``William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,''
Journal of Southern History, vol. 21, Aug. 1956, pp. 354-358.
\40\ Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn
Books, 1975), p. 140.
the President ought to be having a meeting every week with his House and
Senate Leaders so we could tell him what we're planning, and he could
tell us his plans. It could eliminate a lot of confusion. See what you
could do--but don't you dare let him know I suggested it 'cause he
thinks he ``borned'' every idea that ever was.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ D.B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin,
TX: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), p. 227.
At a subsequent White House meeting, FDR informed Rayburn that he had
been thinking that ``maybe it would be a good idea if I had a meeting
with Bill . . .'' (Speaker Bankhead), Rayburn, Vice President John Nance
Garner,\42\ and Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, who was majority
leader of the Senate. Roosevelt proposed that the leaders could meet
about once a week to discuss and coordinate planning. Rayburn replied
that the suggestion was one of the smartest ideas that he had ever
heard.\43\
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\42\ John Nance Garner of Texas, had been Speaker of the House in the
72d Congress (1931-1933).
\43\ Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, p. 227.
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By the time Rayburn became Speaker, he and FDR had worked out their
communications issues and were beginning to turn to legislative and
policy matters. With war raging in Europe and Japan engaging in
aggression in Asia, both leaders recognized that defense and
preparedness issues would consume much of their time in the coming
months. Rayburn believed strongly that the American system of government
was best served by a strong, independent legislature. While the new
Speaker liked and admired FDR, he was determined not to yield to the
executive branch any constitutional prerogatives granted to the
Congress.\44\ At the same time, Rayburn understood that, in times of
national jeopardy, the country needed to be led by the President. ``When
the nation is in danger,'' Rayburn believed, ``you have to follow your
leader. The man in the White House is the only leader this nation has .
. . Although we may disagree with him, we must follow our president in
times of peril . . .'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Ibid., p. 245.
\45\ Ibid., p. 101.
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Global events soon gave Rayburn the opportunity to act on his beliefs.
On January 6, 1941, Speaker Rayburn's 59th birthday, President Roosevelt
addressed a joint session of Congress to deliver his Annual Message to
the Congress. Around the world, the forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan
had engaged in invasions and other aggression. In Europe, France had
fallen in 1940, and as Roosevelt stood before Congress, the United
Kingdom was enduring regular attacks by the Nazi air force. In the
course of the speech, FDR warned of the possibility that the United
States could find itself involved in the conflict.\46\ The President
specifically requested authority from Congress to produce munitions and
other war supplies that could be provided to countries that were at war
with Germany, Italy and Japan, and whose defense was considered vital to
the defense of the United States. This aid was to be directed primarily
to the United Kingdom, but other countries would also be eligible for
assistance. As these countries were unlikely to be able to pay for these
materials, FDR also proposed funding their acquisition of ships, planes,
tanks, and guns, through a program that would become popularly known as
Lend-Lease.\47\
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\46\ Franklin D. Roosevelt, ``The Annual Message to the Congress, Jan.
6, 1941,'' in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938-
1950), vol. 3, pp. 663-678.
\47\ Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, pp. 166-167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 10, 1941, the President sent to Congress the first of
several measures designed to move the Nation forward in war preparation.
At Rayburn's behest, Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts, who
served as majority leader,\48\ introduced the lend-lease measure, which
was deliberately assigned the number H.R. 1776. The measure provided the
President with the authority to transfer title to, exchange, lease,
lend, or otherwise dispose of any defense article to any government
whose defense the President deemed vital to the defense of the United
States. The proposal called for $7 billion to fund the provision of war
materials to nations that could not afford to pay. Under the proposal,
the President would be the sole authority to decide which countries
would receive military assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ McCormack later served as Speaker during the 87th through 91st
Congresses (1961-1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opponents of lend-lease expressed concern that the measure, if passed,
would invest too much power in the President. These concerns focused on
what appeared to some to be a Presidential request for a ``blank check''
which could be used with little congressional oversight. Others saw the
measure as an outright abandonment by Congress of its power to declare
war, allowing it to be transferred to the President so he could draw the
United States into the global conflict.\49\ For his part, Speaker
Rayburn publicly supported granting the President wide latitude in
carrying out the lend-lease program. ``If we are to aid the
democracies,'' Rayburn said, ``Congress must enact a law giving the
power to somebody to administer the law. There could be no one man in
this country as well qualified to administer it as the President.''
Rayburn also discussed the possible consequence of failing to provide
the President with the proposed authority, saying ``either we give the
President the flexible powers necessary to help Britain, or by our
inaction, we strengthen Hitler's power to conquer Britain and attack
us.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, pp. 159-162.
\50\ Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, pp. 257-258.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Privately, however, Rayburn communicated to the President the concerns
of Members, and informed the President that the bill was dead without
changes. At FDR's urging, Rayburn led efforts in the House to craft a
compromise that addressed the concerns of the House. Working with the
President, Representative Sol Bloom, chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and other committee members, Rayburn was able to
negotiate amendments that preserved the basic outline of FDR's proposal
while addressing the concerns that the measure would represent too large
a grant of power to the executive. These included a prohibition on
American shipping convoys transporting war materials, a requirement that
the President report three times a month to Congress regarding the
program's progress, and a 2-year limit on the program. In addition, the
$7 billion the President requested would have to go through scrutiny of
the regular appropriations process.
On the floor, where debate began February 3, Speaker Rayburn, Majority
Leader McCormack, and Chairman Bloom managed the progress of the lend-
lease measure through 5 days of debate. Several Members who were opposed
to the proposal offered amendments designed to scuttle the legislation.
Many of these were declared nongermane by the chair. The House rejected
19 amendments before passing H.R. 1776 by a vote of 260 to 165.\51\ One
month later, the Senate passed lend-lease with minor amendments. Rayburn
convened the House soon thereafter, and, with little debate, the Chamber
accepted the changes. An hour after the House gave final approval, the
measure was signed into law by President Roosevelt.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Transcripts of the consideration of H.R. 1776 in the House can be
found in the Congressional Record, vol. 87, Feb. 3-7, 1941, pp. 484-519,
522-568, 573-678, 710-749, and 753-815.
\52\ 55 Stat. 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout 1941, Congress worked with the President to develop the
Nation's capacity to defend itself and its allies. In one significant
action, Congress approved an administration-backed measure to
reauthorize the draft, and extend the time of enlistment for draftee
soldiers under the Selective Service Act from 1 year to 30 months.
Rayburn was opposed to the extension when it was first proposed. After
meeting with the President, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Army
Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, the Speaker reluctantly
conceded the necessity of the extension, and agreed to advance the
measure in the House. The Speaker faced a House that was very reluctant
to extend the mandatory period of military enlistment. In addition to
the efforts of the whip organization run by Representative Pat Boland,
Rayburn personally approached several Members for their support, telling
them to ``do this for me. I won't forget it.'' \53\ One Member
reportedly said that the Speaker was quite successful at the effort:
``Mr. Sam is terribly convincing . . . There he stands his left hand on
your right shoulder, holding your coat button, looking at you out of
honest eyes that reflect the sincerest emotion.'' Rayburn's effort
proved indispensable as the House ultimately approved the draft
extension by 1 vote, 203 to 202.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Alvin M. Josephy, On the Hill: A History of the American Congress
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 334.
\54\ Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, p. 170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As 1941, and the 1st session of the 77th Congress drew to a close,
Rayburn and FDR collaborated once again on a national defense measure.
For several months, German submarines and surface ships had been
attacking American merchant ships. The Roosevelt administration wanted
to repeal sections of the Neutrality Resolution, passed by the 74th
Congress in 1935,\55\ to permit the arming of American merchant ships,
and to authorize those ships to enter combat zones and the ports of
belligerent nations. In response, the House passed a bill that
authorized the arming of merchant ships, but did not permit their entry
into belligerent ports. In the Senate, amendments were added that
allowed the President to send the ships to any port in the world. The
Senate-passed version of the bill also authorized the President to order
merchant ships to defend themselves against attack. The Senate version
was returned to the House for review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ 50 Stat. 1081.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following a day of debate on the Senate amendments, Rayburn's vote
count showed that the merchant ships bill would be defeated. Rayburn and
Majority Leader McCormack met with FDR to work out a strategy to win
House acceptance of the Senate amendments. The three leaders agreed that
the Speaker would provide a written letter summarizing the concerns of
House Members, and that the President would provide a written reply.
When the House resumed the debate on the Senate amendments. Rayburn
monitored the debate throughout the day. With 11 minutes of debate on
the Senate amendments remaining, Rayburn descended from the chair to
speak from the well of the House regarding his views and the position of
President Roosevelt:
A great deal has been said about the position of the President. Does
the President want these amendments? Does he advocate them? . . . Last
evening late the gentleman from Massachusetts \56\ and I addressed the
following letter to the President of the United States:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Majority Leader McCormack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A number of Members have asked us what effect the failure on the part
of the House to take favorable action on the Senate amendments would
have on our position in foreign countries, and especially in Germany.
Some of these Members have stated that they hoped you would make a
direct expression on this matter.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Representative Sam Rayburn, ``Amending the Neutrality Act,''
remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 87, Nov. 13, 1941, pp.
8890-8891.
Rayburn then read to the House the letter from FDR that he and
Majority Leader McCormack had worked out with the President the previous
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
evening. The President's letter said in part:
I had no thought of expressing to the House my views to the effect, in
foreign countries, and especially in Germany, of favorable or
unfavorable action on the Senate amendments.
But in view of your letter, I am replying as simply and clearly as I
know how . . .
. . . In regard to the repeal of sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality
Act, I need only call your attention to three elements. The first
concerns the continued sinking of American-flag ships in many parts of
the ocean. The second relates to great operational advantages in making
continuous voyages to any belligerent port in any part of the world;
thus, in all probability increasing the total percentage of goods--
foodstuffs and munitions--actually delivered to those nations fighting
Hitlerism. The third is the decision by the Congress and the Executive
that this Nation, for its own present and future defense, must
strengthen the supply line to all of those who are keeping Hitlerism far
from the Americas.
With all of this in mind, the world is obviously watching the course
of this legislation.
In the British Empire, in China, and in Russia--all of whom are
fighting a defensive war against invasion--the effect of the failure of
the Congress to repeal sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act would
definitely be discouraging. I am confident that it would not destroy
their defense or morale, though it would weaken their position from the
point of view of food and munitions.
Failure to repeal these sections would, of course, cause rejoicing in
the Axis nations. Failure would bolster aggressive steps and intentions
in Germany, and in the other well-known aggressor nations under the
leadership of Hitler.
Our own position in the struggle against aggression would definitely
be weakened, not only in Europe and in Asia, but also among our sister
republics in the Americas. Foreign nations, friends and enemies, would
misinterpret our own mind and purpose . . . \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Ibid., pp. 8890-8891.
Reading the President's letter consumed approximately 10 minutes. In
the remaining moments of debate, Rayburn endorsed the President's
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
approach, and added his own thoughts, saying:
In the moment, let me say this: Let us not cast a vote today that will
mean rejoicing in Germany, or Italy, or Japan. Let me say that with all
my heart, this moment, that the failure to enact these amendments will
have repercussions too frightful to contemplate, and might break up the
most serious conferences that have ever been held at this moment between
the representatives of Japan and the representatives of the United
States of America. Let us show the world by our vote, at least a
majority vote, where we stand. Let me appeal to you, whether you love
one man or hate another, to stand up today for civilization as it is
typified in the United States of America.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Ibid.
As time for debate expired, the roll call began. In the end, the House
accepted the Senate amendments by a vote of 212 to 194.
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States forces in Pearl
Harbor, HI. Soon after the attack, Speaker Rayburn returned to
Washington from a personal trip to Richmond, VA, and received a message
that the President wanted to meet congressional leaders that evening. At
the conclusion of the meeting, Rayburn was asked by a reporter if
Congress would support a war declaration. Rayburn replied, ``I think
that is one thing on which there would be unity.'' \60\ The next day,
the President addressed a joint session of Congress to request a
declaration of war against Japan. Following the joint session, each
Chamber convened and passed a joint resolution declaring a state of war
between the United States and Japan. The President signed the measure
into law that afternoon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ C.P. Russell, ``Congress Decided,'' New York Times, Dec. 8, 1941,
p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his first full year as Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn worked
closely with President Franklin Roosevelt to roll back a neutral,
isolationist policy, prepare the Nation for war, and assist nations
already fighting the Axis. When the United States entered the conflict,
the Speaker and the President successfully urged the Nation to produce
the materials essential to combat the enemy, maintain morale on the home
front, and bring ``the war to its earliest possible conclusion.'' \61\
The first few months after the United States joined the conflict were
marked by extensive gains for the Axis powers. In the Pacific theater,
Japanese forces captured Guam, Wake Island, parts of the Aleutian
Islands and the Philippines. In the Atlantic, the naval forces of
Germany, which declared war on the United States 4 days after the Pearl
Harbor attack, launched effective submarine attacks on American merchant
ships. Roosevelt's 1942 Annual Message to the Congress formed the basis
of the American response. In the address, the President called for
increased production of airplanes, tanks, and merchant shipping.\62\
When the goals of Roosevelt's program were questioned in the media and
by the public, Speaker Rayburn embarked on a series of speaking
engagements around the country to defend the proposed goals.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Sam Rayburn interview with Walter C. Hornaday, Jan. 7, 1944, in
H.G. Delaney and Edward Hake Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker
(Bonham, TX: Sam Rayburn Foundation, 1978), p. 104.
\62\ Roosevelt, ``The Annual Message to the Congress, Jan. 6, 1941,'' in
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 32-42.
\63\ Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, pp. 210-211.
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In the House, Rayburn guided numerous measures to passage that
strengthened the American war effort. Measures passed included changes
in tax law that allowed war industries to write off capital expenditures
at an accelerated rate; the establishment and funding of several new
executive branch agencies that controlled the distribution of raw
materials, civilian goods production and rationing, prices, war
propaganda, and economic warfare overseas; amendment of military draft
laws to conscript 18-year-old men; and bills that prevented labor
actions in war industries. Less publicly, Rayburn, Majority Leader
McCormack, and Minority Leader Joseph Martin of Massachusetts were
briefed by Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and Dr. Vannevar Bush
about a secret plan to construct an atomic bomb. Initial efforts to fund
the program had come through illegal transfers of military
appropriations. When the administration officials tried to tell the
congressional leaders about the project, Rayburn cut them off, saying
``I don't want to know . . . because if I don't know a secret I can't
let it leak out.'' A few weeks later, Rayburn persuaded Representative
Clarence Cannon, who was chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, to
quietly insert an appropriation of $1.6 billion for the Manhattan
Project.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Ibid., pp. 211-213; quote, p. 212. See also Mooney, Roosevelt and
Rayburn, pp. 177-182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summarizing congressional action and cooperation with the President in
a speech in Texas in November 1942, Rayburn mentioned several other
actions Congress had taken in support of the President's war program,
saying:
. . . let no one tell you that the seventy-seventh Congress and the
executive branch of the government have not worked together. The
President asked for 185,000 airplanes. Congress provided the authority
and the appropriation. He asked for billions to build war plants. He got
them. He asked for amendments to the Neutrality Act for . . . lend-lease
shipments across the sea. He got them. He asked for authority to take
over Axis ships. He got it. The executive recommended a wage and price
bill and requested legislation by October 1. He got it on October 2 . .
. We have made every attempt to weld our peacetime government machinery
into a compact fist of steel.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Sam Rayburn speech to the Texas Forum of the Air, Nov. 1, 1942, in
Delaney and Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker, p. 93.
While the war effort advanced, Rayburn's efforts appear to have come
at a political price. Despite broad public support for the war, some of
the new policies adopted by Congress, such as the extension of the
Selective Service Act, and rationing measures, were not popular. Some
have argued that this public displeasure led to a loss of more than 50
Democratic seats in the House in the 1942 elections. This left the
Chamber with 222 Democrats and 209 Republicans, at the beginning of the
78th Congress in 1943.\66\ During the first few weeks of the new
session, several administration-backed measures were defeated by the
House, despite Rayburn's efforts. Over the course of the session, a
sense of national purpose appears to have overcome partisan and
factional preferences in the House, and the President's proposals
received more favorable consideration. Beyond the Chamber, Rayburn
continued to tour the country as a spokesman and partner of the
President. The Speaker began to carry out symbolic duties as well,
including dedicating hospitals, war production facilities, and receiving
honorary degrees.\67\ Despite the occasional, temporary setbacks in
Congress, FDR held Rayburn in high esteem. On the occasion of Rayburn's
second anniversary as Speaker, Roosevelt acknowledged the milestone in a
letter to Rayburn that said ``the speakership has assumed a special
importance because of the gravity of issues with which you have
continually had to deal . . . the country has need of you.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ House membership and party division is based on results reported by
the Clerk of the House, based on immediate results of elections held in
November 1942. Four vacancies were reported. U.S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Printing, 2003-2004 Official Congressional Directory, 108th
Congress, 108th Cong., 1st sess., S. Pub. 108-18 (Washington, GPO,
2003), p. 547.
\67\ C. Dwight Dorough, Mr. Sam (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 348-
357.
\68\ Franklin Delano Roosevelt letter to Sam Rayburn, Sept. 16, 1942, in
Delaney and Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker, p. 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rayburn and Roosevelt would continue to work together on war measures
and other issues until Roosevelt died in 1945. On the afternoon of April
12, 1945, Speaker Rayburn adjourned the House at 5 o'clock and was in
his private Capitol office known as the ``Board of Education,'' where he
often met with Members to discuss matters before the House. On this day,
Vice President Harry S Truman was due at the close of the day's Senate
session. Before the Vice President arrived, Rayburn received a call from
the White House; Truman was to call as soon as he arrived. When Truman
reached the Speaker's office, he called the White House and was told to
come to the executive mansion. After he left, a special radio bulletin
informed Rayburn and the Nation that President Roosevelt had died at
Warm Springs, GA, earlier that afternoon. Later that evening, Speaker
Rayburn went to the White House to see Truman take the oath of office as
President.
The only Member of Congress to hold the speakership in four different
decades, Rayburn served with, not under, Presidents Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy.
Some time after World War II ended, Rayburn reflected on his
collaboration with Roosevelt:
I would go to the White House with the other congressional leaders,
and we would talk things out frankly and openly. Sometimes we agreed,
and sometimes we disagreed, but in the end we would find more points of
agreement than disagreement. And we would get things done. We had to get
things done.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, p. 164, italics in original.
Conclusion: Toward a More Complete Understanding of Leaders
Although his focus was World War II and Franklin Roosevelt, Rayburn's
observation suggests a starting point for efforts to understand the
nature of the relationship between the Speaker and the President over
the last century. The cases of Theodore Roosevelt and Joe Cannon, and
Franklin Roosevelt and Sam Rayburn, strongly suggest that in war, peace,
periods of prosperity, or periods of national emergency, things still
need to get done, and that the Speaker and President are integral actors
in achieving those ends. The institutional environment established by
separation of powers brings together two leaders who have different, and
sometimes contentious, governing responsibilities. To some extent, the
relationship between the two sets of leaders bridged that gulf and
facilitated legislative activity. In both cases, Cannon and Rayburn
served as an intermediary between the House and the President, who is
always on the outside of the Legislature. Each Speaker reflected the
mood and will of the House, and provided advice to the Presidents on the
basis of those observations. When both Presidents followed the advice,
whether Cannon's suggestion to avoid the tariff issue in 1907, or
Rayburn's suggestion to revise a lend-lease program that was sure to be
defeated without changes in 1941, both Presidents enjoyed the benefits
of reduced conflict and the advancement of their legislative programs.
When the two Chief Executives ignored advice, or failed to seek
consultation with the Speakers, as with Theodore Roosevelt's contretemps
over the Secret Service, or the setbacks FDR's New Deal programs
suffered as a result of his failed court reorganization, each suffered
political damage.
Both cases strongly suggest that to govern, Speakers and Presidents
must surmount the challenges of divergent constitutional
responsibilities, political contexts, and personal chemistry. Without
recourse to similar studies of the relationship between other Speakers
and Presidents over the last century, however, it is unclear whether
these findings are generally applicable to the other 15 Speakers and 16
Presidents that have served during this time. The volatility of
political contexts and interpersonal relationships shown in the Cannon
and Rayburn eras, as well as Speaker O'Neill's observation that there is
much still to be learned about the Office and men who have been Speaker,
strongly suggests that further inquiry into the relationship between
other Speakers and Presidents would make a valuable contribution to
understanding American Government.